Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.765

Section 537.765(3)(3) treats the plaintiff's knowledge of a danger as a fault factor to be compared in a products liability case, so an open and obvious defect does not automatically bar recovery but may affect fault apportionment.

Ford v. GACS, Inc. · filed 2001-09-07(3)(3)

The Missouri legislature abolished contributory fault for products liability cases, replacing it with pure comparative fault. See Miller v. Varity Corp., 922 S.W.2d 821, 826 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the effect of Missouri's adoption of comparative fault on products liability claims involving open and obvious dangers). The plaintiff's knowledge of a danger is one of the enumerated items of fault to be compared in a products liability case. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.765(3)(3); see also Miller, 922 S.W.2d at 826 (holding that the open and obvious nature of a defect does not bar recovery but is appropriately considered in apportioning fault). Thus, under Missouri products liability law, the openness and obviousness of any alleged design defect in the ratchet does not preclude recovery as a matter of law.

Section 537.765(2) defines a plaintiff's fault in a strict-liability products case as knowingly and unreasonably exposing oneself to a product danger while appreciating its consequences; assumption of risk is comparative fault, not an automatic bar to recovery.

Hopfinger v. Kidder International, Inc. · filed 1993-07-09(2)

The doctrine of assumption of the risk in products liability casés is governed by statute and is incorporated into the system of comparative fault. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.765. The statute provides that the defendant shall plead and prove comparative fault as an affirmative defense. The statute defines fault for the purposes of strict liability in terms of assumption of the risk: “Use of the product with knowledge of a danger involved in such use with reasonable appreciation of the consequences and the voluntary and unreasonable exposure to said danger.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.765(2). ... Finally, the Court declines to hold, as a matter of law, that a person engaging in any recreational sport, let alone waterskiing, assumes all risks of that sport, even those risks created by an unreasonably dangerous product.

Section 537.765(3)(3) treats the plaintiff's knowledge of a danger as a fault item to be compared in a Missouri products-liability case, so an open and obvious defect does not automatically bar recovery.

Robert Ford Bobbie Sue Ford v. Gacs, Inc., Robert Ford Bobbie Sue Ford v. Gacs, Inc. General Motors Corporation · filed 2001-10-16(3)(3)

In the context of a Missouri products liability claim, however, the openness and obviousness of a defect does not automatically preclude judgment. ... The plaintiffs knowledge of a danger is one of the enumerated items of fault to be compared in a products liability case. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.765(3)(3); ... Thus, under Missouri products liability law, the openness and obviousness of any alleged design defect in the ratchet does not preclude recovery as a matter of law.

Section 537.765(2) requires the defendant to plead and prove the plaintiff’s fault as an affirmative defense; that fault reduces compensatory damages but does not bar recovery.

Pitman v. Ameristep Corp. · filed 2016-09-26(2)

Defendant must plead and prove Plaintiffs fault as an affirmative defense. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.765(2). Any fault attributable to Plaintiff reduces the amount of compensatory damages but does not bar recovery. ... Defendants’ arguments about Plaintiffs behavior fall squarely into the definition of fault as listed in the statute.

Section 537.765's comparative-fault rule for strict product liability cases became effective July 1, 1987, so it did not apply to an accident occurring before that date.

Burgess v. Suzuki Motor Co. · filed 1995-12-05

Because this accident occurred prior to the July 1, 1987, effective date of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.765, the applicable law for this issue is governed by Lippard.