Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14

Section 607-14 does not entitle a party to attorneys’ fees on assumpsit claims after the judgment that made it the prevailing party is vacated.

Schmidt v. Dubin. Dissenting Opinion by Eddins, J., with whom Circuit Judge Kawano, In Place of Devens, J., Joins. ICA s · filed 2024-09-16

Once the ICA vacated the Circuit Court’s MPSJ Order #1, which addressed Schmidt’s breach of contract claims, Dubin was no longer the prevailing party as to the assumpsit claims and no longer entitled to attorneys’ fees under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not support a fee award against a party who cannot yet be considered the losing party after the judgment is vacated.

Sapp v. Wong · filed 1980-03-31

Hence, appellants cannot at this time be considered to be the losing parties, even if we assume that appellants’ amended complaint is an action in the nature of assumpsit.

Section 607-14 permits attorney’s fees against a party that loses to one defendant even if it prevails against another.

Rosa v. Johnston · filed 1982-10-04

HRS § 607-14 does not preclude Rosas from being the prevailing parties as to CWJ and the losers as to Johnston in the taxation of attorney’s fee.

Section 607-14 requires a losing party to pay attorneys’ fees; a party is not a losing party when the judgment against it has been vacated and the case remanded.

State Ex Rel. Bronster v. United States Steel Corp. · filed 1996-06-24

The obligation to pay attorneys’ fees under HRS § 607-14 applies only to “losing parties,” and, in view of our remand of this case, the state cannot be considered the “losing party.”

Section 607-14 treats a defendant who obtains dismissal as a prevailing party eligible for attorneys’ fees even without a judgment on the merits.

Blair v. Ing · filed 2001-09-10

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the rule stated in Wong and hold that a defendant who succeeds in obtaining a judgment of dismissal is a prevailing party for the purpose of fees under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 allows attorney’s fees against the losing party; an award must be vacated when unresolved claims may change who loses.

Goran Pleho, LLC v. Lacy. ICA mem.op., filed 07/29/2016. Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion, filed · filed 2019-04-10

Because we vacate the grant of JMOL against GPLLC on its claims for fraud ... and punitive damages, we also vacate the award of attorney’s fees to Lacy Parties, as it is unclear whether GPLLC will remain the “losing party” after the adjudication of these claims.

Section 607-14 requires an award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an assumpsit action.

Jorgensen v. Benjamin B. Cassiday, III Salvador Laurel, Bruce Lee Jorgensen v. Benjamin B. Cassiday, III Salva · filed 2003-02-06

While the trial court has broad discretion as to the reasonableness of fees, HRS § 607-14 requires that fees be awarded to the prevailing party. The district court erred in denying Jorgensen’s request fop attorney’s fees.

Section 607-14 permits attorney fees only for a party that prevailed on the disputed main issue, even when the opposing creditor was paid in full.

Hoopai v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In Re Hoopai) · filed 2007-03-28

Our conclusion that Countrywide was not the “prevailing party” for purposes of Haw.Rev.Stat. § 607-14 with respect to what occurred during the bankruptcy case requires that the order on appeal be vacated and remanded for further consideration.

Section 607-14 identifies the prevailing party by who succeeds on the principal disputed issues in the litigation.

Hoopai v. Hoopai · filed 2009-09-14

Because Hoopai prevailed on these issues, she was the “prevailing party” under section 607-14.

Section 607-14 treats the party that succeeds on the principal disputed issues as the prevailing party for attorneys’ fees.

Countrywide Home v. Hoopai · filed 2009-09-14

Thus, the “prevailing party” is the party that succeeds on the issue or issues that are (1) the “principal” issues raised in the litigation and (2) disputed by the parties.

Section 607-14 permits an attorney’s fee award to the prevailing party; an award to a party whose judgment is reversed must be vacated.

Hart v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. · filed 2012-03-27

Because we are vacating the ICA’s judgment and reversing the judgment of the district court, we vacate the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs to TICOR since the Harts are now the prevailing party.

Section 607-14 allows an attorneys’ fee award in an assumpsit action only after the prevailing party can be determined.

Simmons v. Samulewicz · filed 2013-05-09

Therefore, because we vacate the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment as to Simmons’s claim for unjust enrichment, it remains unclear which party will prevail on the assumpsit claims. ... The award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14 is thus vacated.

Section 607-14 permits an attorneys’ fee award only to the party that prevails on the disputed main issue.

In re Mortgage Store · filed 2014-04-08

Only the party that prevails on the “disputed main issue” can recover under this statute.29 I have awarded the bulk of the amounts requested by HSBC and have rejected most of the trustee’s arguments. I cannot say that the TMS trustee prevailed on the disputed main issue.

Section 607-14 entitles the prevailing party on breach of mortgage and note counterclaims to attorneys’ fees.

Santiago v. Tanaka · filed 2016-01-15

Relatedly, the Santiagos, who should have been the prevailing parties as to Tanaka’s breach of mortgage and breach of note counterclaims, are also entitled to attorneys’ fees they incurred at the circuit court. HRS § 607-14 (Supp. 1997).

Section 607-14 does not entitle a mortgagor to attorney’s fees when an appellate court vacates summary judgment for the foreclosing mortgagee and remands for further proceedings.

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Kozma. · filed 2017-09-05

Therefore, Kozma is not a “prevailing party” and is not entitled to attorney’s fees under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not support an attorney’s fee award based on prevailing party status when the judgment establishing that status is vacated.

Field v. The National Collegiate Athletic Association. · filed 2018-11-20

Based on our disposition, the ICA’s holding affirming the Attorney’s Fee Order is also vacated because it flows from the ICA and circuit court’s holdings that the NCAA was the prevailing party on summary judgment.

A judgment of dismissal makes the defendant a prevailing party for purposes of § 607-14.

Jiang v. Fang · filed 2021-11-09

Because this is a judgment of dismissal, Defendants are the prevailing parties for the purpose of HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 treats the party in whose favor judgment is entered as the prevailing party for attorneys' fees, even if that party did not prevail on every issue.

Princeville II Community Association v. Princeville at Hanalei Community Association · filed 2022-12-19

Because judgment was rendered for PHCA, it was the prevailing party for purposes of attorneys' fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14, and the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to PHCA on that basis.

Section 607-14 treats the party that prevails on the main disputed issue as the successful party for attorney's fees.

Brown v. BWC Hawaii, LLC · filed 2023-02-27

Because the Trust prevailed on the "disputed main issue," the Trust was the "successful party for the purpose of taxing costs and attorney's fees" under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not permit both sides to be treated as prevailing parties for attorneys' fees in this procedural context; the party that prevails on the disputed main issues is entitled to fees.

Putnam v. Nunokawa · filed 2024-01-31

However, the case law does not support the court's determination that Putnam and Nunokawa were both prevailing parties for purposes of awarding attorney's fees under HRS § 607-14. Further, the plain language of the statute, which refers to "the losing party" and "the prevailing party," does not appear to contemplate two prevailing parties in this procedural context.

Section 607-14 permits an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to a party that prevails on the main disputed issue in an assumpsit action, even if it receives only nominal damages.

Adelman v. Steely · filed 2024-02-14

The Adelmans' complaint sought damages primarily under the theory of breach of contract, and the Circuit Court found that Steely had breached the Agreement, and awarded the Adelmans nominal damages. Thus, the Adelmans prevailed on their main disputed issue of whether Steely breached the Agreement, even if they did not prevail to the extent of all of their claims nor in the amount of damages sought.

Section 607-14's prevailing-party fee award is premature when the dismissal on which the fee request rests is vacated.

Lumford v. Ota · filed 2018-11-30

However, because we have determined that the Circuit Court erred when it dismissed the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, the question of an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party is premature.

Under § 607-14, a defendant may be denied attorney's fees when a dismissal without prejudice leaves the plaintiff free to refile and does not materially alter the parties' legal relationship.

Liliha Professional Building, LLC v. Nada, Ono, Kaʻanhe, Solomon & Hayashi LLP · filed 2022-09-29

Defendants also contend that the District Court erroneously concluded that Nada Ono LLP was not a prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys' fees under HRS § 607-14 and costs under DCRCP Rule 54(d). ... As in Oahu Publications, there was "no material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties" ... where Defendants remained at risk that LPB would file another suit. ... Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorneys' fees and costs to Nada Ono LLP on that basis.

Section 607-14 allows the prevailing party on a claim in the nature of assumpsit to seek attorney fees.

Walley Isle Motors, LTD. v. La Costa · filed 2026-02-27

The District Court should allow Valley Isle to move for an award of attorney fees under HRS § 607-14 as the prevailing party on its claim in the nature of assumpsit.

Section 607-14 limits attorney’s fees in assumpsit based on the judgment amount.

Cuerva & Associates v. Wong · filed 1980-09-12

$633.33 is the maximum amount of attorney’s fees which HRS § 607-14 (assumpsit) authorizes on a judgment of $3,333.33.

Section 607-14 permits attorney’s fees in an assumpsit action when the contract does not provide for attorney’s fees in a lawsuit.

Nani Koolau Co. v. K & M Construction, Inc. · filed 1984-04-06

Nani Koolau’s second point of error is without merit. The court below awarded attorney’s fees to Nani Koolau pursuant to HRS § 607-14, which relates to attorney’s fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit. ... The contract in the instant case did not provide for the recovery of attorney’s fees in case of suit ... and the trial court made the award of attorney’s fees under the proper statute.

Section 607-14 caps attorney’s fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit under a schedule calculated on the judgment exclusive of costs.

Burgess v. Arita · filed 1985-06-10

The maximum attorney’s fees awardable to Buyers under HRS § 607-14 on the judgment exclusive of costs total $2,170. We therefore modify the judgment by reducing the attorney’s fees of $15,676.93 to $2,170.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney's fees in assumpsit for a tort suit with no breach of contract.

Leibert v. Finance Factors, Ltd. · filed 1990-03-14

We hold that appellees are not entitled to statutory attorney's fees in assumpsit under HRS § 607-14 and that therefore conclusion of law 11 is erroneous.

Section 607-14’s assumpsit fee schedule does not govern when a written contract provides for attorney’s fees; section 607-17 governs.

Gerner v. Trustees Under the Will & of the Estate of Campbell · filed 1990-12-21

With respect to the Trustees, as appellees, clearly HRS § 607-17 is the applicable statute, not § 607-14. ... Where the case sounds in “assumpsit” but there is a specific contractual provision for attorney’s fees, that provision, under HRS § 607-17, should be followed in awarding attorney’s fees.

Section 607-14 permits a determination of attorney’s fees for an appeal in an assumpsit action.

Gasaway v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, an Oregon Corporation John Does 1-10 Doe Partnerships 1-10 Roe Corporation · filed 1994-06-09

NML has requested attorney’s fees for the appeal on several grounds pursuant to Haw. Rev.Stat. § 607-14 (assumpsit actions), § 607-14.5 (frivolous actions), and § 607-15.5 (tort actions). We remand for a determination of attorney’s fees pursuant to Haw.Rev. Stat. § 607-14 only.

When the greatest possible judgment can be determined, § 607-14 caps a prevailing defendant’s attorney’s fees at twenty-five percent of that amount.

Piedvache v. Knabusch · filed 1998-10-21

Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in awarding the Kna-busches attorney’s fees in excess of twenty-five percent of the greatest possible judgment in the ease.

Section 607-14 caps a prevailing counterclaim defendant’s attorney’s fees at twenty-five percent of the amount sought in the counterclaim.

Fukida v. Hon/Hawaii Service and Repair · filed 2001-08-30

Since Fukida prevailed on the counterclaim as a counterclaim defendant, the amount of attorneys’ fees to which he is entitled under HRS § 607-14 is capped at twenty-five percent of the amount Appellants sued for in their counterclaim.

Section 607-14 requires reasonable attorney fees for the prevailing party in covered assumpsit and written-contract actions, capped at 25 percent of the judgment sought.

Allstate Insurance v. Harms · filed 2001-10-12

Allstate also sought its attorneys’ fees and costs under another Hawaii statute, Haw.Rev.Stat. § 607-14, which makes an award to the prevailing party mandatory “in all actions in the nature of assumpsit and in all actions on a promissory note or other contract in writing that provides for an attorney’s fee____” Section 607-14 caps the amount of fees at 25 percent of the judgment sought; the requested fees must also be reasonable.

Section 607-14 entitles the prevailing party to attorney's fees for an action in the nature of assumpsit, including a successful defense of a breach of contract counterclaim.

Tapat v. Sandwich Islands Const., Ltd. · filed 1991-08-22

By statute, Hawaii provides the prevailing party attorney's fees in actions "in the nature of assumpsit." Haw.Rev.Stat. § 607-14 (1976). ... Because Sandwich's breach of contract counterclaim sounded in assumpsit, Tapat is entitled to attorney's fees for that portion of the case.

Section 607-14 permits attorneys’ fees in an action in the nature of assumpsit even without a written agreement providing for fees.

Eastman v. McGowan · filed 1997-09-29

Under HRS § 607-14, an action in the nature of assump-sit does not need a clause in writing providing for attorneys’ fees in order for attorneys’ fees to be granted.

Under § 607-14, the party opposing attorneys’ fees bears the burden of showing that an assumpsit claim was not actually litigated.

Shanghai Inv. Co., Inc. v. Alteka Co., Ltd. · filed 2000-02-04

The burden is on the party opposing the taxation of fees under § 607-14 to show that an assumpsit claim was not actually litigated.

Section 607-14 requires courts to assess each claim separately and, if practicable, apportion fees between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims.

Kona Enterprises, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop ex rel. Peters · filed 2000-10-06

TSA and Shanghai Investment also make clear that a court must determine whether each individual claim alleged in a complaint sounds in assumpsit or in tort and apportion fees between the assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims if practicable.

Section 607-14 assesses attorney’s fees on the judgment, excluding costs and attorney’s fees, when the plaintiff prevails, and on the amount sued for when the defendant prevails.

Kamaka v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel · filed 2008-02-14

The pertinent language from HRS § 607-14, accurately quoted (with added emphases) by Goodsill, states that attorneys’ fees “provided for by this section shall be assessed on the amount of the judgment exclusive of costs and all attorneys’ fees obtained by the plaintiff, and upon the amount sued for if the defendant obtains judgment.” Based on the plain language of the statute and, because the amount the jury awarded Kamaka differed from the amount sued for, it follows that the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded would vary when the prevailing party changed from plaintiff-Ka-maka to defendant-Goodsill.

Section 607-14 permits an award of attorney's fees against a party who loses a contract action.

Shepard v. Shepard · filed 2009-09-22

The circuit court correctly ordered Brett to pay one-half of Appellees' attorney's fees and costs pursuant to HRS §§ 607-14 (Supp. 2008) and 607-9 (1993).

Section 607-14 allows a prevailing law firm to recover attorney fees for an employee attorney’s work representing the firm in an action to collect a client’s unpaid fees.

Hall v. LAROYA · filed 2010-09-02

This case presents the question of whether a law firm that prevails in a court action to collect fees from a client may also be awarded attorney fees under HRS § 607-14 for the work of an attorney employed with the law firm who represents the firm in the collection action. Given the language and history of the statute and HawaiU.case law, we answer this question in the affirmative.

Section 607-14 can authorize an award of attorney's fees on appeal.

Hanson v. Chang · filed 2012-04-26

(2) the April 6, 2011 award of attorney's fees and costs was authorized by HRS § 607-14, the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, Article III, Section 7.02, and HRAP 39(a), and petitioners fail to demonstrate that the amount of fees and costs awarded was unreasonable; and (3) the August 4, 2011 order correctly struck petitioners' motions filed six months after the dismissal of petitioners' appeal.

Section 607-14 authorizes a reasonable attorney’s fee for a winning defendant on a counterclaim in the nature of assumpsit, subject to a percentage cap based on the amount sued for; it does not cover a claim for specific performance.

Smothers v. Renander · filed 1981-09-11

HRS § 607-14 (1976) (suit in the nature of assumpsit) is not applicable because Smothers’ claim against Renander is not an action “in the nature of assumpsit.” ... However, a portion of Renander’s counterclaim against Smothers is “in the nature of assumpsit” and HRS § 607-14 (1976) is applicable to that portion. As against Renander’s counterclaim, Smothers was a winning defendant and as such, for that portion of the case, he is entitled to a reasonable fee not to exceed HRS § 607-14’s percentages “upon the amount sued for” by Renander in his counterclaim.

Section 607-14 allows a defendant who successfully defends a claim on a promissory note to recover attorneys’ fees, capped at twenty-five percent of the amount sued for.

Stanford Carr Development v. Unity House · filed 2006-08-17

Here, SCD successfully defended HL’s claim of breach of contract on the HL Note. Accordingly, SCD is entitled to attorneys’ fees under HRS § 607-14. ... Because SCD obtained judgment, SCD is entitled to no more than twenty-five percent of that amount, or $1,761,448.50.

Section 607-14 permits attorneys’ fees when a written contract provides for them or when a rescission claim seeks restitution.

Sheehan v. Centex Homes · filed 2011-08-23

Therefore, the Court finds that attorneys’ fees are recoverable by Defendants under the “contract prong” of HRS § 607-14. Moreover, even if the “contract prong” were not applicable, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees under the “assumpsit prong” because Plaintiffs are seeking restitution in conjunction with their rescission claim.

Section 607-14 caps attorney's fees for collecting unpaid rent at 25% of the judgment; any separate award for summary possession requires its own authority and a specified amount.

Wakefield v. Bardellini · filed 2020-11-18

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court's award of $11,335.60 in attorney's fees and costs must be vacated and remanded to the District Court for (1) specification of the authority supporting an award in this case of attorneys' fees attributable to the summary possession action, separate from any fees recoverable for the collection on unpaid rent under HRS § 607–14, and (2) designation of the specific amounts awarded with ... respect to each ground, to guard against (a) possible duplicative awards or (b) an excess award of attorney's fees for services related to the recovery of damages pursuant to HRS § 607-14, if no authority exists supporting a separate award in this case of attorneys' fees attributable to the summary possession action.

Section 607-14 requires a prevailing party seeking attorney’s fees to provide information that lets the court determine whether the requested fees are reasonable.

Lewis v. Lewis Electric LLC · filed 2021-12-27

Here, although Lewis is the prevailing party,17 and his claims are in the nature of assumpsit,18 the Court has no way of determining whether the fees requested are reasonable.

Section 607-14 makes attorney fees an available remedy when both parties claim breach of a subcontract.

Nordic PCL Construction, Inc. v. LPIHGC, LLC · filed 2025-03-10

Nordic and LPIHGC each claimed the other breached the Subcontract. Awarding attorney fees was a "remedy that would have been available to a court deciding the same matter[.]" Awarding attorney fees was thus within the arbitrator's power.

Section 607-14 permits attorney’s fees for an action seeking rescission and restitution of money paid under an agreement, but punitive damages are excluded when calculating the fee cap for that claim.

Hong v. Kong · filed 1984-06-05

We hold that the trial court’s award was proper under HRS § 607-14 but the amount awarded was excessive. ... The total amount prayed for in the counterclaim included $100,000 for punitive damages which is not awardable in an action for restitution. Therefore, the maximum attorney’s fees allowable under HRS § 607-14 to Hong on the counterclaim is $2,862.

Section 607-14 allows reasonable attorney's fees for a contractual rescission claim because rescission is in the nature of assumpsit.

Zhang v. You · filed 2024-11-20

The Circuit Court properly found and concluded that contractual rescission is in the nature of assumpsit and that Zhang was entitled to reasonable attorney's fees up to $6,250.00 pursuant to HRS § 607- 14.

Section 607-14 allows attorney's fees in an action for rescission of an agreement and restitution of money paid under it because that action is in the nature of assumpsit.

Ober v. LIGHTER · filed 2008-02-28

Although we vacate the circuit court's order granting Ober an equitable lien, and instead conclude that Ober is entitled to rescission, we further conclude that HRS § 607-14 remains applicable in awarding Ober attorney's fees because this was an action in the nature of assumpsit; therefore, the circuit court did not err in awarding Ober attorney's fees under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 entitles the prevailing party to attorney’s fees in an action on an agreement that is in the nature of assumpsit.

Bishop Trust Co., Ltd. v. Central Union Church · filed 1983-01-17

We disagree and hold that the action is “in the nature of assumpsit” and the prevailing party on retrial will be entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 607-14 allows attorney’s fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit, but does not apply to an action solely for an injunction.

DeMund v. Lum · filed 1984-10-29

At oral argument DeMunds also asserted that attorney’s fees are allowed to them under HRS § 607-14, which provides for such fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit. However, this action is not in the nature of assumpsit, but is simply for an injunction.

Section 607-14 covers a third-party action alleging a genuine contract claim, and the party opposing fees must show that the assumpsit claim was not actually litigated.

Schulz v. Honsador, Inc. · filed 1984-11-08

Under these circumstances, we conclude that Honsador alleged a bona fide contract claim against CMS and Republic, and the third-party action therefore is in the nature of assumpsit. ... The burden is on the party opposing the taxation of fees under § 607-14 to show that an assumpsit claim was not actually litigated.

Section 607-14 permits reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees in an action for breach of a deed covenant against encumbrances because the action is in the nature of assumpsit.

S. Utsunomiya Enterprises, Inc. v. Moomuku Country Club · filed 1994-08-22

Therefore, pursuant to HRS § 607-14, we conclude that Moomuku is entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing its appeal on the action for breach of the covenant against encumbrances.

Section 607-14 permits prevailing-party attorney fees when an action as a whole is in the nature of assumpsit, even if it also includes a negligence claim.

Helfand v. Gerson · filed 1997-01-28

The court appropriately determined that the plaintiffs’ action was “in the nature of assumpsit” for the purposes of Haw.Rev.Stat. § 607-14. The defendants are also awarded reasonable attorney fees for this appeal, the amount of such fees to be determined by the district court.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys’ fees when the action is not in the nature of assumpsit.

Fujimoto v. Au · filed 2001-02-22

Furthermore, we agree that the circuit court erred in awarding Au and Hewitt attorneys’ fees, pursuant to HRS § 607-14, inasmuch as the present action is not in the nature of assumpsit.

Section 607-14 allows attorney’s fees for defending a failure of consideration claim, with fees allocated to that claim.

Azer v. Myers · filed 1990-03-12

HRS § 607-14, supra, provides for attorney’s fees for the defense of the failure of consideration claim. On remand the court must determine what part of G & C’s attorney’s fees are allocable to the failure of consideration claim.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney’s fees for a claim seeking specific performance of an agreement because that claim is not an action in the nature of assumpsit.

Lee v. Aiu · filed 1997-04-15

A suit to enforce an agreement is a suit for specific performance and is not an action in the nature of assumpsit.

Section 607-14 permits attorneys' fees for a duty-of-loyalty claim arising from a contractual employment relationship.

Eckard Brandes, Inc. v. Riley · filed 2003-08-11

Under Hawaii law, attorneys' fees are available in "all actions in the nature of assumpsit." Haw.Rev.Stat. § 607-14. ... EBI's claim for breach of Riley and Kunimitsu's duty of loyalty is such an action because it arises from and is a breach of their contractual employment relationship with EBI.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys’ fees in an election contest that is not in the nature of assumpsit.

Taomae v. Lingle · filed 2006-05-26

First, the matter before this court is not in the nature of assumpsit and does not implicate HRS §§ 607-14 or 661-1.

Section 607-14 does not shift attorneys’ fees to a party when there is no express, implied, or quasi-contractual relationship and no claim for contract damages.

In Re Hoopai · filed 2006-08-30

The statute cited by the debtor, Haw.Rev. Stat. § 607-14, applies only to “an action in the nature of assumpsit.” ... The debtor does not claim that she had an express, implied, or quasi-contract with Maluhia, and she asserted no claim for damages against Maluhia. ... Thus, the debtor must pay her own attorneys’ fees.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys’ fees when the essential character of an action is not in the nature of assumpsit.

Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel · filed 2007-01-11

Thus, based on KRC’s amended complaint, the “essential character” of the instant action is not in the nature of assumpsit, as provided under HRS § 607-14. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting fees to the Lawyers in the KRC Appeal.

Section 607-14 requires an award of reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party when the action is in the nature of assumpsit, even if the complaint also alleges tort claims.

Harrell v. MRC, INC. · filed 2008-09-12

HRS § 607-14 (Supp. 2007) provides that reasonable attorneys' fees "shall" be awarded to the prevailing party "in all actions in the nature of assumpsit[.]" Although Harrell's complaint alleged that MRC was liable in tort as well as for breach of contract and warranty, we conclude, based on our review of the entire record, [4] that this was an action in the nature of assumpsit.

Section 607-14 permits reasonable attorney's fees for an action seeking damages under an assigned insurance contract because the action is in the nature of assumpsit.

Aig Hawaii Insurance Company, Inc. v. State Farm Insurance Companies · filed 2008-10-08

AIG's requested claim for UM benefits is also clearly "in the nature of assumpsit" under HRS 607-14.

Section 607-14 allows a prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees in an action whose essential character is assumpsit without showing that the opposing claims were frivolous.

Dominguez v. PRICE OKAMOTO HIMENO & LUM · filed 2009-04-29

Because the "essential character" of the FAC was in the nature of assumpsit, Blair, 96 Hawai'i at 332, 31 P.3d at 189, and POHL was the prevailing party, the circuit court was not required to find that Dominguez's claims were frivolous in order to award POHL attorneys' fees under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 covers attorneys’ fees for actions in the nature of assumpsit, but the amount of the award cannot be determined until a final money judgment is entered.

Arakaki v. C & S Electric, Inc. (In Re C & S Electric, Inc.) · filed 2010-07-16

There is no dispute that Consolidated’s claims under the supply contract and the joint check agreement are an “action in the nature of assumpsit” within the meaning of Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 607-14. Partial summary judgment on this legal issue is appropriate. Arakaki correctly points out, however, that the amount of Consolidated’s fee award under the statute cannot be determined until a final money judgment is entered.

Section 607-14 permits an award of attorneys’ fees on an unjust enrichment claim within the realm of assumpsit.

Porter v. Hu · filed 2007-10-04

This court has already determined that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim was appropriately tried to the court (with the jury sitting in an advisory capacity), thereby essentially ruling that the action was an equity action within the realm of assumpsit. The circuit court did not err by awarding attorneys’ fees based on the unjust enrichment award.

Section 607-14 governs attorneys’ fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit.

Kaleikini v. Yoshioka. · filed 2013-05-02

HRS § 607-14 governs attorneys’ fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit and is inapplicable in the instant case.

Section 607-14 permits attorneys’ fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit, but does not authorize them for trespass and ejectment claims that lack a contractual basis.

Krog v. Koahou · filed 2014-02-28

While a prevailing party generally may not recover attorneys’ fees and costs for an action brought under common law tort theories, HRS § 607-14 (Supp. 2011) provides for the recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs for actions brought under the theory of assumpsit. ... This action does not arise from any contractual claims and therefore an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is not justified under the theory of assumpsit.

Section 607-14 permits attorney’s fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit, including contract claims.

Ogeone v. Yang · filed 2017-10-31

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees because Ogeone’s action was in the nature of assumpsit.

Section 607-14 can support an attorneys' fee award when the complaint includes a breach of contract claim, even if another claim is not contractual.

Kawaguchi v. Evelyn Wong in her capacity as the appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Evelyn K. Scholes and · filed 2024-03-25

Kawaguchi alternatively argues that if Count III is not contractual in nature, attorneys' fees should not have been ... awarded against him pursuant to HRS § 607-14 (2016). This argument ignores Count I of his First Amended Complaint seeking specific performance or damages for breach of contract. This alternative argument is also without merit.

Section 607-14 permits attorneys’ fees for a claim pleaded as a contract claim even when the defendant prevails by showing there was no contract.

Curtis v. Hawaiian Mission Academy · filed 2025-12-19

That Defendants successfully defended the claim on the basis that there was no contract and the Curtis Family was merely repackaging a tort claim does not render a request for attorneys' fees under HRS § 607-14 invalid.

Section 607-14 can support attorneys’ fees on a counterclaim that an arbitrator reasonably treats as based on contract law and in the nature of assumpsit.

Kenneth H. Hughes, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Development, Corp. · filed 2009-09-09

The documents before this Court do not indicate that the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law when denying Respondent’s counterclaim, nor in determining that the counterclaim was based on contract law that would give rise to attorneys’ fees in assumpsit.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys' fees for HUFTA claims because they sound in tort rather than assumpsit.

Schmidt v. HSC, Inc. · filed 2018-11-30

Like the Kekonas, the Schmidts' HUFTA claims sounded in tort and were not in the nature of assumpsit. Accordingly, we conclude that the Circuit Court did not err in denying Appellees' request for attorneys' fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys’ fees for wrongful foreclosure claims based on fraud and misrepresentation, even when the claims relate to a contract.

Wetsel v. Association of Apartment Owners of One Waterfront Towers · filed 2023-01-19

Second, the Wetsels’ wrongful foreclosure claim does not sound in assumpsit, leaving it outside the purview of HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 allows attorney’s fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit, but does not apply to a claim for negligent payment of insurance benefits.

Coll v. McCarthy · filed 1991-02-07

We need not discuss the import of Coll not being a party to the contract insofar as this is not a case involving a claim for no-fault benefits under the policy, but a claim for negligent payment of those benefits. Therefore, HRS § 607-14 was not applicable and the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees under said statute was not an abuse of its discretion.

Section 607-14 allows attorney’s fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit, but not for claims that sound in tort.

Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc. · filed 1992-09-30

We consequently hold that the trial court ... correctly denied plaintiffs recovery of attorney’s fees under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 authorizes prevailing party attorney's fees in assumpsit actions; adding a warranty claim to wrongful death tort claims does not by itself make the action one in assumpsit.

Moffitt v. United States · filed 1992-11-04

HRS § 607-14 authorizes an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in assumpsit actions. ... The mere fact the Moffitts alleged breach of warranty in connection with their wrongful death tort claims does not establish the action sounded in contract; i.e., not every action that joins claims sounding in contract with claims sounding in tort are in the nature of assumpsit. ... We find, therefore, the district court did not err when it found HRS § 607-14 was inapplicable and accordingly denied Utility's motion to tax attorneys' fees against the Moffitts.

Section 607-14 allows the prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees in an assumpsit action; including a warranty claim in a wrongful death suit does not by itself make the action assumpsit.

Moffitt v. United States · filed 1993-06-09

HRS § 607-14 authorizes an award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in assumpsit actions. ... The mere fact the Moffitts alleged breach of warranty in connection with their wrongful death tort claims does not establish the action sounded in contract; i.e., not every action that joins claims sounding in contract with claims sounding in tort are in the nature of assumpsit. ... We find, therefore, the district court did not err when it found HRS § 607-14 was inapplicable and accordingly denied Utility's motion to tax attorneys' fees against the Moffitts.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney fees for fraud or breach of fiduciary duty claims merely because the claims relate to a contract.

TSA International Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp. · filed 1999-12-30

In deciding whether to award fees under HRS § 607-14, the court must determine the nature of the lawsuit where both assumpsit and non-as-sumpsit claims are asserted in an action. ... The mere fact that TSA’s claims relate to a contract between the parties does not render a dispute between the parties an assumpsit action. Instead, TSA’s claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty sound in tort.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney’s fees when an appeal seeks to revive an underlying tort action, even if the appeal involves rescission of a settlement agreement.

Leslie v. Estate of Tavares · filed 2000-02-28

The gravamen of Leslie’s original action sounded in tort and not assumpsit. The fact that Leslie has appealed does not transform its character.

Section 607-14 permits attorneys’ fees when the essential character of the underlying action is assumpsit, but not when it sounds in tort.

Kamalu v. Paren, Inc. · filed 2006-04-19

Whether “assumpsit” exists so as to trigger HRS § 607-14 depends upon the “essential character of the underlying action in the trial court.”

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney’s fees when the claims sound in tort rather than assumpsit.

Combs v. CASE BIGELOW & LOMBARDI · filed 2010-01-27

Blair 11 is inapposite to this case because there, the plaintiffs pled breach of implied contract, whereas here, Appellants pled no breach of contract, either express or implied. Further, unlike the plaintiffs in Blair I1, Appellants were not beneficiaries of any contract between Attorney Appellees and Grove Farm and, as we have discussed, Attorney Appellees had no duty to Appellants. Last, the damages Appellants requested in the Second Amended Complaint are more closely akin to tort damages, not economic damages arising out of any frustrated expectation on the part of Appellants. Given the foregoing, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Attorney Appellees‘ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney's fees merely because claims relate to a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship; the action must be in the nature of assumpsit.

Inouye v. Hughes · filed 2010-06-29

The mere fact that Inouye's claims relate to a contractual or quasi-contractual relationship ‘between the parties does not render the dispute between the parties to be in the nature of assumpsit. Accordingly, we conclude that the Circuit Court abused its discretion in granting an award of attorney's fees to Hughes pursuant to HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys' fees for claims sounding in tort rather than assumpsit.

Fyffe v. Hue · filed 2010-08-31

Because Fyffe's claims against Donnelly and Davis sounded in tort rather than assumpsit, the circuit court abused its discretion in granting fees to davis and Donnelly under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 permits a prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees when a declaratory claim seeks relief based on contractual rights and is in the nature of assumpsit.

Greenwell v. Palani Ranch Company, Inc. · filed 2021-11-26

Declaratory action claims may sound in the nature of assumpsit where the relief sought and award of attorneys’ fees and costs requested is premised on rights flowing from a contract. ... Therefore, the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys' fees to Appellees pursuant to HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney’s fees when the claims seek declaratory and injunctive relief rather than money damages.

Kaiser Found. Health Plan Inc. v. the Queen's Med. Ctr. Inc. · filed 2022-02-08

Kaiser sought declaratory and injunctive relief; it did not seek money damages. This action is therefore not in the nature of assumpsit, and QMC is not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 607-14 covers an insurer's declaratory action over insurance coverage as an action in the nature of assumpsit.

Ranger Insurance Co. v. Hinshaw · filed 2003-12-18

Thus, Ranger's declaratory action is in the nature of assumpsit, and Skydive met the requirements of HRS § 607-14 as discussed in S. Utsunomiya Enters., Inc.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys’ fees in a declaratory judgment action seeking only a determination of rights under a contract, rather than money damages.

Chock v. Government Employees Insurance Co. · filed 2003-12-26

Therefore, GEICO cannot recover attorneys’ fees from Chock because HRS § 607-14 does not provide for attorneys’ fees in declaratory judgment actions.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys' fees for an action seeking only a declaration of rights, even when the action involves a contract.

HSBC Bank USA v. Gillespie, Jr. · filed 2021-08-09

Even though the Complaint implicated the Note and Mortgage, which were contracts, it was not in the nature of assumpsit. Gillespie was not entitled to attorneys' fees under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not allow attorney’s fees for a contract-related action seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief rather than money damages.

Kaiser Found. Health Plan Inc. v. the Queen's Med. Ctr. Inc. · filed 2022-07-13

Kaiser sought declaratory and injunctive relief; it did not seek money damages. This action is therefore not in the nature of assumpsit, and QMC is not entitled to attorney’s fees.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys’ fees for enforcing a judgment by foreclosing a mechanic’s lien because that action is not in the nature of assumpsit.

Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Makahuena Corp. · filed 1984-10-17

This case (Civil No. 2483) is an action to collect on a judgment filed in S. P. No. 5511 by foreclosing a mechanic’s and mate-rialman’s lien. It is not an action in the nature of assumpsit and HRS § 607-14 is inapplicable.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys’ fees for a mechanic’s lien application seeking attachment of a lien rather than contract damages.

808 DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. Murakami · filed 2006-09-07

Here, the lien application was brought pursuant to the mechanic’s lien statute and, as such, is not a common law action. Moreover, the action was for the attachment of a mechanic’s lien to the subject property, not for damages based upon the underlying contract. Therefore, the action was not in the nature of assumpsit; consequently, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Owners’ motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney fees for a mechanic's lien application because that statutory proceeding is not in the nature of assumpsit.

Crescent Custom Homes Maui LLC v. Causey · filed 2026-05-27

The parties must bear their own attorney fees. See 808 Development, 111 Hawai#i at 366, 141 P.3d at 1013 (stating that a mechanic's lien application is statutory, not in the nature of assumpsit under HRS § 607-14).

Section 607-14 calculates the maximum attorney’s fee separately on a plaintiff’s judgment and on a defeated counterclaim, then adds the two amounts.

Rodrigues v. Chan · filed 1985-07-16

Consequently, we hold that under the statute where the plaintiff prevails on both his complaint and on the defendant’s counterclaim, the maximum amount of § 607-14 attorney’s fees awardable is computed by applying the schedule to the judgment amount in plaintiffs favor and to the amount sued for in the counterclaim separately and adding the resulting products.

Section 607-14 caps the combined attorneys’ fees taxed against a losing party by the trial and appellate courts at twenty-five percent of the judgment.

Employee Management Corp. v. Aloha Group, Ltd. · filed 1998-04-22

Accordingly, we hold that HRS § 607-14 places a twenty-five percent “maximum” total combined limit that can be taxed against a losing party by both the trial and appellate courts.

Under the pre-1993 version of § 607-14, the fee schedule caps the total award to all prevailing parties in an action.

Wong v. Takeuchi · filed 1998-05-20

We hold that this language indicates that the total amount awarded to all parties may not exceed the maximum amount allowable under the statutory schedule.

Section 607-14 caps authorized attorney fees at twenty-five percent of the judgment; an ineffective tender does not exclude the principal or subsequent interest from that calculation.

Wong v. General Telcourier, Inc. · filed 1999-11-17

HRS § 607-14 limits the attorney fees it authorizes to a maximum of twenty-five percent of the judgment. GTI contends that the $15,718.61 principal and the post-June 11, 1997 interest should not have been included in the amount of the September 1, 1998 Judgment and should not have been used as a basis for computing the maximum attorney fees awardable because the $15,718.61 principal had been previously unconditionally tendered. In light of our decision in part 2(b) above, this point has no merit.

Section 607-14 caps attorney's fees under a written contract at 25 percent and assesses a prevailing defendant's fees on the amount sued for.

Takayama v. Zera · filed 2010-03-18

Here, in dismissing Takayama's complaint/amended complaint and granting count 11 of Zera's counterclaim, the district court properly awarded Zera reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14. Even if we were to assume Takayama's complaint/amended complaint and count 11 of Zera's counterclaim fell within provision H-2 of the rental agreement, HRS § 607-14 states, "[w]here the note or other contract in writing provides for a reasonable attorney's fee, not more than twenty- five per cent shall be a1lowed." As for Zera's claim that the district court erred in calculating Zera's award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party on Takayama's complaint/amended complaint, Zera fails to note the portion of HRS § 607-14 that states, "[t]he above fees provided for by this section shall be assessed . . . upon the amount sued for if the defendant obtains judgment[,]" which, apparently, is precisely how Zera's award was calculated (sued for $2500, awarded $625 in fees).

Section 607-14’s twenty-five percent limit on attorneys’ fees does not apply when the action adjudicates rights and no monetary liability is at issue.

DFS Group L.P. v. Paiea Properties · filed 2006-04-03

Consequently, the underlying appeal involved an adjudication of rights in which no monetary liability was in issue, and thus, in accordance with the foregoing precedent, we conclude that the twenty-five per cent limitation is inapplicable in the case at bar.

Section 607-14’s twenty-five percent limit on attorneys’ fees applies when a contract plaintiff seeks monetary damages, even if the plaintiff later elects to recover the property.

Kekauoha-Alisa v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In Re Kekauoha-Alisa) · filed 2012-03-26

The bankruptcy court did not err in applying the twenty-five percent limit on attorneys’ fees. ... Debtor’s election of remedies does not render the value returned to Debtor an “economic incident of the judgment” that can escape the twenty-five percent limit.

Section 607-14 exempts a nonprofit homeowners or community association existing pursuant to covenants running with the land from the twenty-five per cent cap on attorneys’ fees.

Kaanapali Hillside Homeowners' Ass'n ex rel. Board of Directors v. Doran · filed 2007-06-21

Accordingly, the covenants in the First Amended Declaration run with the land ... such that KHHA is a “planned community association” for purposes of HRS § 607-14. We therefore hold that KHHA is not subject to the twenty-five per cent cap on its attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal.

Section 607-14 caps attorneys’ fees at 25% of the judgment, including prejudgment interest.

FISTES v. Kobayashi · filed 2008-11-28

The circuit court did not err in awarding attorneys' fees of $10,359.60, which was less than 25% of the combined damages and prejudgment interest awards.

Section 607-14’s twenty-five percent fee cap does not apply when an action seeks only nonmonetary relief.

Seven Signatures General Partnership v. Irongate Azrep BW LLC · filed 2012-05-09

Here, Seven Signatures’ Petition sought an order compelling arbitration or mediation. Therefore, the Court finds that section 607-14’s cap does not apply.

Section 607-14 limits appellate attorney’s fees to 25% of the judgment when the planned community association exception does not apply.

Gailliard v. Rawsthorne. · filed 2021-11-19

We agree and hold that the ICA should have limited its appellate attorney’s fees award to $10,000 - 25% of the $40,000 damages award the Gailliards received.

Section 607-14 limits attorneys’ fees for a breach of contract claim to twenty-five percent of the judgment on that claim.

Martin v. Island Palm Communities, LLC · filed 2024-05-20

The award of attorneys’ fees for the breach of contract claim would be limited to twenty-five percent of the judgment in the breach of contract claim.

Section 607-14 limits an attorneys’ fee award for a breach of contract claim to twenty-five percent of the judgment on that claim.

Jabour v. Hickam Communities, LLC · filed 2024-05-20

The award of attorneys’ fees for the breach of contract claim would be limited to twenty-five percent of the judgment in the breach of contract claim. See § 607-14. Based on the parties’ representations, that would appear to be $3,202 for Lonnie Jabour.

Section 607-14’s 25% limit on attorneys’ fees does not apply to claims seeking a declaration of an easement and an injunction against interference with it.

Laurance v. Makana Aloha Plantation Association · filed 2024-05-31

Iokepa Owners' amended complaint sought a declaration that an easement burdened Makana Aloha Plantation Subdivision for Iokepa Owners' benefit, and an injunction against future interference. HRS § 607-14's 25% limitation does not apply to such claims.

Section 607-14 caps recoverable attorney's fees at 25% of the judgment, excluding costs and attorney's fees from the judgment amount.

San Nicolas v. Embassy House, LLP · filed 2024-06-28

The attorneys' fees awarded to Structural Systems under HRS § 607-14 by the circuit court totaled $113,179.00. Structural Systems' indemnity award exclusive of attorneys' fees and costs was $768,979.59. Therefore, the attorneys' fees awarded to Structural Systems did not exceed the statutory maximum.

Section 607-14 permits a reasonable attorney fee award of up to 25 percent of the amount in issue, which may include a collateral award.

Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Company v. Ohana Control Systems, Inc. · filed 2020-10-21

Although the language of section 607-14 does not discuss the situation presented by this case and the authorities the court has identified do not clearly address the issue of whether this court’s ruling on collateral should be considered in calculating the 25 percent cap set forth in Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14, the court is satisfied that the recommendation in the F&R is consistent with the Hawaii legislature’s goal of permitting reasonable fee awards not exceeding 25 percent of the amount in issue whenever possible.

Section 607-14 caps a prevailing defendant's attorney fee award at 25% of the amount sued for.

Badgley v. Bay Clinic, Inc. · filed 2025-02-06

HRS § 607-14 limits a fee award to 25% of "the amount sued for if the defendant obtains judgment." Badgley sued for damages of $5,093.92. Badgley also asked for $5,093.92 in his closing argument. Bay Clinic should have been awarded 25% of $5,093.92 — $1,273.48 — under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 limits a prevailing defendant's fees to 25% of the maximum possible recovery on the assumpsit claim, even when that claim is intertwined with a whistleblower claim.

Knowles v. Hawaii Pacific University · filed 2026-05-27

It would therefore be inequitable to allow a defendant to recover fees beyond HRS § 607-14's 25% limit merely because a plaintiff also asserted an HWPA claim.

Section 607-14 allows members of a planned community association to recover reasonable attorneys' fees beyond the twenty-five per cent limit when enforcing the association's governing documents.

Lise and John Bohm Kauai Green House LLC v. Oceanaire Properties, LLC · filed 2025-07-17

The circuit court did not err in concluding that the "planned community association" exception under HRS § 607-14 applies, and that Bohm could therefore recover attorneys' fees "in excess of twenty-five per cent of the judgment."

Section 607-14 caps attorney fees at 25% of the amount sued for and the judgment in the prevailing party's favor when it prevails on both claims.

Ka'u Andrade Contracting, Inc. v. Naito · filed 2026-03-30

The value of the Count 5 claim alone ($510,260.05) plus the reduced value of the judgment in Tiare Lani's favor ($29,780.00), amounts to $540,040.05, twenty-five percent (25%) of which ($135,010.01) already exceeds the total award of attorneys' fees at issue here ($133,267.59), prior to any reductions by this court and the circuit court on remand.

Section 607-14 limits a defendant's attorney fee award to twenty-five percent of the amount sued for when the defendant obtains judgment.

Yamaguchi v. Title Guaranty Escrow Services, Inc. · filed 2026-05-19

The amount awarded ($27,349.27) was within the twenty-five percent limit under HRS § 607-14, which provides that the amount of fees shall be assessed on "the amount sued for if the defendant obtains judgment."

Section 607-14 does not limit attorney’s fee awards to nongovernmental parties.

Hawaiian Isles Enterprises Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 1994-09-15

For example, HRS § 607-14 governs the award of attorneys’ fees “in all actions in the nature of assumpsit and in all actions on a promissory note or other contract in writing” and does not limit an award of attorneys’ fees to non-governmental parties.

Section 607-14 permits an award of attorneys’ fees against a state agency in an assumpsit action when the state has consented to be sued on the underlying contract.

Fought & Co. v. Steel Engineering & Erection, Inc. · filed 1998-02-11

Neither the plain language of HRS § 607-14 nor of any other statute restricts the former’s application to non-governmental parties.

Section 607-14 entitles a party to reasonable attorneys’ fees, not automatically to every fee it incurred.

Finley v. Home Insurance Co. · filed 1998-12-30

There is a statutory entitlement, pursuant to HRS § 607-14, to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees. This does not equate to an entitlement to an automatic award of all attorneys’ fees expended by a party in litigation.

Section 607-14 gives a prevailing borrower a reciprocal right to recover attorneys’ fees when the mortgage permits the lender to charge fees for the borrower’s default.

Kekauoha-Alisa v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In Re Kekauoha-Alisa) · filed 2008-09-03

The debtor is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs under Haw.Rev.Stat. § 607-14.

Section 607-14 permits reasonable attorneys’ fees in assumpsit actions, but a court may deny fees when the prevailing party receives only $1 in nominal damages.

Maupin · filed 2025-11-26

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14 allows for the award of attorneys’ fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit such as breach of contract. The fee is one “the court determines to be reasonable.” Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14. Awarding attorneys’ fees in this case would not be reasonable. The Court declines to award attorneys’ fees in this case where Plaintiffs are entitled to only $1 in nominal damages.

Section 607-14 allows attorney fees in lease disputes under its assumpsit or written-contract prong, capped at 25 percent of a judgment that includes rent paid after suit and prejudgment interest.

Forbes v. Hawaii Culinary Corp. · filed 1997-09-19

Because leases are essentially contractual in nature, attorneys’ fees in lease disputes are awardable under the “assump-sit” prong and may be awarded under the “contract” prong of HRS § 607-14. ... An award of attorneys’ fees taxed by the court under HRS § 607-14, however, shall not exceed twenty-five percent of the judgment. ... In summary, we conclude that for purposes of HRS § 607-14, the amended judgment upon which the landlord’s attorneys’ fees are computed shall include any partial rental payments made by the tenant after suit was filed, see HRS § 666-5, and any award of prejudgment interest to the landlord.

Section 607-14 permits attorney's fees in lease disputes, and the trial court has discretion to identify the prevailing party when neither side wins completely.

Brewer v. CLAES · filed 2007-11-29

Neither party in this case prevailed completely. Although Brewer was granted possession, that possession was conditioned on the removal of the fence, and Brewer was not awarded double rent until the latter of October 31, 2003 or 30 days after the removal of the fence. Appellants, on the other hand, lost outright on their counterclaim. In a situation such as this, the determination of which party has prevailed is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney's fees for a summary possession action seeking no contract damages when the lease has no attorney's fee provision.

Narvaez v. Rojas · filed 2026-02-27

HRS § 607–14 therefore provided no basis for the fee award to the Rojases, and the District Court acted outside its discretion in making the award based on that statute.

Section 607-14 makes attorney fees taxable as costs in cases to which it applies.

CRSC, INC. v. Sage Diamond Co., Inc. · filed 2001-04-03

In the instant case, attorney fees are taxable as costs pursuant to HRS § 607-14 (1993).

Section 607-14 permits reasonable attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in assumpsit and specified contract actions, but the contingency enhancement rule for private enforcement fee statutes does not apply.

Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd. · filed 2001-10-11

For example, the holding is inapplicable to attorney’s fees under HRS § 607-14 (1993), which authorizes courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party “in all actions in the nature of assumpsit and in all actions on a promissory note or other contract in writing that provides for an attorney’s fee.”

Section 607-14’s attorney fee provision applies to court actions, not arbitration proceedings.

Hamada v. Westcott · filed 2003-08-11

The plain wording of HRS § 607-14 states that it is applicable “[i]n all the courts[.]” Clearly the statute applies only to court actions and not arbitration proceedings.

Section 607-14 applies to court actions, not arbitration proceedings, so its 25 percent fee cap does not limit an arbitration award.

Kona Village Realty, Inc. v. Sunstone Realty Partners, XIV, LLC · filed 2009-06-29

Thus, HRS § 607-14 is not, by its own terms, applicable to arbitration proceedings.

For purposes of § 607-14, an appeal over arbitrability is a separate action from the underlying dispute on the merits.

Charles v. Kapalua Bay, LLC · filed 2017-09-18

With respect to appellate attorneys’ fees, we conclude that, for the purposes of HRS § 607-14, the appeal of the arbitrability issue is a separate action from the underlying dispute on the merits.

Section 607-14 may authorize attorneys’ fees for a court petition to compel arbitration if the petition is in the nature of assumpsit.

Hawaii Tire Co., LLC v. Estate of Deluz, Sr. · filed 2025-09-18

But a petition to compel arbitration is not itself an arbitration proceeding brought before an arbitrator; the petition to compel arbitration is brought before a court. As such, HRS § 607-14 may be a basis for awarding attorneys' fees in a petition to compel arbitration under HRS § 658A-7 if the petition was in the nature of assumpsit.

Section 607-14 permits reasonable attorney fees under a written contract’s fee provision when a party prevails in a proceeding to compel arbitration.

Leary v. Robert's Hawaii, Inc · filed 2026-04-28

Trust prevailed on the main and only issue presented by the special proceeding. Trust was entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs under section 14.4 of the Purchase Agreement and HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 permits attorney’s fees without apportioning assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims when the claims are inextricably linked and apportionment is impractical.

Albert · filed 2026-03-03

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Plaintiffs fail to identify any error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. ... Rather, the Magistrate Judge determined that even the ostensibly non-assumpsit claims were “inextricably linked to the breach of contract claim,” thus making any apportionment impossible.

When a fee request under § 607-14 covers assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims, the court must explain its award and apportion fees between the claims if practicable.

Price v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc. · filed 2005-04-22

In the instant case, AIG requested attorneys' fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14, asserting that all of Price's claims were in the nature of assumpsit. ... Based on the foregoing, we: (1) vacate the award of attorneys' fees as determined in the November 14, 2001 order and referred to in the December 26, 2001 judgment; (2) remand to the circuit court for a redetermination of the proper amount of attorneys' fees based on an apportionment, if practicable, between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims; and (3) affirm the November 14, 2001 order and the December 26, 2001 judgment in all other respects.

Section 607-14 requires attorney's fees to be apportioned between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims when an award covers both.

Lee v. UNCIANO · filed 2008-06-26

However, the circuit court should have apportioned the award between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims because the court awarded Plaintiffs damages for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement and punitive damages.

Section 607-14 permits a fee award without apportioning fees between assumpsit and nonassumpsit claims when the claims are inextricably intertwined.

Au v. Funding Group, Inc. · filed 2013-03-21

Plaintiffs nonassumpsit claims were inextricably linked to and derived from the breach of contract claim. Moreover, the hours expended in this action and motions practice were not directed at any specific claims. Consequently, the Court declines to apportion the fees between the assumpsit and nonassumpsit claims.

Section 607-14 permits a fee award without apportionment when assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims are inextricably linked and separating the fees is impracticable.

Moloaa Farms LLC v. Green Energy Team LLC. ICA s.d.o., filed 06/21/2024 [ada], 154 Haw. 296. Application for Writ of Cer · filed 2025-09-18

Thus, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it would be “impracticable to apportion the attorneys’ fees requested by GET between [Moloaa]’s assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims.”

Section 607-14 generally requires reasonable attorneys’ fees for a qualifying prevailing party, but it does not authorize fees that conflict with the specific fee rules for motor vehicle insurance claims.

Enoka v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc. · filed 2006-02-28

Accordingly, because allowing AIG to seek attorney’s fees under HRS § 607-14 in the instant case would contravene the attorney’s fee award scheme set forth in HRS § 431:100-211, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying AIG’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 607-14 does not govern an insurer's request for attorneys' fees and costs in this UIM bad-faith case; HRS § 431:10C-211(d) applies.

Guajardo v. AIG HAWAII INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. · filed 2007-10-25

Further, upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we hold with regard to AIG's cross-appeal that the circuit court did not err by failing to award AIG attorneys' fees and costs because HRS § 431:10C-211(d), not HRS § 607-14, applied to the instant case.

Section 607-14's fee limit does not govern attorneys' fees awarded under § 607-14.7.

BARNEDO v. Dominguez · filed 2009-04-08

We analyze the circuit court's award of HRS § 607-14.7 attorneys' fees according to HRS § 607-14.7, not the more general HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorney’s fees for an equitable contribution claim merely because contracts underlie the parties’ shared obligation.

Kim v. Kam · filed 2012-08-10

Thus, based on the facts and issues raised in Kim’s November 3, 2010 Complaint, the nature of the grievance, and the relief sought, we conclude that the “essential character of the underlying action” was one of equitable contribution under HRS § 483-2 and was not an action in the nature of as-sumpsit under HRS § 607-14.

Section 607-14 allows the prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees and costs in an unlawful foreclosure action because the action is in the nature of assumpsit.

Santiago v. Tanaka. · filed 2015-12-29

Relatedly, because unlawful foreclosure is an action in the nature of assumpsit, see Sharp v. Hui Wahine, Inc., 49 Haw. 241, 243, 413 P.2d 242, 245 (1966), the Santiagos, who should have been the prevailing parties, are also entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs they incurred at the circuit court. HRS § 607-14 (Supp. 1997). Conversely, because Tanaka should have been the losing party, the circuit court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs to her, based on HRS § 607-14, is erroneous.

An award of fees and costs under § 607-14 must be reconsidered when part of the underlying judgment is vacated because the amount involved and results obtained affect the award’s reasonableness.

Chuck Jones and MacLaren v. Williams · filed 2003-05-14

En suite, the amounts awarded for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to HRS § 607-14 are also vacated and similarly remanded.

Section 607-14 requires a prevailing party’s attorney to submit an explanatory affidavit stating time spent and expected to obtain judgment, or the agreed fee if the fee is not hourly.

MFY Funding LLC v. Ohia Opportunities, LLC · filed 2022-11-04

Among other things, there is no information about MFY’s various attorney timekeepers or their respective billing rates, no description of each timekeeper’s skill, experience or reputation, no description of what each timekeeper did, and no indication of the time spent performing each unidentified task. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14 (requiring the prevailing party’s attorneys to submit an explanatory affidavit “stating the amount of time the attorney spent on the action and the amount of time the attorney is likely to spend to obtain a final written judgment, or, if the fee is not based on an hourly rate, the amount of the agreed upon fee”); ... MFY’s attorneys’ fees request is denied without prejudice so that it may remedy these omissions.

A party seeking fees under § 607-14 must substantiate the amount requested so the court can determine whether it is reasonable.

Guieb v. Guieb · filed 2024-08-07

Without an itemization, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Roland attorney's fees.

Section 607-14 permits attorneys' fees for breach of contract and implied-covenant claims, subject to a twenty-five percent limit.

Kreitman v. Day, Jr. · filed 2023-05-19

Attorneys' fees were recoverable for Counts 1 and 2 under HRS § 607-14 (subject to a twenty-five percent limit), and for Count 3 under HRS § 508D-16(d).

Section 607-14 permits an award of attorneys' fees in an action in the nature of assumpsit even when the contract has no fee provision.

McKay v. Guez · filed 2024-05-21

The supreme court has conclusively determined that, "[u]nder HRS § 607–14, an action in the nature of assumpsit does not need a clause in writing providing for attorneys' fees in order for attorneys' fees to be granted." Eastman v. McGowan, 86 ... Hawai#i 21, 31, 946 P.3d 1317, 1327 (1997). Guez's argument to the contrary is without merit.

In an assumpsit action involving planned community governing documents, § 607-14 follows a specific contractual fee provision that awards fees only to prevailing parties who bring enforcement actions.

Cowan v. Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC. ICA Order Approving the January 19, 2023 Stipulation to Dismiss With Prejudice Pla · filed 2025-08-14

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, which involves a planned community association’s governing documents, we hold that even if a case sounds in assumpsit, where there is a specific contractual provision or language providing for attorney fees, the contract should be followed in awarding fees.

Section 607-14 authorizes attorneys' fees in actions in the nature of assumpsit, which generally require contractual privity between the plaintiff and defendant.

PJ Visionary PTE. LTD. v. Five Senses LLC. · filed 2025-04-24

HRS § 607-14 (2016) authorizes attorneys' fees "in all actions in the nature of assumpsit." ... Generally, "privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant is necessary to the maintenance of an action of assumpsit[.]" ... Here, while this appeal centers on JN Group's lease agreement with Five Senses LLC's subsidiaries, and PJ Visionary's Loan Agreement with Five Senses LLC, PJ Visionary and JN Group are not in privity for any of these contracts.

Section 607-14 does not authorize attorneys' fees for real property tax refund claims brought under HRS chapter 232 because those claims are not in the nature of assumpsit.

In re: Tax Appeal of Rohlfing III and Rohlfing · filed 2025-07-28

And because the Taxpayers' claims before the Tax Appeal Court were not "in the nature of assumpsit," the Tax Appeal Court did not have jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees pursuant to HRS § 607-14.