Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2

Section 378-2(1) does not prohibit discharge based on perceived drug-related activity rather than the mere fact of an employee’s arrest and court record.

Guy KINOSHITA and Ronald Nakashima, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES, LIMITED, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees · filed 1986-10-24(1)

Based on these findings, we conclude that CP Air did not violate § 378-2 when it discharged the plaintiffs. The discharges were not based on the “mere fact” of the plaintiffs’ arrest and court record, but instead were due to the perception that plaintiffs were involved in drug-related activity.

Section 378-2 permits a claim for discharge based on a conviction when the employee alleges that the conviction bears no rational relationship to the duties of the position.

Wright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2006-08-30(1)(A)

Taking the allegations as true and viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Wright, as the nonmoving party, Aames Funding Corp., 107 Hawai'i at 98, 110 P.3d at 1045, we conclude that, at this stage in the litigation, Wright has sufficiently alleged a claim against Home Depot for violation of HRS § 378-2.

Section 378-2 bars an employer from refusing to hire someone because of an arrest or court record, subject to § 378-2.5’s exception for a conviction rationally related to the job.

Shimose · filed 2015-01-16(a)(1)(A)

HRS § 378-2 states: “It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or any employer to refuse to hire or employ . . . any individual . . . [b]ecause of . . . arrest and court record[.]” However, HRS § 378-2.5 allows an employer to disqualify a job applicant based on his or her history of conviction, “provided that the conviction record bears a rational relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the position.” The issue in this case is whether, as a matter of law, HHSC/HMC established a rational relationship between Shimose’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute crystal methamphetamine and the duties and responsibilities of a radiological technician at HMC. We hold that it did not.

Section 378-2 provides a sufficient remedy for discrimination claims based on its prohibitions, so those same allegations do not support a separate common law wrongful discharge claim under the public policy exception.

Hew-Len v. F.W. Woolworth · filed 1990-03-08(1), (5)

Most recently, in Tachera v. United Airlines, 1989 WL 142928, 58 U.S.L.W. 2259, 4 IER Cases 1386 (D.Haw.1989), this court affirmed the decisions in Lui and Lapinad, finding that the public policy exception was not applicable “when, as here, the plaintiff merely advances policies which inhere to an employment discrimination statute that is sufficient in itself — in this case, Haw.Rev. Stat. § 378-2.” 1989 WL 142928 at 4, 4 IER at 1389. ... Accordingly, this court GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss wrongful termination claims insofar as these claims are based upon breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing and the public policy exception to the at-will rule.

Section 378-2 prohibits discriminatory employment practices; the remedy provided by Chapter 378 precludes a separate public policy conspiracy claim based on alleged violations of the section.

Farmer v. HICKAM FEDERAL CREDIT UNION · filed 2010-02-02

Here, HRS Chapter 378, Part I, which prohibits the discriminatory employment practices set forth in HRS § 378-2, also provides a remedy for victims of these discriminatory employment practices. §§§ HRS § 378-5 (1993). Thus, Keomalu was not entitled to bring a claim for conspiracy to violate public policy based on alleged violations of HRS § 378-2.

Section 378-2 provides a nonnegotiable right against employment discrimination; emotional distress claims based on its violation are not preempted when they require no interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. NCL America, Inc. · filed 2008-02-20

Plaintiffs-Intervenors’ IIED/NIED claims are premised on a violation of Haw.Rev.Stat. § 378-2, which provides a nonnegotiable state right. The alleged conduct at issue involves discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion; assessing this alleged conduct does not require reference to the CBA. Because the court does not need to interpret the labor agreement to determine whether Plaintiffs-Intervenors were distressed by discrimination based on their national origin and/or religion, the IIED/NIED claims are not preempted.

Section 378-2(a)(1)(A) prohibits an employer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because of race.

Jackson v. Foodland Super Market, Ltd. · filed 2013-07-25(a)(1)(A)

Under HRS § 378-2, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice “[f]or any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of race.

Section 378-2(1)(A) prohibits employers from discriminating in employment solely on the basis of age.

Bragalone v. Kona Coast Resort Joint Venture · filed 1994-09-29(1)(A)

The mirror provision under Hawaii law makes it illegal “for any employer to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” solely on the basis of age.

Section 378-2(1) prohibits terminating an employee for marrying a coworker in the same department unless a statutory exception applies.

Ross v. STOUFFER HOTEL CO.(HAWAII) · filed 1991-08-29(1)

We conclude that as a matter of law, the policy in question of terminating persons who marry other persons working in the same department violates HRS § 378-2 unless the termination falls within one of the exceptions in HRS § 378-3.

Section 378-2(1) prohibits discharging an employee under a policy against spouses working in the same department unless an exception in § 378-3 applies.

Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai'i) Ltd. · filed 1994-08-30(1)

In sum, contrary to the dissent's charge that we are imposing our view of appropriate public policy in disregard of the legislature's intent, we remain convinced that Stouffer's no-relatives policy as applied to Ross violates the plain language and purpose of HRS § 378-2, unless the termination falls within one of the exceptions in HRS § 378-3.

Section 378-2(1)(A) prohibits employers from discharging an individual because of age.

Shoppe v. Gucci America, Inc. · filed 2000-12-28(1)(A)

Based upon this language, Hawaii’s Employment Discrimination Law prohibits employers from discharging an individual because of his or her age.

Section 378-2(1)(A) applies to employers regardless of size, including two-person businesses.

Sam Teague, Ltd. v. Hawai'i Civil Rights Commission · filed 1999-02-03(1)(A)

In enacting the employment discrimination law, the legislature intended that all employers, regardless of size, be subjected to its provisions.

Section 378-2 covers discrimination based on an employer’s perception of a person’s national origin, even when that perception is mistaken.

Henao v. Wyndham Vacations Resorts, Inc. · filed 2013-02-26

But reading Title VII and section 378-2 as encompassing “perceived as” discrimination is entirely consistent with what Congress and Hawaii’s legislature were attempting to prohibit.

Section 378-2(1) prohibits an employer policy that disadvantages an employee because of the employee’s spouse’s work, unless an exception under § 378-3 applies.

Wigent v. Science Applications International Corp. · filed 2014-05-08(a)(1)

Pursuant to the Ross decisions, it appears that SH-2 constitutes direct evidence of per se discrimination unless one of the exceptions under H.R.S. § 378-3 applies. ... Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether one of the exceptions in § 378-3 applies, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Plaintiffs marital status discrimination claim.

Section 378-2(a)(1)(A) permits an ancestry-discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence when the plaintiff shows more favorable treatment of similarly situated employees outside the protected class or other circumstances supporting an inference of discrimination.

Phanthalasy v. Hawaiian Agents, Inc. · filed 2019-05-30(a)(1)(A)

Despite the low standard of proof required at the prima facie stage, and even drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court concludes that he has failed to show that Defendant treated him less favorably than similarly situated non-Laotian individuals.

Section 378-2(a)(7) protects lactating employees from discrimination for breastfeeding at the workplace; an employer cannot avoid liability by prohibiting the breastfeeding altogether.

Summer v. American Savings Bank F.S.B. · filed 2020-12-07(a)(7)

ASB cannot escape liability for discrimination by prohibiting the protected activity altogether.

Section 378-2 does not apply to a customer's discrimination claim when the customer alleges neither employment with nor an application for employment with the defendant.

Wideman v. Hickam Federal Credit Union · filed 2025-11-10

Wideman's amended complaint didn't allege he was employed by, or that he had applied for employment with, the Credit Union Defendants. HRS § 378-2 has no application to this case.

Section 378-2(a)(1)(A) does not make an employer’s false testimony at an administrative hearing about a refusal to hire an unlawful discriminatory practice.

Shook v. County of Hawaii Police Department · filed 2022-08-31(a)(1)(A)

Even assuming that HPD can be held liable for the false testimony of its employees, § 378-2 does not make it a discriminatory practice for an employer to give false testimony in an administrative hearing regarding the refusal to hire an individual because of arrest and court record.

Section 378-2 protects employees from religious discrimination but does not protect social, political, or economic views or personal preferences.

Victorino v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc. · filed 2024-12-12(a)(1)

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 protect a plaintiff from religious discrimination, but they do not protect all social, political, or economic views or personal preferences.

A plaintiff claiming employment discrimination under § 378-2(1) may support the claim with evidence comparing the plaintiff’s treatment to that of similarly situated employees.

Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Society · filed 1997-04-09(1)

Because the trial court erroneously ruled that Furukawa failed to compare his treatment to that of similarly situated employees, we vacate the grant of the Society’s motion for directed verdict and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A race or ancestry discharge claim under § 378-2 must be assessed under the applicable prima facie discrimination principles on summary judgment.

Takaki v. Allied MacHinery Corp. · filed 1998-01-21(1)

For the reasons previously stated, we cannot ascertain from the record what elements of a claim or test for a HRS § 378-2 violation the court may have considered in granting summary judgment on count ten. As a result, we vacate the award of summary judgment on that count and remand for application of the principles enunciated by the supreme court in Furukawa.

Section 378-2 requires a disability discrimination plaintiff to establish a disability, qualification to perform the job with or without reasonable accommodation, and an adverse employment decision because of the disability.

French v. Hawaii Pizza Hut, Inc. · filed 2004-09-30(1)(A)

Because of the similarities between the ADA and our own HRS chapter 378, we adopt the analysis for establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination under HRS § 378-2 that was established in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). In Sutton, to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff has the burden of establishing that: (1) he or she is an individual with a "disability" within the meaning of the statute; (2) he or she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential duties of his or her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment decision because of his or her disability.

Under § 378-2, a prima facie age discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence requires proof that the employee was at least 40, performed satisfactorily, was discharged, and was replaced by a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications.

Stallings v. Walmart, Inc. · filed 2004-12-17

To establish a prima facie case using circumstantial evidence under the ADEA and Hawaii law, Stallings must demonstrate that he was (1) a member of the protected class (age 40 or over); (2) performing his job in a satisfactory manner; (3) discharged; and (4) replaced by a substantially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications.

Section 378-2 disparate treatment claims follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, and comparator evidence offered to show pretext requires sufficient similarity.

Hac v. University of Hawai'i · filed 2003-07-17(1)(A)

This court has adopted the McDonnell Douglas analysis in HRS § 378-2 discrimination cases. ... But, in order to show pretext by comparison, there must be sufficient similarity between the plaintiff and the matters of discovery sought.

Section 378-2 requires an employee alleging race or gender discrimination in the denial of light-duty reassignment to show that comparable employees outside the protected class received light-duty work the employee could perform.

Suzuki v. State · filed 2008-12-04(1)(A)

To establish a prima facie case of race or gender discrimination based upon the State’s refusal to provide her with light-duty work, Suzuld must show that: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she applied for and was denied reassignment to light-duty work that she was capable of performing; and 3) similarly situated employees outside the protected class were granted reassignment to light-duty work.

Age discrimination claims under § 378-2 follow the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Kocsis v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. · filed 2013-08-05(a)(1)(A)

Thus, to evaluate state-law age discrimination claims under section 378-2, Hawaii courts follow the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework used for federal ADEA claims.

For an age discrimination claim under § 378-2, establishing a prima facie case shifts the burden to the employer to show a legitimate reason for termination unrelated to age.

Straub v. County of Maui · filed 2019-09-24

Because Straub has established a prima facie case of age discrimination pursuant to HRS § 378-2, the burden shifts to the County to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (that is, unrelated to age) for terminating Straub.

Section 378-2 age and sex discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

Hollister v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc. · filed 2013-01-23

The Court follows the framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), as to Plaintiffs Haw.Rev.Stat. § 378-2 discrimination claims.

Section 378-2 disability discrimination and retaliation claims use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework; an employee must show that the employer’s stated reasons were pretextual.

Bach v. Community Ties of America · filed 2021-03-12(a)(1)–(2)

At the summary judgment stage, we apply the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to the discrimination and retaliation claims at issue here. ... Even assuming that the record contained sufficient facts to support a prima facie showing of discrimination and retaliation for all three claims on the first step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Bach failed to show that the overwhelming evidence of non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for her termination were pretextual, at the final step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

Section 378-2 requires a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment based on sex to show that a similarly situated person outside the protected class was treated more favorably.

You v. Longs Drugs Stores California, LLC · filed 2013-03-27

You asserts race, sex, and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII (Count I), “regarded as disabled” discrimination in violation of the ADA (Count II), age discrimination in violation of the ADEA' (Count III), and race, sex, age, ancestry, and disability discrimination in violation of section 378-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes (Count V). ... You fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of sex discrimination because she fails to identify any similarly situated person outside of her protected class who was treated more favorably. Because You fails to demonstrate that any male was treated more favorably than she was, the disparate treatment sex discrimination claims asserted in Counts I and V fail.

Under § 378-2, evidence that casts doubt on an employer’s stated reasons for termination can create a triable issue of age discrimination.

Simmons v. Aqua Hotels & Resorts, Inc. · filed 2013-08-22(1)(A)

We conclude Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding when Defendants made the decision to terminate Plaintiff and what factors motivated that decision. Therefore, the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment against Plaintiff on her HRS § 378-2 claim.

A claim under § 378-2(1) cannot survive summary judgment when no reasonable jury could find that the employer’s stated reason for firing the employee was a pretext for discrimination.

Coyaso v. Bradley Pacific Aviation · filed 2014-06-16(1)

For the same reason, summary judgment was proper on Coyaso’s discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and Hawai’i state law. No reasonable jury could find that Bradley’s stated reason for firing Coyaso was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.

Section 378-2 prohibits an employer from discharging a person because of gender, and summary judgment is improper when a genuine dispute exists over whether the employer’s stated reasons are a pretext for discrimination.

Nozawa v. Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3. · filed 2018-04-24(a)(1)(A)

Thus, HRS § 378-2 prohibits an employer from discharging a person because of that person’s gender. ... Summary judgment is improper if there is a genuine issue as to whether a defendant’s reasons for terminating the plaintiff are a pretext for discrimination.

Under § 378-2, a prima facie showing of age discrimination shifts the burden to the employer to give a legitimate reason for the termination unrelated to age.

Straub v. County of Maui · filed 2019-10-10

Because Straub has established a prima facie case of age discrimination pursuant to HRS § 378-2, the burden shifts to the County to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (that is, unrelated to age) for terminating Straub.

A § 378-2 discrimination claim can survive summary judgment when material facts about the employer’s stated reason for termination are disputed.

Carnate v. Hilton Grand Vacations Company, LLC · filed 2019-11-13(a)(1)(A)

There are genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was terminated because he removed wood from the Hilton property without written authorization.

A race or ancestry discrimination claim under § 378-2 gives fair notice when the complaint alleges protected status, satisfactory job performance, adverse employment actions, and circumstances suggesting discrimination.

Brooks v. Kona Coast Shellfish, L.L.C. · filed 2021-08-17(a)(1)(A)

We conclude that the Amended Complaint provided fair notice to Kona Coast that Brooks was asserting claims for violation of HRS § 378-2 based on his race and ancestry. The Amended Complaint alleged that Brooks belonged to a class of persons protected by the statute; that he was qualified for his position and performed his job satisfactorily; that he experienced various adverse employment actions; and that circumstances surrounding the alleged adverse employment actions gave rise to an inference of discrimination.

Section 378-2 permits a prima facie claim of ancestry or age discrimination when a similarly situated employee outside the protected class is retained, but the claim fails if the employee cannot raise a genuine issue that the employer’s stated reason was pretextual.

Caliwag v. C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc. · filed 2024-01-12(a)(1)(A)

Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of national origin or ancestry discrimination pursuant to Title VII and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2, and a prima facie case of age discrimination pursuant to § 378-2. ... Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination under Title VII and Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 fail as a matter of law.

Section 378-2 discrimination claims use the McDonnell Douglas framework; a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by showing that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably.

Lono v. Hawaii Pacific University · filed 2024-03-13

The Hawaii Supreme Court has also adopted the McDonnell Douglas framework for HRS § 378-2 discrimination cases. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has met her prima facie case.

For an age or sex discrimination claim based on termination, the fourth element of a prima facie case under § 378-2 is that the position still exists.

Lough v. Hawaii Pacific University · filed 2025-12-19(a)(1)(A)

Shoppe and Nozawa make clear that "the position still exists" element applies to both her age and sex discrimination claims, and it is for the Circuit Court to decide on remand whether she satisfied this element and thus established a prima facie case of age and sex discrimination.

Comparator evidence for a § 378-2 discrimination claim must concern the challenged term or condition of employment, such as a reduction in hours.

Carabbacan v. Outrigger Canoe Club · filed 2024-05-21(a)(1)(A)

Thus, the language of HRS § 378-2 and Carabbacan's own Complaint do not support Carabbacan's argument on appeal that he need only show that an employee outside his protected class "was treated more favorably[,]" untethered from any term and condition of employment such as the claimed reduction in hours.

Section 378-2(2) does not require an underlying discrimination complaint to succeed for a retaliation claim to proceed.

Aloha Islandair Inc. v. Linda Tseu, Executive Director, Hawaii Civil Rights Commission Hawaii Civil Rights Commission, State of Hawaii · filed 1997-10-14(2)

On its face, the Hawaii statute prohibiting retaliation does not condition the retaliation claim on the merit' of the underlying discrimination claim.

Section 378-2(2) does not require a retaliation claimant to succeed on the underlying discrimination claim.

Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp. in Hawai'i, Ltd. · filed 2002-12-18(2)

There is no requirement that a retaliation claim be based on a successful discrimination claim.

Section 378-2(2) does not protect an employee from retaliation for preparing to report misconduct unrelated to discrimination prohibited by the statute.

Lalau v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 2013-03-28(2)

Because neither Title VII, the ADEA, nor section 378-2 protects an employee from being retaliated against for preparing to report bogus citations or falsification of a business record like a “DAR,” Lalau’s statement does not come close to satisfying the first element of his retaliation claim.

Section 378-2 does not protect complaints of favoritism that do not concern a protected trait.

Ahuvia v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, Inc. · filed 2013-12-18

Regarding the state law claims, the Internal Problems Letter and Plaintiffs summer of 2007 complaints do not constitute a protected activity under Haw.Rev. Stat. § 378-2.

Section 378-2(2) does not protect an employee from retaliation for complaining about a manager’s behavior unrelated to a protected category.

Aoyagi v. Straub Clinic & Hospital, Inc. · filed 2015-10-26(2)

Because neither Title VII, the ADEA, nor section 378-2 protects an employee from being retaliated against for complaining-about a manager’s unfair or condescending behavior that is unrelated to a protected category, Plaintiffs September 2011 complaint simply cannot satisfy the first element of her retaliation claim.

Section 378-2(a)(2) retaliation claims require a causal link between protected activity and adverse action; temporal proximity alone may be insufficient to establish that link.

Bach v. Community Ties of America, Inc. · filed 2019-11-15(a)(2)

Simply pointing to the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s request for an accommodation and her termination is insufficient to infer causation.

For a retaliation claim under § 378-2(a)(2), the trier of fact assesses whether the employee reasonably believed discrimination occurred based on the circumstances when the employee filed the earlier complaint.

Nacino v. Cambridge Management, Inc. · filed 2022-10-17(a)(2)

The trier of fact must decide whether — under the circumstances that existed when the complaint in the Discrimination Lawsuit was filed — Nacino had a reasonable basis to believe he had been discriminated against in violation of HRS Chapter 378.

Retaliation claims under § 378-2(2) use the same burden-shifting framework as Title VII and Title IX retaliation claims.

Oman v. State of Hawaii Department of Education · filed 2024-06-21(2)

The same burden-shifting framework applies to retaliation claims pressed under Title VII, Title IX, and HRS § 378-2(2).

Section 378-2(a)(2) does not treat an email as protected activity when it says nothing about discrimination or complaints about workplace conduct or conditions.

Kim v. Disney Vacation Club Hawaii Management Company, LLC · filed 2021-04-27(a)(2)

The Court concludes that the first email is not protected activity. The language in the email says nothing about discrimination or complaining about on-the-job conduct or circumstances.

Section 378-2(a)(2) protects employees from retaliation for filing discrimination complaints or requesting a reasonable accommodation.

Gima v. City and County of Honolulu. · filed 2025-06-09(a)(2)

Gima’s two complaints to the HCRC in 2016 qualify as protected activities under HRS § 378-2(a)(2) as does Gima’s November 15, 2017 request for a reasonable accommodation.

Section 378-2 retaliation claims require a causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action; a termination decision made before the protected activity cannot have been caused by it.

Lee v. L3Harris Technologies, Inc. · filed 2022-01-31

Moreover, Hawaii’s statute protecting employees from discriminatory retaliation, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2, is subject to the same analysis as a retaliation claim under the ADA. ... But, Lee cannot meet his burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because L3Harris decided to terminate his employment in January 2020, which was before Lee filed his EEOC and HCRC claim. Thus, there cannot be a causal link between the protected activity and the employment termination.

Section 378-2(a)(2) permits a retaliation claim for firing an employee who filed a Chapter 378 discrimination lawsuit even if the underlying discrimination claim later fails.

Nacino v. Cambridge Management, Inc. · filed 2022-09-26(a)(2)

The evidence in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Nacino, could show that Cambridge terminated Nacino's employment because Nacino filed the Discrimination Lawsuit, which alleged a violation of HRS Chapter 378. That would have been a violation of HRS § 378-2(a)(2).

Section 378-2(a)(2) requires a causal link between protected activity and an adverse employment action; termination for failing to comply with a vaccination policy does not establish retaliation for requesting an exemption.

Cruz v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, Inc. · filed 2025-03-28(a)(2)

Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate that the but-for cause of the alleged adverse action – placing Flores, Medeiros, and Myrick on unpaid leave and ultimately terminating them – was their lack of compliance with the Policy, rather than their request for exemption.

Section 378-2(1)(A) covers unwelcome sexual conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment; when the complainant is a woman, the court applies a reasonable woman standard.

Steinberg v. Hoshijo · filed 1998-06-18(1)(A)

Thus, if the complainant is a woman, the objective standard is met if a reasonable woman would consider such conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and either unreasonably interfere with work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. ... As illustrated above, Dr. Steinberg’s conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive that a reasonable woman could certainly consider the conditions of employment altered, thereby creating an intimidating, hostile, and offensive work environment.

Section 378-2 prohibits hostile environment sexual harassment when unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature is severe or pervasive, interferes with work performance or creates a hostile environment, and is perceived that way by the claimant and reasonably by a person of the claimant's gender in the same position.

Nelson v. University of Hawai'i · filed 2001-12-11(1)(A)

Based on the foregoing, we take this opportunity to clarify the elements of a HESH claim set forth in Steinberg and hold that, in order to establish a HESH claim, the claimant must show that: (1) he or she was subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct or visual forms of harassment of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; (3) the conduct was severe or pervasive; (4) the conduct had the purpose or effect of either: (a) unreasonably interfering with the claimant's work performance, or (b) creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; (5) the claimant actually perceived the conduct as having such purpose or effect; and (6) the claimant's perception was objectively reasonable to a person of the claimant's gender in the same position as the claimant.

Section 378-2 permits a hostile environment sexual harassment claim based on a single incident of sufficiently severe physical contact, including a coworker grabbing an employee’s buttock.

Arquero v. Hilton Hawaiian Village LLC · filed 2004-06-10(1)(A)

Incident # 1, in which Rodas grabbed Arquero’s buttock, was “severe.”

Section 378-2 requires evidence that the employee’s workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation to support an age-based hostile work environment claim; relatively infrequent age-related remarks are insufficient.

Parris v. Wyndham Vacations Resorts, Inc. · filed 2013-10-18

The remaining claims before the court on the present motion are for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623, and Haw.Rev.Stat. § 378-2. ... These relatively infrequent incidents fall far short of the evidence Parris must provide that his workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation.”

Section 378-2 applies the Oncale test to determine whether same-sex harassment constitutes discrimination because of sex.

Hughes v. Mayoral · filed 2010-06-24

Accordingly, the court finds that the Hawaii Supreme Court would apply Oncale’s test in evaluating same-sex harassment.

Claims of discriminatory employment practices under § 378-2 have a two-year statute of limitations.

Lesane v. Hawaiian Airlines · filed 1999-11-24

Personal injury claims of IIED and claims of discriminatory employment practices under Hawaii Revised Statutes sections 378-2 and 378-62 have a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 378-2 discrimination claims may proceed under the single-filing rule when similarly situated employees filed timely administrative charges arising from the same circumstances and time frame.

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. NCL America Inc. · filed 2007-08-31

After reviewing the authorities, the Court concludes that the “single-filing” rule applies here under Hawaii law. Hawaii’s courts find federal precedent under Title VII and other similar laws to be persuasive in interpreting Haw.Rev.Stat. § 378-2.

Separate discriminatory incidents underlying § 378-2 claims do not constitute a continuing violation merely because other incidents occurred within the filing period.

Kosegarten v. Department of Prosecuting Attorney · filed 2012-08-31

This Court therefore applies the same estoppel and continuing violation analysis set forth for Plaintiffs Title VII claims, supra section I.B., to Plaintiffs Chapter 378 claims. Thus, the Court also concludes that estoppel is not warranted as to Plaintiffs Chapter 378 claims, and the Court concludes that the incidents which form the bases of the Chapter 378 claims do not constitute a continuing violation.

Section 378-2(a)(2) retaliation claims require administrative exhaustion even when labeled as claims under the Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection Act.

Jass v. CherryRoad Technologies Inc. · filed 2020-03-27(a)(2)

While the HWPA does not require administrative exhaustion, Jass cannot avoid the administrative exhaustion requirements for Section 378-2(a)(2) retaliation claims by rebranding such a claim as one brought under the HWPA.

A plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies before suing an individual for aiding and abetting discrimination under § 378-2(a)(3), unless an exception permits suit against a party unnamed in the administrative charge.

Fernandez v. FedEx Corporate Services, Inc. · filed 2020-05-18(a)(3)

Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to her claim of aiding and abetting discrimination pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2(a)(3) against Defendant Martin.

Claims under § 378-2 require a discrimination charge filed within Hawaii’s 180-day deadline; filing within the federal 300-day period alone is insufficient.

Hobro v. United Airlines, Inc · filed 2022-09-26

Here, Plaintiff failed to timely file a charge of discrimination to file suit pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2, because his charge was filed within 300 days but not the 180-day deadline imposed by Hawaii state law.

A claim under § 378-2 requires timely exhaustion of administrative remedies; filing with the Hawai‘i Civil Rights Commission more than 180 days after the alleged discrimination is untimely.

Shook v. County of Hawaii Police Department · filed 2024-06-18

The district court also correctly dismissed Shook’s cause of action under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 378-2 arising from his disqualification due to untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies. Shook filed his complaint with the Hawai‘i Civil Rights Commission at the earliest, on May 17, 2021, which was more than 180 days after his allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory disqualification on February 3, 2020.

A § 378-2 discrimination claim requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before it can be brought in circuit court.

Needs, Jr. v. Wesley R. Segawa & Associates, Inc. · filed 2025-10-31

(3) The Circuit Court did not err in dismissing Needs's discriminatory practices claim for failure to exhaust the necessary administrative remedies.

A plaintiff claiming disability discrimination under § 378-2 must show a disability, qualification to perform the essential job duties with or without reasonable accommodation, and an adverse employment decision because of the disability.

Lee v. National Carpet · filed 2024-04-17(a)(1)(A)

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under HRS Chapter 378, "a plaintiff has the burden of establishing that: (1) he or she is an individual with a 'disability' within the meaning of the ... statute; (2) he or she is otherwise qualified to perform the essential duties of his or her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he or she suffered an adverse employment decision because of his or her disability."

Section 378-2 requires an impairment to substantially limit a major life activity for a person to qualify as disabled; a diabetes diagnosis alone does not suffice.

Beaulieu v. Northrop Grumman Corp. · filed 2000-09-28

The Court finds that Plaintiff is not substantially limited in any major life activity, and therefore is not disabled under the ADA or H.R.S § 378-2.

A VA disability rating alone does not establish disability under § 378-2; the claimant must show that an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

Thorn v. BAE Systems Hawaii Shipyards, Inc. · filed 2008-11-10(1)(A)

Further, to the extent Plaintiff relies on the VA determination that Plaintiff is 40 percent disabled, this determination does not create a fact question that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA and HRS § 378-2. ... A VA disability rating— based on quantifying a decrease in a veteran’s earning capacity- — is a completely different inquiry and standard than that imposed by the ADA and HRS § 378-2 of whether a claimant’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.

A § 378-2 disability discrimination claim survives summary judgment when genuine factual disputes remain over whether the employee was qualified.

VanHorn v. Hana Group, Inc. · filed 2013-10-18(a)(1)(A)

Because there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Plaintiff was a qualified individual, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs ADA and HRS § 378-2 disability discrimination claims.

Section 378-2(a)(1)(A) follows the ADA framework for disability discrimination claims; a corresponding state claim fails when the ADA claim fails on the same evidence.

Tsuji v. Kamehameha Schools · filed 2015-12-22(a)(1)(A)

Accordingly, Kamehameha Schools is entitled to 'summary judgment on Tsuji’s disability claims under the ADA. The same result-follows to the extent Tsuji is making a similar claim under HRS § -378-2.

Section 378-2 disability discrimination claims are analyzed under settled ADA precedents.

Turner v. Aoao Wailea Pt. Village · filed 2018-06-27

Because Hawaii looks “to interpretations of analogous federal laws” when interpreting its antidiscrimination laws, ... we analyze both the federal and state law claims under the settled ADA precedents.

Section 378-2 disability discrimination claims use the same framework as ADA claims.

Nunies v. Hie Holdings, Inc. · filed 2018-09-17

Nunies alleged a state-law disability discrimination claim under HRS § 378-2. Because Hawaii applies “the same framework . . . to claims of discrimination under the ADA . . . to claims under HRS § 378-2,” the district court dismissed this claim for the same reasons it dismissed the ADA claims. See Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc’y, 936 P.2d 643, 648–49 (Haw. 1997). Because we reverse the dismissal of the ADA claims, we also reverse the dismissal of the state law discrimination claim.

Section 378-2 disability discrimination claims use the same framework as ADA claims.

Nunies v. Hie Holdings, Inc. · filed 2018-11-01

Because Hawaii applies “the same framework . . . to claims of discrimination under the ADA . . . to claims under HRS § 378-2,” the district court dismissed this claim for the same reasons it dismissed the ADA claims. See Furukawa v. Honolulu Zoological Soc’y, 936 P.2d 643, 648–49 (Haw. 1997). Because we reverse the dismissal of the ADA claims, we also reverse the dismissal of the state law discrimination claim.

Section 378-2 allows a disability discrimination claim to proceed when an employer fails to explore reasonable accommodations and the record does not establish that none was available.

Chan v. Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC. · filed 2015-08-24(1)

There is a question of fact as to whether Wells Fargo failed to reasonably accommodate Chan’s medical condition, which, for purposes of this motion, Wells Fargo is not disputing was' a qualifying disability for purposes of the ADA and section 378-2. ... Because Wells Fargo did not engage in the interactive process of trying to determine whether there was some reasonable accommodation available to Chan that would have allowed him to return to work, and because the, record does not establish as a matter of, law that no such reasonable accommodation was available, summary judgment is denied with respect to Count V.

A disability discrimination claim under § 378-2 requires the employee to be qualified to perform the job’s essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation; disputed facts on that issue preclude summary judgment.

Gomes, Jr. v. County of Hawaii · filed 2024-08-29(a)(1)(A)

Thus, the record reflects a genuine issue of material fact as to Suzuki Element 2 regarding whether Gomes was qualified to perform the essential duties of the Supervisor position, precluding summary judgment on that basis.

Section 378-2 permits a failure-to-accommodate claim to proceed when there is a genuine factual dispute over whether the employer caused a breakdown in the interactive process.

Canastra v. Safeway, Inc. · filed 2024-12-09

Thus, Canastra has established the primary case of failure to accommodate, and there is a dispute of fact as to whether the interactive process broke down because of Safeway. The court DENIES summary judgment on Canastra’s ADA and HRS § 378-2 failure to accommodate claims.

Section 378-2(3) does not impose aiding-and-abetting liability on a person for aiding and abetting their own discriminatory conduct.

Mukaida v. Hawaii · filed 2001-07-12(3)

Because Mukaida has failed to identify any discriminatory practice by anyone other than Okamura, and because Okamura could hardly be liable for aiding and abetting himself, Mukaida cannot state a claim against Okamura in his individual capacity for aiding and abetting a discriminatory practice. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of Okamura on Count XIV.

Section 378-2(3) permits individual liability for inciting a discriminatory practice even when the person gives advice rather than makes the decision.

Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd. · filed 2001-10-11(3)

Thus, under the broad language of HRS § 378-2(3), Fred can be liable even if he was “offering advice, not making any decision.”

Section 378-2(3) permits individual employee liability for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing discrimination.

White v. Pacific Media Group, Inc. · filed 2004-06-16(3)

Only in Section 378-2(3) did the legislature include the broad reference to “any person whether an employer, employee, or not” as being liable for the specific action of aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing discriminatory actions.

Section 378-2 permits individual liability when a person acts as an agent of an employer.

Sherez v. State of Hawai'i Department of Education · filed 2005-09-01

After considering the plain language of the statute, decisions of the Hawaii Supreme Court, and analogous federal precedent under Title VII, this court concludes that individuals are subject to liability under § 378-2 when they act as agents of an employer.

Section 378-2(2) does not permit claims against individual employees who are not themselves employers.

Maizner v. Hawaii, Department of Education · filed 2005-12-01(2)

In accordance with the position she took in Mukaida and Luzon, this judge maintains that section 378-2(2) does not permit claims against individual employees.

Section 378-2 claims against individuals fail when the underlying discrimination claims against the employer fail.

Chang v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate · filed 2003-11-20

Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Chang’s *688hostile work environment, retaliation, and disparate treatment claims against the Estate, we hold that it did not err by dismissing Chang’s claims against Robert Kipune and Nathan Aipa, individually, for discrimination under Haw.Rev.Stat. § 378-2. We need not decide here whether Hawaii discrimination laws would render an employee individually hable for discrimination.

Section 378-2(3) allows claims against individuals who are not employers if they aid, incite, compel, or coerce discrimination.

Abbey v. HAWAII EMPLOYERS MUT. INS. CO.(HEMIC) · filed 2011-02-07(3)

Section 378-2(3) allows claims against individuals who are not employers if the individuals “aid, incite, compel, or coerce” discrimination.

Section 378-2 permits individual liability for employees who act as an employer’s agents or who aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce prohibited discriminatory practices.

Lales v. Wholesale Motors Company · filed 2012-05-09

As explained below, we conclude that employees are subject to individual liability under HRS § 378-2 when they are agents of an employer or when they aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce prohibited discriminatory practices.

Section 378-2(a)(1) and (2) do not permit claims against individuals.

Greenwood v. Frost · filed 2019-09-23(a)(1) & (2)

In addition, the Hawai‘i Supreme Court has determined that Section 378-2(a)(1) & (2) do not permit a cause of action against an individual. ... Therefore, to the extent Counts Two, Three, Four, Five, Six, and Seven are brought against Erik and Karin Frost under Title VII, Section 378-2(a)(1) & (2), and/or the ADA, those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Section 378-2(3) allows an incitement claim without proof of direct communications about the discrimination, a conspiracy, or a plot.

Kosegarten v. Department of the Prosecuting Attorney · filed 2012-10-30(3)

Direct communications about the discrimination, a conspiracy, or a plot are not the only ways to establish a § 378-2(3) claim. Section 378-2(3) includes the prohibition against inciting a discriminatory practice.

Section 378-2(a)(3) permits an aiding-and-abetting claim based on allegations that an individual supported another’s discriminatory conduct by failing to investigate or take remedial action.

Sirois v. E. W. Partners, Inc. · filed 2018-01-05(a)(3)

The Court finds that the allegations in the Complaint sufficiently indicate that Greener supported Sutton in his conduct-albeit via her failure to investigate or impose remedial action-because it not only benefit Sutton, but the company generally.

Section 378-2(a)(3) does not support an aiding and abetting discrimination claim based on a requested medical evaluation without evidence of discriminatory animus.

Cooper v. State of Hawaii Department of Taxation · filed 2019-06-20(a)(3)

Even under HRS 378-2(3), Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that the individual Defendants’ request for a medical evaluation had any discriminatory animus.

Section 378-2(a)(3) permits individual employees to be held liable for aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing a prohibited discriminatory practice.

Jass v. CherryRoad Technologies Inc. · filed 2020-07-13(a)(3)

Indeed, unlike subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(2) that impose liability only on “an employer,” Section 378-2(a)(3) provides that “any person, whether an employer, employee, or not,” may be held liable if the individual acts to “aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce” any prohibited discriminatory practice.

Section 378-2 religious failure-to-accommodate claims use the same standard and framework as Title VII claims.

Schenk v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc. · filed 2025-06-05

Failure-to-accommodate claims on the basis of religion utilize the same standard and framework pursuant to both federal law under Title VII and Hawaii state law under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2.

Religious failure-to-accommodate claims under § 378-2 use the same standard and framework as Title VII claims.

Kahahawai v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc. · filed 2025-06-06

Failure-to-accommodate claims on the basis of religion utilize the same standard and framework pursuant to both federal law under Title VII and Hawaii state law under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2.

Section 378-2 religious accommodation claims use the same summary judgment framework as Title VII claims.

Brennan v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc. · filed 2025-09-29

Courts apply the same framework at summary judgment to evaluate religious accommodations claims under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 378-2 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes.

Section 378-2 uses the same standard and framework as Title VII for religious failure-to-accommodate claims.

Brody v. Hawaiian Airlines Inc. · filed 2025-05-02

Failure-to-accommodate claims on the basis of religion utilize the same standard and framework pursuant to both federal law under Title VII and Hawaii state law under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2.