Iowa Code § 668.3

Section 668.3(1)'s comparative-fault reduction does not apply to punitive damage awards.

Godbersen v. Miller · filed 1989-04-19(1)

Because the aim of chapter 668 is proportional compensation, not punishment, we see no applicability of section 668.3(1) to punitive damage awards.

Section 668.3(2) requires the jury to state each claimant’s damages without considering contributory fault and allocate fault percentages, while section 668.3(6) requires the court to ensure the special verdict is consistent with those amounts and percentages before discharging the jury.

Cowan v. Flannery · filed 1990-10-18(2), (6)

A negligence claim for damages resulting from injury to a person is now brought under the provisions of chapter 668 of the Iowa Code; liability in tort — comparative fault. This chapter requires a jury to answer special interrogatories as to the amount of damages each claimant will be entitled to recover if contributory fault is disregarded and the percentage of the total fault allocated to each claimant. Iowa Code § 668.3(2). The court should not discharge the jury until the court has determined the verdict or verdicts are consistent with the total damages and percentage of fault. Iowa Code § 668.3(6).

Section 668.3(6) allows a court to send an undischarged jury back to complete a verdict form it inadvertently left unfinished.

Grodt v. Darling · filed 1991-04-23(6)

Clearly, the jury had, through mere inadvertence, failed to complete the jury form. It simply made a ministerial error of omission. We do not believe that either party seriously challenges the right and duty of the court to order the jury to resume deliberations to correct this problem. See Iowa Code § 668.3(6).

Section 668.3(2) requires jury instructions when the fault of more than one party is at issue; it does not define which actions chapter 668 governs.

Waterloo Savings Bank v. Austin Ex Rel. Austin · filed 1993-01-20(2)

Rather, section 668.3(2) narrowly applies to a court’s duty to instruct the jury when the fault of more than one party is at issue.

Section 668.3(8) requires damages to be itemized by element, and each itemization must be supported by evidence or the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.

Matthess v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1994-09-21(8)

Because of damages itemization, the jury must now tell us what it is awarding for each element of damages. See Iowa Code § 668.3(8) (1989). And each itemization is a special jury finding that must be supported by the evidence. If such finding is not supported by the evidence, the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.

Section 668.3(2)(a) and (b) requires jury findings on the claimant’s percentage of fault and total damages.

Jackson v. Roger · filed 1993-09-02(2)(a) and (b)

Questions five and six answer the requirements of Iowa Code section 668.3(2)(a) and (b). The jury determined appellant’s percentage of fault and the total amount of her damages.

Section 668.3(8) requires damages to be itemized, with proximate cause determined for each claimed item.

Johnson v. Knoxville Community School District · filed 1997-11-26(8)

Because damages must be itemized in this case, see Iowa Code section 668.3(8), at the new trial the jury should be given verdict forms that properly connect the issue of proximate cause to each item of damage claimed by the plaintiffs.

Section 668.3(1) bars a claimant from recovering damages when the claimant’s percentage of fault is more than fifty percent.

Bokhoven v. Klinker · filed 1991-09-18(1)

Iowa’s modified comparative fault provides, if the claimant’s percentage of fault is more than fifty percent, the claimant cannot recover damages. Iowa Code § 668.3(1).

Section 668.3(1) bars a plaintiff from recovering when the plaintiff is more than fifty percent at fault.

Meyer v. City of Des Moines · filed 1991-09-18(1)

In contrast, under Iowa Code section 668.3(1), a plaintiff who is more than fifty percent at fault cannot recover.

Section 668.3 bars recovery when the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than the defendants combined.

Husker News Co. v. South Ottumwa Savings Bank · filed 1992-03-18

We need not resolve the issue, however, because on this de novo review we find negligence on the part of Husker greatly exceeds the combined negligence on the part of the defendants. Recovery is therefore barred under Iowa Code section 668.3 (contributory negligence a bar to recovery if claimant bears greater percent of fault).

Section 668.3(1) bars recovery when the claimant’s percentage of fault exceeds the combined percentage attributed to defendants, third-party defendants, and released persons.

Fox v. Interstate Power Co. · filed 1994-06-28(1)

Under section 668.3(1), plaintiff is barred from recovery because his percentage of fault is greater than the percentage attributed to defendant.

Section 668.3(2)(b) requires the jury to determine the allocation of fault for parties released from liability.

Garren v. First Realty, Ltd. · filed 1992-02-19(2)(b)

In this case, the court was required to instruct the jury to determine allocation of fault for the parties who had been released from liability. Iowa Code § 668.3(2)(b) (1989). Without the admission of proof of the released parties, the trial court could not have instructed the jury and the jury could not have determined the allocation of fault of the released parties. We hold that the evidence was admissible to identify the parties released.

Section 668.3(2) requires a court sitting without a jury to apportion damages among parties at fault, but does not permit assigning a share to a released party whose liability is based only on fraud.

Freeman v. Ernst & Young · filed 1994-05-25(2)

Under chapter 668 the court, if there is no jury, must apportion damages among all “parties” at “fault.” Iowa Code § 668.3(2) (1993). ... Because Freeman could not have recovered from Neenan under a theory classified as “fault” under chapter 668, it was error for the court to assign a percentage of fault to Neenan.

Section 668.3(2) requires fault allocation among claimants, defendants, third-party defendants, and released persons; someone against whom no relief is sought cannot be added solely for fault allocation.

Peterson v. Pittman · filed 1986-07-23(2)

In the trial of a claim “involving the fault of more than one party,” Iowa Code section 668.3(2) requires that the court or jury make an allocation of fault among each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and person who has been released from liability pursuant to section 668.7. ... Because no relief of any kind was. sought from the county or from Rodman the court correctly ruled they were not parties to this suit.

Section 668.3 places the burden of proving a released person’s fault on the defendant seeking to reduce its own percentage of fault.

Beyer v. Todd · filed 1999-10-13(2)(b)

We believe that the language of Iowa Code section 668.3, and of Iowa Code section 619.17 ... by analogy, suggests that it was defendant Todd’s burden to prove the fault of Comer and Gardner as part of his defense to Beyer’s claim against him.

Section 668.3(2)(b) permits fault allocation only to claimants, named defendants, third-party defendants, and released persons, so fault cannot be allocated to nonparties.

Selchert v. State · filed 1988-03-16(2)(b)

We have repeatedly interpreted these statutory provisions to preclude allocation of fault to nonparties whether they be unidentified, see Baldwin v. City of Waterloo, 372 N.W.2d 486, 492-93 (Iowa 1985); dismissed prior to trial, see Payne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Bob McKiness Excavating & Grading, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 156, 159 (Iowa 1986); known parties to an occurrence from whom no relief was sought, see Peterson v. Pittman, 391 N.W.2d 235, 238 (Iowa 1986); or acts of God, see Renze Hybrids Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 418 N.W.2d 634, 641 (Iowa 1988).

Section 668.3(2)(b) permits fault to be allocated to an insolvent entity if it is made a party to the lawsuit.

Pepper v. Star Equipment, Ltd. · filed 1992-04-15(2)(b)

Thus, considering chapter 668 alone, to the extent that Owatonna is made a “party” to this lawsuit, it may be allocated a percentage of fault under section 668.-3(2)(b).

Section 668.3(2)(b) requires the jury to consider a third-party defendant’s fault in the total allocation of causal fault when a contribution claim puts that defendant’s fault toward the claimant in issue.

Kragel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1995-09-20(2)(b)

Here Wal-Mart’s contribution claims against Laubscher and Lobaugh put in issue their fault toward the Kragels. ... The court also erred when it refused to instruct the jury to consider the fault of Laubscher and Lobaugh in the total aggregate of causal fault toward the Kragels.

Section 668.3 permits separate verdict forms to allocate fault for damages before and during an identifiable period of alleged failure to mitigate.

Greenwood v. Mitchell · filed 2001-01-18(3)

We think the inequitable result of the first trial can be avoided upon retrial by the use of separate verdict forms for the period prior to the plaintiffs alleged failure to mitigate and for the period that includes the plaintiffs alleged failure to mitigate. Nothing in the comparative fault statute requires that an allocation of fault be made in one verdict form in cases such as this, where the failure-to-mitigate claim is easily identifiable to a specific time frame.

Section 668.3(2) allows a jury to allocate fault to a highway worker who failed to exercise reasonable care for his own safety, even though the worker has a different duty of care from an ordinary pedestrian.

Kuta v. Newberg · filed 1999-09-09(2)

Iowa Code section 668.3(2) provides in relevant part: ... This principle does not, of course, totally relieve a highway worker from exercising care for his own safety.

Section 668.3(1) compares fault resulting in death or injury to a person or property, so a claimant’s fault in an enhanced-injury claim is considered when it proximately caused the injuries at issue.

Reed v. Chrysler Corp. · filed 1992-12-23(1)

In cases in which chapter 668 applies, the statutory requirement that fault is to be compared has reference to “fault resulting in death or in injury to person or property.”

Section 668.3 does not require an employer's fault or damages share to be allocated in a third-party tort action when the employer is not a party.

Sorensen v. Morbark Industries, Inc. · filed 1993-10-06(2)(b), (1), and (4)

The court finds that nothing in the statute requires the division of damages into the two pools Morbark suggests. The Sorensens’ employer is simply not a party to the action, and therefore Ch. 668 neither assigns the employer a share of the fault nor a share of the damages award.

Section 668.3(3) requires the factfinder in enhanced injury cases to consider both the nature of each party’s conduct and its relation to the damages when assigning fault percentages; causation alone does not determine the allocation.

Jahn v. Hyundai Motor Co. · filed 2009-10-09(3)

Further, the legislature in Iowa Code section 668.3(3) has expressly stated that “[i]n determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party and the extent of the casual relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.” In this language, we conclude that in enhanced injury cases, the legislature has directed that the casual relation between the conduct of a product manufacturer and the resulting damages is one of the two elements to be considered in assigning a percentage of liability, but is not solely determinative as to the allocation of fault.

Section 668.3(2)(b) permits two or more persons, including a released person, to be treated as a single party when allocating fault, which can treat a physician and hospital as one party for vicarious liability.

Biddle v. Sartori Memorial Hospital · filed 1994-06-22(2)(b)

In summary, we believe the district court correctly ruled that Dr. Watts’ settlement with Biddle extinguished any further claim against the hospital on a theory of vicarious liability. The doctor and hospital were properly “treated as a single party” for purposes of the release. Iowa Code § 668.-3(2)(b).

Section 668.3(6) requires the court to ensure that a jury’s verdict is consistent with the total damages and percentages of fault before discharging the jury.

Neumann v. Service Parts Headquarters · filed 1997-10-29(6)

The court should not discharge a jury until the court has determined the verdict or verdicts are consistent with the total damages and percentages of fault. Iowa Code § 668.3(6); ... The parties agreed to a sealed verdict.

Section 668.3, as part of chapter 668, does not apply to claims based on intentional torts.

Catipovic v. Peoples Community Health Clinic, Inc. · filed 2003-01-06

IBP is correct that chapter 668 does not apply to intentional torts.

Section 668.3(1)(a) generally permits recovery despite a claimant’s contributory fault, reducing damages in proportion to the claimant’s fault unless that fault exceeds the combined fault of the other responsible parties.

McGuire v. Davidson Manufacturing Corp. · filed 2003-04-18(l)(a)

This section makes it clear that rather than barring recovery for a defendant’s negligence when the plaintiff is partially at fault, the Act merely reduced a negligent plaintiffs recovery by the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff.

Section 668.3(1)(a) permits recovery despite a claimant's fault unless the claimant's fault exceeds the combined fault of the responsible defendants and other specified parties, with damages reduced proportionally; accordingly, a res ipsa loquitur plaintiff need not disprove personal fault to prevail.

McGuire v. Davidson Manufacturing Corp. · filed 2005-02-17(1)(a)

The Act provides: Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by a claimant to recover damages for fault resulting in death or in injury to person or property unless the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than the combined percentage of fault attributed to the defendants, third-party defendants and persons who have been released . . . , but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the claimant. Iowa Code § 668.3(1)(a). ... We find this reasoning sound and believe that when the Iowa Supreme Court addresses the issue it, like many other high courts, will find that in a comparative negligence system, plaintiffs using res ipsa loquitur need not disprove their own fault in order to prevail.

Section 668.3(1)(b) requires consortium damages to be reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to the person whose injury or death provides the basis for the consortium claim.

James B. Wilson, As Administrator Of The Estate Of Lily M. Wilson, Vs. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2006-05-12(1)(b)

By reducing the loss of consortium claim by the percentage of fault which the jury attributed to the decedent, the district court did exactly what it was required to do under the law. See Iowa Code § 668.3(1)(b) (any damages for consortium will be reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to the person who provides the basis for the consortium damages); id. § 668.3(4) (the court shall determine the amount of damages payable to each party in accordance with the findings of the court or jury).

Section 668.3(5) requires a court trying a claim to a jury to instruct on, and permit evidence and argument about, the effects of answers to the submitted interrogatories.

Nicholas Reilly, Dennis Reilly, And Marcia Reilly Vs. Christopher J. Anderson, Michael M. Anderson, And Imt Insurance Co · filed 2006-12-08(5)

In this case, the trial court did instruct the jury upon the effect of its determinations, and as it was required to do under Iowa Code section 668.3. See Iowa Code § 668.3(5) (“If the claim is tried to a jury, the court shall give instructions and permit evidence and argument with respect to the effects of the answers to be returned to the interrogatories submitted under this section.”).

Section 668.3(5) requires the court, in a jury trial, to instruct the jury and permit evidence and argument about the effects of its answers to comparative-fault interrogatories; failure to explain the effect of allocating fault to a settling party does not require reversal without prejudice.

Mumm v. Jennie Edmundson Memorial Hospital d/b/a Methodist Jennie Edmundson Hospital, Emergency Physicians of Western Io · filed 2019-03-01(5)

However, Iowa Code section 668.3(5), regarding comparative fault, goes further. It provides, “If the claim is tried to a jury, the court shall give instructions and permit evidence and argument with respect to the effects of the answers to be returned to the interrogatories submitted under this section.” Iowa Code § 668.3(5) (2017) (emphasis added); see also Sullivan v. Wickwire, 476 N.W.2d 69, 72–73 (Iowa 1991) (indicating that in a case with a settling defendant, the district court must instruct the jury that the plaintiff’s recovery will be reduced by the percentage of fault attributed to the settling party).

Section 668.3(5) requires the court to instruct the jury on the effects of its fault findings; a misleading instruction that prejudices a party requires a new trial.

Reilly v. Anderson · filed 2006-12-08(5)

In this case, the trial court did instruct the jury upon the effect of its determinations, and as it was required to do under Iowa Code section 668.3. ... Under our holding, which changes the effect of the verdict and which Naughton challenges, Naughton suffers prejudice because joint and several liability applies. As a result, the case must be tried anew.

Section 668.3(5) permits broad evidence and argument about how the jury’s answers to a comparative fault special verdict will affect damages and liability.

Schwennen v. Abell · filed 1991-06-19(5)

In a multiple defendants’ case like this one, section 668.3(5) gives the parties a wide latitude to argue a number of things.

Section 668.3(5) requires the court to instruct the jury on the effect of its answers to special interrogatories.

Sullivan v. Wickwire · filed 1991-10-16(5)

In keeping with Iowa Code section 668.3(5), our prior decisions make clear that the court ... must instruct the jury with respect to the effect of answers given to special interrogatories, and the court’s failure to do so may constitute reversible error.

Section 668.3(1)(a) permits comparative fault to reduce or bar recovery for property-damage claims, but in a nuisance action it cannot reduce the recovery for diminution in property value because that would be an unconstitutional taking.

Dalarna Farms Vs. Access Energy Coop. · filed 2010-12-23(1)(a)

Section 668.3(1)(a) provides contributory fault may act as a bar to recovery ―in an action . . . to recover damages for fault resulting in . . . injury to . . . property.‖ Id. § 668.3(1)(a). ... Dalarna‘s recovery for other elements of damage, if any, caused by any nuisance found by the fact finder to have been caused by Access Energy shall be reduced in proportion to Dalarna‘s causal fault, if any. ... However, we further conclude that to avoid an unconstitutional taking, comparative fault principles may not be applied to reduce a plaintiff‘s recovery for the diminution in value of his or her property caused by the nuisance.

Section 668.3 allows recovery unless the claimant's percentage of fault is greater than the defendant's, so contributory negligence alone does not bar recovery.

Driesen v. Iowa, Chicago & Eastern Rr Corp. · filed 2011-02-15

Iowa Code § 668.3 provides that contributory fault does not bar recovery unless the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than the defendant. Thus, mere contributory negligence does not bar recovery for the Driesens.

Section 668.3(2)(b) requires aggregate fault to include only fault toward the claimant that is legally sufficient to support a claim; fault lacking a legally sustainable theory of recovery is excluded.

Schwennen v. Abell · filed 1988-09-21(2)(b)

Because no legally sustainable theory of recovery may be predicated on William’s fault toward Mary, his fault should not have played a role in the apportionment of aggregate fault under section 668.3(2)(b).

Section 668.3(2) requires the court to instruct the jury to assign each tortfeasor a percentage of fault.

Estes v. Progressive Classic Insurance Company · filed 2012-01-27(2)

Chapter 668 requires the court to instruct the jury to assess a percentage of fault to each tortfeasor. Iowa Code § 668.3(2) (2005).

Section 668.3(2)(b) generally leaves apportionment of fault to the trier of fact and requires jury interrogatories on damages and each defendant’s percentage of fault.

Eventide Lutheran Home for the Aged, Missouri Synod v. Smithson Electric & General Construction, Inc. · filed 1989-09-20(2)(b)

We note at the outset that apportionment of fault in a negligence action under Iowa’s comparative fault statute is generally a matter for the trier of fact. Iowa Code § 668.3(2)(b)(1987). The statute provides that the court shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories indicating the amount of damages due the plaintiff if comparative fault is disregarded, as well as the percentage of fault borne by each defendant.

Section 668.3 permits fault to be apportioned among claimants, defendants, released persons, and third-party defendants, but not to an eligible tank owner in the Board’s independent suit to recover cleanup costs.

Hagen v. Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. · filed 1995-01-18

Iowa Code section 668.3 allows fault to be apportioned among the claimant, the defendants, a person who has been released under section 668.7 and any third-party defendant. ... We hold that an eligible owner’s fault cannot be compared to that of other potentially responsible parties in a suit by the Board to recover its costs of corrective action.

Section 668.3(2) applies to claims involving the fault of more than one party; a contractual underinsured motorist claim does not meet that requirement.

Wilson v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2009-07-31(2)

We recognized that chapter 668, which governs comparative fault, applies only to claims “ ‘involving the fault of more than one party to the claim.’” Id. at 409 (quoting Iowa Code § 668.3(2)). ... The underin-sured motorist claim here was similarly not brought pursuant to chapter 668.

Section 668.3(2) triggers comparative-fault principles when a claim involves the fault of more than one party, even if the plaintiff is blameless.

City of Urbandale v. Frevert-Ramsey-Kobes, Architects-Engineers, Inc. · filed 1988-11-29(2)

The principles of comparative fault are triggered by any “claim involving the fault of more than one party to the claim.”

Section 668.3 requires fault to be allocated among all relevant parties, including released settling defendants, so a nonsettling defendant's award is reduced by the settling defendant's percentage share of total damages under the proportionate credit rule.

Thomas v. Solberg · filed 1989-06-14(2)(b)

The plain meaning of Iowa Code sections 668.7 and 668.3 leaves us no choice but to impose the proportionate credit rule in all partial settlements of comparative fault cases, even though the settlement results in the plaintiff receiving more than the verdict.

Section 668.3(6) treats a jury’s answer on one defendant’s fault as incomplete until the jury also addresses the other defendant’s fault and determines their combined fault, if any.

Whitlow v. Ron McConnaha, Jodi McConnaha, and Timothy Newton · filed 2019-05-01(6)

See Iowa Code § 668.3(6). Under that statute, the jury’s initial answer on McConnaha’s fault would remain an incomplete, partial verdict until the jury simultaneously addressed Newton’s fault and determined their combined fault, if any. The remedy of a complete new trial, therefore, delivers justice for all the parties.

Section 668.3(2) triggers chapter 668 only when the claim involves the fault of more than one party to that claim; an underinsured-motorist contract claim involving only the insured’s fault does not satisfy that requirement.

Vasquez v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1991-11-20(2)

In contrast, the claim here is contractual. The parties to this claim are Vasquez and LeMars. Only Vasquez’s fault has been placed in issue. So we do not have a “claim involving the fault of more than one party to the claim” as section 668.3(2) requires.

Section 668.3(2) triggers comparative-fault principles when a claim involves the fault of more than one party, even if the plaintiff is blameless.

Johnson v. Junkmann · filed 1986-11-12(2)

Under the Act, the principles of comparative fault are triggered by any “claim involving the fault of more than one party to the claim.” Iowa Code § 668.3(2).

Section 668.3(2) allows the fact finder to assign fault, without explanation, to one or more parties claimed to have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.

Bredberg v. Pepsico, Inc. · filed 1996-07-24(2)

The verdict is» consistent with the intent and purpose of the comparative fault statute, which allows the fact finder to assign fault (without explanation) to one or more parties claimed to have contributed to plaintiffs injuries.

Section 668.3(4) does not authorize a post-trial reduction of a jury verdict to account for collateral-benefit amounts when the jury declined to reduce the award.

Ryan v. Fortune Transportation Co. · filed 2003-04-11(4)

Viewing the determination of the jury in this fashion creates no collision with the provisions of § 668.3. This Court finds no authority under Chapter 668 to alter the jury verdict in the manner sought in the motion.

Section 668.3(2) treats a vicariously liable principal and agent as a single party when allocating fault, so their shared liability is not subject to a proportionate credit between them.

State v. Paxton · filed 2004-01-22(2)

Because Everen Securities was vicariously liable for Paxton’s conduct (rather than independently liable to Clauss), Everen Securities and Paxton would be treated as a single party under the comparative fault statute.

Section 668.3(5) requires the jury to be informed of the legal effects of its comparative-fault findings, not who ultimately pays the damages.

Harrington v. City of Council Bluffs · filed 2012-10-29(5)

The ultimate question of who bears final responsibility for paying any damages award is utterly beyond the scope and the purpose of § 668.3(5). A review of the relevant cases reveals that this provision’s purpose is to ensure that, in every comparative fault lawsuit, the jury is informed as to the legal effect of its findings regarding the respective fault of each party.

Section 668.3(1)(a) bars recovery when the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than the combined percentage of fault attributed to the defendants and other specified persons.

The Estate of Troy Ellis Haakenson, by and Through Its Administrator Melissa Haakenson, Melissa Haakenson, as… · filed 2014-03-12(1)(a)

The district court did not err in concluding that this case is governed by the comparative fault act, Iowa Code chapter 668. Nor did the district court err in concluding that plaintiffs’ claims are barred if Haakenson bore a greater percentage of fault than the combined percentage of Chicago Central.

Section 668.3(1)(a) allocates fault in actions seeking damages for property injury: claimant fault bars damages only when it exceeds the defendants’ combined fault, and otherwise reduces damages proportionally; it does not govern independent injunctive relief.

A.D., L.L.C. v. 2004 Sc Partners, L.L.C. · filed 2014-11-26(1)(a)

Partners argues—without citation to any authority—that more than fifty percent contributory negligence on the plaintiff’s part bars any recovery, not just monetary damages. But the language of the provision does not state contributory negligence shall bar recovery. By its terms it applies “in an action by a claimant to recover damages.” Iowa Code § 668.3(1)(a) (emphasis added). ... Similarly, the goal of injunctive relief is to avoid future harm, not to provide compensation. ... We are not convinced A.D. is barred from equitable relief by its contributory negligence.

Section 668.3 permits the jury to apportion any percentage of comparative fault, and the comparative-fault issue should be submitted when substantial evidence could support finding the plaintiff even one percent at fault.

Tamra Bradley and Scott Bradley v. Timothy Tietz and Carol Tietz · filed 2024-12-04(1)

And comparative fault allows the jury to apportion any percentage of fault between the parties. Iowa Code § 668.3(1)–(3). ... And that video—showing Bradley’s general rate of speed, the weather conditions, the time leading to the crash, and the visibility of Tietz’s truck—contains sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find Bradley negligent and partially at fault for the collision.

Section 668.3(1)(b) bars a plaintiff’s recovery when the plaintiff’s contributory fault is greater in percentage than the combined fault attributable to the defendant.

Kleckner v. United States · filed 2019-07-19(1)(b)

Even if some percentage of fault could be attributed to Mr. Smith for failing to maintain a proper lookout, failure to yield or any of the other specifications of negligence set forth in Plaintiffs’ complaint, I nevertheless conclude that Mr. Kleckner’s own negligence is at least 51% of all fault that may have contributed to the collision. In other words, Mr. Kleckner’s contributory fault is “greater in percentage than the combined percentage of fault attributable to” Defendant. Iowa Code §668.3(1)(b). Therefore, Mr. Kleckner’s contributory fault bars Plaintiffs’ recovery. Id.

Subsection 668.3(2)(b) treats a vicariously liable vehicle owner and the negligent driver as one party for comparative-fault purposes.

Terry K. Jones and Christine Jones v. The Glenwood Golf Corporation · filed 2021-03-12(2)(b)

With respect to Glenwood’s alleged statutory liability under section 321.493 for the damages caused by Jeff’s negligent driving, the driver and owner are considered one party under Iowa Code section 668.3(2)(b).

Section 668.3(2) applies when fault is established and multiple parties are involved in the same claim, requiring allocation of fault among the specified parties; it does not authorize comparing medical-provider fault with the fault of a released original tortfeasor when the claims are separate.

Ellie T. Shimp, Zach Shimp and Kerri Shimp v. Timothy A. Gibbons, M.D., Chad H. Boyer, P.A.-C., Jared A. Knowles, P.A.-C · filed 2025-11-13(2)

Chapter 668 applies when fault is established and when there are multiple parties to the same claim. Iowa Code § 668.3(2); Schwennen v. Abell, 430 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Iowa 1988). That is not the case here.

Section 668.3(1)(a)’s comparative-fault bar applies to negligence claims, but comparative fault is unavailable as a defense to intentional torts such as assault and battery.

Sandra K. Mormann, Individually and as Administrator of The Estate of Augustin G. Mormann, and Daniel J. Mormann, Indivi · filed 2025-11-21(1)(a)

A jury finding that Mormann was more than fifty percent at fault would have barred his recovery for negligence. Iowa Code § 668.3(1)(a) (2021). But the comparative fault defense against torts included in Iowa’s Comparative Fault Act is not available against intentional torts such as assault and battery.

Section 668.3(2)(b) requires fault to be allocated among specified persons and permits the court to treat two or more persons as a single party.

Rhonda Baldwin, as of the Estate of Garrett O. Baldwin v. Central Iowa Hospital Corp., d/b/a Iowa Methodist Medical Cent · filed 2026-05-22(2)(b)

The preemption rule is also consistent with the Iowa Comparative Fault Act. The Iowa Comparative Fault Act requires the trier of fact to determine “[t]he percentage of the total fault allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, [and] person who has been released from liability.” Iowa Code § 668.3(2)(b) (2022). Under the preemption rule, the employer’s vicarious liability already captures the full measure of its employee’s fault; the employer has already acknowledged its liability “for one hundred percent of the damages attributable to the employee’s negligence.” Ferrer, 390 P.3d at 845. Under the Iowa Comparative Fault Act, “[T]he court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a single party.” Iowa Code § 668.3(2)(b). An employer who is vicariously liable for its employee’s negligence is treated as a single unit with the employee for purposes of joint and several liability. Biddle, 518 N.W.2d at 798–99 (explaining that under Iowa’s joint and several liability scheme, the employer and employee are treated as one unit when the employer is vicariously liable). Because the employer and the employee are treated as a single unit, the employer already bears the full percentage of fault allocated to the employee. There is no separate “employer fault” to allocate because the employer’s liability is coextensive with the employee’s. Adding a negligent retention claim does not create a new source of fault to be allocated. It merely introduces a second path to the same liability that the employer has already assumed. “All roads lead to Rome in a case such as this.” Bogdanski, 408 P.3d at 1162.

Section 668.3 requires fault percentages to be attributed only to parties, so an unjoined medical provider cannot receive a comparative-fault allocation.

Lee v. Small · filed 2011-11-22

This is so, because no hospital or medical provider is a “party” to this action within the meaning of Iowa Code § 668.2 to whom fault can be attributed under Iowa Code § 668.3.

Section 668.3(5) requires the court to instruct the jury about the effects of its answers to the submitted interrogatories, including how allocated fault affects the verdict.

Simonson and Roby v. Cutty's Des Moines Camping Club · filed 2020-11-04(5)

Our finding of error is premised on the section 668.3(5) obligation of the court to inform the jury of the effect of its answers on the verdict, including the effect of section 668.3(4).

Section 668.3(1)(6) bars a plaintiff from recovering when the plaintiff’s fault exceeds fifty percent of the total fault.

Todd A. Mulhern, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Elizabeth M. Von Linden v. Catholic Health Initiati · filed 2011-06-24(1)(6)

Significantly for present purposes, the Iowa legislature adopted a modified system of comparative fault under which a plaintiff found over fifty percent at fault was barred from recovery.

Section 668.3(2) does not limit chapter 668 to claims involving the fault of more than one party; the chapter applies when statutory fault is at issue even if only one party is allegedly at fault.

Graber v. City of Ankeny · filed 2000-09-07(2)

We must reject the plaintiffs argument because it is based upon a faulty premise. This court held in Waterloo Savings Bank v. Austin, 494 N.W.2d 715, 717 (Iowa 1998), that the legislature did not intend by the language used in section 668.3(2) to restrict the application of chapter 668 to claims involving the fault of more than one party. We concluded that chapter 668 applied to any suit in which “fault,” as defined by section 668.1, was at issue, regardless of the number of parties allegedly at fault.

Section 668.3 would bar recovery when the claimant’s fault exceeds the defendants’ combined fault, but the court held that it did not govern this case based on its filing date.

Collier v. General Inns Corp. · filed 1988-08-24

Since this case was not filed before July 1, 1984, it is not governed by Iowa Code section 668.3 (1987), which would, in this case, require that plaintiff be barred from recovery, since “the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than the combined percentage of fault attributed to the defend-ants_”

Section 668.3(1) reduces or bars recovery based on a claimant’s share of fault, but its comparative fault defense does not apply to dram shop actions.

Slager v. HWA Corp. · filed 1989-01-25(1)

Under Iowa Code section 668.3(1), recovery is diminished in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the claimant. Recovery, however, is barred if the claimant bears a greater percentage of fault than that attributed to defendants, third-party defendants, and released persons. ... After applying appropriate principles of statutory construction, we conclude the legislature did not intend to afford a comparative fault defense to a dram shop action.

Section 668.3(3) limits percentage-of-fault allocation to parties, so an act of God cannot be assigned a share of fault.

Renze Hybrids, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co. · filed 1988-02-23(3)

The trier of fact under the chapter is only to determine the percentage of fault of each party. Iowa Code § 668.3(3). The legislature did not put acts of God into this statute, and it is not for us to do so.

Section 668.3(1) does not require joint and several liability when a defendant is at least fifty percent at fault or for the fault of a party the claimant did not sue.

Christopherson v. Deere & Co. · filed 1991-08-12(1)

Neither of the sections upon which plaintiffs rely addresses the situation in which one party is assessed with at least fifty percent of the fault, ... nor does either section address the issue of joint and several liability where a party that the plaintiff did not sue is assessed with fault.

Section 668.3(1) does not address joint and several liability when a defendant bears at least fifty percent of the fault or when an unsued party is assigned fault.

Christopherson v. Deere & Co. · filed 1991-10-11(1)

Neither of the sections upon which plaintiffs rely addresses the situation in which one party is assessed with at least fifty percent of the fault, 6 nor does either section address the issue of joint and several liability where a party that the plaintiff did not sue is assessed with fault.

Section 668.3(1)(b) does not bind a spouse seeking loss of consortium damages to a release the spouse did not sign or accept.

Grabill v. Adams County Fair & Racing Ass'n · filed 2003-07-16(1)(b)

While section 668.3(l)(b) may aid defendants in the trial on the merits, it does not serve to subject a loss-or-consortium claimant to the terms of a release that the claimant has not signed or otherwise accepted.