14 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4422

A vehicle used only to commute to work does not qualify as a tool of the trade under Section 4422(5), even when the debtor needs it to get to work.

In Re Langley · filed 1982-06-30(5)

The need for the vehicle to commute to work, even where no alternative means of transportation are available, is not alone sufficient to support a finding that the vehicle is a tool of the trade.

Section 4422(1) permits a debtor to claim the homestead exemption in both real and personal property used as a residence.

Bezanson v. Kennebunk Savings Bank (In Re Ladd) · filed 1982-07-06(1)

Section 4422(1) tracks the language of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) — clearly the Legislature intended to adopt the existing federal homestead exemption. ... In accordance with the expressed intent of the Maine Legislature, this Court interprets Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 14, § 4422(1) similarly.

Section 4422(1) exempts the debtor’s interest in real or personal property that the debtor or a dependent uses as a residence, but a mortgagee’s unbreached security interest in property occupied by a dependent does not qualify.

In Re Roberts · filed 1983-01-071

The issue presented is whether a mortgagee’s interest in real estate where his dependents reside is an interest “in real or personal property” within the meaning and intent of Maine’s homestead exemption statute. ... Under Maine law, the debtor has an interest in the real estate only as security for the mortgage obligation. The mortgage obligation has not been breached, and, therefore, the entire estate remains in the mortgagor, Terry Roberts. The debtor has ■no interest in real or personal property that a dependent of the debtor uses as a residence. ... The debtor is not entitled to claim a homestead exemption.

Section 4422(1)’s homestead exemption can extend to a debtor’s interest in property when the debtor intends to use sale proceeds within a reasonable time to purchase another residence.

Rouillard v. Tardiff (In Re Tardiff) · filed 1984-05-01(1)

The same policy grounds set forth in ... which support extending the homestead exemption to proceeds also support extending the homestead exemption to the particular facts in this case.

Section 4422(1)(A) may recognize constructive occupancy, but the residence exemption does not reach a merely attempted or hoped-for residence without a meaningful ability to occupy it within a reasonable time.

In Re Bennett · filed 1996-02-14(1)(A)

The Maine statute provides an exemption in property that a debtor “uses as a residence.” ... Even liberally construed, employing the constructive occupancy principle, it does not extend so far as the “attempted” or the “hoped for” residence.

Section 4422(1) permits a debtor to claim the residence exemption for property he intends to use as his residence, including under a theory of constructive occupancy while the residence is unfinished.

Richard D Vermeulen · filed 2021-01-21(1)

The “snapshot” mandated by that decision is broad enough to accommodate the Debtor’s present intention to utilize the Lincolnville property as his residence. Caselaw in this District supports the theory of constructive occupancy, and that caselaw is not inconsistent with the “snapshot rule” established in Rockwell. Under the circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that the holding of Rockwell should be extended in the manner urged by Jones. Jones’s objection to the claimed exemption is therefore OVERRULED without prejudice to any objection that he might raise to confirmation of the Debtor’s plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).

A debtor claiming a homestead exemption for sale proceeds must show that the property was a residence and that the debtor intends to use the exempt proceeds to purchase another residence.

Daniels v. Daniels · filed 1991-07-16(1)(A), (1)(C)

We have previously stated that the debtor asserting an exemption bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to a homestead exemption by demonstrating that (1) the property subject to attachment and execution is in fact his residence, 14 M.R.S.A. § 4422(1)(A), and (2) he intends to use the exempt proceeds to purchase another residence.

Section 4422(1)(B) does not allow a homestead exemption in property the debtor did not intend to use as a residence when filing for bankruptcy.

Howison v. Hidler (In Re Hidler) · filed 1996-01-16(1)(B)

The Court finds that on the date of filing the petition Debtor intended his residence to be in Raymond, Maine. Thus, Debtor is not entitled to a homestead exemption in the Danvers property pursuant to Maine law.

Section 4422(1)(A) may cover contiguous property used for residential activities and incidental business use, but it does not exempt an entire property whose primary use is commercial.

In Re MacLeod · filed 2003-07-02(1)(A)

Residential use may extend also to contiguous property which is used for a complimentary activity, like family recreation. It may even extend to incidental business use, like a home office. But when, as in this instance, there is mixed use, and the primary use is commercial, the exemption will not attach to the entire holding. Business property is not exempt.

Section 4422(1) makes the debtor’s intent on the bankruptcy filing date central to whether property qualifies as a residence; a debtor who has moved away may still qualify if intending to return.

In Re Grindal · filed 1983-06-06(1)

The primary factor is the debtor’s intention on the filing date. A debtor who does not actually occupy the homestead on the filing date, but who intends to return when circumstances permit, may qualify for the exemption.

Section 4422(3) exempts household goods used primarily for personal, family, or household use when they have a functional nexus to the household’s daily use, maintenance, or upkeep.

In Schreiber · filed 1999-03-16(3)

Exempt household goods may include items which are convenient or useful to the debtor or his family or that enable them to live in a comfortable and convenient manner, and which items have a functional nexus to the daily use, maintenance or upkeep of the debtor’s household.

Section 4422(2)'s motor vehicle exemption does not cover an airplane.

In re Wilbur · filed 1982-11-15(2)

The sole issue is whether or not the debtors are entitled to exempt their 1944 Aero-naca airplane as a motor vehicle. The court concludes that they may not.

Section 4422(7) does not exempt proceeds from business milk sales because the food or animals were not held for personal, family, or household use.

In Re Kingsbury · filed 1991-02-22(7)

The Kingsburys’ argument that the money is exempt because it represents the “proceeds” of exempt property under § 4422(7) falls short, as well. Even if the “milk earnings” were considered “proceeds,” rather than “products” of animals or food, ... they would be proceeds from business sales of milk, ... rather than from sale of food, produce or animals previously held for “personal, family or household use” as subsection (7) requires.

Section 4422 does not exempt corporate shares from attachment.

Bahre v. Pearl · filed 1991-07-26

Further, the exemption statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 4422, does not list corporate shares as property exempt from attachment.

Section 4422(14)(E) does not exempt annuity payments from a statutory workers' compensation lien on a third-party recovery.

Constr. Svs. Workers' Compensation Group Self-Ins. Trust v. Stevens · filed 2009-04-22(14)(E)

Plaintiff argues that the exemption statute does not insulate against claims based on statutory lien rights. The court agrees.

Section 4422(9) exempts a qualifying boat used to catch lobsters for compensation, even when the debtor does not sell the catch.

Wuori v. Otis · filed 2020-03-03(9)

Rather, “commercial” use of a boat must also encompass use for providing the service of setting lobster traps and catching lobsters for compensation.

Section 4422(13-A) exempts qualifying retirement funds, but a hold and answer order may issue when the debtor has not shown that all the funds qualify.

LOBSTER 207 LLC v. PETTEGROW · filed 2023-08-30(13-A)

While I am not persuaded that a turnover order is appropriate at this time, I am also not convinced that Defendant has demonstrated that all the funds are in fact exempt. ... Accordingly, a hold and answer order regarding the retirement accounts is reasonable.

Section 4422(13)(E) covers an individual retirement account even when the debtor can access its funds before retirement.

In Re Bates · filed 1994-12-13(13)(E)

That a debtor has control over and (penalty notwithstanding) access to IRA assets before retirement does not defeat the exemption. Irrespective of such control, an individual retirement account is a “plan” providing a “right to receive” “payments” on account of “age.”

Disability policy payments that provide an indefinite stream of income akin to future earnings are exempt only to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

Sanders v. Sanders · filed 1998-05-06(13)(E)

The evidence concerning the policy indicates that it provides Herbert with an indefinite stream of payments, akin to future earnings, on account of his disability. Therefore, as a matter of law, these payments fall under 14 M.R.S.A. § 4422(13)(E) and are exempt only to the extent reasonably necessary for Herbert’s support.

Section 4422(13)(E) protects payments and accounts under plans or contracts that substitute for income; it does not exempt health savings accounts.

Cynthia Voisine · filed 2019-05-15(13)(E)

§4422(13)(E) is limited to protecting payments and accounts from plans and contracts which are income substitutions. The plain language of that statute precludes protection for HSAs.

Section 4422(1)(A) does not support a residence exemption when neither the debtor nor a dependent lives at the property or presently intends to move there.

Christopher D. Gistis · filed 2020-03-24(1)(A)

There was no reasonable basis for Mr. White to believe that either the Debtor or his dependents lived in the Property or had any present intention to move to the Property such that the claimed residence exemption might be justified under any legal theory.

Section 4422’s residence exemption protects a debtor’s economic interest in the residence, up to the statutory limit.

Saturley v. Casco Northern Bank, N.A. (In Re Saturley) · filed 1993-01-08(1)(A) & (B)

Plainly, Maine's exemption statute protects only a debtor’s economic interest in the residence, and only up to the statutory ceiling.

The residence exemption requires some form of residency; a vague intention to live on the property later is insufficient.

In Re Cole · filed 1995-08-02(1)

Residency of some character is a prerequisite to 14 M.R.S.A. § 4422(l)’s exemption entitlement.

Section 4422(16) allows debtors who do not own a residence to claim the unused residence exemption in qualifying property.

Kenneth L Raessler and Claudia D Raessler · filed 2020-01-10(16)

As such, the Debtors may claim exemptions under section 4422(16) even though they do not own a residence.

Section 4422’s attachment exemptions do not prevent exempt property from being placed in court custody because that placement is not an attachment.

Davis v. Cox · filed 2004-01-15

Cox’s argument is flawed. While under Maine law certain property is exempt from attachment, 14 M.R.S.A. § 4422, the property at issue here was not attached. It is true that the bankruptcy court said the property was “effectively attached” when it was placed in custodia legis, but it was not actually attached.

Section 4422(1) requires a debtor claiming a homestead exemption for sale proceeds to intend to use them to buy another residence within a reasonable time.

Brown v. Corriveau · filed 1990-06-21(1)

Although we have not previously considered how or when the homestead exemption applies to such proceeds, the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of Maine has on two occasions construed section 4422(1) to require that the debtor manifest an intent to use the proceeds to purchase another residence within a reasonable time after the sale. ... Accordingly, because in the affidavit accompanying his motion to have the attachment lifted defendant expressly states that he intends to use the proceeds for his living expenses, defendant has specifically disproved his entitlement to a homestead exemption pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 4422(1) as it existed on the date defendant’s interest in the escrow account was attached.

A court-ordered transfer of an interest in a marital residence in return for money qualifies as a sale whose proceeds may be exempt for reinvestment in a residence.

In Re Maylin · filed 1993-06-09(1)(C)

The divorce judgment required Maylin to part with his remaining interest in the marital residence. Such a disposition of rights in return for money qualifies as a “sale” under 14 M.R.S.A. § 4422(1)(C) in light of the liberal construction appropriate to applications of the exemption statute.

Section 4422’s residence exemption does not cover nonresidential land whose relationship to the adjoining residence has been severed.

Dellamattera v. Dellamattera · filed 2008-10-07

This court finds that because the land sold by the defendant was not residential, it is not subject to the exemption.

When a debtor owns an exempt residence on the bankruptcy filing date, a later sale does not subject that exemption to subsection (1)(C)’s six-month reinvestment condition.

HULL v. ROCKWELL · filed 2019-09-24(1)(C)

Here, as in DeBerry, Mr. Rockwell’s residence, at the time he filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy, was subject to an unconditional exemption provided under section 4422(1)(A).