Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-31

Section 663-31 adopts comparative negligence prospectively and does not apply retroactively to claims accruing before its effective date.

Bissen v. Fujii · filed 1970-03-12

Our legislature, in the 1969 session, enacted a comparative negligence statute, HRS § 663-31, which became effective on July 14,1969. The statute is not applicable to this suit under a provision reading that it “shall not be retroactive and shall affect only those claims accruing after its effective date.”

Section 663-31 provides for comparative-negligence assessment when a plaintiff may have contributed to the injury.

Farrior v. Payton · filed 1977-03-30

If Mrs. Farrior were negligent in her attempt to escape the charging German sheperd dog, it was for the jury to assess the comparative negligence under the circumstances. HRS § 663-31 (Supp. 1975).

Section 663-31 requires the parties’ comparative negligence to be determined when both the State’s and the plaintiff’s negligence may have proximately caused the injury.

Haworth v. State · filed 1979-04-02

If the State’s negligence and that of appellant were both proximate causes of the accident, findings with respect to the comparative negligence of the parties are required. HRS § 663-31.

Section 663-31(a) makes Hawaii a comparative-negligence jurisdiction, so contributory negligence alone does not bar recovery and the parties' negligence is allocated by degree.

Geldert v. State · filed 1982-08-16(a)

Hawaii is a comparative negligence state. Contributory negligence in itself does not bar recovery in a negligence action. ... We need not determine whether assumption of risk equals contributory negligence and thus cannot be applied in a comparative negligence case to bar recovery. Here, the use of the words “assumed the risk” in Finding of Fact No. 33 did not preclude the court from applying the comparative negligence law and allocating degrees of negligences to all parties involved in the case, which it actually did in Finding of Fact No. 39. ... Hawaii’s comparative negligence law is found in § 663-31, Hawaii Revised Statutes (1976), which became effective on July 14, 1969.

Section 663-31 applies to strict products-liability claims, barring recovery when the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendant's negligence and reducing damages proportionally when recovery is allowed.

Armstrong v. Cione · filed 1987-01-28

Therefore, effective merger of the two doctrines requires that all the provisions of HRS § 663-31 be applied to strict products liability cases, and the injured plaintiff cannot recover in such cases if the proportion of negligence attributed to him exceeds the proportion of negligence attributed to the defendant. Consequently, the jury’s finding that Plaintiff was 67% negligent in causing his injuries defeats any recovery by him for strict products liability and any error by the trial court in directing a verdict on that claim was immaterial.

Section 663-31 bars recovery on a negligent products-liability claim only when the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the combined negligence of the defendants.

Wagatsuma v. Patch · filed 1994-08-26

Moreover, even if a fact finder should find Plaintiff negligent, it could also find from the evidence that her negligence was not the sole cause of Wayne’s death but was only one of the factors contributing to it, along with the negligence of all the defendants. In such case, Plaintiff’s recovery on her negligent products liability claim would only be defeated completely if the fact finder found that her negligence was greater than the negligence of the defendants in this case. HRS § 663-31 (1985).

Section 663-31 establishes comparative negligence, but it applies only to claims accruing after July 14, 1969.

Pacheco v. HILO ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, LTD. · filed 1974-03-19

While the legislature abrogated the doctrine in 1969, replacing it with the comparative negligence system contained in HRS § 663-31 (Supp. 1973), the operation ofthenewlaw is confined to those claims accruing after July 14, 1969.

Section 663-31(a) compares the injured person's negligence with the aggregate negligence of all persons against whom recovery is sought when multiple defendants contributed to the injury.

Wong v. Hawaiian Scenic Tours, Ltd. · filed 1982-03-24(a)

We thus construe the phrase “the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought” to mean “the negligence of the persons against whom recovery is sought.”

Section 663-31 did not repeal by implication the provision of § 663-14 requiring a settlement to reduce the remaining claim by the greater of the amount paid or the released tortfeasor's pro rata share of liability.

Nobriga v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. · filed 1984-05-03

They contend that the words “or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be released, if greater than the consideration paid” in HRS § 663-14 were repealed by implication by the enactment of the Hawaii Comparative Negligence statute, HRS § 663-31, citing ... While repeals by implication are possible, HRS § 1-9, they are not favored. ... We see nothing in the wording or the legislative history of the comparative negligence statute to justify a repeal by implication of a portion of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. Hence we decline to follow ... Bartels, supra.

Section 663-31 allows a plaintiff to recover damages when the plaintiff’s negligence is no greater than the combined negligence of the other negligent actors.

Espaniola v. Cawdrey Mars Joint Venture · filed 1985-09-26

This would be inconsistent with the public policy of the State since a plaintiff whose negligence is no greater than that of the other negligent actors in the aggregate is allowed to recover damages. See HRS § 663-31; Wong v. Hawaiian Scenic Tours, Ltd., 64 Haw. 401, 404, 642 P.2d 930, 932 (1982).

Section 663-31(a) allows an injured person to pursue a dram shop claim despite contributing to the driver’s intoxication, unless the injured person’s negligence exceeds the liquor licensee’s.

Kuahiwinui v. Zelo's Inc. · filed 2019-11-21(a)

Therefore, the complicity defense would bar recovery to an injured individual who would otherwise be able to recover pursuant to the comparative negligence statute, HRS § 663-31.

Section 663-31 does not apply its comparative-negligence rules to strict products liability claims.

Armstrong v. Cione · filed 1987-06-01

The plain meaning of the words of the statute itself indicates the legislature has not intended to reach this area of law.

Section 663-31 permits a comparative negligence defense to claims for enhanced injuries from a second collision, including strict products liability claims.

Dannenfelser v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. · filed 2005-03-31

Hawaii has codified the applicability of a comparative negligence regime in Hawaii Revised Statutes Section 663-31. ... Thus, in keeping with the precedent of the Hawaii Supreme Court, the California Supreme Court, and the majority of other jurisdictions, the Court finds that Defendant may indeed assert a defense of comparative negligence to Plaintiffs negligence and strict liability claims regarding the injuries stemming from the "second collision."

Section 663-31 bars a derivative loss-of-consortium claim when the injured spouse’s negligence is greater than the defendant’s negligence.

Mist v. Westin Hotels, Inc. · filed 1987-06-03(a), (c)

We hold that Martha’s loss of consortium claim is a derivative action subject to HRS § 663-31. Under that statute, Martha’s loss of consortium claim must fail in view of Robert’s degree of fault being greater than the defendants.

The statute requires comparative-negligence apportionment to use only negligence that contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.

Dunbar v. Thompson · filed 1995-08-14(a)-(d)

It follows that in apportioning negligence under Hawaii’s comparative negligence statute, the only negligence to be apportioned is causative negligence — negligence which contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.

Section 663-31(a) allows an injured plaintiff to recover despite contributory negligence when the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the defendant's, with damages reduced in proportion to the plaintiff's negligence.

Steigman v. OUTRIGGER ENTERPRISES, INC. · filed 2011-12-15(a)

The statute is structured as follows: subsection (a) of the statute mandates that a plaintiffs negligence will not completely bar recovery for that plaintiff, as long as her negligence was not greater than the defendant’s. Subsection (b) requires a special verdict form from the jury with findings of the total amount of damages and the percent of negligence of each party. Subsection (c) guides the court in administering the recovery, and subsection (d) permits the court to instruct the jury about comparative negligence where appropriate. The plain language of the statute does not expressly include or exclude actions involving known or obvious dangers.

Section 663-31 protects a defendant sued only for negligence from a plaintiff's greater negligence, requiring judgment for that defendant even when a codefendant committed an intentional tort.

Ozaki v. AOAO DISCOVERY BAY · filed 1998-05-04(a), (b), and (c)

But this is precisely why Discovery Bay's conduct necessarily fell within the ambit of the statute, inasmuch as negligence was the sole theory advanced against it as the basis for imposing liability. HRS § 663-31 provides in relevant part that "if the [proportion of negligence attributable to the person, for whose injury, damage, or death recovery is sought,] is greater than the negligence of the person or... the aggregate negligence of such persons against whom recovery is sought, the court will enter judgment for the defendant." Thus, by its plain language, the statute requires that judgment be entered in favor of Discovery Bay, inasmuch as the jury's special verdict apportioned greater fault to Dennis than to Discovery Bay.[5] There is no discernible reason why Discovery Bay should lose the protection of HRS § 663-31 merely because its codefendant committed an intentional tort.

Section 663-31 reduces recovery in proportion to a plaintiff's fault up to fifty percent and bars recovery when the plaintiff is more than fifty percent at fault.

Megan E. Chadwick Sturgis E. Chadwick v. United States · filed 1996-05-30

Hawaii has adopted a modified form of comparative negligence. If the plaintiffs failed to exercise due care, then the amount of their recovery is reduced proportionately to their degree of fault up to fifty percent. If the plaintiffs were more than fifty percent at fault, then recovery is precluded.

Section 663-31 bars recovery when a plaintiff is more than fifty percent responsible for the injury, regardless of the defendant’s negligence.

Kahan v. United States · filed 1999-04-27

Finally, under Hawaii law, if a plaintiff is found to be over fifty percent responsible for his own injuries, the doctrine of comparative negligence bars recovery for those injuries, regardless of any negligence by a defendant. Haw.Rev.Stat. § 663-31. The court finds that because plaintiffs knowingly entered a closed area with an open and obvious hazard, not only was their behavior unreasonable, but they alone are responsible for their injuries.

Section 663-31 does not bar or reduce recovery when the defendant fails to prove that the plaintiff’s negligence proximately caused the injury.

Mamea v. United States · filed 2011-02-18(a)

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs’ recovery in this action is neither barred nor reduced by comparative negligence.

Section 663-31 establishes modified comparative negligence by barring recovery when the plaintiff's negligence exceeds the defendants' aggregate negligence, reducing otherwise recoverable damages proportionally, requiring fault percentages and appropriate jury instructions, and thereby making the last-clear-chance doctrine obsolete.

Rapoza v. Parnell · filed 1996-09-03(a), (b)(2), (c), and (d)

Today, Hawaii’s modified comparative negligence statute, HRS § 663-31, bars a plaintiffs recovery only if the plaintiffs negligence is greater than the negligence of all defendants involved. If recovery is not barred, HRS § 663-31 then reduces the plaintiffs recovery against the defendant or defendants by the proportion of fault of the negligent plaintiff. ... Moreover, the apportionment of damages provision in HRS § 663-31 has rendered the doctrine of last clear chance completely obsolete. HRS § 663-31 allows for an apportionment of damages provided that the plaintiffs negligence is not greater than the defendant or defendants. Under HRS § 663~31(b)(2), the fact finder must determine “[t]he degree of negligence of each party[.]” ... Because HRS § 663-31 clearly permits the apportionment of damages and because no justification exists to maintain the harsh and archaic doctrine of last clear chance, we believe that the better course would be to abolish the use of this doctrine by any plaintiff. Accordingly, we hold that the common law doctrine of last clear chance is no longer viable in Hawai'i.

Section 663-31's modified comparative-negligence bar applies only when an action is wholly based on negligence; when negligence combines with another liability theory, the plaintiff's negligence reduces recovery proportionally but does not bar it.

Ozaki v. Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay · filed 1998-02-27(a), (b), and (c)

We hold that Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 663-31 (1993), Hawai'i’s modified comparative negligence statute, applies only to actions sounding wholly in negligence. Where negligence combines with other grounds of liability to cause injury to a plaintiff, we believe pure comparative negligence principles apply. In our view pure comparative negligence principles are best suited to accomplish a fair and equitable result by distributing a plaintiffs loss in proportion to the respective faults of the parties causing the loss. Under this approach, a plaintiffs negligence would not bar recovery but would reduce the plaintiffs recovery by an amount equal to the degree to which the plaintiff is culpably negligent.

Section 663-31 applies to a negligence claim against one defendant even when a codefendant committed an intentional tort, and bars recovery when the plaintiff's negligence is greater than that defendant's negligence or the aggregate negligence of the defendants against whom recovery is sought.

Ozaki v. Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay · filed 1998-04-14(a) and (c)

But this is precisely why Discovery Bay’s conduct necessarily fell within the ambit of the statute, inasmuch as negligence was the sole theory advanced against it as the basis for imposing liability. HRS § 663-31 provides in relevant part that “if the [proportion of negligence attributable to the person, for whose injury, damage, or death recovery is sought,] is greater than the negligence of the person or ... the aggregate negligence of such persons against whom recovery is sought, the court will enter judgment for the defendant.” Thus, by its plain language, the statute requires that judgment be entered in favor of Discovery Bay, inasmuch as the jury’s special verdict apportioned greater fault to Dennis than to Discovery Bay.

Section 663-31(a) bars recovery when the claimant’s contributory negligence is greater than the negligence of the person or persons sued, while reducing damages when the claimant’s negligence is not greater.

Dorrance v. Lee · filed 1999-04-27(a)

Because the Arbitration Award apportioned the liabilities in the Cintron Action as Dorrance 70%’ negligent and Lee 30% negligent and, given our holding that the Arbitration Award has collateral estoppel effect, HRS § 663-31(a) (1993) bars any recovery by Dorrance herein.

Section 663-31(a) eliminates contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery when the claimant’s negligence is not greater than the opposing negligence, while reducing damages in proportion to the claimant’s negligence.

Samson v. Nahulu. · filed 2015-12-04(a)

The rule stated in Arena no longer applies because it was premised on the existence of contributory negligence, which was eliminated by the passage of Hawaii’s comparative fault statute, HRS § 663-31.

Section 663-31 does not bar recovery for contributory negligence unless the plaintiff's negligence is greater than the defendant's, and requires that determination to follow the procedures in subsections (b) and (c).

McKellar v. Outfitters Kauai, LTD. · filed 2025-09-09(b) and (c)

We further note that under HRS § 663-31, contributory negligence does not bar recovery in a negligence action, as long as the plaintiff's negligence is not greater than the negligence of the defendant. This determination must be made in accordance with the procedure set forth in HRS § 663-31(b) and (c). That procedure was not followed here.

Section 663-31 requires the jury in a comparative-negligence action to return a special verdict stating the degree of negligence attributable to each party as a percentage.

Kamaunu v. Kaaea · filed 2002-04-23(b)

The apportionment sanction also deprived Defendant of a jury determination as to the degree of negligence of the parties, a patent violation of HRS § 663-31, which provides, in relevant part, as follows: ... (b) In any action to ivhich subsection (a) of this section applies, the court, in a nonjury trial, shall make findings of fact or, in a jury trial, the jury shall return a special verdict which shall state: ... (2) The degree of negligence of each party, expressed as a percentage.

Section 663-31 requires the jury to assign each party a percentage of negligence and reduces damages in proportion to the deceased person's negligence.

San Nicolas v. Embassy House, LLP · filed 2024-06-28(a)-(c)

As relevant to this case, HRS § 663-31 requires the jury to determine the degree of each party's negligence, and also requires damages be reduced in proportion to the deceased's degree of negligence.