Minn. Stat. § 645.17

When construing an ambiguous statute, courts presume the legislature did not intend absurd or unreasonable results.

In re the Risk Level Determination of C.M. · filed 1998-06-02(1)

Where a statute is ambiguous, a court applies established canons of construction. We must presume that the legislature did not intend absurd and unreasonable results. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1996). ... The unreasonableness of the state’s construction is closely related to the question of its constitutionality.

Section 645.17(1) permits a court to look beyond a statute’s plain language to avoid an absurd result when that language utterly departs from a clearly expressed legislative goal.

Olson v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1997-02-13(1)

When, however, the literal meaning of the words of a statute would produce an absurd result, we have recognized our obligation to look beyond the statutory language to other indicia of legislative intent. Wegener v. Commissioner of Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn.1993); see Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1). ... We will only exercise our power to undertake such an expanded inquiry when a party demonstrates that the statute's plain language utterly departs from a clearly expressed goal of the legislature. ... Because it simply is not clear that the legislature intended to benefit motorists alone in enacting the seat belt gag rule, we cannot say that applying the plain language of the statute to crashworthiness cases produces an absurd result that utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when a statute is construed.

Dicks v. Minnesota Department of Administration · filed 2001-04-24(1)

In construing a statute, we are to presume that the legislature did not intend a result that is “absurd” or “unreasonable.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2000). We conclude that an interpretation of the Minnesota Prevailing Wage Act that caused the legislature to nullify its own act in approving the collective bargaining agreement would be just such an untenable result.

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to look beyond a statute’s literal meaning when that reading would produce an absurd result.

Guderian v. Olmsted County · filed 1999-07-06(1)

“It is well settled that courts may presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.” State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn.1996) (citing Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994)). Nevertheless, we face the incongruity between sections 1 and 5. When faced with such an absurd result, courts must look beyond a statute’s literal meaning to ascertain and fulfill the legislature’s intent.

Section 645.17(1)'s presumption against absurd results does not justify disregarding unambiguous statutory language merely because its application seems unreasonable.

Scott v. Forest Lake Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge · filed 1999-08-24(1)

We are not persuaded by the unpublished opinions cited by Forest Lake Chrysler because those opinions improperly applied the statutory presumption set forth in Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) to construe a statute that is not ambiguous.

Section 645.17 presumes that every word of a statute has meaning and cautions against absurd results, but the latter presumption does not displace clear statutory language.

Bortnem v. Commissioner of Public Safety · filed 2000-05-23(1), (2)

Section 645.17(2) provides that “[t]he legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” That language supports our conclusion that each word of the statute must be given meaning. But Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) cautions that “[t]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” ... Ultimately, the language of Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (1998) convinces us that we cannot adopt the state’s position on absurdity.

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when a court construes an ambiguous statute.

Will & Appointment of Estate of Kipke v. Kipka · filed 2002-06-04(1)

Where a statute is ambiguous, a court applies established canons of construction and must presume that the legislature did not intend absurd and unreasonable results. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000). ... If we were to read subdivision 6(3) so as to limit the power of a principal to act, we believe we would render the statute unreasonable and absurd.

Section 645.17(1) permits a court to depart from a statute's plain meaning when applying it would produce an absurd or unreasonable result that departs from the statute's purpose.

Msi v. Lmcit · filed 2002-06-26(1)

But although plain meaning is the governing principle in applying statutory language, Minnesota courts will not give effect to plain meaning if it produces an absurd or an unreasonable result that departs from the purpose of the statute. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000); ... Application of the plain meaning of the statutory definition of "motor vehicle" to this case produces an absurd and unreasonable result that plainly departs from the first stated purpose of the no-fault act.

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to reject a statute’s plain meaning when it produces an absurd or unreasonable result that departs from the statute’s purpose.

Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. v. League of Minnesota Cities Insurance Trust · filed 2002-06-26(1)

But although plain meaning is the governing principle in applying statutory language, Minnesota courts will not give effect to plain meaning if it produces an absurd or an unreasonable result that departs from the purpose of the statute.

Section 645.17(1)’s presumption against absurd results does not displace plain statutory language merely because another reading would better serve a law’s purposes.

Behr v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2002-01-29(1)

Although the No-Fault Act’s purposes may in some sense be served by disregarding the plain language of the statute in this case, the construction afforded the statute above does not rise to the level of an absurdity, which may, in some cases, permit this court to disregard plain language and embrace a purposive construction.

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result when interpreting a statute.

Hyatt v. Anoka Police Department · filed 2004-07-20(1)

The city counters that because application of the statute to police dogs leads to absurd results, we must look beyond the plain language in order to ascertain and fulfill the legislature's intent. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2002) (stating that when "ascertaining the intention of the legislature," courts may presume that "legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable"). While the language of the dog bite statute appears clear on its face, we agree with the city that the statute's application to police dogs leads to absurd results, presumably not intended by the legislature.

Section 645.17(1)’s presumption against absurd results does not displace a statute’s plain meaning merely because its application may be undesirable; the result must be utterly absurd or utterly confound a clear legislative purpose.

Hyatt v. Anoka Police Department · filed 2005-02-10(1)

In Lena Hyatt’s situation, although there might be good policy reasons to not apply the dog bite statute to police dogs, we cannot say that holding municipalities liable for police dog injuries or attacks is “utterly absurd” or “utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.”

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result; applying that presumption, good cause to extend a filing deadline need not mean literal impossibility.

Td v. Ak · filed 2004-04-06(1)

In ascertaining the intention of the legislature, we may assume that the legislature does not intend a result that is unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2002). It would be unreasonable to permit a failure to meet the 30-day filing requirement to be excused for good cause and then limit good cause to circumstances where it is impossible to meet the filing requirement.

Section 645.17(1)'s presumption against absurd results generally applies only when statutory language is ambiguous and cannot override its plain meaning.

Weston v. McWilliams & Associates, Inc. · filed 2006-06-29(1)

But this rule of construction only operates where the words of a statute are ambiguous; the rule cannot generally be used to override the plain language of a statute.

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result when a court interprets an ambiguous statute.

Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency · filed 2007-03-15(1)

It is well settled that when we seek to “ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature” with regard to an ambiguous statute,7 Blanche, 599 N.W.2d at 166 (quotation omitted), we presume that the legislature does not intend a result that is unreasonable. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2006).

Section 645.17(1)’s presumption against absurd results does not permit a court to depart from clear, unambiguous statutory language.

In Re the Risk Level Determination of G.G. · filed 2009-08-25(1)

Absurd and unreasonable results are presumed to be against the legislature’s intent. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2008). ... But, unlike the word “enters,” the word “confinement” is clearly and unambiguously defined in the statute where it is used. Where a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, a reviewing court must give effect to the plain meaning of the statute and may not engage in any further construction.

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result when statutes are construed together.

State Ex Rel. Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass'n v. Nicollet County Board of County Commissioners · filed 2009-09-01(1)

To construe section 116B.10 as overriding or usurping the plain language of sections 116B.02 and 116B.03 would be unreasonable. We presume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2008). Thus, we disagree with the DNR that section 116B.10 provides the exclusive mechanism by which a citizen may challenge an agency’s conduct.

Section 645.17(1) requires courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result when construing an ambiguous statute.

In re the Financial Responsibility for the Out-of-Home Placement Costs for S.M. · filed 2011-05-31(1)

In addition to applying the canons of construction, we must assume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2010). Construing Minn.Stat. § 256G.10 to mean that the county financially responsible for a child’s social services is the county of residence of the child’s parent could easily lead to such a result, for at least four reasons.

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when construing a statute.

State v. Hansen · filed 2011-11-21(1)

Further, in ascertaining legislative intent, we presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2010). Here, to construe the deer baiting statute as urged by respondent would so restrict the right of a farmer who hunts on his own property that the farmer’s right to hunt would not exist. This is an absurd result that the legislature certainly did not intend.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend unreasonable results when courts interpret statutes.

County of Dakota v. Cameron · filed 2012-03-26

Cameron’s proposed construction of the term “comparable property” is also unpersuasive because it is unreasonable. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2010) (stating that, in ascertaining legislative intent, courts presume that the legislature does not intend results that are “absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”); ... And because the legislature cannot guarantee completion of a purchase, we reject Cameron’s argument that a comparable property must be an existing property that is available for purchase.

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result, but that presumption applies only when a statute’s plain meaning utterly confounds its clear purpose.

Vermillion State Bank v. State ex rel. Department of Transportation · filed 2017-04-17(1)

When construing a statute, this court presumes that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2016). This canon, however, is applicable only “in an exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute utterly confounds the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” State v. Schouweiler, 887 N.W.2d 22, 26-27 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). As stated above, the plain language of Minn. Stat. § 117.045 is consistent with its goal of making landowners whole.

Section 645.17’s presumption against absurd or unreasonable results is used to determine legislative intent only when the statute being interpreted is ambiguous.

Feldmann Imports Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC · filed 2020-12-11(1)

But Feldmann’s argument ignores the principle that courts consult such canons of construction to determine legislative intent only when a statute is ambiguous.

Section 645.17(1)’s presumption against absurd or unreasonable results does not apply when the statutory language is unambiguous.

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: S. F., Commissioner of Children, Youth, and Families, Legal Custodian. ... · filed 2025-10-27(1)

Grandmother does not argue that the language of the statutory-affidavit requirement is ambiguous, and we do not discern any ambiguity. One could argue—as a matter of policy—that the statutory-affidavit requirement is unreasonable. However, in the absence of ambiguous statutory language justifying consideration of legislative intent and application of legislative presumptions, there is no occasion for us to consider that possibility.

Section 645.17 favors an interpretation that gives statutory provisions effect rather than making them a nullity.

Specktor v. Commissioner of Revenue · filed 1981-07-31

The statutes quoted above would be a nullity if federal adjusted gross' income were conclusive.

Section 645.17(2) directs courts to presume that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective when construing related provisions.

MacK v. City of Minneapolis · filed 1983-05-06(2)

Courts are to presume the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective, Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1982), and, therefore, we cannot narrowly focus on Minn.Stat. § 176.521 alone. To hold that section 176.081 does not apply where the parties stipulate a settlement would greatly reduce the effect of the section.

Section 645.17(2) favors a reading that gives effect to every part of a statute.

Application of Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. · filed 1985-05-14(2)

To hold otherwise would render superfluous the first sentence of that section. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1984) (legislature intends the entire statute to be effective).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends statutes to be effective and certain, favoring an interpretation that can be applied with certainty.

Shakopee Ford, Inc. v. Wittenberg · filed 1985-07-09(2)

It is also presumed that the legislature intends a statute “be effective and certain.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1980). ... The amount can be determined with certainty even if the total finance charge is not specified in the retail agreement.

Section 645.17(2) calls for a statute to be read in its entirety so that its whole is given effect.

Roberts v. Commissioner of Public Safety · filed 1985-07-23(2)

The implied consent statute must be read in its entirety to give effect to its whole. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1984).

Section 645.17(2) favors a construction that gives effect to related statutory provisions rather than making one redundant.

Anderson v. Medtronic, Inc. · filed 1986-02-28(2)

Since the legislature intends that the entire statute be effective, Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1984), we hold that the proper construction of the “cost of such suit” language in Minn.Stat. § 181.14 is all out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred in prosecuting or defending the action not including attorney fees.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.

Pitkin v. Gross · filed 1986-04-15(2)

However, in ascertaining the intent of the legislature, this court must be guided by the presumption that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1984). We believe that this presumption governs in this case.

Section 645.17(2) directs courts to interpret a statute so that all its provisions have effect.

Sherman v. Whirlpool Corp. · filed 1986-05-02(2)

Furthermore, respondents are correct in arguing that if monetary benefits included rehabilitation services, the entire section would have no retroactive effect and subdivision 11(a) would be a nullity. This court will interpret a statute in such a way as to give effect to all of its provisions.

Section 645.17(2) favors reading separate adjustment provisions to have separate effects.

Mapleton Community Home, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Human Services · filed 1986-08-08(2)

Any other interpretation would render the language providing for a second adjustment superfluous. In construing a statute, we presume the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. 2 (1984).

Section 645.17(1) and (2) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result and intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.

Matter of Spence · filed 1989-01-10(1), (2)

Such a construction would ignore the presumptions that the legislature does not intend an absurd result, and intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.

Section 645.17, subdivision 2, calls for apparently inconsistent statutory provisions to be read together, if possible, so both have effect.

Schleck v. State · filed 1989-07-18subd. 2

On their faces, the two laws appear to be inconsistent. It is our duty to give effect to both, if possible. Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. 2 (1988).

Section 645.17 presumes that statutes should be construed to be effective and certain and to produce reasonable, nonabsurd results.

Maeser v. COOK, VOEGELE AND NELSON, PA · filed 1989-10-17(1-2)

To interpret the operation of the MTA as the sole method of quieting title would effectively eliminate the action to determine adverse claims, Minn.Stat. § 559.01 (1988), and the Torrens proceeding to register property, Minn.Stat. § 508.22 (1988), as alternative methods. Statutes should be construed to be effective and certain and to achieve a result that is reasonable and not absurd. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1-2) (1988).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and certain.

Carlson v. Lilyerd · filed 1989-12-19(2)

In light of the statute's stated policy of favoring family farm entities, we believe that our interpretation of the first refusal provision is consistent with the idea that "[t]he objective of all [statutory] interpretation and construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature," Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1984) (emphasis added) as well as the idea that "[t]he legislature intends [an] entire statute to be effective and certain." Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1984) (emphasis added).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain, so an interpretation should not undermine another provision.

Olson v. Lovett · filed 1990-06-12(2)

Affirming the trial court and allowing it to inflict binding ADR on the parties would substantially abrogate those provisions of subdivision 2a requiring that the parties consent to binding ADR and that they agree on the special magistrate. By law, “[t]he legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain,” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (1988) (emphasis added) and “[ejvery law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (emphasis added).

Section 645.17(2) supports an interpretation that gives effect to an entire statute.

Gopher Oil Co., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California · filed 1991-02-15(2)

To hold otherwise would do violence to the legislature’s intention that the entire statute be effective.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to be effective and certain.

Matter of Mn. Indep. Equal Access · filed 1991-11-19(2)

US West's construction of Minn.Stat. § 237.60, *521 subd. 3, as prohibiting only rate, and not service area, discrimination impermissibly disregards the first two sentences of the statute and focuses instead upon the discussion of rate discrimination. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (1990) ("The legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain").

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to have effect, so a reading that disregards operative sentences is disfavored.

In re the Minnesota Independent Equal Access Corporation's Application for a Certificate of Public Convenience & Necessity · filed 1991-11-19(2)

US West’s construction of Minn.Stat. § 237.60, *521subd. 3, as prohibiting only rate, and not service area, discrimination impermissibly disregards the first two sentences of the statute and focuses instead upon the discussion of rate discrimination. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (1990) (“The legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”).

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective, so related provisions should be read together.

Valenty v. Medical Concepts Development, Inc. · filed 1992-11-03(2)

While we re-affirm the conclusion that unsuitability of work is not a stated "exception" to the voluntary quit provision, we are of the opinion that the "unsuitability" and "voluntary quit" provisions must be considered together. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (1990) ("The legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.").

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective, so courts give purpose to its provisions when construing related terms.

American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lindsay · filed 1993-06-01(2)

A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (1992). ... The only way to accomplish this is to transfer the substance of the “agency” definition to the definition of the related term “agent,” just as the legislature did at its next session.

Section 645.17(2) favors interpretations that give effect to every provision of a statute.

Kirkwold Const. v. MGA CONST. · filed 1994-03-11(2)

This interpretation would render the phrase meaningless. A mortgagee with actual notice of an existing lien arising out of the visible improvement would already be subject to a lien because all liens would have attached with the visible improvement. Whenever possible, this Court must interpret a statute so as to give effect to all of its provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1992).

Section 645.17(2) directs courts, when possible, to interpret a statute so that all its provisions have effect.

Kirkwold Construction Co. v. M.G.A. Construction, Inc. · filed 1994-03-11(2)

This interpretation would render the phrase meaningless. A mortgagee with actual notice of an existing Ken arising out of the visible improvement would already be subject to a Ken because aU Kens would have attached with the visible improvement. Whenever possible, this Court must interpret a statute so as to give effect to all of its provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1992).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to have effect.

Kowler Associates v. Ross · filed 1996-03-26(2)

Moreover, if an order that vacates an award and directs rehearing were construed to be appealable as an order denying confirmation of the award, then section 572.26, subd. 1(5), would be of no effect and an order vacating an award always would be appeal-able, even if a rehearing has been directed. Such a construction would be inconsistent with the rules of statutory interpretation and the statutory prohibition against appeals from orders directing a rehearing.

Section 645.17(2) favors reading statutes so that all their provisions are effective and certain.

Matter of Rate Appeals of Lyngblomsten Care Center · filed 1998-04-28(2)

Statutes are to be read to make the entire statute effective and certain. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1996). In this case, DHS’s reading of sections 144A.071 and 256B.431 gives meaning to and makes effective all of the provisions brought into question by this ease.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to be effective and certain and does not intend a result impossible to execute.

Kasdan v. Berney · filed 1999-01-05

Although Minn.Stat. § 518C.204 does not currently define administrative requests as “petitions,” to include such requests as “petitions” would render meaningless the statute’s requirement that the court consider the time allowed to file a responsive pleading in determining jurisdiction. ... see also Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (1996) (requiring this court to presume legislature intends entire statute to be effective and certain and does not intend result that is impossible to execute). Thus, Kasdan’s administrative request for modification also is not a “petition or comparable pleading” within the Act.

Section 645.17(2) calls for interpreting a statute so that the entire statute is effective.

Blanche v. 1995 Pontiac Grand Prix (VIN: 162WJ12M95F268403) · filed 1999-09-09(2)

Laws should be interpreted so as to make the entire statute effective. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1998). We cannot reconcile the statute's detailed notice requirements with the limited judicial procedure the state requests and the dissent sets forth.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intended every part of a statute to have effect.

Kismet Investors, Inc. v. County of Benton · filed 2000-09-12(2)

Moreover, to interpret the statutory language to apply both standards to use variances would read the more demanding particular-hardship standard out of the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (1998) (stating legislature intends entire statute to be effective). Our construction of the statute gives practical meaning to both standards.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends statutes to be effective and certain and does not intend results impossible to execute.

Cuna Mutual Insurance Society v. Commissioner of Revenue · filed 2002-07-18(1), (2)

Moreover, we presume that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and certain. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2000). We must also presume that the legislature does not intend a result that is impossible of execution. . Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000). Consistent with our rules of statutory construction, we conclude that an insurance company with CUNA’s asset volume that sells both life insurance and also disability insurance and health and accident insurance need not also sell property insurance in order to qualify as a mutual property and casualty company entitled under the split-rate tax structure of Minn. Stat. § 60A.15, subd. 1(e) to a tax rate of 2 percent on its life insurance premiums and 1.26 percent on its non-life premiums.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature does not intend an interpretation that renders part of a statute ineffective.

Wood v. Diamonds Sports Bar & Grill, Inc. · filed 2002-12-24(2)

Moreover, the suggested purpose of providing time for pre-litigation investigation would render part of the statute ineffective, and we presume that the legislature does not intend such an outcome.

Section 645.17(2) requires courts to presume that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.

State v. Coleman · filed 2003-05-20(2)

If the legislature intended for all of section 169A to be effective and certain as Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) requires this court to presume, it could not have intended the reference to “Minnesota Statutes 1998” as a limitation of the ten-year look-back period in subdivision 3(1).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and certain, supporting different meanings for different terms in its subdivisions.

Vlahos v. R&I Construction of Bloomington, Inc. · filed 2004-04-01(2)

Collins’ contention violates the statutory presumption that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and certain. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2002); State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 158 (Minn.2000). The legislature would not have employed different terms in different subdivisions of the statute if it had intended those subdivisions to have the- same effect.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every provision of a statute to have effect.

Middle River-Snake River Watershed District v. Dennis Drewes, Inc. · filed 2005-02-15(2)

Second, courts must presume that the legislature intends to give effect to all provisions of a statute, Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2004), and must construe every law, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2004). To apply a general 60-day extension whether or not an affidavit is filed would invalidate part of subdivision 6(c)’s operative language and eviscerate the effect of the mandatory-dismissal provision.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to be effective, weighing against an interpretation that would impede an existing provision.

Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Bjelland · filed 2006-02-02(2)

The first presumption we rely on in this case is that we presume that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2004). ... Zurich’s interpretation of the 2000 amendments could seriously impede the operation of the distribution formula, running counter to our presumption that the entire statute be given effect.

Section 645.17 directs courts to presume that the legislature does not intend absurd results and intends every part of a statute to have effect.

Ortell v. City of Nowthen · filed 2012-04-02(1), (2)

If subdivision le(a)(2) is interpreted to mean that there is effectively no time after which a nonconformity lapses, it is an absurd result; the legislature would not give a municipality the power to regulate nonconformities and then block their ability to regulate. See MinmStat. § 645.17(1) (“[T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd.”). Second, we seek to give effect to all the provisions of a statute. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2). If a nonconforming property owner may apply at any time, without limit, for a building permit, the first clause of the subdivision, which states that a nonconformity ceases if it is discontinued for a period of more than one year, has no meaning. Only one interpretation of this subdivision satisfies the rules of statutory construction: the language “[i]n this case” must refer to a building permit applied for within 180 days of the damage to the property.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends a statute to be effective and certain, weighing against an interpretation that makes the same act count differently depending on the response to it.

State v. PTACEK · filed 2009-06-09(2)

In ascertaining the legislature’s intent, we presume that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2008). ... If contact without stimulation is not fellatio, whether an act was sexual penetration would depend on the response to the act, and, depending on the response, exactly the same act could be sexual penetration in one instance but not in another. We do not believe that the legislature could have intended such a result when it enacted a statute that prohibits certain acts.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the Legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain, disfavoring interpretations that make a statutory condition virtually meaningless.

Brayton v. Pawlenty · filed 2010-05-05(2)

This result is contrary to the statutory presumption that "the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. " Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (emphasis added). Reading the statute to require enactment of a balanced budget as a predicate to the exercise of unallotment authority provides a definite and logical reference point for measuring whether current revenues are "less than anticipated."

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the Legislature intends the entire statute to be effective, weighing against treating obsolete wording as an implied repeal.

In re 2010 Gubernatorial Election · filed 2010-12-07(2)

And, in ascertaining legislative intent, we are to presume that the Legislature intends the entire statute to be effective. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2008). ... We decline to deem Minn.Stat. §§ 204C.20 and 206.86 repealed by implication.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective, so a statutory requirement must be given meaning beyond another requirement it would otherwise duplicate.

J.E.B. v. Danks · filed 2010-07-22

We are to assume that “the legislature intends the ... entire statute to be effective and certain.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2008); ... If the requirement of “good faith” is to have meaning, the reporter must make a showing of state of mind that goes beyond mere “suspicion.”

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain, so courts should avoid interpretations that make express language meaningless.

Minnwest Bank v. Arends · filed 2011-08-15(2)

Application of a substantial-compliance standard in this case would, thus, render this statutory notice requirement meaningless. We presume that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and certain, and we decline to construe the statute in such a way as to render express statutory language meaningless.

Section 645.17(2) favors reading a statute so that none of its words is rendered ineffective.

Axelberg v. Commissioner of Public Safety · filed 2014-05-21(2)

In addition, if we were to read “an affirmative defense” in subdivision 3(c) to allow for innumerable other affirmative defenses to be offered at implied consent hearings, we would be reading the word “limited” in subdivision 3(b) out of the statute entirely. The rules of statutory interpretation do not permit us to do that. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2012) (“[T]he legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.”).

Section 645.17(2) directs courts to construe a statute so that each of its provisions has effect.

Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud · filed 2014-09-10(2)

Interpreting subdivision 2 to permit reallocation of an uncollectible share to a severally liable defendant would violate the principle that a statute must be construed in a manner that gives effect to each of its provisions. See Am. Family Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000); accord Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2012).

Section 645.17 permits courts to presume that the legislature intended every statutory provision to be effective, favoring an interpretation that gives effect to an exception.

Builders Ass'n v. City of St. Paul · filed 2012-07-23(2)

These canons ensure that all provisions of law are effective, and none are unnecessary or incapable of execution. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2010) (noting that courts may presume “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”). ... A contrary interpretation would result in the exception having no effect.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain, weighing against a reading that makes a provision redundant.

Nassar v. U.S. Home Corporation d/b/a Lennar Homes · filed 2015-04-27(2)

Adopting appellants’ construction of the statute would also contravene the presumption that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain,” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2014), as district courts are already empowered, when civil actions are litigated in bad faith, to award fees as a sanction under Minn. Stat. § 549.211 (2014) and Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.03.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to be effective, so a court should reject an interpretation that makes a statutory requirement superfluous.

Dykhoff v. Xcel Energy · filed 2013-12-26(2)

But we must give effect to both prongs of the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2012) (noting that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective”).

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to have effect, so courts avoid readings that make statutory language meaningless.

Determination of an Appropriate Unit & Certification as Exclusive Representative Service Employees International Union, Local 284 v. University of Minnesota, Unit 8 · filed 2017-09-05

And this court does not interpret a statute in a way that would render portions of a the statute meaningless. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2016) (stating that courts presume that the legislature “intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”). Here, the specific provision referring to “rank” controls over the more general provision referring to “all instructional employees.” See Minn. Stat. § 179A.11, subd. 1(8). And reading the statute to apply as a blanket matter to “all instructional employees,” without reference to rank, which the union urges us to do, would render the additional statutory language referring to “rank” meaningless. See id.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain, weighing against an interpretation that renders part of it ineffective.

In re Seifert · filed 2016-01-25

A presumption in ascertaining legislative intent includes, “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17. Reading Mr. Seifert’s farm proceeds as being outside of the purview of the “earnings” definition of Minn. Stat. § 571.921 would be tantamount to “erasing” a portion of Mínn. Stat. § 571.921. Such a result goes against a clear presumption in ascertaining legislative intent by rendering a portion of a statute ineffective.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends reasonable results and intends every part of a statute to be effective.

State of Minnesota, ex rel., Branden Lee Pollard v. Tom Roy, Commissioner of Corrections · filed 2016-04-11

If an offender could be “on supervised release,” while in prison, this subdivision would have no meaning for that offender. For example, an offender could not be “reimprison[ed]” for violating supervised release, if serving supervised release in prison. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (providing that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable” and that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”).

The presumption that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective provides no guidance when both reasonable interpretations leave terms superfluous.

State of Minnesota v. Reyes · filed 2017-01-09(2)

Because the definition contains superfluous terms under both reasonable interpretations, the presumption that the legislature intended the entire statute to be given effect provides no guidance.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to be effective, so a statutory directive should not be rendered superfluous.

Ashland Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue · filed 2017-08-02(2)

Relying on this Revenue Notice would render superfluous the directive in Minh. Stat. § 290.01, subd. 19, to recognize “any elections” made by a taxpayer. This we cannot do. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2016) (stating that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain”).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.

In re the Welfare of I.N.A. · filed 2017-09-05(2)

Finally, courts are to presume that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2016). I.N.A.’s construction of the statute would make Minn. Stat. § 260B.198, subd. 7, ineffective, because a court would lack authority to impose any of the listed conditions under subdivision 1 during a stay of adjudication.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain, weighing against an interpretation that would make part of a statute ineffective.

Christensen v. Healey · filed 2017-07-03(2)

Second, courts must presume that “the legislature intends [for an] entire statute to be effective ahd certain.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2016). Interpreting a child’s primary residence to be determined solely by which parent has the greater portion of parenting time would render ineffective a portion of Minn. Stat. § 518,175.

Section 645.17 presumes that the Legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain and favors the public interest over private interests.

Daniel v. City of Minneapolis · filed 2019-02-27(2), (5)

To ascertain the Legislature's intent, we construe the law to "give effect to all its provisions," id. , presume that the Legislature "intends the entire statute to be effective and certain," and presume that the Legislature "intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest," Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2), (5) (2018). Applying these principles here, we are compelled to conclude that the decision in Karst is contrary to the plain language of the workers' compensation act and the human rights act.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends reasonable results and intends every part of a statute to be effective.

State of Minnesota v. Martens · filed 2023-09-18(1), (2)

Furthermore, we presume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable” and “intends the entire statute to be effective.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1), (2) (2022). ... Martens’s interpretation of the word “child” would render the three-year provision ineffective and lead to unreasonable results.

Section 645.17(2) directs courts to presume that the legislature intended a statute to be effective.

COUNTY OF FREEBORN BY TUVESON v. Bryson · filed 1976-06-18(2)

Thus, the grantee would benefit derivatively from the farmer’s immunity and the Act would be ineffective. We must presume that the legislature intended the Act to be effective. Minn. St. 645.17(2).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and certain.

Fleck v. Spannaus · filed 1977-02-18(2)

If the Act were not to apply to causes of action pending on the date of its termination (or of its preemption by ERISA), the legislature would have performed a useless act. An act would have been passed which would have had no effect. We decline to so hold. See, Minn. St. 645.17(2).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the Legislature intends the entire statute to be effective.

Abshir Abtidon Barrow v. State of Minnesota · filed 2015-04-15(2)

Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 73-74, 93 N.W.2d 690, 698 (1958) (“We apply the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be read and construed as a whole so as to harmonize and give effect to all its parts. Moreover, various provisions of the same statute must be interpreted in the light of each other, and the legislature must be presumed to have understood the effect of its words and intended the entire statute to be effective and certain.”); see Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2014) (noting that the Legislature “intends the entire statute to be effective”).

Section 645.17(2) disfavors a construction that makes a statutory limit superfluous.

Sundberg v. Lampert Lumber Co. · filed 1986-07-08(2)

It is elementary under the rules of statutory construction that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective.

Section 645.17(2) directs courts to give effect to every word of a statute when possible.

State v. Bissonette · filed 1989-09-26(2)

The legislature intends the entire statute to be effective; every word of the statute must be made effective if possible. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1988); Department of Public Safety v. Grovum, 297 Minn. 66, 209 N.W.2d 788, 792 (1973) (applying Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) to a traffic regulation).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective, but the presumption does not require giving overlapping terms distinct meanings.

Rasmussen v. Glass · filed 1993-06-09(2)

We are aware that under Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1990) "[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions," see also Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1990) (legislature intends an entire statute to be effective), and that our interpretation of "creed" makes the ordinance's reference to religion extraneous. The ordinance, however, cannot be interpreted to make all its terms effective.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to be effective, disfavoring an interpretation that makes a provision superfluous.

In re the Welfare of M.D.C. · filed 1993-06-22(2)

We will assume that “[t]he legislature intends the entire statute to be effective.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1992). ... If violation of a state law were required to vest jurisdiction, then part (d) would be superfluous since a juvenile court would have jurisdiction arising under part (a) or (b).

Section 645.17(2) requires courts to give effect to every word of a statute and avoid treating any part as surplusage.

State v. Orsello · filed 1996-10-31(2)

Canons of statutory construction require us to give effect to each word in the statute, to avoid any interpretation that characterizes any portion of the statute as surplusage. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1994). ... In subdivision 1, the legislature included terms not required to produce a general intent crime, but which must still be given meaning.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective, so a reading that nullifies statutory language should be rejected.

Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Transit Commission · filed 1995-03-01(2)

This date is attractive because it is easily ascertainable, but we conclude this accrual date nullifies the “or obligated to pay” language of § 65B.53, subd. 1 and thus violates the principle that the legislature intends that the entire statute be effective. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1992).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and certain, so distinct statutory language should be given meaning.

State v. Pendleton · filed 1997-08-07(2)

Specifically, we are directed to presume that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and certain. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (1996). If we were to construe “defense of dwelling” to require a fear of great bodily harm or death, we would effectively be eliminating the defense, because it would then be synonymous with self defense; the only difference between the two as stated in section 609.065 is the “fear of great bodily harm or death” element present only in the definition of self defense. Because the legislature specifically included a separate definition of “defense of dwelling” — and omitted any fear of great bodily harm or death language for that defense — it presumably intended that language to be meaningful.

Section 645.17(2) favors a construction that gives effect to every statutory provision rather than rendering one superfluous.

In re the Cease & Desist Order Issued to Loyd · filed 1996-12-10(2)

Reading such a limitation into the statute would render Minn.Stat. § 18B.33, subd. 1(a), superfluous, as licensure for the handling of restricted-use pesticides is mandated elsewhere in the chapter. See Minn. Stat. § 18B.30 (1994) (imposing license requirement for use or supervision of use of restricted-use pesticides); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (1994) (requiring statutes be construed such that all provisions are effective); Kirkwold Constr. v. M.G.A. Constr., 513 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Minn.1994) (same).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that every provision of a statute should be given effect, including distinctions and requirements that an interpretation would otherwise make meaningless.

In Re Proposed Petition to Recall Hatch · filed 2001-06-25(2)

To allow an allegation of a failure to perform a duty to state a claim for malfeasance as well as nonfeasance would render meaningless both the recall statute’s distinction between action and nonaction and its express requirement of repetition in the case of nonfeasance. The canons of statutory construction require that all provisions of a statute be given effect. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2000).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and certain, so courts avoid interpretations that make a subdivision surplusage.

State v. Loge · filed 2000-03-02(2)

The "to keep" an open bottle language of subdivision 3 means more than knowingly continuing possession because such conduct is already made illegal by subdivision 2. Any other interpretation would render subdivision 3 mere surplusage and would violate the statutory presumption that the legislature intends an entire statute to be effective and certain. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2); Orsello, 554 N.W.2d at 75-76.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to have effect, so distinct phrases should each be given meaning.

Hare v. State, Department of Human Services · filed 2003-07-29(2)

In ascertaining legislative intent, we presume that “the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2002); ... To give meaning to the entire statute and thus avoid rendering any phrase superfluous, each of the four phrases employed by the legislature must have a distinct and separate meaning.

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to be effective, so an interpretation that renders statutory language superfluous violates that rule.

Marriage of Goldman v. Greenwood · filed 2008-03-27(2)

The interpretation of the court of appeals, which limits the applicability of section 518.18(d) to the change of provisions specifying a child's primary residence, renders the phrase "custody arrangement" superfluous, violating the rule of statutory construction that "the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain," Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2006).

Section 645.17(2) presumes that the legislature intends every part of a statute to be effective, favoring a construction that avoids making a provision superfluous.

DeCook v. Rochester International Airport Joint Zoning Board · filed 2012-03-22(2)

But, as the DeCooks point out, the Board’s interpretation of the reference in section 117.045 to the federal Relocation Act renders section 117.045 superfluous: if federal funds are used in the project that results in a regulatory taking, the property owner is entitled to recover costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal under the Relocation Act itself. But the Legislature has instructed that every law is to be “construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions,” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2010), and we are to presume that “[t]he legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain,” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(2) (2010).

Section 645.17(5) presumes that the legislature intends to favor the public interest over a private interest.

Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State Ex Rel. Allen · filed 1982-02-12(5)

In addition, Minn.Stat. § 645.17(5) (1980) provides that “the legislature intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest.” An extension of the Act’s tax reduction to all producers of gasohol would redound almost exclusively to ADM’s benefit.

Section 645.17(5) favors a harmonious construction of public-data statutes that serves the public interest.

Doe v. Minnesota State Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1988-02-16(5)

Our analysis provides a harmonious interpretation of the various statutes and, unlike the trial court’s interpretation, favors the public interest.

Section 645.17(5) presumes that the legislature intends to favor the public interest over private interests when interpreting laws.

Humphrey v. Shumaker · filed 1994-12-06(5)

The legislature has stated that it “intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(5) (1992). This language suggests that the attorney general, whose time and funds are not unlimited, should focus on his or her duties to represent the public and should not be ordered to represent individual plaintiffs in district court.

Section 645.17(5) presumes that the legislature intends to favor a public interest over a private interest when courts ascertain legislative intent.

Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hospital · filed 1999-08-12(5)

Thus, the privilege provision strikes a balance between these sometimes conflicting motivations and favors the public interest of patient well-being over the private interest of the physicians’ desire to gain access to a review organization’s proceedings and information by creating a situation where one professional may speak freely about a colleague’s performance without fear of retaliation. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(5).

Section 645.17(5) presumes that the legislature favors the public interest over private interests; preserving public funds serves the public interest.

In Re the Disability Earnings Offset of Masson · filed 2008-07-29(5)

We presume that the legislature intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(5) (2006). Preservation of public funds is in the public interest.

Section 645.17(5) presumes that the legislature favors the public interest over a private interest when construing a statute.

Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista · filed 2007-03-15(5)

Another rule of construction is the presumption that “the legislature intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(5) (2006). Here, the public interest is reflected in the City’s present zoning and Comprehensive Plan and they outweigh the private interests of Hagen to have its application automatically approved without any consideration of the public interest.

Section 645.17(5) presumes that the legislature intends to favor the public interest over a private interest.

Greene v. Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services · filed 2008-08-28(5)

Also, granting a tribal member the right to opt out of the mandatory referral runs contrary to the presumption that the legislature “intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(5) (2006). Clearly, the public interest of promoting tribal sovereignty and providing culturally appropriate services through the tribe must be favored over any private interest of Greene.

Section 645.17(5) presumes that the legislature favors the public interest over any private interest when ascertaining legislative intent.

Helmberger v. Johnson Controls, Inc. · filed 2012-10-09(5)

And it is well settled that the “legislature intends to favor the public interest against any private interest.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(5) (2010). The plain language of section 645.17(5) refutes ARI’s public-policy argument.

Subsection 645.17(5) directs courts to presume that the legislature intends to favor the public interest over a private interest.

Abex Corporation v. Commissioner of Taxation · filed 1973-03-23(5)

In arriving at our decision, we are mindful that exemptions from taxation are to be strictly construed, that the burden of proof is upon the one seeking the exemption, and that in ascertaining its intention the legislature has directed us that “[t]he legislature intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest.” Minn. St. 645.17(5).

Section 645.17(5) presumes that the legislature favors the public interest over private interests; the public interest in secure land transactions can outweigh a public body's interest in an unrecorded right.

Township of Sterling v. Griffin · filed 1976-06-25(5)

Appellant cites with emphasis the statutory rule of construction, employed in Wichelman, providing that “the legislature intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest” (Minn. St. 645.17 [5]) as support for holding town roads exempt from the act since they are in the public interest. But the significance of that rule in construing the act is broader than appellant’s argument admits. ... The fact that the owner of an old, outstanding interest is a public body is not a sufficient public interest to defeat the larger interest of the public in greater security in real estate transactions.

When the court of last resort has construed statutory language, later laws on the same subject are presumed to use that construction.

Jansen v. PEOPLES ELEC. CO., INC. · filed 1982-04-09(4)

"When a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject intends the same construction to be placed upon such language." ... In this context, we do not think we should overrule a statutory interpretation that the legislature has chosen not to overrule.

Section 645.17(4)'s presumption that the legislature adopts a prior judicial construction does not apply when the prior decision did not construe the language at issue.

State v. Soto · filed 1985-12-06(4)

As support, the state cites Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) which reads, "When a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language." We decline to draw that inference. Nowhere in our civil Death by Wrongful Act Statute, nor in this court's limited holding in Verkennes is the phrase "human being" defined.

Section 645.17, subdivision 4 presumes that later laws on the same subject adopt a court of last resort’s prior construction of statutory language.

Carlson v. Independent School District No. 623 · filed 1986-08-08(4)

When a court of last resort has construed the language of the law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter is presumed to intend the same construction to be placed upon such language. Minn. Stat. § 645.17, subd. 4 (1984).

Section 645.17(4) presumes that when the legislature reenacts a law previously construed by a court of last resort, it adopts that construction.

O'Neal v. Burlington Northern, Inc. · filed 1987-10-13(4)

When the legislature re-enacts a law previously construed by a court of last resort, the legislature intends to adopt that construction. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (1986). The legislature has reenacted the substantive law of §§ 219.-31-33 following several decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court that the protection of the fencing statute is limited to domestic animals and irresponsible children. It should not be presumed that the legislature intended to expand the coverage.

Section 645.17(4) presumes that the legislature adopts a court of last resort’s construction when it later legislates on the same subject.

Willette v. the Mayo Foundation · filed 1990-07-03(4)

Appellant correctly asserts that regardless of the origin of the rule, the legislature has presumptively adopted it. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(4) (1988) provides: ... We therefore conclude the legislature has presumptively adopted the termination of treatment rule for determining the time when a medical malpractice claim accrues and the two-year limitation period begins to run.

Section 645.17(4) presumes that when the legislature retains statutory language after a court of last resort construes it, the legislature intends that construction to continue.

Rowe v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center · filed 1990-09-11(4)

When a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language. By retaining the “any claimant” language when it revised the statute after Faber, the legislature demonstrated that it did not intend to limit liability for an occurrence to $200,000, or to consider all claimants from a given occurrence as subject to one single $200,000 limit.

Section 645.17(4) presumes that the legislature intends a prior supreme court construction to apply to subsequent laws on the same subject.

State v. Olson · filed 1991-04-18(4)

Additionally, the definition of possession in this context has been construed by our supreme court and the same construction must be applied to subsequent laws. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (1990).

Section 645.17(4) presumes that the legislature intends to adopt an established judicial construction when it legislates on the same subject.

Star Tribune v. BD. OF EDUC., SP. SCHOOL · filed 1993-11-09(4)

While this provision does not expressly limit the attorney-client exception to the context of pending or threatened litigation, we presume the legislature intended to adopt the same construction as promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court.

Section 645.17(4) presumes that a court of last resort’s construction of statutory language applies to later laws on the same subject.

State v. Bragg · filed 1998-05-12(4)

This interpretation presumptively still applies. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (1996) (providing that when court of last resort has construed statutory language, legislature presumptively intends same construction to apply to subsequent laws on same subject matter).

Section 645.17(4) presumes that the legislature adopts the Minnesota Supreme Court’s existing construction of a statutory term.

Automated Building Components, Inc. v. New Horizon Homes, Inc. · filed 1994-04-12(4)

We presume the legislature intends to adopt the same construction of the term “adjoining lots” as used by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (1992).

Section 645.17(4) presumes that reenacting a statute without change adopts a prior interpretation by the court of last resort.

State v. Newman · filed 1995-10-03(4)

Even after the supreme court ruled that a BB gun could be a firearm under the aggravated robbery and mandatory minimum sentence statutes, the legislature has reenacted the criminal statutes without giving "firearm" another definition and, thus, has presumptively adopted the supreme court's definition.

Section 645.17, subdivision 4 presumes that later legislation on the same subject adopts a court of last resort’s prior construction of statutory language.

Koehnen v. Dufuor · filed 1999-03-11(4)

The legislature amended the Civil Damages Act in 1985 and 1990 without extending liability to social hosts, and the rule of construction applies: "[w]hen a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language." [40] The legislature thus presumptively adopted the Cole and Cady rulings.

Section 645.17(4)'s presumption applies to a prior statutory construction by a court of last resort.

Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women's Center, Inc. · filed 2002-01-03(4)

The court of appeals, however, is not the court of last resort with respect to a statute's construction. ... Therefore, the principle of statutory construction embodied in section 645.17(4) does not apply to the court of appeals' interpretation of the whistleblower statute in Donahue.

Section 645.17(4) presumes that when the legislature later uses language construed by a court of last resort in a law on the same subject, it intends the same construction.

State v. Timberlake · filed 2008-02-14(4)

We conclude that the legislature did not intend to overrule Paige through the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act and in fact added provisions that buttress our analysis in Paige. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(4) (2006) (“[W]hen a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language * * *.”).

Section 645.17(4) presumes that when a court of last resort has construed statutory language, later laws on the same subject use that language with the same meaning.

Coleman v. Ritchie · filed 2009-03-06(4)

This interpretation limiting the scope of errors subject to correction by county canvassing boards to those “evident from an examination of the returns made by the various precincts” applies to the current statute, section 204C.39, as well. This application is based on the presumption that “when a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (2008).

Section 645.17(4) presumes that legislation on the same subject adopts an existing construction by the court of last resort.

Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC · filed 2005-11-17(4)

Given that the legislature took no action to alter the standard we set forth in Dawley and rearticulated in Wicken, our case law provides that the legislature's silence expressed its concurrence in Dawley's and Wicken's holdings. See Robinson v. Lamott, 289 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Minn.1979); Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (2004) (stating that "[w]hen a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language").

Section 645.17(4) presumes that when the Minnesota Supreme Court has construed statutory language, the legislature intends the same construction in later laws on the same subject.

State v. Fleming · filed 2006-12-12(4)

And under our statutory cannons of construction, it is presumed that, when the Minnesota Supreme Court has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (2004). By choosing not to define “firearm” for purposes of section 624.713, the legislature presumptively adopted the Minnesota Supreme Court’s definition.

Section 645.17 presumes that when the court of last resort has construed statutory language, the legislature intends the same construction for that language in later laws on the same subject.

State v. Franks · filed 2009-05-14

The legislature has directed that “when a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.... ” Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2008). Thus, when the legislature enacted Minn.Stat. § 609.749 in 1993 as part of comprehensive anti-stalking legislation, see Act of May 20, 1993, ch. 326, art. 2, § 22,1993 Minn. Laws 1999, 2010-13, we can presume that the legislature intended the term “terrorize! ]” in Minn.Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5 to carry the same meaning as the word “terrorize” that we construed in Schweppe — to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.

Section 645.17(4)’s presumption concerning a court of last resort’s construction does not apply to letters from a district court administrator.

In Re the Welfare of J.B. · filed 2010-05-14(4)

Minnesota Statutes § 645.17(4) (2008) provides that to ascertain the intention of the Legislature, the courts may be guided by the presumption that “when a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.” The district court administrator's letters do not represent our construction of the pertinent statutes.

Section 645.17(4) presumes that later legislation on the same subject retains a court of last resort’s construction of earlier statutory language.

Pioneer Industries, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance · filed 2011-04-08(4)

Furthermore, the Minnesota Legislature, despite recodifications to the statute after the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the statute to applications for insurance, has not disturbed the state courts' interpretation or seen it necessary to include a specific reference to "application" within the statute. Thus, the statute should be read as referring to "applications" notwithstanding the absence of the term therein. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(4) (providing that "when a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language").

Section 645.17(4)’s presumption that the legislature adopts a prior judicial construction applies only when that construction came from a court of last resort.

KRUMMENACHER v. City of Minnetonka · filed 2010-06-24(4)

The court of appeals is not “a court of last resort.” ... We therefore reject the City’s argument that the legislature has ratified the Rowell standard.

Section 645.17(4) supports a presumption that the Legislature acquiesces in a court of last resort’s statutory interpretation when it leaves the statute unamended.

Engquist v. Loyas · filed 2011-09-21(4)

The Legislature has not amended Minn. Stat. § 347.22 in response to our decision in Bailey that the statute requires that the plaintiff-victim have knowledge of the danger and voluntarily expose herself to that danger in order for the provocation element of the statute to be satisfied. Because the Legislature has not acted, we assume that the Legislature has acquiesced in our interpretation.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends a court of last resort’s construction of statutory language to apply to subsequent laws on the same subject.

State v. Rohan · filed 2013-07-22

Moreover, we must presume that “when a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2012); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2012) (when interpreting legislative intent, this court may look to “the former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects”).

Section 645.17(4) presumes that later laws on the same subject use a construction previously given by a court of last resort.

State of Minnesota v. Haywood · filed 2015-09-28(4)

This court’s approach to the legislature’s declining to comprehensively define the term “firearm” under chapter 609 is consistent with Seifert and Minn. Stat. § 645.17(4) (2012), which provides that “when a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.”

Section 645.17(4) supports presuming that the Legislature knew an established judicial standard when it used a phrase associated with that standard.

Sanchez v. State · filed 2012-07-18(4)

We presume that the Legislature was aware of this objective standard when it used the phrase “the date the claim arises” in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(c). See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(4) (2010).

Section 645.17(4) supports applying a court of last resort’s construction to a later law on the same subject when the relevant language is nearly identical.

Ouradnik v. Ouradnik · filed 2018-06-06(4)

Because both Minn. Stat. § 87.01 (1982) and Minn. Stat. § 604A.20 (2016) have nearly identical language, including the relevant phrase "by the public," Hughes remains binding precedent. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(4) (2016) ("[W]hen a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.").

Section 645.17(4) presumes that the Legislature intends a prior judicial construction to apply to later laws on the same subject using the same language.

In the Matter of Keystone Township v. Red Lake Watershed District, Paul Novacek, et ... · filed 2025-05-14(4)

Under these circumstances, we presume that the Legislature intended for our interpretation in Lenz to be placed upon the current statutory language. See Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633, 640 (Minn. 2022) (“In ascertaining legislative intent, there is a presumption that if we have already construed language of a Minnesota statute, then later laws using that same language within the same subject matter are bound to that construction of the language.”); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17(4) (2024) (stating the presumption that “when a court of last resort has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language”).

Section 645.17(4) presumes that the legislature intends to retain a supreme court construction when it revisits a statute without changing the construed language.

Ouradnik v. Ouradnik · filed 2017-05-08(4)

We presume that the legislature is aware of the supreme court’s interpretation of Minnesota statutes and that interpretation gains credence when the legislature revisits a statute after the court’s interpretation and does not modify the language.

Section 645.17(4) supports inferring legislative approval when statutory language remains unchanged after judicial construction.

Hughes v. Patrick and Associates · filed 1974-07-12(4)

That our interpretation accurately reflects the intention of the legislature is demonstrated by the fact that the statutory language in question has remained unchanged through a general revision of the statutes. See, Minn. St. 645.17(4).

Section 645.17(4) directs courts to presume that the Legislature concurs in a longstanding judicial construction when it has not changed the law through subsequent legislative action.

Robinson v. Lamott · filed 1979-07-13(4)

The legislature undoubtedly concurs in our longstanding construction of § 340.95, since it has not seen fit to reverse the Sworski decision by subsequent legislative action. ... See, also, Minn.St. 645.17(4). Just as significant is the legislature’s failure to provide an exception to the Sworski principle. The legislature has had numerous opportunities to modify the law to allow an alcoholic to recover damages, yet it has not seen fit to do so. In light of this legislative silence, we must presume the legislature intended that the Sworski rule be applied, without qualification, to an intoxicated individual suffering from alcoholism.

Section 645.17(4) presumes that the legislature intends a prior judicial construction when it later enacts laws on the same subject.

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Spaeth · filed 1950-10-20(4)

This court has frequently held that the reenactment of a statute without change, after construction of the statute by the court, presumptively constitutes an adoption of such construction.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result or a violation of the constitution.

Essling v. Markman · filed 1983-06-24(1), (3)

In determining this intent, we also must remember that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result— Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1982) — and does not intend to violate the constitution. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(3) (1982). Relying upon these rules of construction, we conclude that the legislature never intended that the Act apply to travel coverages.

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to violate the federal or state constitution when granting statutory authority.

Quam v. State · filed 1986-08-08(3)

In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, we are guided by the presumption that the legislature does not intend to violate the constitution of the United States or of this state. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3)(1984). Thus, while the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the WCCA is broad, it could not include the power to adjudicate the adherence of agency rules to their statutory parameters.

Section 645.17, subdivision 3, presumes that statutes do not violate the federal or state constitution unless that presumption is overcome.

Voss v. Duerscherl · filed 1987-08-19(3)

Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. 3, creates a presumption that statutes are not violative of the federal or state constitutions. Appellants have failed to overcome this presumption.

Section 645.17(3) requires courts to presume that the legislature did not intend to violate the federal or state constitution.

State v. Moore · filed 1988-11-15(3)

One who challenges the constitutionality of a statute must overcome every presumption in favor of its constitutionality. Miller Brewing Co. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Minn.1979), Matter of Martenies, 350 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Minn.Ct.App.1984) pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 12, 1984); see also Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (1986) (courts required to presume the legislature did not intend to violate the constitution of the United States or of this state).

Section 645.17(3) presumes that laws enacted by the legislature are constitutionally valid.

State v. Willenbring · filed 1990-04-17(3)

Every law enacted by the legislature carries a presumption of constitutional validity.

Section 645.17(3) presumes statutes constitutional and requires compelling evidence to rebut that presumption.

Schmitz v. Stransky · filed 1990-04-24(3)

Statutes benefit from a presumption of constitutionality. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (1988). Stransky must demonstrate compelling evidence in order to rebut this presumption.

Section 645.17(3) presumes laws constitutional; a challenger must disprove that presumption beyond a reasonable doubt.

Larson v. Sando · filed 1993-11-09(3)

We first note every law is presumed constitutionally valid. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (1990); ... This presumption of constitutionality must be disproven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 645.17(3) presumes that every law is constitutionally valid.

State v. Kortkamp · filed 2001-09-25(3)

Every law is presumed to be constitutionally valid. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (2000).

Section 645.17(3) presumes laws are constitutionally valid until a constitutional challenge disproves that presumption beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Enyeart · filed 2004-03-23(3)

Laws are presumed to be constitutionally valid. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (2002); Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Minn. 2000). The presumption of constitutional validity governs the adjudication of constitutional challenges until disproved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to violate the U.S. or Minnesota Constitution.

State v. Bartylla · filed 2008-08-21(3)

It is presumed that, in enacting the statute, the legislature did not intend to violate either the U.S. Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (2006). Therefore, we will uphold a statute unless the challenging party demonstrates that it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature did not intend to violate the federal or state constitution when enacting a statute.

Soohoo v. Johnson · filed 2007-05-10

We presume that, in enacting section 257C.08, the legislature did not intend to violate either the U.S. Constitution or the Minnesota Constitution. Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2006).

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend unreasonable results or laws that violate the state or federal constitution.

State v. Rick · filed 2012-09-24(1), (3)

And we presume the legislature did not intend to enact a law that subjects only men, and not women, to criminal liability for identical conduct. See MinmStat. § 645.17(1), (3) (stating presumptions that legislature does not intend unreasonable result or to violate the constitutions of the United States or of this state).

Section 645.17(3) favors an interpretation that preserves a statute’s constitutionality, but the presumption does not permit a court to add language to the statute.

State of Minnesota v. Muccio · filed 2016-06-20(3)

If at all possible, we are to interpret a statute to “preserve its constitutionality.” Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 698 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Minn. 2005); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17(3) (2014) (“[T]he legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or of this state.”). ... All of the state’s proposed limiting constructions require that we add language to Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2a(2). ... We therefore conclude that the statute is not readily subject to a narrowing construction to save it from overbreadth.

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to enact laws that conflict with the constitution.

Bolin Lumber Co. v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co. · filed 1965-04-02(3)

As we pointed out long ago in Stewart v. G. N. Ry. Co. 65 Minn. 515, 68 N. W. 208, 33 L. R. A. 427, where we also concluded that a forced conveyance of land through the aid of statutes such as these would be unconstitutional if required for a private purpose, we must construe the statutes, if possible, so that they will not conflict with the constitution.

Section 645.17(3) directs courts to construe statutes so as to uphold their constitutionality.

Minnesota Higher Education Facilities Authority v. Hawk · filed 1975-08-08(3)

Statutes are to be construed so as to uphold their constitutionality. Minn. St. 645.17 (3); Port Authority of City of St. Paul v. Fisher, 275 Minn. 157, 145 N. W. 2d 560 (1966).

Section 645.17(3) presumes that the legislature does not intend to violate constitutional limits.

Wuertz v. Garvey · filed 1970-06-19(3)

Although a statute must be applied literally if its language permits no other construction, it is a cardinal principle that a statute susceptible of different interpretations will be given that which is reasonably consistent with constitutional limitations. The legislature, by Minn. St. 645.17(3), has declared this presumption of its intent.

Section 645.17’s presumption of constitutionality guides courts considering a constitutional challenge, but it does not preserve a statute after the court rules it unconstitutional.

Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., Inc. · filed 1986-02-07(c)

The presumption of constitutionality in Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. c (1984) is a rule of statutory construction to be employed by the courts when facing a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute; once a statute is ruled unconstitutional, it is void ab initio.

Section 645.17(3) supplies a presumption of constitutionality when Minnesota’s rules of statutory construction apply to an ordinance.

State v. Turner · filed 1986-02-18(3)

In reviewing the language of PB2-21 we note that Minnesota rules of statutory construction are applicable to our interpretation. Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances § 3.40 (1976). Under the rules of statutory construction, this ordinance is presumed constitutional. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (1984).