Iowa Code § 627.6

Section 627.6(9)(e) exempts an interest in future payments from a profit sharing plan, including the present assets from which those payments will be made.

In Re Pettit · filed 1985-09-18(9)(e)

The fourth issue raised by the bank is whether the exemption under Iowa Code § 627.6(9)(e) applies only to present payments due under the profit sharing plan, not to the assets of the plan. This court finds the bank’s position without merit. The debtors have “rights in a payment” under the plan regardless of when the payment may be due. This is clearly contemplated by the very nature of the exemptions in Iowa Code § 627.6(9). An interest in future payments necessarily includes an interest in the present assets from which those payments will be made. The exemption therefore applies to all the assets in the fund, not just present payments due.

Section 627.6(9)(e) permits a Keogh Plan to qualify for the retirement plan exemption.

In Re Lawrence · filed 1986-02-19(9)(e)

In consideration of all of the foregoing, I conclude that a Keogh Plan can be exempted as a matter of law as a “pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract” pursuant to Iowa Code § 627.6(9)(e) in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.

Section 627.6(9)(e) does not exempt an IRA whose owner has nearly unrestricted access to and use of its funds.

In Re Matthews · filed 1986-06-25(9)(e)

The key distinction between an IRA and a pension, then, is the recipient’s virtually free access to his IRA funds and the lack of restrictions in the use of the funds. ... Debtor’s Individual Retirement Account is not exempt.

Section 627.6(8)(e) exempts payments under a pension or similar plan only to the extent reasonably necessary to support the debtor and dependents.

In re Hunt · filed 1988-09-27(8)(e)

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes Debtor’s rights in payments under the pension and profit sharing plan and the 401(k) benefit plan are not reasonably necessary for the support of Debtor.

Section 627.6(8)(e) can cover a statutorily created public employee retirement system as a similar plan or contract.

Matter of Carver · filed 1990-05-29(8)(e)

The trustee also argues that Pamela Carver can not claim an exemption under Iowa’s general exemption statute because the statutorily created retirement system is not a plan or contract that is similar to the type of pension or annuity contemplated by the Iowa legislature when enacting Iowa Code section 627.6(9)(e) (now section 627.6(8)(e)). The court does not find the trustee’s argument persuasive.

Section 627.6(8)(e) is not preempted by ERISA and exempts a qualifying retirement annuity to the extent reasonably necessary for the debtor’s support.

Matter of Lingle · filed 1990-09-25(8)(e)

In the instant case, Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(e) does not make any reference to ERISA or to attendant IRS provisions and exempts plans and contracts which are not ERISA qualified plans. Therefore, it is not preempted by ERISA § 514(a). ... In the instant case, the retirement plan meets all four Pettit criteria and therefore is a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract under Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(e). ... Therefore, the Court finds that the Farmland Retirement Annuity is reasonably necessary for Debtors’ support.

Section 627.6(8)(e) requires an annuity payment to be triggered by illness, disability, death, age, or length of service to qualify for the exemption.

In Re Huebner · filed 1992-04-15(8)(e)

This court finds that “on account of” is more appropriately interpreted to mean “triggered by.”

Section 627.6(8)(e) does not exempt annuity payments when the debtor can withdraw funds at any time, regardless of age.

In Re Glen H. Huebner, Debtor. Glen H. Huebner v. Farmers State Bank, Grafton, Iowa · filed 1993-02-26(8)(e)

In these circumstances, we agree with the district court that Huebner’s access to and complete control over the timing of annuity payments mean that any payments received under the contracts would not be “on account of” his age.

Section 627.6(8)(e) exempts annuity payments on account of disability to the extent they replace earnings lost through impaired bodily function.

In Re Wiley · filed 1995-07-31(8)(e)

However, some portion of those payments is exempt pursuant to Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(e), because they are payments “on account of’ disability, and, more specifically, payments akin to or substituting for loss of earnings as the result of a loss or impairment of bodily function.

Section 627.6(8)(e)'s amended pension exemption covers a deferred compensation plan, but does not apply to a bankruptcy petition filed before the amendment.

Matter of Pedersen · filed 1993-06-16(8)(e)

On its face, the amendment to Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(e) results in Debtor's deferred compensation plan qualifying as exempt property; but because this case was filed prior to the amendment, the Plan does not qualify as exempt property.

Section 627.6(8)(e) exempts qualifying annuity payments payable on account of age; payments beginning on a date chosen by the debtor do not qualify.

Eilbert v. Pelican · filed 1997-10-14(8)(e)

The debtor’s annuity does not fall within the category of exemptible investments enumerated in Iowa Code § 627.6(8) (e). Furthermore, the debtor’s annuity payments were not payable “on account of’ age. Therefore, we conclude that the debtor’s annuity payments are not exempt.

Section 627.6(8)(e) does not exempt a single premium annuity bought with inherited assets as bankruptcy planning when it does not replace earnings and its payments are not tied to age.

Eilbert v. Pelican · filed 1998-12-07(8)(e)

We agree with the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that this investment was not a “pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract” within the meaning of § 627.6(8)(e). ... An elderly annuitant’s age at the inception of the contract does not automatically mean that all payments under the annuity are “on account of age.”

Section 627.6(8)(f), as it stood when the debtor filed, includes individual retirement annuities within its exemption for individual retirement accounts.

In Re Pepmeyer · filed 2002-01-07(8)(f)

The court believes the use of individual retirement accounts in the statute includes an individual retirement annuity such as Debtors. Accordingly, Debtor’s individual retirement annuity is included under the exemption.

Section 627.6(8)(e) exempts annuity payments only when they are on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of service.

In Re Hupton · filed 2002-11-25(8)(e)

At the hearing, counsel for Debtor conceded that the annuity payments Debt- or receives are not “on account of [Debt- or’s] illness, disability, death, age, or length of service.” Thus, the Court finds that Debtor may not claim the annuity payments exempt under this statute.

An objection that a retirement account exceeds § 627.6 contribution limits requires an explanation of how the account violates a limit.

In Re Tendal · filed 2005-03-31

With regard to the excess contribution objection, Chad has failed to direct the court’s attention to the particular portion of Iowa Code § 627.6 allegedly violated by the allocation and transfer of the Thrivent account. His objection relates to excess funding. He may be referring to the contribution limitations described in Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(f)(4) and (6). He does not say how the amount allocated to Ann violates a contribution limitation, and he does not justify why an account created by previous contributions and transferred pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order exceeds pre-bankruptcy contribution limitations.

Section 627.6(8)(e) exempts deferred compensation payments that substitute for wages and are paid because the recipient reached a qualifying age.

Commerce Bank v. McGowen · filed 2021-03-12(8)(e)

Given the liberal construction afforded exemption statutes, we hold McGowen’s deferred compensation plan benefits paid upon him attaining age sixty-seven are exempt under Iowa Code section 627.6(8)(e).

Section 627.6(8)(f)(1)(d) does not exempt inherited IRAs from execution because they are not retirement investments.

Muff Corp. v. Paige · filed 2022-09-21(8)(f)(1)(d)

That is, to be exempt, IRAs must be retirement investments. Inherited IRAs are not retirement investments.

Section 627.6(10)(d) allows debtors engaged in farming, including custom farmers, to exempt farm implements even if they also work full time in another occupation.

Matter of Myers · filed 1985-12-12(10)(d)

Thus, their work as full-time schoolteachers does not prevent them from claiming farm equipment as exempt tools of their trade. ... Thus, a custom farmer is a farmer for the purpose of Iowa’s exemption statute.

Section 627.6(11)(a) allows a farmer to exempt a semi-tractor as equipment reasonably related to a normal farming operation.

In re Erickson · filed 1987-07-27(11)(a)

Semi-tractors pulling trailers loaded with grain or livestock serve the same purposes as a truck. A semi-tractor therefore satisfies the section 627.6(ll)(a) requirements.

Section 627.6(11) allows a debtor whose custom farm work contributes to his support to qualify as engaged in farming despite off-farm employment.

In re Smith · filed 1987-09-25(11)

The evidence in this case supports finding that the debtor is a farmer under Iowa’s exemption statute. His custom farming activities certainly contribute to his support in that his work on his father’s farm is being exchanged for rent. His additional planting work and his desire to return to farming full time are noted. The fact the debtor has off farm employment does not detract from this debtor’s farmer status.

Section 627.6(11) does not allow a farm equipment exemption when the debtor works on another’s farm without using his own stored equipment and his cessation of farming is not temporary.

In re Clausen · filed 1988-01-11(11)

WHEREFORE, for the reasons expressed above, the debtors are not engaged in farming for purposes of Iowa Code section 627.6(11).

Section 627.6(11)(a) allows a farmer to claim qualifying equipment as exempt despite a temporary pause in farming if the farmer intends to resume.

In Re Indvik · filed 1990-07-09(11)(a)

To be a farmer, for exemption purposes, a person does not need to be farming on the day of a levy. A temporary cessation of farming activity does not defeat the claim of exemption if the debtor intends to resume farming.

Section 627.6(11)(b) exempts livestock and feed reasonably related to farming, but lien avoidance for cattle kept for family meat is limited to one year's consumption.

Matter of Simmons · filed 1988-04-19(11)(b)

Accordingly, the court determines that lien avoidance pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 522(f)(2)(A) and premised on Iowa Code section 627.6(ll)(b) should be limited to one year’s consumption.

Section 627.6(ll)(a) allows a farmer debtor to exempt up to $10,000 in farming implements and equipment and contains no exception for a divorce decree.

Brockman v. Brockman (In Re Brockman) · filed 1992-07-01(ll)(a)

Iowa Code § 627.6(ll)(a) provides a farmer-debtor may hold exempt ten thousand dollars worth of farming implements and equipment. Section 627.6 does not provide, as does § 598.21, for its own trumping when there is a “special declaration of statute to the contrary.” There appears to be no statutory basis for finding the Debtors may not claim the property as exempt. Thus, Debtors are entitled to the exemption.

A debtor who has temporarily stopped farming may claim the farm equipment exemption if objective facts support an intent to resume farming.

In Re Mausser · filed 1998-09-30(11)(a)

Debtors who have temporarily quit farming may benefit from the exemption for farming implements and equipment if there are objective facts which support their subjective intent to return to farming.

Section 627.6(12)(a)’s 1986 farm equipment exemption applies to bankruptcy petitions filed after the amendment took effect, even when the security agreements predate it.

In Re Punke · filed 1987-01-16(12)(a)

The application of the 1986 amendments to Iowa Code § 627.6(12)(a) to the security agreements in effect prior to the effective date of that amendment, does not constitute an unconstitutional impairment of contracts nor an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation.

Section 627.6’s $10,000 farm machinery exemption applies retrospectively to security interests granted before the 1986 amendment took effect.

Matter of Towns · filed 1987-06-10(12)(a)

The Iowa legislature amended section 627.6 by increasing the maximum farm machinery exemption to $10,000.00. ... Applying these principles to the case at bar, this court concludes that the amendments to Iowa’s exemption law are remedial and therefore operate retrospectively.

Section 627.6(11)(a) exempts a computer used in farming when it is reasonably related to a normal farming operation; the computer need not be necessary to the farmer’s work.

In re Eby · filed 1987-07-28(11)(a)

WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the debtors’ Apple computer qualifies as an implement or a piece of equipment reasonably related to a normal farming operation pursuant to Iowa Code section 627.6(11).

Section 627.6(12)(a)’s increased exemption applies to bankruptcy petitions filed after its effective date, even when the debts and liens arose earlier.

Ackley State Bank v. Van Hove (In Re Van Hove) · filed 1987-09-29(12)(a)

Therefore, § 627.6(12)(a) is applicable in both these cases because the debtors filed their bankruptcy petitions after the statute’s effective date.

Section 627.6(10) does not exempt vehicles as proper implements or tools of the trade because Iowa places vehicles in a separate exemption category.

Matter of Van Pelt · filed 1987-06-29(10)

The foregoing principles lead this court to conclude that Iowa’s separate categorization of vehicles and tools of the trade evinces a legislative intent that vehicles are not included within the meaning of “proper implements” or “tools of the trade” under Iowa Code section 627.6(10).

Section 627.6(10) exempts a computer used in an insurance business as a tool of the trade when it is usually adapted to that work, even if it is not necessary.

Matter of Knight · filed 1987-06-30(10)

However, the debtor need not show that the computer is a necessity. Under the authorities cited above, all that need be shown is that the tool or instrument be a “proper tool or instrument” that is usually adapted to the debtors’ employment. A computer in an insurance office satisfies this standard.

Section 627.6 allows a motor vehicle to be claimed under the motor vehicle exemption, but not under the tools of the trade exemption.

In Re Graettinger · filed 1988-11-07(9)(b), (10)

Under Iowa exemption law, a motor vehicle may only be claimed exempt under the motor vehicle exemption, not under the tools of the trade exemption.

Section 627.6(10) does not exempt a camper used for shelter or transportation as a tool of the trade, and § 627.6(9)(c) does not exempt a tax refund for a spouse with no interest in the wages that generated it.

Matter of Honomichl · filed 1987-12-21(10), (9)(c)

WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing discussion, the Highlander fifth wheel camper does not qualify as an implement or tool of the trade under Iowa Code section 627.6(10). Further, Suzette K. Ho-nomichl is not entitled to claim a tax refund exemption under Iowa Code section 627.-6(9)(c).

Section 627.6(1) exempts jewelry actually worn and used by the debtor as wearing apparel, but excludes jewelry held primarily for investment or resale.

In Re Eden · filed 1988-12-29(1)

In conclusion, the Iowa Exemption Statute allows a debtor to exempt jewelry which is actually worn and used by the debtor. The exemption statute does not extend to jewelry which is held primarily for investment or resale purposes.

Section 627.6 allows the debtor to claim personal property exemptions within its statutory limits.

Matter of Lassiter · filed 1989-07-17

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 627.6, the personal property exemptions the debtor has claimed are all valid.

Section 627.6(9)(b) permits a debtor to exempt an equitable interest in a motor vehicle even without legal title.

In re Bierman · filed 1991-09-06(9)(b)

It is also exempt property under Iowa Code § 627.6(9)(b). It is true that debtor does not have legal title to a motor vehicle, but the statute does not appear to require legal title as a predicate to a claim of exemption.

Section 627.6(2) places no dollar limit on the shotgun exemption, so buying an expensive shotgun to convert cash into exempt property does not alone defeat the exemption.

In Re McCabe · filed 2002-06-17(2)

Absent legislature limitation, the purchase of a shotgun, even a very expensive one, does not violate sec.627.6(2) and the objection to exemption must be overruled.

Section 627.6(9)(a) permits an exemption of up to $5,000 in a vehicle’s remaining value.

In Re Buelow · filed 2002-12-19(9)(a)

Debtor is entitled to ... exempt up to $5,000 of the remaining value of the vehicle, if any, not subject to the lien. Iowa Code § 627.6(9)(a).

Section 627.6(9)(b) includes an inoperable motor vehicle that can be made operable by reassembling or repairing its parts.

In Re Bailey · filed 2004-09-27(9)(b)

Hence, for the purpose of the Iowa exemption statute, the Court concludes that the ordinary and common meaning of the term “motor vehicle” includes an inoperable vehicle that can be made operable by reassembling one of more of its parts or by repairing one or more of its parts.

Section 627.6(9) exempts a debtor’s interest in a motor vehicle, calculated by subtracting secured debt from the vehicle’s value.

Goben v. Corydon State Bank (In re Goben) · filed 2013-09-23(9)

The bankruptcy court correctly determined that the Debtor is not entitled to an exemption under Iowa Code § 627.6 because she does not hold an interest in the Vehicle that she could claim to be exempt. To determine the Debtor’s interest in the Vehicle that is subject to her claim of an exemption, we subtract the amount of the secured debt from the value of the Vehicle. The Debtor does not dispute that the value of her Vehicle is less than the amount she owes to the Bank. Therefore, the Debtor enjoys no equity, and has no interest in the Vehicle to exempt.

Section 627.6(11) permits a debtor to claim tools of the trade as exempt after moving from self-employment to employment in the same trade.

Upper Explorerland Regional Planning Commission v. Vanhorn · filed 2021-02-25(11)

Plaintiff has not identified any authority supporting its position that a debtor’s transition—within the same general trade—from employer to employee precludes him from using the tools of the trade exemption.

Section 627.6(11) does not exempt tools for a debtor who has stopped working in the trade when no objective facts support a realistic plan to resume it.

Larry Dean Schoneboom · filed 2024-11-18(11)

Outside of his testimony that he intends to return to work, Debtor has presented no evidence indicating that his return to work is a “reasonable prospect” or that he has taken any affirmative steps towards doing so. ... As such, the Debtor is not entitled to the “tools of the trade” exemption under Iowa Code § 627.6(11).

Section 627.6(6) exempts an unmatured life insurance policy, but does not exempt funds held in a separate premium deposit account.

In Re Buffinton · filed 1987-12-09(6)

On the basis of this analysis, the Court finds that the Debt- or’s life insurance policy purchased with the $4,042.50 premium is “unmatured” and can be claimed exempt pursuant to Iowa Code § 627.6(6). The funds in the Debtor’s Deposit Account do not constitute “insurance” under Iowa law, but are property of the estate and shall be turned over to the Trustee.

Section 627.6(6) treats advance premiums that increase a policy’s cash value as part of the life insurance policy.

Eide v. Rodemeyer (In re Rodemeyer) · filed 1989-01-04(6)

With these differences in mind, the court finds and concludes that Rodemeyer’s policy with AAL, including the advance payment of premiums in January, 1988, is insurance within the meaning of Iowa Code § 627.6(6).

Section 627.6(6) does not exempt a taxpayer’s life insurance proceeds from an Iowa income tax claim because section 422.26 denies exemptions for the taxpayer’s property.

Deblois v. Department of the Treasury/Internal Revenue Service · filed 1995-04-26(6)

Neither Joseph nor the executor of his estate can claim exemption from Iowa income tax assessments. If Barbara is a taxpayer who failed to make required income tax payments, she cannot claim an exemption of the proceeds she received as beneficiary under her husband’s life insurance policies. The district court was mistaken in declaring she may be able to claim $15,000 as exempt from execution of the state tax claim.

Section 627.6(6) does not exempt a debtor’s beneficial interest in a trust that is a beneficiary of a life insurance policy; the individual must own the policy, and the policy’s beneficiary must be the individual’s spouse or child.

In Re Theis · filed 2004-11-15(6)

Theis, individually, is not the owner of the policy. Her interest is a beneficial interest in the Theis Trust; it is not an interest in life insurance. Even if the Theis Trust owned the policy, Theis’s interest would not be exempt under § 627.6(6). The statute requires that the beneficiary be the child or spouse of an individual owner.

Section 627.6(6) exempts qualifying life insurance equity without a dollar limit; proceeds briefly held in a bank account while being transferred to a mortgage lender retain their exempt status.

In re Arends · filed 2014-03-04(6)

The money in this case was only in the Debtors’ bank account for six days. The only reason it was even in the account was to transfer it from the insurance company to the mortgage company. The money had to sit in the account in order to verify that the check cleared the bank. To some extent, Debtors never really had the money in the account until the check cleared. Therefore, on these facts, and in light of the state’s policy of liberally interpreting exemptions, the Court concludes that the $28,000 was exempt at the time Debtors transferred it to their mortgage company.

Farm program payments are not exempt as accrued wages under section 627.6(9)(c) because they are unrelated to a farmer’s labor.

Matter of Mattice · filed 1987-12-22(9)(c)

The lack of any relationship between program payments and a farmer’s labor leads the court to conclude that program payments are not wages for purposes of Iowa Code section 627.6(9)(c).

Section 627.6(8)(a) exempts Social Security benefits from execution, but the child support exception in section 627.12 permits withholding them to collect assigned child support arrears.

Shepherd v. Shepherd · filed 1991-03-20(8)(a)

An exception to this exemption, however, is found in section 627.12, which provides that a “decree for the support of a child” is not subject to the exemption of section 627.6. ... We reject that argument for all the reasons stated in the preceding discussion of the federal statute. ... We agree with the district court that Paul’s social security benefits were not exempt from mandatory withholding.

Section 627.6(8)(a) exempts the earned income credit, while § 627.6(9)(c) limits a bankruptcy debtor’s exemption for accrued wages and tax refunds to $1,000.

Matter of Davis · filed 1991-10-03

Absent any such argument by the trustee, and in light of the liberal interpretation courts are to give Iowa exemption statutes, the Court finds the earned income credit in this case is exempt under § 627.6(8)(a). ... The debtor may exempt only $1,000 of her accrued wages and tax refunds under § 627.6(9)(c).

Section 627.6(9)(c) exempts compensation for an independent contractor’s own services as accrued wages, but does not exempt income derived from employees’ labor or investments.

Matter of Sexton · filed 1992-04-09(9)(c)

Rather., the focus should be on distinguishing between types of income. That is, whether the funds represent compensation from personal services, which are exempt, or the non-exempt account receivable an independent contractor derives from the labor of his or her employees or investment income.

Section 627.6(8)(c) does not exempt tort recoveries for bodily injury as disability benefits.

In Re Buchholz · filed 1992-05-28(8)(c)

I conclude that § 627.6(8)(c) of the Iowa Code does not exempt tort recoveries for bodily injury.

Section 627.6(8)(c) exempts a rent tax credit received because of disability from a state agency debt offset.

Smith-Porter v. Iowa Department of Human Services · filed 1999-03-24(8)(c)

We simply hold that the summary offset procedures of section 421.17(29) do not override the exemption available under section 627.6(8) when the funds sought to be intercepted are disability payments. That is the case here.

Section 627.6(8)(a) exempts a federal earned income credit as a public assistance benefit.

In Re Longstreet · filed 2000-02-28(8)(a)

Thus, in the context of the Iowa exemption statute and according to its common meaning, “public assistance benefit” includes government aid payments like the property in issue.

Section 627.6(9)(c) exempts a debtor’s interest in a tax refund, subject to a valid government setoff right.

In Re Allen · filed 2001-08-21(9)(c)

The debtor’s interest in the tax refund which comes into the estate is subject to the right of setoff. It is a debtor’s “interest” in a tax refund that is to an extent exempt. Iowa Code § 627.6(9)(c). That interest is limited by the government’s rights.

Section 627.6(8)(a) exempts government benefits based on factors such as need, disability, or dependent status; farm program payments based on crop farming do not qualify.

In Re Wilson · filed 2003-07-29(8)(a)

The exemption in § 627.6(8)(a) is for government benefits based upon such factors as need, disability, and status as a dependent. ... The court concludes that the Iowa legislature did not intend the exemption statute to protect Wilsons’ farm program payments as “public assistance benefits.”

Section 627.6(8)(a) exempts direct payments under the 2002 Farm Bill as public assistance benefits.

Wilson v. Sergeant (In Re Wilson) · filed 2004-01-27(8)(a)

Construing the exemption for “public assistance benefits” liberally in a light most favorable to the debtor, and for all of the reasons discussed above, this court finds that the Wilsons’ entitlement to direct payments under the Farm Bill are exempt as “public assistance benefits” under Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(a).

Section 627.6(9)(c) permits a debtor to exempt accrued wages garnished before bankruptcy if the debtor retained an interest in them when the petition was filed.

In Re See · filed 2003-10-28(9)(c)

Debtor had an interest in the garnished wages until a valid condemnation order was entered. Further, Debtor properly listed her interest in the garnished wages as of the date of filing as exempt property on the bankruptcy petition. ... The $227.71 garnished prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition and properly scheduled as exempt property must be paid over to Debtor by the Bank.

Section 627.6(9)(c) preserves for bankruptcy debtors the wage protections available in state court garnishment proceedings.

In Re Irish · filed 2003-12-03(9)(c)

This court concludes that the Iowa legislature, by enactment of § 627.6(9)(c), intended to protect a bankruptcy debtor’s wages from the reach of creditors to the same extent they would be protected in state court garnishment proceedings.

Section 627.6(9)(c) allows a debtor in bankruptcy to exempt up to $1,000 in accrued wages and tax refunds in addition to amounts protected by Iowa’s garnishment statutes, subject to the $5,000 aggregate limit in subsection (9).

Forker v. Irish (In Re Irish) · filed 2004-05-20(9)(c)

In summary, the Court holds that Irish may exempt from property of the estate her accrued, unpaid wages of $3,300.00 by utilizing both the $1,000.00 exemption for wages and tax refunds of § 627.6(9)(e) in addition to any amount Irish could protect from creditors under the garnishment protections statutes of §§ 642.21 and 527.5105. The total amount of Irish’s exemptions under all subsections of § 627.6(9) is limited to $5,000.00.

The refundable Additional Child Tax Credit is exempt as a public assistance benefit.

In re Hatch · filed 2014-10-03(8)(a)

The anecdotal and empirical evidence in this case support the conclusion that the refundable portion of the child tax credit, known as the ACTC is exempt as a public assistance benefit under Iowa law.

Section 627.6(8)(a) exempts Social Security disability benefits from execution when their source remains identifiable, even after they are converted to cash.

State of Iowa v. Yoosuf Moment · filed 2021-03-17(8)(a)

Iowa Code section 627.6(8)(a) states that certain property or property interests of a debtor who is a resident of Iowa may be exempt from execution, including “[t]he debtor’s rights in . . . a social security benefit.” ... Given Moment’s undisputed testimony that the seized money came from his disability check alone as well as federal and state authority establishing the ... funds represented in that check are exempt from execution, we conclude Moment was entitled to have the levy quashed.

Section 627.6’s personal property exemption does not protect property from a claim for unpaid alimony, even after the property is set aside to a surviving spouse.

Nielsen v. Nielsen · filed 1989-09-20

The specific property listed as exempt from execution in the probate inventory schedule are within the list of personal property items declared exempt under the general exemption statute, Iowa Code § 627.6. ... We hold that where, as here, there exists some preferred debt or favored creditor subjecting the exempt property to an exception in its favor, the property remains subject to the exception in the hands of the surviving spouse. We have long recognized a debtor cannot claim the protection of the exemption statute to avoid a claim for unpaid alimony or child support.

A motor vehicle exempt under section 627.6(9) cannot be levied on under either rule 260(a) or rule 260(b).

Printen v. James · filed 1991-09-18(9)

By its very nature, exempt property may not be subjected to any of the imperatives which attend the issuance of a writ of general execution. ... As such, it is not subject to levy under either rule 260(a) or rule 260(b).

Section 627.6 makes its personal property exemptions available only to Iowa residents.

In Re Williams · filed 2007-05-22

As stated above, the personal property exemptions are only available to a debtor “who is a resident of this state.” Iowa Code § 627.6 (2007). Under Drenttel, the personal property exemptions are territorial and would not be available to a nonresident debtor (although acceptable in this instance because the trustee or other interested party failed to object within the allowed period of time).

Section 627.6 limits personal property exemptions to debtors who reside in Iowa.

Stephens v. Holbrook (In Re Stephens) · filed 2009-03-09

In contrast, however, the current Iowa personal property exemption statute does contain a residency restriction. That exemption is expressly restricted to a “debtor who is a resident of this state.”

Section 627.6(8)(e) is not preempted by ERISA because its generic wording does not refer to ERISA or related IRS provisions.

Matter of Gouker · filed 1990-05-29(8)(e)

That is, Iowa Code section 627.6(8)(e) is generic on its face. It can not be construed as making any reference to ERISA or to attendant IRS provisions. Thus, it is not preempted by ERISA section 514(a).

Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(e) is not preempted by ERISA because its pension exemption does not refer to ERISA plans.

Matter of Layton · filed 1990-05-29(8)(e)

That is, Iowa Code section 627.6(8)(e) is generic on its face. It can not be construed as making any reference to ERISA or to attendant IRS provisions. Thus, it is not preempted by ERISA section 514(a).

Section 627.6(8)(e) exempts pension payments to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of a debtor or dependent, and ERISA does not preempt it.

Matter of Bartlett · filed 1990-05-29(8)(e)

That is, Iowa Code section 627.6(8)(e) is generic on its face. It can not be construed as making any reference to ERISA or to attendant IRS provisions. Thus, it is not preempted by ERISA section 514(a).

Section 627.6(16) can exempt a home purchased with traceable personal injury settlement proceeds when the funds are reasonably necessary for the debtor’s family support.

In Re Meyer · filed 2008-07-01(16)

In these unique circumstances, the Court concludes that the sec. 627.6(16) exemption extends to the home which Debtors purchased with their personal injury settlement payment.