Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020

A claim under § 407.020 requires enough evidence of a violation to be submitted to the jury.

Stratman v. Brockmeyer · filed 1997-10-30

We also agree that the Stratmans failed to make a submissible case that Logcrafters violated the MMPA. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 407.020, 407.025 (1994 & Supp. 1996).

Section 407.020 requires a private MMPA claim alleging fraudulent conduct to plead that conduct with particularity.

Baryo v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. · filed 2006-05-19

The private right of action created by the MMPA requires proof of, among other things, an “act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise.” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 407.020. Thus, fraudulent conduct of some sort is an element of Plaintiffs’ MMPA claims and must be pleaded with particularity.

Section 407.020’s unlawful-act element is adequately pleaded when plaintiffs identify specific deceptive product representations, explain why they are deceptive, and allege resulting harm.

Hughes v. Ester C Co. · filed 2013-03-15

Lastly, plaintiffs adequately plead an unlawful act under Section 407.020, pointing to specific language contained in defendants’ labeling, packaging, and marketing upon which plaintiffs relied in purchasing Ester-C (see id. ¶¶ 16-21), stating why such language is deceptive (see id. ¶¶ 4, 25 & n. 1, 47-48), and stating the harm suffered on account of such misrepresentations (id. ¶¶ 9-10, 29, 49).

A deceptive-practice claim under § 407.020 must allege more than a visit to the seller’s website; it must identify something the buyer encountered that was deceptive.

Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC · filed 2018-04-10

Regardless, stating that she visited the website is not sufficient to claim that she saw something that deceived her.

A claim under § 407.020 must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement in federal diversity court.

Vogt v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2022-06-29

In diversity cases like this one, MMPA claims must satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).

Section 407.020 requires a deceptive, unfair, or fraudulent practice in trade or commerce and an injury resulting from that practice.

Beeney v. FCA US, LLC · filed 2023-10-20

Although the statutes are not identical, they all require a Plaintiff to at least establish that (a) the Defendant engaged in one or more deceptive, unfair, or fraudulent practices in trade or commerce, and (b) the Plaintiff suffered an injury as a result of that deceptive, unfair, or fraudulent practice.

Section 407.020 requires specific allegations of a deceptive or unfair practice; broad allegations that a product was defective and lacked a warning do not state a claim.

Christensen v. Louisville Ladder, Inc. · filed 2024-03-28(1)

Section 407.020 bars a variety of conduct, including “any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact . . . . .” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020. ... These broad and nonspecific allegations are insufficient to state a claim under the MMPA.

Section 407.020 does not apply when the evidence shows no prohibited deception or material omission in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise.

State Ex Rel. Ashcroft v. Wahl · filed 1980-05-13

The trial court correctly concluded that respondents had not committed an act or used or employed any act of deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, nor had they concealed, suppressed, omitted any material fact with the intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression, or omission in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise as prohibited by § 407.020.

Section 407.020(1) requires a deceptive or unfair act connected with the sale or advertisement of merchandise in trade or commerce.

State v. Love · filed 2002-09-30(1)

For purposes of this litigation, to prove violation of the statute requires that the unlawful act by use of “any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact” be committed by a person in connection with “the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce.”

Section 407.020.1 does not require proof of intent to deceive or customer reliance to establish an unlawful practice.

State Ex Rel. Webster v. Areaco Investment Co. · filed 1988-09-061

What we have said disposes of defendant’s contention that absence of intent precludes a finding of unlawful practice. We also do not find that proof of reliance by customers is a necessary element of such cases.

Section 407.020.1 requires evidence tying an individual defendant to the alleged unfair merchandising practices before that person can be held liable.

State Ex Rel. Webster v. Eisenbeis · filed 1989-06-27(1)

For all the variations between promises and actuality perceived by the state, the state either has not shown any unfair merchandising practices, or, if these practices were shown, the state failed to show Eisenbeis personally engaged in these practices or must be held legally responsible for them. The Act is liberally interpreted but, even with a liberal interpretation, Eisenbeis still must be properly tied to the alleged improper acts.

Section 407.020.1 does not require a plaintiff to plead common law fraud, intent to defraud, or reliance to state a claim.

Ullrich v. Cadco, Inc. · filed 2008-01-29(1)

It was not necessary for Ullrich to allege the elements of common law fraud or that CADCO intended to defraud him by misrepresenting its qualifications to act as general contractor or that Ullrich relied on CADCO’s misrepresentations as the basis for entering into the contract in order to adequately plead his cause of action under the MMPA.

Section 407.020.1 does not require a consumer to prove reliance on the seller’s representations to bring a Missouri Merchandising Practices Act claim.

Janson v. Legalzoom.Com, Inc. · filed 2010-12-14(1)

Plaintiffs also cite Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 774 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (“[A] fraud claim requires both proof of reliance and intent to induce reliance; the MPA claim expressly does not.”). Defendant LegalZoom has not provided any contrary caselaw. Thus, Plaintiffs have met their burden of establishing that other members of the class have the same or similar grievances as the named Plaintiffs with respect to their MPA claims as well.

Section 407.020(1) does not treat the sending of unsolicited fax advertisements as a misrepresentation when the advertisements are not alleged to be false or misleading.

Missouri Ex Rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc. · filed 2002-03-13(1)

Even if § 227(b)(1)(C) was constitutional, the MPA claim against defendants would still be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The MPA prohibits the use of misrepresentation in connection with the advertisement of any merchandise. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 407.020(1). However, the Attorney General does not allege that any of the advertisements faxed by the defendants are false or misleading. ... Even if defendants' conduct in sending unsolicited fax advertisements was found to be in violation of the TCPA, the Court fails to see how this conduct is prohibited under the MPA.

Section 407.020(1) covers deceptive or unfair omissions about network security that allegedly induce a consumer to buy a product.

In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation · filed 2014-01-21(1)

Thus, because Plaintiffs have alleged that Sony’s omissions were deceptive and/or unfair because Sony misled consumers into believing that their Personal Information was secure, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a loss of money or property as a result of an act or practice declared unlawful under the MMPA.

A claim under § 407.020.1 that a health care provider deceptively failed to disclose a product risk must plausibly allege that the provider knew or should have known of the risk.

Coby v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc. · filed 2015-01-02.1

It therefore cannot be said that the petition *294plausibly alleges that this defendant knew or should have known about the risks and therefore engaged in some sort of deception or unfair practice in not communicating this risk to consumers.

Section 407.020(1) permits an unfair or deceptive fee claim to proceed at the pleading stage despite the defendant’s assertion that the fees were fully disclosed.

Byler v. Deluxe Corp. · filed 2016-08-19(1)

Although Defendant argues its fees were fully disclosed and therefore cannot form the basis of unfair or deceptive conduct, the authority relied on is inapposite. ... Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a violation of the MMPA.

Section 407.020 permits a material-omission claim when the plaintiff specifies the undisclosed severity of a defect; mentioning the defect’s existence may not disclose its effect on use.

Freeman v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2020-11-30

Finally, it is not dispositive that Toyota’s owner’s manuals contained mentions of an echo when using the Bluetooth system. Disclosure of the existence of an echo is different from disclosure of the fact that the echo is so pronounced as to make conversations impossible to maintain.

A claim based on omission of a material fact requires a purchase and an ascertainable loss caused by the omission.

Early v. Henry Thayer Company Inc. · filed 2021-07-22

To state a claim under the MMPA in Counts III and IV, Plaintiff must allege that she purchased merchandise and suffered an ascertainable loss as a result of the omission of a material fact.

Section 407.020(1) does not require an affirmative statement for a claim based on concealment, suppression, or omission of a material fact.

Tucker v. General Motors LLC · filed 2023-01-19(1)

We disagree. The plain language of the statute -- “any . . . concealment, suppression, or omission” -- dispels the notion that this unlawful practice requires an affirmative statement.

Section 407.020(1) covers deceptive product labeling; factual allegations that a product labeled “No Artificial Preservatives” contains artificial tocopherols suffice at the pleading stage.

Boone v. Pepsico, Inc. · filed 2023-01-27(1)

Under the MMPA, “[t]he act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce…is declared to be an unlawful practice.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020.1. ... Accepting these allegations as true for the purposes of the motion and viewing them in light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to assert that the Products contain artificial ingredients.

Section 407.020(1) does not treat packaging as deceptive to a reasonable consumer when accurate disclosures state the product’s net weight, number of servings, and number of pieces.

Guerrero v. PIM Brands, Inc. · filed 2024-07-09(1)

The Court concludes the Sour Jacks product here is not deceptive to a reasonable consumer in light of the accurate and express disclosures of the net weight, number of servings, and number of pieces per box.

Section 407.020(1) requires a plausible allegation that a representation or material omission would deceive a reasonable consumer; describing an opened but unused game as “new” did not meet that standard.

Odle v. GameStop Corp. d/b/a GameStop, Inc. · filed 2025-03-28(1)

For the same reasons articulated in the Court’s analysis of Odle’s ICFA claim, Pfeil fails to sufficiently allege a deceptive representation or a material omission by GameStop. Consequently, Pfeil has failed to plausibly alleged that GameStop’s conduct would deceive a reasonable consumer, and his claim is subject to dismissal.

Section 407.020 treats a seller’s false representation about a product as unlawful even when the seller states the truth elsewhere.

Merritt v. Target Corporation · filed 2025-05-23

An unambiguously false representation about a product is no less of an unlawful method, act, or practice under the MMPA simply because elsewhere the seller contradicts the representation with the truth.

Section 407.020 does not treat an uncompleted repair contract as an unlawful merchandising practice without evidence of a false promise or deception.

Kiechle v. Drago · filed 1985-07-09

In this case, there was no evidence that Drago made any false promise or practiced any deception with respect to his ability to restore plaintiff’s vehicle. Indeed, the evidence shows that he undertook to repair it, although the work was slowly done. There was no evidence of a course of conduct on Drago’s part that would amount to fraud or deception.

Selling another refiner’s gasoline while representing the station as a Kerr-McGee station was not shown to violate § 407.020.

United States v. Sharp · filed 1986-06-18

Furthermore, Kerr-McGee has not established that Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act, § 407.020 R.S.Mo., was violated by Sharp selling non-Kerr-McGee gasoline even though Sharp represented itself to be a Kerr-McGee station.

For a § 407.020 claim alleging concealment of a material fact, a petition should not be dismissed for lack of materiality unless the fact is so obviously unimportant that reasonable minds could not differ.

Packard v. KC One, Inc. · filed 1987-04-07

Materiality is a mixed question of law and fact, and a petition should not be dismissed unless the materiality is so obviously unimportant that reasonable minds could not differ.

Section 407.020(1) prohibits a seller from falsely representing that a vehicle passed a state safety inspection and that the seller has its inspection certificate.

Viene v. Concours Auto Sales, Inc. · filed 1990-03-13(1)

In addition, appellant has violated § 407.020 RSMo 1986. The appellant misrepresented to respondent that the car had passed the Missouri state inspection and that appellant had possession of the certificate of inspection which would be given to respondent if and when the car was purchased. Appellant made this representation despite the fact that appellant did not actually have a current certificate of inspection and approval and that appellant knew that the vehicle would not pass the state inspection unless further repairs were made to the vehicle.

Section 407.020 does not impose liability for an inartfully worded statement that was not a misrepresentation.

Baker Team Properties, LLC v. Matt Wenta · filed 2020-10-20

While Baker’s statement to Wenta that he “signed a different one” may have been inartfully worded, it was not a misrepresentation. Despite DocuSign’s “void” email, Wenta’s signed renewal was still in existence, and Baker communicated that fact to Wenta the next day by sending him a picture of a paper copy of his signed renewal and assuring him that his renewal was “fine.” The court’s judgment denying Wenta’s MMPA claim based upon an alleged misrepresentation was not against the weight of the evidence.

Under the 1986 version of § 407.020.1, deception requires a recipient to act in reliance on the solicitation; a mere capacity to deceive is insufficient.

State Ex Rel. Nixon v. Telco Directory Publishing · filed 1993-09-28(1)

Given this legislative history, we conclude that at the time of Wilcox’ acts the common law meaning of “deception” limited the reach of Section 407.020.1 to cases of actual deception. As a species of fraud deception is present only where the recipient of a solicitation is deceived, i.e., acts in reliance on the statement the State claims is deceptive.

Section 407.020 prohibits concealing, suppressing, or omitting a material fact in a real estate sale.

Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A. · filed 2007-05-01(1)

Section 407.020 bars a variety of conduct, including concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact in connection with the sale of merchandise, which includes real estate.

Section 407.020.1 covers deceptive practices in a merchandise lease, including conduct that makes an optional damage waiver appear mandatory.

Chochorowski v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2009-09-22(1)

To satisfy this element, plaintiff was required to allege facts establishing that defendant used or employed a deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice, concealment, suppression, or omission in connection with the lease of the power tiller.

A dealer’s failure to deliver vehicle title does not support a claim under Section 407.020.1 when the dealer made no false representation about delivering it.

Bolt v. Giordano · filed 2010-04-20(1)

Bolt does not allege Dealer made any false representations with respect to the delivery of title, just that he failed to do so. As such, her claim for damages pursuant to the MMPA regarding a violation of Section 301.210.4 fails.

Section 407.020(1) does not make vague claims of product superiority actionable when they cannot be measured or proved false.

Hurst v. Nissan North America, Inc. · filed 2016-03-22(1)

The exaggerations, sales propaganda, and expressions of opinions in this case are not statements "not in accord with the facts" and are not statements that create a false impression because there is no way that such statements are measurable or are capable of being proved false.

Section 407.020.1 does not prohibit a clear display of the full gasoline price and a discount available with a Walmart gift card.

Taylor v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. · filed 2020-01-23(1)

There is nothing false, misleading, or deceptive about Murphy Oil’s offer of a three-cent per-gallon discount or its explanation to the consumer of how to obtain the discount.

Section 407.020 permits a claim based on specific false representations about a camper’s posted and dry weights.

Drew v. Lance Camper MFG. CORP. · filed 2021-11-19(1)

The Court finds Plaintiff plausibly states a claim for relief under the MMPA and for negligent misrepresentation based on Defendant’s representations as to the weights of the camper compared to the actual weights of the camper.

Section 407.020.1 covers an allegedly misleading lifetime replacement promise when the replacement offered carries only a short warranty.

Slaughter v. Bass Pro, Inc. · filed 2023-01-03(1)

The MMPA prohibits as “an unlawful practice” “any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the concealment, suppression, or omission or any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce.” § 407.020.1, RSMo. ... Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants’ replacement of the Socks under the lifetime warranty with 60-Day Socks is inconsistent with the Socks’ lifetime warranty as it was represented. ... Accordingly, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads a violation of the MMPA.

Statements about an educational program’s accreditation can be factual misrepresentations under § 407.020(1) when their meaning and truth are disputed.

Rhoads v. Webster University · filed 2025-09-22(1)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that a reasonable juror could understand statements (c) through (f) as factual claims about contemporaneous states of affairs. Whether those statements were made; what their implications were in context; and their veracity are all disputed questions of material fact for a jury to decide.

Section 407.020.1 can cover factual misrepresentations about a program’s accreditation status made in connection with its sale.

Gaarder v. Webster University · filed 2025-09-22(1)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that a reasonable juror could understand statements (c) through (f) as factual claims about contemporaneous states of affairs. Whether those statements were made; what their implications were in context; and their veracity are all disputed questions of material fact for a jury to decide.

Section 407.020 does not cover an alleged unfair practice in a transaction between other parties when it was not connected to a sale or advertisement to the claimant.

Williams v. Regency Financial · filed 2002-11-01

Regency’s alleged violations of the U.C.C. and the title statute occurred in its transaction with FPI, not in conjunction with a sale or advertisement to Williams. We have found no Missouri cases, nor have the parties cited any, in which one who is not a direct party to the “sale or advertisement” in which the “unfair practice” or otherwise violative conduct occurs has been held to have a cause of action under the MPA. We do not believe that the Missouri legislature intended to include Regency’s transaction with FPI as conduct that could be remedied by the MPA. Accordingly, the MPA does not provide Williams a means by which to redress Regency’s disposition of her collateral to FPI.

Section 407.020 does not provide a remedy for an unfair practice in a transaction with another party that was not connected to a sale or advertisement to the claimant.

Byther Mae Williams Richard v. Fink v. Regency Financial Corp. · filed 2002-12-18

Regency’s alleged violations of the U.C.C. and the title statute occurred in its transaction with FPI, not in conjunction with a sale or advertisement to Williams. We have found no Missouri cases, nor have the parties cited any, in which one who is not a direct party to the “sale or advertisement” in which the “unfair practice” or otherwise violative conduct occurs has been held to have a cause of action under the MPA. We do not believe that the Missouri legislature intended to include Regency’s transaction with FPI as conduct that could be remedied by the MPA. Accordingly, the MPA does not provide Williams a means by which to redress Regency’s disposition of her collateral to FPI.

Section 407.020(1) covers alleged deception during an arrangement to reinstate and collect an original loan.

White v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2017-06-16(1)

Because the purported “reinstatement” arrangement was part of CitiMortgage’s efforts to enforce and collect on the original, unmodified loan, we conclude White’s allegations are covered by the MMPA, at least in this respect.

Section 407.020(1) covers misleading conduct during an arrangement to reinstate and collect an original loan.

White v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2017-07-26(1)

... was part of CitiMortgage’s efforts to enforce and collect on the original, unmodified loan, we conclude White’s allegations are covered by the MMPA, at least in this respect.

Section 407.020.1 does not cover property preservation services performed by a third party when those services were not sold to or purchased by the borrower in connection with the mortgage.

McDonnell v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2017-12-28(1)

It provides property preservation services, and property preservation services are not a service that was sold to, or purchased by, Ms. McDonnell in connection with her mortgage.

Section 407.020.1 does not cover property preservation services that were not sold to or purchased by the borrower in connection with the mortgage.

McDonnell v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2018-05-22(1)

It provides property preservation services, and property preservation services are not a service that was sold to, or purchased by, Ms. McDonnell in connection with her mortgage.

Section 407.020.1 covers deceptive practices related to a sale, whether they occur before, during, or after it.

Searcy v. Gilead Sciences Inc · filed 2021-09-28(1)

“In connection with,” means the use of deceptive practices enumerated in the statute are actionable if there is a relationship between the sale of merchandise and the alleged unlawful action, which may occur at any time before, during or after the sale.

Allegations that mortgage servicers used delays to lure borrowers into an unwanted forbearance that caused harm can support a § 407.020 claim at initial review.

Patterson v. Bank of America N.A. · filed 2023-05-19(1)

Here, plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts against Rushmore and BOA under the MMPA to survive initial review. They have asserted that both defendants used “various tactics, including consistent delays, to lure [them] into a forbearance.” According to plaintiffs, they did not need or want this forbearance, but were convinced to enter into it, causing them harm.

Section 407.020 does not cover a loan servicer’s modification of a repayment schedule as conduct connected with the original loan sale when modification was not among the services agreed to in that loan.

Geran v. Xerox Education Services, Inc. · filed 2015-05-19

Modification of the repayment schedule was not included in the bundle of services of the 2005 loan. As such, ACS was not enforcing the terms of that loan in modifying the repayment schedule and thus ACS’s actions surrounding the modification of the repayment schedule were not “in connection with” the consolidated loan.

Section 407.020 permits claims based on odometer misrepresentations despite the specific motor vehicle odometer statutes, whose remedies became cumulative on January 1, 1984.

State Ex Rel. Webster v. Myers · filed 1989-10-31

The first issue addressed herein is whether the State’s action filed pursuant to § 407.100 for violations of § 407.020, was preempted by §§ 407.511 through 407.556. ... Therefore, an action for injunctive relief and restitution under the general provisions of § 407.100 of the Merchandising Practices Act has not been preempted by the provisions of §§ 407.511 through 407.556 since January 1, 1984.

Section 407.020.1 does not cover negotiations to modify a loan when the original loan did not require renegotiation, because those negotiations are not in connection with the original sale.

Watson v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2014-08-19(1)

In engaging in loan modification negotiations, Wells Fargo was not enforcing the terms of the loan but rather contemplating creating a new agreement. Its actions were not “in connection with” the sale of the original loan.

Section 407.020 covers a third-party debt collector’s conduct when the collection activities are connected to the original sale; the collector need not have a lender-borrower relationship with the buyer.

Jackson v. Barton · filed 2018-04-17(1)

First, while both Conway and Watson involved a lender-borrower relationship, nothing in this Court's analysis suggests such a relationship is required to find a third-party debt collector's actions were "in connection with" a sale.

Section 407.020’s prohibition on unfair practices can cover a conspiracy to keep Canadian vehicles out of the United States.

In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation · filed 2004-12-08(1)

I conclude that the alleged conspiracy could qualify as an “unfair practice” in violation of the MMPA under the Missouri regulation.

Section 407.020(1) broadly prohibits deception, misrepresentation, and unfair practices connected with the sale or advertisement of merchandise, and is substantially similar to other broad unfair or deceptive practices statutes.

In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation · filed 2008-09-26(1)

Although some other statutes are not clones, the Court also includes in this group the statutes that are substantially similar. See Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code § 17200 (“As used in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising”); and Mo.Rev.Stat. § 407.020(1) (“The act, use or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice ... in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise in trade or commerce ... is declared to be an unlawful practice.”).

Section 407.020 prohibits unfair business practices independently of fraud, deception, or misrepresentation.

Cottrell v. Alcon Laboratories · filed 2017-10-18

This reasoning fails to recognize a category of business practices entirely separate from practices that are fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading – “unfair” business practices – prohibited under the state consumer protection statutes invoked.

Section 407.020 does not treat failure to disclose a loan’s securitization as inherently unfair.

Estate of Marvin Byas v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage · filed 2020-12-09

Securitization is not illegal and failure to disclose that a loan is securitized is not per se unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous.

Section 407.020 does not cover faxing conduct merely because it allegedly violates the TCPA when the conduct is not tainted by conventional unfair practices or consumer fraud.

Missouri Ex Rel. Nixon v. Progressive Business Publications, Inc. · filed 2007-02-26

In sum, plaintiffs attempt to couch its TCPA claims within the MPA is improper, as the activities targeted by plaintiff are not the sort of actions that are tainted by conventional unfair practices or consumer fraud. Thus, these actions are not covered by the MPA.

Section 407.020 permits an unfair practice claim based on improper fee calculations independently of a misrepresentation or omission; the customer need not have read the fee descriptions to pursue that claim.

Cooks v. The Hertz Corporation · filed 2019-08-22(1)

As pleaded, the alleged unfair practices are independent acts that a jury could find to be unlawful under the MMPA. ... Furthermore, because Bradley’s unfair practices claims are independent of her misrepresentation and omission claims, her failure to review the fee descriptions on Hertz’s website is inconsequential here.

Section 407.020 does not prohibit a shop supply fee as unfair or deceptive when undisputed evidence shows that the fee covers costs for a variety of shop supplies.

Toben v. Bridgestone Retail Operations · filed 2014-05-13(1)

However, the undisputed evidence shows that the fee covers costs for a variety of shop supplies. The fee, therefore, is not an unfair or deceptive practice under the MMPA.

Section 407.020.1 does not prohibit charging different prices for antiperspirants marketed to men and women without facts showing deception or an unfair practice.

Schulte v. Conopco, Inc. · filed 2020-07-17(1)

Schulte’s complaint fails to allege any facts that support a claim the sales of the Dove antiperspirants at issue were extrinsically discriminatorily deceptive or unfair.

Misrepresentations and unfair practices in garnishment filings and a collection call can qualify as unlawful practices under § 407.020.

Stone v. J&M Securities, LLC · filed 2020-10-06

Plaintiffs have plausibly pled misrepresentation and unfair practices related to the inconsistent garnishment filings and phone call.

Section 407.020 does not prohibit different prices for distinct products marketed to women and men when the difference reflects product preferences rather than the purchaser’s gender.

Schulte v. Conopco, Inc. · filed 2021-05-18

Because preference-based pricing is not necessarily an unfair practice, the MMPA does not prohibit the defendants’ pricing here.

Section 407.020 cannot support a gasoline octane disclosure claim that the federal PMPA and fuel rating regulations expressly preempt.

Johnson v. MFA Petroleum Co. · filed 2014-03-28(1)

After carefully reviewing Plaintiffs complaint as a whole, the Court holds that the PMPA and AFR regulations expressly preempt Plaintiffs MMPA claim.

Section 407.020.2(2) exempts a Missouri Division of Finance licensee from section 407.020.1, so its conduct cannot support an MMPA claim under that provision.

Garland v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC · filed 2020-04-23(2)(2)

Because Nationstar is a licensee of the Missouri Division of Finance, it is exempt from section 407.020.1 of the MMPA pursuant to section 407.020.2(2), and Plaintiff’s MMPA claim against Nationstar will be dismissed.

Compliance with FDA labeling requirements does not by itself foreclose liability under § 407.020 for misleading food advertising.

Sally v. Panera Bread Company · filed 2021-08-03

Ultimately, Panera could be in compliance with the FDA’s labeling requirements and still be liable to Plaintiff for violating the MMPA based on Plaintiff’s allegations surrounding the clean campaign.

Section 407.020 exempts entities regulated by the director of the department of commerce and insurance from its prohibitions and related private claims.

Vogt v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company · filed 2022-09-082(2)

But section 407.020 expressly exempts from its reach—and the statute therefore does not grant any private right of action for—claims against entities regulated by the department of commerce and insurance.

Section 407.020 imposes a duty against unfair merchandising practices independent of a patient’s ERISA plan.

Dames v. Mercy Health · filed 2023-09-30

Whether Defendants violated the MMPA by an unfair practice or breach of duty of good faith does not depend on Plaintiff Davis’s ERISA Plan. The statute imposes the duty, not the terms of an ERISA plan.

Section 407.020 does not itself provide a private right to relief; the private claim arises under § 407.025.

Lauria v. Wright · filed 1991-03-12

Although we agree with defendants that § 407.020 does not provide a private right to relief, we agree with plaintiff that Count II was brought under § 407.025.

Section 407.020.2(2) exempts entities licensed by the Missouri Division of Finance from the MMPA unless the director authorizes enforcement or a statute provides an enforcement right.

Reitz v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC. · filed 2013-06-27(2)(2)

Given that this Court has found that HAMP does not provide a private cause of action, and plaintiff has failed to cite any Missouri statute that would provide her a cause of action independent of the MMPA, the Court finds that defendant is exempt from the application of the MMPA.

Section 407.020.2(2) exempts a company subject to licensing or regulation by the Missouri Division of Finance from MMPA claims.

Wright v. Oasis Legal Finance Operating Company, LLC · filed 2020-03-24(2)(2)

Oasis’ loan agreements are clearly exempt from the provisions of the MMPA.

Section 407.020 does not require a consumer to rely on the allegedly unlawful practice to pursue an MMPA claim.

Johnson v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc. · filed 2018-07-12

Nothing in Sections 407.020 or 407.025 indicate that a consumer must rely on the allegedly unlawful practice to pursue a claim.

Section 407.020 uses a reasonable consumer standard to determine whether slack-fill packaging is unlawful; whether the practice injured a purchaser is a separate inquiry.

White v. Just Born, Inc. · filed 2018-08-07

However, while that standard applies to the determination of whether the slack-fill violates the MMPA, it does not apply to the determination of whether any unlawful slack-fill injured each plaintiff.

Section 407.020(1) does not require a plaintiff to prove reliance on a forbidden misrepresentation.

Tershakovec v. Ford Motor Company, Inc. · filed 2023-07-07(1)

As Ford has acknowledged, the MMPA does not by its terms require a plaintiff to prove that he or she relied on for- bidden misrepresentations.

Section 407.020 covers the purchase of savings account services as merchandise under the MMPA.

Savett v. Capital One N.A. and Capital One Financial Corp. · filed 2024-11-12

Thus, the opening of Plaintiffs’ 360 Savings accounts qualifies as “merchandise” to trigger the MMPA’s protections.

Section 407.020’s criminal prohibition applies to sales between businesses and does not require the buyer to be an end consumer or the transaction to be public.

State v. Simmons · filed 2008-12-16(3)

The text of sections 407.010 and 407.020 does not define or include the terms “consumer” or “end consumer” or distinguish between “private” and “public” transactions. ... The absence of similar language in the MMPA’s criminal provision indicates that the legislature did not intend to limit the statute’s protection to only those who purchased merchandise primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

Section 407.020 treats medical goods and services as merchandise covered by the MMPA.

Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. State of Missouri ex rel. Attorney General Andrew Bailey · filed 2025-04-15(1)

The circuit court correctly concluded that medical goods and services are “merchandise” for the purposes of the MMPA.

Section 407.020.1 covers unfair practices connected with medical services, even when those practices overlap with medical malpractice concerns.

Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region & Southwest Missouri, Respondent/Cross-Appellant v. Andrew Bailey, Attorney General, State of Missouri, Appellant/Cross-Respondent. · filed 2025-05-06(1)

To the contrary, allegations of unfair practices in connection with the provision of medical services fall under the broad ambit of the MMPA. See § 407.020.1.

Section 407.020(3) requires a person charged with a criminal unfair practice to have acted willfully and knowingly with specific intent to defraud, which gives sufficient notice of the prohibited conduct.

State v. Shaw · filed 1993-02-23(3)

We hold, therefore, that the scienter element of Section 407.020 sufficiently cures any uncertainty as to the meaning of the phrase “unfair practices” as used in that statute. A defendant cannot be found guilty unless the fact finder determines that he willfully and knowingly engaged in conduct that is unfair and that he did so with the specific intent to defraud his victim by means of the unfair practice.

Section 407.020 requires proof that the accused knowingly and willfully engaged in an unlawful practice with specific intent to defraud the victim.

State v. Morin · filed 1994-03-30

An accused cannot be found guilty unless the fact finder determines that he willfully and knowingly engaged in an unlawful practice and did so with the specific intent to defraud his victim by means of the unlawful practice.

A felony conviction under section 407.020.3 requires proof of intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt; failure to complete promised services and subsequent unresponsiveness alone do not establish that intent.

State v. Hogan · filed 2009-09-08(3)

But the State presented no evidence to the jury beyond Hogan’s failure to fully perform his promise and his unresponsiveness with regard to that failure. And we note that the State’s evidence included Hogan’s partial performance of an assigned repair by working at Jones’s home for seven nonconsecutive days. Therefore, the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence for the jury to find Hogan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of acting with intent to defraud.

Amendments to § 407.020 concerning long-term care facilities violate Missouri’s single subject rule when enacted in a bill whose stated subject is the department of social services.

Missouri Health Care Ass'n v. Attorney General · filed 1997-09-30

The amendments to section 407.020 contained within CCSHB 409 do not fairly relate to, have a natural connection with, or accomplish the work of the department of social services. ... Consequently, the amendments to section 407.020 contained within CCSHB 409 fall outside of the subject “the department of social services.”

Section 407.020 covers unfair practices occurring after the prohibition was added in 1985, even if they preceded the regulation defining the term.

State v. Polley · filed 1999-10-05(1)

The fact that the CSR interpretative definition of “unfair practice” did not become effective until after Mr. Polley had contracted with consumers Braverman, Bass, and Pierron does not make section 407.020 inapplicable to Mr.Polley’s pre-CSR actions.