Iowa Code § 216.6

Section 216.6 prohibits discharge because of race or religion, and claims under it require the same elements of proof as Title VII claims.

Brown v. Polk County, Iowa · filed 1993-08-11

Likewise, Iowa Code § 216 also makes it a violation of state law to discharge an employee because of his religion or race. Iowa Code § 216.6 (1993). ... For purposes of this opinion, the Court will assess concurrently Plaintiffs Title VII and state civil rights claims, as both claims require the same elements of proof.

Section 216.6 sex discrimination claims use federal cases as their basic framework, so an erroneous dismissal of a parallel Title VII claim cannot support summary judgment on the state claim.

Quick v. Donaldson Company, Inc. · filed 1996-09-23

Federal cases provide the basic framework for deciding sex discrimination cases under the Iowa civil rights statute, Iowa State Fairgrounds Security v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm., 322 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1982), and federal courts may decide a state law claim based on a judicial estimate of what the Iowa Supreme Court would do if confronted with the same issue. Heeney v. Miner, 421 F.2d 434, 439 (8th Cir.1970). Since Quick's Title VII claim was improperly dismissed, summary judgment on his state claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act was also inappropriate.

Section 216.6 claims follow the same burden-of-proof analysis as federal Title VII claims.

Moschetti v. Chicago, Central & · filed 1997-07-11

The analysis for both the federal and state claims is the same under Iowa law. See Iowa Code § 216.6 (1997); see e.g., Hulme v. Barrett, 480 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 1992); Naylor v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 875 F.Supp. 564 (N.D. Iowa 1995).

Section 216.6 employment discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims.

McGregory v. Crest/Hughes Technologies · filed 2001-04-25

Courts apply the same analysis under the ICRA as under Title VII.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discharge because of sex, and a claim may proceed when the evidence creates a genuine dispute about whether sex motivated the discharge.

Smith v. Iowa Jewish Senior Life Center · filed 2001-08-17(1)(a)

Title VII and the ICRA make it unlawful for an employer to discharge an individual because of his or her sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). ... Based on this evidence, the Court finds that Smith has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether she was terminated because of her sex.

Section 216.6 sex discrimination claims use Title VII analysis, and a failure-to-promote claim can proceed when genuine factual disputes remain about the employer’s decision.

Morgan v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2001-11-16

Iowa courts apply Title VII analysis to discrimination claims brought under the ICRA, and the Court will do so here. ... The Court denies Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the Title VII and ICRA claims of sexual discrimination through disparate treatment.

Gender-based constructive discharge can violate section 216.6.

Van Meter Industrial v. Mason City Human Rights Commission · filed 2004-02-25

The Mason City Human Rights Commission ruled that appellant, Van Meter Industrial (VMI), had discriminated against the appellee, Jane Sires, on the basis of her gender and had constructively discharged Sires from her job with VMI in violation of Iowa Code section 216.6 (1997). ... Upon our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we hold there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Sires was constructively discharged from her employment at VMI.

Section 216.6 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees in compensation, terms, or conditions of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

DAVID GRIFFITH, PLAINTIFF—APPELLANT v. CITY OF DES MOINES, DEFENDANTS—APPELLEES · filed 2004-12-17

Title VII and the Iowa Human Rights Act prohibit an employer from discriminating against an employee with respect to his compensation, terms, or conditions of employment on account of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discharge because of sex; when its relevant language matches federal law, courts analyze the state and federal discrimination claims under the same framework.

Schoonover v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc. · filed 2007-06-26(1)(a)

Here, because the relevant language is nearly identical in both statutes, ... the following analysis simultaneously addresses Schoonover's state and federal discrimination claims.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits national origin discrimination in employment, and claims under it are analyzed using the Title VII framework.

Liu v. BASF Corp. · filed 2009-03-16(1)(a)

ICRA also prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of national origin. Iowa Code § 216.6(l)(a). Iowa courts have analyzed claims under ICRA by applying the federal framework for Title VII cases. ... Accordingly, the Court has combined analysis of plaintiff's state and federal claims.

A national origin discrimination claim under § 216.6(1)(a) requires evidence that similarly situated employees outside the protected class received different treatment.

Liu v. BASF Corporation · filed 2011-02-14(1)(a)

He also claims the protection of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). Because the Iowa Civil Rights Act was modeled after Title VII and Liu has presented no separate argument or citations with respect to Iowa law, we jointly consider his federal and state claims. ... Liu has not established that BPS gave different treatment to similarly situated employees who were not members of his protected class, and thus he has not established a prima facie case.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin, and claims under it are analyzed using the Title VII framework.

Barucic v. Titan Tire Corp. · filed 2012-03-14(1)(a)

ICRA prohibits employment discrimination based on national origin in much the same manner as Title VII. ... As such, this Court will utilize the same analysis for Plaintiff's Title VII and ICRA claims.

Section 216.6(1)(a) does not prohibit firing an employee because the employer’s spouse views their relationship as a threat to the marriage, without evidence that the firing was based on the employee’s sex.

Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C. and James Knight · filed 2013-07-12(1)(a)

We are asked to decide only if a genuine fact issue exists as to whether Dr. Knight engaged in unlawful gender discrimination when he fired Nelson at the request of his wife. For the reasons previously discussed, we believe this conduct did not amount to unlawful discrimination, and therefore we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A claim under § 216.6 based on constructive discharge requires the employee to give the employer a reasonable opportunity to resolve the alleged intolerable conditions before quitting.

Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co · filed 2014-06-26

The ICRA provides the same prohibitions. See Iowa Code § 216.6. Because Ames presents no separate arguments under the ICRA, we analyze her ICRA claims together with her Title VII claims under the same analytical framework used for Title VII claims. ... We thus conclude that Ames has not met her burden of demonstrating constructive discharge.

Section 216.6 prohibits sex discrimination in hiring and termination; evidence that sex influenced either decision can defeat summary judgment.

Plato v. Anderson Erickson Dairy Company · filed 2017-08-02

The Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination in employment based on an applicant or employee’s sex. See Iowa Code § 216.6 (2014). ... His statement that women are not suited to work in the plant, made during a discussion about hiring for the human resources representative position, is direct evidence of a discriminatory motive by the decisionmaker. On this record, summary judgment is not warranted. ... The evidence supports the inference that Plato’s sex played a part in her termination.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits religious discrimination in employment, and claims under it use the Title VII analysis.

Mial v. Foxhoven · filed 2018-04-04(1)(a)

Federal and state laws forbid an employer from discriminating against an employee because of that employee's religion. ... The Iowa Supreme Court has adopted the Title VII analysis for religious discrimination claims arising under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

Section 216.6 race-discrimination claims based on indirect evidence are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Garang v. Smithfield Farmland Corp. · filed 2020-02-12

When a plaintiff presents indirect evidence of race discrimination, as is the case here, the claim is analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Section 216.6 permits a failure-to-promote claim to proceed when evidence of racial bias by promotion decisionmakers creates a genuine dispute over whether the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Clifford J. Watkins, III v. City of Des Moines, Pat Kozitza, John Desio, and Tony Chiodo · filed 2020-06-03

Drawing all inferences in Watkins’s favor, we find there is a genuine issue of material fact whether the city’s nondiscriminatory reason for denying his promotion was pretextual and that racial discrimination was the real reason he was not elevated to section chief. Accordingly, the city is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this promotion claim.

Section 216.6(1)(a) race discrimination claims are evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework at summary judgment.

Carter v. Atrium Hospitality · filed 2021-05-17(1)(a)

Accordingly, absent further instruction from the Iowa Supreme Court to the contrary, we will continue to apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to ICRA discrimination claims at summary judgment.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires proof that the decision-maker knew of the employee’s protected characteristic before making the challenged employment decision.

Godfrey v. State of Iowa, Terry Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa, in His Official Capacity, Renna · filed 2021-06-30(1)(a)

To prove discrimination was because of an employee’s membership in a protected class, the plaintiff must prove the decision-maker knew of the employee’s membership in the protected class.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires a discrimination plaintiff to prove that the decision-maker knew of the employee’s protected characteristic.

Godfrey v. State of Iowa, Terry Branstad, Governor of the State of Iowa, in His Official Capacity, Brenna · filed 2021-06-30(1)(a)

To prove discrimination was because of an employee’s membership in a protected class, the plaintiff must prove the decision-maker knew of the employee’s membership in the protected class.

An employee relying on unequal treatment to show pretext for sex discrimination under section 216.6(1)(a) must show that the compared employee was similarly situated in all relevant respects.

Caldwell v. Casey's General Stores, Inc., Casey's Marketing Company and Casey's Retail Company · filed 2022-03-02(1)(a)

The ICRA prohibits firing an employee based on sex. Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2009) (citing Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (2003)). ... But whether Caldwell and Aguirre were treated differently is relevant only if the two were similarly situated. ... The district court correctly applied the test in determining Caldwell fails to show Aguirre was similarly situated.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discharge because of sex or sexual orientation. An employee challenging a stated nondiscriminatory reason for discharge must raise a genuine factual issue of pretext to avoid summary judgment.

Avery v. Iowa Department of Human Services, State of Iowa, and Michael McInroy · filed 2023-07-13(1)(a)

Under the ICRA, it is “an unfair or discriminatory practice . . . to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment . . . because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, religion, ... or disability of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation.” Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (emphasis added). ... Thus, the burden shifted back to Avery to establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether HHS’s reason was pretextual. See Feeback, 988 N.W.2d at 348. ... On our review of the summary judgment record, we find no error of law or reason to modify the district court’s ruling. We therefore affirm.

Section 216.6 prohibits race discrimination in employment; an employee relying on indirect evidence must make a prima facie showing that includes an adverse employment action.

Hart v. Deere & Company · filed 2023-10-11

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must make a minimal evidentiary showing that he or she (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position or met his or her employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) suffered an adverse employment action and (4) that the circumstances of his or her employment, or adverse employment action, give rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 216.6(1)(a) permits an age-discrimination claim to proceed when disputed safety allegations and favorable evaluations create a fact question about the employee’s qualifications.

McClure v. Ei Du Pont Nemours and Company d/b/a Corteva Agriscience · filed 2024-07-24(1)(a)

We conclude McClure generated a fact question under either articulation. ... We find the facts here, particularly considering McClure’s decades of continued employment, established a prima facie case of age discrimination.

Section 216.6 requires a plaintiff alleging sex discrimination in pay to show substantially equal work based on actual duties, rather than job titles.

Lara v. Thomas · filed 1994-02-23(1)(a)

To determine whether Lara’s work was substantially equal to that of the male employees we must look beyond the job title or description and examine the nature of the actual duties performed. ... For the same reasons, we conclude Lara has also failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under Iowa law.

Section 216.6 covers discriminatory pay practices, and each discriminatory paycheck starts a new 300-day filing period.

Erin Dindinger, Lisa Loring, and Elizabeth Freund v. Allsteel, Inc. and Scott Mills · filed 2015-03-06(1)(a)

We have no difficulty concluding that wage discrimination is potentially actionable under Iowa Code section 216.6. ... For reasons explained below, we adopt neither position, and instead conclude each paycheck is a discriminatory practice and a new 300-day limitations period applies to each check.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discharge based on disability, but an employee must establish all four elements of a prima facie disability discrimination claim.

Nelson v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1994-04-26(1)(a)

Under Iowa Code Section 216.6(1)(a), it is an unfair employment practice for an employer to discharge any employee on the basis of a disability. ... Therefore, the Court is persuaded that the Plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ICRA since he cannot establish all four of the elements required by Trobaugh. As a result, as to this disability discrimination claim, the Court finds for the Defendant.

Section 216.6 does not protect a vision impairment when the employee is not significantly limited in obtaining other satisfactory employment or disqualified from a wide range of available jobs.

Schwarz v. Northwest Iowa Community College · filed 1995-03-15

However, the court concludes that Schwarz is not “disabled” within the meaning of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, because there was no evidence in the record that she is “limited in any significant way from obtaining other satisfactory employment,” or disqualified from a wide range of other available jobs.

Section 216.6 protects an employee from disability discrimination only if the employee has a qualifying disability.

Fink v. Kitzman · filed 1995-03-29

The threshold inquiry is whether the plaintiff can show that he or she is a disabled person subject to protection under Iowa Code § 216.6.

Section 216.6 protects employees whose impairments substantially limit their ability to obtain satisfactory employment.

Hutchinson v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 1995-04-26

The court concludes that Hutchinson is not “disabled” within the meaning of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, because there was no evidence in the record that she is “limited in any significant way from obtaining other satisfactory employment,” or disqualified from a wide range of other available jobs.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires a court considering a disability discrimination claim to determine whether the employee was disabled and, if so, whether the employee made the disability known to the employer before discharge.

Falczynski v. Amoco Oil Co. · filed 1995-05-24(1)(a)

Following these principles on remand, the trial court must make the threshold inquiry of whether the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that she was disabled. ... On the other hand, if the trial court finds the plaintiff was disabled, it must also determine whether plaintiff made her disability known to her employer before her discharge.

Section 216.6 requires proof of disability to recover for disability discrimination.

Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co. · filed 1997-11-26(1)(a)

Proof of a disability is essential to recovery for disability discrimination under the ADA and the ICRA.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discharge because of disability, and depression can qualify as a mental impairment for a disability discrimination claim.

Fuller v. Iowa Department of Human Services · filed 1998-03-25(1)(a)

We therefore conclude that plaintiffs depressive condition qualifies as a “mental impairment” under the ICRA for purposes of a disability discrimination claim, irrespective of the testimony presented at trial concerning Fuller’s predisposition to depressive episodes.

Section 216.6 prohibits disability discrimination in employment, and a factual dispute over whether the employee was qualified can preclude summary judgment.

Walsted v. Woodbury County, IA · filed 2000-09-25

Iowa Code § 216.6 makes it an unfair or discriminatory employment practice to “discharge” or “otherwise discriminate” against any employee “because of’ a disability “unless based upon the nature of the occupation.” ... Accordingly, because the court finds that Walsted has generated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Walsted was “qualified” for the position, the court denies Woodbury County’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Walsted’s claim of disability discrimination under Iowa Code Chapter 216.

Section 216.6 prohibits discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of a disability unless the action is based on the nature of the occupation.

Kalskett v. Larson Manufacturing Co. of Iowa, Inc. · filed 2001-06-01

Iowa Code § 216.6 makes it an unfair or discriminatory employment practice to “discharge” or “otherwise discriminate” against any employee “because of’ a disability “unless based upon the nature of the occupation.”

Section 216.6(1) requires a disability discrimination claimant seeking reassignment to identify an available job for which she is qualified.

Schlitzer v. University of Iowa Hospitals & Clinics · filed 2002-01-24(1)

In this case the plaintiff failed to identify a specific available job for which she was qualified. In addition to Schlit-zer’s failure to identify a specific job that was available, she failed to show she was qualified for the type of position she sought. She therefore failed to establish a prima facie case under the civil rights statute.

Section 216.6(1) prohibits disability discrimination against a qualified employee and requires evidence that an adverse employment action occurred because of the disability.

Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works · filed 2005-10-10(1)

The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibit covered employers from discriminating against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability on account of that disability. 42 U.S.C § 12112(a); Iowa Code § 216.6(1). ... Specifically, Simpson has produced insufficient evidence that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability, the third element of his prima facie case.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discharging an employee because of disability unless the discharge is based on the nature of the occupation.

Napreljac v. John Q. Hammons Hotels, Inc. · filed 2006-11-08(1)(a)

Under the ICRA, it is unlawful to discharge an employee on the basis of the employee’s disability, “unless based upon the nature of the occupation.”

Disability discrimination claims under section 216.6(1)(a) are generally analyzed under ADA standards when the parties do not dispute using federal analysis.

Gretillat v. Care Initiatives · filed 2007-03-30(1)(a)

Where, as here, the parties do not dispute the application of federal analysis, disability claims under the ICRA are generally analyzed in accord with the ADA.

Section 216.6 disability discrimination claims arising before the ADA amendments took effect are analyzed under the same standards as pre-amendment ADA claims.

Magnussen v. Casey's Marketing Co. · filed 2011-05-26(1)(a)

Consequently, because the ADAAA is inapplicable here, my discussion of Magnussen’s “disability” claims applies equally to Magnussen’s claims under the ADA and the ICRA.

Section 216.6(1) disability discrimination claims are analyzed under the same standards as ADAAA claims.

Jenkins v. Medical Laboratories of Eastern Iowa, Inc. · filed 2012-07-20(1)

Therefore, the court’s discussion of Jenkins’s ADAAA claims applies equally to her ICRA claims.

Section 216.6(1)(a) does not categorically exclude workers whose impairments affect squatting, kneeling, or crawling from protection against disability discrimination.

Hollinger v. State of Iowa · filed 2016-12-21(1)(a)

Because an interpretation of the ICRA that excludes those impaired from performing acts such as squatting, kneeling, or crawling does not broadly effectuate the purposes of the ICRA, we decline to apply the statement in Bearshield relied on by the district court to the case at bar.

Section 216.6(1) requires a disability discrimination claimant to show a disability, qualification for the position, and an employment decision based on the disability.

McCrea v. City of Dubuque · filed 2017-03-08(1)

In order to establish a claim based on disability discrimination under the ICRA, McCrea must make a prima facie case by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) she has a disability, (2) she was qualified for the position sought, and (3) the employment decision was based on her disability.”

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires a sex discrimination plaintiff relying on a comparator to produce evidence that a similarly situated male employee received better treatment.

Rebouche v. Deere & Company · filed 2015-05-26(1)(a)

Delyorce Raye Rebouche brought claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a), alleging that her employer, Deere & Company a/k/a John Deere Company (Deere), and individuals Rodger Burris and Bruce Boardman (collectively, Defendants) discriminated against her on the basis of sex. ... Rebouche has failed to produce any such evidence and has therefore failed to show that Wilson, who had a different job title and pay grade, was similarly situated to her. ... We therefore agree with the district court that Rebouche has failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.

Section 216.6(1)(a) can protect an employee with multiple sclerosis when flare-ups substantially impair a major life activity, even if the condition causes no impairment in remission.

Goodpaster v. Schwan's Home Service, Inc. and Todd Swanson, Individually and in His Corporate Capacity · filed 2014-06-27(1)(a)

Accordingly, we hold multiple sclerosis can constitute a disability under the Iowa Act if the plaintiff produces evidence that the condition substantially impaired one or more major life activities during episodes or flare-ups, even if it did not impair life activities at all when in remission.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires a disability discrimination claimant to show that an adverse employment decision was made because of the claimant’s disability.

Nolan Deeds v. City of Cedar Rapids, St. Luke's Work Well Solutions, St. Luke's Healthcare, and Iowa Health System D/B/A · filed 2017-10-11(1)(a)

The Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) prohibits discrimination in employment based on disability. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Deeds must show: (1) he is a person with a disability, (2) he was qualified to perform the job either with or without an accommodation for his disability, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision because of his disability. ... Because Deeds’s has failed to show the City rescinded its job offer based on his MS diagnosis, we affirm.

Disability claims under § 216.6 are generally analyzed under the ADA framework when the parties do not dispute its application.

Winters v. Deere & Company · filed 2021-12-07(1)(a)

Because the parties do not argue otherwise, I will analyze Winters’ ICRA disability claims under the federal framework.

Section 216.6(1) prohibits disability-based employment discrimination against a qualified individual.

Siebrecht v. Mercy Health Service - Iowa Corp. · filed 2024-09-30(1)

The ADA and the ICRA prohibit an employer from discriminating against a “qualified individual” based on their disability.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires a disability-discrimination claimant to show a disability, qualification for the job, and an adverse employment decision because of the disability.

Nolan Deeds v. City of Marion, St. Luke's Work Well Solutions, St. Luke's Healthcare and Iowa Health Systems D/B/A Unity · filed 2017-10-11(1)(a)

The Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) prohibits discrimination in employment based on disability. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Deeds must show: (1) he is a person with a disability, (2) he was qualified to perform the job either with or without an accommodation for his disability, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision because of his disability. ... Because Deeds’s has failed to show the City rescinded its job offer based on his MS diagnosis, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.

An employer does not discriminate against an applicant because of a disability under section 216.6(1)(a) when it is unaware of the disability and the applicant does not disclose it or request an accommodation.

Nolan Deeds v. City of Marion, Iowa, St. Luke's Work Well Solutions St. Luke's Healthcare, and Iowa Health System · filed 2018-06-22(1)(a)

When the City rescinded its job offer to Deeds, the City did not know he had MS. The City only knew that the physician reported Deeds was not medically qualified for the firefighter position. Deeds, however, knew the physician found him unqualified because of his MS and could have told the City he had that condition and requested an accommodation but failed to do so. Deeds also failed to engage in the interactive process offered by the City after his ICRA complaint to explore reasonable accommodations. We conclude that Deeds cannot show the City discriminated against him “because of” his disability.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits disability discrimination in employment, and squatting and kneeling can be major life activities when determining whether a worker has a disability.

Hollinger v. State of Iowa · filed 2019-11-27(1)(a)

The ICRA prohibits employment discrimination based on disability. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (2013). ... Thus, the district court correctly interpreted our holding in the first appeal to determine that squatting and kneeling are major life activities under the ICRA.

Section 216.6 requires an impairment affecting work to substantially limit a person’s ability to work; a restriction to dayshift work alone does not establish a disability.

McClure v. Ei Du Pont Nemours and Company d/b/a Corteva Agriscience · filed 2025-06-20

Thus, even setting aside the fact that Congress’s 2008 amendments to the ADA had no bearing on the unaltered Iowa Code section 216.6, these principles addressing work as a major life activity continue to guide the question of whether an individual’s impairment substantially limits their ability to work.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discharging an otherwise qualified employee because of a disability.

Hunter v. City of Des Moines, Iowa; and Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit, Jane Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 2, · filed 2026-04-24(1)(a)

Rather, as relevant here, it prohibits certain types of discrimination, specifically discharging an employee who was otherwise qualified because of their disability. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a).

Circumstantial evidence can show that an employee’s disability was a motivating factor in a discharge under § 216.6(1)(a).

Hunter v. City of Des Moines, Iowa · filed 2025-10-01(1)(a)

From the circumstantial evidence presented by Hunter, a reasonable factfinder could infer that his PTSD was a motivating factor in the disciplinary decision.

Section 216.6 includes reasonable accommodation in assessing whether a disabled employee is qualified to perform a job.

Fischer v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission · filed 1994-05-26

The issue of accommodation is included in an assessment of an employee’s qualifications to perform the job in a reasonably competent and satisfactory manner given reasonable accommodation by the employer.

Section 216.6 does not require an employer to accommodate a disability by removing an essential job duty.

Courtney v. American National Can Co. · filed 1995-09-20

Therefore, eliminating forklift driving from Courtney’s job duties would alter the essential nature of the job — an accommodation not required under Iowa law.

Section 216.6(1) requires an employee seeking reassignment under a company transfer policy to identify a specific available position.

Casey's General Stores, Inc. v. Blackford · filed 2003-04-02(1)

Thus, even if an employee relies on a company transfer policy, instead of the statutory obligation to reassign, the employee must still identify a specific available position.

Section 216.6(1)(a) covers an employer’s failure to make a required disability or religious accommodation; an emotional distress claim based on the same refusal is preempted.

Cole v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2006-07-11(1)(a)

Under either theory, the lack of an ac-coftimodation is an element of Cole’s ICRA claim. Therefore, for Cole to have suffered emotional distress resulting from Wells Fargo’s failure to accommodate the exercise of her religion or her alleged disability, she must succeed on her ICRA claim. Consequently, preemption principles forbid her from advancing a tort claim on any alleged failure to accommodate.

Section 216.6 protects employees from age discrimination regardless of age, subject to exceptions for certain minors and people over forty-five in apprenticeship programs.

Rouse v. Farmers State Bank of Jewell, Iowa · filed 1994-09-29(3), (5)

Membership in the protected class is age-neutral under Iowa Code Ch. 216, which prohibits discrimination in employment “because of age” of an employee, with the exception that under Iowa Code § 216.6(3), persons under eighteen years of age are not covered if they are not considered by law to be adults, and under Iowa Code § 216.6(5), the employee is over forty-five years of age in an apprenticeship program. ... Thus, both Rouse and Baird are members of the protected class under the Iowa age discrimination statute.

Section 216.6 protects employees from age discrimination regardless of age, subject to exceptions for certain minors and employees over forty-five in apprenticeship programs.

Kunzman v. Enron Corp. · filed 1995-09-13

Membership in the protected class is age-neutral under Iowa Code Ch. 216, which prohibits discrimination in employment “because of age” of an employee, with the exception that under Iowa Code § 216.6(3), persons under eighteen years of age are not covered if they are not considered by law to be adults, and under Iowa Code § 216.6(5), the employee is over forty-five years of age in an apprenticeship program.

Section 216.6 age discrimination claims are analyzed under the same framework as ADEA claims.

Regel v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1999-09-09

We apply the same analysis to the appellants' age discrimination claims under the ADEA and under Iowa Code § 216.6.

Section 216.6 age discrimination claims are analyzed under the same standards as ADEA claims.

Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn · filed 2000-10-12

The ICRA is interpreted to mirror federal law, including the ADEA. ... Thus, our analysis of Fisher's ADEA claim applies equally to his ICRA claim.

Section 216.6 prohibits age-based discharge; during a reduction in force, a plaintiff must offer additional evidence that age was a factor in the termination.

Bialas v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. · filed 1995-07-12

Likewise, the Iowa Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from discriminating against or discharging an employee because of his age. Iowa Code § 216.6 (1995). ... Therefore, in a reduction-in force case, the plaintiff is required to come forward with additional evidence that age was a factor in his termination.

Section 216.6 age-discrimination claims are analyzed under the same standards as ADEA claims.

Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn · filed 2000-09-05

The ICRA is interpreted to mirror federal law, including the ADEA. See Montgomery v. John Deere & Co., 169 F.3d 556, 558 n.3 (8th Cir. 1999). Thus, our analysis of Fisher’s ADEA claim applies equally to his ICRA claim.

Section 216.6 prohibits employment discrimination because of age without requiring an employee to be at least 40.

Kesler v. BASF Corp. · filed 2002-12-10(a)

The first element of an ADEA prima facie case is thus not required by ICRA, but this difference is not important here as Kesler was over 40.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires a plaintiff using circumstantial evidence to show that she was in an age-protected class, met her employer’s expectations, was discharged, and that age was a factor in the discharge.

Orluske v. Mercy Medical Center-North Iowa · filed 2006-10-10(1)(a)

Age discrimination in employment is prohibited by both federal and Iowa law. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code § 216.6(l)(a). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under either federal or state law, in a case based on circumstantial evidence like the one now before the court, the plaintiff must show that she was in an age-protected class (over 40 for purposes of the ADEA); (2) that she was qualified for her job, ie., that she was performing to her employer’s expectations; (3) that she was discharged; and (4) that age was a factor in the employer’s decision to terminate her.

Section 216.6(1)(a) does not impose age discrimination liability if the employer would have taken the same action without considering age.

Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. · filed 2009-11-30(1)(a)

It follows from the Iowa court’s adoption of this rule from Price Waterhouse that there is no violation of the ICRA if the employer would have taken the same action in the absence of an improper motive.

Section 216.6(1)(a) permits an age discrimination plaintiff in a pretext case to prove causation by showing that age played a part in the discharge and need not have been the only reason.

Newberry v. Burlington Basket Co. · filed 2010-09-28(1)(a)

The ICRA addresses discrimination based on “sex” and “age” in the same section, Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a), and we see no reason to believe that the Iowa court would vary from DeBoom in an age discrimination case. ... In that scenario, DeBoom establishes that the district court’s instruction, drawn from the Eighth Circuit “motivating factor” model instruction, was correct under Iowa law.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits refusing to hire an applicant because of age; age need only be a motivating factor in the decision.

Tusing v. Des Moines Independent Community School District · filed 2011-04-12(1)(a)

Similarly, the ICRA prohibits employers from refusing to hire an employee "because of the age . . . of such applicant or employee." Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). ... However, because the ICRA permits a lesser showing to establish age discrimination, we must further consider whether Tusing has presented any evidence to show that age was a motivating factor in the School District's decision not to hire her as a school counselor. ... We conclude that Tusing has not provided sufficient evidence to support an inference of age discrimination under the ICRA.

Section 216.6 age discrimination claims generally follow the ADEA analysis, but the ICRA applies a lower standard of proof at the pretext stage.

Ridout v. JBS USA, LLC · filed 2012-08-20

Notably, this third phase of the analysis requires a somewhat lower standard of proof under the ICRA than it does under the ADEA.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment; an employee must prove that age was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.

Sellers v. Deere & Co. · filed 2014-05-19(1)(a)

In an action brought pursuant to the ICRA, however, the plaintiff need only prove that age was “a motivating factor” in the employer’s decision.

Section 216.6(1)(a) age discrimination claims without direct proof use the McDonnell Douglas framework; evidence of a veteran’s preference violation does not establish pretext without a connection to age discrimination.

Boyd v. Legislative Services Agency, Glen Dickinson and State of Iowa · filed 2014-07-16(1)(a)

Under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), claims of discrimination for which direct proof is not available are analyzed using the framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) ... (2011); King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1983). ... Second, even if we assume the State violated the veteran’s preference statute in June 2009, we agree with the State’s claim “Boyd has failed to explain how that evidence has any bearing on determining whether the defendants acted with age-related animus.” ... For all of the above reasons, the challenged evidence is not relevant to Boyd’s age-discrimination claim, and we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding such evidence “attenuated” and not relevant.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discrimination in employment because of an employee’s age.

Wyngarden v. State of Iowa Judicial Branch, John Wauters, and Bruce Buttel · filed 2014-08-27(1)(a)

The statute provides it “shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any person” to discriminate in employment against any employee “because of the age” of such employee.

Under § 216.6, age need only play a part in an adverse employment decision; it need not be the sole reason.

Severe v. O'Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. · filed 2015-03-23

Under the ICRA, a plaintiff must ... only show that age “played a part” in the adverse employment decision and need not prove age was the only reason.

Section 216.6 requires an age discrimination plaintiff to show that age played a part in the adverse employment decision, but not that it was the only reason.

Lorenz v. Tyson Foods, Inc. · filed 2015-12-03

Under the ICRA, a plaintiff must only show that age “played a part” in the adverse employment decision and need not prove age was the only reason.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits age discrimination in employment, including the discharge of an at-will employee because of age.

Steven Kuhle as Fraternal Order of Eagles 568 v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission and Patricia Kelly and Michael Fishnick · filed 2019-03-06(1)(a)

The ICRA legislatively prohibits unlawful discrimination against an employee based on the employee’s age. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (2013). Discharge of an employee because of age is an exception to the employment-at- will doctrine. See Boyle v. Alum-Line, 710 N.W.2d 741, 749 (Iowa 2006).

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits age discrimination against employees, including employees who serve at will.

Steven Kuhle as Fraternal Order of Eagles 568 v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission and Patricia Kelly and Michael Fishnick · filed 2019-04-03(1)(a)

The ICRA legislatively prohibits unlawful discrimination against an employee based on the employee’s age. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (2013). Discharge of an employee because of age is an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Under section 216.6(1)(a), an isolated remark about an employee’s career stage is not, by itself, sufficient to show age discrimination.

Hedlund v. State of Iowa · filed 2019-06-28(1)(a)

Moreover, isolated remarks, such as "twilight of his career," are not sufficient on their own to show age discrimination.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires a plaintiff alleging sex or age discrimination to show that the employer discriminated in the terms and conditions of employment because of that trait.

Heisler v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co · filed 2019-07-30(1)(a)

To establish discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII or discrimination on the basis of sex or age under ICRA, a plaintiff needs to show that her employer discriminated against her with respect to the terms and conditions of employment on the basis of the relevant impermissible category. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a).

Section 216.6(1)(a) allows an age-discrimination discharge claim to proceed to trial when the evidence could convince a reasonable jury that age motivated the firing.

Feeback v. Swift Pork Company, Troy Mulgrew and Todd Carl · filed 2022-03-30(1)(a)

That disparate treatment, viewed together with the lack of investigation into the intended recipient of his texts, could convince a reasonable jury that Swift fired Feeback because of his age. Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on Feeback’s age discrimination claim and remand for trial.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits age discrimination against employees over forty and requires age to be a motivating factor in the adverse employment action.

Smothers v. Rowley Mem. Masonic Home · filed 2023-03-23(1)(a)

The ADEA and ICRA prohibit age discrimination against an employee who is over the age of forty. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). ... We apply the same analysis under the ADEA and ICRA, acknowledging that the ADEA requires that age be the but-for cause of the adverse employment action, whereas ICRA requires only that age be a motivating factor.

Section 216.6(1)(a) allows an age discrimination claim when the employee alleges qualification and circumstances supporting an inference that age played a part in the employment decision.

Wilson v. TK Elevators Corporation · filed 2024-10-29(1)(a)

Under the ICRA, a plaintiff must show only that age “played a part” in the adverse employment decision and need not prove age was the only reason. ... When viewing the alleged facts and permissible inferences in Wilson’s favor, he has sufficiently pleaded a claim of age discrimination under the ICRA.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits discharge because of age; age need only play a part in the decision.

Wilson · filed 2025-11-26(1)(a)

Under the ICRA, a plaintiff must show only that age “played a part” in the adverse employment decision and need not prove age was the only reason.

Section 216.6(1)(a) permits an age discrimination claim when age was a motivating factor in an employee’s termination.

Ridout v. JBS USA, LLC · filed 2013-06-14(1)(a)

Both statutes provide a right of action for an employee who is terminated "because of" his age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). The statutes require slightly different showings of causation, compare Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 178 (2009) (ADEA plaintiff must show that age discrimination was a "but[] for" cause of his termination) with DeBoom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Iowa 2009) (ICRA plaintiff need only show that age discrimination was a "motivating factor"). The difference is not important in this case because Ridout has produced sufficient evidence to allow a rational factfinder to find in his favor under either statute.

Section 216.6 preempts common law emotional distress claims tied to the filing of an age discrimination complaint.

O'BRYAN v. KTIV Television · filed 1994-11-22

The court concludes that these allegations of outrageous conduct are cognizable as age discrimination claims. Specifically, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress which are tied to his filing of an age discrimination complaint. Therefore, these claims would be preempted by Iowa Code § 216.6.

Section 216.6 provides the exclusive remedy for portions of common-law tort claims based on sex discrimination.

Thompto v. Coborn's Inc. · filed 1994-11-23

In light of the authorities cited above, Iowa Code § 216.6 provides the exclusive remedy for any portions of Thompto’s tort claims that are based on sex discrimination.

Section 216.6 provides the exclusive remedy for common-law tort claims based entirely on alleged discriminatory employment conduct.

Westin v. Mercy Medical Services, Inc. · filed 1998-02-12

In light of the authorities cited above, Iowa Code § 216.6 provides the exclusive remedy for these claims since they are both based in their entirety on the claimed discriminatory actions of defendants.

Section 216.6(1)(a)’s prohibition on employment discrimination applies only to employers, so Chapter 216 does not necessarily displace an interference-with-contract claim against a third party.

Knutson v. Sioux Tools, Inc. · filed 1998-01-12(1)(a)

Furthermore, Iowa Code Ch. 216 is not necessarily the exclusive remedy for a claim of intentional interference with a contract. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that the language in Iowa Code Ch. 216 that makes it unlawful for a person to discharge “or otherwise discriminate in employment,” Iowa Code § 216.6(l)(a), “pertains only to employers.” ... Similarly here, it is not entirely clear from the record whether Brown and Wilson are or effectively are parties to Knutson’s contract, a matter to which the court will return in its discussion of the tortious interference claim in subsection IV.C. below.

Section 216.6 does not support a sex discrimination claim for harassment that was not based on the employee’s sex.

Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc. · filed 1995-08-04(1)(a)

The facts of this case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, do not support claims in Counts IX and X for sex discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-2(a)(1) or the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Chapter 216, the Iowa Code; these claims are dismissed.

Section 216.6 permits a sex-discrimination claim based on a hostile work environment, using federal Title VII cases as the basic framework.

Quick v. Donaldson Co. · filed 1996-07-29

Since Quick's Title VII claim was improperly dismissed, summary judgment on his state claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act was also inappropriate.

Hostile work environment sexual harassment claims under § 216.6 use Title VII analysis and require harassment based on sex.

Noble v. Monsanto Co. · filed 1997-06-11

The court applies Title VII analysis for hostile-work-environment sexual harassment claims brought under the ICRA. ... Ridicule is not actionable absent showing that the harassment was based on sex.

Section 216.6(1)(a) covers hostile work environment claims under its prohibition on otherwise discriminating in employment, but limits liability for those claims to employers.

Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1997-06-19(1)(a)

The Court holds that a claim for hostile work environment falls within the “otherwise discriminate in employment” language in Section 216.6(l)(a). Because the Iowa Supreme Court has limited the applicability of the language “otherwise discriminate in employment” in Section 216.6(l)(a) to apply only to employers, the Court holds that a hostile-work-environment claim applies only to employers.

Section 216.6 treats a sexually hostile work environment as unlawful sex discrimination.

Stricker v. Cessford Construction Co. · filed 2001-09-07

Maintenance of a sexually hostile work environment not only violates federal law, but is a form of illegal sex discrimination under Iowa Code § 216.6.

Section 216.6(1)(a) covers hostile work environment sexual harassment, and an employer may assert the Ellerth/Faragher defense when it took no tangible employment action.

Reed v. Cedar County · filed 2007-02-08(1)(a)

The Iowa Supreme Court has adopted the federal framework to analyze sexual harassment claims, so the court will apply the same analysis to Reed’s Title VII and ICRA claims. ... In sum, the court concludes that Sheriff Hannes never inflicted economic harm on Reed, and Defendants took no “tangible employment action” against her.

Section 216.6 requires sexual harassment to be severe or pervasive enough to alter a term or condition of employment; repeated unwanted invitations and unprofessional conduct did not meet that threshold here.

Henthorn v. Capitol Com. · filed 2004-03-05

We analyze both the Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act claims by applying the analytical framework established by the federal courts for Title VII cases. ... Having examined the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that although Parker’s comments and actions were inappropriate, immature, and unprofessional, they did not cross the high threshold required to support a claim of sexual harassment.

Section 216.6 covers racial harassment that creates a hostile work environment and affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Torres v. Quatro Composites, LLC · filed 2012-10-01

The Iowa Supreme Court has also recognized that a hostile work environment claim under ICRA consists of the same elements as a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. ... Therefore, in this Court’s judgment, Plaintiffs allegations are sufficient to establish that his co-workers’ treatment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his employment.

Section 216.6(1) supports a hostile work environment claim developed through Iowa caselaw based on Title VII precedent, although it does not expressly provide for one.

Haskenhoff v. Homeland Energy Solutions, LLC · filed 2017-06-23(1)

The Iowa legislature, however, did not expressly include a hostile-work-environment provision in the ICRA. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1). Rather, the claim has been developed through our caselaw, beginning in 1990, based expressly on Title VII precedent.

Section 216.6 requires a sex-based hostile work environment claimant to show unwelcome harassment severe enough to affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.

Mahler v. First Dakota Title Ltd Partner · filed 2019-07-31

This court addresses Mahler’s Title VII and ICRA hostile work environment claims using the same analysis. ... Because her actions demonstrate that she did not personally experience offensive or unwelcome harassment, her claim fails. ... Because Mahler cannot establish a prima facie case, summary judgment is proper.

Section 216.6(1) prohibits sexually hostile work environments.

Easterday v. Whirlpool Corporation · filed 2020-03-31(1)

Iowa Code section 216.6 makes the creation of a sexually hostile work environment illegal.

Section 216.6(1) permits individual liability for a hostile work environment only when the person has authority to correct or prevent the abusive environment.

Valdez v. West Des Moines Community Schools and Desira Johnson · filed 2023-06-30(1)

And in the context of a hostile work environment, the necessary authority for liability must include the authority to correct or ... prevent an abusive working environment.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires sexual harassment to be objectively severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment.

Rheeder v. Shellene Gray, City of Marion, Douglas Slagle and Joseph McHale · filed 2025-06-06(1)(a)

Although Slagle was Rheeder’s superior, his conduct falls short of the severe or pervasive conduct required to support a hostile-work-environment claim under our caselaw.

Section 216.6(1)(a) supports a race-based hostile work environment claim when unwelcome racial harassment affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Hager v. M & W Welding, Inc., Colton Beals, Jacob Rhoades and Benjamin Andrew Guy St. Lawrence · filed 2025-07-02(1)(a)

To establish a hostile work environment claim under the ICRA, “the plaintiff must show: (1) he or she belongs to a protected group; (2) he or she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was ... based on a protected characteristic; and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 741, 746 (Iowa 2006) (citation omitted). ... Ultimately, we find Hager’s petition sufficiently pled a hostile work environment claim.

Section 216.6 protects a worker regarded as disabled when the perceived impairment significantly limits access to a wide range of other jobs.

Muller v. Hotsy Corp. · filed 1996-02-21

Based upon Fernholz’s own testimony that he perceived Muller as disabled, the representations made by Fernholz to Muller, Muller’s wife, and Mathiason regarding his doubts of the temporary nature of Muller’s condition, and Fernholz’s alleged statements that any further work would aggravate Muller’s condition, the court concludes that there is evidence in the summary judgment record that Fernholz perceived Muller as “limited in a significant way from obtaining other satisfactory employment,” or disqualified from a wide range of other available jobs. Thus, the court finds Muller has raised a material fact question as to whether he is “disabled” within the meaning of the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

Section 216.6 protects employees from discharge based on a perceived disability, even if they have no actual disability.

Howell v. Merritt Co. · filed 1998-10-21(1)(a)

Inclusion of such claims under our civil rights act prevents adverse employment consequences based upon prejudices, ignorance, and stereotypes regardless of whether the individual has an actual physical or mental disability.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires a perceived-disability claimant to show that the employer relied on myths, fears, or stereotypes instead of an individualized assessment.

Vincent v. Four M Paper Corp. · filed 1999-02-17(1)(a)

The plaintiff must establish that the defendant failed to make the employment decision based on an individualized assessment of the plaintiff’s condition, and instead based its decision on myths, fears or stereotypes.

Section 216.6 protects an employee whom an employer regards as substantially limited in the ability to obtain a wide range of jobs.

Wheaton v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc. · filed 1999-10-08

The threshold inquiry is whether the plaintiff can show that he or she is a disabled person subject to protection under Iowa Code § 216.6. ... In light of this information, a reasonable fact-finder could infer that the defendant perceived Wheaton as “limited in a significant way from obtaining other satisfactory employment,” or disqualified from a wide range of available jobs.

Section 216.6 permits emotional distress damages for employment discrimination without proof of physical injury, severe distress, or outrageous conduct.

Davis v. City of Waterloo · filed 1996-07-24

It is clear that under both Iowa Code section 216.6 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress for employment discrimination without a showing of physical injury, severe distress, or outrageous conduct.

Section 216.6(1)(a) can reach nonemployers, but an advisory medical recommendation directly responsive to a prospective employer’s request is not a discriminatory act.

Sahai v. Davies · filed 1997-01-22(1)(a)

Although we agree that this language extends the prohibition of the act to some situations in which a person guilty of discriminatory conduct is not the actual employer of the person discriminated against, it does not, in our view, embrace the actions of the clinic and Dr. Sahai in the present case. That is due to the fact that within the context of the Nissen hiring decision the clinic's role was advisory. The advice being sought was an independent medical judgment. Recommendations made in this context that are directly responsive to a prospective employer's request are not in our view discriminatory actions.

Section 216.6(1)(a) does not make a person liable for employment discrimination merely because information they gave may have prompted an employer to fire someone.

Zepeda v. Fort Des Moines Men's Correctional Facility, Department of Correctional Services · filed 1998-11-25(1)(a)

The defendant facility did not thereby become Zepeda’s employer, or “discriminate in employment,” as contemplated in Iowa Code section 216.6(l)(a). Olsten’s actions were its own, and did not come under the control of the facility.

Section 216.6(1) permits individual liability for a supervisory employee who commits an unfair employment practice.

Vivian v. Madison · filed 1999-10-13(1)

For the reasons expressed above in analyzing the various arguments and cases, we hold that a supervisory employee is subject to individual liability for unfair employment practices under Iowa Code section 216.6(1) of the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

Section 216.6 allows individual supervisor liability only when the supervisor controls the employer’s hiring decisions; an advisory role is insufficient.

Nelson v. Wittern Group, Inc. · filed 2001-01-29

Before an individual may be found liable under Iowa civil rights law, he or she must be found to have “control [of] the company’s hiring decisions.”

Section 216.6(1)(a) does not impose individual liability on a non-supervisory official who has no authority over the employment decisions affecting the plaintiff.

Erickson-Puttmann v. Gill · filed 2002-05-06(1)(a)

The court, therefore, concludes that individual liability under the ICRA will not lie against a non-supervisory official who exercises no decision making authority over the employment actions effecting a plaintiff.

Section 216.6(1) permits individual liability for supervisory employees for unfair employment practices.

Pospisil v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc. · filed 2007-10-05(1)

However, Swaim and Workman may still be held individually liable on Plaintiffs claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

Section 216.6 does not make an employer liable for coworker sexual harassment when its prompt corrective action ends the known harassment.

Alvarez v. Des Moines Bolt Supply, Inc. · filed 2010-11-17

The Supreme Court of Iowa’s recent decision in DeBoom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2009), concerning Iowa Code § 216.6 suggests that not all federal and Iowa discrimination claims should be analyzed the same. ... We therefore analyze the federal and state claims together in this case. ... Although Alvarez was required to tolerate some delay while DMB investigated the complaint and formulated a remedy, DMB’s response effectively ended the harassment within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of DMB on Alvarez’s discrimination claims based on pre-suspension sexual harassment.

Section 216.6(1)(a) may reach a person who controls an employer’s employment decisions even if that person is not the worker’s formal employer.

Johnson v. BE & K CONSTRUCTION CO., LLC · filed 2009-01-16(1)(a)

Second, while it is entirely possible, and even likely, that ADM cannot be held liable under § 216.6(1)(a) because it was not “in a position to control [BE & K’s] hiring decisions,” the precise contours of ADM’s relationship with BE & K and with Plaintiff are not entirely clear at this early stage of the proceedings. While ADM contends that it was nothing more than a customer of BE & K, the allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint plausibly support an inference that ADM had supervisory authority over Plaintiffs employment.

Section 216.6(1) permits individual liability for unfair employment practices beyond supervisory employees.

Blazek v. United States Cellular Corp. · filed 2011-11-28(1)

Contrary to the defendants’ contentions, I do not find that individual liability under Iowa Code § 216.6(1) is limited to “supervisory” employees.

Section 216.6(1)(a) can impose individual liability on a person who upholds an employment termination through a grievance process.

Gonzalez v. Whirlpool Corporation · filed 2021-06-10(1)(a)

Here, at the motion to dismiss stage of litigation, and, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and, given the fact that Gonzalez was terminated from employment and his termination was upheld by Cook under the grievance process, the court is persuaded that Cook is a “person” under the ICRA for purposes of individual liability.

Section 216.6 permits individual liability for discrimination when a person is personally involved in and able to effectuate an adverse employment action, if the other elements of the claim are met.

Rumsey v. Woodgrain Millwork, Inc. d/b/a Windsor Windows and Doors, Liz Mallaney, and Clay Coppock · filed 2021-06-25(1)(a)

We conclude that an individual who is personally involved in, and has the ability to effectuate, an adverse employment action may be subject to individual liability for discrimination under section 216.6 or retaliation under section 216.11(2), assuming the other elements of each claim are satisfied with respect to the individual defendant.

Section 216.6 may impose employment discrimination liability on a person who is not the employee’s employer.

Vroegh v. Iowa Department of Corrections, and Wellmark, Inc. · filed 2022-04-01(1)(a)

The prohibition on discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act thus may extend beyond an actual employer.

Section 216.6(3)'s ninety-day filing deadline does not bar a state civil rights claim when a timely federal action qualifies for continuation under Iowa Code section 614.10.

Wetter v. Dubuque Aerie No. 568 of the Fraternal Order of Eagles · filed 1998-11-30(3)

The underlying purpose of Iowa Code section 216.6(3) like any other statute of limitations is well established: ... In this case, none of these purposes are advanced by the harsh result reached by the district court. Wetter’s state law claim was filed exactly six months after the Iowa Civil Rights Commission issued its right-to-sue letter. Moreover, the Eagles cannot reasonably claim the time elapsed compromised its ability to defend against Wetter’s claims. We accordingly reverse the decision of the district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits race and sex discrimination and harassment in employment; an ongoing pattern of that conduct can constitute a continuing violation.

Madison v. IBP, Ind. · filed 2001-06-25(1)(a)

ICRA and Title VII both prohibit employment discrimination and harassment on the basis of either race or sex. See Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. ... We conclude that Madison proved a continued violation of her civil rights from the time she began working at IBP in 1988 until she filed her federal lawsuit in 1996.

Race or sex discrimination and harassment may constitute a continuing violation, for which Iowa law permits damages throughout the violation, subject to a recovery limit the plaintiff agreed to at trial.

Sheri Sawyer Madison v. Ibp, Inc., Sheri Sawyer Madison, United States of America, Intervenor Below-Appellee v. Ibp, Inc · filed 2001-07-02(1)(a)

We conclude that Madison proved a continued violation of her civil rights from the time she began working at IBP in 1988 until she filed her federal lawsuit in 1996. Under Iowa law, this would have entitled her to recover damages for the entire period of that continuing violation. Because she agreed to a uniform limitations date at trial, however, Madison may only recover damages for illegal acts occurring after January 13, 1993.

Section 216.6(1) requires a claimant alleging employment discrimination to prove an adverse employment action, using the same elements as a Title VII discrimination claim.

Channon v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2001-07-05(1)

To establish her state claims of sexual discrimination and retaliation, Channon had to prove the same elements as for her sexual discrimination and retaliatory claims under Title VII. Therefore, under the state discrimination and retaliatory claims, as with the Title VII discrimination and retaliatory claims, Channon had to prove that she suffered an adverse employment action.

Section 216.6 requires a tangible change in duties or working conditions for reprimands or a poor performance evaluation to qualify as adverse employment action in an age discrimination claim.

Wiemann v. Indianola Community School District · filed 2003-05-06

Assuming arguendo plaintiffs written reprimands and poor performance evaluation were in part motivated by age-related animus, absent evidence of “more tangible change in duties or working conditions,” the reprimands and evaluation do not rise to the level of adverse employment action under the ICRA.

Section 216.6(1)(a) requires an adverse employment action for a discriminatory discharge claim; ending an employee’s notice period after the employee resigns does not qualify.

Munoz v. Adventure Lands of America, Inc. · filed 2021-02-03(1)(a)

Under the facts before us, Munoz caused the severance of her employment, and Adventureland did not inflict an adverse employment action on her by refusing to allow her to continue working after she expressed her intention to resign.

A discriminatory decision not to renew an employment contract is an unfair employment practice when communicated to the employee; the contract’s later expiration is not a separate act of discrimination.

Woomert v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission · filed 2008-06-25(1)(a)

We conclude the 180-day limitations period began to run when appellant was notified of the board’s discriminatory employment action. The subsequent expiration of her employment contract was not a separate discriminatory act or the end of continuing discrimination. The only discriminatory action by the board was the non-renewal of appellant’s employment contract.

Section 216.6 protects employees from employment discrimination but does not protect independent contractors.

Wortham v. American Family Ins. · filed 2004-10-08

Independent contractor status is not protected under the ADEA, Title VII, or the ICRA. Employees are protected under these acts. Thus, Wortham’s claims brought pursuant to these statutes fail as a matter of law.

Section 216.6 protects employees from employment discrimination but does not cover independent contractors.

Wortham v. American Family Insurance Group Dave Vore, Bob Carnine · filed 2004-11-19

Independent contractor status is not protected under the ADEA, Title VII, or the ICR A. Employees are protected under these acts. Thus, Wortham’s claims brought pursuant to these statutes fail as a matter of law.

Section 216.6(6)(a) exempts employers with fewer than four employees from its employment discrimination prohibition, and a city cannot apply the same prohibition to those employers.

Baker v. City of Iowa City · filed 2008-05-30(6)(a)

Iowa Code section 216.6(6)(a.) reflects the legislature’s intent to recognize and protect small employers’ associational interests. To allow local communities to bar employment discrimination by these same small employers would thwart this legislative intent.

Section 216.6(6)(a) counts a person toward the four-employee threshold while the person has an employment relationship with the employer, as shown by being on the payroll.

Simon Seeding & Sod, Inc. v. Dubuque Human Rights Commission and Jermaine Stapleton · filed 2017-05-19(6)(a)

We instead adopt the Walters approach to hold that an employee is counted for purposes of the small-business exemption if that employee has an employment relationship with the employer—that is, if he or she is on the payroll.

Section 216.6(6)(a)’s family-member exception does not allow a corporate employer to exclude its owner’s relatives when counting employees.

Joanne Cote v. Derby Insurance Agency, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, and Kevin Dorn, Individually · filed 2017-08-02(6)(a)

In the context of the ICRA’s specific reference to family members of an employer, we believe “employer” means a natural person.

Section 216.6(6)(a) does not allow a corporate employer to exclude an owner's family members when counting employees.

Joanne Cote v. Derby Insurance Agency, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, and Kevin Dorn, Individually · filed 2018-03-09(6)(a)

On the employee-numerosity issue, the district court appropriately decided Derby, as a corporation, did not qualify for the statutory exemption for “members of the employer’s family.” Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(a) (2014). Accordingly, Derby is subject to the ICRA.

Section 216.6(6)(a) does not allow a corporate employer to exclude the owner's family members when counting employees.

Joanne Cote v. Derby Insurance Agency, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, and Kevin Dorn, Individually · filed 2018-03-09(6)(a)

We hold that a corporation does not have family members and therefore cannot qualify for the family-member exception in section 216.6(6)(a).

Section 216.6 treats pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination; an employee bringing such a claim must show that she was qualified for her position and discharged under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Gorman v. Wells Manufacturing Corp. · filed 2002-07-15(1)(a)

The parties agree that as a pregnant female, Gorman was a member of a protected class. However, Gorman has failed to establish the “qualified” prong of her prima facie case. As it did with respect to her ADA claim, Gorman’s excessive absenteeism precludes deeming her qualified to perform the essential functions of her job.

Pregnancy discrimination claims under § 216.6(2)(a) are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when the plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discriminatory intent.

Pruett v. Krause Gentle Corp. · filed 2002-10-08(2)(a)

Where a plaintiff does not offer any direct evidence of discriminatory intent to support their claim, Title VII and ICRA claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Section 216.6 permits a pregnancy discrimination claim to proceed when a jury could find that the employer’s stated reasons for firing were false and discrimination was the real reason.

Smidt v. Porter · filed 2005-04-08

If the employer offers a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff must show the employer’s reason was pretextual and that unlawful discrimination was the real reason for the termination. ... Having waded into the murky waters of this case, we think the facts are sufficiently in dispute to warrant resolution by the trier of fact.

A pregnant employee satisfies the protected group element under § 216.6(2)(a), and a genuine dispute about her qualifications can defeat summary judgment.

Rohloff v. Metz Baking Co., L.L.C · filed 2007-06-12(2)(a)

The first element is not in dispute here, because the parties agree that Rohloff was pregnant at the time of adverse action against her by the defendants, so that she was a member of a protected group under § 2000e(k) and Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(a). ... Therefore, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Rohloffs state and federal pregnancy discrimination claims on the ground that Rohloff cannot show that she was “qualified” for her job, because Rohloff has met her burden to point to evidence generating genuine issues of material fact on the “qualification” element of her claims.

Section 216.6(2)(e) requires pregnancy leave for the period of disability or eight weeks, whichever is less; eighteen weeks of leave satisfies that requirement.

Walker v. Fred Nesbit Distributing, Co. · filed 2004-08-12(2)(e)

Pursuant to Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(e), an employer cannot refuse to grant a leave of absence if it “is for the period that the employee is disabled because of the employee’s pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, or for eight weeks, whichever is less.” ... Plaintiff was provided with eighteen weeks of unpaid leave, well beyond the eight weeks of unpaid leave required by Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(e). For this reason, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted on Plaintiffs claim of insufficient leave for pregnancy.

Section 216.6(2)(a) covers constructive discharge caused by pregnancy discrimination as exclusion from employment because of pregnancy.

MERFELD v. Warren County Health Services · filed 2009-02-12(2)(a)

Merfeld clearly asserts she suffered an adverse employment action, including that she was constructively discharged due to Defendants’ discriminating against her based on her pregnancy, which constitutes ”exclu[sion] from employment ... because of pregnancy” and thus states a claim under the ICRA.

Section 216.6(2)(d) protects women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, and related conditions, including maternity leave.

Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc. · filed 2009-08-28(2)(d)

After reviewing interpretations of the federal PDA, we interpret the phrase “a person disabled by pregnancy because of the employee’s pregnancy” broadly to include women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, and other related conditions. Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(d).

Section 216.6(2)(a) treats employment practices that exclude applicants or employees because of pregnancy as prima facie violations; pregnancy discrimination claims under the section use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.

Neessen v. Arona Corp. · filed 2010-04-30(2)(a)

The Iowa Supreme Court has embraced this burden-shifting analysis for pregnancy discrimination claims under the ICRA. ... Accordingly, the court applies the same analysis to both of Plaintiffs claims.

Iowa Code § 216.6 prohibits sex and pregnancy discrimination in employment. When a plaintiff makes no separate ICRA argument, the court analyzes the ICRA claim under the Title VII framework.

Ames v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co · filed 2014-03-13

The ICRA provides the same prohibitions. See Iowa Code § 216.6. Because Ames presents no separate arguments under the ICRA, we analyze her ICRA claims together with her Title VII claims under the same analytical framework used for Title VII claims. ... We thus conclude that Ames has not met her burden of demonstrating constructive discharge.

Section 216.6(2)(b) protects employees with a disability caused or contributed to by pregnancy; pregnancy alone does not trigger its protections.

McQuistion v. City of Clinton, Iowa Mark Regenwether Jeffrey Farwell And Jeffrey Horne · filed 2015-12-24(2)(b)

Pregnancy alone does not trigger the protections of section 216.6(2)(b); the statute requires a disability that is “caused or contributed to” by the pregnancy or related condition for the protections to apply.

Section 216.6 prohibits employment discrimination based on pregnancy.

Habben v. City of Fort Dodge · filed 2007-01-29

... Iowa Code § 216.6 (prohibiting pregnancy discrimination); ... Thus, Habben has alleged a cognizable basis for her sex discrimination claims.

Section 216.6(2)(a) treats an employment policy that excludes applicants or employees because of pregnancy as a prima facie violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

Elam v. Regions Financial Corp. · filed 2009-03-25(2)(a)

The ICRA similarly prohibits such conduct. See Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(a) (“A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from employment applicants or employees because of the employee’s pregnancy is a prima facie violation of this chapter.”).

Section 216.6(1)(a) does not prohibit an employer’s grooming code that bars men, but not women, from wearing earrings or studs.

Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc. · filed 2003-12-17(1)(a)

In sum, we conclude that an unwritten personal grooming code prohibiting males but not females from wearing earrings or studs is not unlawful sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII or the ICRA.

Section 216.6(1)(a) closely tracks Title VII’s sex discrimination provision, and federal cases supply the basic framework for evaluating claims under it.

Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America, LLC · filed 2008-11-13(1)(a)

The relevant language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—2(a)(1) and Iowa Code § 216.6(l)(a) are nearly identical and federal case law supplies the basic framework for deciding cases under the ICRA.

Section 216.6(1)(a) prohibits sex discrimination in employment; when an employer gives a legitimate reason for a transfer, the employee must show that reason is pretext for discrimination.

Stanbury v. Sioux City Community School District · filed 2022-07-20(1)(a)

Under the ICRA, it is “an unfair or discriminatory practice . . . to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment . . . because of . . . sex.” Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (2019). ... With the record viewed as a whole we cannot find that the reasons given by the District were pretextual or that the decision to transfer was based upon unlawful criteria.