Statute Annotations › Iowa › Iowa Code § 614.1

Iowa Code § 614.1

Limitations of actions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Iowa
Case notes
306
Cited in passing
123
Citing cases indexed
422
Case dates
1966–2026
Screened through
2026-05-29
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-03
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

429 citing cases reviewed: 306 interpreted the section (annotated below), 123 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-05-29 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Iowa Code § 614.1?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1977-06-20 Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC held that state limitation periods do not govern EEOC Title VII enforcement suits, displacing the older two-year wage-period rule for such suits. Source
  • 1983-05-03 Iowa Acts chapter 69 added § 614.1(10), a two-year period measured from sale for claims founded on secured interests in farm products. Source
  • 1985-04-17 Wilson v. Garcia required § 1983 claims to borrow the state's personal-injury period; in Iowa this displaced the earlier use of § 614.1(4)'s five-year catchall in favor of § 614.1(2)'s two-year period. Source
  • 1986-04-21 Iowa Acts chapter 1120 added § 614.1(11)'s fifteen-year repose period for unsafe or defective improvements to real property. Source
  • 1991-05-08 Iowa Acts chapter 130 added § 614.1(12), giving five years for sexual-abuse damages claims against a counselor or therapist. Source
  • 1992-05-04 Iowa Acts chapter 1199 extended subsection (12) to sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist. Source
  • 1993-05-03 Iowa Acts chapter 89 added subsection (13)'s eleven-year period for claims involving cancellation, transfer, redemption, or replacement of public bonds or obligations. Source
  • 1997-05-21 Iowa Acts chapter 175 removed subsection (6)'s twenty-year limit for actions to recover judgments for child support, spousal support, or distribution of marital assets. Source
  • 1997-07-01 Iowa Acts chapter 197 added subsection (2A)'s fifteen-year product repose period, with its stated exceptions and an accrual-preservation rule for already accrued claims. Source
  • 1997-07-01 The same act added subsection (9)(b), allowing certain malpractice actions brought for children under eight until their tenth birthday or the ordinary deadline, whichever is later; its applicability provision also addresses earlier accruals filed after July 1, 1999. Source
  • 2003-05-30 Iowa Acts chapter 180 extended subsection (12)'s five-year sexual-abuse or exploitation period to school employees. Source
  • 2004-05-03 Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. held that 28 U.S.C. § 1658's four-year period governs § 1981 claims made possible by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, displacing Iowa's borrowed two-year period for those claims. Source
  • 2007-04-04 Iowa Acts chapter 40 added subsection (14), removing a time limit for specified county actions to collect delinquent real-property taxes levied on or after April 1, 1992. Source
  • 2007-07-01 Iowa Acts chapter 110 replaced § 670.5's municipal notice and filing scheme with a two-year period from injury, loss, or death, subject to § 614.8, for claims arising on or after this date. Source
  • 2013-05-09 Iowa Acts chapter 95 added § 614.1(5)(b), a five-year period for rent claims instead of subsection (5)'s ordinary ten-year period for written contracts. Source
  • 2017-07-01 Iowa Acts chapter 64 replaced subsection (11)'s generally applicable fifteen-year real-property-improvement repose period with fifteen years for nuclear plants and interstate pipelines, ten for residential construction, and eight for other improvements, plus a fifteen-year intentional-misconduct or fraud period and a one-year discovery extension. The amendment does not apply to improvements existing before July 1, 2017, or covered by a binding agreement then. Source
  • 2021-07-01 Iowa Acts chapter 102 extended subsection (12)'s five-year sexual-abuse or exploitation period to adults providing paid training or instruction to minors outside a school setting. Source

Personal-injury limitations and discovery

Section 614.1(2)'s limitations period for a later-manifested, separate asbestos-related disease does not begin when asbestosis first manifests.

Wilber v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. · filed 1991-10-16(2)

The manifestation of asbestosis does not trigger the running of the statute of limitations on all separate, distinct, and later-manifested diseases which may have stemmed from the same asbestos exposure.
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Section 614.1(2) requires a slander claim to be based on a publication within the two-year limitation period.

Kiner v. Reliance Insurance Co. · filed 1990-11-21(2)

For Kiner’s slander action to be timely under section 614.1(2), it must be based on the August 25 publication because, as already noted, that is the only publication within the two-year limitation period.
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The two-year limitations period begins when the injured person knows enough facts to trigger a duty to investigate, even if the person does not yet know those facts support a legal claim.

Franzen v. Deere and Co. · filed 1985-12-18(2)

In the present case plaintiffs knew on the date of the accident all of the facts they needed to know to be charged with a duty to investigate to determine the existence of a cause of action against defendant. Therefore the action accrued on that date, and the two-year statute of limitations expired before they brought this action.
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Section 614.1(2)’s two-year period begins when a plaintiff knows of an injury and the facts needed to bring a claim; discovery of a more serious injury later does not restart it.

LeBeau v. Dimig · filed 1989-10-18(2)

Because there appear to be no disputed fact issues as to the knowledge of the plaintiff of the necessary elements for bringing her cause of action within the two-year statute of limitations, based on her initial injuries, we believe the discovery rule is inapplicable.
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Section 614.1(2) requires an action for personal injury to be commenced within two years.

Jacobson v. Union Story Trust & Savings Bank · filed 1983-09-21(2)

Iowa Code section 614.1(2) requires that an action based on injury to the person be commenced within two years. Plaintiffs’ suit was commenced on the last day of the two-year period, but it named a decedent as the only defendant.
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Section 614.1(2) sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions that the amendment to the probate claims deadline did not change.

Healy v. Carr · filed 1989-10-24(2)

The district court correctly determined that while the 1985 amendment removed such claims from the limitations imposed in that section, it did not alter the general two-year statute of limitations contained in Iowa Code section 614.1(2).
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Section 614.1(2) applies a two-year limitation to personal-injury claims based on implied warranty or strict liability in tort.

Franzen v. Deere and Co. · filed 1983-06-15(2)

Whether plaintiffs’ implied warranty claims be considered to be based on contract or tort, those claims like that alleging strict liability in tort are “founded on injuries to the person” and subject to the two-year period prescribed by Iowa Code section 614.-1(2).
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Section 614.1(2) gives a plaintiff two years from injury to file a personal injury action.

Altena v. Altena · filed 1988-06-29(2)

Iowa Code section 614.1(2) provides that plaintiff had two years from her injury to file suit.
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Section 614.1 applies a two-year limit to emotional distress claims under subsection (2) and a five-year limit to economic loss claims under subsection (4).

Rodgers v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance · filed 1982-04-16(2), (4)

Utilizing this analysis, the allegations regarding recovery for emotional distress would be considered injuries to the person and, therefore, would fall within the two-year limitation period of section 614.1(2), whereas, the economic loss allegations would be deemed injuries to a property right and, consequently, would be encompassed within the five year limitation period of section of 614.1(4).
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Section 614.1(12) allows five years to bring a sexual-abuse claim against the school employee who committed the abuse; it does not set the deadline for claims against the school district or other employees.

Brent A. Buszka, Teresa M. Buszka, and C.B. v. Iowa City Community School District · filed 2017-02-08(12)

Sections 614.1(12) and 670.5 can be harmonized by concluding that claims against the school district and employees who did not commit sexual abuse must commence within two years of the injury, pursuant to section 670.5, but claims against the employee offender must commence within five years, pursuant to section 614.1(12).
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The two-year limitation for injuries to the person or reputation includes injuries to relative rights only when they are also injuries to the person or reputation; “relative rights” does not expand that limitation.

Barrett v. Burt · filed 1966-03-16Iowa Code § 614.1

It is clear that injuries to relative rights are included in this statutory provision only if they are also injuries to the person or reputation. The phrase “relative rights” does not expand the scope of the statute.
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An action for interference with business relationships is governed by the five-year period in § 614.1(4), as an injury to property or an action not otherwise provided for, rather than the two-year period in § 614.1(2).

Clark v. Figge · filed 1970-11-10Iowa Code § 614.1(2) and § 614.1(4)

All in all, we are persuaded that the case alleged here, interference in business relationships bringing plaintiff and the corporation to their knees, is fundamentally proprietary in character although incidental injuries may have been of a different nature and although defamatory statements may have been employed to accomplish the end. But if the action is not for “injuries to property”, then we think it must surely be one “not otherwise provided for”. In either event the limitation period is five years. We hold the cause of action alleged is not barred.
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The two-year limitations period in Iowa Code § 614.1(2) applies to adults, while the child’s part of a parental-consortium claim is governed by the minors’ limitations provision in § 614.8.

Beeck v. S.R. Smith Co. · filed 1984-12-19(2)

the two-year statute applicable to adults (section 614.1(2)) ... The applicable statute of limitation as to the children’s part of the claim ... should be the statute applicable to minors. That is section 614.8.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(2) is an ordinary statute of limitations that begins running when the cause of action accrues and does not bar the cause of action from arising.

Harris v. Clinton Corn Processing Co. · filed 1985-01-16(2)

In contrast an ordinary statute of limitations like section 614.1(2) starts to run only after the cause of action accrues and never bars it from arising.
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Under Iowa Code § 614.1, subd. 2, the two-year personal-injury limitations period begins when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the injury, its cause, and the allegedly wrongful act—sufficient facts to know of the cause of action.

Foster v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. · filed 1986-03-26Iowa Code § 614.1, subd. 2

the limitation period is triggered when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of “the allegedly wrongful act.” ... The court explained that “actual or imputed knowledge of all the elements of the action” is required.
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Under § 614.1(2), once claimants know facts supporting an actionable claim, the two-year limitations period runs while they discover additional theories of recovery.

Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc. · filed 1987-06-17(2)

We therefore hold that once claimants have knowledge of facts supporting an actionable claim they have no more than the applicable period of limitations to discover all the theories of action they may wish to pursue in support of that claim.
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Under § 614.1(2), Iowa's discovery rule starts the limitations period when a plaintiff knows enough to be put on inquiry notice of a problem and charges the plaintiff with facts a reasonably diligent investigation would reveal.

Kraciun v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. · filed 1990-01-31(2)

The Iowa “discovery” rule imposes an obligation on plaintiffs to investigate once they become sufficiently aware a problem exists, and they are charged with whatever facts such an investigation would have revealed.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(2) requires negligence actions to be brought within two years, but under the discovery rule accrual is delayed until the plaintiff knows or should know of the injury or negligent act.

Grove v. Principal Mutual Life Insurance · filed 1998-03-16(2)

Under Iowa law, an action for negligence must be brought within two years. Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (1997). Generally, under the discovery rule, a cause of action for negligence does not accrue until the existence of a harm has been established and the injured party knows or should know of either the injury or the negligent act.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(2) bars an assault claim based on alleged assaultive behavior occurring in 1994 because the applicable limitations period is two years.

Green v. the Servicemaster Co. · filed 1999-07-21(2)

The two instances of alleged assaultive behavior occurred in 1994 and are therefore time-barred by Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2).
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Iowa Code § 614.1(2) gives personal-injury claims a two-year limitations period, but the discovery rule tolls that period until the injury is discovered or reasonably should have been discovered.

Roycroft v. Hammons · filed 2002-05-17(2)

There is a 2-year statute of limitation imposed upon injuries to persons. Iowa Code § 614.1(2). By statute, Plaintiff had two years from the date of Lange’s death to file his claim. However, the discovery rule tolls the running of the statute until a plaintiff discovers, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury.
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The fifteen-year product-liability repose period begins when the product is first purchased, leased, bailed, or installed for use or consumption, with “for use or consumption” applying to the entire series of triggering events.

Hamilton v. Werner Co. · filed 2003-06-06(2A)(a)

The words “after the product was first purchased, leased, bailed, or installed for use or consumption” describe the events which trigger the running of the repose period. The events are preceded by the temporal modifier “first” and followed by the purpose modifier “for use or consumption.” The use of these modifiers as bookends for transactions or events by which a product is typically acquired by a user or consumer clearly indicates both modifiers are intended to apply to the entire series.
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Section 614.1 measures the limitations period from accrual, which generally occurs when the elements of the cause of action, including the injury, occur rather than when the injury is discovered.

Nixon v. State · filed 2005-09-30

Iowa Code § 614.1 (2003) (“Actions may be brought within the times [specified] after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared .... ”). Thus, it was generally understood from the earliest development of our law that an action accrued at the time the elements of the cause of action occurred.
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Iowa Code section 614.1(2) imposes a two-year limitations period on injury-to-person claims, running here from discovery of the death.

Estate of Butler Ex Rel. Butler v. Maharishi University of Management · filed 2006-11-02(2)

There is a two-year statute of limitation imposed upon injuries to persons. Iowa Code § 614.1(2). By statute, the Estate had two years from the date of the discovery of Levi’s death to file its claims.
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A damages claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for improper extradition is subject to Iowa Code § 614.1(2)’s two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims.

White v. Kautzky · filed 2005-09-08(2)

Such a claim would have been subject to a two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, Iowa Code § 614.1(2).
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Section 614.1(2)’s limitations period is not tolled when the plaintiff knew of the abuse and resulting harm but later learned the wrongful character of the conduct.

Kestel v. Kurzak · filed 2011-07-13(2)

Under those precedents, Kestel’s cause of action accrued at the time he allegedly suffered the abuse because he was immediately “aware of the existence of a problem.”
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Section 614.1(2)’s two-year limitations period ends on the corresponding calendar date and is not extended by an intervening leap day.

Lane v. Spencer Municipal Hospital · filed 2013-06-26(2)

Whether the reference point is days, months, or years, the last day to file the lawsuit was February 28, 2012, as the district court originally concluded, not February 29, 2012.
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Section 614.1(2) supplies the two-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims, and tolling under the Iowa Tort Claims Act does not extend that period.

DeVries v. Driesen · filed 2014-09-10(2)

Iowa law sets the limitations period at two years, and the district court correctly determined that DeVries filed his complaint outside that window.
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Section 614.1(2) provides a two-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, including § 1983 claims.

Turner v. Palmer · filed 2015-02-04(2)

Iowa’s applicable statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two years.
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Section 614.1(2) gives two years for personal-injury claims, but under the discovery rule the period begins when the plaintiff knows or reasonably should know both the injury and its cause.

Thiele v. Givaudan · filed 2021-01-06(2)

The parties agree that Thiele’s claims are subject to Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (imposing a two-year limitation on claims “founded on injuries to the person or reputation . . .”).
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Section 614.1(2) supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Iowa by incorporating the state's personal-injury limitations period.

Parker v. Dubuque City · filed 2021-07-16(2)

In Iowa, § 1983 actions are subject to a two-year statute-of-limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2).
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Section 614.1(2) supplies a two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 personal-injury claims in Iowa.

Nyama v. Rockefeller · filed 2022-02-25(2)

In Iowa, § 1983 actions are subject to a two-year statute-of-limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2). Because Nyama alleges that this incident occurred in 2019, and he did not file this complaint until 2022, the complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 614.1(2) provides a two-year limitations period for Iowa § 1983 actions.

Nyama v. United States of America · filed 2022-02-25(2)

In Iowa, § 1983 actions are subject to a two-year statute-of-limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2). Because Nyama alleges that this incident occurred in 2019, and he did not file this complaint until 2022, the complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 614.1(2) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions, including § 1983 claims.

McGonigle v. Finley Hospital · filed 2022-03-30(2)

Iowa enforces a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Iowa Code § 614.1(2); see also Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying Iowa’s two-year statute of limitations to § 1983 claims).
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Section 614.1(2) gives Iowa § 1983 actions a two-year statute of limitations.

Hardin v. Sperfslage · filed 2022-09-30(2)

In Iowa, § 1983 actions are subject to a two-year statute-of-limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2). ... Thus, to the extent defendants move for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, that motion is denied.
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Section 614.1(2) requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years of the injury, subject to the applicable extension when timely notice is given under section 613A.5.

Clark v. Miller · filed 1993-07-21(2)

Under chapter 614, an action for personal injury must be filed within two years of the date of injury. Iowa Code § 614.1(2).
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Section 614.1(2) requires personal injury claims to be brought within two years after accrual.

Sanchez v. United States · filed 1995-03-10(2)

Iowa’s personal injury statute of limitations, requiring claims to be brought within two years after the action accrues, has been applied to section 1983 actions. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (1993); Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983, 984 (8th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028, 106 S.Ct. 1230, 89 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986). Applying this limitations period to this Bivens action, we find the district court correctly held that Sanchez’s claim is barred because it accrued almost six years before he filed his complaint.
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Section 614.1(2) sets a two year limitations period for personal injury actions.

Sheri Sawyer Madison v. Ibp, Inc., Sheri Sawyer Madison, United States of America, Intervenor Below-Appellee v. Ibp, Inc · filed 2001-07-02(2)

The Iowa limitations period for personal injury actions is two years. See Iowa Code § 614.1(2) (Supp.1999).
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Section 614.1(2) imposes a two-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Williams v. Hawkeye Community College · filed 2007-06-27(2)

Because Iowa Code § 614.1(2) imposes a two-year statue of limitations for personal-injury actions, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Wycoff that, in Iowa, “all [§ 1983] actions [are] governed by a two-year statute of limitations.... ” ... Thus, the remainder of Count IV is outside the ambit of § 1658 and is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.
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Section 614.1(4) imposes a five-year limitations period, with accrual upon actual injury and application of the discovery rule.

Wild v. Bruce A. Willey, Bruce A. Willey, P.C., and Willey, O'Brien, L.C. · filed 2019-03-06(4)

The parties agree the foregoing claims are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(4); Shams v. Hassan, 905 N.W.2d 158, 164 (Iowa 2017) (breach of fiduciary duty); Hallet Constr. Co. v. Meister, 713 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Iowa 2006) (fraudulent misrepresentation). Both claims are subject to the discovery rule for statute-of-limitations purposes. ... No cause of action accrues until the defendant’s act or omission produces actual injury to the plaintiff’s interest. ... The plaintiff must suffer actual loss, not speculative or future harm. ... Here, the actual injury to Wild arose at the time the third party defaulted under the loan arrangement, in June 2008. ... As such, the discovery rule does not apply to toll the statute of limitations.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(2) requires personal injury product liability claims to be brought within two years after accrual, which occurs when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered all elements of the action.

Merfeld v. Bayer Corp. CA1/3 · filed 2024-08-29(2)

In Buechel v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc. (Iowa 2008) 745 N.W.2d 732 (Buechel), the Iowa Supreme Court explained the limitation period for a product liability claim resulting in personal injury is set forth in Iowa Code section 614.1(2), and “such claims must be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.” (Buechel, at p. 736.) ... The undisputed material facts establish under Iowa law that Merfeld was on inquiry notice of her claims — and thus her cause of action accrued — no later than February 2016. (Buechel, supra, 745 N.W.2d at p. 736.)
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Section 614.1(2)’s limitations period begins when a plaintiff knows facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to investigate the injury and its cause.

Estate of Montag Ex Rel. Montag v. T H Agriculture & Nutrition Co. · filed 1993-12-22(2)

Under our cases, the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff first becomes aware of facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to begin seeking information as to the problem and its cause.
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Section 614.1(2) sets a two-year limit for personal injury tort claims, including battery claims.

Claus v. Whyle · filed 1994-12-21(2)

Iowa Code section 614.1(2) provides an action may be brought for “[t]hose founded on injuries to the person or reputation, including injuries to relative rights, whether based on contract or tort, or for a statute penalty, within two years.” ... As Beverly Jo’s accusation of Richard touching her breasts would be a tort, her claim would fall within the scope of these statutes of limitations.
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Section 614.1(2) sets a two-year limitations period for personal injury claims; under the discovery rule, the period begins when the plaintiff knows of the injury and its cause.

Woodroffe v. Hasenclever · filed 1995-11-22(2)

We too conclude from these statements that both the sexual abuse and its relationship to her psychological problems were known to Woodroffe at the time of her consultation with Dr. Hall. The two-year period of limitations for bringing an action founded on injuries to the person, as set by Iowa Code section 614.1(2), thus barred Woo-droffe’s claim on March 20, 1987.
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Section 614.1(2) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury action; claims against defendants added after that period are barred unless the amendment relates back.

Alvarez v. Meadow Lane Mall Ltd. Partnership · filed 1997-03-26(2)

Iowa Code section 614.1(2) (1995) provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Because Alvarez claims to have been injured April 10, 1993, two years expired April 10, 1995, well before the petition was amended on August 29, 1995. Her action against the defendants who were added by the amendment was hence barred under section 614.1(2) unless it related back to an earlier date under Iowa rule of civil procedure 89.
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Section 614.1(2) requires actions for personal injuries to be brought within two years.

Thompson v. Estate of Herron · filed 2000-07-06(2)

We agree with the district court that, in any event, Thompson’s refiled claim was barred by Iowa Code section 614.1(2), which provides that actions for injuries to the person must be brought within and not after two years.
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Section 614.1(2) gives two years to bring an abuse of process claim, measured from the last alleged abusive act rather than the end of the underlying proceeding.

Penn v. Iowa State Board of Regents · filed 1998-03-25(2)

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 614.1(2) (1991), the statute of limitations for these causes of actions is two years. ... Contrary to Penn’s contentions, his claim for abuse of process commenced from the date Cole committed her last alleged act constituting abuse of process, not the date the petition for judicial review was dismissed.
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Section 614.1(2)’s two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff has facts sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice of a potential problem, even without knowing the specific defect.

Buechel v. Five Star Quality Care, Inc. · filed 2008-03-07(2)

The plaintiffs were on inquiry notice on January 21, 2001. On that date, the plaintiffs’ action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run.
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Section 614.1(2)’s two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff is on inquiry notice of a potential claim, even if the plaintiff does not yet know the nature of the defect.

Bernard Buechel, Individually And As Coexecutor Of The Estate Of Juanita Buechel, Angela Pauly, Individually And As Coexecutor Of The Estate Of Juanita Buechel, Daniel Buechel, Monica Hagen, Mary Rose, Teresa Smith, And Joanne Mallicoat Vs. Five Star Quality Care, Inc. D/b/a Prairie Ridge Care & Rehabilitation Fsq, Inc. Shopco-ia, Llc Five Star Quality Care-ia, Llc Snh · filed 2008-03-07(2)

Under the teaching of Franzen, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claim against Sunrise is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs were on inquiry notice on January 21, 2001. On that date, the plaintiffs’ action accrued and the statute of limitations began to run.
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Section 614.1(2)’s two-year limit for personal-injury actions applies to claims against an estate regardless of the claimant’s status in the estate proceeding.

O'Brien v. Estate of Ripley · filed 2023-05-24(2)

O’Brien’s status as it relates to the estate proceeding has no effect on whether the matter was barred by the general statute of limitations. ... We accordingly affirm the district court’s unchallenged determination that O’Brien’s action against the estate is time-barred under section 614.1(2).
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Section 614.1(2)’s two-year limitation period applies to an aiding-and-abetting-breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim founded on alleged defamation.

Wollesen v. Wixted, Inc. · filed 2023-11-21(2)

Because the Wollesens’ aiding-and-abetting-breach-of-fiduciary-duty argument rests on the alleged attack on their reputation, we agree with the district court that it is subject to the two-year limitation period in section 614.1(2).
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Section 614.1(2) gives two years to bring a defamation claim; even if the discovery rule applies, the period can run from inquiry notice rather than actual notice.

Betz v. Rebecca Mathisen, Eric Muller, Kelly Rasmuson and Michael Wilson · filed 2026-01-09(2)

The statute of limitations for defamation claims is two years. ... Like the district court and the court of appeals dissent, we conclude that Betz’s defamation claims against the defendants are barred even under a discovery rule. ... Even if we were to apply the discovery rule, Betz knew enough to be on inquiry notice of these defamation claims more than two years before she filed her petition.
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Medical-malpractice limitations

Section 614.1(9) bars a malpractice claim six years after the act or omission giving rise to it, even if the claimant discovers the alleged negligence later.

Lawse v. University of Iowa Hospitals · filed 1988-11-29(9)

Plaintiff’s claim, however, is barred under the six-year limitation in the statute. The removal of the kidney and the giving of the consent were the act, omission or occurrence giving rise to the claim. The statute is clear claims are barred six years from this time.
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Section 614.1(9)'s time limit for medical malpractice actions is extended for a minor until one year after the minor reaches the age of majority.

Kohrt Ex Rel. Kohrt v. Yetter · filed 1984-02-15(9)

We hold that the time for bringing an action of the type referred to in Iowa Code section 614.1(9) is extended in favor of a minor for one year after the minor reaches the age of majority.
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Law changed since The Supreme Court held in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC (June 20, 1977) that EEOC Title VII enforcement suits do not borrow state limitation periods; this two-year wage-period rule no longer governs those suits.

Iowa Code § 614.1(8) supplies a two-year limitation period for Title VII back-pay claims, running for each aggrieved person from the last discriminatory act from which recovery is sought.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eagle Iron Works · filed 1973-12-06(8)

In the instant case the applicable limitation period is two years. Iowa Code § 614.1(8). Such period begins to run as to each aggrieved person as of the date of the last discriminatory act committed against such person by the defendant - from which recovery is sought.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(2) provides the two-year personal-injury limitations period governing § 1983 claims accruing in Iowa.

Wycoff v. James Menke, Official of the Iowa State Penitentiary · filed 1985-09-25(2)

In Iowa, this means that all such actions will be governed by a two-year statute of limitations, Iowa Code § 614.1(2).
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Law changed since Iowa Acts chapter 110 (effective July 1, 2007) made § 670.5’s own two-year period govern municipal tort claims arising on or after that date, replacing the former reliance on chapter 614 for those claims.

Iowa Code § 614.1(2) gives adults two years to file lawsuits against private tort-feasors, and chapter 614 supplies the limitations period for chapter 613A actions.

Miller v. Boone County Hospital · filed 1986-10-15(2)

Iowa Code § 614.1(2) allows adults two years to file lawsuits against private tort-feasors.
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For a § 1983 constitutional-injury claim, Iowa Code § 614.1(2) supplies a two-year limitations period, so the claim is time-barred if filed more than two years after accrual unless tolling applies.

DePugh v. Smith · filed 1995-03-22(2)

Thus, in this § 1983 action alleging violation of constitutional rights, this court must apply the personal injury statute of the state of Iowa. The applicable statute of limitations is Iowa Code § 614.1(2). ... Thus, DePugh’s claim will be time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, unless the running of that statute was tolled, if his action was brought more than two-years after his cause of action accrued.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(2) imposes a two-year limitations period on claims based on injuries to the person, and application of that period turns on when the injuries and their possible connection to the product were or should have been discovered.

Waitek v. Dalkon Shield Trust · filed 1995-12-08(2)

It is undisputed that the two-year limitation provided in Iowa Code section 614.1(2) applies to all of the Waiteks’ claims because all are based on injuries to the person. ... the court concludes that the Waiteks have generated a genuine issue of material fact as to when Priscilla knew or should have known about her injuries and their possible connection to the Daikon Shield IUD.
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Under Iowa Code § 614.1(2), the two-year limitations period begins when the plaintiff discovers the injury or is on inquiry notice of facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to investigate the problem and its cause, even without suspecting a particular defendant's negligence.

The Estate of John Doe, by and Through Its Legal Representative, Jane Doe v. American Association of Blood Banks America · filed 1996-03-13(2)

Under the concept of inquiry notice, the statute of limitations begins to run " 'when a plaintiff first becomes aware of facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to begin seeking information [about] the problem and its cause.' "
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Section 614.1(8) gives wage claims a two-year limitations period that begins separately when each periodic payment becomes due.

Gabelmann v. NFO, INC. · filed 1997-11-26(8)

The two-year statute of limitations for wages commences as each payment comes due.
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Law changed since Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (May 3, 2004) applies the federal four-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 to § 1981 claims made possible by the 1991 Civil Rights Act; Iowa’s two-year period still applies to claims available before that Act.

Under Iowa Code § 614.1(2), the two-year personal-injury limitations period applies to § 1981 claims, limiting recovery to illegal acts occurring within two years before the federal complaint.

Madison v. IBP, Ind. · filed 2001-06-25(2)

Iowa two year statute therefore applies to Madison's § 1981 claims.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(9)'s medical-malpractice limitations period remains subject to the fraudulent-concealment exception and does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the basis for the cause of action.

Koppes v. Pearson · filed 1986-03-19(9)

If fraudulent concealment is established, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care should discover, the basis for the cause of action.
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For medical malpractice, the two-year limitations period runs from when the claimant discovers, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, meaning the cause of action for negligence rather than merely the physical condition.

Elizabeth A. Vacura and Raymond Vacura v. Plott · filed 1981-12-16(9)

Under the circumstances, we cannot hold as a matter of law that plaintiffs had reason to infer malpractice on the part of Dr. Plott prior to six to nine months after she had seen Dr. Neel on May 12, 1976.
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The actual nature of a legal malpractice action, determined by the right sued upon rather than the relief sought, places an action arising from an unwritten attorney-services agreement and property loss under the five-year limitation in § 614.1(4), not the two-year limitation in § 614.1(2).

Venard v. Winter · filed 1994-11-23(2), (4)

The actual nature of the action determines the proper statute of limitations. This •determination turns on the nature of the right sued upon and not on the elements of relief sought for the claim.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(9) applies only to claims arising out of patient care; willful tortious conduct outside patient care is not governed by the statute, while a medical-negligence claim remains subject to it.

Doe v. Cherwitz · filed 1995-08-28(9)

Section 614.1(9) is, by its terms, limited to claims “arising out of patient care.”
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Iowa Code § 614.1(9)'s medical-malpractice limitations period covers all claims for personal injuries arising out of patient care, regardless of the theory of liability.

Frideres v. Schiltz · filed 1995-11-22(9)

We agree with Simpson that Iowa Code section 614.1(9) — the malpractice statute of limitations — applies to all of the claims the Langners assert against him and the hospital. The italicized language makes clear that all injuries arising out of patient care are covered by the statute.
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Under § 614.1(9), fraudulent concealment can avoid the malpractice time bar only when the concealment is independent of the acts establishing liability and occurs after the alleged negligence.

Van Overbeke v. Youberg · filed 1995-11-22(9)

Despite this “special relationship,” which calls for a reduced level of proof of fraudulent concealment in certain cases, the acts of concealment must nevertheless be independent of the alleged acts relied on to establish liability.
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Under Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a), the continuous-treatment doctrine does not toll the limitations period once the plaintiff is on inquiry notice of the injury.

Ratcliff v. Graether · filed 2005-05-13(9)(a)

We need not decide whether we should reject the continuous treatment doctrine outright in all circumstances. However, we do think the doctrine does not apply when the plaintiff, as here, is on inquiry notice, a concept that underlies the discovery rule that is now part of Iowa Code section 614.1(9)(a).
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Under Iowa Code section 614.1(9), the medical-malpractice period begins when the patient knows of the physical harm, even without knowing that the physician’s conduct was wrongful.

Schlote v. Dawson · filed 2004-01-22(9)

The statute of limitations began to run on that date because Schlote knew at the time that the surgery would result in removal of his voice box.
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Section 614.1(9) does not alter the showing required for fraudulent concealment, and subsection (6) governs minors’ loss-of-consortium medical-malpractice claims.

Christy v. Miulli · filed 2005-02-18(9)(a), (9)(6)

The same reasoning leads us also to conclude that section 614.1(9) does not affect the showing required to successfully rely on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. ... In conclusion, we hold section 614.1(9)(6) applies to the loss-of-consortium claims filed by Christy on behalf of the decedent’s minor children.
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For medical-malpractice claims, Iowa Code section 614.1(9) begins its limitations period when the plaintiff actually or constructively knows both the injury and its factual cause, with enough facts to alert a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate.

Rathje v. Mercy Hospital · filed 2008-02-22(9)

We think it is clear our legislature intended the medical malpractice statute of limitations to commence upon actual or imputed knowledge of both the injury and its cause in fact. Moreover, it is equally clear this twin-faceted triggering event must at least be identified by sufficient facts to put a reasonably diligent plaintiff on notice to investigate.
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In a negligent-misdiagnosis case involving a condition that is not immediately diagnosed, the injury under section 614.1(9) occurs when the condition develops into a more serious condition posing greater danger or requiring more extensive treatment, rather than when an undiagnosed condition merely continues.

Murtha v. Cahalan · filed 2008-02-22(9)

In a case involving a condition that is not immediately diagnosed, such as Murtha’s, the “injury” does not occur merely upon the existence of a continuing undiagnosed condition. Rather, the “injury” for section 614.1(9) purposes occurs when “the problem [grows] into a more serious condition which poses greater danger to the patient or which requires more extensive treatment.”
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Section 614.1(9) starts the medical-malpractice limitations period when the claimant knew, or through reasonable diligence should have known, both the injury and its cause; it does not impose inquiry notice at the beginning of an investigation.

Rock v. Warhank · filed 2008-11-21(9)

Common law notions of inquiry notice should not be incorporated into the statute.
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Section 614.1(9)’s medical-malpractice limitations period begins when the claimant knows, or through reasonable diligence should know, both the injury and its factual cause.

Pamela G. Rock And Keith A. Rock Vs. Rose Warhank, Blue Grass Family Medical Center A/k/a Family Medical Center Of Blue · filed 2008-11-21(9)

Under the statute, the clock begins ticking when the claimant has actual knowledge of her injury and its cause or “through the use of reasonable diligence should have known” of the injury and its cause.
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Section 614.1(9) starts the two-year medical-malpractice limitations period when the plaintiff has actual or imputed knowledge of the injury and its cause in fact; the plaintiff need not know that the physician was negligent, and an injury is more than a persistent undiagnosed condition when the condition becomes more serious, riskier, or requires more extensive treatment.

Meta Crow v. Sarvenaz Jabbari, M.D. · filed 2020-07-22(9)

The triggering event for the limitations period is the date when the plaintiff has actual or imputed knowledge of both her injury and its cause in fact. ... The patient’s injury—for purposes of section 614.1(9)—occurs when the condition grows more serious and poses more risk or requires more extensive treatment. ... But Crow did not have to know that Dr. Jabbari’s conduct was allegedly negligent or wrongful for the two-year limitations period to commence. ... That knowledge warranted an investigation and served as the starting date for the statute of limitations.
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Section 614.1(9) imposes a two-year limitations period on personal-injury claims against a physician arising out of patient care, measured from when the claimant knew or should have known of the injury.

Kostoglanis v. Leroy L. Yates and Diamond Medical Spa & Vein, P.C. · filed 2021-03-12(9)

To “arise out of” patient care means the injuries and causes of action originate in, stem from, or result from patient care. ... Kostoglanis’s claims are thus subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Iowa Code section 614.1(9) and are untimely.
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Section 614.1(9) limits medical malpractice actions to two years after discovery and absolutely bars them after six years, except when an unintentionally retained foreign object caused the injury or death.

Fitz v. Howard P. Dolyak, D.O. · filed 1983-06-19(9)

Although one state supreme court has held to the contrary in its analysis of a similar statute, see Carson v. Maurer, 120 R.I. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980), we find that a distinction between foreign object cases and other malpractice cases could rationally be found to further this legislative purpose. In contrast to the propriety of a diagnosis or adequacy of treatment, the presence or absence of foreign objects inadvertently left in the body may be easily verified after the passage of time. That the distinction drawn by the legislature is not sufficiently broad or that a classification operates harshly in a particular case is not grounds for a finding that it is unconstitutional. See Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). We are unpersuaded by the reasoning of Carson and decline to follow it.
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Section 614.1(4) provides a five-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Iowa when no other limitations statute specifically applies.

Smith v. Updegraff · filed 1984-10-01(4)

After the district court’s ruling, however, this court held that the proper period of limitations for section 1983 actions in Iowa is the five-year period prescribed by Iowa Code § 614.1(4), which governs actions not specifically covered by other statutes of limitations.
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Section 614.1(9)’s two-year medical malpractice limit is not tolled by continuous treatment without an ongoing treatment relationship or by fraudulent concealment when the patient’s symptoms put her on notice of the injury.

McClendon v. Beck · filed 1997-09-17(9)

The question is whether this medical malpractice action is barred by the two-year limit of Iowa Code section 614.1(9) (1995), or whether the record made on summary judgment reveals disputed material facts bearing on fraudulent concealment or the continuous treatment doctrine. Like the district court, we find no facts in the record that would support a tolling of the limitation period.
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Section 614.1(9) governs when a medical malpractice claim is lost through the passage of time, not when the claim becomes property of a bankruptcy estate.

Lobberecht v. Chendrasekhar · filed 2008-02-01(9)

The statute of limitations under section 614.1(9) determines when a cause of action is lost by passage of time. However, for bankruptcy purposes, the question is not when the cause of action was lost, but when it was acquired.
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Section 614.1(9)’s foreign-object exception to the six-year medical malpractice statute of repose applies only when an object is unintentionally left in the patient’s body.

Fisher v. McCrary-Rost Clinic, P.C. and Yotin Keonin · filed 1998-07-01(9)

The language of the foreign-object exception to section 614.1(9) is narrowly limited to situations in which some object is unintentionally left in the body. Because that did not occur in the tubal ligation procedure of which plaintiff complains, the exception to the six-year statute of repose does not apply.
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Section 614.1(9)(a)’s two-year period for medical malpractice claims begins when the claimant knows or should know of the injury and its connection to medical care.

Zediana v. Abdolhossein E. Ahari, M.D. and Mason City Clinic, P.C. · filed 2021-02-03(9)(a)

By the time of his July 2016 hospitalization and by the time of his final appointment with Dr. Ahari on August 24, 2016, Zediana knew enough to tie the leak to his earlier cancer- removal surgery.
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Wrongful-death medical-malpractice accrual

Section 614.1(9)(a)'s two-year limitations period for a healthcare wrongful-death claim involving a missing person with no discrete physical injury begins when death is judicially determined.

Kindle Schneider, as temporary administrator for the Estate of Cynthia Miles, decendant v. Tarrah Holliday, ARNP; Amy Phillips, LISW; Zion Integrated Behavioral Health Services, Inc.; an Iowa non-profit corporation d/b/a Harbor Point CSRS and d/b/a Southwest Iowa Mental Health Center · filed 2026-05-22(9)(a)

The puzzle is solved, though, if we hold that—in cases where there is no discrete physical injury and it is unknown whether the person who disappeared is alive or dead—the limitations hourglass does not turn until the judicial determination of death.
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For a wrongful-death claim arising from medical malpractice, the two-year period begins when the injury and its negligent cause were known during the patient's lifetime; the patient's later death does not reset the limitations period.

Estate of Jill Cataldo by Zachary Mead, individually and as special administrator v. RCHP-Ottumwa, LLC, Matthew Jay Bree · filed 2026-02-27(9)(a)

When the injury and its negligent cause are known during the patient’s lifetime, the clock begins to run on any wrongful-death claim that results from the injury. Although the later death of the patient alters the nature of the damages available and transfers the claim to the estate representative, it does not reset the statute of limitations. ... The two-year limitations period thus expired on February 5, 2023. The estate filed its petition on February 17, 2023. As a result, and as the district court correctly held, the action is time-barred under § 614.1(9)(a).
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Section 614.1(9) requires a medical malpractice wrongful death action to be brought within two years after the claimant knew of the death, regardless of when the claimant learned it was allegedly wrongful.

Schultze v. Landmark Hotel Corp. · filed 1990-11-21(9)

This language plainly communicates that malpractice actions for wrongful death must be brought within two years after the claimant knew of the death.
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In a cancer misdiagnosis case, section 614.1(9)’s limitations period cannot begin before the patient is properly diagnosed with cancer.

Wilkins v. Marshalltown Medical & Surgical Center · filed 2008-12-05(9)

In Rock, we held that in a medical misdiagnosis case involving cancer, the earliest possible triggering date for the statute of limitations under Iowa Code section 614.1(9) is when the patient is properly diagnosed with cancer. ... In this case, Wilkins was not informed that he had cancer until sometime after August 14, 2002. That date is well within two years of the commencement of the present action.
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Contracts, property, fraud, and other actions

Section 614.1(4) gives a remainder person five years from the occurrence of waste to bring an action for injury to property when the remainder person can sue at that time.

Bennett v. Johnson · filed 1992-03-24(4)

Because statutorily claimants were authorized to sue when waste occurred, the statute began to run immediately on the accrual of the action. Iowa Code section 614.1(4) provides an action for injury to property must be brought within five years.
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Section 614.1(5)'s ten-year period governs a claim for promised insurance coverage when the insured had an existing written policy and took reasonable steps to obtain a new one, provided the insurer waived its separate twelve-month defense.

Stockton v. Shelter General Insurance Co. · filed 1991-09-24(5)

The trial court, however, determined the governing statute must be Iowa Code section 614.1(5), which allows ten years to bring action on a written contract. The Stocktons had an existing written contract with the defendant and had taken reasonable steps to obtain one for their new property. Furthermore, it would be unfair to allow MFA to take advantage of the fact that Shaughnessy died before creating written documentation. ... We agree that section 614.1(5) is controlling, provided Shelter’s affirmative defense of section 515.138 was indeed waived.
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Section 614.1(4) provides a five-year limitations period for an inverse condemnation claim based on a regulatory taking.

Scott v. City of Sioux City · filed 1988-11-23(4)

We believe the most appropriate period of limitation for the type of injury sustained in the present case is the five-year period provided in Iowa Code section 614.-1(4) governing actions brought for injuries to property ... and all other actions not otherwise provided for in this respect ....
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Under section 614.1(4), a legal malpractice claim arising from litigation accrues when the alleged negligence becomes irreversible; an appeal may postpone that point.

Neylan v. Moser · filed 1987-02-18(4)

Other courts, however, have stated that the date of injury “coincides with the last possible date when the attorney’s negligence becomes irreversible.” ... We adopt the latter approach, for it comports with our view that a client has a “right to rely upon the superior skill and knowledge of his attorney.”
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Section 614.1(4) bars an implied warranty action filed more than five years after delivery when the discovery rule does not apply.

City of Carlisle v. Fetzer · filed 1986-02-19(4)

In its brief filed in district court, and here, plaintiff concedes the Iowa Code section 614.1(4) five-year statute of limitations applies to its action for breach of implied warranties and its petition was filed more than five years after tender of delivery of the sweeper. ... It is plain from these authorities the discovery rule did not apply in this case, and plaintiff’s action was barred by the five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 614.1(4) sets a five-year limitations period for fraudulent-transfer actions; whether that period has run may depend on when the transfer was discovered under section 614.4.

INNK Land and Cattle Co. v. Kenkel · filed 1992-12-23(4)

Iowa Code section 614.1(4) provides that actions ... [must be commenced], within five years.... ... For summary judgment purposes, there is clearly a fact issue as to when INNK Land “knew” of the fraudulent transfer for purposes of applying section 614.4. We reverse and remand for trial.
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Section 614.1(4) requires an action for injury to property to be brought within five years after the cause accrues; filing a petition does not toll the period when the plaintiff fails to serve process promptly or show good cause for the delay.

Becker v. Star Auto, Inc. · filed 1985-09-24(4)

Iowa Code section 614.1(4) (1985) provides that an action for injury to property must be brought within five years after its cause accrues. ... We conclude that under these circumstances the filing of the petition was not enough to toll the statute of limitations.
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Section 614.1(4) provides a five-year limitations period; a defendant claiming that the period bars some damages must prove which damages arose before it.

Hora v. Hora · filed 2023-02-08(4)

In short, the court limited the evidence to claims based on conduct that arose on or after August 18, 2012, based on the five-year statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(4). ... We affirm the district court. ... Kurt admitted at trial that he took at least 30,000 bushels in 2015, and he failed to prove that any portion of the ... misappropriated corn was taken before August 2012. Under these circumstances, we find that all damages related to misappropriated corn are recoverable by the plaintiffs, and we direct the district court to abide by this ruling when evaluating damages consistent with the balance of this opinion.
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Section 614.1(5)(a) requires actions on written contracts to be brought within ten years.

In re Estate of Franken · filed 2020-06-12(5)(a)

Finally, the estate argues the statute of limitations in Code section 614.1(5) bars the Rottinghauses’ damages action. That provision provides, as relevant here, that actions on written contracts must be brought within ten years. ... That action clearly falls within the statute of limitations.
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Subsection (4) imposes a five-year limitations period on actions for property injuries, fraud-based equitable relief, and other actions not otherwise provided for, including claims for financial loss caused by fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.

Sedco International, S. A. v. Cory · filed 1981-08-21(4)

The Iowa limitations period on actions “for injuries to property, or for relief on the ground of fraud in cases heretofore solely cognizable in a court of chancery, and all other actions, not otherwise provided for in this respect,” is five years. Iowa Code § 614.1(4) (1977). This provision applies to actions for financial loss from fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(4) provides a five-year limitations period for fraud-based relief in cases formerly cognizable only in chancery, and the period reaches back five years for the court's review of the debtors' property dispositions.

In Re Krantz · filed 1989-02-21(4)

The pertinent statute of limitations is found in Iowa Code § 614.1(4) (1987), which states that actions “for relief on the ground of fraud in cases heretofore solely cognizable in a court of chancery [may be brought] within five years.” Thus, Iowa law, which this Court must rely on in determining the allowability of the claimed exemptions, allows a reach back period of five years.
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Under § 614.1(5), an action qualifies as founded on a written contract only when the writing or writings chargeable to one party show that party's obligation to the other, or facts from which the law will infer an obligation; otherwise the five-year limitation in § 614.1(4) applies.

Matherly v. Hanson · filed 1984-12-19(5), with § 614.1(4) applying otherwise

We hold only that where no writing (or series of writings) chargeable to one party shows the existence of an obligation to another party (or facts from which the law will infer an obligation), any action urging an obligation between the parties is subject to the statute of limitations for actions founded on unwritten contracts.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(5) provides a five-year statute of limitations for claims on unwritten contracts.

Dolezal v. City of Cedar Rapids · filed 1982-11-24(5)

The claim is therefore subject to the five-year statute of limitations on unwritten contracts.
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Section 614.1(5) requires a ten-year limitations period for an action to recover real property, and the court applied that period to conclude the State's adverse-possession claim had ripened.

C.H. Moore Trust Estate Ex Rel. Warner v. City of Storm Lake · filed 1988-05-11614.1(5)

Because this date was well beyond the ten years required by section 614.1(5), we agree with the district court that there was no genuine issue of fact as to the passage of the requisite ten-year period.
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For a fiduciary-duty claim, § 614.1(4) provides a five-year limitations period, and the court held the claim untimely because Kendall had inquiry notice of the breach in March 1977.

Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co. v. Rowe · filed 1988-05-11(4)

The limitation period for this type of action is five years.
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For a fraud action governed by § 614.1(4), the five-year limitations period generally begins when the fraud is consummated, but fraudulent concealment postpones accrual if the defendant affirmatively concealed the cause of action and the plaintiff exercised due diligence.

Woods v. Schmitt · filed 1989-05-19§ 614.1(4)

The general rule is that a cause of action for fraud accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when the fraud is consummated.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(5)'s ten-year contract limitations period does not prevent an insurance policy from imposing a shorter reasonable period, and the policy's two-year limit is enforceable.

Douglass v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1993-11-24(5)

Under general contract law, it is clear that the parties may agree to a modification of statutory time limitations. ... We conclude that the two-year limitation provided by the policy was valid and enforceable.
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For recurring property injuries from a continuous or repeated wrongful act, § 614.1(4)'s five-year limitations period runs separately from each injury's accrual, limiting recovery to damages occurring within five years before suit.

Hegg v. Hawkeye Tri-County REC · filed 1994-02-23614.1(4)

We agree that where the wrongful act is continuous or repeated, so that separate and successive actions for damages arise, the statute of limitations runs as to these latter actions at the date of their accrual, not from the date of the first wrong in the series.
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A bad-faith nonpayment claim is an “other action” under § 614.1(4), so the five-year limitation period applies rather than § 614.1(2)’s two-year period.

Brown v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 1994-03-23(4)

Thus in answer to the second certified question, we hold that the five-year limitation period of section 614.1(4) applies to actions based on the bad-faith nonpayment of workers’ compensation benefits.
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Iowa Code § 614.1(4) provides a five-year limitations period for claims alleging tortious interference with a contract.

Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co. · filed 1999-06-03(4)

The applicable period of limitations for claims for tortious interference with a contract under Iowa law is five years.
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Iowa Code section 614.1(2A)(a) bars all product-defect claims, including pre-sale, point-of-sale, and post-sale negligence claims, when brought more than fifteen years after the product was purchased.

Merner v. Deere & Co. · filed 2001-12-18(2A)(a)

The plain language of the statute makes it clear that Iowa’s statute of repose applies to all actions based on product defects. The statute makes no distinction between those based on pre-sale negligence, negligence at the point of the sale, and post-sale negligence.
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Iowa Code section 614.1(4) bars Fibred’s negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims under its applicable five-year statute of limitations.

Fibred Properties Ltd. Partnership v. City of Iowa Falls · filed 2002-06-14(4)

With respect to Fibred's claims against Fox, we agree with the district court's analysis and conclusion that those claims are barred by the applicable five-year statute of limitations. See Iowa Code § 614.1(4); see also McCracken v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 445 N.W.2d 375, 383 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (statute of limitations for negligent misrepresentation is five years).
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Iowa Code section 614.1(2A)(a)'s fifteen-year product-liability statute of repose is not extended for minors by section 614.8(2).

Albrecht v. General Motors Corp. · filed 2002-07-17(2A)(a)

In summary, we hold section 614.8(2) does not extend the statute of repose found in section 614.1(2A)(a).
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Iowa Code section 614.1(5) provides a ten-year statute of limitations for causes of action based on written contracts.

Furleigh v. Allied Group Inc. · filed 2003-09-08(5)

The general Iowa statute of limitations for causes of action based on written contracts is ten years. Iowa Code § 614.1(5) (2003).
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Iowa Code section 614.1(5)’s ten-year limitations period governed the written-contract action, so the claim was not time-barred.

Weitz Co. v. Travelers Casualty Surety Co. of America · filed 2003-06-02(5)

Believing that maintenance of this case does serve a substantial interest of Iowa, Iowa’s ten-year statute of limitations governs this case.
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Iowa Code section 614.1(5) supplies a ten-year limitations period for written-contract claims, although parties may agree to a shorter reasonable period.

Davidson v. Wal-Mart Associates Health and Welfare Plan · filed 2004-02-20(5)

In Iowa the general statute of limitations period for written contracts (as ERISA plans are considered for limitations purposes) is ten years; but Iowa law does allow for shorter periods through private contractual agreements.
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Iowa’s limitations periods begin when the claimant has inquiry notice of facts that would prompt a reasonable investigation, even without knowing the defect’s exact nature.

John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. John Q. Hammons Hotels L.P. v. Acorn Window Systems Inc. Nabholz Construction Corporation · filed 2005-01-07(4), (5)

Knowledge of the exact nature of a problem is not required in order for the statute of limitations to commence.
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For an inverse-condemnation claim based on intermittent but inevitably recurring flooding caused by a government project, section 614.1(4) requires the action to be filed within five years after the property owner discovers the injury and its cause.

K & W ELEC., INC. v. State · filed 2006-04-07(4)

When a property owner seeks recovery for the diminution in value of its property resulting from intermittent but inevitably recurring flooding caused by a government project, the landowner must file its action for inverse condemnation within five years of the date upon which it discovers the injury to its land and the cause of the injury.
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The five-year period in § 614.1(4) governs fraud, unwritten-contract, and otherwise-unprovided claims, while the ten-year period in § 614.1(5) governs claims whose purpose is recovery of real property, even when fraud is part of the proof.

Hallett Construction Co. v. Meister · filed 2006-05-05(4) and (5)

We think the actual nature of this claim is one of fraud and not of breach of a written contract. ... Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations is the five-year period for fraud actions contained in Iowa Code section 614.1(4). ... Looking to the nature of the claim asserted in count I, we think the ten-year statute of limitations “for the recovery of real property” applies.
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The court held that Iowa Code § 614.1(2)’s two-year limitations period did not bar the plaintiff’s fraudulent-concealment and civil-conspiracy claims because the amended claims related back to the original petition.

Remmes v. International Flavors & Fragrances, Inc. · filed 2006-09-26(2)

Consequently, the two year statute of limitations found in Iowa Code Iowa Code § 614.1(2) presents no bar to plaintiff Remmes’s assertion of his fraudulent concealment and civil conspiracy claims in this lawsuit.
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Iowa Code section 614.1(4)'s default five-year limitation does not bar a county treasurer's action to collect delinquent property taxes because the common-law nullum tempus doctrine makes the county immune from that limitation when collecting taxes for the public school system.

Bill Fennelly, Scott County Treasurer Vs. A-1 Machine & Tool Co. · filed 2006-10-06(4)

In summary, we conclude that the district court erred in refusing to apply the common-law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi and in holding the statute of limitations ran against the Treasurer in this tax-collection action.
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Law changed since Iowa Acts chapter 64 (effective July 1, 2017) keeps the fifteen-year period for preexisting or previously contracted improvements and for new nuclear plants or interstate pipelines, but sets ten years for new residential construction and eight years for other new improvements, with statutory exceptions.

Section 614.1(11) is a fifteen-year statute of repose for implied-warranty claims concerning unsafe or defective improvements to real property, running from completion of construction and barring claims after that period regardless of ownership.

Robert M. Speight And Beverly E. Speight Vs. Walters Development Company, Ltd. · filed 2008-02-01(11)

Section 614.1(11) applies to an action for breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction in the purchase of a building. ... Pursuant to section 614.1(11), the period of repose begins to run on the date of the act or omission causing the injury. In cases involving the construction of a building, such as this home, that period begins upon completion of the construction of the building. ... As a result, builder-vendors are not liable on an implied-warranty claim after the statute of repose has run, regardless of who owns the home.
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Iowa Code section 614.1(4) gives common-law unfair-competition claims a five-year limitations period.

Bendzak v. Midland National Life Insurance · filed 2006-07-27(4)

Under Iowa law, a common law claim for unfair competition is subject to a five-year statute of limitations.
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Section 614.1(4)’s default five-year limitations period normally applies to actions not otherwise given a special period, but the nullum tempus doctrine can exempt governmental tax-collection actions involving a public activity.

Fennelly v. A-1 MacHine & Tool Co. · filed 2006-10-06(4)

Without a special limitation period provided by a statute, the “default” five-year statute of limitations found in section 614.1(4) normally applies.
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The contribution exception in section 614.1(2A)(a) lets a contribution claim accrue during the products-liability repose period, but common liability remains necessary for a viable contribution claim.

Estate of Ryan Ex Rel. Ryan v. Heritage Trails Associates, Inc. · filed 2008-03-07(2A)(a)

The repose period does not prevent a contribution claim from accruing.
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Section 614.1(4) gives five years for unwritten-contract, property-injury, fraud, and other unprovided-for actions, running after accrual; Iowa’s discovery rule may create a fact issue about accrual.

McGraw v. Wachovia Securities, L.L.C. Ex Rel. A.G. Edwards, Inc. · filed 2010-12-22(4)

The court doubts that the defendants have met their initial burden on a motion for summary judgment to show that the McGraws’ causes of action accrued at the time that they made their last contribution to the “special investment” with Lovegren in 1999.
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The latent-disease exception applies only when a substance has been determined by the EPA or Iowa to pose an unreasonable regulated risk; because diacetyl did not qualify, the fifteen-year product repose period barred the claims.

Daughetee v. Chr. Hansen, Inc. · filed 2013-03-06(2A)(b)(2)

Diacetyl is not classified as harmful material by either the United States EPA or Iowa. To the contrary, it is listed as a food ingredient that is generally recognized as safe for human consumption.
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Section 614.1(4) provides a five-year limitations period for covered actions, but goods-warranty accrual follows the delivery rule in § 554.2725(2) rather than the common-law discovery rule.

Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance v. SMA Elevator Construction Inc. · filed 2011-08-29(4)

However, ... on which Nationwide relies, demonstrates that this ... is not applicable here.
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Section 614.1(4) gives unwritten-contract claims a five-year limitations period that begins when the cause of action accrues, generally upon breach.

In re Meyer · filed 2017-01-11(4)

As noted, the Iowa statute of limitations for unwritten contracts is five years. Iowa Code § 614.1(4). This limitation period begins to run when the cause of action “accrues.” Iowa Code § 614.1. “It is well settled that no cause of action accrues under Iowa law until the wrongful act produces loss or damage to the claimant.”
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Section 614.1(5) gives claims for breach of a written contract a ten-year limitations period.

Huerta-Orosco v. Cosgrove · filed 2013-10-30(5)

If a written contract was formed, under Iowa law a claim for its breach would have to be brought within ten years.
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Section 614.1(4) provides five years to sue on an unwritten contract or for injury to property.

Cedar Rapids Lodge & Suites, LLC v. JFS Development, Inc. · filed 2015-06-15(4)

The applicable Iowa statute provides a five-year limitations period for actions on unwritten contracts, or those “brought for injuries to property.” Iowa Code § 614.1(4). ... Given the undisputed facts, including letters, reports, and site visits between November 2003 and November 2004, Cedar Rapids Lodge & Suites was on notice that there was at least reason to inquire in the exercise of reasonable diligence about potential negligence of Lightowler more than five years before this action was filed in December 2009.
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Section 614.1(4) ordinarily gives clients five years to bring legal negligence claims based on unwritten contracts or injuries to property.

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Powell · filed 2007-01-19(4)

We have found, normally, when the relationship between the attorney and the client is “ ‘founded on unwritten contracts’ ” or if it is an action “ ‘brought for injuries to property,’ ” Iowa Code section 614.1(4) governs the statute of limitations for legal negligence claims. Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Iowa 1994) (citation omitted); see also Iowa Code § 614.1(4) (setting the statute of limitations at five years).
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Section 614.1(4) gives a creditor five years after obtaining judgment to sue to void a fraudulent transfer under the usual accrual rule.

INNK Land and Cattle Co. v. Kenkel · filed 1996-04-17(4)

We have held that claims to void fraudulent transfers are seeking “relief on the ground of fraud” and thus are subject to the five-year statute of limitations now contained in Iowa Code section 614.1(4) (1993). ... Consequently, laches did not exist, and the usual rule allowing five years to sue after entry of judgment must prevail.
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Section 614.1(2) imposes a two-year limit on a wrongful discharge claim based on retaliation for pursuing workers’ compensation.

Vrban v. Deere & Co. · filed 1996-11-19(2)

Because the Iowa Supreme Court characterizes this action as a tort, I believe that it would apply the two-year statute of limitations from Iowa Code section 614.1(2) to this claim.
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Section 614.1(4)’s five-year period applies to a property damage claim based on restrictions in a condominium declaration.

Bowles v. Schilling · filed 1998-04-24(4)

The covenant in the declaration having created a legal interest in the land, plaintiffs’ claim was properly classified as a claim for property damage. The trial court applied the proper statute of limitations. We affirm on this issue.
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Section 614.1(4) imposes a five-year limitation on a county’s reimbursement claim for inpatient mental health payments when no note or other written agreement evidences the debt.

Emmet County Board of Supervisors v. Ridout · filed 2005-02-25(4)

A note or other written agreement between the parties does not evidence the debt created by chapter 230; therefore, the five-year statute of limitations governing unwritten contracts in Iowa Code section 614.1(4) applies to the county’s claim.
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Section 614.1(5)’s limitations period for an action to enforce a contract runs from breach, not from the date the agreement was executed.

Krotz v. Sattler · filed 1998-11-25(5)

In an effort to uphold the trial court’s ruling, Krotz contends that Iowa Code section 614.1(5) “now bars both Krotzs and Satt-lers from trying to enforce the April 29,1985, contract.” The argument is fundamentally flawed. The time for bringing an action to ... enforce a contract runs from the date of breach, not from the date the agreement was executed.
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Section 614.1(5) supplies the limitations period for an uninsured-motorist coverage claim when the policy’s contractual time limit is invalid.

Faeth v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 2005-12-23(5)

We hold that the contractual period of limitation is invalid, and by default, we impose the statutory period of limitations contained in Iowa Code section 614.1(5).
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The ten-year limitation period for written contracts in section 614.1(5) yields to the specific one-year period for fire insurance contracts in section 515.109(6).

Donnell v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company · filed 2014-03-12(5)

The general rule, that a specific statute supersedes a general one, clearly elevates the one-year limitations period in section 515.109(6) over any found in the general statute, section 614.1.
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Section 614.1(4) requires actions founded on unwritten contracts to be brought within five years after the cause accrues.

Stenoien v. Stenoien · filed 2014-07-30(4)

This action is not barred by either the statute of frauds or the statute of limitations, and we therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. ... Section 614.1(4) provides that actions “founded on unwritten contracts, those brought for injuries to property, or for relief on the ground of fraud in cases heretofore solely cognizable in a court of chancery” must be brought within five years “after their causes accrue.”
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Section 614.1 provides a ten-year limitation period for a claim based on a written contractual provision, including an express duty of good faith.

Darla Legg and Jason T. Legg, on Behalf of Themselves and All Persons Similarly Situated v. West Bank · filed 2016-01-22(5)

Because we find that the plaintiffs may only proceed on a claim of a breach of the duty of good faith based on the written contractual provision between customers and West Bank, we likewise find that the appropriate statute of limitations that governs this action is the ten-year limitation for written contractual provisions.
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Section 614.1(4)’s five-year limitations period applies to a civil extortion claim alleging injury to property.

Duncan v. Ford Motor Credit, Repossessors, Inc. and Bruce Shores · filed 2018-06-20(4)

Looking at “the actual nature of the action,” we conclude Duncan’s civil extortion claim alleges an injury to property, and we determine the five-year statute of limitations in section 614.1(4) should be applied.
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Section 614.1(4) sets a five-year limit for property injury claims; a defendant relying on that limit must show a nuisance was permanent rather than continuing.

Lee and Rita Dvorak v. Oak Grove Cattle, L.L.C. · filed 2019-08-07(4)

We conclude the district court improperly granted summary judgment to Oak Grove on the ground the Dvoraks’ action was barred by the statute of limitations. Oak Grove did not meet its burden to show the case involved a permanent nuisance, rather than a continuing nuisance.
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Section 614.1(4)’s five-year period governs claims for injury to property; section 614.1(6)’s period for actions founded on a judgment does not apply when the plaintiff is not seeking to enforce a judgment.

George J. Saluri and Candace C. Saluri v. Jay R. Buckley and Cathy Buckley · filed 2019-11-06(4), (6)

The Saluris’ petition alleged injury to their property due to the Buckleys’ actions. The Saluris are not seeking to enforce a judgment. We determine the proper statute of limitations is section 614.1(4), not section 614.1(6).
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Section 614.1(4) requires breach of implied warranty actions to be filed within five years after they accrue.

Kelly v. Ethicon, Inc. · filed 2020-08-07(4)

Section 614.1(4) requires that actions based on implied warranty must be filed within five years after they accrue.
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Section 614.1(4)’s limitation period for fraud actions can be tolled by the discovery rule.

Benskin, Inc. v. West Bank · filed 2020-12-23(4)

The discovery rule, however, can apply in a fraud action governed by section 614.1(4).
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Section 614.1(4)'s five-year period does not make earlier component acts irrelevant when a claim reflects the cumulative impact of ongoing conduct.

Duncan v. Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC, Bruce Shores, and Repossessors, Inc. · filed 2021-02-17(4)

Ford and Shores argue that any threats made during the repossession are not relevant because they are barred by the five-year statute of limitations. We disagree. When the cause of action reflects the cumulative impact of ongoing conduct, “it makes no difference that some of the component acts fall outside the period of limitations.”
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Section 614.1(5) provides a ten-year limitations period for actions founded on written contracts.

Rembrandt Enterprises Inc v. Tecno Poultry Equipment, SpA · filed 2022-11-08(5)

Thus, the written contract is governed by Section 614.1(5) and subject to a ten-year statute-of- limitation.
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Section 614.1(5) supplies the ten-year period required to establish title by adverse possession.

Bernard A. Nelson, Vicki Toomsen, Rodney Nelson, Ricky Nelson, and Sherri Brown v. Bobette Cross and Gidget Cross Trask · filed 2023-08-30(5)

The doctrine of adverse possession is based on the ten-year statute of limitations for recovery of real property in Iowa Code section 614.1(5). ... The law also requires adverse possession for a ten-year period. That length of time simply has not existed between these parties as owners or previously.
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Section 614.1(5)(a) supplies the ten-year period for adverse possession; qualifying possession must continue for ten years.

Bradford Worrell and Nancy Worrell v. Lake Crest Manor Home Owners Association · filed 2025-05-07(5)(a)

After all, “[t]he doctrine of adverse possession is based on the ten-year statute of limitations for recovery of real property” in Iowa Code section 614.1(5)(a) (2025). ... But that level of conduct was not continuous for ten years.
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Section 614.1(4) gives an unjust enrichment claim a five-year limitations period; when the promised benefit was a deed, completing construction does not determine when that period begins.

Randall Anderson, Jr., and Katie Anderson v. Randall Anderson and Rebecca Anderson · filed 2023-11-08(4)

Unlike the district court, we conclude as a matter of law that the completion of the work is not the starting point for the timing of the statute of limitations in this case. Randy was never promised payment for construction of the race shed, so his completion of the work is irrelevant to the start date for accrual of the statute of limitations.
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Section 614.1(5)(a) supplies the ten-year possession period required to acquire real property by adverse possession.

Duke Carter v. Mike Fricke and Laura Fricke · filed 2024-05-22(5)(a)

And again, the possession must be for at least ten years because “[t]he doctrine of adverse possession is based on the ten-year statute of limitations for recovery of real property” in Iowa Code section 614.1(5)(a).
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Wages and periodic payments

Section 614.1(6)’s twenty-year limit bars collection of alimony installments dating back more than twenty years before collection efforts, but does not bar collection of later installments.

In Re the Marriage of Logsdon · filed 1993-10-28(6)

Accordingly, the statute of limitations contained in Iowa Code section 614.1(6) (1991) does not act as a complete bar to these garnishment proceedings. This statute of limitations has run only on the part of the alimony arrearage which dates back more than twenty years prior to Donna’s collection efforts.
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Section 614.1(2) gives claims for unpaid wages under chapter 91A a two-year limitations period, allowing recovery only for wages due within two years before suit is filed.

Hengesteg v. Northern Engineering, Inc. · filed 1991-09-24(2)

The two-year limitations period found in Iowa Code section 614.1(2) is controlling.
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Notes 1–150 of 306, oldest cases first.

123 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Bishop v. Schield Bantam Company, the court merely mentions Iowa Code § 614.1 in listing defendants’ statute-of-limitations contention; it does not construe the section or independently decide how it applies, stating that summary judgment on other grounds was dispositive. opinion →
Cole v. Alodex Corp., the court only reports that plaintiffs argued for the five-year Iowa common-law fraud limitations period under § 614.1(4); it does not adopt or interpret that section, and its ruling applies the Iowa Blue Sky statute instead. opinion →
Cole v. Alodex Corp., the court mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(4) only to report plaintiffs’ argument for the five-year common-law-fraud limitations period; it does not adopt or interpret that provision, and affirms on the Blue Sky statute instead. opinion →
Anderson v. Luitjens, Iowa Code § 614.1(2) appears only in a footnote stating that the statute of limitations appears to have run in Iowa; the opinion does not explain or apply the section's meaning. opinion →
Myrick v. James, Iowa Code § 614.1(9) appears only in a footnote list of statutes from other jurisdictions that codify a discovery rule; the court does not analyze or apply Iowa's provision. opinion →
Ronald Lee Roy Branchcomb v. Lou Brewer, James Menke, and Charles Wilkens, the opinion mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only to report the district court’s limitations ruling and the parties’ agreement; the court’s own holding concerns § 614.1(4), not subsection (2). opinion →
Regal Insurance Co. v. Summit Guaranty Corp., the court only reports appellants’ argument citing Iowa Code § 614.1(4); it does not interpret or apply that subsection, instead holding that § 614.4 governs discovery of the fraud. opinion →
Scheetz v. IMT Ins. Co.(Mut.), the opinion mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(5) only as plaintiffs’ claim that the ten-year statute applied; the dissent does not adopt or interpret subsection (5), instead addressing the policy’s one-year limitation and proposing the Peloso tolling rule. opinion →
Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., the court cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) to identify the applicable personal-injury limitations period and reports that the period expired; it does not interpret, apply, or otherwise state what the section itself means. opinion →
Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., the Wyoming court mentions Iowa Code § 614.1 only in a footnote as a comparison to explain Iowa's different treatment of U.C.C. § 2-725; it does not decide what § 614.1 means or apply it to the case. opinion →
Miller v. Continental Insurance Co., the opinion cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only as background to the parties’ dispute and discusses advice about the statute of limitations; the court makes no operative statement interpreting or applying § 614.1. opinion →
Franzen v. Deere and Co. opinion →
United States v. Security State Bank, the citation appears in the defendant’s laches argument, and the passage’s characterization of the action as conversion is attributed to a magistrate’s prior ruling rather than stated as this court’s own holding under § 614.1. opinion →
Bean v. Midwest Battery & Metal, Inc., the court merely cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) to identify the two-year limitations period and the filing date; its operative holding concerns delayed service under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 49, not the meaning or application of § 614.1. opinion →
Husker News Co. v. Mahaska State Bank, the opinion cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only in a footnote stating that the parents’ loss-of-consortium claims were dismissed as barred by the two-year statute of limitations; the court does not explain or apply the statute’s meaning. opinion →
Grant v. Cedar Falls Oil Co., the only citation to Iowa Code § 614.1(2) appears in a footnote stating that the parties appear to agree on the applicable limitations period; the court does not independently interpret or apply that subsection. opinion →
Dennis v. Christianson, the court cites § 614.1(2) only to identify the last day on which the lawsuit could be commenced; it does not state or apply the subsection's operative meaning. opinion →
Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Van Etten, the court merely recounts that respondent raised a ten-year statute-of-limitations defense and cites Iowa Code § 614.1(5); it does not state or apply the subsection’s operative rule. opinion →
FSC Securities Corp. v. Freel, Iowa Code § 614.1 appears only in a footnote recounting plaintiffs’ statute-of-limitations argument and the general tolling rule; the court’s holding concerns the arbitration code’s section 15, not § 614.1. opinion →
Ridgway v. Wapello County, Iowa Bud Irwin, Wapello County Sheriff John Smith, Deputy Sheriff and Tom Smith, Deput, the court reports the prior Garmon rule and the later Wilson rule in deciding retroactivity; it does not independently construe or apply Iowa Code § 614.1. opinion →
Thomas v. United Fire & Casualty Co., the opinion uses § 614.1(2) only as a comparator in an equal-protection discussion of a different twelve-month insurance limitation; it does not construe or apply § 614.1 itself. opinion →
Balboa Insurance Co. v. Pixler Electric of Spencer, Iowa, Inc., the opinion reports the trial court’s view that a possible future suit would be barred by § 614.1(4), but the appellate court does not adopt or construe that limitations ruling. opinion →
Doe v. Cherwitz, the court cites § 614.1(2) only as the basis for the defendants’ dismissal motion and in a certified question; it does not itself interpret or apply that subsection. opinion →
William Davis and Regina Davis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. And Gina M. Benzshawel, the opinion cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only to identify the asserted two-year statute of limitations; the court's operative analysis and holding concern Iowa's savings statute, § 614.10, not what § 614.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
Coulter v. Cigna Property & Casualty Companies, the citation to Iowa Code § 614.1(2) appears only in the procedural history to describe the Iowa court’s statute-of-limitations ruling; this court does not independently interpret or apply § 614.1(2). opinion →
Madison v. IBP, Inc., the opinion cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only as the limitations period IBP argues should apply to the § 1981 claim; the court does not independently interpret or apply § 614.1. opinion →
Carroll v. Martir, the opinion cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only to state that the petition was filed approximately one month before the two-year statute of limitations expired; the court does not explain, interpret, or apply the statute's operative requirements. opinion →
Gutierrez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the opinion mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only as Wal-Mart's affirmative statute-of-limitations defense in the procedural history. The court decides service and relation-back under the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure and does not adopt or decide any interpretation of § 614.1(2). opinion →
O'Hara v. State, Iowa Department of General Services, the court cites Iowa Code section 614.1(5) only to contrast the ten-year limitations period for a collective-bargaining-agreement claim with the ninety-day period for a fair-representation claim; it does not decide or construe section 614.1(5). opinion →
Peda v. American Home Products Corp., the court merely recited the defendants’ argument that Iowa Code § 614.1(8) imposed a two-year limitations period for wage claims and expressly declined to reach that argument after declining supplemental jurisdiction; it therefore made no holding construing or applying the statute. opinion →
Madden v. City of Eldridge, the city argued that the claim was barred by Iowa Code section 614.1(11), but the court expressly stated that it did not address the statute-of-repose or statute-of-limitations argument because it resolved the appeal on other grounds. opinion →
Estate of Hollywood v. First National Bank of Palmerton, the opinion cites Iowa Code section 614.1(4) only in a parenthetical reference to Husker News as supporting authority for the court's discussion of Pennsylvania's UCC limitations rules; it does not construe or hold what Iowa Code section 614.1(4) means or requires. opinion →
Stotts v. Eveleth, the court merely noted Stotts's unpreserved argument that later changes in the law, including Iowa Code section 614.1(12), recognized an existing cause of action; it did not decide or adopt any interpretation of section 614.1(12). opinion →
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States Ex Rel. Wilson, the opinion cites Iowa Code §614.1 only in a footnote listing possible analogous state statutes of limitations; the Court does not construe or apply Iowa Code §614.1 and does not adopt it as the applicable limitations period. opinion →
Perkins Ex Rel. Perkins v. Dallas Center-Grimes Community School District, the staged passage is solely a dissenting opinion. Its discussion of Iowa Code § 614.1(2) states the dissent's proposed limitations analysis and would-be disposition, not a holding adopted by the court. opinion →
Laura J. Perkins By David M. Perkins, Her Parent And Next Friend Vs. Dallas Center-grimes Community School District, the opinion addresses the minor-tolling provision in Iowa Code section 614.8(2) and the limitations period in section 670.5, but it does not cite, construe, or apply Iowa Code section 614.1. Any relevance to chapter 614 is background to the court's analysis, not a holding about section 614.1. opinion →
Draper v. Wellmark, Inc., the court did not construe or apply Iowa Code § 614.1(5) or (8); it mentioned those provisions only in a footnote describing the statutory periods that would apply to an ERISA benefits claim if no valid contractual limitations clause controlled, then held the contractual two-year period governed. opinion →
Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the opinion merely explains the plaintiffs’ selected class-period date and cites Waterman for the two-year limitations rule; it does not independently construe or decide anything about Iowa Code § 614.1. opinion →
Joel A. Harper And Kathy L. Harper Vs. Pella Corporation, the statute is cited only to describe the plaintiffs’ argument and the district court’s procedural ruling; the Iowa Supreme Court expressly made it unnecessary to consider the statute-of-limitations cross-appeal and did not construe or apply § 614.1(2). opinion →
C & J MANAGEMENT CORP. v. Anderson, the court cited § 614.1(4) in a footnote only to explain that the plaintiffs could refile their claims in state court; it did not decide the statute's meaning, requirements, coverage, or application. opinion →
Linden v. CNH AMERICA LLC, the court described Iowa Code § 614.1(2A) only while comparing competing statutes in a choice-of-law analysis; it selected Indiana law and did not construe or apply the Iowa statute. opinion →
J. Thomas Zaber, On Behalf Of Himself And All Others Similarly Situated Vs. City Of Dubuque, Iowa, the opinion mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(4) only in a footnote to report the parties' agreement that the refund claims are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. The court does not construe or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Ferezy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., section 614.1(9) appears only in a string citation describing Rock v. Warhank’s use of a dictionary definition. This court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about § 614.1(9); its holding concerns Iowa Code § 91A.5(1)(b). opinion →
In the Matter of the Estate of Johnny VAJGRT, Deceased, Bill Ernst, Inc., Intervenor-Appellant, the court mentions § 614.1(4) only to identify the limitations period and note that timeliness was uncontested; it does not interpret or apply the statute. The footnote's reference to § 614.1(2) is likewise incidental. opinion →
Anderson v. Bristol, Inc., the court mentions § 614.1(5) only to note the asserted limitations period for a written-contract claim while discussing defendants’ tolling argument; it does not interpret or decide the statute’s meaning or application. opinion →
Rivera v. Woodward Resource Center and State of Iowa, the court cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only as an example of the otherwise applicable personal-injury limitations period; its holding construes the Iowa Tort Claims Act savings clause in § 669.13(2), not § 614.1(2). opinion →
Life Investors Insurance Company of America v. Estate of John M. Corrado and Federal City Region, Inc., the court mentioned Iowa Code § 614.1(4) only in describing the existence of contract statutes of limitations while discussing laches; it did not interpret, apply, or decide any issue under § 614.1(4). opinion →
Cote v. M.Blais Properties, the court cites Iowa Code § 614.1(11) only as an example of another state's statute of repose while discussing Maine law; it does not construe, apply, or decide anything about the Iowa statute. opinion →
Bank of America, N.A. v. Schulte, the court mentioned Iowa Code § 614.1(5) only as a possible longer limitations period and expressly said it was unnecessary to decide whether it applied; the case was resolved under the two-year period in § 615.1. opinion →
Bank of America, N.A. v. Schulte, the court mentioned § 614.1(5) in a footnote as a possible longer limitations period, but expressly said it was unnecessary to decide whether that period applied; the citation was only incidental to its holding under Iowa Code § 615.1. opinion →
Doe v. New London Community School District, the court cited § 614.1 only as a contrast while construing the IMTCA's limitations provision; it did not decide what § 614.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
Foster v. Cerro Gordo County, the court cited § 614.1(2) to identify the applicable two-year limitations period while deciding whether proposed claims were futile and related back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c); it did not construe or finally apply the Iowa statute, and expressly left the limitations defense for later. opinion →
Doretta Dilley and Jan C. Dilley v. Auto-Owners Insurance Group, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, and Owners Insurance Com, the court mentions § 614.1(2) only in a footnote describing the policy and the background two-year limitations period; it does not construe or apply the statute, deciding instead the relation-back issue and contractual limitation. opinion →
Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services v. BendTec, Inc., the court applied Minnesota Statutes § 541.051. It mentioned Iowa Code § 614.1(11) only when describing the prior Harder decision and using that decision by analogy; it did not decide a question about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of the Iowa statute in this case. opinion →
Ainley Kennels & Fabrication, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, Iowa, the opinion mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(4) only in a footnote reporting Ainley’s concession that a five-year statute of limitations applies; the court does not interpret or decide the statute’s meaning or applicability. opinion →
Supreme Auto Transport LLC v. Mittal, the opinion mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(4) only in a footnote listing statutes of limitations for various state-law claims. The court does not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Stender v. Blessum, section 614.1(2) appears only in a footnote to support a factual background statement that the limitations period had run; the court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Stender v. Blessum, the opinion mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(2) only in a footnote supporting a background statement that the attorney knew or should have known the limitations period had run; the court did not interpret or decide anything about the statute. opinion →
Amended September 5, 2017 Melissa Stender v. Blessum, the statute appears only in a footnote to the factual background, citing the limitations period mentioned in connection with Blessum's letter; the court did not construe or decide anything about Iowa Code § 614.1. opinion →
Preferred Marketing, Inc., D/B/A Broken Arrow Wear v. Le Mars Insurance Company, the court mentioned §§ 614.1(4) and (5) only to identify the statutory limitation periods and contrast them with the insurance policy’s two-year contractual limitation; it did not construe or decide an issue about either statutory subsection. opinion →
Tsb Holdings, L.L.C. and 911 N. Governor, L.L.C. v. City of Iowa City, Iowa, -------------------------------------------, section 614.1(5) is mentioned only in the special concurrence as an analogy while discussing the majority’s interpretation of section 614.1(6); the court did not decide an issue under subsection (5). opinion →
Linda Linn and Mark Shuck v. Pat Montgomery, Christy Schrader, and Brad Allen, the court quoted Iowa Code § 614.1(2) and discussed whether its discovery rule applies to defamation, but expressly declined to decide the statute-of-limitations issues because the jury’s finding made them unnecessary. opinion →
Paul Craig Jeffries and Gerald Jeffries, as Co-Administrators of the Estate of Fanchon B. Jeffries v. Central Iowa Healt, the court cited § 614.1(5)(a) only as one of several reasons for affirming summary judgment and did not interpret, explain, or analyze the statute’s requirements or application. opinion →
Reiff Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Robert B. Reiff d/b/a Reiff Funeral Home and Crematory, the court mentions § 614.1 and § 614.1(4) while discussing an analogous limitations period, but expressly leaves whether the claim was within that period unclear and resolves the case on laches. It does not construe or apply the statute. opinion →
CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc., the court did not decide whether § 614.1(4) governs conversion claims; it described the five-year period as likely and expressly relied on an earlier case that assumed the issue without deciding it. The citation was only used as a premise for the limitations analysis. opinion →
Raymond Vern Butler and Mary Butler v. Wells Fargo Financial, Inc., the statute is mentioned only while reporting the district court's procedural ruling dismissing WFB as a defendant after the limitations period had passed; the appellate court does not construe or apply § 614.1. opinion →
Shayesteh v. Hoye, the court mentions § 614.1(2) only to identify Iowa’s two-year personal-injury limitation period as one consideration in deciding whether to grant a permissive extension of time for service. It does not construe or decide any issue about the statute itself. opinion →
Billy Dean Carter, Bill G. Carter, and the Estate of Shirley D. Carter, by and through Bill G. Carter v. Carter, the court cited § 614.1 in passing to support its decision affirming denial of a continuance; it did not decide a statute-of-limitations issue or construe the statute. opinion →
Jaye v. Barr--PER 3 ORDER AUTHORIZED TO EMAIL HER PLEADINGS - PER 25 ORDER - EMAIL AND MAIL ALL DOCKETED FILINGS TO PLT, the statute is mentioned in a footnote within the procedural history to describe the limitations issue identified in Judge Williams’s earlier order; this opinion does not decide the meaning or application of § 614.1. opinion →
Curt N. Daniels and Indian Creek Corporation v. John Holtz, personally and John Holtz, d/b/a WSH Properties, LLC, Hunter, section 614.1(6) appears only in the procedural history as Daniels's timeliness argument; the court affirmed on claim preclusion and expressly declined to address the other grounds for dismissal. opinion →
In the Matter of the Estate of Francis O. Glaser, Judy E. Bowling, Fiduciary of the Estate of Francis O. Glaser, and Sta, the court cited § 614.1(4) only to identify the limitations consequence of its separate holding that the amendment did not relate back under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.402(5); it did not interpret or independently analyze § 614.1(4). opinion →
Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co. a/k/a Snap-On Tools Corp., the court cites § 614.1 only to identify examples of statutes of limitations and repose while distinguishing them from the jurisdictional deadline in Iowa Code § 17A.19(3). It does not decide what § 614.1 means, requires, or how it applies. opinion →
Botts v. West, the opinion merely reports the parties' agreement about the two-year limitations period and includes § 614.1(2) in a footnote string cite. The court decided the federal § 1983 tolling issue under binding Eighth Circuit precedent and did not interpret or apply this Iowa statute. opinion →
Michael McKee and Diane McKee v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, the opinion mentions § 614.1(4) only in a footnote identifying an alternative statute-of-limitations ground raised in the City's summary-judgment motion. The district court did not address it, the City did not pursue it on appeal, and the appellate court expressly declined to affirm on that ground; the statute is not construed or applied by the court. opinion →
Larry C. Beverage, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles E. Beverage, and Linda K. Anders, the court mentions § 614.1(11) only while describing the background and result of Tallman; the decision itself construes and applies Iowa Code § 686B.7(5), not § 614.1(11). opinion →
Larry C. Beverage, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Charles E. Beverage, and Linda K. Anders, Incidental: the majority mentions § 614.1(11) only when describing prior asbestos cases and the statutory background, while the dissent cites it only in a comparative footnote. The court did not construe or apply § 614.1(11) in deciding this appeal. opinion →
Kiddey v. Transport Security Administration, the court merely cited Iowa Code § 614.1(2) through Dominguez as background for the possible limitations period and expressly made no determination about the timeliness of the action; it did not interpret or apply the statute. opinion →
Safemark Systems, LP v. HRDMM Hospitality Services, Inc., the court cited § 614.1(6) only to support its conclusion that waiting to collect did not show abandonment of the judgment. It did not construe or decide the statute's requirements or limitations period. opinion →
Muff v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, section 614.1(4) appears only as the estate’s alternative argument for a five-year limitations period. The court did not construe or apply that statute; it rejected the argument and resolved the claim under Article 4’s three-year limitations period in Iowa Code § 554.4111. opinion →
Lon Tweeten d/b/a Tweeten Farms and Grinnell Mutual Insurance, Co. v. Tweeten, the court mentioned § 614.1(9) only as an analogy and historical comparison while construing the workers’ compensation limitations provision in § 85.26(1). It did not decide a dispute about the meaning, requirements, coverage, or application of § 614.1. opinion →
S.K., a legally incapacitated Minor by and through his Conservator, Thomas T. Tarbox v. Obstetric & Gynecologic Associat, the opinion mentions § 614.1(9)(b) only in a footnote to identify the limitations date for the minor’s claims while analyzing waiver of a separate certificate-of-merit statute; it does not decide what § 614.1 means or how it applies. opinion →
S.K., a legally incapacitated Minor by and through his Conservator, Thomas T. Tarbox v. Obstetric & Gynecologic Associat, the reference to § 614.1(9)(b) appears only in a concurring opinion’s procedural timeline to note the limitations date for the minor’s claims. The court did not interpret, apply, or decide anything about that statute; its holding concerned Iowa Code § 147.140 and the admission of hearsay. opinion →
Estate of Larry Joe McVay, By Thomas Mcvay, and Thomas Mcvay, Individually v. Grinnell Regional Medical Center, Grinnell, the court cited § 614.1(2) only to state the underlying two-year limitations period; it did not interpret or independently apply the statute. The decision turned on the constitutional validity of the supreme court's COVID-19 tolling order, following Rivas. opinion →
Marlene Banwart and Richard Banwart v. Neurosurgery of North Iowa, P.C., David Beck, M.D., and Thomas Getta, M.D., the opinion mentions Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a) only in describing the defendants’ statute-of-limitations argument and expressly bypasses those issues; the decision rests on Iowa Code § 147.140. opinion →
Garcia v. Sanchez-Lopez, the opinion merely cites Iowa Code § 614.1(2) in recounting the Iowa Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hamm. The court does not construe, apply, or decide what § 614.1 requires; its holding concerns the ambiguity of an insurance-policy limitation clause under Illinois law. opinion →
Lathrop v. MidAmerican Energy Company, section 614.1(2) is mentioned only in the procedural history as part of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court did not construe or apply subsection (2); it affirmed on unpreserved statute-of-repose grounds and expressly did not reach that ground’s merits. opinion →
Sara Montague, individually, and as parent and next friend of C.M., a minor, and as the duly authorized representative o, the court did not construe or decide the application of § 614.1(2). It mentioned the two-year period only as a comparison while deciding whether the plaintiff exhausted the Iowa Tort Claims Act administrative process and could add additional defendants. opinion →
Victoria Abrahamson, Hana Schroeder, Jody Schroeder, Terry Schroeder, Samantha Johnson, Bre Ahna Boggess f/k/a Bre Ahna, section 614.1(4) appears only as the district court's and plaintiffs' rejected position; subsection (9) appears only in a historical string citation. The court instead held that the IMTCA's two-year limitation in section 670.5 governs. opinion →
Trask v. Amar F. Ahmed, M.D.; Sandro Younadam, M.D.; Shellie O'Brien-Perry, A.R.N.P.; Kimberly A. Willich, A.R.N, the court merely recited and applied the two-year limitations period as background to determine whether Iowa Code § 614.10 saved the second lawsuit. Its holding construed and applied § 614.10, not § 614.1. opinion →
Betsworth v. MOREY'S AND RAYMOND'S, the court applied the limitations period but decided the tolling and party-definition rules in Iowa Code §§ 668.8 and 668.2. opinion →
Speer v. Blumer, the court decides tolling under Iowa Code § 910.8; § 614.1(2) only supplies the two-year limitations period. opinion →
Wenke Ex Rel. Laufenberg v. Gehl Co., the court decides Wisconsin's borrowing statute, while Iowa Code § 614.1 is cited only to identify the applicable foreign period. opinion →
Goings v. Chickasaw County, IA, the discussion reports the Iowa Supreme Court's decision in Miller and does not make this court's own decision about § 614.1. opinion →
Pitsenbarger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., the § 614.1(5) argument was Northern’s defense; the court expressly declined to decide whether the statute applied. opinion →
State Ex. Rel. Rake v. Ohden, the court recounts its earlier ruling in Stearns; this opinion decides the constitutionality of § 675.33. opinion →
International Ass'n of MacHinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Union 2548 v. Victor Fluid Power Co., the reference to section 614.1 is the defendant’s argument, which the court did not adopt; the court decided the applicability of chapter 679A’s ninety-day period. opinion →
Harden v. State, the reference to section 614.1(9) describes another court’s ruling; this court decides the limitation in section 25A.13. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Iowa Department of Human Services v. Mundie, the opinion reports the district court’s application of section 614.1(4); this court decides claim preclusion, not the limitations issue. opinion →
Mathias v. Glandon, the court mentions the limitations period as background; its decision concerns sanctions, not a ruling under § 614.1. opinion →
Huffey v. Lea, the court did not decide which limitations period under section 614.1 applies; it left that issue for the district court on remand. opinion →
State Ex Rel. Lankford v. Mundie, the cited ruling on section 614.1 was the district court’s decision in an earlier action, not this court’s decision in this opinion. opinion →
Matter of Estate of Herron, this reports that the district court left the limitations issue open; this court did not decide it. opinion →
Deuth v. Ratigan, the reference to § 614.1 states Deuth’s argument, which the court did not adopt as a ruling about that section. opinion →
University of Iowa v. Dunbar, the court decided that section 262.19 abrogates the limitations defense, without deciding a rule of section 614.1. opinion →
Berntsen v. Cooper & Lybrand, L.L.P., the court decides whether section 614.10 saves the action; it does not decide any rule of section 614.1. opinion →
In Re Marriage of Griffey, the court cites the amendment as evidence of public policy while deciding an estoppel defense; it does not decide a rule under § 614.1. opinion →
Perkins v. HEA of Iowa, Inc., this sentence reports a holding in an earlier case; this court decides the limitations issue under section 85.26(1). opinion →
State v. Bonjour, the court cites an earlier decision about section 614.1(9) as an analogy; it does not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
Maghee v. IOWA DIST. COURT JUDGE, READE, the section 614.1 ruling was Judge Reade’s ruling below; this court did not decide it. opinion →
Maghee Vs. Iowa, the opinion reports the district court’s application of section 614.1; this court decides the counsel and sanction issues under section 610A.3. opinion →
Furnald v. Anthony Hughes and Emcasco Insurance Company, the reference to § 614.1(2) reports Hughes’s defense. The court decides the requirements of § 614.10. opinion →
Slife v. Farmers Mutual Hail Insurance Company of Iowa, the citation appears in the Slifes’ argument, which the court did not adopt as a ruling about the statute. The court decided whether the policy’s one-year limit was unconscionable. opinion →
David P. Garr Jr. and Julie A. Garr v. City of Ottumwa, Iowa, this is the City’s argument, which the court did not decide; it resolved the appeal on causation. opinion →
Erin Dindinger, Lisa Loring, and Elizabeth Freund v. Allsteel, Inc. and Scott Mills, the court states what would follow in a hypothetical unpaid-wages claim; it does not decide a claim under § 614.1(8). opinion →
Amended May 14, 2015 Erin Dindinger, Lisa Loring, and Elizabeth Freund v. Allsteel, Inc. and Scott Mills, the court decides the ICRA limitations issue and mentions § 614.1(8) only as a comparison involving a hypothetical unpaid-wages claim. opinion →
Bob Kopp and Sharon Kopp v. American Builders & Contractors Supply Co., Inc. D/B/A Abc Supply Co., Inc., and Custom Aluminum Products, Inc., section 614.1(4) is cited as the basis of ABC’s motion, but the court’s analysis decides the discovery-rule issue under section 554.2725(2). The section 614.1(11) argument was not preserved for review. opinion →
Dlr Group, Inc. v. Oskaloosa Community School District M&M Enterprises And Story Construction Co., the citation appears in DLR’s argument, which the court did not adopt as a ruling on § 614.1. opinion →
Dean Snyder Construction Co. v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, the discussion of § 614.1(2) is quoted from Robinson, while this court decides whether an insurance policy’s contractual deadline is enforceable. opinion →
Thornton v. American Interstate Insurance Company, the opinion recounts the limitations ruling in Brown; it does not decide a section 614.1 issue in this case. opinion →
Amended August 22, 2017 Toby Thornton v. American Interstate Insurance Company, the court recounts its holding in Brown; it does not decide which limitation period applies in this case. opinion →
Jones v. Great River Medical Center and Maria Schnitzer, M.D., the appellate court decided electronic-filing and service rules, not a rule of § 614.1; the citation reports the district court’s ruling. opinion →
Rivera v. Clear Channel Outdoor, LLC, Lamar Media Corporation, TLC Properties, Inc., and All Unknown Claiming Any Right Title or Interest in the Property, the court expressly declined to decide whether section 614.1(5) applies, leaving that issue to the district court. opinion →
Bert Miller and Nancy Duffner v. State of Iowa, the court decides the effect of FARA’s limitations provision; section 614.1(9) is cited as a general statute that provision overrides. opinion →

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