Statute Annotations › Minnesota › Minn. Stat. § 541.05

Minn. Stat. § 541.05

Various limitations: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Minnesota
Case notes
294
Cited in passing
151
Citing cases indexed
183
Case dates
1942–2026
Screened through
2026-05-14
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-01
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

445 citing cases reviewed: 294 interpreted the section (annotated below), 151 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-14 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Minn. Stat. § 541.05?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1982-03-23 1982 Minn. Laws ch. 528, §§ 8–9 imposed a two-year period for dram shop actions arising from that date, ending the temporary application of § 541.05's six-year period to those claims; the limit was recodified at § 340A.802, subd. 2. Source
  • 1989-03-14 Berg v. Groschen, applying Owens v. Okure, selected § 541.05, subd. 1(5)'s six-year residual period for all Minnesota § 1983 claims, displacing Cook's two-year intentional-tort period. Source
  • 2000-08-01 2000 Minnesota Laws ch. 471, §§ 1–2, added a six-year period for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and other personal-injury torts when the conduct also constitutes domestic abuse; it applies to causes arising on or after that date. Source
  • 2016-01-01 2015 Minnesota Laws ch. 5, art. 15, § 18, removed trust enforcement from § 541.05, subd. 1(7), and renumbered the following clauses; new § 501C.1005 supplies the limitations periods for beneficiary proceedings against trustees. Source

Six-year limitation for statutory liabilities

A six-year limitations period applies to actions based on liabilities created by statute.

Leisure Dynamics, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. · filed 1980-07-03Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2)

In answer to question 1 then, the 6-year statute of Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) (1978), applies to the seller’s cause of action under Minn.Stat. § 297A.03, subd. 1 (1978).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A six-year limitations period applies to an arbitration claim only after a demand for arbitration is made and refused.

Spira v. American Standard Insurance Co. · filed 1985-01-29Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1)

An “action”, as defined in the 6-year statute of limitations, is confined to judicial proceedings. ... In arbitration proceedings, the 6-year limitations statute does not begin to run until there has been both a demand and a refusal to arbitrate.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05(2) imposes a six-year limit on an action to recover pension payments owed under statute.

Bond v. Johnson · filed 1965-01-22(2)

In the instant case it is clear that plaintiff did not commence his action within the statutory time allowance. He waited over 30 years after defendants first suspended his payments and over 18 years since he ceased all teaching before bringing this action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Contract actions—six-year limitation

Section 541.05(1) gives an obligee six years to sue on a surety bond when no other limitation applies.

Hayle Floor Covering, Inc. v. First Minnesota Construction Co. · filed 1977-04-22(1)

The general limitation statute, Minn.St. 541.05, ... therefore applies to the bond as a ... contract between Metram and Capitol; Me-tram’s suit was filed well within the 6-year limit of this provision.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year period in subdivision 1(5) yields when the Uniform Commercial Code prescribes a different limitation period.

Mader v. American Motors Corp. · filed 1985-06-21Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

Thus, under the explicit terms of Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5), the four-year UCC limitation period takes precedence over the six-year negligence limitation period.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A six-year limitations period applies to an action for breach of contract.

Carney v. Central Life Assurance Co. · filed 1985-04-16subd. 1(1)

Carney’s legal right, upon the offer of the lump sum payment, was to sue Central for breach of contract, and he had six years to bring the suit. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1982).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A contract action is subject to a six-year limitations period, but the period cannot begin before the action is legally available under the contract’s proof-of-loss requirement.

Ryan v. ITT Life Insurance Corp. · filed 1989-02-07(1)

Minn.Stat. § 541.05(1) (1986) provides that legal actions shall be commenced within six years. ... Since no legal action can be commenced until sixty days after a written proof of loss has been furnished, and since no proof of loss was furnished to ITT, the six-year statute of limitations cannot begin to run until such time.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A six-year limitations period applies when a contractual one-year period is unreasonably short and the policy must conform to state law.

Henning Nelson Construction Co. v. Fireman's Fund American Life Insurance Co. · filed 1986-03-21subd. 1(1)

We hold, therefore, that the 1-year limitation on actions found in the Builder’s Risk policy was unreasonably short. Under the provisions of the policy requiring it to conform to state law, the policy is hereby amended to include the 6-year statute of limitations found in section 541.05, subd. 1(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

When the UCC supplies no specific limitations period, a breach-of-warranty action treated as an implied contract action is governed by § 541.05.

E.S.P., Inc. v. Midway National Bank of St. Paul · filed 1989-04-24Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1)

Midway’s cause of action arises as a breach of warranty under the U.C.C. and is in the nature of an implied contract action. Accordingly, since Midway paid the check on February 6, 1981, under Minn.Stat. § 541.05, it had until February 6, 1987 to bring suit against First Bank.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period for a contract-based UIM action without a Sargent-type contractual accrual clause begins on the date of the motor vehicle accident.

Cattnach v. State Farm Insurance Co. · filed 1998-04-14subd. 1(1)

We therefore conclude that the six-year limitations period for pursuing a UIM action on the policy here (which had no Sargent-type language) accrued on the date of the accident that provided the condition precedent for the UIM claim asserted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05 does not apply to a statutory-notice cancellation of a contract for deed because the chapter's statutes of limitations apply only to actions.

Lambert v. Bongard · filed 2002-07-23§ 541.05 (no subdivision specified)

A statutory cancellation of a contract for deed is not an action. Thus, the plain language of chapter 541 makes the statutes of limitation in that chapter inapplicable to a proceeding by statutory notice.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period for contract, fiduciary-duty, and statutory claims accrues no later than when required payments contradict the alleged promise.

Parkhill v. MN Mutual Life Ins. · filed 2002-04-18Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1

Parkhill's breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and statutory claims are governed by section 541.05's six-year limitations period. ... the latest time that any of the claims could have accrued was the point at which Minnesota Mutual required Parkhill to make out-of-pocket payments that were inconsistent with Russo's alleged representations regarding the policy.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's statute of limitations allows six years for contract actions.

Land O' Lakes, Inc. v. Employers Insurance Company of Wausau · filed 2013-08-29subd. 1(1)

We, therefore, hold that Land O' Lakes's 2009 duty-to-defend claims were barred by the Minnesota statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year contract limitations period applies to UM claims and begins when the claim accrues, which for excess UM benefits is the accident date.

Jamy Hegseth f/k/a Jamy Jager v. American Family Mutual Insurance Group · filed 2016-03-23subd. 1(1)

It is well settled that UM claims are subject to the 6-year statute of limitations governing contracts, and that the limitations period begins to run when the claim accrues. ... Because the statute of limitations is 6 years under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), claimants have significant time to resolve both primary and excess claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period in subdivision 1 does not apply to equitable claims seeking to collect an already-obtained judgment; those claims are governed by Minn. Stat. § 541.04’s ten-year period.

Drewitz v. Motorwerks, Inc. · filed 2015-06-22subd. 1

The applicable statute of limitations for such claims is not the six-year period found in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1, but rather the ten-year period for actions upon judgments under Minn. Stat. § 541.04 (2014).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), (6), the six-year limitations period for breach-of-warranty claims begins when the covenant is breached, while the period for fraud or misrepresentation begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud.

Case name unavailable · filed 2015-11-30Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), (6)

"The six-year statute of limitations began to run on Isanti Pines’s breach of warranty claims in October of 1998." ... "The statute of limitations on a fraud or misrepresentation action begins to run when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud."
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The statute gives breach-of-contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Riddle v. Geckobyte.com, Inc. · filed 2018-06-22subd. 1(1)

Rather, Minnesota’s six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract applies. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), provides a general six-year statute of limitations for contract actions.

Harmony East Condominium Association v. Falls Lake Fire and Casualty Company · filed 2024-12-19§ 541.05, subd. 1(1)

Minnesota has a general six-year statute of limitations for all contract actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims, subject to potential equitable tolling.

Jaunich v. State Farm Life Insurance Company · filed 2022-06-28subd. 1(1)

Jaunich seeks to toll the otherwise-applicable six-year limitations period for his breach-of-contract claims. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(1) imposes a six-year limitation period for contract suits, running as to each amount due under an installment obligation.

First Construction Co. v. Tri-South Mortgage Investors · filed 1981-07-10(1)

The original promissory note was to be partially amortized in equal payments from January 1, 1977, to November 1, 1983, with the balance payable on November 30, 1983. Thus the six-year limitation on contract suits will have run, as to each amount due, after November 30, 1989. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1980). ... The bond should be reformed to provide that the time of indemnification security is extended to November 30, 1989, in order to cover the six-year limitation on contract suits.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(1) imposes a six-year limitations period on contract actions, running separately from the due date of each installment.

Honn v. National Computer Systems, Inc. · filed 1981-10-161(1)

Applying the 6-year statute of limitations and the rule that each installment payment carries its own statute of limitations, we hold that respondent’s claim for the monthly payments which fell due through July 25, 1973, is barred by Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1980). We further hold that respondent’s claim for the payments due after July 25, 1973, is timely and should be allowed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), gives breach-of-contract actions a six-year limitations period.

Petersen v. Dekalb Pfizer Genetics · filed 1984-09-25(1)

The statute of limitations for a breach of contract action is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1982). Thus, the Petersens’ suit was timely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 requires contract-based actions to be commenced within six years, and that period applies to a judicial action to imply insurance coverage.

Karels v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1985-10-18

The Minnesota statute of limitations provides that actions based upon contracts must be commenced within six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (1984) ... Since there is no underinsurance arbitration clause in respondent’s insurance contracts, respondent’s cause of action, if any, is premised on a judicial proceeding to imply coverage, thus Spira is not applicable and the standard six year statute of limitations applies.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subd. 1(1)'s six-year period for contract or other obligations allowed Rhodes to pursue his § 1981 claim because it was the period previously applicable in the district, although the court did not decide whether it governs future § 1981 claims.

Rhodes v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. · filed 1987-03-16(1)(1)

Under this analysis, Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), a six-year statute for actions upon “a contract or other obligation, express or implied,” is appropriate for § 1981 claims. ... The parties have not developed arguments for and against these various possible statutes of limitations. Moreover, on the facts of this case, Rhodes is entitled to proceed under the six year statute of limitations previously applicable to § 1981 claims in this district. Accordingly the court need not decide which of the possible statute of limitations should apply to future § 1981 claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(1) requires contract actions with no other expressly prescribed limitation to be commenced within six years, measured from accrual when the breach occurs.

BGT Enterprises, Inc. v. Gronholz · filed 1987-05-19(1)

Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 (1986) provides in part: Except where the uniform commercial code otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within six years: (1) Upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed; * * *. ... Litigation on a claimed contract must begin within six years after a cause of action accrues. The time period begins to run when the breach occurs. ... Regardless of the date of the alleged breach, September 1975 or March 1976, it is more than six years prior to the commencement of this lawsuit, and thus barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 provides a six-year limitation period for an action upon a contract, including an action under LMRA § 301 to enforce an arbitration award.

Hanson v. Larson · filed 1990-08-21subd. 1

The limitation period in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1, providing a six-year limitation period for actions “upon a contract,” applies to actions to enforce an *342arbitration award under section 301.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subd. 1(1)'s six-year limitations period did not bar the contract claim because the breach accrued when the insurer stopped payment in 1988, not when the policy was modified in 1977.

Benton v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. · filed 1993-05-25subd. 1(1)

Mutual of Omaha argues that Benton’s breach of contract claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations, because the cause of action accrued when the contract was modified in 1977. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1990). But, the contract was not modified in 1977, because Mutual of Omaha could not change the policy absent adequate notice. Canadian Universal, 258 N.W.2d at 575. Put more significantly, the breach occurred in 1988 when Mutual of Omaha stopped payment, and thus the statute of limitations does not bar suit.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivisions 1(1) and 1(5) provide six-year limitations periods applicable to an underinsured-motorist claim, beginning on the accident date when the policy has no contractual clause postponing coverage until settlement.

Nelson v. State Farm Insurance Co. · filed 1997-09-021(1), 1(5)

The statute of limitations on an UIM cause of action begins to run on the day of the accident. ... It is undisputed that the statute of limitations is six years, pursuant to Minn.Stat. §§ 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1996) (providing six years for contract cases), and 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1996) (providing six years for tort cases).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), requires actions on contracts to be brought within six years when no other express limitation applies.

Entzion v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. · filed 2004-03-23subd. 1(1)

Under Minnesota law, an action shall be commenced within six years “upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2002). ... Here, Entzion’s action for recovery of no-fault benefits denied by Farmers Insurance is based on an alleged breach of the insurance contract. Neither the No-Fault Act nor Entzion’s insurance policy expressly prescribes a period of limitations for bringing such action. We, therefore, conclude that the six-year contract statute of limitations is applicable to Entzion’s action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), provides a six-year limitations period for a breach-of-contract claim when no other limitation is expressly prescribed.

McClure v. Davis Engineering, L.L.C. · filed 2006-06-13(1)

Rather, McClure Associates’ breach-of-contract claim for a commission on the Lloyd’s Barbeque sale is subject to the six-year statute of limitations in section 541.05, subdivision 1(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), gives contract actions a six-year limitations period, and each distinct breach accrues separately within that period.

St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. A.P.I., Inc. · filed 2007-09-11subd. 1(1)

The statute of limitations for a contract action is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2006). Generally, a cause of action for breach of contract accrues when the terms of the contract are breached. ... Therefore, we conclude that each failure to defend or indemnify was a distinct breach and could be pursued within six years.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 sets a six-year limitations period for tort actions, subject to applicable tolling provisions.

Eliseuson v. Frayseth · filed 1971-05-28

It is therefore our conclusion from a review of the above cases interpreting § 541.13 that it does not apply to nonresidents of Minnesota and that the time for commencement of this action expired May 24, 1966, when plaintiff attained 22 years of age in accordance with Minn. St. 541.05 and 541.15.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Fraud and trust claims—six-year limitation

Law changed since Effective January 1, 2016, 2015 Minnesota Laws ch. 5 removed trust enforcement from § 541.05, subd. 1(7); § 501C.1005 now governs beneficiary proceedings against trustees, with a three-year period after an adequate report and otherwise a six-year period measured from specified trust events.

Fraud and trust-enforcement actions have a six-year limitations period.

Stelflug v. Benson · filed 1986-04-29Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subds. 1(6) and 1(7)

The statute of limitations for actions based on fraud and enforcement of trusts is six years.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A fraud claim accrues when the facts constituting the fraud are discovered, subject to the statute’s discovery rule.

Kassan v. Kassan · filed 1987-02-03(6)

Appellant, however, presents a claim of alleged fraud, which cause of action does not accrue until the facts constituting the fraud are discovered. Minn. Stat. § 541.05(6).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A fraud claim must be brought within six years after discovery, measured by when the plaintiff could and ought to have discovered the fraud with reasonable diligence.

Hydra-Mac, Inc. v. Onan Corp. · filed 1989-01-13subd. 1(6)

A cause of action for fraud must be asserted within six years after discovery of the fraud. Discovery occurs when, with reasonable diligence, the plaintiff could and ought to have discovered the fraud.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For fraud claims, the six-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud; when discovery reasonably should have occurred is a fact question.

Barry v. Barry · filed 1996-03-12subd. 1(6)

The six-year limitations period begins to run when a plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud. ... The question of when discovery could or should have reasonably been made is one of fact.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For fraud claims, the six-year period does not begin until the fraud is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Matter of Trust Created by Hill · filed 1993-04-20Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1

Where fraud is alleged and shown, however, the six-year period does not begin to run until the facts constituting fraud were discovered or, by reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period in subdivision 1 applies to declaratory-judgment claims when no other limitations period governs.

Case name unavailable · filed 2015-05-26subd. 1

Therefore, the period of limitations applicable to respondent’s declaratory judgment claims is provided by the six-year statute of limitations found in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 (2014).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A six-year limitations period for fraud claims begins when the fraud is discovered or, with reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.

CSM Equities, LLC v. Woodland Village Investments Limited Partnership · filed 2016-01-25subd. 1(6)

In Minnesota, claims of fraud must be brought within six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (Supp. 2015). “The 6-year period begins to run when the facts constituting fraud were discovered or, by reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period for fraud claims starts when the aggrieved party discovers, or should have discovered through reasonable diligence, the facts constituting the fraud.

Doe v. Archdiocese of Saint Paul & Minneapolis · filed 2012-07-25subd. 1(6)

The 6-year fraud statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6). We judge discovery of the fraud under the reasonable person standard. ... The facts constituting the fraud are deemed to have been discovered when they were actually discovered or, “by reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For claims seeking relief on the ground of actual fraud, the limitations period does not begin until the injured party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Case name unavailable · filed 2015-02-181(6)

The limitations period applicable to MUFTA claims based on actual fraud “shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud,” Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (2014).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period for an action on the ground of fraud includes a discovery allowance, so the cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

In re Petters Co. · filed 2013-06-19Minn. Stat. § 541.05, Subd. 1(6)

On those considerations, it is clear that the Trustee seeks relief “on the ground of fraud” through his claims under MUFTA, and that the limitations period of Minn. Stat. § 541.05, Subd. 1(6) governs.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's six-year limitations period for liabilities created by statute applies to MUFTA constructive-fraud claims, while the six-year fraud limitations period with discovery accrual applies to MUFTA actual-fraud claims.

Finn v. Alliance Bank · filed 2013-09-03subd. 1(2); subd. 1(6)

Actual-fraud claims under the MUF-TA are governed by the statute of limitations in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6); constructive-fraud claims under the MUFTA are governed by the statute of limitations in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For an actually fraudulent MUFTA transfer, subdivision 1(6) applies and the six-year period runs from discovery of the facts constituting fraud.

Finn v. Alliance Bank · filed 2015-02-18Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6)

In short, for the limited purpose of determining the applicable statute of limitations, we conclude that a claim against a transferee that receives an actually fraudulent transfer under MUFTA is for “relief on the ground of fraud,” just as it was for a transferee that received a fraudulent transfer at the time of McMillan and Dux-bury. Thus, we agree with the court of appeals that the district court erred when it dismissed the Receiver’s actual-fraud claims under Minn. Stat § 541.05, subd. 1(2), and therefore remand to the district court for consideration of whether the Receiver filed its action within 6 years of the discovery of the “facts constituting the fraud.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For fraud claims, the six-year limitations period starts when the fraud is discovered or should have been discovered through reasonable diligence.

TCF National Bank v. Market Intelligence, Inc. · filed 2016-02-04subd. 1(6)

However, Minnesota follows the “discovery rule” for fraud claims, under which “the limitations period begins to run ‘when the facts constituting fraud were discovered or, by reasonable diligence, should have been discovered.’”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota law requires contract and fraud claims to be commenced within six years, and a fraud claim accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Tharp v. CitiMortgage Inc. · filed 2019-09-061; 6

Under Minnesota law, claims “upon a contract” must be commenced within six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 1. ... Under Minnesota law, fraud claims must be commenced within six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 6. A cause of action for fraud accrues upon “discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(6) delays accrual of a fraud claim until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

Nelson v. Jerentosky · filed 2022-09-26§ 541.05, subd. 1(6)

For claims based on fraud, “the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(5) bars a legal-malpractice claim six years after the claim accrues, when damage from the alleged negligence occurs.

Thiele v. Stich · filed 1988-07-01(1)(5)

There was no dispute in trial court that Thiele’s malpractice action accrued on July 29,1980, when damage from Stich’s alleged negligence occurred. ... As Stich was not effectively served within six years of that date, the malpractice claim was time-barred under Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) provides a six-year limitations period for the plaintiffs’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim.

Harju v. Olson · filed 2010-03-29(1)

The statute of limitations for this claim is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(1). Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duties is not time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 bars claims for rent that accrued more than six years before the action began.

Bowman v. Plumb · filed 1945-11-02

Further, it is clear that, since the new lease was made more than six years prior to the commencement of the action, any claims against defendant for rent prior thereto are barred by the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Six-year limitations period

Subsection 1(1) provides a six-year limitations period, and the period does not begin until the plaintiff incurs compensable injury.

Bartlett v. Miller & Schroeder Municipal, Inc. · filed 1984-09-181(1)

The six year statute of limitations is applicable to appellants’ claims. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1976). Those causes of action did not accrue until June 1, 1976, when the first default in payment occurred, or September 1976, when sale of the plant below cost foreclosed any possibility of full repayment of bondholders.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A contract action is barred when the six-year limitations period expired before service of the summons and complaint.

Bentonize, Inc. v. Green · filed 1988-11-22Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1)

Assuming arguendo that there was a breach, it occurred no later than April 22, 1975, when respondents executed a licensing agreement with Ben Enterprises. As such, the statute of limitations had run more than five months before the summons and complaint was served on respondents in late September 1981.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The statute provides a six-year limitations period under subdivisions 1(1), (5), or (7), as applicable.

Pederson v. American Lutheran Church · filed 1987-05-05subd. 1(1), (5) or (7)

The trial court properly noted that the longest limitations period that could possibly apply to Pederson’s claim is six years under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), (5) or (7) (1984).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) provides a six-year limitations period for statutory claims, but it does not govern a claim that cannot be characterized as statutory.

Rice v. Target Stores, a Division of Dayton Hudson Corp. · filed 1988-01-25541.05, subd. 1(2)

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action cannot be characterized as a statutory claim governed by the six-year limitations period set forth in Minn.Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(2).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota’s six-year residual personal-injury limitations period applies to discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Air Carrier Access Act.

Vaughn v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. · filed 1996-06-111(5)

Discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Air Carrier Access Act are limited by Minnesota’s six-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period for a MERLA property-damage claim begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the contamination, applying the common-law discovery rule.

Union Pacific RR Co. v. Reilly Industries · filed 2000-06-14subd. 1

In the present case, we conclude, as did the district court, that the Minnesota Supreme Court would apply the common law discovery rule for determining when to commence the six-year statutory limitations period for a MERLA claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05(5) provides a six-year limitations period for personal-injury negligence actions.

D.M.S. v. Barber · filed 2002-06-13(5)

Generally, personal injury actions grounded on negligence must be commenced within the six-year period of limitation provided in Minn. Stat. § 541.05(5) (2000).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's six-year limitations period for personal injury actions applies to ADA claims.

Gaona v. Town & Country · filed 2003-03-31not specified in passage

Because the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act enforce the same substantive rights, we conclude that the six-year limitations period of Minn. Stat. § 541.05 applies to the Gaonas' ADA claim as well.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(2) requires a claim to be brought within six years after the cause of action accrues.

State of Minnesota by Lorie Afremov and Michael R. Afremov v. Anne L. Remes, Martha W. Gabbert · filed 2015-08-10subd. 1(2)

Because the continuing-wrong doctrine does not apply, the Afremovs’ action must have been brought within six years from the time the cause of action accrued to survive Minn. Stat. 541.05.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 provides a six-year limitations period that begins running when the claim accrues, including when the alleged damage first occurs.

Benigni v. St. Louis County, State of Minnesota, by Department of Human Services, Lake Superior Community Hea · filed 2016-06-13subd. 1

The parties agree that appellant’s claims are subject to the six-year statute of limitations period set forth in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1 (2014).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's six-year limitations period governs conversion claims.

White v. US Bank · filed 2017-08-10(4)

We detect no error in the District Court’s treatment of White’s claim as “one of conversion,” and agree that it is time-barred by the six-year statutes of limitations that govern such claims in both New Jersey and Minnesota. See N.J. Stat. 2A:14-1; Minn. Stat. § 541.05(4).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota generally gives six years to bring an action upon a contract unless another limitation is expressly prescribed.

International Decision Systems, Inc. v. JDR Solutions, Inc. · filed 2019-05-07subd. 1(1)

Under Minnesota law, the statute of limitations for actions “upon a contract” is six years if “no other limitation is expressly prescribed.” Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota gives six years to bring a breach-of-contract claim.

Huntsman v. 3M Company · filed 2019-08-26subd. 1

The statute of limitations for breach of contract claims in Minnesota is six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's six-year limitations period applies to claims based on liability created by statute.

Willis Electric Co., Ltd. v. Polygroup Limited · filed 2020-02-031(2)

Under Minnesota law, a six-year statute of limitations applies to any claim based on:“liability created by statute.” Minn. Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(2).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota provides a six-year limitations period for personal-injury-based claims.

Case v. Walz · filed 2021-06-02subd. 1(5)

For § 1983 claims, the statute of limitations is established by the state statute of limitations for personal injury torts. ... In Minnesota, the applicable statute of limitations is six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota breach-of-contract claims have a six-year limitations period, but summary judgment on a limitations defense is improper when disputed facts concern accrual or equitable tolling.

Jaunich v. State Farm Life Insurance Company · filed 2021-11-01subd. 1(1)

In Minnesota, the statute of limitations for a breach-of-contract claim is six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1). ... An argument that the statute of limitations bars a claim succeeds only if there are no disputed facts as to when the claim arose or whether any equitable doctrines might toll the limitations period.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), provides a six-year statute of limitations for contract actions.

Varela v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2023-02-13§ 541.05, subd. 1(1)

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2022) proscribes a 6-year statute of limitations for all contract actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), requires a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim to be brought within six years of the alleged breach.

Kelley v. BMO Harris Bank N.A., as successor to M&I Marshall and IIsley Bank · filed 2023-06-23§ 541.05, subd. 1(1)

Under Minnesota law, any cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty must be brought within six years of the alleged breach.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's six-year statute of limitations governs § 1983 claims and runs from accrual of the cause of action.

Arrington v. City of Andover · filed 2023-06-27§ 541.05

Under Minnesota law, § 1983 claims must be brought within six-years from accrual of the cause of action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(6) provides a six-year limitations period for fraud actions, but it does not govern a motion to vacate an existing order because that motion is not a new action.

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D. J. T. and N. L. T., Parents · filed 2023-11-20§ 541.05, subd. 1(6)

Appellants seek to vacate an existing order that was signed pursuant to their consents to adoption. They have not commenced a new action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) imposes a six-year statute of limitations on breach-of-contract actions.

Knox v. Impact MHC Management, LLC · filed 2025-05-02§ 541.05, subd. 1(1)

a six-year statute of limitations applies to their breach-of-contract action.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Law changed since For causes arising on or after August 1, 2000, 2000 Minnesota Laws ch. 471 added a six-year period for battery and other specified torts when the conduct also constitutes domestic abuse; battery is no longer categorically subject to the two-year period in that setting.

Subdivision 1(5)'s six-year limitations period applies to an action characterized as negligence rather than battery.

Plath v. Plath · filed 1987-04-29(1)(5)

Maribelle’s suit, based on a September 5, 1977, incident, was commenced September 2, 1983. Her action can only be maintained if her fall was the result of her husband’s negligence and therefore subject to the six-year statute of limitations. Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (1982). However, if her action is properly characterized as the intentional tort of battery, it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Minn.Stat. § 541.07(1) (1982).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 provides a six-year limitations period for legal malpractice and for negligence arising from a continuing common-law fiduciary relationship, rather than the six-month period applicable solely to a personal representative.

May v. First National Bank of Grand Forks · filed 1988-08-16(1)(5)

If First Bank acted in a common law fiduciary capacity, any negligence in that capacity would be subject to the general statute of limitations of six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year contract limitations period in section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), is general and yields to the more specific period in section 541.051 for injuries arising from defective and unsafe improvements to real property.

Arbitration Demand of 200 Levee Drive Associates, Ltd. v. Bor-Son Building Corp. · filed 1989-06-13(1)

While section 541.05, subd. 1(1) could apply to this action because it arises out of a contract between the parties, section 541.051 may also apply because the injury arises out of a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property. Where the provisions of two laws conflict, and where they cannot be otherwise reconciled, the more particular provision prevails over the more general provision. ... Section 541.051 clearly contains the more particular provision because it is limited to actions involving a defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to realty, whereas section 541.05, subd. 1(1) applies generally to all actions based upon a contract or obligation. ... Consequently, we conclude that section 541.051, not section 541.-05, subd. 1(1), applies here.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05's six-year limitations period governs common-law negligence claims against blood banks based on their administrative and standard-making functions, rather than medical malpractice by licensed employees.

Kaiser v. Memorial Blood Center of Minneapolis, Inc. · filed 1992-07-24

In essence, then, this case is about the administrative and standard-making functions of the blood bank industry for which a physician’s or nurse’s professional license is not required. Therefore, the action is not based on respondeat superior for medical malpractice but for common law negligence by the corporate entities and is thus governed by the six-year statute of limitations, Minn.Stat. § 541.05.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(1), supplies the applicable six-year limitations period when the UCC’s four-year period does not govern a transaction predominantly for services.

Vesta State Bank v. Independent State Bank of Minnesota · filed 1993-11-16(1)

The threshold issue is whether the UCC applies to the lease. If the UCC applies, then its four-year statute of limitations would apply to this ease and appellants’ claims would be barred. See Minn.Stat. § 336.2-725 (1992). If the UCC does not apply, the six-year statute of limitations of Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (1992) would apply and appellants’ claims would not be barred. ... Since the contract was predominantly for the provision of services, not farm equipment, the six-year statute of limitations in Minn.Stat. § 541.05 applies to this case. Thus, the district court erred in denying the motion to amend the complaint.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subd. 1(2) provides a six-year limitations period for statutory causes of action unless a shorter period is provided by section 541.07.

Larson v. New Richland Care Center · filed 1995-12-20(1)(2)

A six-year statute of limitations applies to causes of actions “created by statute, other than those * ⅜ * where a shorter period is provided by section 541.07.” Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) (1990).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(5) requires legal-malpractice actions to be commenced within six years, with accrual when the claim would survive a motion to dismiss because some damage has occurred.

Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson · filed 1999-04-08subd. 1(5)

The statute of limitations for a legal malpractice action is six years. We have in the past addressed the question of when a statute of limitations begins to run. A cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action will survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 gives contract, fiduciary-duty, and specified statutory claims a six-year limitations period, running from accrual.

Parkhill v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance · filed 2000-08-25subd. 1(1), (2), and (6)

Each of these claims is subject to a six year statute of limitation. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subds. 1(1), (2) & (6). ... Therefore, Parkhill’s common law and statutory claims accrued, at the latest, when Minnesota Mutual required the Parkhills to make additional out-of-pocket payments to maintain the policy. ... Because a 1990 accrual date falls well outside the statutory period for plaintiffs common law and statutory claims, those claims are time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(1) imposes a six-year limitations period, and the continuing-violation doctrine does not toll it for separate, distinct distributions.

Davies v. West Publishing Co. · filed 2001-03-06(1)

Does the continuing violation doctrine toll or extend the six-year statute of limitations of Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2000), for a claim for breach of fiduciary duty alleging improper distributions made over a 30-year period? ... We conclude that even if the continuing violation doctrine could apply here, because each distribution was a separate and distinct act that could have been challenged by'respondents, the doctrine does not toll application of the six-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), supplies a six-year limitations period for common-law actions permitted under Minn. Stat. § 340A.801, subdivision 6.

Wollan v. Jahnz · filed 2003-02-11(1)(5)

Because we find no compelling reason to diverge from the negligence analysis used in prior cases under the Civil Damages Act and subdivision 6, we hold that the six-year limitations period under Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) is the proper measure for those common-law actions permitted by section 340A.801, subdivision 6.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 supplies a six-year limitations period when no other limitations period is expressly prescribed.

Bradley v. First Nat. Bank of Walker, N.A. · filed 2006-03-28

The UFA does not contain an independent statute of limitations. Therefore, claims arising under the UFA are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (providing that a six-year statute of limitations applies where no other limitations period is expressly prescribed).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) provides a six-year limitations period for § 1982 civil-rights claims in Minnesota.

Sternjohn v. Kreisler · filed 2003-01-06subd. 1(5)

Based on the foregoing, this Court finds that the personal injury statute of limitations is also appropriate for § 1982 causes of action. Multiple circuits concur in this result and have found that the § 1982 causes of action should be treated like § 1983 and § 1981 claims for statute of limitations purposes See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191, 1198 (7th Cir.1970); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int’l Harvester Co. 427 F.2d 476, 488 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 137, 27 L.Ed.2d 151 (1970); (1985); Scheerer v. Rose State College, 774 F.Supp. 620, 622 (W.D.Okla.1991); Mitchell v. Sung 816 F.Supp. 597, 601 (N.D.Cal.1993).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The general six-year limitations period applies to an arbitration demand, and it begins to run when the demand for arbitration is made.

Vaubel Farms, Inc. v. Shelby Farmers Mutual · filed 2004-05-18subd. 1(1)

Because enforcement of the arbitration award is not subject to the two-year period of limitations in the contract, Vaubel’s arbitration demand is subject solely to the general six-year statute of limitations prescribed in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2002).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period in section 541.05 applies to UM claims, but for a UM claim created by the tortfeasor insurer’s insolvency it begins when the insurer is judicially declared insolvent, if that occurs within six years after the accident.

Oganov v. American Family Insurance Group · filed 2009-06-25

In this case, it is undisputed that a UM claim is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (2008) (establishing a six-year contract statute of limitations); ... The narrow issue before us is when the statute of limitations began to run on Oganov’s cause of action for UM benefits. ... We therefore reject the rule that a UM claim accrues on the date of the accident when that claim arises from the subsequent insolvency of the tortfeasor’s insurer. We hold instead that if a tortfeasor’s insurer is judicially declared insolvent •within six years of the date of the accident, a claim for uninsured motorist benefits accrues, and the limitations period begins to run, on the date the tortfeasor’s insurer is declared insolvent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The statute of limitations bars recovery for claims accruing before April 11, 2000, but charges reconciled after that date remain recoverable.

Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp. · filed 2010-05-25

The statute of limitations bars recovery pri- or to April 11, 2000. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05. Some reconciliations for lease year 1999, however, were completed after April 11, 2000. Therefore, those charges are properly included as damages.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 supplies a six-year limitations period for nuisance, trespass, waste, and Minnesota Environmental Rights Act claims, while CERCLA’s discovery rule governs accrual for these environmental claims.

Minnesota Ex Rel. Northern Pacific Center, Inc. v. BNSF Railway Co. · filed 2010-07-14

Plaintiffs claims for nuisance, trespass, waste, and violations of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, Minn.Stat. § 116B.01-13 (2008) are subject to Minnesota’s general six year statute of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (2008). A fair review of these claims in plaintiffs complaint shows its alleged property damage was either “caused or contributed to” by defendant’s release of hazardous substances. As such, these claims fall under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) discovery rule set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 9658 (2005).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims; the limitations period for a warranty tied to a future event may begin when that event occurs.

Residential Funding Co. v. Academy Mortgage Corp. · filed 2014-11-12subd. 1(1)

The Court finds that, at this stage of the litigation, none of RFC’s breach of representation and warranty claims are properly dismissed as time-barred. Under § 108(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, if the statute of limitations governing a debtor’s claim has not expired prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the trustee may commence an action on that claim before the later of the end of the statutory limitations period or “two years after the order for relief.” 11 U.S.C. § 108(a). The parties agree that Minnesota has a six-year statute of limitations for contract claims. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1): And, here, the instant actions were filed in December 2013, which is within the two-year period following the bankruptcy court’s order for relief. Accordingly, because the six-year statute of limitations had not expired as to loans sold to RFC on or after May 14, 2006 at the time RFC filed its bankruptcy petition on May 14, 2012, those claims are not time-barred. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (stating that “a debtor in possession shall have all the rights ... and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties ... of a trustee serving in a case under [Chapter 11]”); Johnson v. First Nat’l Bank of Montevideo, 719 F.2d 270, 278 n. 11 (8th Cir.1983) (citations omitted) (“Although the language of § 108 refers only to the trustee, it is generally agreed that the debtor-in-possession is also entitled to the statute’s privileges.”); Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Wallick & Volk, Inc., Civ. No. 13-3512 (MJD/JJG), 2014 WL 3955257, at *5 (D.Minn. Aug. 13, 2014) (finding that RFC was entitled to invoke § 108(a) in a similar case).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 gives six years from the maturity of a contractual claim to bring an action; a claim for unpaid freight charges matures when the charges become due.

Hawley v. Little Falls Mill & Mercantile Co. · filed 1945-06-08

While plaintiffs had the right to sue at the end of each month for the difference between the rate charged and the lawful rate, such right of action matured at the end of each month, when the full charge became due, and plaintiffs’ rights of action on the claims expired six years from that date.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 provides six-year limitations periods for unjust enrichment, breach of contract, negligence, vicarious liability, fraud, and fraudulent inducement claims.

Abarca v. Little · filed 2014-09-22(1), (5), (6)

Defendants argue that Campis’s state-law claims are time barred under the applicable six-year statutes of limitations. See Minn.Stat. § 541.05(1) (unjust enrichment and breach of contract); § 541.05(5) (negligence and vicarious liability); § 541.05(6) (fraud and fraudulent inducement); and Minn.Stat. § 628.26(d) (labor trafficking). ... As such, Campis’s claims accrued before March 12, 2008, and are untimely.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(4), provides a six-year limitations period that courts may borrow for an analogous federal takings claim.

Foster v. Minnesota · filed 2016-12-211(4)

There appears to be no dispute that Minnesota’s six-year general statute of limitations, which applies to state takings claims, is the most analogous limitations period.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), provides a six-year limitations period for a retaliatory discharge claim under the worker’s compensation act, running from the adverse employment action.

Osorio v. StepStone Hospitality, Inc. · filed 2018-09-14subd. 1(2)

The parties agree that the six-year limitations period set forth in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(2) applies to this action. ... Here, the limitations period commenced on June 6, 2012, the date of Osorio’s termination, and therefore expired on June 6, 2018.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 provides a six-year limitations period for personal injury claims, including § 1983 claims brought in Minnesota.

Rassier v. Sanner · filed 2020-03-06

As explained in the Court’s prior Order, a six-year statute of limitations applies to Plaintiffs’ § 1983-First Amendment retaliation claim.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 provides six-year limitations periods for contract claims, certain noncontract injuries, and fraud claims.

Shields Law Group, LLC, Spencer Shields v. Gustafson Gluek PLLC, Watts ... · filed 2026-01-12subd. 1(1), (5)-(6)

As appellant agrees, all seven of its claims were subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subds. 1(1) (stating that claims based on an express or implied contract are subject to a six-year statute of limitations if no other limitation is expressly provided), (5)-(6) (listing a six-year limitation for commencement of an action “for any other injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not hereinafter enumerated,” and an action “for relief on the ground of fraud”); Block v. Litchy, 428 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Minn. App. 1988) (“The applicable time limit for bringing an action in unjust enrichment is six years.”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Six-year limitation period

The six-year limitations period applies to chiropractic malpractice claims accruing before March 23, 1982, because those claims were not covered by the two-year period in section 541.07.

Underhill v. Knox · filed 1984-09-25subd. 1(5)

Chiropractic malpractice is therefore subject to a six year limitation period for causes of action accruing prior to March 23, 1982. Since Underhill’s cause of action arose prior to this date, it is governed by the six year period under Minn.Stat. § 541.-05 (1980).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's six-year personal-injury limitations period governs Title VI and Title IX claims.

Egerdahl v. Hibbing Com. College · filed 1995-12-18subd. 1(5)

We hold that the six-year limitations period of Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) governs Title VI and Title IX claims.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The residual six-year limitations period applies when a plaintiff suffers some damage or the claim is sufficiently ripe to survive a motion to dismiss.

Jacobson v. Board of Trustees · filed 2001-05-29subd. 1(5) (also cited with subd. 1(1) and (2))

This claim is governed by the six-year residual statute of limitations, Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) (2000). A cause of action accrues under this statute of limitations when a plaintiff suffers “some” damage or when the claim is sufficiently ripe to overcome a motion to dismiss.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period for trespass actions under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(3), does not bar a claim on the pleadings when the record leaves unresolved whether the trespass is continuing.

Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes · filed 2008-01-17subd. 1(3)

Because we cannot make a determination on the record before us — where the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true — whether there is a continuing trespass, we remand the claim to the district court for further proceedings.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year period in subdivision 1(5) applies to negligence torts, including negligent hiring and retention.

Lonnie Strandlund, etc. v. William Hawley, etc. · filed 2008-07-07Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

limitations period applies to torts of negligence such as negligent hiring and retention.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subd. 1(5), provides a six-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including an unlawful-arrest claim under § 1983.

Markham v. Tolbert · filed 2022-12-20§ 541.05, subd. 1(5)

Minnesota’s personal injury statute imposes a six-year limitations period.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(5) supplies a six-year limitations period for general personal-injury actions in Minnesota, which applies to § 1983 claims.

L.M.G v. Campbell · filed 2025-05-28§ 541.05, subd. 1(5)

In Minnesota, the general personal-injury statute of limitations is six years.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(5) sets a six-year statute of limitations for personal-injury actions in Minnesota.

Nygard v. Orono, City of · filed 2024-01-05Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

The statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Minnesota is six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5), provides a six-year residual statute of limitations for claims not governed by a more specific limitations period.

Blackwell v. Washington County, Minnesota · filed 2024-12-02Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

And his other state law claims, however stated and construed liberally, have at most a six-year statute of limitations under Minnesota’s residual statute. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5), provides a six-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including the § 1983 and negligence claims identified by the court.

Doe v. Anoka County · filed 2025-03-10Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5)

(1) Doe’s § 1983 claims—including her equal-protection claim in Count 1 and her Monell/Canton claim in Count 3—are subject to Minnesota’s general personal-injury statute of limitations, and here that is six years pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05(5)'s six-year limitations period does not govern pre-1982 negligent-care and supervision claims against nurses when the two-year medical-malpractice period in section 541.07(1) applies.

Tackleson v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital, Inc. · filed 1987-12-11(5)

We do not believe that the legislature intended to impose a 2-year period for suit against a hospital and, at the same time, impose a 6-year period for suit against the hospital’s nurses for the very same conduct. ... We hold that claims of negligent care and supervision against nurses which arose prior to 1982 are governed by the 2-year statute of limitations contained in section 541.07(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 allows six years to sue for disability benefits when a shorter contractual limitation does not apply or is void.

Dawes v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen · filed 1944-02-04

The 1937 amendment of defendant’s constitution changing the time within which to sue from six years, to which plaintiff was entitled under the statute of limitations, to six months after termination of the payments is void as to plaintiff. He still had the right to sue at any time within the six years allowed by the statute of limitations. This he did.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 imposes a six-year limit on an action to recover an unpaid balance for construction work.

Schueller v. Knapp · filed 1961-01-27

Plaintiff’s statement of account was submitted to defendants on March 30, 1946, after the job had been completed. Almost 14 years later, this action was brought. Clearly, on such facts, the action is barred by the 6-year statute. Minn. St. 541.05.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05(1) gives an action for restitution of money paid a six-year limitation period unless another limitation is expressly prescribed.

City of Minneapolis v. Smith · filed 1974-05-03(1)

Minn. St. 541.05(1) provides that any action “[u]pon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed” must be commenced within 6 years. Plaintiff’s action, being one for restitution of money paid, is contractual or quasi-contractual in nature. ... Therefore, the 6-year limitation applies unless some other limitation is expressly prescribed.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 provides a six-year limitation period for a suit to enforce a hail-insurance adjustment agreement.

Dorn v. Home Farmers Mutual Insurance Ass'n · filed 1974-07-19

We therefore hold Strampe controlling in the case at bar. Since the limitation applicable is the 6-year period set forth in Minn. St. 541.05, we need not today decide when the limitation period begins to run.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05(5) provides a six-year limitation period for this negligence action.

Bonhiver v. Graff · filed 1976-11-19(5)

The limitation period on bringing this action is 6 years. Minn. St. 541.05(5). ... The action was thus commenced by Bonhiver against Schwartz, Frumm within the 6-year period of the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(5), provides a six-year limitation period for negligence claims.

Kossak v. Stalling · filed 1979-03-021(5)

Therefore, plaintiffs negligence claim is subject to the usual 6-year limitation period provided for in Minn.St. 541.05 subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Strict liability actions—four-year limitation period

Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 2, sets a four-year limitations period for strict-liability actions.

Erickson v. Coast Catamaran Corp. · filed 1987-10-23subd. 2

The statute of limitations governing strict liability actions is 4 years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 2 (1987).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Statutory-liability claims—six-year period

The six-year limitation period applies to actions based on liabilities created by statute, unless the liability arises upon a penalty or a shorter period is provided by section 541.07.

McDaniel v. United Hardware Distributing Co. · filed 1991-05-03Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2)

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), applies to liabilities imposed by statute, not to liabilities existing at common law which have been recognized by statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Actions upon a liability created by statute must be brought within six years.

Christiansen v. University of Minnesota Board of Regents · filed 2007-06-12subd. 1(2)

Thus, the appropriate limitation period is the six years prescribed in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), for liabilities created by statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's six-year limitation applies to liabilities created by statute, including statutory indemnification claims.

Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Transit Commission · filed 1995-03-01subd. 1(2)

Because indemnification rights among insurers under the no-fault act are created by statute, we find the six-year statute of limitations of Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) applies to indemnification actions under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53, subd. 1.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitation applies to statutory liabilities, including Data Practices Act claims, whether or not the alleged violation is intentional.

Manteuffel v. City of North St. Paul · filed 1997-11-181(2)

For this reason, and for the sake of uniformity and avoiding confusion, we hold that the six-year limitation period in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), applies to all claims under the data practices act, whether or not the alleged violation is intentional.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period applies to an action upon a liability created by statute.

Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schools · filed 2014-12-151(2)

Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), applies to appellant’s whistleblower action, and appellant’s action is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), provides a six-year limitations period for an action based on liability created by statute when section 541.07 does not provide a shorter period.

Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schools · filed 2016-01-20subd. 1(2)

It follows that Ford’s claim is “upon a liability created by statute” and that no shorter limitations period “is provided by section 541.07,” Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), meaning that the statute of limitations is 6 years.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period applies to equitable claims seeking relief under statutes, and a fraud claim accrues when the aggrieved party discovers or should reasonably discover the supporting facts.

Linda �RandeeŽ Wines v. Jeff Wines · filed 2016-07-11subd. 1(2), 1(6)

Accordingly, the equitable nature of Randee’s claims does not exempt them from the statute of limitations contained in Minn. Stat. § 541.05. ... This argument has merit.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 imposes a six-year limitations period on an action based on a liability created by statute.

United Healthcare Services, Inc. v. AmerisourceBergen Corporation · filed 2024-04-24subd. 1(2)

an action based “upon a liability created by statute” is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), gives claims under the Minnesota False Statement in Advertising Act a six-year limitations period that begins at the sale, without a discovery allowance.

Moua v. Jani-King of Minnesota, Inc. · filed 2009-01-27subd. 1(2)

In Tuttle, the Eighth Circuit held that claims based on violations of the MSFAA are governed by the six-year statute of limitations in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), which does not include a “discovery allowance” similar to that allowed in the statute of limitations applicable to common-law fraud claims. ... Though this argument regarding the incongruous treatment of MSFAA claims under existing law is not entirely without merit, this Court will follow binding Eighth Circuit precedent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Personal-injury and fraud claims

Personal-injury and fraud actions must be brought within six years after accrual, and for defective-product injuries accrual requires a cognizable physical manifestation plus evidence connecting the injury to the defendant's product, act, or omission.

Tuttle Ex Rel. Tuttle v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. · filed 2004-07-30Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)-(6)

All parties agree the applicable statute of limitations for the common law negligence, fraud and conspiracy claims is governed by Minn. Stat. section 541.05, subd. 1(5)-(6), providing that actions for personal injury and fraud must be brought within six years from the date of accrual. Before a cause of action can accrue in cases involving injury caused by defective products, the Minnesota discovery rule requires a showing of two elements: “(1) a cognizable physical manifestation of the disease or injury, and (2) evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and the defendant’s product, act, or omission.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The statute generally gives negligence claims a six-year limitations period.

Doe YZ v. Shattuck-St. Mary's School · filed 2016-10-05Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

Under Minnesota law, negligence claims are generally subject to a six-year statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Negligence claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Olson v. Amatuzio · filed 2018-08-27subd. 1(5)

Under Minnesota law, the statute of limitations for a negligence claim is six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For a negligence claim, the six-year limitations period does not begin until the claimant has a cognizable injury and evidence causally connecting it to the defendant’s product, act, or omission.

Hampton v. Mentor Corporation · filed 2018-02-22subd. 1(5)

Under that rule, “two elements must be satisfied . . . before a cause of action accrues in cases involving injuries caused by a defective product: (1) a cognizable physical manifestation of the disease or injury, and (2) evidence of a causal connection between the injury or disease and the defendant’s product, act, or omission.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Contract and statutory-liability claims—six-year period

The six-year limitations period applies to corporate-waste and statutory-liability claims arising more than six years before suit.

Abbott v. McNeff · filed 2001-05-02Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) and (2)

is applicable to Plaintiffs claims of corporate waste and misappropriation and does so relying on precedent established by the Supreme Court of Minnesota and past practice in this federal district.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period in subdivision 1(1) governs UIM contract actions and begins when the claim accrues upon an enforceable settlement, including notice that the insurer will not substitute its check.

Stroop v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2009-04-21subd. 1(1)

It is undisputed that a UIM action is a contract action governed by the six-year statute of limitations under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (2008).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

A six-year limitations period applies to breach-of-contract and indemnification claims.

ResCap Liquidating Trust v. First Mortgage Corporation · filed 2018-12-21subd. 1(1)

Minnesota has a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract and indemnification claims. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota applies a six-year limitations period to breach-of-contract claims, beginning when the alleged breach occurs.

Free Spirit Publishing Inc. v. Dworsky · filed 2022-04-18subdiv. 1(1)

Minnesota law provides a six-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract claims. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdiv. 1(1). “A cause of action for breach of contract accrues—and the statute of limitations begins to run—‘at the time of the alleged breach.’ ”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1(1) requires a cause of action on a contract or other obligation with no other expressly prescribed limitation to be commenced within six years; for a loan payable on demand, the period is applied from a timely demand for repayment.

In re the Estate of Oria Albert Brinkmeier · filed 2026-01-12§ 541.05, subd. 1(1)

Under Minnesota law, a cause of action “upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed” must be commenced within six years. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd 1(1) (2024).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Civil-rights and takings claims

Minnesota law imposes a six-year limitations period on claims for takings of private property.

Kristen Harne and Sheila Foster, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. State of Minnesota · filed 2015-06-29subd. 1(4)

In Minnesota, a six-year statute of limitations applies to takings of private property.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota's six-year personal-injury limitations period applies to § 1983 actions filed in Minnesota.

Anderson v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2018-03-30subdivision 1(5)

Thus, as the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly recognized, under Wilson and Owens, all § 1983 actions filed in Minnesota are subject to the six-year statute of limitations contained in the state’s personal injury statute, Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdivision 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(2), supplied the six-year limitations period for this § 1983 claim filed before the shorter period announced after Wilson v. Garcia.

Cook v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1985-08-16subd. 1(2)

At the time this action was filed, ... Minnesota’s six-year limitations period for statutory actions governed § 1983 claims. ... By applying Wilson prospectively, this court holds that plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is not time barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Accrual and discovery rules

The six-year limitations period begins when some compensable damage occurs, even if the exact amount of damages is not yet ascertainable.

Veit v. ProSource Technologies, Inc., and third party v. Carlson Professional Services, Inc., third party · filed 2016-05-09subd. 1(2), (5)

We conclude that Veit’s professional-negligence action accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, in September 2006, when the appraisal was completed. Although the exact amount of damages may not have been ascertainable at that time, “some damage” had occurred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The six-year limitations period for legal-malpractice claims begins when the plaintiff suffers some compensable damage, including loss of nonmarital-property protections upon marriage.

Frederick v. Wallerich · filed 2016-08-011(5)

Here, Frederick’s legal-malpractice claim would have survived a motion to dismiss on the day that he married Gatliff because that was the moment when he no longer enjoyed nonmarital protections to his property. Hence, when Frederick filed his legal-malpractice claim nine years later, it was time-barred.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Subdivision 1 provides a six-year limitations period for certain civil actions.

Thornberg v. State Farm Fire and Casualty · filed 2016-04-05Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1

six-year statute of limitations for certain civil actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Fraud actions have a six-year period that accrues when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting fraud.

Hernandez v. General Mills Federal Credit Union (In re Hernandez) · filed 2016-06-13Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6)

Under Minnesota law, actions may be commenced within six years “for relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota’s negligence limitations period is six years.

Kearse v. Mentor Corporation · filed 2017-03-09Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5)

The statute of limitation for a negligence claim is six years. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Product-liability claims

For Minnesota products-liability claims, the statute of limitations accrues under the discovery rule.

Robinson v. Mentor Corporation · filed 2017-03-09subd. 1(5); subd. 2

In conclusion, we hold that the Eighth Circuit’s discovery rule is the appropriate standard for determining the accrual date for the statutes of limitation in products liability cases under Minnesota law.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Minnesota sets a four-year limitations period for strict-liability claims and a six-year period for negligence claims, with accrual under the discovery rule requiring a cognizable injury and evidence of a causal connection to the defendant’s product, act, or omission.

Latta v. Mentor Corporation · filed 2017-03-09subd. 2; subd. 1(5)

The Minnesota statute of limitation for a strict liability claim is four years. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05 subd. 2. The statute of limitation for a negligence claim is six years. See Minn. Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(5).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For a products-liability negligence claim, Minnesota's six-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff has evidence of a causal connection between the injury and the defendant's product.

Alvarado v. Mentor Corporation · filed 2017-11-16subd. 1(5)

Consistent with the Eighth Circuit, we conclude that Minnesota law requires a causal connection before a cause of action accrues in a products liability case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Six-year limitations period for workers’ compensation retaliation claims

Minnesota's six-year limitations period in § 541.05, subd. 1(2), applies to retaliation claims under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act.

Wilkes v. Biffs, Inc. · filed 2020-08-11subd. 1(2)

Finally, Wilkes’s retaliation claims under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act (“MWA”), Minn. Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(1), are subject to a six-year statute of limitation. See Ford v. Minneapolis Public Schs., 874 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Minn. 2016) (holding that MWA retaliation claims are subject to the six-year statute of limitations found in Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2)).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Fraud claims accrue on discovery

Section 541.05(6) delays accrual of a fraud claim until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

City of Coon Rapids v. Suburban Engineering, Inc. · filed 1969-03-28(6)

And, except in the case of fraud, ignorance of a cause of action will not prevent the running of the statute. ... “(6) For relief on the ground of fraud, in which case the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Fraud limitations period—discovery of fraud

For fraud claims, the six-year limitations period begins when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.

ARP Wave, LLC v. Salpeter · filed 2020-02-24subd. 1(6)

Under Minnesota law, “[t]he 6-year fraud statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(6), gives six years from discovery of facts constituting fraud to commence an action based on fraud.

Burns v. Ersek · filed 1984-05-08subd. 1(6)

The other state limitations period that could be applied is the general fraud provision found in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6). That section gives a party six years from the date of discovery of facts constituting the fraud to commence an action based on fraud. ... In these specific circumstances, it is clear that the RICO claim is basically one for securities fraud. The more specific three-year securities law fraud limitation, instead of the more general six-year fraud limitation, will be applied.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For a fraud action, the six-year limitations period does not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers, or reasonably should discover, the facts constituting the fraud.

ESTATE OF JONES BY BLUME v. Kvamme · filed 1988-12-01(1)(6)

Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (1986) provides that a fraud action must be commenced within six years, but “the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud.” ... Absent any suspicion of misrepresentation or any triggering event which could have aroused suspicion, the jury was correct in finding that Lorraine did not know and could not reasonably have known before 1980 that Kvamme was the true stock purchaser. Therefore, this action was not barred by the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

For a fraud claim under subdivision 1(6), when the fraud was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered is a question of fact determined from the evidence.

Estate of Jones Ex Rel. Blume v. Kvamme · filed 1989-12-22(1)(6)

Similarly, we agree with the appellate court’s analysis in affirming the trial court’s determinations with regard to the statute of limitations and the denial of Kvamme’s post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Kvamme urges this court to conclude that Blume knew or should have known all operative facts relative to her claim of fraud before 1980 and that her failure to conduct the necessary inquiry demonstrates a lack of diligence as a matter of law. Bustad v. Bustad, 263 Minn. 238, 243-44, 116 N.W.2d 552, 556 (1962). Accordingly, he asserts that the action is barred by the statute of limitations contained in Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (1988). However, as correctly pointed out by the court of appeals, the question of when discovery could or should have reasonably been made is one of fact. Murphy v. Country House Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 351, 240 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1976). The totality of the direct and circumstantial evidence adequately supports the jury’s conclusion that neither the decedent Emlyn nor Blume had reason to suspect any misrepresentation or fraud before obtaining actual knowledge that Kvamme had purchased the stock on his own behalf.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05, subdivision 1(6), provides that a fraud action accrues when the facts constituting the fraud are discovered, so fraudulent concealment prevents the limitations period from running before discovery.

Larson v. Dunn · filed 1990-08-31(1)(6)

Further, because “fraudulent concealment of th[e] cause of action will prevent the running of the statute of limitations,” Kopperud v. Agers, 312 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Minn.1981); see also Minn.Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6) (1988) (fraud action does not accrue until discovered), the statute of limitations had not run when suit was filed January 4, 1989.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 541.05 bars a fraud claim filed after its limitations period expires.

Tharp v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2021-12-27

We also agree that Tharp’s claims arising under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and his state law claims for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress, were time-barred. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614; Minn. Stat. §§ 541.05, 541.07.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Statute of Limitations—Personal Injury Torts

Section 541.05 imposes a six-year statute of limitations on claims to recover personal property, running from when the claimant's cause of action accrues.

Cleys v. Cleys · filed 1985-02-12

In addition, had Phyllis wanted to make a claim for any of the Moose Lake personal property, she should have done so within the time limits of the applicable statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for the recovery of personal property is six years. Minn.Stat. § 541.05 (1982). The statute began to run against Phyllis when she left Ted in October 1973, and he began to treat the property as his own. See Muus v. Muus, 29 Minn. 115, 118-19, 12 N.W. 343, 344-45 (1882). We agree with the trial court’s finding that Phyllis’ claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Notes 1–150 of 294, oldest cases first.

151 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Preuit & Mauldin Et Al. v. Jones, the opinion does not construe Minn. Stat. § 541.05. It mentions § 541.05 only in a dissenting footnote listing Minnesota's six-year limitations period as an example of statutes similar to those discussed in the § 1983 borrowing dispute. opinion →
Pickar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the court states that it was undisputed that the six-year limitations period in Minn. Stat. § 541.05 applied, but it does not construe or explain the section. The operative rule about when the limitations period begins is attributed to O’Neill, and the court merely applies that rule to affirm dismissal. opinion →
JOHN DOES 1-100 v. Ninneman, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) only in describing the prior rule adopted in Garmon and in background chronology. This court's ruling concerns whether Wilson should apply retroactively, not what § 541.05 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Nitz v. David Nitz, Inc., the opinion construes Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1, concerning the two-year limitations period for injuries arising from improvements to real property. Minn. Stat. § 541.05(5) appears only in a footnote as a citation to the presumably applicable six-year limitations period if a different cause of action could be stated; the court does not construe, apply, or decide the meaning of § 541.05(5). opinion →
Nielsen v. Professional Financial Management, Ltd., Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only as a statute-of-limitations position advanced by plaintiffs: they argue that its six-year period applies to the RICO claims and to the abusive-tax-shelter claim. The court does not decide or construe § 541.05; it dismisses the RICO claims on pleading grounds and the tax-shelter claim because no private cause of action is implied. opinion →
Tackleson v. Abbott-Northwestern Hospital, Inc., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to describe the trial court's ruling concerning the nurses. This court's issue and holding concern Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1), so it does not construe § 541.05. opinion →
Searles v. Searles, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05(4) only in a footnote to report that the court of appeals barred a separate claim for rental income, and expressly says plaintiff did not appeal that ruling and it was not before this court. The Supreme Court does not construe, apply, or rule on the statute. opinion →
Ostrander Ex Rel. Ostrander v. Cone Mills, Inc., the court does not construe Minn. Stat. § 541.05. It treats § 541.05 as the applicable six-year limitations period and decides only whether the separate tolling provision in § 541.15 suspends that period for the parents’ claims. opinion →
Nitz v. Nitz, the citation to Minn. Stat. § 541.05(5) appears only in a quoted footnote from the court's earlier opinion, and this court expressly characterizes that footnote as dicta that is not binding. the opinion does not construe or apply § 541.05(5) as this court's holding. opinion →
Western Lake Superior Sanitary District v. Orfei & Sons, Inc., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only to state that the court does not reach whether the claims are barred by the six-year contract statute; the court decides the case on other grounds and does not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Snesrud v. Instant Web, Inc., Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) appears only while this court recounts the supreme court's ruling in McDaniel about the applicable limitation period. The opinion does not itself construe, apply, or decide anything about § 541.05. opinion →
Howell v. Birnberg, Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in footnote 5 as the statute supporting the Limiteds' argument that Minnesota law governed and allowed six years to sue. The court rejected that choice-of-law position by applying Massachusetts procedural limitations law and never interpreted or applied § 541.05. opinion →
Doe v. American National Red Cross, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05(5) only to state the competing Minnesota limitations period in discussing a possible conflict of laws. The court ultimately holds that Wisconsin law applies under Wisconsin's borrowing statute and does not construe or apply § 541.05(5). opinion →
Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Med., the court mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) only as the six-year limitation Kulinski argued should apply. The court does not construe or analyze § 541.05; it resolves the limitations issue under § 541.07(5). opinion →
Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Med., Minn. Stat. § 541.05 is mentioned only as the statute Kulinski argued governed his claim. The court rejected that argument and decided the limitations issue under § 541.07(5), without construing or applying § 541.05. opinion →
Union Pacific Railroad v. Reilly Industries, Inc., the opinion only states that the parties recognize Minn. Stat. § 541.05's six-year limitations period applies to the common-law claims and cites the statute. The court's actual ruling concerns a genuine factual dispute over when the injury and likely cause were known, relying on the discovery rule and other authority; it does not construe or explain what § 541.05 means or requires. opinion →
Bergquist v. Vista Development, Inc. (In Re Quality Pontiac Buick GMC Truck, Inc.), the opinion does not construe Minn. Stat. § 541.05. It mentions the six-year fraud limitations period in describing the plaintiff's proposed amendment and reproduces the statutory text in a footnote, but the court decides the case under 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) and expressly leaves for future determination whether the state limitations period cumulates with § 546(a). opinion →
Lederman v. Cragun's Pine Beach Resort, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to state the general six-year limitations period for most personal-injury negligence claims. The court's analysis and holding concern Minn. Stat. § 541.051, including whether a temporary trench is an improvement to real property, not what § 541.05 means or requires. opinion →
Peoples State Bank Truman v. Triplett, Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in the Bank’s argument that its unjust-enrichment claim was subject to the six-year statute of limitations. The court did not construe or apply § 541.05; it held instead that the tax-refund statute provided the exclusive remedy and its time limits could not be avoided. opinion →
State v. Joseph, Minn. Stat. § 541.05 is mentioned in the procedural history to describe the Washington County District Court's time-bar ruling and Church Mutual's argument. This court does not construe, apply, or decide the meaning or operation of § 541.05; it resolves the appeal on res judicata. opinion →
Shaw v. The McFarland Clinic, the opinion does not construe Minn. Stat. § 541.05. The statute appears only in the dissent's discussion of Adamson as a cited Minnesota statute of limitations, while the majority analyzes Iowa law and decides the case under Iowa's statutes. opinion →
Botten v. Shorma, the majority mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05(1) only while identifying the possible six-year limitations period in the parties' dispute, then resolves the case under Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) and does not construe or apply § 541.05. The dissent's reference to § 541.05 is part of its contrary view, not the court's holding. opinion →
State Farm Fire & Casualty v. Aquila Inc., the opinion construes Minn. Stat. § 541.051, not § 541.05. The only appearance of § 541.05 is in the opinion's description of what the court of appeals held, so it is procedural history rather than this court's holding under the specified statute. opinion →
Highway Sales, Inc. v. Blue Bird Corp., the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(6) only as an example of Minnesota's discovery rule while analyzing accrual of UCC breach-of-warranty claims. It does not construe, apply, or decide any fraud claim under § 541.05. opinion →
Hart v. Aurora Loan Services, Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in the discussion of the district court's ruling that Hart's fraud and negligence claims were time barred. The appellate court does not construe or independently explain the statute; it merely affirms on the basis of the district court's opinion. opinion →
ReAmerica, S.A. v. Wells Fargo Bank International, the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only to note that the negligence claim ordinarily would have a six-year limitations period. The court does not construe or apply that section; its holding is that Article 4A precludes the common-law negligence claim and controls over the inconsistent limitations period. opinion →
Johnson v. Mott, Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in a parenthetical citation to Egerdahl stating the limitations period applicable to § 1983 claims in Minnesota. This court does not construe, apply, or independently discuss the statute; its holding concerns the proper procedural rule for dismissal and affirms the district court's limitations analysis. opinion →
Georgen-Running v. Grimlie, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(6), only in a footnote to state that Minnesota fraud cases have a six-year statute of limitations and to cite an outside bankruptcy decision. The court does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under § 541.05. opinion →
Whitney v. The Guys, Inc., the court mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 subd. 1(1) and subd. 1(5) & (6) only to identify Minnesota's six-year limitation periods while conducting a choice-of-law comparison. It does not construe those provisions or apply them as the governing law; it holds that Delaware law controls and the claims are untimely under Delaware's statute. opinion →
Monson v. Jeff Suck, the court construes and applies Minn. Stat. § 541.051, especially subdivisions 1(a) and 1(d), the statute of repose. The references to Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appear only in the court's discussion of what the supreme court said in Olmanson and do not show that this opinion construes § 541.05 itself. opinion →
Davies v. Waterstone Capital Management, L. P., the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) only to note that breach-of-contract claims have a six-year statutory limitations period, as background for comparing the parties’ 90-day contractual arbitration period. It does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 541.05. opinion →
The Janice Kaunas Samsing Revocable Trust v. Walsh, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) only while recounting appellant's statute-of-limitations argument. The court expressly declines to consider that issue because it was not timely raised, so the court does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
Onuoha v. International Univ. of Nursing, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdivision 1(1), only to describe the defendant's motion and the district court's merits-based dismissal. The appellate court says the time-bar issue was not preserved and is waived, so it does not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Quinn v. Johnson, Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(3) appears only as the Quinns' argument that the six-year limitations period for trespass applies. The court instead analyzes Minn. Stat. § 541.051 and does not decide what § 541.05 means or how it applies. opinion →
Melillo v. Heitland, Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) appears only in the respondent’s argument that the claim was time-barred and in the procedural history. The court addresses whether service by certified mail was valid and whether service occurred within the limitations period, but it does not construe, explain, or apply the meaning of § 541.05. opinion →
United States v. Golden Gate National Senior Care LLC, Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in a footnote addressing and denying a statute-of-limitations argument. The court quotes and relies on the Minnesota Court of Appeals' ruling in Ford, but does not itself interpret, apply, or decide what § 541.05 means; it notes that the complaint was filed within two years in any event. opinion →
Contech Engineered Solutions LLC v. Element Materials Technology St. Paul Inc., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only as the general six-year statute of limitations that Contech alternatively argued should apply, and in comparing it with the more specific § 541.051. The court decides the case under § 541.051 and does not construe what § 541.05 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services v. BendTec, Inc., the opinion cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to state that a six-year limitations period would apply if the § 541.051, subd. 1(e) exception applied. The court's analysis and holding concern § 541.051, not the meaning, requirements, or application of § 541.05. opinion →
Melillo v. Heitland, the opinion cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to identify the expiration date of the limitations period in the procedural history and to explain the consequence of ineffective service. The court construes the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure governing service, not § 541.05. opinion →
Carlson v. Midwest Professional Planners, the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdivision 1(5), only to identify the six-year limitations issue it expressly declines to consider after affirming dismissal on other grounds. It does not construe, apply, or decide the statute. opinion →
Zweber v. Credit River Township, Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) appears only in a footnote identifying Zweber's unaddressed argument that the six-year limitations period for § 1983 claims preempts the 60-day certiorari period. The court expressly says it need not address that argument and leaves it for another case, so the statute is not construed or applied. opinion →
City of Lake Elmo v. 3M Co., Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in the description of 3M’s argument that the claims were barred by the general six-year statute of limitations. The court does not interpret the section or decide the accrual issue; it assumes a possible March 2005 accrual date and resolves timeliness through the parties’ tolling agreement. opinion →
Pollard v. Remington Arms Co., the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05 in a list of other jurisdictions' limitation periods to estimate how many claims may be time-barred. It does not interpret, apply, or otherwise state what § 541.05 means or requires. opinion →
Foster v. State of Minnesota, the opinion reports that the Minnesota trial court and Court of Appeals treated the claims as time-barred under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, but this court affirmed on res judicata and expressly declined to address the alternative statute-of-limitations ruling. Its later statement that the claim was subject to the same six-year limitation is collateral to the full-and-fair-opportunity analysis, not a construction of § 541.05. opinion →
Great N. Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in a footnote listing other statutes that may impose separate time limits; the opinion does not construe, apply, or decide anything about § 541.05. opinion →
In re RFC & Rescap Liquidating Trust Action, the opinion cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) only as support for the parties' agreement that Minnesota has a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims. the opinion does not construe the statute or decide whether it makes the claims time-barred; the accrual rules are attributed to other cases, and the time-barment issue is presented as Defendants' argument. opinion →
Osorio v. Minneapolis Hotel Acquisition Grp., LLC, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subdivision 1(2), only to state the parties' agreed six-year limitations period and calculate when the claim became time-barred. The court's ruling concerns relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C), not the meaning, requirements, or application of § 541.05. opinion →
Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to state the already-established six-year limitations period for Minnesota § 1983 actions and to explain why it has jurisdiction. It does not construe what § 541.05 means, requires, or authorizes. opinion →
ResCap Liquidating Trust v. LendingTree, LLC, the opinion does not construe Minn. Stat. § 541.05. It mentions the six-year limitations period only in a footnote as an assumed alternative, stating that the claim would still be timely; the court's actual ruling applies the ten-year period under Minn. Stat. § 541.04. opinion →
Tharp v. CitiMortgage, Inc., the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only as one of two authorities supporting the bare statement that certain claims were time-barred; the opinion does not identify a subsection, interpret the statute, or specifically apply its terms. opinion →
Perkins v. Proctor and Gamble Company, the court only cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05 in a comparison to conclude that Delaware's limitations period is shorter; it does not construe, apply, or explain what § 541.05 means or requires. opinion →
In re the Marriage of: Rachel Marie Benedict v. Benedict, the opinion mentions § 541.05 only in a footnote recounting Thomas’s argument that a fraud claim would be time-barred; the court does not adopt, analyze, or construe that statute. opinion →
Polywad, Inc. v. Federal Cartridge Company, the opinion applies Georgia law and mentions Minnesota law only in a footnote to explain that the result would be the same; it does not analyze, apply, or construe Minn. Stat. § 541.05 in deciding the motion. opinion →
J.J v. Ashlynn Marketing Group, Inc., the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05(1)–(2) only in a comparative list of states' limitation periods while discussing differences in consumer-protection laws; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
State of Minnesota Office of the Attorney General v. Madison Equities, Inc., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), only as the Attorney General’s alternative limitations-period argument and expressly declines to reach its applicability; the later dissent likewise reports that the majority did not reach the issue. opinion →
Reynolds, the opinion cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2), only in a list identifying the limitations periods applicable to various claims; it does not construe or apply what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Everest Stables, Inc. v. Porter, Wright LLP, the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to identify the six-year Minnesota limitations period asserted by the plaintiffs and to state that the claims would have been timely if it applied; the court instead applies Ohio law and does not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Harleysville Preferred Insurance Company v. Dude Products, Inc., the opinion reports a party’s argument that Minnesota has a six-year limitations period for property-damage claims; it does not construe or apply Minn. Stat. § 541.05 in deciding the insurance-coverage issue. opinion →
Korea Electric Terminal Co., LTD v. Phillips & Temro Industries, Inc., the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), only in a parenthetical supporting the six-year period for contract-based claims; it applies the UCC’s four-year period to the account-stated claim and does not independently construe § 541.05. opinion →
Jane Does 1-100 v. Omodt, the court mentions section 541.05 to identify the limitations period relevant to its retroactivity analysis under section 1983; it does not construe or independently decide what the statute means or requires. opinion →
Devine v. Rayette-Faberge, Inc., the court mentions § 541.05 only to describe the hypothetical result if Minnesota’s limitations period applied. It does not construe or apply § 541.05; the holding rests on the borrowing statute, § 541.14, and New York’s limitations period. opinion →
McBride v. Bitner, the court used § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to identify the six-year limitations deadline. Its analysis addressed whether the action was commenced under Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01 and whether service was effective; it did not construe or otherwise decide what § 541.05 requires. opinion →
Talley v. United States Postal Service, the court mentioned § 541.05 only as an alternative six-year limitations period for a breach-of-contract characterization, then rejected that alternative and applied Minn. Stat. § 572.19 (Subd. 2) instead. It did not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Sundquist v. AMERICAN HOIST AND DERRICK, INC., section 541.05 appears only as the plaintiff’s proposed limitations period. The court did not adopt or construe it; it held the action barred under the 90-day statute for vacating arbitration awards and alternatively under the NLRA’s six-month period. opinion →
Duresky v. Hanson, the opinion’s holding concerns tolling under Minn. Stat. § 541.13 and the availability of substituted service under § 170.55. The only reference to § 541.05 is a footnote quoting its six-year limitations text, while the quoted discussion of a six-year period is the appellants’ argument and was not a construction or application of § 541.05. opinion →
In Re Carlson, the court cites § 541.05, subd. 1(5), only as an example of common parlance while interpreting the scope of Minn. Stat. § 550.37, subd. 22. It does not decide what § 541.05 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Appelbaum v. Ceres Land Co., the court mentions § 541.05(6)'s six-year fraud period while rejecting its use as the limitations period for the federal securities claims; it holds that the Minnesota Blue Sky law's three-year period governs, without construing or applying § 541.05(6) itself. opinion →
Chris N. v. Burnsville, Minn., the court mentions § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only in recounting Cook’s comparison of Minnesota limitation periods and the former Garmon rule. The court adopts § 541.07(1) as the applicable period and decides the retroactivity of Wilson, not the meaning or application of § 541.05. opinion →
Acton Construction Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, section 541.05 appears only in the appellants’ argument, reporting the rule applied in Leisure Dynamics. The court did not construe or apply § 541.05; it held instead that the specific limitations period in the sales-tax-refund statute, § 297A.35, governed. opinion →
Sullivan v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank of New Ulm, the court construed Minn. Stat. § 541.051, holding that a negligent-failure-to-warn claim against an owner or possessor was outside that statute's limitations bar. It merely identified § 541.05 as the generally applicable six-year tort limitations statute and did not interpret or apply § 541.05 itself. opinion →
Ferens v. Deere & Co., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only in a footnote listing states with six-year personal-injury limitation periods. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the Minnesota statute. opinion →
Midwest Federal Savings & Loan Association of Minneapolis v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Co., the statute is cited only in the court’s discussion of alleged prejudice supporting denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. The court did not construe Minn. Stat. § 541.05; the limitations statement is incidental to the procedural ruling. opinion →
Carver v. Continental Grain Co., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only as the limitations period plaintiffs argued was analogous; the court expressly declined to decide which Minnesota law applied and resolved the motion under a federal tolling doctrine. opinion →
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. C & A Construction Co., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only as the six-year limitations period urged by the appellant; the court decides the case under and interprets Minn. Stat. § 541.051 instead. opinion →
Koderick v. Snyder Bros. Drug, Inc., the statute appears only in a citation supporting Roderick's rejected argument that the six-year limitations period applied. The court instead held that Minn. Stat. § 541.07 governed through respondeat superior and did not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Wittmer v. Ruegemer, the opinion cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only as an example of the general rule that limitations periods run despite a claimant's ignorance; the court's actual interpretation and holding concern Minn. Stat. § 541.051. opinion →
Thiele v. Stich, the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to identify the six-year legal-malpractice limitations period. Its actual holding concerns when the cause of action accrued under Minn. Stat. § 541.01, and it does not interpret or analyze § 541.05. opinion →
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in a multi-state list stating the limitations period and a damages-recovery date for a Minnesota bottler; the court expressly declined to address the proper statute of limitations applicable to the Consent Decrees. opinion →
In Re Professional Financial Management, Ltd., the statute appears only in a footnote reporting the plaintiffs' unsupported argument; the court does not construe or apply Minn. Stat. § 541.05. opinion →
Radloff v. First American National Bank of St. Cloud, N.A., the opinion mentions § 541.05(3) and (4) only as the general statutes the appellants argued would govern if § 541.07(8) did not apply. The court decided the meaning and application of § 541.07(8), and did not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Minnesota Mutual Fire & Casualty Co. v. Retrum, the court mentions § 541.05 only as the six-year statute contrasted with § 541.051 and describes the party's concession; it does not construe § 541.05 or decide its applicability. opinion →
Dokmo v. Independent School District No. 11, the court mentions § 541.05 as part of its practical rationale for requiring certiorari, but it does not construe or decide an issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Simington v. Minnesota Veterans Home, the court mentions subdivision 1(5) only to identify the limitations period applicable in the background of a § 1983 case; it does not construe or decide any issue about § 541.05. opinion →
E.S.P., Inc. v. Midway National Bank of St. Paul, the opinion recounts the trial court’s and court of appeals’ treatment of § 541.05 as procedural history, then notes that the supreme court reversed. The deciding court addresses UCC liability and attorney fees, not the meaning or application of § 541.05. opinion →
Rademacher v. Tountas, the court mentioned section 541.05 only to state the general six-year limitations period; its holding construed and applied the two-year period in Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1), not section 541.05. opinion →
Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Ahrenstorff, the court cited § 541.05 only to identify the former six-year limitations period while deciding whether Minn. Stat. § 582.30 applied retroactively; it did not construe or decide the meaning or application of § 541.05. opinion →
Doe v. American National Red Cross, the court quoted Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(5), only in a footnote while discussing an unresolved choice-of-law issue; it applied Wisconsin law and expressly said the choice issue was moot, so it did not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Soo Line Railroad Ex Rel. Minnesota v. B.J. Carney & Co., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only as the defendants’ cited source for a six-year limitations period. The court resolved the limitations issue under CERCLA’s federal commencement-date rule and did not interpret or apply § 541.05 itself. opinion →
Geldert v. American National Bank, the opinion only reports that the trial court dismissed two claims as time-barred under § 541.05; the appellant did not challenge that ruling, and the appellate court did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Hajjiri v. First Minnesota Savings Bank, the court cited Minn. Stat. § 541.05 as the applicable six-year limitations statute and concluded the action was untimely, but it did not construe or apply any provision of that statute. The holding concerned when service by mail commenced the action under the federal and Minnesota service rules. opinion →
Vesta State Bank v. Independent State Bank of Minnesota, the court mentions § 541.05 only to identify the general six-year limitations period for services, then holds that the transaction is a sale of goods governed by the U.C.C.'s four-year period. It does not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
BD. OF REGENTS OF U OF M v. Reid, the court did not decide which limitations period applies and expressly remanded that question to the district court; § 541.05, subd. 1(6) was cited only as one side of a comparison. opinion →
Oelschlager v. Magnuson, the court cited § 541.05 only to identify the ordinary six-year limitations period for negligence. It did not construe or independently decide the meaning or application of § 541.05; the statutory ruling concerned Minn. Stat. § 541.073 and its delayed-discovery period. opinion →
Harold E. ADAMSON, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ARMCO, INC., Defendant-Appellee, section 541.05(1) appears only in the appellants’ argument for applying the general six-year contract limitations period; the court instead applied § 541.07(5) and did not construe § 541.05. opinion →
Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Transit Commission, the opinion treats the six-year limitations period under Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(2) as undisputed and does not construe or decide what that statute means or requires. The holding concerns accrual under Minn. Stat. § 65B.53 and common-law indemnity principles. opinion →
Narum v. Eli Lilly and Co., the court mentions § 541.05 only as part of the parties’ agreement that the applicable limitations period was six years. It does not interpret the statute or address a statutory requirement; its accrual analysis relies on Minnesota-law principles and cited precedent. opinion →
Seavey v. Chrysler Corp., the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only while recounting an earlier order in the case; the present decision addresses res judicata and does not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
AKA Distributing Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., the court cited § 541.05 only to identify the general six-year limitations period, then held that the U.C.C.’s four-year period under § 336.2-725 governed; it did not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Maloney v. Dakota County Receiving Center, Inc., the court cited § 541.05 only as background contrast to the two-year malpractice limitation in § 541.07; it did not interpret or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Berres v. Anderson, the court did not decide whether Minn. Stat. § 541.05 applied; it mentioned the six-year period only as an alternative assumption after concluding the claim accrued in December 1986 and was already barred under the applicable limitations analysis. opinion →
Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., James M. Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., the court mentions § 541.05 only to recount Kulinski’s alternative limitations argument and then resolves the case by applying § 541.07(5); it does not interpret or independently analyze § 541.05. opinion →
Masepohl v. American Tobacco Co., Inc., the court merely reports the defendants’ statute-of-limitations argument and expressly declines to address it, so it does not decide anything about Minn. Stat. § 541.05. opinion →
Femrite v. Abbott Northwestern Hospital, the court merely recited the general six-year limitations period and expressly assumed, without deciding, that it applied; it decided the appeal on the merits and did not construe or definitively apply Minn. Stat. § 541.05. opinion →
Talley Ex Rel. Talley v. Portland Residence, Inc., the court cited § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to identify the ordinary six-year limitations period; its holding concerned tolling for legal disability under Minn. Stat. § 541.15(a), not the meaning or application of § 541.05. opinion →
Paulos v. Johnson, the court cited § 541.05 only to contrast its six-year limitations period with the two-year malpractice period in § 541.07. It held that § 541.07 governed these claims and did not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Beautone Specialties, Co., the court cites § 541.05 only as an analogous limitations-period benchmark supporting its laches analysis; it does not construe or apply the statute itself. opinion →
Medtronic, Inc. v. Shope, section 541.05 appears only as the statute supporting the defendant’s rejected characterization of his claims; the court decides the limitations issue under Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5) and does not interpret or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Koes v. Advanced Design, Inc., the court mentions § 541.05 only while recounting respondents’ argument; it does not interpret or apply that statute, instead deciding the limitations issue under § 541.051, subd. 4. opinion →
Peggy Rose Revocable Trust v. Eppich, the court mentions § 541.05 to describe the statutory fraud limitations period and discovery rule as background and a benchmark for assessing a private contractual arbitration deadline. Its decision concerns the reasonableness of the 18-month contractual period and expressly declines to impose the statutory discovery rule on the agreement, rather than construing or applying § 541.05 itself. opinion →
Twinco Romax Automotive Warehouse, Inc. v. Olson General Contractors, Inc., the court merely identified the general six- and four-year limitations periods in contrasting them with Minn. Stat. § 541.051, which it actually construed and applied. It did not decide any issue about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 541.05. opinion →
Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., the court mentioned Minn. Stat. § 541.05 in a footnote to identify potentially applicable six-year limitation periods, but it expressly declined to decide whether an EEOC investigation tolled those periods. The statute was not construed or applied as part of the holding. opinion →
Froland v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., the statute is mentioned only in a footnote as a possible limitations issue. The court states that the issue was not briefed or argued and need not be addressed, so it does not construe or apply Minn. Stat. § 541.05. opinion →
Nolan and Nolan v. City of Eagan, the court mentions § 541.05 only as a contrast to § 541.051. It does not interpret or apply § 541.05; the limitations ruling concerns whether § 541.051 governs the nuisance and trespass claims. opinion →
Allen v. Hennepin County, the statute appears only in describing appellant’s alternative argument for a six-year limitations period. The court expressly said it did not reach the merits of that argument and decided the case on failure to satisfy PELRA’s filing requirement. opinion →
Merritt v. Mendel, the court merely recounts the appellants' argument that § 541.05 applied; it did not construe or apply that statute, instead holding that Minn. Stat. § 541.051 governed and barred the claim. opinion →
Mehl v. Canadian Pacific Railway, Ltd., the court merely mentions the six-year personal-injury limitations period to explain that the plaintiffs could potentially refile in Minnesota state court; it does not construe, apply, or decide any issue under Minn. Stat. § 541.05. opinion →
Botten v. Shorma, section 541.05(1) appears only in a string citation identifying the parties' competing limitations-period theories. The majority resolves the case by applying Minn. Stat. § 541.07(5), while the separate discussion invoking § 541.05 is dissenting and therefore is not the court's holding about § 541.05(1). opinion →
Marriage of Gerber v. Gerber, the opinion recounts Har-Mar's interpretation of “action” under Minn. Stat. § 541.05 as background for interpreting the parallel term in § 541.04. The court's holding concerns § 541.04 and administrative income withholding, not the meaning or application of § 541.05. opinion →
Johnson v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co., the citation to Minn. Stat. § 541.05 appears only in Johnson’s argument. The court instead held that the statutorily required appraisal provision was governed by the two-year limitation on actions or suits under the policy, relying on Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, subd. 3; it did not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Strandlund v. Hawley, the court cited § 541.05, subd. 1(5) only to identify the limitations period relevant to its Rule 21 misjoinder and prejudice analysis; it did not construe or decide an issue about this statute. opinion →
Middleebrooks v. Interstate Credit Control, Inc., the statute is cited only in the background to describe when the debt allegedly became stale; the court does not interpret, apply, or decide any issue about § 541.05. opinion →
Hebert v. CITY OF FIFTY LAKES, the court cited Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(8) to identify the six-year limitation for permanent trespass, but it did not construe or apply the statute to resolve the case. Instead, it held that factual issues remained about whether the trespass was permanent or continuing and affirmed denial of summary judgment. opinion →
Powell v. I-Flow Corp., the court cited § 541.05 in a footnote to summarize Minnesota limitations periods, but did not construe the statute or decide how it applied to the claims. The court's ruling concerned transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). opinion →
Georgen-Running v. Grimlie (In Re Grimlie), the court mentions § 541.05 subd. 1(6) only in a footnote as background support for the six-year limitations period; it does not decide a limitations issue or construe how the statute applies. opinion →
In re Individual 35W Bridge Litigation, the opinion construes and applies Minn. Stat. § 541.051, while § 541.05 appears only in a codification citation for a 2007 amendment and is not interpreted or applied. opinion →
Land O' Lakes, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance, the opinion cites § 541.05, subd. 1(1), to state a conditional six-year limitations framework while introducing the duty-to-defend accrual issue and recounting the parties’ arguments. the opinion ends before the court resolves that issue, so it does not show a holding construing or applying the statute. opinion →
EEP Workers' Compensation Fund v. Fun & Sun, Inc., the court cited § 541.05 only to identify the limitations period for the breach-of-contract action while ruling that laches was unavailable; it did not construe or otherwise decide an issue about the statute. opinion →
A.P.I., Inc. v. Home Insurance, the court listed Minn. Stat. § 541.05 as a possible limitations issue but expressly declined to decide timeliness and assumed the claims were not time-barred. The statute therefore was not construed or applied in the holding. opinion →
In re Petters Co., the statute is mentioned only while framing an unresolved timeliness issue. The court does not decide the meaning or application of Minn. Stat. § 541.05; it resolves the claims on another ground under United States v. Bame. opinion →
Hooper v. State, section 541.05 is cited only as an example of an ordinary tolling/discovery rule supporting the court’s conclusion that Minn. Stat. § 590.01’s postconviction limitations period is nonjurisdictional. The court does not construe or apply § 541.05. opinion →
Kaye v. Nath Companies (In re Duke & King Acquisition Corp.), the court cites Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only in a parenthetical quotation from In re Petters to identify an undisputed six-year limitations premise. It does not construe the statute or decide how either subsection applies; the substantive timing issue addressed is the interaction with 11 U.S.C. § 546(a). opinion →
Minnesota Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v. Granite Re, Inc., the court cited Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1), only to identify Minnesota’s default six-year limitations period as a comparison to the bond’s contractual one-year period. It did not construe or independently apply the statute; its holding concerned equitable tolling of the contractual bond limitation. opinion →
Songa v. Sunrise Senior Living Investments Inc., the court mentions § 541.05, subd. 1(5) in a footnote while addressing an alternative NIED characterization, but it does not decide the limitations issue because it holds that any NIED claim fails on the merits. opinion →
Whitney v. Guys, Inc., the court mentions § 541.05 as the defendants’ position in a choice-of-law dispute and notes that Minnesota law would be more permissive, but it selects Delaware law and does not construe or apply the Minnesota statute. opinion →
In re Actiq Sales & Marketing Practices Litigation, the court cited Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) only through Jacobson as one example of differing state limitation periods in its choice-of-law analysis. It did not interpret or independently apply the Minnesota statute. opinion →
County of Dakota v. Milan (In re Milan), the opinion mentions Minn. Stat. § 541.05 only in a footnote explaining that the court did not need to reach the Milans' alternative arguments; it does not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Halverson v. Rolvaag, this describes the district court’s apparent finding, not the appellate court’s own decision about § 541.05. opinion →
Independent Consolidated School District No. 24 v. Carlstrom, the reference to § 541.05 appears in the school district’s contention, not in the court’s own ruling about the section. opinion →
KOHOUT v. Shakopee Foundry Co., the court construes the scope of § 541.07(5)'s two-year limit; § 541.05(1) appears as the alternative urged by plaintiffs. opinion →
Christensen v. State, Department of Conservation, Game & Fish, the court only describes a question from another case; its own decision concerns § 176.101, subd. 6. opinion →
Hall v. Community Credit Company, the court dismissed the appeal without deciding whether § 541.05’s six-year limitation applied. opinion →
Kelly v. Kelly, the court's application of § 541.05 is conditional; it identifies a different limitations period as applicable. opinion →
Holman v. General Ins. Co. of America, the court uses the limitations period to assess contingent liability under the collateral agreement and garnishment statute; it does not decide a rule of § 541.05. opinion →
Kopperud v. Agers, the court cites § 541.05’s fraud discovery rule to explain why a different limitations provision does not allow tolling. opinion →
Bednarek v. Bednarek, the court mentions § 541.05 as an exception in the tax-intercept statute while deciding whether § 541.04 bars collection of older child support arrears. opinion →
Johnson v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., the court cites § 541.05 as a possible limitations period for a § 1981 claim but decides only that Johnson had at least two years to sue. opinion →
Henderson v. Allina Health System, the court rejects the appellant’s proposed six-year limitation period and holds that the medical malpractice limitation period under section 541.07 applies. opinion →
Hester v. Redwood County, the court cites the section as a possible limitations period but resolves the claims on their merits without deciding whether it applies. opinion →
Zimmerschied v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., the court discusses possible limitations problems but dismisses the fraud claim without prejudice for failing to plead fraud with particularity. opinion →
ASI, Inc. v. Aquawood, LLC, the court assumed a six-year limitations period under the section for this motion without deciding which period governs abuse of process claims. opinion →
Sigler v. Ecolab Inc., the court uses Section 541.05’s limitations periods to identify a conflict with Oregon law for its choice-of-law analysis. opinion →

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under Minn. Stat. § 541.05. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace