Statute Annotations › Minnesota › Minn. Stat. § 645.17

Minn. Stat. § 645.17

Presumptions in ascertaining legislative intent: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Minnesota
Case notes
317
Cited in passing
244
Citing cases indexed
625
Case dates
1950–2025
Screened through
2026-03-09
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

561 citing cases reviewed of 625 in the citation index: 317 interpreted the section (annotated below), 244 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-03-09 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Minn. Stat. § 645.17?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Avoiding absurd results

Section 645.17(1) presumes the legislature does not intend an absurd result and directs courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce one.

Cooperative Power Ass'n v. Eaton · filed 1979-09-28(1)

A contrary conclusion would allow a single condemnation court in a county along the transmission line to effectively overrule the comprehensive findings of MEA and MEQC, who presumably have specialized expertise in the area. Such an absurd result is presumed to be unintended by the legislature, and thus should be avoided in construing the pertinent statutory provisions. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1978).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) favors a reading that avoids an absurd result; here, the new wage base applies to rates adopted after its effective date.

Minnesota Express, Inc. v. Travelers Insurance Co. · filed 1983-05-20(1)

Based upon this legislative history and the remaining provisions of chapter 79, we are satisfied that the intent of the legislature in adopting this statute was to provide a new wage base against which any rate adopted after the effective date of the statute is to be applied. To hold otherwise would be to produce an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. 1 (1982).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.

Habel v. City of Chisago City · filed 1984-04-10(1)

To require notice of deferment and procedures when these optional deferments have not been established by the municipality would be absurd, in contravention of the well settled rule that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1982).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) calls for avoiding absurd results when interpreting statutes; when the available outcomes are unsatisfactory, a court may choose the least absurd one.

In Re the Welfare of C.A.N. · filed 1985-06-25(1)

Our struggle is to avoid an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1); State v. Fleming, 223 N.W.2d at 399. In the difficult application of law to the unfortunate facts of this case, the struggle is more correctly viewed as one to find the least absurd result among several unsatisfactory options.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to avoid interpreting a statute to produce an absurd result.

State v. Lockhart · filed 1985-10-29(1)

Such a result is absurd and we cannot interpret the statute in such a fashion. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1984). Thus, we hold that “clothing” under Minn.Stat. § 609.341, subd. 11 includes bed clothes and bed coverings.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that statutory provisions are effective and certain and that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results.

Henry v. Dolphin Temporary Help Services · filed 1986-04-29

The intent of the legislature must be construed with respect to an entire statute, the provisions of which are presumed to be effective and certain and not absurd or unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (1984). Although construing a separate section of the act, Smith clearly indicates that under the same type of facts the legislature intended that an employee such as Henry should receive unemployment compensation benefits.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.

State v. Freeberg · filed 1986-07-22(1)

It is well settled that courts may presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. ... See also Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1984). Respondent’s interpretation would result in permitting courts to set aside convictions of offenders under 21 years of age whether or not they meet the requirements of sections (b) and (c).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature did not intend a statute to produce an absurd result.

Nash v. Allen · filed 1986-08-12(1)

Appellants also claim a lump sum settlement may not be used as an incentive to an admission of paternity. Adoption of this claim, however, would lead to an absurd result. Settlements by their very nature entail the give and take of conditions. If the court or opposing parties were unable to offer a more advantageous financial settlement as bargaining leverage, it is unlikely a purported father would ever acknowledge paternity when settling a lawsuit. When interpreting a statute, it must be presumed the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1984).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) requires courts to avoid absurd statutory constructions.

Rieck v. Lambert · filed 1986-11-18(1)

We must avoid absurd construction of the statute. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1984). Thus, we reject the notion that the legislature established a past support right to offset older but not more current expenses, those incurred after an action is commenced.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to construe statutes to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.

O'MEARA v. Olson · filed 1987-11-03(1)

If the theory of the appellants were followed, a full hearing on the merits in open court subject to appellate review would be preempted by summary, non-judicial cancellation enforced by the vendor. This would thwart the purpose of the statute — protection of vendees — and lead to an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1944) (a statute should be construed so as to avoid a result that is absurd or unreasonable).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.

Bouza v. Gallagher · filed 1987-12-01(1)

Leaving these assignments in the hands of the Commission rather than those of Chief Bouza would lead to an absurdity clearly not intended by the legislature. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1986).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) calls for construing a statute to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result.

Grubb v. State · filed 1988-12-27(1)

We must also keep in mind that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1986). ... Respondents urge a construction of the second paragraph of the statute which, if adopted, would both frustrate the legislative object to be obtained and lead to an absurd, unreasonable and unjust result, rendering the tax-payment requirement a virtual nullity.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when a statute is interpreted.

Annandale Advocate v. City of Annandale · filed 1989-01-20(1)

It is presumed that the legislature "does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable." Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (1986). To construe Minn. Stat. § 471.705, subd. 1b as forbidding dissemination of written materials regarding private data, but allowing oral discussion of the same data would be unreasonable and perhaps absurd.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

Gurewitz v. Commissioner of Jobs & Training · filed 1989-08-29(1)

To conclude that Gurewitz untimely filed his retroactive claim for continued benefits would not only be unjust but would result in an absurd and unreasonable interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 268.08, subd. 1. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1988) (it must be presumed that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.) We particularly note that Minn.Stat. § 268.08, subd. 1, entitles the Commissioner to waive or alter reporting requirements if compliance with those requirements would be oppressive or inconsistent with the purposes of the unemployment laws.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) disfavors a construction requiring two jury trials to value the same tract of land.

Mortenson v. State · filed 1989-10-17(1)

We will not assume the legislature intended to require two jury trials to determine the value of the same tract of land. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1988) (presumption that legislature does not intend absurd result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.

Marriage of Reynolds v. Reynolds · filed 1990-06-15(1)

Moreover, application of this time limit to the birth of the younger child, but not to the older child, would create an absurd result which we presume the legislature did not intend. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1988).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) guides the court toward a workable reading of a statute that specifies no weight for a victim statement.

State v. Yanez · filed 1991-04-30(1)

The legislature does not “intend a result that is absurd.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (1990). “Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (1990). Based on these principles of statutory construction, we infer that the legislature intended the trial court to consider the victim’s statement in sentencing.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) disfavors a statutory construction that produces an absurd sentencing gap.

State v. Robinson · filed 1991-12-23(1)

We presume the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990). Adopting Robinsons’s interpretation would produce an absurd or unreasonable result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when enacting a statute.

In re the Marriage of Hamann v. Hamann · filed 1992-02-04(1)

Any other interpretation of the statute leads to the absurd result of repeated hearings on the same subject matter. When interpreting a statute, it must be presumed the legislature did not intend to produce an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

H.D. v. White · filed 1992-04-07(1)

In ascertaining legislative intent, we presume the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. ... We decline to find the legislature intended such an absurd result, particularly where section 1 of the same act explicitly provides that all claims arising from sexual abuse must be brought within six years of when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know the injury was caused by the abuse.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) disfavors an interpretation of the pen-register standard that would eliminate any meaningful standard.

State v. Benson · filed 1992-04-14(1)

This construction leads to an absurd result which we are to avoid. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990) (legislature does not intend results that are absurd).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when courts interpret a statute.

Griebel v. Andersen Corp. · filed 1992-09-18(1)

Because the consequence of the restrictive definition of "unsafe" adopted by the court of appeals is to credit the legislature with the intent to achieve an absurd result — to provide a longer limitation period with respect to a claim arising out of a defect which poses no risk of bodily harm than for a claim arising out of a defect which has caused bodily harm, see Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1988), we recognize alternative definitions of "unsafe" such as "insecure" and thus implement the legislature's sensible intention to provide one limitation period for claims arising out of defective and unsafe improvements to property regardless whether the defect is hazardous to human health or whether the defect simply renders the property insecure and vulnerable to invasion.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when a court interprets a statute.

Dufloth v. Commissioner of Public Safety · filed 1992-11-17(1)

The relationship between the judicial and legislative branches is distorted when the judicial branch insists on giving a literal reading to a statute that obviously involves a legislative oversight. The legislature has explicitly declared its desire for assistance in such a circumstance, stating that "[t]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. " Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990) (emphasis added). The legislature clearly did not intend the unreasonable result reached by the trial court in this case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) requires courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result.

Keezer v. Spickard · filed 1992-12-22(1)

We cannot believe the legislature intended the term “government data,” to be literally interpreted to include unrecorded data that exist only in a human brain. Interpreting “government data” to include mental impressions formed by public employees during the course of employment would lead to absurd results. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990) (court must presume legislature did not intend absurd result); Salmen v. City of St. Paul, 281 N.W.2d 355, 361 n. 8 (Minn.1979).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) favors reading a notice requirement to give property owners a chance to abate a nuisance.

City of St. Paul v. Spencer · filed 1993-03-09(1)

We find this result would be unreasonable, and thus it cannot be the intent of the legislature. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990) (the legislature does not intend a result that is unreasonable).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17’s presumption against absurd results weighs against construing a nuisance law to let multiple tenants evade abatement for a single building.

City of Minneapolis v. Fisher · filed 1993-08-10

Moreover, allowing appellants to prevail on their “two businesses” claim could lead to absurd results. Establishments permitting prostitution could structure their real estate holdings so there would be multiple tenants, thus requiring the city to obtain numerous convictions to obtain an abatement order for a single building. Such an artifice defeats the legislative purpose of the statute. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (in ascertaining the intent of the legislature, courts should avoid absurd results).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) disfavors construing a statute to produce an absurd result.

State v. Hamacher · filed 1994-01-25(1)

Although the term “family unit” may be applied differently in other fact situations, it would lead to an absurd result to define the term as excluding a resident minor complainant such as A.J.H. See generally Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1992) (presumption that legislature does not intend an absurd result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results when courts interpret a statute.

Frandrup v. Pine Bend Warehouse · filed 1995-05-23(1)

The legislature, however, does not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994). ... Thus, timeliness is penalized and later delivery is rewarded. We cannot reward a bizarre interpretation of the statute.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend a statutory construction that leads to absurd or unreasonable results.

Phelps v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Co. · filed 1995-09-08(1)

Each of the potential results illustrates that the dissent's construction could lead to absurd or unreasonable results that would, in effect, render the multiplier provision meaningless. A presumption exists against statutory constructions that lead to absurd or unreasonable results. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994). In accordance with well settled statutory construction, therefore, we believe the legislature intended the trial court to be able to multiply at its discretion.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 directs courts to construe statutory language to avoid unreasonable or absurd results.

Zuehlke v. Independent School District No. 316 · filed 1995-10-17

Rules of statutory construction require that the court construe statutory language to avoid reaching an unreasonable or absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (1994); Spaeth v. City of Plymouth, 344 N.W.2d 815, 822 (Minn.1984). The construction urged by AFSCME is contrary to the basic philosophy of the statute and permits an unreasonable result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results when a statute is interpreted.

Bedow v. Watkins · filed 1996-01-25(1)

We are not persuaded by the Commissioner’s literal statutory interpretation. It could lead to absurd results. The legislature does not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when interpreting a statute.

State v. Murphy · filed 1996-04-12(1)

We also reject Murphy’s interpretation of the terroristic threats statute because limiting the reach of the statute to oral or written threats would lead to an absurd result. It would allow one to terrorize another if the terrorist were clever enough to make threats without recourse to the spoken or written word. It is well settled that courts may presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to presume that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results.

Wong v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1998-04-23(1)

And, as we must, ... we presume that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when ascertaining legislative intent.

Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Johnson · filed 1995-02-28(1)

In ascertaining legislative intent, we presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994). ... Interpreting Minn.Stat. § 609.748 to include corporations as persons does not lead to an absurd result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1)'s presumption against absurd results prevents reading the reconsideration statute to let the Commissioner disregard information an applicant is required to submit.

Rodne v. Commissioner of Human Services · filed 1996-05-14(1)

It would be absurd to require an individual who requests reconsideration to present information to show that the information the Commissioner relied upon is incorrect, and then allow the Commissioner to disregard the information presented when deciding whether to set aside the disqualification. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994) (“legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 directs courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce absurd or unreasonable results.

State v. Wagner · filed 1996-11-05

Such an interpretation would not only lead to an absurd and unreasonable result, but would render the statute ineffective. It is axiomatic that such an interpretation is to be avoided. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when a statute is construed.

Kalberg v. Park & Recreation Board of Minneapolis · filed 1997-06-03(1)

Moreover, this reading of the chemical dependency exception would produce the absurd result of limiting its application only to employees discharged solely because they were known to be chemically dependent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 directs courts to presume that the legislature did not intend absurd results when construing statutes.

Everest Development, Ltd. v. City of Roseville · filed 1997-07-15

Such analysis would lead to an absurd outcome because, under Minn.Stat. § 13.02, subd. 13, protected nonpublic data is not accessible to the subjects of the data. See State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn.1996) (applying Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (1996)) (when construing statutes, court must presume legislature did not intend absurd results).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when courts interpret a statute.

Cummings v. Koehnen · filed 1997-08-28(1)

There is nothing in the MHRA to indicate the legislature intended to leave these classes of employees unprotected, and we cannot presume the legislature intended such an absurd result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (in interpreting statutes, courts must presume the "legislature does not intend a result that is absurd").
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when a statute is interpreted.

State v. Bistodeau · filed 1998-08-25(1)

Such a result is absurd and was not intended by the legislature. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1996) (legislature does not intend absurd result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd results or constitutional violations when courts interpret statutes.

In Re the Welfare of J.A.J. · filed 1996-04-09(1), (3)

f. Finally, we cannot interpret statutes to produce absurd results. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994). To examine changes in the form of a code purpose section and to find in them an abolition of the substantive preference for non-removal, attributes folly to a legislative enactment. It charges the legislative body with adoption of the public policy notion that Minnesota's juvenile courts can be indifferent to leaving children in their own homes. And it attributes to the legislature the will to invite our juvenile courts to be without concern for the minimum constitutional guarantees of substantive due process of law. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(3) (stating presumption that legislature does not intend to violate constitution).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when courts interpret a statute.

A&H VENDING CO. v. Commissioner of Revenue · filed 2000-04-06(1)

We can see no logical reason why the legislature would intend such a result and decline to interpret the amendment in that manner. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1998) (establishing presumption that legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

Brua v. Olson · filed 2001-01-16(1)

Appellant contends the district court’s interpretation of the CDA renders an absurd result. We agree. When ascertaining the intent of the legislature, this court assumes that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

In Re the Welfare of V.D.M. · filed 2001-03-20(1)

Courts may presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000). ... To rule otherwise would lead to the disfavored and unreasonable result of an adult individual avoiding punishment, or getting off “home free,” simply because of the technicality of exceeding the jurisdictional age.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when a court interprets a statute.

Brooks v. Commissioner of Public Safety · filed 1998-09-22(1)

The legislature does not intend an absurd result and will favor the public interest over any private interest. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1), (5) (1996). ... It would be an absurd result if we were to agree that the sample result displayed at the time the machine registers zero could constitute a test result for purposes of revoking a driver's license.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when courts interpret statutes.

Hersh Properties, LLC v. McDonald's Corp. · filed 1999-02-04(1)

There is nothing in the MTA to indicate that the legislature intended to abrogate the purpose of the Torrens Act through enactment of the MTA, and we cannot presume the legislature intended such an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1998) (interpreting statutes requires the courts to presume the “legislature does not intend a result that is absurd”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd results when courts interpret statutes.

Ceridian Corp. v. SCSC Corp. · filed 1999-03-05(1)

If Plaintiffs interpretation of the statute were adopted, this absurd result would follow. The Minnesota legislature does not intend absurd results. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1)'s presumption against absurd results weighs against exempting a destructive device merely because its maker intends to convey a message.

In Re the Welfare of C.P.K. · filed 2000-06-27(1)

We may presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1998). ... Concluding that a destructive burning cross is transformed into a safe symbolic burning cross simply by virtue of the maker’s desire to communicate a message produces an absurd result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) supports rejecting a statutory reading that would produce an absurd result by treating convictions for the same conduct differently after a statute was recodified.

State v. Cook · filed 2000-09-12(1)

To otherwise construe the statute would promote an absurd result because prior convictions for intrafamilial sexual abuse under the amended criminal-sexual-conduct statute would trigger the ten-year conditional release, but convictions for the same conduct under the old intrafamilial-sexual-abuse statute would not. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1998) (legislature does not intend an absurd result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.

Baughman v. Mellon Mortgage Co. · filed 2001-01-09

Nor can we hold that the legislature in 1996 enacted a statute prohibiting mortgagees from making certain charges intending that statute to be in conflict with a 1981 statute prohibiting regulation of those charges “[n]otwithstanding any law to the contrary”; such a result would be absurd and we presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (1998).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when courts interpret a statute.

Burkstrand v. Burkstrand · filed 2001-08-30(1)

In addition, we can apply certain presumptions, including the presumption that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2000). ... As recognized in Kite, such divestiture would be an absurd result, especially when a hearing is delayed due to causes other than the petitioner's own actions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable or absurd result.

Pangerl ex rel. Pangerl v. Electric Repair & Construction · filed 2002-06-13(1)

We believe such a result would be both unreasonable and absurd, and the legislature is presumed not to intend a result that is unreasonable or absurd.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to construe statutes to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.

State v. Stern · filed 2002-11-19(1)

The laws should be construed to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000). It would be unreasonable to determine that section 171.22,subd. 1(1) applies only to “fictitious” licenses issued or issuable by the commissioner of public safety, when the commissioner does not issue fictitious licenses.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results, so courts must account for a public defender co-payment when calculating reimbursement.

State v. Cunningham · filed 2003-06-10(1)

In interpreting a statute, we presume that the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2002). ... We conclude that the legislature did not intend such an unreasonable result, and that the legislature intended courts to take the $28 co-payment into account when determining the amount of reimbursement owed by a defendant.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when enacting a statute.

Yoraway v. Commissioner of Public Safety · filed 2003-10-07(1)

To interpret the statute to permit an arrest but not the stop necessary to effect the arrest would lead to an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2002) (it is presumed that in enacting a statute the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when interpreting a statute.

State v. Morris · filed 2002-05-14(1)

Appellant’s interpretation of MinmStat. § 609.746, subd. 1(f), would lead to an absurd result. “In ascertaining the intention of the legislature” we may presume that the “legislature does not intend a result that is absurd.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2000).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) requires courts interpreting a statute to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result.

Heidbreder v. Carton · filed 2002-06-13(1)

However, in interpreting a statute, we must presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2000). It would be absurd to conclude that a putative father who knew of the pregnancy but did not know the birth mother’s location is entitled to greater protection under the statute than a putative father *369who is ignorant of both the pregnancy and the birth mother’s location.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 permits courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result.

State v. Jones · filed 2002-08-13

In interpreting statutes, this court may assume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2000). Requiring a motorist to signal a turn or a lane change only on highways and not busy city streets would be an absurd result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature avoids absurd or unreasonable results and intends every part of a statute to have effect.

Peterson v. Township · filed 2003-12-24(1) and (2)

We are guided in our interpretation by the statutory presumptions that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result and intended that the entire garnishment statute be given effect. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) and (2) (2000). This requires us to consider the nature and purpose of the garnishment remedy and to look at the garnishment statutory framework as a whole.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce absurd or unreasonable results.

Weston v. McWilliams & Associates, Inc. · filed 2005-04-12(1)

Taking into account these plain-meaning observations of Minn.Stat. § 541.051, we also remember that we are compelled to avoid an absurd interpretation. Thus, we anticipate cases where injuries covered by the section are discovered, for example, in the ninth or tenth year after construction, but the cause of action is not brought until year eleven or year twelve.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when a statute is interpreted.

In Re ZK · filed 2005-05-17

But, under the school board's argument, the very waivers that the parents allege are invalid would operate to waive their right to challenge the validity of the waivers. This reading leads to an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2004) (stating the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when a statute is interpreted.

Breza v. City of Minnetrista · filed 2005-11-29(1)

But this interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd and unreasonable result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2004) (“legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 guides courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce absurd or unreasonable results or contradict the legislation as a whole.

State v. Peck · filed 2008-10-07(1)-(2)

Lastly, statutory construction generally is guided by a presumption “that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd ... or unreasonable” or that is contradictory to the legislation as a whole. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(l)-(2) (2006). If we were to adopt the state’s suggested interpretation of “mixture,” a person might absurdly be prosecuted for possessing over 25 grams of a controlled substance if the person accidentally spilled .01 grams of a controlled substance in his or her swimming pool and the presence of the drug was discernible by testing.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.

In re the Expulsion of Z.K. · filed 2005-05-17(1)

This reading leads to an absurd result. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2004) (stating the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when a court interprets a statute.

Minnesota Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Integra Telecom, Inc. · filed 2005-06-07

However, to construe the statute to mean anything other than permitting MIGA to maintain a reimbursement claim against a high net worth insured would be absurd.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when a statute is construed.

State v. Weber · filed 2007-11-20(1)

Particularly in light of the legislature’s obvious desire to restrict firearms from those convicted of violent crimes, that intention would be absurd, and we must presume that “[t]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd .... ” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2006).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when a statute is interpreted.

In Re the Expulsion of N.Y.B. · filed 2008-06-10(1)

Otherwise, a legitimate expulsion process could be thwarted by waiving the hearing and consequently depriving the school board of the opportunity to present a factual basis for expulsion. We do not believe the legislature intended such an absurd result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2006). Rather, we read this aspect of section 121A.47, subdivision 13, as prohibiting parties from introducing new evidence in closing argument to the school board.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17’s presumption against absurd results counsels against reading DWI laws to let a driver prevent use of a prior license revocation by waiving the review deadline and later withdrawing the review petition.

Heino v. One 2003 Cadillac, MN License No. KFR615, VIN: 1G6KS54Y83U131208 · filed 2009-02-17

Under the district court’s analysis, a person accused of drunk driving may file a PJR, waive the 60-day requirement, and then prevent that revocation from ever being used against him or her by withdrawing the PJR prior to the forfeiture trial but after the 60-day window has expired. This would lead to an absurd result that is contrary to the statutory framework. Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2008) (stating that, when ascertaining legislative intent, courts may presume that the legislature does not intend results that are absurd).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when a statute is construed.

Lorix v. Crompton Corp. · filed 2006-08-22(1)

Although we acknowledge the “expansive grant of standing” in section 325D.57, ... we presume that the legislature did not intend such an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2004); ... We reject Lorix’s unlimit-ing construction.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd results when courts interpret statutes.

BANGTSON v. Allina Medical Group · filed 2009-06-09

If a notice of discharge were to automatically act as a discharge, then it would be impossible for an employee to voluntarily end his employment prior to the date of the future discharge. This is an interpretation that is both illogical and against the statute’s plain language. As a result, we decline to adopt it. See, e.g., ... Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2008) (stating courts presume that the legislature does not intend results that are absurd).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intends an entire provision to be effective and certain and to avoid absurd results.

Cannon v. Minneapolis Police Department · filed 2010-06-01

And we must presume that the legislature intended the entire section to be “effective and certain,” and not lead to an absurd result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2008). In order to give effect to the language of the entire ordinance, we conclude that the $8,500 cap applies only to punitive damages. If the cap were applied to the total of all three awards, an individual could be precluded from recovering mental-anguish and punitive damages because the attorney fees in the ease exceeded the $8,500 cap. Such an interpretation ignores the intent of the statute and leads to an absurd result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 permits a court to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result when interpreting a statute.

State v. Petersen · filed 2011-07-05

We presume that the legislature did not intend for an act such as appellant’s to be considered a mere attempt, for which the maximum possible punishment is only one-half the maximum sentence for second-degree murder.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that lawmakers did not intend an interpretation that would be impossible to implement.

Troyer v. Vertlu Management Co./Kok & Lundberg Funeral Homes · filed 2011-08-17(1)

Because only one health care provider may charge for a service, article or supply, an interpretation of “furnish” that provides no basis to choose among several health care providers would be impossible to implement. We presume that the drafters of the rule did not intend such an interpretation. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (providing that courts may presume that the Legislature does not intend an impossible result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1)’s presumption against absurd results permits a court to look past unambiguous statutory language only when its plain meaning utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.

Rohmiller v. Hart · filed 2012-02-29(1)

We will do so only when the plain meaning of a statute “utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1)'s presumption against absurd results favors a reasonable statutory construction that avoids an unnecessary second election.

Martin v. Dicklich · filed 2012-12-05(1)

Finally, respondents’ proposed interpretation has the potential to lead to an absurd result. ... Because petitioners’ proposed construction eliminates this potentially absurd possibility, it is the more reasonable construction.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature intended the entire statute to be effective and did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

Stern v. Stern · filed 2013-10-15(1), (2)

If we were to adopt appellant’s interpretation, we would not only ignore the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes granting original and exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court over custody issues, but we would also create an absurd result with the family court and juvenile court simultaneously considering the same issues and possibly reaching inconsistent decisions.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 permits a court to presume that a lawmaking body does not intend an absurd result when interpreting a zoning ordinance.

Schultz v. Scott A. Mende, and third party v. City of Madison Lake, third party · filed 2014-12-08(1)

To cast the definition of “structure” as widely as the city suggests would seem to incorporate items like picnic tables, tents, cars, or umbrellas, and would clearly produce an absurd result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2012) (providing that a court, in ascertaining the intent of a lawmaking body, may presume that it “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature did not intend an absurd result when courts construe a statute.

State of Minnesota v. Conlin · filed 2014-12-15(1)

Appellant’s argument that “‘official duties’ [are] separate and distinct from ‘the lawful execution of any legal process’” produces the absurd result of construing one statute to remove the execution of search warrants from the list of peace officers’ official duties even though another statute, Minn. Stat. § 626.05 (2012), mandates that peace officers, and only peace officers, execute search warrants. It is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2012).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

The absurd-result presumption permits a court to look beyond unambiguous statutory text only in the rare case when that text utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.

Persigehl v. Ridgebrook Investments Limited Partnership · filed 2015-01-26(1)

Finally, tenants assert that the legislature did not intend to permit landlords to “overwhelm” a tenant’s utility bill with add-on fees, leading to an absurd result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014) (stating presumption that legislature did not intend absurd result). But we may not look past the plain language of an unambiguous statute absent the “rare case” when the plain language “utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.” Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs. Inc., 716 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). This is not such a case.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.

Ramsey County, A. L. A. v. E. v. S. · filed 2015-06-22(1)

It would be absurd to construe “in the community” as referring to the community in which the determination of potential income is made rather than the community in which the person potentially earning the income resides and works, and the legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd, impossible, or unreasonable result.

Tracie Erickson, Relators v. Minnesota Department of Natural Resources · filed 2015-07-20(1)

But this interpretation would lead to absurd results, as a sand-mine operator could be required to obtain a new permit each time it had a new customer for its sand. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014) (mandating the presumption that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result, including a reading that benefits someone for causing more serious harm.

Gant v. State of Minnesota · filed 2015-09-21(1)

But strictly limiting predicate acts to those on the list would lead to an absurd result. Under Gant’s approach, an assailant who strangles a family member would not create a predicate act for establishing a pattern of stalking conduct, while an assailant who commits a misdemeanor domestic assault would. That an assailant would be benefited by inflicting more serious harm is the type of absurd result that our interpretation must aim to avoid. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2010) (“[T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.”); see also Wegener v. Comm'r of Revenue, 505 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 1993) (recognizing our obligation to go beyond the plain language of the statute if a literal interpretation “leads to absurd results or unreasonable results which utterly depart from the purpose of the statute”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1)’s presumption against absurd or unreasonable results applies when statutory language is ambiguous.

Schatz v. Interfaith Care Center · filed 2012-04-11(1)

When construing a statute, we presume that the Legislature did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. MinmStat. § 645.17(1) (2010). This rule of construction applies when the words of the statute are ambiguous. ... We conclude that section 176.136, subdivision lb(d), is clear and unambiguous, and does not lead to an absurd result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when courts interpret a statute.

In re the Estate of Holmberg · filed 2012-09-10(1)

Appellant’s interpretation of the phrase “person nominated as personal representative” violates the canon of construction that presumes the legislature did not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 directs courts to presume that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results.

State v. Nelson · filed 2012-12-10

Finally, we observe that both of the parties’ proposed interpretations of the nonsupport statute would elicit absurd results that the legislature could not have intended. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (requiring a reviewing court to presume that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) guides statutory interpretation with a presumption that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results.

Manty v. Johnson · filed 2014-04-22(1)

When ascertaining legislative intent, courts interpreting Minnesota statutes may be guided by the presumptions detailed in Minn. Stat. § 645.17. ... We view this as an absurd and unreasonable result which could not have been intended by the Minnesota legislature.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when interpreting a statute.

Manty v. Johnson (In re Johnson) · filed 2014-04-22(1)

If the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of the statute is correct, then any person (regardless of income) who received a property tax refund under the Act is exempt from collection action by that person’s creditors for six months. We view this as an absurd and unreasonable result which could not have been intended by the Minnesota legislature.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result, so a court rejects a literal interpretation that would produce one.

Yaggie v. Schmidt · filed 2014-11-10(1)

A literal interpretation of the statute leads to the unreasonable and absurd conclusion that any candidate who makes such a promise should be prosecuted for a felony. This interpretation must be rejected, because a court presumes that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2012).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result; that presumption weighs against reading a general expungement provision to override a specific controlled-substance remedy.

State of Minnesota v. T. J. Z. · filed 2015-02-23(1)

The district court countered that it would “lead to an absurd or unreasonable result” to allow subdivision 3 to supersede subdivision 1 whenever a petitioner seeks to expunge a controlled-substance conviction arising out of the same incident as any other conviction. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2012) (directing a court to presume that the legislature “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable”). We agree.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 directs courts to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

110 Wyman, LLC, (A14-1176), Ruby Red Dentata, LLC, (A14-1177) v. City of Minneapolis, Minnesota · filed 2015-03-30

This court must presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2014). Thus, we presume that the legislature intended the standard set forth in chapter 428A to apply to service charges imposed on property owners in a special service district rather than the special-benefit standard, the application of which could render the chapter ineffectual.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when courts interpret a statute.

City of Oronoco v. Fitzpatrick Real Estate, LLC v. Whitney National Bankof New Orleans, Louisiana · filed 2015-09-08

But if we were to hold that a garnishment lien supersedes an attorney cause-of-action lien, a client could avoid that attorney lien by confessing judgment to his general creditor instead of making an assignment. This would be an absurd result that the legislature could not have intended. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2014) (stating that in ascertaining legislative intent, the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when interpreting a statute.

State of Minnesota v. Rocky Lane Zahrowski · filed 2015-11-09(1)

Courts may assume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014). ... Requiring an actor to intend to engage in sexual conduct with the child solicited would lead to absurd and unreasonable results and is contrary to the legislature’s intent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result, supporting rejection of a statutory interpretation that would produce one.

State of Minnesota by Lorie Afremov and Michael R. Afremov v. Anne L. Remes, Martha W. Gabbert · filed 2015-08-10(1)

We conclude that such a result is absurd and cannot be the rule. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014) (“[T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when interpreting ambiguous statutory text.

State of Minnesota v. Goggleye · filed 2016-01-11(1)

Courts may assume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014). ... Adopting the latter interpretation, however, leads to absurd and unreasonable results. Under this interpretation, Goggleye could be convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under section 609.342, subdivision 1(a) if, on one occasion, he engaged in sexual contact with a person under 13 years of age. However, if he committed such conduct on numerous occasions and had a significant relationship to the complainant, his offenses would not fall under the scope of section 609.342, subdivision 1(g) or (h)(iii). Thus, the district court did not err in its interpretation of section 609.342.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the Legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result, but that presumption overcomes plain meaning only when the meaning utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.

State of Minnesota v. Schouweiler · filed 2016-11-16(1)

When construing a statute, we presume that the Legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014). But this canon is *27not applicable “except in an exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute ‘utterly confounds’ the clear legislative purpose of the statute.”
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1)'s presumption against absurd results does not allow courts to reject a legislative distinction between offenses merely because they question the punishment it produces.

State v. Stay · filed 2019-02-11(1)

In determining the legislature's intent, courts are to presume that "the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable." Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2018). ... We cannot say that the legislature's application of the reasonable-foreseeability modifier to the misdemeanor-offense clause, but not to the fifth-degree-assault clause, creates an absurdity in section 609.20(2).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1)'s presumption against absurd results does not preclude reading tobacco licensing laws to require a distributor or subjobber license for transfers between commonly managed retail stores.

Kareem INC v. Property Seized by Minnesota Department of Revenue in Goodhue County, ... · filed 2025-12-01(1)

Kareem argues that this interpretation is absurd because it would require any business that has multiple retail stores and a centralized warehouse or redistribution point to obtain duplicative licenses. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2024) (stating presumption that the legislature does not intend absurd results). But, as DOR noted in oral arguments, such distribution is contemplated within the statutory scheme as the work of licensed subjobbers. ... We disagree that DOR’s reading of the statutory scheme is absurd.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1)’s presumption against absurd or unreasonable results applies to ambiguous statutes, except when plain meaning utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.

Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan North America, Inc., Stephen J. McDaniels · filed 2016-02-17(1)

When interpreting statutes, we presume that the Legislature did not intend absurd or unreasonable results. State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 2003); accord Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2014). But this canon of construction applies only to ambiguous statutes, except in the “exceedingly rare case in which the plain meaning of the statute ‘utterly confounds’ the clear legislative purpose of the statute.” Schatz v. Interfaith Care Ctr., 811 N.W.2d 643, 651 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Weston v. McWilliams & Assocs., Inc., 716 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Minn. 2006)).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 permits courts to presume that the legislature does not intend absurd results when interpreting a statute.

NJK Holding Corporation v. The Araz Group, Inc. · filed 2016-05-02

We also are guided by the statutory presumption that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd, impossible, or unreasonable results. ... We agree that requiring a writing for a modification of a credit agreement but not for a promise to forgive debt under a credit agreement would produce an absurd result that was not intended by the legislature.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to avoid construing a statute to produce an unreasonable result.

In re the Marriage of: Joshua Ryan Beckendorf v. Fox · filed 2017-02-13(1)

We will not interpret Minn. Stat. § 518A.40, subd. 3(a), to produce such an unreasonable result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2016).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result when a court interprets a statute.

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: D. J. T. and N. L. T., Parents · filed 2023-11-20(1)

Removing F.T. from her home would frustrate the purpose of the rules of juvenile protection and require us to reach an unreasonable result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1). We decline to do so.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the Legislature does not intend an absurd result.

State of Minnesota v. Moore · filed 2024-08-28(1)

We cannot presume that the Legislature intended such a result. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (2022); State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 916 (Minn. 1996) (“It is well settled that courts may presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 counsels courts against construing a law to produce an absurd or unjust result.

Schoening v. United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. · filed 1963-03-15

While this court presumptively will not give retroactive effect to a statute unless a purpose that it have such effect is implicit therein, neither will this court construe a law in a manner which will result in absurdity, injustice, or patent inconvenience. 17 Dunnell, Dig. (3 ed.) § 8947; Minn. St. 645.17. The construction of L. 1961, c. 230, § 3, urged by defendants as the basis for their claim that immunity cannot be waived to the extent of the liability insurance coverage carried by the village leads to an unjust conclusion, since the record clearly indicates that at the time the liability insurance was acquired the purpose was to protect the aircraft stored at the municipal ariport.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 guides courts to avoid unreasonable results and to give effect to the entire statute.

Mechling v. Jasper Stone Company · filed 1972-06-09(1), (2)

Likewise, Minn. St. 645.17 provides in part: ... “In ascertaining the intention of the legislature the courts may be guided by the following presumptions: ... “(1) The legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable; ... “(2) The legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” ... We doubt that the legislature had any intention of giving double benefits during the so-called healing period, primarily because it would be an unreasonable result — a result that even the employee does not here seek.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd result.

Salmen v. City of St. Paul · filed 1979-05-18(1)

We may presume that, “[t]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd * * Minn.St. 645.17(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature avoids absurd, impossible, or unreasonable results and intends the whole statute to be effective.

Slayton Gun Club v. Town of Shetek, Murray County · filed 1970-04-03(1)

There is nothing in the statutes which prohibits the appeal. Minn. St. 645.17(1) permits a presumption that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable and does intend the entire statute to be effective. We hold that in order to give full effect to all the provisions of §§ 164.07 and 164.08, plaintiff, as the party who must pay the damages, may appeal from the agreement constituting the award of damages made between the town board and the landowner to the district court. Minn. St. 645.16.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

Hestbeck v. Hennepin County · filed 1973-10-26(1)

It would seem unreasonable, if not absurd, to require a patient while under the care and treatment of a municipal hospital to not only formalize the time, place, and circumstances of his claim of negligence by employees upon whom he must depend to continue to serve him but to threaten public disclosure by filing a suit for damages. The rules of statutory construction to ascertain legislative intent reject such a construction. Minn. St. 645.17(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

Kaysen v. Federal Insurance Co. · filed 1978-06-30(1)

Furthermore, in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, we are bound to conclude that the legislature does not intend to achieve an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn.St. 645.17(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd, impossible, or unreasonable result.

Dahl v. Minneapolis Police Relief Assn. Inc. · filed 1971-05-28(1)

Minn. St. 645.17(1) provides that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. Plaintiff’s claim is certainly absurd and unreasonable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) lets a court presume that the Legislature does not intend an absurd result when ascertaining legislative intent.

State v. Fleming · filed 1974-11-01(1)

Although the legislative intent is not completely clear, we conclude that the intent of the 1974 amendment was to continue jurisdiction of the juvenile court over an individual 18 years of age or older where the alleged offense occurred before that individual was 18 years of age. In ascertaining the legislative intent this court may presume that “[t]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd * * *.” Minn. St. 645.17(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) permits courts to presume that the legislature does not intend absurd, impossible, or unreasonable results.

Polivka Logan Designers, Inc. v. Ende · filed 1977-02-18(1)

We do not think the legislature intended these incongruous and unreasonable results. Minn. St. 645.17(1).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17, subdivision 1, presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd, impossible, or unreasonable result.

Wolf Lake Camp, Inc. v. County of Itasca · filed 1977-03-251

We do not believe the legislature intended such a result. See, Minn.St. 645.17, subd. 1.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend unreasonable or absurd results.

Ewers v. Thunderbird Aviation, Inc. · filed 1979-09-07(1)

A contrary result, i. e., adoption of defendants’ theory that the phrase “aircraft operated within * * * this state” limits an owner’s vicarious liability to accidents occurring in Minnesota, would lead to unreasonable and absurd results, which, of course, we presume the legislature did not intend.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to presume that the legislature did not intend an unreasonable or absurd result when construing statutes.

Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc. · filed 1998-04-16(1)

See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1996)(di-recting courts construing statutes to presume that the legislature did not intend an unreasonable or absurd result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Avoiding unreasonable results

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce unreasonable results.

Bow v. Mallinger · filed 1984-08-21(1)

To hold otherwise would lead to unreasonable results, which must be avoided in statutory interpretation. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1982).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result, such as requiring compliance with a statute before it takes effect.

Haluptzok v. Peyton · filed 1984-10-03(1)

It is unreasonable to require a notice of cancellation comply with a statute not yet effective. The Legislature does not intend a result that is unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1982).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) does not permit an unreasonable agency interpretation of an unemployment statute to stand.

Holman v. OLSTEN CORP., OLSTEN HEALTH CARE · filed 1986-06-10(1)

An unreasonable interpretation by the Commissioner, however, will not be upheld. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1984).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result when a statute is construed.

Southdale Circle Partnership v. County of Hennepin · filed 1988-06-10(1)

Thus, if section 278.05 is construed to give rise to an implied counterclaim in the taxing authority, a taxpayer who does nothing would be in a superior position to one who asserts the right to question the valuation; a defaulting taxpayer would be in a superior position to the taxpayer who voluntarily dismisses the petition; and a delinquent taxpayer would be in a superior position to one who pays the tax when due. These results, if not absurd, are certainly unreasonable and directly contravene the presumptions of statutory construction. Minn.Stat. § 645.17. .
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result when courts interpret statutes.

Love v. Amsler · filed 1989-06-13(1)

That the legislature intended to protect only purchases of residential real estate and not leases of the same properties — especially in light of the unequal bargaining positions of those who are forced economically to rent —does not appear reasonable. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (1988).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result when a court interprets a statute.

Casper v. City of Stacy · filed 1991-07-30

We conclude the legislature did not authorize the expenditure of public funds for the purchase of liability insurance in excess of the liability limits of section 466.04 and at the same time not allow recovery beyond those limits. Such a result would be unreasonable. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (1986).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result when enacting a statute.

State Ex Rel. Beaulieu v. Independent School District No. 624 · filed 1995-06-16(1)

Furthermore, there is a presumption that the legislature does not intend a result that is unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994). A statutory scheme which does not allow a school district to develop an early retirement program limited to persons of a certain age would, we believe, be unreasonable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature did not intend an unreasonable result when enacting a statute.

Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan · filed 1996-08-06(1)

It would be unreasonable for the legislature both explicitly to restrict a municipality’s taxing power and to empower a municipality to impose taxes at will. In construing statutes, we are to assume that the legislature did not intend an unreasonable result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1994).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) supports rejecting a statutory interpretation that would penalize compliance with a legislative mandate as unreasonable.

Washington v. Independent School District No. 625 · filed 2000-05-16(1)

Additionally, a holding that Washington qualifies as an aggrieved person would involve an unreasonable construction of the applicable statutes. Under that construction, a political subdivision would be required by law to withhold protected nonpublic data from the subject of the data. If the political subdivision complied, it would nevertheless be subject to an award of attorney fees if a court later permitted the disclosure of the protected nonpublic data. Thus, the political subdivision would be penalized for complying with a legislative mandate. We cannot conclude that the legislature intended such a construction of the data practices laws.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result, supporting rejection of an interpretation that would produce one.

In Re Daniel for the Establishment of Cartway · filed 2002-05-28

And we are to presume that the statute is not intended to produce an unreasonable result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17 (2000). ... This would not be a reasonable interpretation of the cartway statute, and we reject it as being indicative of probable legislative intent.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend unreasonable results when courts interpret statutes.

Bradley v. First Nat. Bank of Walker, N.A. · filed 2006-03-28(1)

Minnesota statutes instruct the courts that the legislature does not intend unreasonable results. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1), subd. 1. ... It is unreasonable to have a longer statute of limitations and greater exposure when a bank defendant plays a more limited role in a transaction, and a shorter, more protective statute if the bank has greater involvement.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an unreasonable result.

First Class Valet Services, LLC v. Gleason · filed 2017-03-20(1)

Moreover, the interpretation that First Class advocates would necessarily result in an unreasonable outcome. When interpreting a statute, we avoid interpretations that create unreasonable results. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2016) (providing that courts should assume legislature does not intend results that are unreasonable).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the Legislature did not intend unreasonable results when a statute is interpreted.

State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Ryan James Martens, Appellant · filed 2025-04-02(1)

We also must presume that the Legislature did not intend unreasonable results. State v. Koenig, 666 N.W.2d 366, 372 (Minn. 2003); Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1). ... Given this directive, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended that the maltreatment of a child who is 17 years and 6 months old should not be subject to a mandatory report simply because the abuse came to light a few months later after the victim had turned 18.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Avoiding impossible execution

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd, impossible, or unreasonable result when a statute is construed.

Bethune Associates v. County of Hennepin · filed 1985-02-15(1)

We agree with the reasoning advanced by Judge Gustafson in the thoughtful memorandum which accompanied his decision: ... “In attempting to ascertain legislative intent, we are aided by several presumptions: ... 2. The legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to avoid statutory interpretations that produce absurd, impossible, or unreasonable results.

Andrade v. Ellefson · filed 1985-12-30(1)

The legislature directs us to consider "[t]he consequences of a particular interpretation," Minn.Stat. § 645.16(6) (1984), and to avoid "a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable," Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1984). The effect of excluding counties from the definition of state is that counties may not benefit from the partial grant of immunity given to the state under section 3.736. Impliedly, the legislature would not thus intend counties to benefit from the immunity granted state employees.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to presume that the legislature does not intend a result that is impossible to execute.

Baker v. Baker · filed 1992-12-31(1)

We are directed to presume that the legislature does not intend a result that is impossible of execution. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990). Because the application of a § 257.025(a) “best interests” analysis is impossible to execute in the context of a hearing on a domestic abuse order for protection, we hold that it does not apply here.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature avoids absurd or impossible results and intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.

Nastrom v. City of Blaine · filed 1993-05-28(1), (2)

We note “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable” but, rather, it “intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1), (2) (1988). In this case, following the statutory standard of the percentage of “property abutting streets” would have been an impossibility and an absurdity.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd, impossible, or unreasonable result when a statute is interpreted.

Northern States Power Co. v. City of Oakdale · filed 1999-02-02(1)

"The legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable." Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1998). It would be absurd to interpret the MPUA as granting conflicting authority.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes the legislature does not intend an absurd, impossible, or unreasonable result when statutes are construed.

In Re Simpkins · filed 1999-07-20(1)

The name-change statute requires a petitioner's personal appearance before the court to prove his or her identity. Minn.Stat. § 259.10. "The legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable." Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (1998). Moreover, we construe conflicting statutory provisions to give effect, if possible, to both. Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (1998). By authorizing an inmate to seek a name change during confinement and requiring an inmate's personal appearance before the court, the legislature must have intended to permit the inmate's transportation to the hearing or to allow some other means of satisfying the in-person requirement.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd, impossible, or unreasonable result.

State v. Bradford · filed 2000-10-25(1)

In ascertaining legislative intent, courts should presume that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible, or unreasonable. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1998). ... As noted above, we must not construe legislation in a way that will achieve an absurd result. If we construed the domestic abuse murder statute so that heat of passion mitigated the offense, the statute would be stripped of its purpose.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17 presumes that the legislature does not intend an interpretation that makes a statute impossible to execute.

State Ex Rel. Hatch v. Employers Insurance of Wausau · filed 2002-05-21(1)

Bearing in mind the rule that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd or impossible of execution, we begin with the fact that in 1970 — before MERLA was even enacted — the legislature was aware of approximately 250 landfills creating water-pollution problems, many of which had leached contaminants into the water table. ... Given the sheer number of contaminated sites known to the legislature when it enacted MERLA in 1983, if the accrual period were to begin when the contamination was discovered, then by definition, no cost-recovery actions could be brought with respect to these sites. The result is a statute impossible of execution.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17, subdivision 1, presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd or impossible results when a court interprets a statute.

State v. Bluhm · filed 2004-03-25(1)

Bluhm's argument, while creative, is not convincing because Bluhm's reading of the statute would render section 152.026 meaningless for those committed to a local correctional authority and would lead to absurd results or results that would be impossible to execute. In ascertaining the legislature's intent, we presume that "the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable." Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. 1 (2002).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd or impossible results when a court construes a statute.

In Re Md · filed 2009-06-09(1)

"[T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable...." Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2008). ... We disagree because interpreting "state correctional facility" to mean a correctional facility in any state leads to absurd and impossible results.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or impossible result.

In re the Risk Level Determination of M.D. · filed 2009-06-09(1)

We disagree because interpreting “state correctional facility” to mean a correctional facility in any state leads to absurd and impossible results.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend absurd or unreasonable results when courts interpret statutes.

In Re the Welfare of the Child of S.S.W. · filed 2009-07-07(1)

When interpreting statutes, we presume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1). We can readily identify several scenarios in which the department’s suggested construction would yield absurd and unreasonable results.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when a statute is interpreted.

Faegre & Benson, LLP v. R & R INVESTORS · filed 2009-09-29(1)

We base our conclusion primarily on the former UPA’s treatment of partnership property and allowance for continuation of partnership businesses. Appellants’ reading of the former UPA would frustrate the purposes of these provisions. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17, subd. (1) (stating presumption that legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

City of Cohasset v. Minnesota Power · filed 2010-01-12(1)

We agree that such a result would be absurd. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1), subd. 1 (2008) (stating that we are to presume that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result when a statute is construed.

Imperial Developers, Inc. v. Calhoun Development, LLC · filed 2010-10-28(1)

Further, a construction of the term “of record” in section 514.05, subdivision 1, as synonymous with the term “registered” leads to an absurd and unreasonable result in violation of Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2008) (“[T]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd ... or unreasonable.... ”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend a statute to require an impossible act.

ADT Security Services, Inc. v. Swenson · filed 2011-03-21(1)

Construing the statute as requiring Zilge to physically arrest an individual when he was literally unable to is a result foreclosed by Minnesota law. See Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd, impossible, or unreasonable result when its intent is ascertained.

State v. Brown · filed 2011-06-13(1)

In ascertaining the intention of the legislature, we presume that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (2010). ... Reading the sections together in a manner that avoids conflict and an absurd result, we conclude that Brown’s operation of his scooter as a substitute for walking does not make him the driver of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1, and does not subject him to criminal charges for operating the scooter while impaired.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Limits on avoiding absurd results

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd or unreasonable result.

Buhs v. State, Department of Public Welfare · filed 1981-06-05(1)

All of these results clearly violate the policy that “[t]he legislature does not intend a result that is absurd ... or unreasonable.” Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1980).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes that the legislature does not intend an absurd result when enacting a statute.

In Re Complaint Concerning Kirby · filed 1984-05-25(1)

Such a construction would in effect vest in the board on judicial standards the power to suspend when it has no power of removal and conflicts with the well-established principle that this court presumes the legislature does not intend an absurd result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts to construe statutory language to avoid an unreasonable or absurd result, even when the literal wording supports that result.

Good Neighbor Care Center v. City of Little Canada · filed 1984-11-06(1)

Although the literal language can be read to support Little Canada’s position, we must construe statutory language to avoid reaching an unreasonable or absurd result.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) presumes the legislature did not intend an unreasonable result that would leave a claimant with no court able to order the return of seized property.

State, Department of Public Safety v. $6,276 in United States Currency · filed 1991-12-10(1)

Under the state’s interpretation of the statute, if the state does not bring a forfeiture action, a claimant could never regain his seized property. If the statute of limitations a claimant wishes to use to regain seized property has run, he can find no court with jurisdiction, and until it has run, why would a court use it as a reason to give him back his property? See Minn. Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990) (“The legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.”).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) counsels against interpreting a statute to produce an absurd or unreasonable result.

Nieszner v. Minnesota Department of Jobs & Training · filed 1993-05-11(1)

Interpreting Minn.Stat. § 268.10, subd. 2(2) to allow an employer within 24 months, in essence, to “reopen” or to “revisit” the issue of disqualification where that issue was determined initially and not appealed leads to an absurd or unreasonable result. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1990).
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Section 645.17(1) directs courts construing an ambiguous statute to presume that the legislature did not intend absurd or unreasonable results.

Matter of Cm · filed 1998-06-02(1)

Where a statute is ambiguous, a court applies established canons of construction. We must presume that the legislature did not intend absurd and unreasonable results. Minn.Stat. § 645.17(1) (1996). ... The unreasonableness of the state's construction is closely related to the question of its constitutionality.
Read the full opinion on CourtListener →

Notes 1–150 of 317, oldest cases first.

244 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

MINNESOTA FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DIST. v. State, the references to § 645.17 appear only in the dissent, not in the court’s decision. opinion →
Minnesota Fifth Congressional District Independent-Republican Party v. State ex rel. Spannaus, this statement appears in a dissent, so it is not the court's holding. opinion →
First American National Bank v. State, the court cited § 645.17(5) while deciding the reconveyance price under § 161.44, but did not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Balderrama v. Milbank Mutual Insurance Co., the court invokes § 645.17's presumptions to interpret § 65B.47, but its decision concerns § 65B.47 rather than a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Willems v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court cites § 645.17(5) as a general interpretive principle while deciding the availability of a hearing under § 171.19; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Miller v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., the court recites § 645.17’s presumptions but decides how to interpret § 65B.49, not a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the citation supports the Commissioner’s argument, which the court rejects; the court does not adopt a ruling about § 645.17(1). opinion →
Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., Inc., the court presented the analysis invoking § 645.17(c) as a ground the trial court could have used, then affirmed on a different limitations analysis. opinion →
Hough Transit, Ltd. v. Harig, the court decides the scope of § 268.04, subd. 12(b); it cites § 645.17(2) without deciding that section’s own rule. opinion →
Davila v. Ramsey County Community Human Services Department, only the dissent invokes § 645.17; the majority does not decide its meaning or application. opinion →
Herrly v. Muzik, the court decides the effect of an amendment to § 340.95 and cites § 645.17, subd. 4 by analogy; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In Re the Welfare of D.L.K., the court cites section 645.17 as an interpretive principle but decides the force requirement in section 609.345(c), without deciding a rule of section 645.17. opinion →
White v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., the reference to § 645.17 appears in White’s argument, which the court did not adopt as a ruling on that section. opinion →
Shortridge v. Daubney, the citation appears in the dissent’s quotation of an earlier case, not in this court’s majority decision about § 645.17. opinion →
State v. Neisen, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumptions to construe § 340A.503, but does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Good Neighbor Care Centers, Inc. v. Minnesota Department of Human Services, the court cites § 645.17 as an interpretive rule while deciding what § 256B.48 requires; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Color-Ad Packaging, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, the discussion of § 645.17 appears in Justice Kelley's dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
State v. Quinn, the citation and interpretation appear only in Justice Wahl's dissent, not in the court's decision. opinion →
Sherek v. Independent School District No. 699, the court invokes § 645.17 as an interpretive presumption but decides which teacher recall statute governs; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
First Trust Co., Inc. v. Leibman, the citation appears in First Trust's argument; the court does not decide a rule under § 645.17. opinion →
State v. Dutton, the court cites the presumption while deciding the constitutionality of other statutes, but does not decide a rule of § 645.17(3). opinion →
Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, the court cites § 645.17 as an interpretive aid while deciding how to apply the collateral source statute; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Ruzic v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the only discussion of § 645.17(1) appears in the dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Schmidt v. Apple Valley Health Care Center, Inc., the court cites § 645.17 as an interpretive principle while deciding the meaning of § 256B.48; it does not decide § 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., the court cites § 645.17(4) while deciding the purpose and effect of the Minnesota Human Rights Act; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Clark v. Growe, the citation appears only in Chief Justice Popovich’s dissent, not in the court’s decision. opinion →
Bourbon Bar & Cafe Corp. v. City of St. Paul, the court cites § 645.17(1) as an interpretive presumption while deciding whether a disposition under § 152.18 is a conviction; it does not decide § 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
Jurkovich v. Independent School District No. 708, the court decided when the amendment to the superintendent tenure law applied. It cited § 645.17(2) as a supporting rule of construction and did not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself; it also left the constitutional argument associated with subdivision 3 unresolved. opinion →
In Re the Complaint Regarding the Annexation of a Portion of the Service Territory of People's Cooperative Power Ass'n, the discussion of § 645.17 is in a dissent criticizing the majority’s decision, so it is not the court’s holding. opinion →
Principal Financial Group v. Allstate Insurance Co., Judge Davies invokes § 645.17(2) only in his separate concurrence, not in the court's decision. opinion →
In Re the Insurance Agents' Licenses of Kane, the court cites § 645.17 while interpreting the insurance statutes, but does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Holmes v. Watson-Forsberg Co., the court recites § 645.17’s presumption while deciding whether an agreement is enforceable under chapter 337; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Investment Co. Institute v. Hatch, the court cites § 645.17(3) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the constitutionality of § 80A.28; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Matter of May, the court decides whether the hearing deadline in § 253B.08 can be waived; it cites § 645.17(1) only to support that interpretation, without deciding a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Ginsberg v. Minnesota Department of Jobs & Training, the court decides the meaning of § 268.04 and cites § 645.17(2) only as support for a rule of statutory construction. opinion →
1989 Street Improvement Program v. Denmark Township, the court cites § 645.17 as an interpretive presumption while deciding the meaning of § 429.031; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
United Power Ass'n v. Commissioner of Revenue, the court cites § 645.17(2) in passing while deciding the scope of the tax exemption under § 272.02; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17(2). opinion →
Rogers v. Ponti-Peterson Post 1720 Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States of America, Inc., the court cites § 645.17(3) as a general presumption while deciding whether § 340A.404 is unconstitutionally vague; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
In Re the Welfare of E.Y.W., the court cites § 645.17(3) as supporting authority while deciding whether § 260.125 is constitutional; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Davis v. State, Department of Corrections, the court decides whether section 3.738 has an implied assault exception; it cites section 645.17 only as support for that interpretation. opinion →
State v. Kimmons, the court invokes the presumption while deciding the constitutionality of § 609.152; it does not decide § 645.17(3)'s own rules. opinion →
Heaslip v. Freeman, the court mentions § 645.17’s constitutional presumption but does not apply or decide its rules; it decides the scope of the Free Flow of Information Act. opinion →
State v. MBM, the court decides the forms of expungement available under § 152.18 and cites § 645.17(4) only in support of that interpretation. opinion →
State v. M.B.M., the court cites § 645.17(4) while deciding the scope of expungement under § 152.18; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 627e, this is an attorney general opinion, not a court’s own decision. opinion →
Franzen v. Borders, the court applied the presumption in § 645.17(1) while interpreting the child-support statute; it did not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Burns, the court cites § 645.17(3) as background to its decision about the constitutionality of an extended limitations period; it does not decide the section’s own rules. opinion →
Fedorko v. State, Commissioner of Human Services, the court construed the waiver provision in § 256B.04; it cited § 645.17(1) for the general presumption against absurd results without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
AFSCME Council No. 14, Local Union No. 517 v. Washington County Board of Commissioners, the court cites the presumption while deciding whether preclusion applies, but does not decide any rule of § 645.17(5). opinion →
Kedzior v. NORWEST BANK MINN., NAT. ASS'N, section 645.17(1) appears only in the dissent, not in the court's decision. opinion →
Kedzior v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, National Ass'n, this is a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Lolling v. Midwest Patrol, the court cites § 645.17(1) as support while deciding the deadlines in § 268.10; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Lolling v. Midwest Patrol, the court invokes § 645.17(5) while deciding the deadline and jurisdictional effect of § 268.10; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Lambert, the court cites § 645.17(1) to support its interpretation of the fine statute, but decides no rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Englund v. MN CA Partners/MN Joint Ventures, the court cites § 645.17(2) as a guide while deciding the meaning of the liquor law; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Spears, the court decides the coverage of § 609.346; § 645.17 appears only in the state's rejected argument. opinion →
State v. Behl, the citation to § 645.17(1) appears only in a dissent, not in the court's decision. opinion →
Miller-Lagro v. Northern States Power Co., the court cites § 645.17 as an aid to interpreting § 561.04; it decides the scope of § 561.04, not a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Stang v. Minnesota Teachers Retirement Ass'n Board of Trustees, the court cites § 645.17(1) to support its interpretation of the teachers retirement statute; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Thompson v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court cites § 645.17(5) as a presumption while interpreting § 171.3215; it does not decide a rule or limit of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 268l, this is an Attorney General opinion, not a court’s decision. opinion →
State v. Royster, the reference to § 645.17(1) appears in Royster’s argument, not in the court’s own decision. opinion →
Hersh Properties, LLC v. McDonald's Corp., the court cites § 645.17 as a general interpretive rule, but decides whether the Marketable Title Act applies to registered property; it does not decide § 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 159a-3, the opinion cites § 645.17 to support its interpretation of the school election laws, but does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Collins, the court cites § 645.17(2) while interpreting the sentencing guidelines; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Lundberg Ex Rel. Lundberg v. Jeep Corp., the court cites § 645.17(3) as background for the presumption of constitutionality but decides the validity of § 256B.042, without deciding a rule of § 645.17(3). opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 268l, Attorney general opinion, not a court decision; § 645.17 was cited during advice on another statute. opinion →
Madison v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the court cites the presumption to support its interpretation of § 171.19; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
State v. Sater, the court cites § 645.17’s presumption while deciding what § 609.035 permits; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 161b-7 (Cr. Ref. 59a-25, 125a-28, 469a-7), this is an Attorney General opinion, not a court's decision. opinion →
Amaral v. Saint Cloud Hospital, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumptions to interpret § 145.64, but decides access to peer review materials under § 145.64 rather than a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
In Re the Welfare of A.A.E., the court decides how to interpret § 609.66; it cites § 645.17(1) only as support for avoiding an absurd result. opinion →
In Re Estate of Ablan, the court recites the statutory presumption but decides the homestead statutes without deciding or applying a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Smith v. State, the court decides the meaning of § 609.19(2) and cites § 645.17(2) only as support. opinion →
State v. Linville, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumptions to interpret § 624.714; it decides the scope of § 624.714. opinion →
Board Order, Kells v. City of Rochester, the court cites § 645.17(1) as support while deciding whether the filing fee under § 103G.2242 applies; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Wallin v. Minnesota Department of Corrections, the court cites § 645.17(1) while deciding whether the MHRA permits supplemental federal jurisdiction; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Boelter v. City of Coon Rapids, the court cites § 645.17(1)'s presumption while deciding the meaning of the military leave statute, § 192.26; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Coauette, the court uses § 645.17(1) to support its interpretation of the firearm statutes; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Larson, the court decides the scope of section 609.445; it cites section 645.17 without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Owens Ex Rel. Owens v. Water Gremlin Co., the citation to § 645.17(1) supports the relators’ argument, which the court did not adopt. opinion →
Edward Kraemer & Sons, Inc. v. Ashbach Construction Co., the court cites the presumption while deciding the payment-bond notice statutes, without deciding a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Rockford Township v. City of Rockford, the court cites § 645.17 as an interpretive aid while deciding the scope of § 414.07; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Deal v. Northwood Children's Home Society, Inc., the court cites § 645.17(1) for an interpretive principle but decides whether § 573.02 permits punitive damages, without deciding a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Pearson, the court applies the presumption against unreasonable results to construe § 611A.775(3); it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Fosselman v. Commissioner of Human Services, the court cites § 645.17(3) as support for a rule of construction, but decides whether the relators were denied due process and entitled to a hearing under § 256.045. opinion →
Pecinovsky v. AMCO Insurance Co., the court cites § 645.17(4) by analogy while interpreting § 65B.47, subd. 7; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17(4). opinion →
Berreman v. West Publishing Co., the court cites § 645.17 as an interpretive principle while deciding the meaning of § 302A.751; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 852 (Cr. Ref. 523a-17, 523a-27), the opinion cites § 645.17(1) for the absurd-results presumption but decides whether the documents are public under §§ 13.39 and 13.03. It does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 852 (Cr. Ref. 523a-17, 523a-27), the opinion cites § 645.17(1) as a rule of construction while deciding whether documents are public under the Data Practices Act; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Dealers Manufacturing, Co. v. County of Anoka, the only discussion of § 645.17(2) is in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 484e-1 (Cr. Ref. 185b-2), this is an attorney general opinion, not a court decision. opinion →
American Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, the court cites § 645.17(1) as a general rule of construction but decides the meaning of § 15.99, not a rule of § 645.17(1). opinion →
State v. Lattimer, the court uses the statutory presumption as an analogy for interpreting judicial decisions; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Buss v. Johnson, the court cites § 645.17 as an interpretive principle while deciding the meaning of § 394.36; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In Re the Enlargement & Increasing the Number of Managers of the Brown's Creek Watershed District, the court cites § 645.17(1) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the scope of § 103D.261; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Sherbrooke, the court cites § 645.17(2) as an interpretive aid while deciding what qualifies as a special permit under § 169.86; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
West Circle Properties LLC v. Hall, No. The court rejects the parties’ argument about the zoning statutes without deciding the meaning or scope of § 645.17(1). opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 125a (Cr. Ref. 59a-9), this is an Attorney General opinion, not a court decision. opinion →
State v. Gebeck, the court invokes section 645.17’s presumptions while construing section 609.21; it does not decide a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
Heidbreder v. Carton, the court recites the presumption while deciding the adoption registry’s constitutionality; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
State v. Pearson, section 645.17 appears only in a special concurrence; the court’s majority does not decide its rule. opinion →
In Re RBP, the court cites § 645.17(1) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the ECRC’s authority under § 244.052; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In re the Risk Level Determination of R.B.P., the court cites § 645.17(1) as an interpretive principle but decides the scope of the committee’s authority under the Sex Offender Community Notification Act, not a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Occhino v. Grover, the court mentions § 645.17(3) in an overview of interpretive canons but decides the scope of § 504B.255, without applying or construing § 645.17(3). opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 63b-14 (Cr. Ref. 61c), the opinion cites § 645.17(1) to support its construction of the zoning statutes; it does not decide that section's own rules. opinion →
D.M.S. v. Barber, the court cites § 645.17(1) to support its interpretation of a different statute; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Chapman v. Commissioner of Revenue, the court cites § 645.17 as a guide while construing the AMT deduction, but decides no issue about § 645.17's own rules. opinion →
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., No. The citation appears only in Judge Randall's dissent, not in the court's decision. opinion →
State v. Gresser, the court applied the presumption while deciding the constitutionality of § 86B.313; it did not decide the meaning or operation of § 645.17(3). opinion →
Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, the court cites § 645.17’s presumptions while deciding the meaning of § 317A.241; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Wukawitz, the court cites § 645.17 as an interpretive presumption while deciding how to apply the conditional release statute, § 609.109; it does not decide § 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
Advantage Capital Management v. City of Northfield, the court states § 645.17(1)’s general interpretive rule but decides the scope of § 15.99; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
State v. Koenig, the court cites § 645.17 as a general interpretive presumption but decides the meaning of the child solicitation statute, not a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
State v. Anderson, the court cites § 645.17 as support for its interpretation of the felony-murder statute; it does not decide a rule or limit of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Murphy v. Allina Health System, the court cites § 645.17(2) as a canon while deciding the limitations period under other statutes; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Gaertner Ex Rel. Minnesota State Patrol v. One 1999 Dodge Pickup Truck, MN Lic. No. GKR-391, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumptions while deciding how two forfeiture provisions fit together; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Zeimet, the court cites the presumption as background but decides the meaning of the DWI enhancement statute and sentencing guidelines, not a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Podruch v. State, Department of Public Safety, the court uses § 645.17 as support for its interpretation of the MHRA; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Pomrenke v. Commissioner of Commerce, the court cites § 645.17(3) for a general presumption but decides the constitutional challenge to § 58.12, not a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Free Press v. County of Blue Earth, the court cited § 645.17 as an interpretive aid while deciding the open meeting law; it did not decide § 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, Inc., the discussion of § 645.17(1) appears in Judge Beam’s dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Industries, the discussion of § 645.17(1) appears in Judge Beam's concurring and dissenting opinion, not in the court's decision. opinion →
Olmanson v. LeSueur County, the discussion of § 645.17 appears in Justice Page’s dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
Law Enforcement Labor Services, Inc. v. Sherburne County, the court cites § 645.17(2) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the Workplace Testing Act; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Schmidt v. City of Columbia Heights, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumptions to interpret § 299A.465, but decides no rule about § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Veit Co. v. Lake County, the court decides the written-reasons requirement in § 15.99; it cites § 645.17 only as supporting authority for applying an earlier construction. opinion →
Lewis-Miller v. Ross, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumption while deciding the procedure required by § 257C.03; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, the court uses § 645.17's presumption to interpret § 15.99; it does not decide the meaning or limits of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Pillandco, Inc. v. State, the court cites § 645.17(1) while interpreting § 93.55, but does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Wingert & Associates v. Paramount Apparel, the discussion of § 645.17 appears in the dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Wingert & Associates, Inc. v. Paramount Apparel International, Inc., Wingert & Associates, Inc. v. Paramount Apparel Int, the citation to § 645.17 appears in the dissent, not in the court's decision. opinion →
Brown v. Cannon Falls Township, the court uses § 645.17’s presumption to interpret the open meeting law, but decides no rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In Re Commission Investigation of Issues Governed by Minnesota Statutes, Section 216a.036, the court cites the presumption while deciding whether the employment-restriction statute is unconstitutionally vague; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
State v. Mauer, the court cites § 645.17(3) to support its interpretation of § 617.247, but decides no rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In Re Collier, the court cites § 645.17(2) to support its interpretation of § 508.25; it does not decide the meaning or scope of § 645.17. opinion →
Elmasry v. Verdin, the court applies the presumption while interpreting § 518B.01; it does not decide a rule or limit of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Richmond, the court cites § 645.17 as support while construing the controlled-substance statutes; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Irongate Enterprises Inc. v. County of St. Louis, the court cites § 645.17 as support for its interpretation of § 278.05; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Wiltgen, the court found the statute’s language plain and discussed § 645.17(3) only as a conditional alternative. opinion →
In Re the Civil Commitment of Giem, the court cites § 645.17(2) as support for its interpretation of § 253B.08, but decides the rights under § 253B.08 rather than a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, the court cites Section 645.17’s presumption while deciding whether another statute bars an ejectment claim; it does not decide Section 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Soukup, the court cited section 645.17(1) only as additional support for its interpretation of section 628.26(c); it did not decide a rule of section 645.17. opinion →
Northern Realty Ventures, LLC v. Minnesota Housing Finance Agency, the court recites § 645.17(4) as an interpretive principle but decides the recording requirements of § 580.24(a)(2), without construing § 645.17(4). opinion →
City of West St. Paul v. Krengel, the discussion of § 645.17 is in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Milner v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, the court invokes the section’s presumption while deciding who receives civil penalties under the MFLSA; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Perry, the court cites § 645.17(1) to support its interpretation of § 65B.44, subd. 6, without deciding a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In Re Stadsvold, the court invokes § 645.17(2) while interpreting § 394.27, but does not decide § 645.17(2)'s own meaning or limits. opinion →
In re the Decision of County of Otter Tail Board of Adjustment to Deny a Variance to Stadsvold, the court cited § 645.17(2) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the meaning of § 394.27, subdivision 7; it did not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Moen, the court applies a presumption from § 645.17 to interpret § 609.02, subd. 16; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. O'MEARA, the court cites § 645.17(4) as support while deciding whether evidence is admissible under § 634.20; it does not decide § 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
Nestell v. State, the court used the presumption in § 645.17(1) to interpret § 590.01; it did not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Williams, the court uses § 645.17’s presumption to interpret § 609.341, but decides the meaning of § 609.341 rather than a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Sperle v. Orth, the court cites § 645.17’s presumptions as support for its interpretation of § 518B.01; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 292 v. City of St. Cloud, the citation to § 645.17 supports respondents’ argument, which the court did not adopt; the court applied the clear statutory text. opinion →
Morris v. State, the court cites section 645.17(3) as a presumption while deciding the constitutionality of section 611.14(2); it does not decide section 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
Business Bank v. Hanson, the court invokes § 645.17(2) as an interpretive rule while deciding the Mortgage Registry Tax statute; it does not decide § 645.17’s own meaning or scope. opinion →
State v. Peck, the discussion of § 645.17 is in a dissent, not the court's own decision. opinion →
State v. Johnson, the court cites the presumption while interpreting § 617.246, but does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Laase v. 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, the discussion of § 645.17(2) is in Justice Page's dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
Graff v. ROBERT M. SWENDRA AGENCY, INC., the court decides how to apply the collateral-source statute, § 548.251; it cites § 645.17(1) only as support for avoiding an absurd result. opinion →
Minneapolis Police Department v. Kelly, the court cites section 645.17(2) as support for an interpretive principle, but decides whether the ordinance permits a civil penalty against the police department; it does not decide a rule of section 645.17. opinion →
State v. Perez, the court recites § 645.17(1)’s presumption but decides the scope of § 609.746 without applying or construing that presumption. opinion →
In Re Enlargement of the Valley Branch Watershed District, the court cites § 645.17(1) as an interpretive aid, but decides the scope of BWSR’s authority under § 103D.261, not a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Middle-Snake-Tamarac Rivers Watershed District v. Stengrim, the court cites § 645.17’s presumption against absurd results while deciding the scope of the anti-SLAPP statutes; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Sampair v. Village of Birchwood, the court cites § 645.17 to support its interpretation of the Marketable Title Act, but decides no rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Holmes, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumptions to interpret § 514.02, but decides the scope of § 514.02 rather than a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Bearder v. State, the court cites § 645.17(5) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the effect of other statutes; it does not decide that section’s own rule. opinion →
Gassler v. State, the citation appears in a concurrence, not the court's decision. opinion →
U.S. Bank N.A. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., the court cites § 645.17 to support its interpretation of the corporate statutes; it does not decide the meaning or limits of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Sayer v. Minnesota Department of Transportation, this interpretation appears in a separate concurrence; the majority did not decide the issue. opinion →
State v. Ferrier, the court invokes § 645.17 while interpreting the test-refusal statute; it does not decide § 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
Vasseei v. Schmitty & Sons School Buses Inc., the court cites § 645.17’s presumption while deciding the ULJ’s authority under § 268.105; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Hester, the court cites the presumption while interpreting sections 169A.03 and 626.91, but does not decide a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Hahn, the court rejects the state’s argument citing § 645.17 and decides the meaning of the sentencing guidelines, without deciding a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
City of Minneapolis v. Minneapolis Police Relief Ass'n, the court decides how to calculate pension benefits under other statutes and the bylaws; it cites § 645.17 only to support that interpretation. opinion →
Abrahamson v. St. Louis County School District, the court cites section 645.17(1) as a general interpretive presumption while deciding the meaning of chapter 211A; it does not decide a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
Mayer v. Countrywide Home Loans, only the dissent cites § 645.17; the majority does not decide it. opinion →
State v. Heiges, the court rejects a reading of § 634.051 and cites § 645.17 without deciding any rule of § 645.17. opinion →
U.S. Bank N. A. v. Cold Spring Granite Co., the court decides the meaning of “fraud” in § 302A.423 and cites § 645.17(4) as support; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Hormann, the court cited § 645.17(1) while deciding the meaning of the tracking-device statute; it did not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In re the Welfare of J.J.P., the court cites § 645.17 as additional support for its interpretation of § 260B.198, but does not decide a rule or limit of § 645.17. opinion →
City of Moorhead v. Red River Valley Cooperative Power Ass'n, the court recites section 645.17’s presumptions but decides the damages issue under section 216B.47 without deciding a rule of section 645.17. opinion →
Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, the court cites section 645.17(1) while deciding the meaning of section 604.02; it does not decide a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Barrientos, the court recites § 645.17’s presumption but decides the probation extension limit under § 609.135 without applying or construing the presumption. opinion →
State v. Ness, the court cites § 645.17’s presumption while deciding the constitutionality of § 629.75; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
First National Bank v. Profit Pork, LLC, the court uses § 645.17 as support for interpreting the livestock-lien statute, but does not decide § 645.17’s own rules. opinion →
White v. City of Elk River, the court construed § 462.357 and cited § 645.17’s public-interest presumption as support; it did not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Motokazie! Inc. v. Rice County, the court applies the absurd-result presumption while deciding the scope of section 15.99; it does not decide a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
Odunlade v. City of Minneapolis, the citation appears in a dissent, not in the court’s own decision. opinion →
State v. Greenman, the court cites § 645.17 as a general interpretive rule but decides the meaning of the impaired-driving statutes, not a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
City of Brainerd v. Brainerd Investments Partnership, this discussion is in a dissent, not the court’s own decision. opinion →
Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Second Chance Investments, LLC, the court invokes § 645.17 as an interpretive presumption while deciding the meaning of § 65A.01; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In re Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., the court decided whether equity applies to Torrens property and cited § 645.17(1) as support; it did not decide the section’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Garcia-Gutierrez, the court cites § 645.17(2) as an interpretive presumption while deciding what § 609.582 requires; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Clark v. Connor, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumption while deciding the meaning of the dog-attack statute; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In re the Welfare of B.A.H., the court cites the presumption as a review standard but decides the constitutionality of § 609.342, not a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
State v. Ward, the court invokes § 645.17’s presumption while deciding how § 609.346 applies; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
In re the Marriage of: Sharon Marie Sanvik, Below, Becky Toevs Rooney v. Sanvik, the court cites § 645.17(4) while interpreting § 518.14, but does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Re: Declaring a Negative Need for an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Living Word Bible Camp Project., the court cites § 645.17(1) as an interpretive aid while deciding what § 116D.04 permits; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF the CHILD OF R.D.L. and J.W., Parents, the court cites § 645.17’s presumption in support of its decision about the rebuttal burden under § 260C.301; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: R.D.L. and J.W., Parents., the court cites § 645.17’s presumption about legislative intent while deciding the burden imposed by § 260C.301; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Christians v. Dmitruk, the court cites § 645.17 as interpretive background but decides whether the Education Credit is exempt under § 550.37, subd. 14; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Christians v. Dmitruk (In re Dmitruk), the court recites § 645.17’s presumptions but decides whether the Education Credit is exempt under § 550.37, subd. 14, without deciding a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
In Re the GUARDIANSHIP OF Jeffers J. TSCHUMY, Ward, the discussion of § 645.17(1) appears in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
David v. Bartel Enterprises (Nitro Green), Relator, and SFM Mutual Insurance Company, Relator., the court cites § 645.17 in support of judicial restraint while deciding a challenge to § 176.081; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Medical Staff of Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center v. Marshall, the court cites section 645.17(2) as an interpretive rule while deciding what section 540.151 means; it does not decide a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
Medical Staff of Avera Marshall Regional Medical Center v. Marshall, the court cites § 645.17(2) as an aid to interpreting § 540.151, whose meaning it decides. opinion →
Nichols v. State of Minnesota, Office of the Secretary of State, the court decides whether §§ 181.64 and 181.65 waive sovereign immunity under § 645.27; it cites § 645.17 indirectly through a prior case without deciding that section’s own rule. opinion →
Nichols v. State, the court decides how § 645.27 applies; § 645.17 appears only in an indirect citation supporting the rule against surplusage. opinion →
State of Minnesota v. Schmid, the court cites the presumption while interpreting the game and fish laws, but does not decide what § 645.17 itself means or requires. opinion →
State of Minnesota v. Minnesota School of Business, Inc. d/b/a Minnesota School of Business, the court rejected an argument about the interpretation of section 56.01(a); it did not decide the rules of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
State of Minnesota v. Miamen, the court cites section 645.17(1) while deciding the scope of section 634.20, without deciding a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
State of Minnesota v. Rey, the court cites section 645.17(1) while deciding what the identity-theft restitution statute requires; it does not decide a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
Leiendecker v. Asian Women United of Minnesota, the court invokes § 645.17(3)'s presumption while deciding the constitutionality of § 554.02, but does not decide the presumption's meaning or limits. opinion →
State v. Prigge, the court cites the presumption while limiting its decision about § 624.7142; it does not decide the meaning or application of § 645.17(1). opinion →
Great N. Ins. Co. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., the court invokes the presumption in § 645.17(2) while deciding the meaning of § 541.051; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Laymon v. Minn. Premier Props., LLC, the court cites the presumption but decides the meaning of section 524.3-101, not a rule or limit of section 645.17. opinion →
Associated Bank, N.A. v. Comm'r of Revenue, the court applied a presumption associated with § 645.17 to interpret § 290.20; it did not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Lake Country Power Coop. v. Comm'r of Revenue, the court cites § 645.17(2) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the deadlines under § 273.372; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Olson v. One 1999 Lexus Mn License Plate No. 851ldv Vin: Jt6hf10u6x0079461, the citation appears in a dissent, not the court's decision. opinion →
In re Midway Pro Bowl Relocation Benefits Claim, the court recites § 645.17’s presumption but decides the requirements of § 14.63; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Kroll Ontrack, LLC v. Comm'r Revenue, the court recites § 645.17(2)'s presumption while deciding the scope of the § 297A.68 sales tax exemption; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Pitman Farms v. Kuehl Poultry, LLC, the court cites § 645.17’s presumption against unreasonable results while deciding the meaning of other statutes; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 169i (Cr. Ref. 169x), the opinion invokes § 645.17(1) to interpret § 124D.111, but decides the school-lunch provision rather than the presumption’s meaning or limits. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 622a6, the citation accompanies the requester's argument; the opinion decides implied authority under the school property statute, not a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Op. Atty. Gen. 622a6, the opinion decides the scope of § 123B.51; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
In the Matter of the Welfare of: M. A. B., Child, the court cites § 645.17 for a general interpretive presumption, but decides jurisdiction under § 260B.193 and rule 14 rather than a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: V. R. R. and M. A. H., Parents, Commissioner of Human Services, Legal ..., the court cites § 645.17 as a general interpretive presumption while deciding the requirements of § 260C.607; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
Daugherty v. Travelers Commercial Insurance Company, the court cites § 645.17 to support its interpretation of the building code, but does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Renee Hogendorf, Respondent, vs. James J. Green, Jr., et al., Appellants, the court recites § 645.17’s presumptions while deciding the meaning of MERLA’s agricultural exception; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17. opinion →
In the Matter of the Unlicensed Debt Collection Activity of PurCo Fleet Services, Inc, the court decides the meaning of the collection agency statutes and cites § 645.17(1) in support; it does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Paragon Restorations, LLC, a Minnesota limited liability company v. Robinet Productions, LLC, a Minnesota ..., the court invokes section 645.17(2) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the requirements of section 554.13(a); it does not decide a rule of section 645.17 itself. opinion →
Wilmington Trust, National Association, Gregg Williams v. 700 HENNEPIN HOLDINGS, LLC, ..., the court cites § 645.17(2) as an interpretive presumption while deciding how the receivership statutes work; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Harstad v. City of Woodbury, the court invokes § 645.17(2) as an interpretive presumption while deciding the scope of § 462.358; it does not decide a rule of § 645.17 itself. opinion →
State v. Pakhnyuk, the court cites the presumption in § 645.17(2) while interpreting § 609.746, but decides no issue about § 645.17 itself. opinion →
Honeymead Products Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., the court reports defendants’ reliance on the section but decides the appeal deadline under § 605.08. opinion →
Western Meat, Inc. v. Wilson, the court cites the section only in a footnote as a general interpretive reference. opinion →
Lenz v. Coon Creek Watershed District, the court cites the section only as a statutory construction reference in a footnote. opinion →
State v. Target Stores, Inc., the court cites the section only in a footnote while discussing an ambiguity in the Sunday closing statute. opinion →
DePonti Aviation, Inc. v. State, the court cites the section only in a footnote listing a legislative intent presumption and does not apply it. opinion →
State v. Ott, the court cites Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) only as part of the defendant’s rejected statutory-construction argument. opinion →
State, Department of Public Safety v. Grovum, the court cites the section only as a guide for interpreting the amendments to the implied-consent statute. opinion →
Murphy v. Hiniker, the court mentions the section only as part of appellants’ argument before deciding the treatment of rent credit refunds under the Income-Adjusted Homestead Credit Act. opinion →

Which of these rulings fit your facts?

Describe your situation under Minn. Stat. § 645.17. Ezel checks it against the cases on this page and answers with citations.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Checks the law as it stands today, not only this page
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace