Minn. Stat. § 645.17

Section 645.17, subdivision 3, directs courts to construe statutes to avoid constitutional conflict when possible.

Matter of Harhut · filed 1986-04-11(3)

Again, we employ the principle that this court must construe a statute in such a way as to avoid constitutional conflict. Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. 3. Therefore, the burden of proof in a section 253B.17 hearing is on the state.

Section 645.17 favors an interpretation that preserves a statute’s constitutionality when its language and legislative intent permit that reading.

State v. Christensen · filed 1989-05-09

However, when the statutes are read together, as they are intended to be, the law is “susceptible of an interpretation which supports its constitutionality, [therefore this] court must accord the law such meaning.”

When a statutory classification is ambiguous, § 645.17(3) presumes the legislature did not intend an unconstitutional interpretation.

Minnegasco, Inc. v. County of Carver · filed 1989-11-17(3)

When, as here, there is ambiguity in the contours of the statutory classification, it is to be presumed that the legislature did not intend an interpretation that would be unconstitutional. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (1988). Our interpretation of the statutes avoids violation of the uniformity and equal protection clauses.

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to violate the federal or state constitution, favoring a statutory reading that avoids constitutional problems.

State v. Carpenter · filed 1990-01-12(3)

We cannot conclude that the statute’s silence regarding impeachment combined with its superseding of the rule precludes the admission and use of evidence as described in the comment to rule 404(c). To do so would be to read into the statute the same constitutional problems that Cas-well eliminated in the rule. Such a reading of the statute would be contrary to both ... amendments designed to make the statute consistent with the rule, and the presumption that “[t]he legislature does not intend to violate the constitution of the United States or of this state.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (1988).

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature intends statutes to comply with the Constitution and guides courts to adopt a constitutional interpretation when one is available.

State v. Crims · filed 1995-11-28(3)

We are constrained to interpret statutes as constitutional in purpose and effect unless a party proves otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. ... Following these principles, we conclude the rape shield statute serves to emphasize the general irrelevance of a victim’s sexual history, not to remove relevant evidence from the jury’s consideration.

Section 645.17(3) presumes the legislature did not intend to violate the constitution and supports a construction that avoids a constitutional violation.

Humenansky v. Minnesota Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1994-12-20(3)

We construe this provision to mean that the statute allows a mental examination only if such an examination is the least intrusive means of determining a physician’s mental condition. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (courts presume the legislature does not intend to violate the constitutions of the United States or of this state).

Section 645.17 directs courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce absurd results or undermine constitutionality.

In Re Conservatorship of Riebel · filed 2001-05-01(1), (3)

We will not construe a statute in a way that creates such an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000). More importantly, even if intended by the legislature, such a construction of the statute would undermine this court’s exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law and would violate the doctrine of separation of powers. We are constrained to interpret statutes to preserve their constitutionality. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (2000).

Section 645.17(3) directs courts to presume the legislature did not intend to violate the federal or state constitution when choosing between possible readings of a statute.

State v. Myrland · filed 2002-06-04(3)

Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (2000) (“The legislature does not intend to violate the constitution of the United States or of this state”). In this case, the possible interpretations are either that it imposes a burden of persuasion with respect to an element of the crime, which is unconstitutional, or it imposes a burden of production, which is constitutional. Given this choice, we must adopt the constitutional interpretation and find that the defense imposes merely the lesser burden of production.

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to violate the federal or state constitution, so an inspection statute is construed to require a warrant or probable cause.

State v. Colosimo · filed 2002-07-23(3)

Although the narrow words of Minn.Stat. § 97A.251, subd. 1(3), could be read to do just that, when we construe that section to be consistent with the constitution, we conclude that it implies a predicate that the officer requesting inspection has either a search warrant or probable cause to support the request. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (1998) (providing the presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate the constitution of the United States or of this state).

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to violate the federal or Minnesota Constitution, so constitutional limits must be read into statutory inspection authority.

State v. Larsen · filed 2002-08-29(3)

The occupant of a fish house is entitled to the protections against unreasonable search and seizure afforded by our federal and state constitutions, and while we do not hold that Minn.Stat. § 97A.215, subd. 3 is unconstitutional, we do hold that these constitutional protections must be read into the “at reasonable times” language of subdivision 3. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (2000) (providing the presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate the constitution of the United States or Minnesota Constitution).

Section 645.17(3) guides courts to adopt a construction that preserves a statute’s constitutionality when the language permits it.

Hutchinson Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · filed 2005-06-09(3)

Where possible, this court should interpret a statute to preserve its constitutionality.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature did not intend a statute to violate the United States Constitution, favoring a construction that avoids constitutional conflict when the statute is ambiguous.

Mayo Collaborative Services, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · filed 2005-07-29

First, we are to presume that the legislature did not intend for the statute to violate the United States Constitution. Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2004). Accordingly, “[w]here a[tax] statute is ambiguous, the construction that will avoid constitutional conflict is to be preferred, even though it is less natural.”

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to violate the constitution and directs courts to construe ambiguous language to avoid constitutional conflict.

State v. Mauer · filed 2007-11-15(3)

Importantly, the rules also provide the presumption that “[t]he legislature does not intend to violate the constitution of the United States or of this state.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (2006). Resorting to that presumption, we are bound to adopt an interpretation of “reason to know” that would avoid a constitutional conflict.

Section 645.17(3) permits courts to presume that the legislature does not intend to violate the federal or state constitution when interpreting a statute.

Riley v. Jankowski · filed 2006-04-26(3)

And in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, we may presume that “the legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this state.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(3) (2004). Therefore, the legislature could not have intended the proceeding in the OAH to be a criminal prosecution because a criminal prosecution would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the legislature explicitly required other standards of proof.

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to violate the constitution and guides courts to read statutes consistently with constitutional requirements.

State v. Shriner · filed 2007-10-02(3)

But we assume that the legislature does not intend to violate the constitution. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (2006). We therefore note that Minn.Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 1, does not refer to search warrants. We construe the subsection as not dispensing with the warrant requirement when a warrant can be obtained and is otherwise required by the constitution. Likewise, we consider the exigent-circumstances requirement as a part of the statute.

Section 645.17(3)’s presumption against unconstitutional legislative intent cannot override clear, unambiguous statutory language.

Drake Snell v. Tim Walz, Governor of Minnesota, in his official capacity, ... · filed 2024-05-10(3)

Alternatively, Snell contends that requiring anything short of an evidentiary showing would give the Governor “unbridled discretion” (in violation of the nondelegation doctrine) and contravene the interpretive mandates of Minn. Stat. § 645.17(3) (2022) (“the legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this state”) and Minn. Stat. § 645.16(6) (the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering “the consequences of a particular interpretation”). But these interpretive directives referenced by Snell are canons of construction, which, generally, are “not available to override the plain language of a clear and unambiguous statute.” ... Because the statutory language is unambiguous, the interpretive methods raised by Snell are not available here.

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature intends statutes to comply with the Constitution.

Kittson County v. Wells, Denbrook & Associates, Inc. · filed 1976-04-23(3)

The scope of the statute as a whole should therefore be construed narrowly so as to avoid constitutional questions. Minn. St. 645.17(3); Head v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 288 Minn. 496, 182 N. W. 2d 887 (1970), certiorari denied sub nom., Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local No. 59 v. Spannaus, 404 U. S. 886, 92 S. Ct. 196, 30 L. ed. 2d 168 (1971).