Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-212

When matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment.

Perry v. Board of Franklin County Comm'rs · filed 2006-05-05(b)(6)

It notes that under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6), if “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in K.S.A. 60-256.”

The subsection (b)(6) dismissal standard does not apply when the court relies on facts outside the pleadings.

Seaboard Corp. v. Marsh Inc. · filed 2012-08-31(b)(6)

We have no quarrel with Ripley’s recitation of the standard that typically applies to consideration of a motion filed under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6). The problem is that standard does not apply to the procedural circumstances of this case because the district court relied on facts that were not alleged in the petition or stated in other pleadings.

Section 60-212(h)(2) permits a failure-to-state-a-claim defense to be raised in a permitted pleading, by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at trial on the merits, so asserting it shortly before trial does not waive the defense.

Cross v. City of Kansas City · filed 1982-01-15(h)(2)

However, K.S.A. 60-212( h )(2) states: " A defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a defense of failure to join a party under K.S.A. 60-219, and an objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered under K.S.A. 60-207(a) or by motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits. " (Emphasis supplied.) ... We conclude that even though the defense was not raised until shortly before trial, nearly two years after the action was commenced, that the defendants have not waived their right under the statute to assert the defense.

Section 60-212(h)(2) permits a statute-of-limitations defense to be raised in a motion for judgment on the pleadings or at trial on the merits.

Ternes v. GALICHIA · filed 2010-06-11(h)(2)

However, that fact alone does not lead us to conclude Galichia waived his affirmative defense, because a statute of limitations can be raised in a K.S.A. 60-207(a) motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits.

Section 60-212(b) requires a defendant who presents a defense by motion to do so before pleading.

Marr v. Geiger Ready-Mix Co. · filed 1972-04-08(b)

If the defendant desired to present this defense by motion, he was required to do so before pleading.

Section 60-212 abolishes the distinction between general and special appearances and provides that a personal-jurisdiction defense is waived only if it is not raised by motion or in the answer.

Garrison v. Vu · filed 1982-11-19(1)

“K.S.A. 60-212 has abolished the old distinction between general and special appearances. A defendant need no longer appear specially to attack the court’s jurisdiction over him. The defense of lack of jurisdiction of the person is waived only when it is not raised by motion or in the answer itself. This is clearly stated by the express terms of K.S.A. 60-212(1;).”

Section 60-212(b) eliminates the general/special appearance distinction and preserves a personal-jurisdiction defense unless it is omitted from a motion or answer.

In Re the Marriage of Thompson · filed 1992-05-01(b)

The distinction was abolished by K.S.A. 60-212(b). ... A party may now plead to the merits and at the same time contest jurisdiction over his person. ... “A defendant need no longer appear specially to attack the court’s jurisdiction over him. The defense of lack of jurisdiction of the person is waived only when it is not raised by motion or in the answer itself. . . . The defense is then waived not because of defendant’s voluntary appearance, but because of the failure to assert the defense within the time prescribed by the rules.” 207 Kan. at 465.

Section 60-212(h)(1) waives a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction if it is not raised in an answer or motion.

Austin v. JOHNSTON COCA-COLA BOTTLING GROUP, INC · filed 1995-03-24(h)(1)

If not raised in an answer or motion, the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived. K.S.A. 60-212(h)(1). The district court, therefore, erred in concluding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Johnston Coca-Cola.

Under subsection (h), a timely motion to dismiss raising personal jurisdiction preserves the issue for appeal unless other factors support waiver.

Kansas Bd. of Regents v. Skinner · filed 1999-07-16(h)

The minimum requirements of K.S.A. 60-212(h) are satisfied when a defendant raises the issue of personal jurisdiction in a timely motion to dismiss.

Section 60-212(h) waives a personal-jurisdiction defense only if the defendant fails to raise it by motion or in the answer.

Fisher v. DeCarvalho · filed 2011-06-24(h)

Thus, it is clear that DeCarvalho did not waive these defenses pursuant to K.S.A. 60-212(h).

Section 60-212 preserves a personal-jurisdiction or service-of-process defense when the defendant asserts it in a motion or answer, subject to waiver for omitting it from an earlier available motion.

Bunyard v. State · filed 2019-02-15

"K.S.A. 60-212 abolished the 'old distinction between general and special appearances' and now provides that a defendant only waives the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to assert the defense in a 60-212 motion or in the answer. In other words, a defendant retains the right to challenge personal jurisdiction up to the time that the defendant files his or her answer to the petition. [Citation omitted.]" Here, Larned filed an answer that included a defense of insufficient service of process. Thus, this defense appears to have been preserved by Larned.

Section 60-212(b)(2) requires a defendant to raise a personal-jurisdiction defense in a responsive pleading or pre-answer motion or waive it.

MidFirst Bank v. Sipple · filed 2026-02-20(b)(2)

But, even if we were inclined to address the question of personal jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, may be waived. K.S.A. 60-212(b)(2), (h) (noting that a party waives an objection to personal jurisdiction by failing to raise the defense in a responsive pleading or motion filed before a responsive pleading is due). It is true that the Sipples never filed a responsive pleading in this case. But they entered an appearance with the district court by invoking the power of the court in various ways. ... The Sipples did not claim a lack of personal jurisdiction in their initial voluntary appearance, though they raised it more than six months after MidFirst Bank filed its petition and about a month after MidFirst Bank's motion for summary judgment. Under the circumstances of this case, the Sipples waived any objection to personal jurisdiction that they might have had.

Section 60-212 makes a personal-jurisdiction defense waivable when the defendant does not raise it by motion or answer, and the former general/special appearance distinction no longer controls.

Adamson v. Harris · filed 1987-03-17

Under Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-212 (1983) (modeled on F.R.CÍV.P. 12, Haley v. Hershberger, 207 Kan. 459, 485 P.2d 1321, 1327 (1971)), the common law distinction between general appearances (waiving jurisdiction) and special appearances (preserving jurisdictional objections) is obsolete. See footnote 2, supra. Under the current statute, the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived only when the defendant fails to raise the defense by motion or answer. Haley, 485 P.2d at 1326.3 ... A letter may serve as a motion in some circumstances. ... Though Harris’ letter did not fulfill the formal requirements of either pleading or motion under Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-210 (1983), it did contain the style number of his case and his response to the merits of the allegations against him. The letter appears to have been in the nature of a lay person’s answer to the petition. ... Since Harris filed a document in the nature of an answer to the petition, it does not lie in his mouth to argue that he failed to comply with procedural requirements under the Kansas statutes on civil procedure. Therefore, Harris waived any personal jurisdictional defense otherwise available to him.

Section 60-212(h) allows a party to contest personal jurisdiction while also pleading to the merits without waiving the jurisdictional objection.

Small v. Small · filed 1965-11-06(h)

The old distinction between a general and special appearance loses its significance under K. S. A. 60-212 (h) as a party may plead to the merits and at the same time contest jurisdiction over his person. The purpose of the provisions is to permit the combining of an objection to the jurisdiction with pleadings on the merits without the old ritual of first entering a special appearance.

Section 60-212(h) preserves an objection to personal jurisdiction when it is raised in responsive pleadings, even if the defendant seeks visitation in the custody action.

Warwick v. Gluck · filed 1988-03-17(h)

Gluck raised lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense in his responsive pleadings and, therefore, did not consent to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him.

Section 60-212(h) waives a personal-jurisdiction defense when a party fails to raise it by motion or in a responsive pleading.

In re Marriage of Williams · filed 2018-05-18(h)

This waiver occurs because K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-212(h) explicitly states: "A party waives any defense listed in subsections (b)(2) [lack of personal jurisdiction] by: . . . (B) failing to either: (i) Make it by motion under this section; or (ii) include it in a responsive pleading." Alfonza did neither. Essentially, through silence, he waived his objection to the court's jurisdiction and constructively consented to the court's jurisdiction.

Section 60-212 waives a defense to personal jurisdiction only when the defendant fails to assert it by motion or in the answer within the prescribed time.

Haley v. Hershberger · filed 1971-06-12(h)

The defense of lack of jurisdiction of the person is waived only when it is not raised by motion or in the answer itself.

Section 60-212(h) waives personal-jurisdiction, venue, process, and service defenses when they are not timely raised by the required motion or responsive pleading; a post-judgment motion to reconsider is not a responsive pleading for this purpose.

Carrington v. Unseld · filed 1996-09-06(h)

“(1) A defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, improper venue, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process is waived (A) if omitted from a motion in the circumstances described in subsection (g) or (B) if it is neither made by motion under this section nor included in a responsive pleading or an amendment thereof permitted by subsection (a) of K.S.A. 60-215 and amendments thereto to be made as a matter of course.” ... The post-judgment motions to reconsider filed by Unseld are not “responsive pleadings” within the typical contemplation of K.S.A. 60-212(h).

Section 60-212(h) waives defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficient service of process only when they are not timely raised by motion or in the answer or another responsive pleading.

Jenkins v. City of Topeka · filed 1997-04-28(h)

K.S.A. 60-203(c) must therefore be read and interpreted in conjunction with the other rules of civil procedure, including K.S.A. 60-212(h), which states that the defense of insufficient service of process is waived if not raised by motion or in the answer or other responsive pleading. This court therefore holds that the filing of an "entry of appearance" by counsel for the defendant does not have the same effect as service when the defendant timely files an answer or other responsive pleading or a motion asserting insufficiency of service of process.

Section 60-212(b) permits a defendant to join multiple listed defenses in one motion, and joining defenses does not waive them.

Blue v. Tos · filed 2004-12-23(b)

By its clear and -express terms, joinder of defenses in a motion pursuant to 60-212(b) is expressly permitted and precludes any ... argument of waiver of those defenses. Here Tos merely joined her defense of insufficiency of service of process with her defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted due to the running of the statute of limitations. Such pleading is clearly contemplated by and fully consistent with K.S.A. 60-212.

Section 60-212(h)(1) waives a defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, or insufficiency of service of process when it is not timely raised by motion or responsive pleading.

Pieren-Abbott v. Kansas Department of Revenue · filed 2005-02-18(h)(1)

The KDR did not timely assert its lack of jurisdiction defense to the Pieren-Abbott petition, and such defense, under the precise language of K.S.A. 60-212(h), has been waived.

Section 60-212(b) requires affirmative defenses to be asserted by motion before pleading or in the responsive pleading; an entry of appearance alone does not waive them.

Kina v. Kansas Dept. for Children and Families Vocational Rehabilitation Svcs. · filed 2026-01-16(b)

But this argument misses the key issue—the service was valid, but the timing of the service made the lawsuit untimely. As VR Services correctly notes, affirmative defenses under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1)-(7) must be asserted either by motion before pleading or in the responsive pleading. See K.S.A. 2024 Supp. 60-212(b). VR Services raised its argument that the lawsuit was untimely commenced in its motion to dismiss before it filed any responsive pleading. VR Services did not waive its affirmative defense because it complied with the procedure described in K.S.A. 60-212(b).

Section 60-212(h) requires jurisdiction and service defenses to be raised by motion or responsive pleading; pleading lack of personal jurisdiction was sufficient here where service was void.

Hopkins v. State · filed 1985-07-02(h)

The defenses are waived if not raised by motion or included in a responsive pleading or an amendment of a responsive pleading. K.S.A. 60-212(h). ... The defendants were correct in raising lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense. ... The trial court was correct in ruling that the parties did not confer jurisdiction upon the court by waiver of a defense.

On a jurisdictional motion under subsection (h)(1), the court may examine evidence showing the factual background of the claim, unlike a motion under subsection (f)(6), which asks whether the claim states a basis for relief.

Collins v. MBPXL CORP. · filed 1984-03-29(h)(1), (f)(6)

Examination of evidence demonstrating the factual background of plaintiffs claim is proper even though the issue is one of jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-212(h)(l) and not whether there is a claim upon which relief can be granted under K.S.A. 60-212(fe)(6).

A pretrial motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under § 60-212(b)(1), decided from pleadings and written materials without an evidentiary hearing, requires factual disputes to be resolved in the plaintiff's favor and only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.

POM of Kansas v. Kobach · filed 2024-12-27(b)(1)

When a district court rules on a defendant's K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction before trial based on the pleadings, affidavits, and other written materials without an evidentiary hearing, any factual disputes must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.

Section 60-212(b) permits a defendant to raise defenses such as lack of personal jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of process by motion, and an objection is judged by its substance rather than its label when determining whether it was preserved.

Newell v. Krause · filed 1986-07-18(b)

To hold otherwise would appear to be overly technical and to place form over substance. Clearly, Carl Brollier preserved his objection to the service of process the two times he was required formally to do so (answer and pretrial), and the trial court did not err in considering the issue as being properly before it.

Section 60-212(b) permits a defendant to raise personal jurisdiction and service objections by motion without waiving them through counsel’s appearance.

City of Hutchinson v. HUTCHINSON, OFF. OF ST. EMP. SERV · filed 1973-12-08(b)

Counsel for the appellees raised the defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process by motion as he was authorized to do by K. S. A. 1972 Supp. 60-212 (b). By his appearance for the named parties defendant’s counsel did not waive any rights of the named defendants.

Section 60-212(a) requires a defendant to answer within 20 days after service of the summons and petition, unless the court orders a different deadline.

Bazine State Bank v. Pawnee Production Service, Inc. · filed 1989-10-27(a)

K.S.A. 60-212(a) requires a defendant to answer within twenty days after the service of the summons and petition. However, this deadline may be extended if a different time is fixed by order of the court.

Under § 60-212(a)(1)(A)(i), a defendant must serve an answer within 21 days after being served with the summons and petition.

Miles v. Shawnee County · filed 2021-02-26(a)(1)(A)(i)

But Miles fails to acknowledge that the plain language of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-212(a)(1)(A)(i) clearly states that the 21-day period begins "after being served with the summons and petition," not upon the issuance of the summons. (Emphasis added.) ... Instead, the 21-day period began to run on the date each defendant was served with the summons and the petition.

Section 60-212(a) requires a defendant to file an answer within 21 days after service.

Garcia v. Ball · filed 2014-04-25(a)

Under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-212(a), Ball had to file an answer within 21 days, which would have been June 7, 2011.

Section 60-212(b)(6) permits dismissal when a pleading is factually insufficient or when its well-pleaded facts, even if true, do not establish a legally actionable claim.

In re NIC, Inc. · filed 2024-01-12(b)(6)

But Plaintiffs overlook the duality of the defense of failure to state a claim under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 60-212(b)(6). A pleading can fail to state a claim in two ways: (1) It fails to state enough facts to apprise a defendant of the claims asserted against it (a factual insufficiency) or (2) its facts, even when taken as true, fail to state a legally actionable claim (a legal insufficiency).

Under subsection (b)(6), when a motion challenges the legal sufficiency of a claim, the court decides it from the petition’s well-pleaded facts and may treat the motion as the modern equivalent of a demurrer.

Ripley v. Tolbert · filed 1996-07-12(b)(6)

“When a motion to dismiss under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6) raises an issue concerning the legal sufficiency of a claim, the question must be decided from the well-pleaded facts of plaintiff’s petition. The motion in such case may be treated as the modem equivalent of a demurrer.”

Section 60-212(b)(6) requires the legal sufficiency of a claim on a motion to dismiss to be determined from the petition's well-pled facts.

Bennett v. Van Doren Industries, Inc. · filed 1997-05-30(b)(6)

Pursuant to K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6), the legal sufficiency of Employees’ claim is to be determined on the well-pled facts of their petition.

Section 60-212(e)'s procedure for obtaining a more specific pleading is available in a KJRA judicial-review action.

Karns v. Kansas State Board of Agriculture · filed 1996-08-09(e)

In the present case, KSBA did not file a motion for a more specific petition under K.S.A. 60-212(e). ... However, KSBA did orally move for a more specific petition at the first hearing held before the district court. ... We find the court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss or in failing to order Karns to file a more specific petition because KSBA had adequate notice of the issue sought to be raised by Karns.

A party must request a more definite statement under § 60-212(e) to preserve an objection that a petition lacks required specificity.

University of Kansas v. Department of Human Resources · filed 1995-01-06(e)

In this case, Evans did not file a motion for more definite statement under K.S.A. 60-212(e). Instead, he filed an answer to the petition without even alleging a lack of specificity in the petition. Because Evans did not raise the issue of specificity in the district court, the issue of the University’s compliance with 77-614(b) is not properly before us.

A summary judgment motion can serve as a motion for a more definite statement under subsection (e); failure to provide the ordered details can justify judgment on the deficient claims.

Schulze v. Coykendall · filed 1976-01-24(e)

In the present case the motion for summaiy judgment had the effect of a motion for a more definite statement authorized by K. S. A. 1975 Supp. 60-212 ( e ) in that plaintiff was directed to furnish the necessary information within 15 days after the order on the renewed motion for summary judgment. An examination of both the plaintiff’s deposition and the memorandum indicates that plaintiff failed or refused to disclose this necessary information. The judgment for defendant was proper as to the claim or claims of slander.

Section 60-212(e) requires a motion for a more definite statement before a defendant can compel a plaintiff to supply more pleading detail.

Rinsley v. Frydman · filed 1977-01-22(e)

While the rule asserted by the appellee is correct, it requires a motion by the defendant under 60-212 (e), supra, to give it substance and compel compliance.

Section 60-212(e) allows a party to seek a more definite statement of an unclear pleading; when defendants make that motion, the court must order the plaintiff to provide the needed details before dismissing a libel claim for lacking them.

Knight v. Neodesha Police Department · filed 1980-10-10(e)

In the present case, these defendants filed a motion for a more definite statement which was coupled with a motion to dismiss and to strike. In his response, plaintiff resisted the motion and the trial judge did not order plaintiff to plead more specific facts. We are of the opinion the district judge erred insofar as Lawrence H. Tucker and Shari B. Tucker, d/b/a Neodesha Daily Sun newspaper, and Thomas H. Prunier are concerned in not first ordering plaintiff to comply with the motion for more definite statement before he dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

When matters outside the pleadings inform the court’s decision, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is treated as a motion for summary judgment.

McShares, Inc. v. Barry · filed 1998-12-18(b) and (c)

The district court’s journal entry of judgment recites that defendants had filed various motions requesting judgment on the pleadings, dismissal of the action, and summary judgment. The district court had requested the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the journal entry of judgment contains findings of fact and conclusions of law. It does not appear that all the district court’s findings of fact are from the pleadings. For this reason, the trial court’s action will be deemed to be an entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants/appellees and against McShares. K.S.A. 60-212(b) and (c).

Section 60-212(e) permits a court to require a more definite statement when a pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot reasonably frame a response, and allows the court to strike the pleading or make another just order if the party fails to comply.

Gatlin v. HARTLEY, NICHOLSON, HARTLEY & ARNETT, PA · filed 2001-06-15(e)

Although the court gave no statutory citation in support of its order, we conclude the court's order was appropriate under K.S.A. 60-212(e), which states: "If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, such party may move for a more definite statement before interposing such party's responsive pleadings. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the order of the judge is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within such time as the court may fix, the judge may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as the judge deems just."

Section 60-212(b) requires every defense to a claim to be asserted in the responsive pleading, so a defense first raised later is not properly before the court.

Dunn v. Unified School District No. 367 · filed 2002-02-08(b)

Further, defendant did not set up in its answer the defense of noncompliance with K.S.A. 12-105b. See K.S.A. 60-212(b) ("Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto."). Defendant never sought to amend its answer. The first time the defendant asserted that Dunn failed to comply with K.S.A. 12-105b was in its supplemental trial brief, and the issue was not listed in the pretrial order. The district court never ruled on the issue. The issue is not properly before this court.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be treated as a motion for summary judgment when the court considers matters outside the pleadings.

University of Kansas Memorial Corp. v. Kansas Power & Light Co. · filed 2003-01-24(b)(6), (b)

“[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense provided in subsection (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in K.S.A. 60-256 ... Here, UKMC presented a matter outside the pleading, a contract between UKMC and the University, that was not excluded by the trial court. As a result, we must treat UKMC’s motion as one for summary judgment.”

Section 60-212(f) places a motion to strike a defense from a pleading within the trial court’s sound discretion.

King v. Pimentel · filed 1995-02-24(f)

Ruling on a motion to strike a defense from a pleading pursuant to K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 60-212(f) rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.

The section permits a judge to strike an insufficient defense or redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter on a party’s motion or the court’s own initiative.

State Ex Rel. Topeka Police Department v. $895.00 U.S. Currency · filed 2006-05-05(f)

The motion to strike is governed by the rules of civil procedure, K.S.A. 60-212(f), which provides: ... “Motion to strike. ... Upon motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by this article, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon such party or upon the court’s own initiative at any time, the judge may order stricken from any pleading ... any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”

Subsections (b) and (h) require a service-of-process objection to be raised in a responsive pleading or separate motion, or the defense is waived.

Rawlins v. State · filed 2008-05-16(b), (h)

A party who wishes to challenge service of process must do so within a responsive pleading or a separate motion. K.S.A. 60-212(b). Failure to object to insufficient process or insufficient service of process within such a pleading or motion waives the defense. K.S.A. 60-212(h). We see no such motion in the record. The State has waived the issue.

Section 60-212(h) waives an insufficiency-of-service defense unless the defendant raises it by motion or in a responsive pleading.

Reverse Mortgage Solutions, Inc. v. Goldwyn · filed 2017-12-29(h)

Subsection (h) of K.S.A. 60-212 provides that a defense of . . . insufficiency of service of process is waived if it is not made by motion or included in a responsive pleading.

A venue objection is a defense that must be raised in a responsive pleading or motion.

AkesoGenX Corp. v. Zavala · filed 2017-11-09(b)(3)

This is why K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-212(b)(3) states that a complaint about venue is a defense which parties must raise in a responsive pleading or in a motion.

Section 60-212(h) waives an objection to venue when it is not raised in a motion or responsive pleading.

Bohanon v. Werholtz · filed 2011-05-13(h)

If an objection to venue is not raised in a motion or responsive pleading, it is waived. K.S.A. 60-212(h).

Section 60-212(b) permits a party to raise improper venue in an answer, but the party must also make a timely motion and establish the grounds before trial on the merits.

Powers v. State Department of Social Welfare · filed 1972-01-22(b)

In order to reconcile these statutory provisions it would seem reasonable to construe them to permit a party to set up the defense of improper venue in his answer or other responsive pleading but also to require him to file a timely motion and to establish his grounds therefore before the commencement of the trial on the merits.

Subsection (b)(2) requires only a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, with factual disputes resolved in the plaintiff's favor, when a pretrial motion is decided on written materials without an evidentiary hearing.

AEROFLEX WICHITA, INC. v. Filardo · filed 2012-04-27(b)(2)

Hence, we reject TIC’s arguments and conclude that, even though there was discovery, when a defendant’s K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 60-212(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is decided before trial on the basis of the pleadings, affidavits, and other written materials and without an evidentiary hearing, any factual disputes must be resolved in the plaintiffs favor and the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction.

Section 60-212(a)(l) gives a defendant 10 days after denial of a motion to dismiss to file an answer or other responsive pleading.

Church of God in Christ, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Emmanuel Church of God in Christ · filed 2012-06-08(a)(l)

Here, it is undisputed that the defendants did not file an answer nor did they seek leave to file an answer out of time. Although the defendants filed two motions to dismiss, both were denied. As such, they had 10 days after the motions to dismiss were denied to file an answer or other responsive pleading. K.S.A. 60-212(a)(l). When they failed to do so, the COGIC moved for a default judgment under K.S.A. 60-255(a), and the district court appropriately held a hearing on the motion.

Section 60-212(a) delays the time to answer after a defendant serves a motion under subsection (b); the ten-day period begins after notice that the court denied the motion or postponed its decision until trial.

Goldsberry v. Lewis · filed 1976-06-12(a)

In this case the trial court neither denied the motion nor postponed its disposition until trial, and obviously never gave defendant “notice of its action.” The result is that defendant’s ten days to answer never started to run. The further result must be that his answer day never arrived and he was never in default.

In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, the substance of a petition prevails over its form.

Smith v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. · filed 2014-07-18(b)(6)

Moreover, the substance of a petition prevails over its form, at least in the context of reviewing a dismissal of a petition for failure to state a claim under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6).

Subsection (b)(5) treats insufficient service of process as a defense in Kansas civil procedure, but does not govern criminal cases.

State v. Davis · filed 2018-04-13(b)(5)

He cites to K.S.A. 60-212(b)(5), in which insufficient service of process is a defense under Kansas civil procedure. However, criminal procedure statutes do not follow the same service requirements. ... The statutes provided by Davis are all civil procedure statutes, which are not applicable here.

Section 60-212(b)(6)'s failure-to-state-a-claim standard does not apply to a respondent's motion to dismiss a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition.

Wooldridge v. Snyder, Warden · filed 2026-02-20(b)(6)

It was error for the district court to act upon Snyder's K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6) motion to dismiss, but the error was harmless because it did not affect the outcome of these proceedings.

Section 60-212(b)(6)'s failure-to-state-a-claim standard does not apply to motions to dismiss K.S.A. 60-1501 habeas petitions.

Denney v. Norwood · filed 2022-03-11(b)(6)

Thus, when ruling on a respondent's motion to dismiss a K.S.A. 60-1501 petition, neither the failure-to-state-a-claim standard under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-212(b)(6) nor the summary judgment standard under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-256 apply.

Section 60-212(b)(6) generally calls for a plaintiff to receive a reasonable opportunity to amend before dismissal with prejudice, unless an insurmountable legal bar or futility makes amendment unnecessary.

CVR Energy, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. · filed 2024-07-19(b)(6)

Typically, a district court should afford a plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to amend its petition before dismissing an action with prejudice under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6). But a district court need not do so if an insurmountable legal bar precludes any claim or an amendment would otherwise be futile. See Johnson v. Board of Pratt County Comm'rs, 259 Kan. 305, Syl. ¶ 15, 913 P.2d 119 (1996); Dutoit v. Board of Johnson County Comm'rs, 233 Kan. 995, 1002-03, 667 P.2d 879 (1983).

Section 60-212 requires dismissal whenever a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, even if the objection is raised after the answer.

Morgan v. Board of Doniphan County Comm'rs · filed 2017-12-08(h)(3)

Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction is not a waivable defense. See K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-212(h)(1). Rather, if a "court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 60-212(h)(3).

Section 60-212(h)(3) requires dismissal when a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

Parisi v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas City · filed 2018-11-02(h)(3)

When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction the proper remedy is dismissing the suit. Our code of civil procedure states: "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-212(h)(3). The use of the word "must" makes dismissal mandatory upon a determination that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.

A party may raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time, even if the party did not raise it in a responsive pleading.

The Bank of New York Mellon v. Luna · filed 2021-11-19(b)(1)

The Bank first argues that the Lunas waived the subject-matter jurisdiction argument. It cites K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-212(b)(1), which provides that "[e]very defense to a claim for relief in any pleading must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: (1) Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." ... That said, the notable distinction here is that subject matter jurisdiction can be raised any time, by any party, or by the court on its own motion. ... To that end, this issue was not waived.

On a motion to dismiss for improper venue under § 60-212(b)(3), courts accept uncontroverted pleading allegations as true, resolve disputed facts in the plaintiff's favor, and review the ruling de novo.

Bicknell v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue · filed 2022-05-20(b)(3)

This court reviews a district court's decision on a K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-212(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue under a de novo standard, and we accept as true the allegations and factual assertions in the pleading when those are uncontroverted.