La. Stat. Ann. § 40:966

Section 40:966(D)(2) requires a prosecution seeking the second-offender marijuana-possession penalty to allege the prior conviction in the bill of information before conviction.

State v. Bouzigard · filed 1973-12-03(D)(2)

As in the case of prosecution for multiple offender DWI, the prosecution for multiple offender possession of marijuana, must include in the bill of information the charge that the defendant had been previously convicted of the same offense.

Section 40:966(c) prohibits unlawful possession of an illegal drug; subsection (a) addresses manufacture or distribution.

State v. Hamilton · filed 1974-07-01(c)

Subsection A of La. R.S. 40:966 provides for the crime of unlawful manufacture or distribution of an illegal drug. The defendant was charged by the original indictment with unlawful possession of an illegal drug, the crime prohibited by Subsection c. The effect of the amendment was simply to correct the error in the citation of the statute that the defendant was charged with violating.

Section 40:966 requires knowing and intentional possession of LSD with intent to distribute, and a bill alleging that the defendant possessed it “wilfully and unlawfully” sufficiently charges the offense.

State v. Thorson · filed 1974-10-28

Defendant Richard Thorson was charged by bill of information with possession of LSD with intent to distribute, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966. The bill merely states that the defendant did "wilfully and unlawfully" possess LSD with intent to distribute it, whereas the statute proscribes the knowing and intentional possession; however, under this Court's holding in State v. Scott, 278 So.2d 121 (La.1973) the information is sufficient.

Section 40:966(B)(2) remained in force after Act 207 of 1973 and provides the felony penalty for distributing marijuana.

State v. St. Romain · filed 1974-03-18(B)(2)

R.S. 40:966, subd. B(2) was not repealed or deleted from the law intentionally or otherwise.

Section 40:966 covers distribution of Schedule I drugs even though the schedules call them “controlled substances” rather than “controlled dangerous substances.”

State v. Bates · filed 1974-10-11

La.R.S. 40:966 prohibits distribution of "a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I." ... This extremely technical argument falls, if only because the definitions section of the statute defines a "controlled dangerous substance" as one of the drugs listed in Schedules I through IV.

Section 40:966(A)(1), read with Section 40:961(19), gives fair notice of the conduct prohibited as manufacturing a controlled dangerous substance.

State v. King · filed 1975-11-03(A)(1)

La.R.S. 40:966, subd. A(1), taken together with La.R.S. 40:961(19), more than adequately gives a person of ordinary intelligence notice of what constitutes criminal conduct.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires evidence of intent to distribute; possession of fifteen marijuana cigarettes alone is insufficient.

State v. Willis · filed 1975-12-08(A)(1)

We therefore hold that evidence of possession of fifteen marijuana cigarettes, without other evidence, does not, as a matter of law, constitute evidence of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Section 40:966 makes delivery of marijuana a crime; possession and delivery of marijuana establish the offense.

State v. Mayes · filed 1976-01-19

The fact is that the defendant had possession of the marijuana and delivered it to McKee. The crime is established. La.R.S. 40:966.

Distribution under Section 40:966 requires only general criminal intent, established by proof of voluntary distribution.

State v. Williams · filed 1977-12-19

The distribution offense is a crime requiring only general criminal intent. Such intent is established by mere proof of voluntary distribution. La.R.S. 40:966.

Section 40:966 requires only general criminal intent for distribution of heroin, established by proof of voluntary distribution.

State v. Jackson · filed 1977-11-14

The defendant is charged with distribution of heroin on March 20, 1974. This is a crime requiring only general criminal intent; such intent is established by mere proof of voluntary distribution. La.R.S. 40:966; State v. Clark, 338 So.2d 690 (La. 1976).

Possession of 27 marijuana cigarettes, even with false denials of knowledge and ownership, is insufficient to prove intent to distribute beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Ramoin · filed 1982-03-01A(1)

Proof that defendant had 27 cigarettes in his possession, combined with defendant's lies regarding his knowledge and ownership of the cigarettes, simply are insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's intent to distribute marijuana.

Section 40:966(A) prohibits distribution of Schedule I drugs, including marijuana after its 1981 rescheduling.

State v. Washington · filed 1983-01-17(A)

At the time of the commission of the offenses charged marijuana had been legislatively changed to a Schedule I drug. See La.R.S. 40:964 as amended by Act 800 of 1981, effective August 2, 1981. Therefore, defendant should have been charged under La.R.S. 40:966(A) which proscribes distribution of Schedule I drugs.

Intent to distribute a Schedule I substance under § 40:966(A)(1) may be inferred from the quantity of the drug and the circumstances of its possession.

State v. Allen · filed 1983-04-22(A)(1)

In this present case, the state presented evidence that the defendant was leaning over a table where a one pound bag of marijuana, a triple beam balance scale and individual, small "baggies" were placed. The quantity of marijuana and the surrounding circumstances indicate that a reasonable jury could infer that the defendant possessed the requisite specific intent.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance.

State v. Beridon · filed 1984-02-28(A)(1)

The statute under which defendant was charged, La.R.S. 40:966, reads in part as follows: "A. Manufacture; Distribution. Except as authorized by this part, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (1) To produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I; ...". Heroin is listed in Schedule I. After reviewing the evidence herein, as set forth above, we are strongly convinced of defendant's guilt. There is the testimony of Lynn Blanchard which is further corroborated by the district attorney and his chief investigator. We can easily understand why a jury or finder of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime, beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966(A) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of both possession and intent to distribute.

State v. Benton · filed 1985-02-12(A)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute contains two distinct essential elements which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: possession and the intent to distribute. La.R.S. 40:966(A).

Section 40:966(A) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed marijuana with intent to distribute it.

State v. Huber · filed 1987-03-16(A)

In order to convict Huber of violating La.R.S. 40:966(A), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Huber did possess with intent to distribute marijuana.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed marijuana.

State v. Jackson · filed 1985-12-04(A)(1)

Thus, the state must only show that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed marijuana. The testimony adduced at trial, especially that of State Trooper Charles Epps, provides proof that defendant did in fact distribute marijuana.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof of knowing or intentional distribution of a Schedule I substance; an actual distribution charge does not require separate proof that the substance was held for sale rather than personal use.

State v. Wysinger · filed 1985-12-11(A)(1)

The defendant in this case was convicted of actual distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. Therefore, the cited case law in the defendant's brief is not authority to impose the above-mentioned burden of proof on the State. The State merely needed to prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed marijuana. La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1).

Section 40:966(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed or dispensed a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance.

State v. Ratliff · filed 1986-01-15(A)

In order to support a conviction under R.S. 40:966(A), the State must prove the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed or dispensed a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that a defendant knowingly or intentionally produced a Schedule I controlled substance.

State v. Ford · filed 1987-03-04(A)(1)

The defendant correctly asserts that in order to validly convict him, the state had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally produced the marijuana.

To prove production of marijuana under this section, the State must show that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the plants.

State v. Ford · filed 1988-05-11(A)(1)

In order to prove its case, the State had to prove that defendant exercised dominion and control over the marijuana plants.

Section 40:966 requires only general criminal intent for a conviction of distributing marijuana.

State v. Rexrode · filed 1988-12-14

A conviction of distribution of marijuana requires the prosecution only to establish general criminal intent.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits knowing and intentional distribution of marijuana; personally handing marijuana to a buyer in exchange for payment supports a conviction.

State v. Heacox · filed 1989-04-19(A)(1)

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact in concluding that Heacox knowingly and intentionally distributed marijuana, contrary to La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1).

Circumstantial evidence may establish possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under § 40:966.

State v. Jackson · filed 1989-06-14

The circumstantial evidence presented in this case is sufficient to allow the jury to infer the existence of the enterprise and thus the defendant's possession with intent to distribute.

Section 40:966(A)(1) supports a marijuana distribution conviction when the defendant possessed the marijuana and sold it for payment, demonstrating intent to distribute.

State v. Thomas · filed 1989-06-28(A)(1)

The defendant had possession of the marijuana he sold before handing it to the agent. In selling the marijuana to the agent for a financial reward, the defendant demonstrated the intent to distribute. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of distribution of marijuana.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof of possession of a controlled dangerous substance and intent to distribute it; possession may be shown through dominion and control.

State v. Newberry · filed 1990-04-18(A)(1)

Defendant, Alton Wayne Newberry, was convicted by a twelve member jury of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1). ... The State was required to prove two essential elements: possession of the controlled dangerous substance and the intent to distribute it. The prosecution is not required to show actual possession in order to convict. The State need only show that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal substance.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires knowing or intentional possession of marijuana with specific intent to distribute it for a possession-with-intent-to-distribute conviction.

State v. Moffett · filed 1990-12-20(A)(1)

The State had the burden of establishing that defendant (1) knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana, and (2) so possessed the marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it. La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1); See, State v. Johnson, 529 So.2d 142 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988).

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to distribute it.

State v. Laviolette · filed 1991-03-26(A)(1)

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute carries a maximum penalty of fifteen years at hard labor and a $7,500 fine.

State v. Harmon · filed 1992-02-12(A)(1)

The record does not reveal whether these convictions were based upon La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1), La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1), or La. R.S. 40:979. However, the distinction is of no moment to the issues presented on appeal because the statutory sentencing scheme is the same under both. These offenses each carry a maximum statutory penalty of imprisonment at hard labor for not more than fifteen years and a fine of not more than $7,500.00. Defendant was sentenced to serve ten years on each charge, to run concurrently. Clearly, this sentence is within the permissible statutory limits.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits possessing marijuana with intent to distribute; intent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.

State v. DeCuir · filed 1992-04-16(A)(1)

In light of the items of evidence produced, a rational trier of fact could have found that defendant was guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana with intent to distribute it.

State v. Tucker · filed 1992-06-24(A)(1)

The essential elements of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute are: (1) the defendant knowingly or intentionally (2) possessed marijuana (3) with the intent to distribute.

Intent to distribute marijuana may be inferred from the amount possessed and the presence of scales, plastic bags, and other drug paraphernalia.

State v. Beach · filed 1992-11-20(A)

Under the circumstances present herein, it is obvious that the defendant was in possession of an amount of marijuana inconsistent with personal use. This fact, and the seizure of a scale, clear plastic sandwich bags, and other paraphernalia for drug use or packaging obviously indicated possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Considering all of the above, we find sufficient evidence was presented to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

Section 40:966(A) requires proof of intent to distribute marijuana; possession alone does not establish that intent without supporting circumstances.

State v. Tong · filed 1992-12-03(A)

Read in its entirety, Sellers's testimony offered the jury no rational basis for rejecting the reasonable hypothesis presented by the evidence at trial that the defendant possessed the marijuana for personal use and not for distribution. The defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is therefore reversed.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires general criminal intent, which can be established by proof of voluntary distribution.

State v. Gamble · filed 1994-02-02(A)(1)

The intent required in La.R.S. 40:966 can be established by mere proof of voluntary distribution.

Section 40:966 requires proof of possession of marijuana and intent to distribute it for a conviction of possession with intent to distribute.

State v. Reynaga · filed 1994-10-05

The defendants were found guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966. Therefore, the State was required to prove two essential elements: possession of marijuana, and the intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; an observed exchange of baggies for money can establish intent.

State v. Roberson · filed 1995-11-02(A)(1)

The testimony of Officer Van Dyke that he saw the defendant hand two baggies to someone in exchange for money establishes the intent to distribute. La.R.S. 40:966 makes it unlawful for persons to knowingly or intentionally, "produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance." The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to establish that the defendant committed the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966(B)(2) requires five to thirty years of imprisonment at hard labor for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.

State v. Mangrum · filed 1996-05-10(B)(2)

We also notice error in the sentence of fifty-four months imposed for count one. The sentence for possession with intent to distribute marijuana is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years (sixty months) and not more than thirty years. La.R.S. 40:966(B)(2). However, this Court will not correct the sentence as the error is in defendant's favor and the state has not appealed the illegal sentence.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof of possession of marijuana and intent to distribute it; constructive possession and circumstantial evidence can establish those elements.

State v. Gladney · filed 1997-09-24(A)(1)

A jury found defendant, Booker T. Gladney, guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of La. R.S. 40:966A(1). ... We find that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, could have found the essential elements of the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966(A) requires proof of intent to distribute marijuana; ten individually packaged bags did not establish that intent when the evidence left open personal use.

State v. Jack · filed 1997-10-08(A)

We agree that House is controlling on these facts, and, accordingly, we find that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of intent to distribute.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits distribution of marijuana, not cocaine.

State v. Green · filed 1996-12-10(A)(1)

La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1) proscribes distribution of marijuana, not cocaine; clearly the trial judge merely made a clerical error in reciting the applicable law.

Section 40:966(A)'s possession element can be supported by eyewitness testimony that the accused possessed heroin during a controlled delivery.

State v. Zapata · filed 1998-05-27(A)

The defendant in this case was charged with a violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A), which provides, in pertinent part, "Except as authorized by this part, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: * * * To produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I * * *." Heroin is classified as a Schedule I substance. La. R.S. 40:964(B). The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he possessed the heroin. He argues that the heroin never left the possession of the government or its agents and, therefore, was not in possession of the defendant. However, Agent Kennedy, Captain Soutoullo and Agent Junker testified that they saw the defendant in possession of the heroin.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof of both possession of marijuana and intent to distribute it; constructive possession can establish the possession element.

State v. Perkins · filed 1998-06-17(A)(1)

When we view the entire record in this case, we reach the inescapable conclusion that a rational trier of fact could not have concluded that the defendant intended to distribute marijuana. Rather, the evidence supports a conviction for possession of marijuana, a lesser and included responsive verdict.

In 1990, § 40:966(B)(2), applied with the attempt statute, allowed up to 15 years at hard labor for attempted possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

State v. Jackson · filed 1999-01-20(B)(2)

That contention is itself without merit; in 1990, La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2) and 14:27 provided that the penalty for the attempted violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) with respect to marijuana was imprisonment at hard labor for not more than 15 years.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof of knowing or intentional possession of marijuana and intent to distribute; mere possession does not establish intent unless the quantity permits no other inference.

State v. Mamon · filed 1999-09-08(A)(1)

The fifteen baggies did not contain such a large amount of drugs that only an inference of intent to distribute was possible. Accordingly, defendant's mere possession of the drugs was insufficient to justify his conviction for possession with intent to distribute.

Evidence that marijuana was possessed for medicinal use may explain the quantity possessed and rebut an inference of intent to distribute.

State v. Webb · filed 2000-03-31

However, this defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute. ... However, the medicinal use may have provided an explanation for the quantity of the drug that he possessed sufficient to negate the state's inference that he possessed it with intent to distribute.

Section 40:966 permits a conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute when the evidence supports both possession and an inference of intent to distribute.

State v. Crosby · filed 1999-11-17

The evidence also supported the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Although the defendant disputed ownership of the marijuana, the officers found the marijuana in his bedroom. Defendant admitted that he and Ms. Addison resided in the apartment, rent receipts in defendant's name were found in the apartment, and defendant admitted to previously distributing narcotics. We will also not disturb the jury's finding on this issue.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires possession of a Schedule I drug and specific intent to distribute; the defendant’s admissions and the number of heroin packets can establish those elements.

State v. Quest · filed 2000-10-18(A)(1)

The essential elements of the crime are 1) possession and 2) specific intent to distribute. ... Considering the Defendant's statements and the number of packets of heroin in the pill bottle, we find that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence is sufficient to convict the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires the state to prove that the defendant possessed marijuana with intent to distribute it.

State v. Brown · filed 2000-12-06(A)(1)

To support this conviction, the state has the burden of proving that the defendant possessed the marijuana with intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(B)(2) provides a prison term of five to thirty years at hard labor for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

State v. Derouin · filed 2001-01-31(B)(2)

The offense of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is punishable in part by "imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years." La.R.S. 40:966(B)(2). Thus, absent the pardon issue, the sentence imposed is clearly authorized by law.

Section 40:966(A)(2) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana and intended to distribute it.

State v. Johnson · filed 2001-02-14(A)(2)

The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana and that the defendant possessed it with the intent to distribute it.

In 1987, possession with intent to distribute marijuana carried a maximum sentence of ten years at hard labor.

State v. Harbor · filed 2002-04-10(A)

The three felonies used to find the Defendant to be a fourth felony offender were: 1) possession of cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967 C; 2) being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:95.1; and 3) possession with intent to distribute marijuana, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966 A. ... In 1987, a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana was "imprisonment at hard labor for not more than ten years and payment of a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars." Thus, it was "punishable for more than five years."

Section 40:966(B)(3) applies retroactively to June 15, 2001, and sets no minimum fine for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, so the court may omit the fine.

State v. Legett · filed 2002-05-22(B)(3)

However, pursuant to Acts 2002, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 45, La. R.S. 40:966(B) was amended to add subsection (B)(3) for convictions of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and made retroactive to 15 June 2001. Therefore, the amendment to the statute applies to this case. ... After reviewing the Supreme Court case of State v. Williams, 2000-1725 (La.11/28/01), 800 So.2d 790, and the applicable statutory provisions, we held that where no minimum fine is provided by statute, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in omitting the fine, and no error patent existed. ... We follow the holding in Course and find that no patent error exists concerning this issue.

Section 40:966(A) prohibits possession of marijuana with intent to distribute; an attempted violation requires specific intent and an act directed toward that offense.

State v. Hines · filed 2002-09-30(A)

Thus, the State had to prove not only that the defendant had the specific intent to possess marijuana with the intent to distribute it, but also that defendant did an act or omitted to do an act "for the purpose of and tending directly toward the accomplishing of [her] object." La.R.S. 14:27; 40:966(A). ... Based on the foregoing, we find that a reasonable juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to possess the marijuana with intent to distribute.

Section 40:966(A) requires knowing possession of marijuana and specific intent to distribute it; three grams in individual bags and empty packaging did not establish that intent.

State v. Gilbert · filed 2003-01-28(A)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute marijuana requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. La.R.S. 40:966(A). ... In this case, the State produced evidence of only one, or at the most two, of the factors we must consider in determining whether, under Jackson, the Defendant had the intent needed to be convicted of attempted possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute. Thus, we find that the evidence is not sufficient to convict the Defendant of that crime.

Section 40:966(A) prohibits distributing heroin and possessing it with intent to distribute; possession with intent to distribute requires possession and specific intent, which may be inferred from the circumstances.

State v. Sandoval · filed 2003-02-25(A)

Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin and distribution of heroin, violations of LSA-R.S. 40:966(A) [2] . ... The essential elements of the crime are 1) possession and 2) specific intent to distribute. ... We find that the evidence was sufficient under the Jackson standard to support defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin.

Section 40:966(A) requires proof of possession and specific intent to distribute; packaging heroin in individual doses does not establish intent to distribute when the evidence also supports personal use.

State v. Francois · filed 2003-04-09(A)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (here, heroin), the state must prove both possession and specific intent to distribute. ... The state failed to prove that they intended to distribute the heroin, which is an essential element of the crime charged.

Possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I drug requires knowing and intentional possession and specific intent to distribute.

State v. Anderson · filed 2003-04-09

The crime of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I drug requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(A) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Esteen · filed 2003-04-29(A)

To establish defendant's guilt in the instant case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it. LA.-R.S. 40:966A.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits knowingly possessing a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to distribute; possession may be constructive when the defendant exercises dominion and control over it.

State of Louisiana v. Cash · filed 2003-12-10(A)(1)

The present case is even stronger than Odle as the box of marijuana was in an open area that was within Defendant’s dominion and control. The evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant possessed a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute it.

State v. Smith · filed 2003-12-31(A)(1)

To support a conviction for the crime charged, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant: 1) possessed the controlled dangerous substance; and 2) had the intent to distribute the controlled dangerous substance.

Section 40:966(B)(2) requires a fine of not more than $50,000 for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.

State v. Mitchell · filed 2004-03-03(B)(2)

There is a mandatory fine of "not more than $50,000.00" for the conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, as per La. R.S. 40:966 B(2).

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits the knowing or intentional distribution of marijuana, including its delivery or physical transfer with knowledge of the substance.

State v. Green · filed 2003-03-05(A)(1)

Louisiana R.S. 40:966(A)(1) and 40:964(C)(22) make it unlawful to distribute marijuana, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance. ... When viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the remaining evidence is sufficient to prove the essential elements of distribution of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed marijuana.

State v. Jackson · filed 2003-04-29(A)(1)

In order to convict the Defendant of distribution of marijuana, La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant knowingly or intentionally distributed marijuana, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance.

Jointly purchasing and using a Schedule I drug, without conduct beyond that of a purchaser and consumer, does not establish intent to distribute under § 40:966(A)(1).

State v. Corbett · filed 2004-04-02(A)(1)

Under La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1), it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess MDMA, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance, with the intent to distribute. ... The facts provided by the state in the bill of particulars... do not support the essential element of distribution for the second degree murder charge, or the possession with intent to distribute charge.

Carefully packaging bulk heroin into individual doses can support a finding of intent to distribute under § 40:966(A)(1), even when personal use is a possible explanation.

State v. Francois · filed 2004-04-14(A)(1)

Even accepting defense counsel’s argument that addicts would not consume the entire amount at one time, the care with which respondents converted the heroin from bulk form to individual doses supported a reasonable inference that they used a common method of packaging drugs for distribution because they meant to sell the squares on the street as opposed to dividing up the heroin for their own personal use at a later time.

Allegations that a person obtained MDMA from a source and brought it to other participants can support intent to distribute and defeat a motion to quash.

State v. Smith · filed 2004-09-24(A)(1)

The state's application is granted, the ruling of the court of appeal is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court denying defendant's motion to quash the prosecution against her for second degree murder in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(3)(distribution of a controlled substance which directly causes of the death of the recipient), and for possession of MDMA (ecstasy) with intent to distribute in violation of La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1), is reinstated. ... If accepted by a factfinder, that same evidence could lead the factfinder to conclude that defendant possessed the intent to distribute the drug obtained from her source to the other persons involved in the joint enterprise. The trial court therefore properly denied defendant's motion to quash.

Section 40:966(A) requires proof that the defendant possessed heroin and intended to distribute it; observed drug transactions supported a finding of that intent.

State v. Sykes · filed 2005-03-09(A)

The defendant was charged with and convicted of one count each of possession of heroin with the intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. La. R.S. 40:966 A, 40:967 A. In order to support a conviction for these counts, the State had to prove that the defendant possessed the cocaine and the heroin and that he had the intent to distribute them. ... Viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of guilty of possessing both the heroin and the cocaine with the intent to distribute them.

Section 40:966(B)(3) sets a five-to-thirty-year hard-labor term and a fine of up to $50,000 for possessing marijuana with intent to distribute.

State v. Taylor · filed 2005-04-06(B)(3)

Any person who violates La. R.S. 40:966(A) by possessing marijuana with intent to distribute shall upon conviction be sentenced to a term of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than thirty years, and pay a fine of not more than $50,000. La. R.S. 40:966(B)(3).

Section 40:966(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Jackson · filed 2006-03-28(A)

In the matter before us, defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana. Thus, the State was required to prove that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed those drugs with the specific intent to distribute them.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally distributing marijuana.

State v. Smith · filed 2006-12-28(A)(1)

Under La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1), it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally distribute marijuana, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance. ... Therefore, considering the foregoing, we are convinced that the evidence presented at the trial of this matter, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant participated in the distribution of marijuana in this case.

Section 40:966(B)(3)’s penalty for distributing marijuana was unchanged by the 2001 sentencing amendments.

State v. Robert · filed 2007-03-09(B)(3)

In this regard, the ameliorative sentencing provisions enacted by 2001 La. Acts 403 have no bearing on defendant’s sentence, either directly or as a guide for what a trial judge might deem an appropriate punishment, ... as they did not change either the penalty provided for distribution of marijuana as a matter of La.R.S. 40:966(B)(3), or the sentencing range provided for a second offender by La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(a).

Section 40:966(B)(2) requires a fine of up to $50,000 for distribution of marijuana, along with a hard-labor sentence of five to thirty years, at least five years of which must be served without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

State v. Copelin · filed 2007-12-12B(2)

A person convicted of distribution of marijuana shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five nor more than thirty years, at least five years of which shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence and pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars. La. R.S. 40:966 B(2). In the case at bar, the trial court failed to impose Copelin's sentence without the benefits of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on both convictions and failed to impose the mandatory fine on the distribution of marijuana conviction. Accordingly, Copelin's sentences are illegally lenient.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant intentionally possessed marijuana and specifically intended to distribute it.

State of Louisiana v. Lee · filed 2007-04-18(A)(1)

Given these charges, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally possessed cocaine and marijuana and that he had the specific intent to distribute the cocaine and marijuana. See La.R.S. 40:967(A)(1) and La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1).

Section 40:966(B)(3) did not require the first five years of a sentence for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute to be served without parole eligibility.

State of Louisiana v. Dupree · filed 2007-05-30(B)(3)

When Defendant committed the present offense, the penalty provision for possession with the intent to distribute marijuana provided for a sentence of five to thirty years at hard labor and a fine of not more than $50,000.00. La.R.S. 40:966(B)(3). The penalty provision did not require the first five years to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing marijuana with intent to distribute it; intent may be inferred from a quantity inconsistent with personal use.

State v. Robbins · filed 2008-03-19(A)(1)

A person commits the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute if he knowingly or intentionally possesses marijuana with the intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1). ... Because defendant was the driver of a car that had more than nine pounds of marijuana in the trunk of the car, which experts testified was not consistent with personal use, the factfinder may have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Robbins possessed the requisite intent to distribute the marijuana.

Section 40:966(A) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Mosley · filed 2009-05-12(A)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute marijuana requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(A) prohibits distribution of marijuana; conviction requires proof of transfer, guilty knowledge, and the substance's identity.

State v. Dowell · filed 2009-09-09(A)

Defendant was convicted of distribution of both cocaine and marijuana, violations of La. R.S. 40:967(A) and La. R.S. 40:966(A), respectively. To convict for distribution of a controlled dangerous substance, such as cocaine or marijuana, the State must prove: (1) "delivery" or "physical transfer;" (2) guilty knowledge of the controlled dangerous substance at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the controlled dangerous substance. ... Viewing all the direct and circumstantial evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the offenses of distribution of cocaine and distribution of marijuana present beyond a reasonable doubt, and found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of those offenses.

Section 40:966(A) requires knowing and intentional possession of marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Huntley · filed 2011-01-25(A)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute marijuana requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it. ... Having reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the state proved that Mr. Huntley knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to distribute, and circumstantial evidence of control, knowledge, and intent can support a conviction.

State v. Baulkman · filed 2011-01-26(A)(1)

After viewing the totality of the evidence, a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence presented by the state was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of possession with intent to distribute; thus Baulkman’s arguments to the contrary are without merit.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a Schedule I substance with specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Bobo · filed 2011-06-08(A)(1)

The crime of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I or Schedule II substance requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(B)(2) sets a five to thirty year prison term for possession of MDMA with intent to distribute, requires at least five years without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and permits a fine of up to $50,000.

State v. Smith · filed 2011-06-14(B)(2)

The penalty for possession of MDMA with the intent to distribute is imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five years nor more than thirty years, at least five of which shall be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and a fine of not more than $50,000. La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2).

Section 40:966(B)(1) sets a five-to-fifty-year prison term for possession with intent to distribute heroin, with at least five years served without probation or suspension of sentence and a possible fine of up to $50,000.

State v. Ventris · filed 2011-11-15(B)(1)

The penalty for possession with intent to distribute heroin is imprisonment for not less than five nor more than fifty years at hard labor, at least five years of which must be served without benefit of probation, or suspension of sentence, and the possible imposition of a fine of not more than $50,000.00.

Section 40:966 requires proof that a defendant knew of the marijuana underlying a possession with intent to distribute charge.

State of Louisiana v. Fobb · filed 2012-06-06

We find that the same standard applies to charges under La.R.S. 40:966 for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. ... We find that the evidence, while it established the offense of possession of marijuana, was insufficient to prove Defendant’s guilty knowledge of the presence of the packaged drugs and, therefore, was insufficient to convict Defendant of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires knowing or intentional possession of marijuana with intent to distribute it.

State v. Williams · filed 2012-11-14(A)(1)

A person commits the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute if he knowingly or intentionally possesses marijuana with the intent to distribute it. La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1). The state must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute.

Section 40:966(A) requires knowing and intentional possession of heroin with the specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Smith · filed 2012-12-11(A)

Next, defendant challenges his convictions for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of La. R.S. 40:967(A), and possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:966(A). To prove these offenses, the State was required to show defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug, and that he did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(B)(3) makes possession of marijuana with intent to distribute punishable by five to thirty years imprisonment and a fine of up to $50,000.

State of Louisiana v. Eubanks · filed 2013-04-10(B)(3)

The Defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, which is punishable by five to thirty years imprisonment and a fine of not more than $50,000. La.R.S. 40:966(B)(3).

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant delivered heroin; delivery may be inferred from an observed exchange followed promptly by recovery of heroin from the recipient.

State in the Interest of C.D. · filed 2012-07-02(A)(1)

The timing of the stop supported a rational inference by the juvenile court judge that the object clenched in Mary Charles’s hand as she drove away from the scene was the same object Dobard had witnessed defendant transfer to Charles only moments before, even assuming she was not alone in the car when the police stopped the vehicle. ... We therefore find no clear error in the juvenile court’s determination defendant delivered the packet of heroin to Charles.

Section 40:966(C) requires proof that the defendant actually or constructively possessed or controlled the marijuana.

State v. Navarro · filed 1975-05-30(C)

The marijuana seized from the underwear of relator's companion obviously could not form the basis for relator's prosecution; the relator's actual or constructive possession of, or control over, this marijuana was not established at the hearing on the motion to suppress or at trial.

Section 40:966(C) requires guilty knowledge to possess a controlled dangerous substance, which may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.

State v. Humphreys · filed 1975-09-05(C)

Louisiana jurisprudence has firmly established that guilty knowledge is an essential element of the crime of possession of a controlled dangerous substance. [1] Whether the accused knew the substance was contraband is a matter of proof by direct or circumstantial evidence.

Section 40:966(C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule I controlled substance, including constructive possession when the substance is under a person's dominion and control.

State v. Roach · filed 1975-11-03(C)

Defendant was charged with the violation of La.R.S. 40:966(C), which provides in pertinent part: It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I [9] . . .. In the case at bar, defendant admitted to Deputy Self that the bedroom in which the marijuana was found was his. According to the "pink slip," the motorcycle on which the bag of marijuana was found was registered in defendant's name. Additionally, the stipulated laboratory report indicated that the substances recovered in his bedroom and on his motorcycle were marijuana. Certainly, this constituted some evidence of each element of the crime charged. Hence, the trial judge properly denied the motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

Section 40:966 permits a marijuana possession conviction based on constructive possession only when the person knows the drug exists and it is subject to that person's dominion and control.

State v. Alford · filed 1975-12-19(C)

Under our law, an individual need not personally possess a drug to violate a law against its illegal possession, because constructive possession is sufficient. But for a person to constructively possess a drug it must be subject to his dominion and control, and he must have knowledge of its existence.

Section 40:966(C) requires general criminal intent to convict a person of possessing heroin.

State v. Clift · filed 1976-11-08(C)

However, Louisiana law requires only a showing of general intent, not specific intent, in order to establish that a person is guilty of possessing heroin.

Section 40:966's possession prohibition includes knowing constructive possession when a person shares the right to control a drug held by a companion.

State v. Perique · filed 1976-12-13

We further stated in Smith that a person may be deemed to be in joint possession of a drug which is in the physical custody of a companion if he willfully and knowingly shares with the other the right to control it. ... We are of the opinion that these circumstances constitute "some evidence" that Claudia Merritt knowingly and constructively possessed the heroin.

Section 40:966 requires ownership or dominion or control of a drug for constructive possession; mere presence near it is insufficient.

Harris v. Frank Blackburn, Warden · filed 1981-04-13

Under Louisiana law, in order for a person to constructively possess a drug, he must either own the drug, or have dominion or control over it. ... It is well-settled in Louisiana that mere presence in the area where the narcotic is discovered or mere association with the person who does control the drug or the property where it is located, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.

Section 40:966(C) requires knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule I controlled substance; the evidence supported that finding for PCP mixed into marijuana.

State v. Keys · filed 1985-04-09(C)

Using this standard, we are unable to conclude that a reasonable jury could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Keys knowingly or intentionally possessed the PCP found in the marijuana.

Section 40:966 requires possession of PCP and guilty knowledge or intent; PCP residue can support a conviction when the evidence establishes those elements.

State v. White · filed 1988-09-21

La.R.S. 40:966 provides, in pertinent part, that: "It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I...." Thus the elements of the offense charged are possession of PCP and guilty knowledge, or an intent to possess it. ... In light of the foregoing, and the evidence establishing the identity of the substance found in defendant's possession as PCP, there is sufficient evidence upon which to base this conviction.

Section 40:966 permits a marijuana possession conviction based on constructive possession when the marijuana is subject to the defendant's dominion and control.

State v. Wilson · filed 1987-10-07(D)(2)

One need not physically possess the controlled dangerous substance to violate the prohibition against possession, constructive possession is sufficient. A person may be in constructive possession of a controlled dangerous substance if it is subject to his dominion and control, regardless of whether it is in his physical possession.

Marijuana found in another inmate’s mattress does not support a possession offense under § 40:966(C) without evidence of the defendant’s constructive possession.

State v. Burchett · filed 1988-12-14(C)

The marijuana seized from David Williams’s bedding was not in defendant’s possession. No evidence was adduced to show the defendant was in constructive possession of drugs in Williams’s mattress. There was only one possession offense in this case.

Section 40:966 requires proof that the defendant possessed the controlled substance knowingly to support a conviction for attempted possession.

State v. Hall · filed 1988-04-12

To support a conviction for attempted possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La.R.S. 40:966, the state must prove that the defendant was (1) in possession of the illegal drug and (2) that he knowingly possessed the drug. ... Even if we reject Truvia's testimony, the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found defendant guilty of attempted possession of PCP.

Section 40:966(C) requires proof of knowing or intentional possession of marijuana; constructive possession is sufficient when the marijuana is subject to the defendant’s dominion and control.

State v. Owens · filed 1989-12-13(C)

In order to convict him, the state must prove that Owens knowingly or intentionally possessed marijuana. La.R.S. 40:966 C. Constructive possession, meaning the marijuana was subject to Owens’ dominion and control, is sufficient. ... We hold that the state has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966 permits a marijuana possession conviction when the evidence shows the defendant exercised dominion and control over the drug, even without actual possession.

State v. Morgan · filed 1990-02-15

Under the circumstances of this case, a rational trier of fact could have found that this defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal substances. As such, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the state proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966(A) and (E)(1) require proof that the defendant knowingly possessed more than 60 pounds of marijuana; possession may be actual or constructive.

State v. Perez · filed 1990-10-31(A), (E)(1)

To prove a violation under La. R.S. 40:966(A), (E)(1), the State must show that defendant knowingly possessed in excess of 60 pounds of marijuana. Possession may be either actual or constructive.

Section 40:966 permits a heroin possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knowingly exercises dominion and control over the drug.

State v. Allen · filed 1996-12-27

Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact-finder could easily conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants had constructive possession of the heroin found in the pouch behind 3510 Desire Parkway.

Section 40:966(C) requires proof of knowing or intentional possession of a Schedule I controlled substance; constructive possession requires dominion and control over the drug.

State v. Joseph · filed 1998-07-01(C)

The defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, and possession of marijuana, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966. ... The state is not required to show actual possession of the drugs in order to convict, but only that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the illegal substances. ... Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the evidence adduced at trial excluded the reasonable hypothesis that the contraband belonged solely to Ms. Slater and that the defendant exercised no dominion or control over the illegal drugs.

Section 40:966 allows a marijuana possession conviction when the drug is within the defendant's dominion and control or joint possession.

State v. President · filed 1998-07-15

To prove constructive possession, the State must show that the substance was within the defendant's dominion and control or in his joint possession.

Section 40:966 requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed marijuana; constructive possession is sufficient.

State v. Alford · filed 2000-06-14

To support a conviction for possession of either cocaine or marijuana, the State must prove that the defendant was in possession of the contraband and that he knowingly possessed it. La. R.S. 40:966. However, it is not necessary that the State prove that the defendant had actual physical possession of the drugs; proof of constructive possession is sufficient to support a conviction. ... The record in this case supports a finding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had constructive possession of the marijuana.

Section 40:966 requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed heroin; residue and surrounding circumstances can establish possession.

State v. Bullock · filed 2000-06-14

To support a conviction for possession of narcotics, the state must prove that the defendant was in possession of the illegal drug and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug. La. R.S. 40:966; La. R.S. 40:967; State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990). ... Thus, the evidence found in the defendant's possession was sufficient to prove defendant's illegal possession of cocaine and heroin.

Section 40:966 permits a heroin possession conviction when the State proves knowing possession, including constructive possession.

State v. Toney · filed 2000-11-08

To support a conviction for possession of narcotics, the State must prove that a defendant knowingly possessed narcotics. State v. Chambers, 563 So.2d 579, 580 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1990). The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support the conviction.

Constructive possession of marijuana requires evidence of knowledge and dominion and control; residence or access alone is insufficient.

State v. Hodge · filed 2001-01-17(A)(1)

Viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Allison Hodge exercised dominion and control over any of the marijuana found during the search, or that she attempted to do so.

Section 40:966(C) permits a heroin possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant has dominion and control over the drugs.

State ex rel. T.E. · filed 2001-04-11(C)

The State need not prove that the defendant was in actual possession of the narcotics found; constructive possession is sufficient to support conviction.

Section 40:966(C) requires proof that a person knowingly or intentionally possessed heroin.

State v. Baker · filed 2000-11-15(C)

In the instant case, defendant was convicted of possession of heroin, a violation of La. R.S. 40:966(C) which provides in pertinent part: "It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I ..." Therefore, the crime of possession of heroin requires proof that defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the drug.

Section 40:966(C) permits a heroin possession conviction based on residue too small to weigh when the evidence proves knowing or intentional possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Carter · filed 2000-11-15(C)

The evidence established that, as to the bottle cap alone, defendant was in possession of a piece of paraphernalia commonly used by heroin users to heat up heroin; that this process leaves a residue; and that this particular bottle cap had heroin residue in it, as evidenced by the testing. Additionally, the evidence established that defendant was a confessed heroin user who admitted to selling fake crack cocaine to obtain money to purchase heroin. Viewing this evidence and the evidence as a whole, in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed heroin by virtue of his possession of the bottle cap.

Section 40:966(C) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of heroin; the amount possessed and furtive behavior can support an inference of knowledge.

State v. Williams · filed 2003-07-16(C)

In the case at bar, guilty knowledge can be inferred from the amount of contraband possessed by Williams. Furthermore, Williams exhibited such furtive behavior that the officers initially thought he might be ill. This circumstantial evidence corroborates the solid evidence that Williams knowingly and intentionally possessed the heroin.

Section 40:966 permits a possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant knows the drugs are present and exercises dominion and control over them.

State v. Clark · filed 2002-09-25

Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had a strong connection to the Palm Street apartment, that he knew the heroin and marijuana were there, and that he exercised dominion and control over the drugs, thus constructively possessing them.

Section 40:966 prohibits knowing or intentional possession of PCP.

State v. Hill · filed 2004-06-23

La. R.S. 40:966 makes it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess certain controlled dangerous substances. PCP is a controlled dangerous substance listed in R.S. 40:966. ... The evidence presented in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational fact finder that the essential elements of the crime of possession of PCP were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires more than a commercial truck driver’s access to cargo to prove constructive possession of drugs found there; evidence must address the driver’s knowledge or the possibility that others placed the drugs in the cargo.

State v. Pigford · filed 2005-01-26(A)(1)

The mere fact that the driver of such a vehicle may also have access to the cargo area of his vehicle is not sufficient proof of constructive possession of any contraband subsequently found in the cargo. To convict, there must be some other evidence to preclude the possibility that the contraband was put there by third persons during the loading of the cargo, or evidence proving the driver’s knowledge of the contraband in the cargo area.

Section 40:966(A)(1) permits proof of possession with intent to distribute through constructive possession when the defendant controls and knows of the marijuana, and its amount and value support an inference of intent to distribute.

State v. Pigford · filed 2006-02-22(A)(1)

The evidence otherwise supported the jury's finding that defendant had dominion and control over the contraband by virtue of his access to the interior of the trailer and that he therefore had constructive possession of the marijuana, in an amount and value sufficient to support an inference of intent to distribute.

A third-offense marijuana possession conviction requires proof that the defendant knowingly possessed marijuana and had two prior marijuana possession convictions.

State v. Turner · filed 2005-05-31(E)(3)

To support a conviction for possession of marijuana, third offense, besides proving that the defendant was in possession of marijuana and that he knowingly possessed it, the State must prove that he had two prior convictions for possession of marijuana. ... For the foregoing reasons, we modify the conviction to show that Turner is guilty of possession of marijuana, second offense.

Section 40:966(C)(2) requires proof that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed PCP; access to a room where PCP was hidden did not establish possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Jenkins · filed 2007-01-24(C)(2)

The provisions of La. R.S. 40:966 make it unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess certain controlled dangerous substances, including phencyclidine (PCP). ... We find, however, that the contents of the black bag were not tied to Jenkins beyond a reasonable doubt, even examining the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution.

Section 40:966(C) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed heroin knowingly or intentionally.

State v. Barker · filed 2009-09-29(C)

Therefore, in order to convict a defendant for possession of heroin under La. R.S. 40:966(C), the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in possession of the heroin and that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the heroin.

Section 40:966(C) prohibits knowingly or intentionally possessing a Schedule I controlled substance without authorization.

State v. Jones · filed 2011-10-19(C)

La. R.S. 40:966(C) provides in pertinent part: ... No evidence was presented that defendant was legally in possession of the heroin. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for possession of heroin.

Section 40:966(F) covers knowing or intentional possession of at least 60 but less than 2,000 pounds of marijuana; positive samples from similar bundles can support a finding that their full weight is marijuana.

State v. Lara · filed 2011-11-02(F)

From the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt, that the two bundles found in Lara’s possession were completely composed of marijuana. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to convict Lara on possession of marijuana, more than 60 pounds but less than 2,000 pounds.

Attempted possession of more than 400 grams of heroin may be proved by evidence that the defendant knew drugs were in the vehicle and had access to them.

State of Louisiana v. Cortes · filed 2012-02-01(D)(1)(c)

Defendant‟s guilty knowledge was supported by his display of nervous behavior during the traffic stop and his statement that he was aware of the fact that drugs were in the vehicle. ... We find that the facts in this case are sufficient to support Defendant‟s conviction for attempting to possess CDS I (heroin) over 400 grams.

Section 40:966 requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the marijuana; ownership of a residence where it was found does not alone establish constructive possession.

State of Louisiana v. Pittman · filed 2012-03-07

Based on these considerations, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Pittman had constructive possession of the marijuana found in the bedrooms of his residence.

Section 40:966 requires knowing and intentional possession of the drug; possession may be constructive when the drug is under the defendant’s dominion and control.

State v. Hayes · filed 2013-01-23

Addressing the issue of dominion and control, to support a conviction for possession of a controlled dangerous substance in violation of La. R.S. 40:967 and La. R.S. 40:966, the State must prove that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug. ... A person not in physical possession of narcotics may have constructive possession when the drugs are under that person’s dominion and control.

Section 40:966(C) permits a heroin possession conviction based on constructive possession when the defendant has dominion and control over the drug, including in a shared apartment.

State v. Brown · filed 2013-02-27(C)

Although Brown did not have heroin on his person, we find that a reasonable and rational person could conclude that he was in constructive possession of heroin in the foils inside the apartment. ... A reasonable and rational factfinder could conclude that Brown had dominion and control over the heroin found in the apartment if not in joint possession of it.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits knowing or intentional possession of Schedule I marijuana with intent to distribute; the amount and packaging of the drug can establish that intent.

State v. Moore · filed 2013-11-20(A)(1)

La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) states in part that it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense or possess with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule I (which includes marijuana). ... Both the amount (over two pounds) and packaging (separation into multiple bags, two of which weighed a pound) of the marijuana indicated that its possessor(s) intended to distribute the drug.

Section 40:966(A)’s possession element can be proved by showing that the defendant exercised dominion and control over heroin, even without physical possession.

State v. Melancon · filed 2014-09-24(A)

Based on the foregoing testimony and evidence, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that defendant exercised dominion and control over the heroin in the apartment and thus, he constructively possessed it.

Section 40:966(A) requires knowing and intentional possession of marijuana with specific intent to distribute it.

State v. Gatlin · filed 2014-10-29(A)

In this case, however, defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, which requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he or she did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966 sets a 5-to-30-year hard-labor range for possession with intent to distribute marijuana or methylenedioxymethcathinone; the latter requires at least five years without benefits.

State v. Manning · filed 2015-04-15(B)(2), (B)(3)

The penalty for possession with intent to distribute marijuana is 5 to 30 years at hard labor and a fine of not more than $50,000. La. R.S. 40:966(B)(3). The penalty for possession with intent to distribute methylenedioxymethcathinone, also Schedule I, is 5-30 years at hard labor, with at least 5 years to be served without benefits, and a fine of not more than $50,000. La. R.S. 40:966(B)(2).

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant distributed a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance to support a distribution conviction.

State v. Scott · filed 2013-12-23(A)(1)

To support a conviction under La. R.S. 40:966(A), the State must prove that the defendant distributed a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I.

Intent to distribute under Section 40:966(A)(1) may be inferred from packaging materials and other circumstances even when the drug quantity alone does not support that inference.

State v. Howard · filed 2015-06-24(A)(1)

The amount of drugs found was not large enough to create an inference of intent to distribute; however, there was sufficient evidence of paraphernalia consistent with intent to distribute based on the extra box of baggies on the television stand, the additional baggies in the closet and the small lxl inch bags, even though no scales or cash on Defendant were found.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires knowing possession of a Schedule I drug with specific intent to distribute, which may be inferred from the circumstances.

State v. Purvis · filed 2017-04-05(A)(1)

When determining whether a defendant is in possession with intent to distribute, the state must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed the drug with the specific intent to distribute it. ... These things taken together provide enough circumstantial evidence to infer that Purvis had the requisite intent to distribute the 14 bags of marijuana.

Section 40:966(A)(1) prohibits possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, and circumstantial evidence can establish possession and intent.

State v. Simon · filed 2018-01-10(A)(1)

La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1) provides that it is unlawful for a person to possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analogue classified in Schedule I, which includes marijuana. ... Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that all elements of the charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Section 40:966(B)(3) prescribes five to thirty years of imprisonment and a mandatory fine of up to $50,000 for possession with intent to distribute marijuana.

State v. Gillin · filed 2018-10-17(B)(3)

Nevertheless, defendant's sentences fall within the sentencing ranges statutorily prescribed. As to his possession with intent to distribute marijuana conviction, defendant faced a sentencing range of five to thirty years imprisonment and payment of a mandatory fine not to exceed $50,000.00.

For possession with intent to distribute heroin under § 40:966(A), possession may be actual or constructive.

State of Louisiana Versus Eric Richardson · filed 2019-09-04(A)

In this case, defendant was convicted of five counts of narcotics possession: ... possession with intent to distribute heroin; ... Although there are different elements required to support these five crimes, defendant only challenges the State’s alleged failure to prove the element of possession beyond a reasonable doubt for each of the counts. ... In Louisiana, the element of possession may be established by showing defendant exercised either actual or constructive possession of the substance.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires knowing possession of marijuana and specific intent to distribute it.

State of Louisiana v. D'Mycal Lmontay Turner · filed 2022-04-13(A)(1)

Thus, to prove their case, the state had to prove two elements: (1) Mr. Turner knowingly possessed marijuana (2) with a specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof of delivery or physical transfer of the controlled substance, guilty knowledge at the time of transfer, and the substance’s identity.

State of Louisiana v. Muse · filed 2023-09-27(A)(1)

To present sufficient evidence of distribution of a CDS, the state must prove the following elements: (1) delivery or physical transfer of the CDS to its intended recipient; (2) guilty knowledge of the CDS at the time of transfer; and (3) the exact identity of the CDS.

Section 40:966(A)(1) requires proof that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed marijuana with the specific intent to distribute it.

State of Louisiana v. Flenory Frazier, III · filed 2024-01-10(A)(1)

To support a conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana under La. R.S. 40:966, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the drug and that he or she did so with the specific intent to distribute it.

Section 40:966(B)(1)(a) sets a prison term of one to ten years and permits a fine of up to $50,000 for possession with intent to distribute less than 28 grams of psilocin.

State of Louisiana v. Nguyen · filed 2025-02-26(B)(1)(a)

La. R.S. 40:966(B)(1)(a) states that a defendant convicted of possession with the intent to distribute a Schedule I CDS, psilocin, in an amount less than 28 grams, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than one year nor more than ten years and may, in addition, be required to pay a fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars.

A person who helps another sell marijuana can be guilty as a principal of distribution under § 40:966(A)(1).

State v. McCullough · filed 1987-03-04(A)(1)

Hence, any assistance whatsoever rendered by McCullough to Lyons makes the defendant a principal to the offense.

Section 40:966(A)(1) permits a distribution charge against a person who aids an intermediary in delivering MDMA to others, if the state proves those facts.

State v. Corbett · filed 2004-11-15(A)(1)

The state’s application is granted and the rulings of the court of appeal and trial court, which granted defendant’s motion to quash the prosecution against him for second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(3) (distribution of a controlled substance which directly causes the death of the recipient) and for possession of MDMA (ecstasy) with intent to distribute in violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A)(1), are reversed. ... However, if the state proves the circumstances it has alleged at trial, the factfinder may rationally conclude that the defendant aided and abetted Smith in her actions as intermediary, in the delivery of the drugs to persons other than himself, which would make him a principal to the crimes.