Statute Annotations › Hawaii › Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-14

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-14

Judicial review of contested cases: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Hawaii
Case notes
329
Cited in passing
197
Citing cases indexed
945
Case dates
1971–2026
Screened through
2026-06-04
Checked for later law changes
2026-10-04
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

526 citing cases reviewed of 945 in the citation index: 329 interpreted the section (annotated below), 197 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-04 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-14?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1973-07-01 Act 31 set a fifteen-day period for an agency to transmit the review record after its contents were determined. Source
  • 1974-07-01 Act 145 added the appellate filing-fee rule for statutory direct appeals to the supreme court under subsection (b). Source
  • 1979-05-25 Act 111 revised subsection (b)'s direct-appeal reference in the appellate reorganization; subsection (f) still required requested oral argument and written briefs. Source
  • 1980-05-27 Act 130 replaced discretionary stays with four criteria governing a court-ordered stay under subsection (c). Source
  • 1983 Act 160 changed the agency record-transmission period in subsection (d) from fifteen to twenty days; the official codification credits the 1983 amendment, and the 1979 session law states the earlier fifteen-day rule. Source
  • 1986-05-29 Act 274 specified that review does not stay confirmation of an administrative fine as a judgment under § 92-17(g). Source
  • 1993-05-20 Act 115 included an agency that was a party to a contested case among persons aggrieved who may seek judicial review. Source
  • 2006-07-01 Act 202 of 2004 redirected statutory direct appeals under subsection (b) from the supreme court to the intermediate appellate court as part of appellate reorganization; Act 94 of 2006 postponed the scheduled sunset, and Act 109 of 2010 removed it. source source Source
  • 2015-07-01 Act 218 of 2014 added environmental court as a forum for applicable contested-case appeals under subsection (b). Source
  • 2016-08-01 Act 48 permitted direct appeals to the supreme court where another statute so provides, made oral argument discretionary while retaining requested written briefs, and added priority for contested-case appeals of statewide importance. Source
  • 2019-06-30 Act 213 removed Act 48's scheduled repeal, making its changes permanent without changing subsection (b)'s operative wording. Source

Standing and participation

Section 91-14(a) entitles neighboring property owners specially affected by a zoning variance to judicial review when they have followed the available agency procedures.

East Diamond Head Ass'n v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Honolulu · filed 1971-01-20(a)

Clearly, therefore, under Hattem and Dalton, supra, each appellant as a "person aggrieved" within HRS § 91-14(a) must be afforded judicial review should we find each comported with all other necessary administrative procedures at the lower level.
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Section 91-14(a) requires an aggrieved person to have been involved in the agency contested case to obtain judicial review.

City & County of Honolulu v. Public Utilities Commission · filed 1972-04-11(a)

HRS § 91-14(a), which provides “[a]ny person aggrieved by a fined decision and order in a contested case ... is entitled to judicial review ... ”, is clear and unambiguous that the person aggrieved must have been involved in the contested case before the PUC.
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Section 91-14 allows an aggrieved person who participated in a contested case to seek judicial review and requires an appeal within thirty days after service of the agency’s final decision and order.

Life of the Land, Inc. v. Land Use Commission · filed 1979-05-11(a), (b)

Accordingly, we find that in each of these cases appellant was an aggrieved party who participated in a contested case. ... Both appeals were filed within thirty days after service of the LUC decisions as provided by HRS § 91-14(b) (1975).
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Section 91-14(a) requires a person seeking judicial review to be aggrieved by agency action when the right to appeal is asserted or challenged.

Jordan v. Hamada · filed 1982-04-02(a)

HRS §91-14 quite clearly contradicts this contention by requiring that a person must be aggrieved by administrative action in order to appeal of right, and this determination is to be made at the time the right to appeal is asserted or attacked, not at the time of the appellant’s intervention in the proceedings below.
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Section 91-14(a) allows an aggrieved person to seek review of a final contested-case decision; written objections submitted as the agency invited can satisfy the required adversary participation.

Mahuiki v. Planning Commission · filed 1982-12-06(a)

HRS § 91-14(a) allows any person “aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case” to invoke judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act. ... For they “contested the issue [of whether the permits should be granted] before the agency” in a manner suggested by the Planning Commission, and thereby satisfied the requirement of “adversary participation”.
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Section 91-14(a) gives a police chief standing to appeal a civil service commission order when the chief is not an agency under § 91-1.

Gibb v. Spiker · filed 1986-05-08(a)

Gibb, therefore, was not an agency based on the definitions provided in HRS § 91-1 and possessed standing under HRS § 91-14(a) to appeal the Commission’s order.
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Section 91-14 permits judicial review only for a person aggrieved by a final decision and order; an entity whose legitimate interest was not injured in fact lacks standing to appeal.

Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship Committee for the Heat & Frost Asbestos Insulator Trade v. Kauhane · filed 1986-08-28

Under HRS §91-14, only a “person aggrieved by a final decision and order” is entitled to judicial review. HJAC’s legitimate interest was not injured in fact, and therefore HJAC is not aggrieved by the Deputy Director’s final decision and order reinstating Kauhane.
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An aggrieved person who may seek judicial review under § 91-14(a) can include an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization, or agency.

Save Our Bays & Beaches v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 1994-07-27(a)

For the purposes of this statute, an “aggrieved person” may include individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, public or private organizations, or agencies.
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Section 91-14(a) permits judicial review when a claimant participated under agency rules in a contested case, challenges a final decision or qualifying preliminary ruling, and has an injured legal interest.

Public Access Shoreline Hawaii ex rel. Rothstein v. Hawai'i County Planning Commission ex rel. Fujimoto · filed 1995-08-31(a)

The necessary inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether PASH has met the requirements of HRS § 91-14: first, the proceeding that resulted in the unfavorable agency action must have been a “contested case” hearing — i.e., a hearing that was 1) “required by law” and 2) determined the “rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties”; second, the agency’s action must represent “a final decision and order,” or “a preliminary ruling” such that deferral of review would deprive the claimant of adequate relief; third, the claimant must have followed the applicable agency rules and, therefore, have been involved “in” the contested case; and finally, the claimant’s legal interests must have been injured — i.e., the claimant must have standing to appeal.
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Section 91-14(a) requires a person seeking judicial review of an agency decision to show a concrete injury to qualify as aggrieved.

United Public Workers, Local 646 v. Brown · filed 1996-01-30(a)

Therefore, we hold that UPW did not demonstrate that it suffered a concrete injury. Because UPW is not a person aggrieved by the HLRB decision, it has no standing to appeal to the circuit court under HRS § 91-14(a).
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Section 91-14 allows judicial review when a party demonstrates personal and special interests affected by an agency decision.

Ka Pa'akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Commission · filed 2000-09-11(a)

PTP likewise established personal and special interests sufficient to invoke judicial review under HRS § 91-14.
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Section 91-14(a) treats an agency that was a party to a contested case before another agency as a person aggrieved with standing to appeal.

Sierra Club v. OFFICE OF PLANNING, STATE · filed 2006-01-27(a)

Pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a) (1993), however, "the term 'person aggrieved' shall include an agency that is a party to a contested case proceeding before that agency or another agency." Because SOP was a party to the contested case proceeding before the LUC, SOP is a "person aggrieved” and has standing to appeal.
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Section 91-14 permits judicial review when an aggrieved claimant participated in a contested case under the agency rules and appeals a final decision and order.

Myers v. Hawaiian Homes Commission · filed 2023-07-20(a)

We apply this test to determine whether the circuit court had jurisdiction over Meyers's appeal. ... Because all elements were met, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Meyers's appeal from the Commission's decision.
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Contested case and finality

Section 91-14(a) permits judicial review of a final decision and order in a contested case, including an order resolving a separable workers’ compensation benefit issue.

Cole v. AOAO Alii Cove · filed 2014-07-31(a)

HRS § 91-14(a) authorizes judicial review of “a final decision and order in a contested case.... ” While a final order is generally one that ends the proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished, “a final order is not necessarily the last decision in a case.”
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Section 91-14 judicial review standards apply only to contested cases, which require a hearing mandated by law.

Abramson v. Board of Regents, University of Hawaii · filed 1976-04-02

She seeks to apply the standards of judicial review of contested cases laid down in HRS § 91-14. But the applicability of these standards depends upon whether Plaintiff's tenure application created a "contested case" within the meaning of the Act. As defined in HRS § 91-1(5), a contested case is "a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing." No requirement of a hearing on Plaintiff's tenure application has been shown.
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Section 91-14(a) requires a final agency decision for judicial review; an order is not final while a party’s rights remain undetermined or the matter is retained for further action.

Gealon v. Keala · filed 1979-03-08(a)

“Final order” means an order ending the proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished. Consequently, an order is not final if the rights of a party involved remain undetermined or if the matter is retained for further action.
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Section 91-14(a) permits review of a preliminary agency order only when waiting for a final decision would deprive the appellant of adequate relief; an alleged legal error alone does not permit an interlocutory appeal.

Inouye v. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System · filed 1983-09-22(a)

As we have noted, § 91-14 allows review only where a final order has been filed or where a preliminary order is of such a nature that deferral of review would deprive the appellant of adequate relief. The statute does not allow an interlocutory appeal merely to review an agency’s alleged error of law.
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Section 91-14(a) permits review of a final agency decision only when it was made in a contested case; an available agency appeal with a hearing must be pursued first.

Kona Old Hawaiian Trails Group Ex Rel. Serrano v. Lyman · filed 1987-03-19(a)

But Kona Old did not avail itself of this opportunity for an agency hearing; hence there is no final decision or order in a contested case which is subject to judicial review by virtue of HRS § 91-14(a).
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Section 91-14(a) allows judicial review of a DLNR decision only after a contested case hearing under the agency’s rules; a public hearing alone does not qualify.

Simpson v. Department of Land & Natural Resources · filed 1990-05-09(a)

Thus, we hold that the public hearing before the Board was not a “contested case hearing” in accordance with the DLNR’s Rules.
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Section 91-14(a) allows judicial review of agency proceedings that qualify as contested cases because constitutional due process required a hearing, even when the governing statute and agency rules made hearings discretionary.

Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture · filed 1994-09-23(a)

Although the relevant statute and agency rules provide the DOH with discretionary authority to hold hearings on applications for ATC permits, the proceedings nonetheless constituted contested eases because they were required by constitutional due process. The circuit court, therefore, properly concluded that it was vested with appellate jurisdiction pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a).
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Section 91-14(a) permits judicial review when a person follows agency procedures to seek a contested case hearing, even if the agency denies formal intervention.

Pub. Access Shoreline v. HAWAII CTY PLANNING COMMISSION · filed 1995-08-31(a)

Having followed the procedures set forth by the HPC, PASH's participation in the SMA use permit proceeding amounts to involvement "in a contested case" under HRS § 91-14(a). See Puna Geothermal, 77 Hawai`i at 70, 881 P.2d at 1216. The mere fact that PASH was not formally granted leave to intervene in a contested case is not dispositive because it did everything possible to perfect its right to appeal.
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Section 91-14(a) permits circuit court judicial review only when a contested case hearing was held; a hearing qualifies as a contested case only if required by statute, rule, or due process.

Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Commission · filed 1994-05-03(a)

In summary, if a contested case hearing has not been held, judicial review in the circuit court cannot be obtained because the court does not have jurisdiction pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a). If the agency has held a hearing on a matter pending before it, that proceeding cannot constitute a contested case hearing for purposes of determining a person’s right to appellate review unless the hearing was “required by law,” i.e., specifically mandated by statute, rule, or the due process guarantees of the state and federal constitutions.
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Section 91-14(a) requires a final agency decision for judicial review unless delaying review of a preliminary ruling would deprive the appellant of adequate relief; an unresolved compensation amount leaves the decision nonfinal.

Mitchell v. State, Department of Education · filed 1994-11-01(a)

Such determination has not been made; therefore, the requisite degree of finality is lacking with respect to this case. ... There is nothing to prevent Mitchell from seeking judicial review of the Board’s legal conclusions after the Director determines the amount of Mitchell’s compensation, if any, for the first incident.
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Section 91-14 does not give the circuit court jurisdiction to review a water management area designation because the designation is not a contested case determining the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties.

Ko'olau Agricultural Co. v. Commission on Water Resource Management · filed 1996-11-27

A WMA designation, however, is not a contested case because it does not determine “the legal rights, duties, or privbeges of specific parties.” HRS § 91-1(5) (1993). Therefore, HRS § 174C-60 does not confer jurisdiction on this court, and, for the same reason, HRS § 91-14 does not confer jurisdiction on the circuit court.
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Section 91-14(a) permits judicial review when an agency director declines to process an application, because that decision is final and equivalent to a denial.

Gatri v. Blane · filed 1998-07-24(a)

The decision of the Director not to process GATRI’s application is a final decision equivalent to a denial of the application. Therefore, it is appealable under HRS § 91-14(a).
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Section 91-14(a) permits judicial review when a planning director, acting for the board, summarily denies an appeal as untimely; that denial is a final decision of the board.

Curtis v. Board of Appeals · filed 1999-06-15(a)

Accordingly, the planning director’s denial constituted a “final decision” by the board under HRS § 91-14(a), which the circuit court had jurisdiction to review on appeal.
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Section 91-14(a) requires participation in a contested case hearing for a party to be aggrieved and entitled to judicial review of an agency determination.

Alejado v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 1999-01-15(a)

In order to be entitled to judicial review of the Commission’s scope of duty determination, Appellant must have participated in a “contested ease” hearing. Without participation in a “contested case” hearing, a party cannot be “aggrieved” and therefore has no right to appeal.
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Section 91-14(a) permits an appeal from a decision that finally adjudicates medical and temporary disability benefits even when permanent disability remains for later determination.

Bocalbos v. Kapiolani Medical Center for Women & Children · filed 1999-04-01(a)

Accordingly, we hold that a decision that finally adjudicates the matter of medical and temporary disability benefits is an ap-pealable final order under HRS § 91-14(a), even though the matter of permanent disability has been left for later determination.
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Section 91-14(a) does not provide judicial review of parole denials because prison parole hearings are not contested cases.

Turner v. Hawai'i Paroling Authority · filed 2000-05-09(a)

We hold that a prison parole hearing is not a contested case hearing subject to judicial review under the Hawai'i Administrative Procedures Act (the HAP A), chapter 91 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS).
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Section 91-14(a) permits review of a preliminary agency ruling when postponing review until a final decision would deprive the appellant of adequate relief; complying with the challenged order is not necessarily adequate relief.

Tam v. Permanente · filed 2001-02-08(a)

Given the parties’ positions, and particularly Tam’s claim that the order was unlawful, the option of complying with the Director’s order is not “adequate relief.” Accordingly, pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a), we have jurisdiction over the present appeal.
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Section 91-14(a) allows judicial review when an agency says it will not deliberate or vote again: its action is either a final decision or a reviewable preliminary ruling.

Hawaii Electric Light Co. v. Department of Land & Natural Resources · filed 2003-08-25(a)

Plainly, if the Board’s action is not considered a “final decision” ending any further resolution of this issue by the Board, then it must be considered a preliminary ruling subject to judicial review.
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Under § 91-14(a), an order awarding or denying attorney’s fees and costs under § 386-93(b) is a final, appealable order even when other workers’ compensation issues remain.

Lindinha v. Hilo Coast Processing Co. · filed 2004-03-18(a)

Similarly, an order awarding or denying attorney’s fees and costs under HRS § 386-93(b) “determines a claimant’s rights to those benefits.” ... An award of attorney’s fees and costs, then, is final under the Bocalbos rationale for purposes of an appeal.
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Section 91-14(a) does not authorize judicial review of an apprenticeship program registration when no contested case hearing occurred and the challengers had no right to one.

International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades, Drywall Tapers, Finishers & Allied Workers Local Union 1944 v. Be · filed 2004-04-30(a)

We hold that a contested ease hearing pursuant to Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14(a) (1993) was not required in the determination by Appellee-appellant Director (Director) of the Appellee-appellant Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) (collectively Appellees) to register an apprenticeship program pursuant to HRS § 372-4 (1993).
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Section 91-14(a) allows judicial review only of a contested case; a hearing on a motion for an order to show cause is not a contested case when it does not determine specific parties’ rights, duties, or privileges.

Aha Hui Malama O Kaniakapupu v. Land Use Commission · filed 2006-07-24(a)

Thus, the January 2004 hearing did not constitute a contested case for the purposes of obtaining judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a).
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Section 91-14(g) treats the Employees’ Retirement System Board of Trustees as an agency whose decision is subject to judicial review.

Preble v. Board of Trustees · filed 2006-09-20(g)

The Board is an "agency” within the meaning of HRS § 91-14(g) (Supp.2004).
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Section 91-14 allows judicial review of a liquor commission’s denial of a license after a chapter 281 public hearing, even though the commission need not follow chapter 91 contested-case procedures.

E & J Lounge Operating Co. v. Liquor Commission of Honolulu · filed 2007-12-24(a)

In light of Singleton, Mahuiki, and prior supreme court precedent, we conclude that an applicant who is denied a liquor license following a "public hearing" held in compliance with HRS chapter 281 is entitled to seek judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14.
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Section 91-14 permits judicial review of a liquor commission’s license decision when the required public hearing is a contested case; it does not provide review of a non-contested case hearing.

E & J Lounge Operating Co. v. Liquor Commission of Honolulu · filed 2008-07-29

However, it appears that the ICA gravely erred in concluding that the public hearing did not constitute a contested case and that an aggrieved party to a non-contested case hearing could seek judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14. Because the public hearing herein constituted a contested case hearing, it was governed by HRS chapter 91. Accordingly, Petitioner was entitled to judicial review under HRS § 91-14, HRS § 91-11 applied to the proceedings on Petitioner’s application for a liquor license, and the Commission did not comply with HRS § 91-11.
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Section 91-14 permits review of final decisions in contested cases, so the merits of a director’s decision rendered without an agency hearing cannot be appealed to the circuit court under that section.

Jou v. Hamada · filed 2009-03-05(a)

Thus, Dr. Jou was not entitled to appeal the merits of the Director’s decisions to the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 91-14, which, in relevant part, permits appeals of final decisions in contested cases.
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Section 91-14(a) permits judicial review of an interim instream flow standard independently of a water use permit appeal when the standard affects property interests and due process requires a hearing.

In re ‘Iao Ground Water Management Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications and Petition to Amend Interim · filed 2012-08-15(a)

However, the court’s due process cases indicate that the court has jurisdiction to hear Hui/MTF’s appeal because the IIFS, independent of any WUPA, affects property interests of Hui/MTF’s members.
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Section 91-14(a) provides judicial review of liquor commission renewal proceedings when required hearings determine a licensee’s legal rights and duties.

N Group LLC v. Hawai'i County Liquor Commission · filed 2009-03-03(a)

Accordingly, renewal proceedings before the Liquor Commission constituted “contested case[s]” under HRS § 91-14(a), and the Liquor Commission’s decisions in those proceedings are therefore subject to the review pursuant to procedures prescribed by the statute.
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Section 91-14(a) treats an agency order as nonfinal when the agency retains the matter for further action and the parties’ rights remain undetermined.

Hawai'i State Teachers Ass'n v. Abercrombie · filed 2011-09-01(a)

Contrary to HSTA’s contention that Order No. 2573 left nothing further to be determined, the order shows otherwise. In the order, HLRB set an evidentiary hearing for March 23 and 24, 2009 “to determine whether there has been bad faith during negotiations, and if there had been repudiation of the [CBA], whether any repudiation was wilful.” Clearly, the matter was retained for further action, and the rights of the parties remained undetermined because the eviden-tiary hearing had yet to be held.
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Section 91-14(a) allows judicial review of a commission decision denying a contested case hearing when the decision is reflected in meeting minutes authenticated by an authorized deputy.

In re Petition to Amend Interim Instream Flow Standards for Waikamoi, Puohokamoa, Haipuaena, Punalau/Kolea, Honomanu, We · filed 2012-01-11(a)

The decision, as reflected in the minutes of the Commission's October 18, 2010 meeting, is a final decision of the Commission for which judicial review may be sought pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a).
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An agency’s final permit decision while a valid contested case hearing request remains pending effectively denies the request and satisfies the final decision requirement for judicial review.

Kilakila ‘O Haleakala v. Board of Land and Natural Resources. · filed 2013-12-13(a)

While in PASH and Kaleikini we concluded that the formal denial of the contested case hearings provided the requisite finality to enable the respective appellants to appeal to the circuit court pursuant to HRS § 91-14, we note here that the failure to either grant or deny KOH’s requests for a contested case hearing became an effective denial when BLNR proceeded to render a final decision by voting to grant the permit to UH at the December 1, 2010 board meeting. Accordingly, we conclude that BLNR’s vote to grant the permit in the face of a valid pending request for a contested case hearing satisfies this prong of the test.
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Section 91-14(a) permits judicial review of a final decision and order in a contested case, so an agency determination made without a contested case hearing is not reviewable under that section.

Puna Pono Alliance v. State · filed 2022-06-13(a)

The Alliance's and Steiner's actions below were instead brought under HRS § 91-14. Because the Director's determination was not made after a contested case hearing, the circuit court correctly dismissed the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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Section 91-14(a) permits an appeal from a LIRAB order that finally adjudicates a workers’ compensation benefit or penalty, even if other issues remain; an order adjudicating neither is not appealable.

Vicente v. Hilo Medical Investors, Ltd. · filed 2020-06-03(a)

The appealability of a decision and order of the LIRAB is governed by HRS § 91-14(a). "[A]n order that finally adjudicates a benefit or penalty under the worker's compensation law is an appealable final order under HRS § 91-14(a), although other issues remain." ... In the instant case, LIRAB's January 6, 2020 interlocutory order does not finally adjudicate any benefit or penalty, nor does it finally determine the substantive issues in the underlying LIRAB proceeding.
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Section 91-14 permits an appeal from a final LIRAB decision or order; denial of a trial continuance is not appealable when it adjudicates no benefit, penalty, or substantive issue.

Vicente v. Hilo Medical Investors, Ltd. · filed 2021-11-17(a)

The appealability of a LIRAB decision and order is governed by HRS § 91-14. ... Here, no order denying a motion to continue trial by Vicente appears in the record on appeal. Regardless, such an order would not finally adjudicate any benefit or penalty or finally determine the substantive issues in the underlying LIRAB case.
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Section 91-14(a) treats termination of a contested case by withdrawing a permit application after failing to rule on a petition to intervene as a final decision subject to judicial review.

The Community Associations of Hualalai, Inc. v. Leeward Planning Commission. · filed 2021-12-02(a)

The LPC’s failure to deny or grant Hualalai’s petition to intervene in the contested case and the Planning Director’s termination of the proceedings by withdrawing Special Permit Application No. SPP-16-188 constituted a final decision within the meaning of HRS § 91-14(a) and PASH.
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Section 91-14(a) permits an immediate appeal from a preliminary PUC ruling in a contested case if waiting for a final decision would deprive the appellant of adequate relief.

In re: The Application of Hawai'i Electric Light Company, Inc. · filed 2022-02-04(a)

It also has jurisdiction over appeals from preliminary PUC rulings in contested cases if forcing the appellant to wait until the entry of a final decision would “deprive appellant of adequate relief.” HRS § 91-14(a).
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Section 91-14(a) does not permit an appeal from a LIRAB order that leaves the proceedings open and does not finally adjudicate medical or temporary disability benefits.

Suzuki v. American Healthways, Inc. · filed 2022-11-03(a)

It does not end the LIRAB proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished, nor does it finally adjudicate any matter of medical and temporary disability benefits.
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Section 91-14(a) requires a final agency decision or order for judicial review; an appeal before final disposition is premature.

Vicente v. Hilo Medical Investors, Ltd. · filed 2022-11-07(a)

An aggrieved party may appeal from a final decision and order by the LIRAB directly to this court under Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 386-88 (2015) and 91-14 (2012). ... Absent an appealable, final decision or order in LIRAB Case No. 2015-259(H)(S), the appeal is premature and we lack jurisdiction.
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Section 91-14(a) requires a final order that ends the proceeding and leaves no party’s rights undetermined or matter for further action; a compensability decision is not final while the amount of compensation remains undecided.

Estate of Kimo I. Jardin v. State of Hawaii Department of Transportation · filed 2023-02-28(a)

For purposes of HRS § 91-14(a), "final order" means "an order ending the proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished[;] . . . Consequently, an order is not final if the rights of a party involved remain undetermined or if the matter is retained for further action." Bocalbos v. Kapiolani Med. Ctr. for Women & Child., 89 Hawai i 436, 439, 974 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1999) (cleaned up). Thus, a LIRAB decision merely "finding a workers' compensation claim to be compensable [is] not an appealable final order because the amount of compensation ha[s] yet to be determined." Id. (citing Williams v. Kleenco, 2 Haw. App. 219, 629 P.2d 125 (1981)).
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Section 91-14(a) permits appeal from a final decision or order in a contested case; dismissal of one claim during a prehearing conference is not a final appealable order.

SHOPO v. HLRB · filed 2023-12-29(a)

HRS § 91-14(a) (2012) provides for appeals only from final decisions and orders in a contested case. HLRB's dismissal of one of SHOPO's claims during the prehearing conference was not a final decision or order from which an appeal could be taken.
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Section 91-14(a) allows judicial review of a preliminary order compelling a claimant to undergo an independent medical examination because waiting for a final decision would deprive the claimant of adequate relief.

Suzuki v. American Healthways, Inc · filed 2023-03-08(a)

An order compelling a claimant to undergo an IME is sufficient to constitute the deprivation of adequate relief that is required under the preliminary ruling language of HRS § 91- 14(a).
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Section 91-14(a) permits review of a preliminary agency ruling only when waiting for a final decision would deprive the appellant of adequate relief; the possibility of later asserting automatic approval provides adequate relief.

Bolte v. Maui Planning Commission · filed 2023-03-30(a)

Ultimately, the Boltes fail to establish that the January 9, 2018 vote to deny the Application or the February 22, 2018 Letter represented a preliminary ruling "such that deferral of review [pending entry of a subsequent final decision] would deprive [the Boltes] of adequate relief[.]" MECO, 141 Hawai#i at 258, 408 P.3d at 10.
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Section 91-14 permits judicial review of the denial of a reconsideration hearing as a final decision and order even when no contested case hearing occurred.

In re: Islands Hospice, Inc. v. Malama Ola Health Services LLC · filed 2024-06-20

Here, even though no contested case hearing was held, the denial of the reconsideration hearing is reviewed as the appealable "final decision and order" under HRS § 91-14, which provides for "[j]udicial review of contested cases."
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Section 91-14 applies to appeals of contested cases, not election contests.

Dicks v. State · filed 2024-07-25

In addition, Plaintiff’s reliance on HRS § 91-14 is misplaced as HRS § 91-14 applies to an appeal of a contested case, and has no application to election contests.
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Section 91-14(a) requires a contested case hearing that was required by law and determined the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties before judicial review is available.

West Sunset 32 Phase 1 v. County of Kaua'i Planning Commission · filed 2024-12-10(a)

Therefore, the June 25, 2019 meeting was not a contested case hearing for the purposes of obtaining judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a) because it was not required by law and it did not determine the rights, privileges, or duties of ... the parties, and the Circuit Court erred in exercising jurisdiction over Somers's appeal.
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Section 91-14 does not give the environmental court jurisdiction to review an agency decision that was neither made in a contested case nor required to be made in one.

Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources · filed 2025-04-30(a)

The Environmental Court did not have jurisdiction over Sierra Club's appeal from BLNR's decision to continue the Permits for 2023 because it was not made in a contested case, and did not need to be made in a contested case.
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Section 91-14 provides an administrative appeal when BLNR denies a contested case hearing request concerning continuation of a permit.

Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources · filed 2025-11-18

Here, we also conclude an HRS § 91-14 appeal was available as part of the corrective procedures in BLNR's administrative process.
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Section 91-14 permits an appeal of an agency decision and order only when it arose from a contested case or a proceeding that should have been a contested case.

Friends of Māhā'ulepū v. Kaua'i Planning Commission · filed 2026-01-22

We therefore conclude that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over Appellants' HRS § 91-14 appeal of the Commission's Decision and Order because there was no decision and order in a contested case, or what should have been a contested case, from which to appeal.
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Section 91-14 does not confer jurisdiction to review an agency decision when no contested case hearing occurred or was required by statute, administrative rule, or constitutional due process.

Friends of Māhā'ulepū v. Kaua'i Planning Commission · filed 2026-04-07(a)

On this record, we conclude that the KPC did not conduct a contested case hearing on Appellant's Petition, and a contested case hearing was not required by statute, administrative rule, or constitutional due process. We therefore vacate the circuit court's Order, KPC Order, Costs Order, and Final Judgment, and remand with instructions for the circuit court to enter an order dismissing Appellants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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Appeal filing and service

Service of the notice of an administrative appeal on every other party to the proceedings is required under the civil procedure rules incorporated by § 91-14(b), but failure to serve them is not jurisdictional; appellants must promptly comply or risk dismissal.

Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission · filed 1977-08-24(b)

To avoid an unnecessary subsequent appeal on the question of whether lack of service of a certified copy of the notice of appeal on every other party to the proceedings pursuant to HRS § 91-14(b) (Supp. 1975) and Rule 72(c), H.R.C.P., is jurisdictional as contended by the commission, we render the following opinion: ... The question we must resolve is whether this notice requirement is a jurisdictional one, with noncompliance resulting in the deprivation of the circuit court’s jurisdiction over the appeal. We hold that it is not a jurisdictional requirement.
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Section 91-14(b) allows judicial review when a timely notice identifies the agency decision and the parties; omitting the agency from the caption does not defeat the appeal if the agency is promptly served or later joined.

Jordan v. Hamada · filed 1980-09-08(b)

Appeals from administrative agencies to a circuit court are governed by section 14 of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (HRS § 91-14) and Rule 72 of the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure. ... A timely notice identifying the decision or order being appealed and the parties involved in the administrative proceeding is sufficient to vest the circuit court with authority to consider the appeal. Its jurisdiction over any appellee (including the administrative agency) is, of course, contingent upon prompt service of the appeal documents or upon subsequent joinder pursuant to Rule 19, H.R.C.P., if necessary.
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Section 91-14(a) gives the circuit court jurisdiction over an agency appeal when its requirements are met; agency approval is not required to perfect an interlocutory appeal.

In Re Hawaii Government Employees' Ass'n, Local 152 · filed 1980-12-29(a)

HRS § 91-14(a) controls an appeal to the. circuit court from an administrative agency, and so long as the requirements of HRS § 91-14(a) are met, the circuit court is vested with jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We rule that the circuit court erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that HPERB’s approval was required to perfect an interlocutory appeal.
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Section 91-14(a) requires notice of appeal within 30 days after notice of an agency’s final decision and order; an unresolved circuit-court remand does not bar further review in the original appeal.

Jordan v. Hamada · filed 1982-04-02(a)

Because no final judgment was entered in Civil No. 52424, appellant is not barred by the requirement of HRS § 91-14(a) and HRCP 72(b) that notice of appeal be filed in circuit court within 30 days of the petitioner’s being notified of the administrative agency’s final decision and order.
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When agency regulations permit a timely motion for reconsideration in a contested case, the denial of that motion is the final agency decision for purposes of § 91-14(b), and service of a certified copy of the denial starts the 30-day appeal period.

McPherson v. Zoning Board of Appeals · filed 1985-05-08(b)

Where an administrative agency’s regulations permit the filing of a petition or motion for reconsideration from a decision and order in what is a contested case under HRS Chapter 91, and such a motion is timely filed, it is our express holding that, for the purposes of an appeal under HRS § 91-14(b), the denial of the petition or motion for reconsideration is the final decision and order of the agency. The service of a certified copy of the denial starts the 30-day appeal period running.
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Section 91-14(b) starts the thirty-day period for judicial review when a certified copy of the agency decision is mailed, because mailing completes service.

Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawai'i, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals · filed 1992-05-22(b)

The language of HRS § 91-14(b) clearly indicates that the legislature intended that the manner of service generally provided for by HRCP would govern service of the certified copy of the agency decision under HRS § 91 — 14(b). ... The HRCP provisions regarding service clearly establish the date of mailing as the date of service.
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Section 91-14(b) treats service of a certified agency decision as complete when the decision is mailed, starting the thirty-day period for seeking judicial review.

KOREAN BUDDHIST TEMPLE v. Zoning Bd. · filed 1992-10-09(b)

The presumption clearly indicates that the supreme court considered that the period for filing an appeal under HRS § 91-14(b) began on the date of mailing.
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Section 91-14(a) requires a person aggrieved by a decision and order to have participated in the contested case that produced it to seek judicial review.

Kaapu v. Aloha Tower Development Corp. · filed 1993-02-25(a)

Just as HRS § 91-14(a) clearly and unambiguously requires that a person aggrieved by a decision and order have participated in the contested case that produced it, so HRS § 92-12 clearly and unambiguously entitles “any person” to “commence a suit in the circuit court of the circuit in which a prohibited act occurs,” regardless of the person’s participation in any proceeding.
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Section 91-14(b)’s thirty-day period to seek circuit court review begins the day after an agency decision is mailed, and service by mail adds two days under HRCP 6(e).

Price v. ZONING BD. OF APP. OF HONOLULU · filed 1994-11-02(b)

Thus, the statutory thirty day period within which the Prices were required to file a notice of appeal to the circuit court commenced on August 6, 1991, the day after mailing. Pursuant to HRCP 6(e) (1990), the Prices were entitled to add two days to this prescribed period, by virtue of the ZBA’s effecting service by mail.
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Before May 20, 1993, § 91-14(a) did not allow an agency that was a party to a contested case to seek circuit court review of an adverse agency decision because the agency was not a “person” entitled to appeal.

County of Hawai'i, Department of Finance v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1994-12-13(a)

Because we hold that a party agency did not fall within the definition of a “person” who is entitled to appeal under HRS § 91-14 prior to May 20, 1993, we dismiss the appeal before us.
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Section 91-14(b) requires review proceedings to begin within thirty days; when the agency decision is served by mail, two days are added before applying the weekend or holiday extension.

Rivera v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations · filed 2002-12-26(b)

The period prescribed by HRS § 91-14(b) is thirty days. Accordingly, under the facts of the instant case, the prescribed period is thirty days and the time allowed by the rules is an additional two days by operation of HRCP Rule 6(e), for a total of thirty-two days. Only when the last day of the allowed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday will HRCP Rule 6(a) become operable.
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Section 91-14(b) directs review of contested agency cases to circuit court and does not give district family courts authority to conduct that review.

In the Interest of Doe Children · filed 2004-06-16(b)

... HRS § 91—14(b) does not confer the same powers upon the district family courts. The family court therefore was not a “court of competent jurisdiction” for purposes of judicial review of the administrative proceedings.
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Section 91-14(b) requires every party seeking circuit court review of an agency decision, including a cross-appellant, to file within thirty days after service of the certified final decision and order.

Friends of Makakilo v. D.R. Horton-Schulder Homes, LLC. · filed 2014-10-30(b)

In this case, HRS § 91-14(b)’s similar omission of extended or different deadlines to file a cross-appeal indicates that all parties seeking review in the circuit court must institute proceedings in the circuit court within thirty days after service of the certified copy of the agency’s final decision and order.
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Section 91-14(b) requires every aggrieved person seeking judicial review of an agency decision, including a cross-appellant, to institute proceedings within thirty days after service of the final decision and order.

Friends of Makakilo v. D.R. Horton-Schuler Homes, LLC · filed 2014-10-30(b)

Unless the legislature enacts a similar provision, however, for the reasons already discussed, an “aggrieved person” seeking judicial review of an administrative decision under the Hawaii APA must institute review proceedings within thirty days after service of the final decision and order, as provided in HRS § 91-14.
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Section 91-14(a) allows judicial review of an agency decision when the proceeding was a contested case, the decision is reviewable, the claimant complied with agency rules, and the claimant has standing.

In re Application of Maui Electric Company, Limited. · filed 2017-12-14(a)

Judicial review over an agency appeal is authorized by HRS § 91-14 when the following requirements have been met: first, the proceeding that resulted in the unfavorable agency action must have been a contested case hearing . . . ; second, the agency’s action must represent a final decision or order, or a preliminary ruling such that deferral of review would deprive the claimant of adequate relief; third, the claimant must have followed the applicable agency rules and, therefore, have been involved in the contested case; and finally, the claimant’s legal interests must have been injured--i.e., the claimant must have standing to appeal.
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Section 91-14(b) permits an appeal within thirty days after service of the agency’s final decision even if an earlier preliminary ruling could have been appealed.

Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Board of Land and Natural Resources. · filed 2015-12-02(b)

HRS § 91-14(b) provides that a party wishing to appeal shall appeal “within thirty days after the preliminary ruling or within thirty days after service of the certified copy of the final decision and order of the agency[.]” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, even if the 2011 permit is characterized as a “preliminary ruling” under this statute, Appellants’ appeal shortly after the “final decision and order of the agency” was appropriate. Appellants did not waive a due process challenge by not immediately appealing after BLNR issued the 2011 permit.
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Section 91-14(b) starts the appeal period when the agency mails a certified copy of its final decision or a certified letter incorporating the proposed decision as final.

Benedict v. Employees' Ret. Sys. · filed 2018-11-09(b)

Accordingly, we must vacate the Circuit Court's Order and remand the case to the Circuit Court to determine the date that the ERS deposited in the mail a certified copy of the final decision (or certified letter incorporating by reference the Proposed Decision as final) as that is the date on which the period for filing an appeal under HRS § 91-14(b) began to run.
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Section 91-14(a) requires an appellant to be aggrieved by the agency decision; without standing, the circuit court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits and must dismiss the appeal.

Hawai'i State Teachers Ass'n v. Charter Sch. · filed 2018-02-16(a)

Nevertheless, as argued by HSTA, once the Circuit Court concluded that HSTA did not have standing to bring an appeal under HRS § 91-14, it no longer had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the merits of HSTA's appeal. ... Therefore, we conclude that the Circuit Court erred in affirming the HLRB's rulings, rather than dismissing HSTA's appeal.
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Section 91-14(b) does not require an appeal within thirty days of an order denying party status when that order leaves other issues in the agency proceeding unresolved; the appeal may follow the final decision and order.

In re Application of Hawai'i Electric Light Company, Inc. · filed 2019-05-10(b)

Here, Order No. 34651 Denying LOL’s Motion to Upgrade Status was not required to be appealed within thirty days because it did not constitute a “final decision and order” of the PUC.
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Section 91-14(b) permits a circuit-court appeal from an agency’s denial of reconsideration when the notice of appeal is filed within thirty days after the denial is mailed.

Olepau v. Hawaiian Homes Commission. · filed 2023-12-20(b)

His notice of appeal was filed on March 12, 2020, within 30 days after the Commission's Letter was mailed. Thus, the Second Appeal was filed within the time required by HRS § 91-14(b). The circuit court erred by dismissing the Second Appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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Scope and record of review

Section 91-14(g) authorizes a reviewing court to affirm, remand, reverse, or modify an agency decision on the grounds listed in the statute.

Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources. ICA Opinion, filed 04/12/2024 [ada], 154 Haw. 264. Dissenting Opinio · filed 2025-09-05(g)

Thus, we hold the Environmental Court had HRS § 91-14 jurisdiction over not only BLNR’s denial of Sierra Club’s request for a contested case hearing, but also BLNR’s subsequent decision to renew the RPs.
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Section 91-14(f) generally confines judicial review of an agency decision to the record.

Levin v. Hasegawa · filed 1973-12-17(f)

Under HRS § 91-14(f), such review is basically confined to the record.
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Section 91-14(a) allows ratepayers aggrieved by a PUC order to seek judicial review when they participated in the agency hearings and the PUC staff through which they participated did not appeal, even if the ratepayers were denied party intervenor status.

Application of Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc. · filed 1975-05-07(a)

We hold, therefore, that where the appellants have been “aggrieved” by the action of the PUC, and where they were involved as “participants” during the agency hearings, and where the PUC staff (the agency through which they participated at the hearings) has failed to appeal the decision of the PUC, the appellants may challenge the order of the PUC in this court.
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Section 91-14(g) prevents a circuit court from setting aside agency fact findings that are not clearly erroneous on the whole record, while allowing review for error of law.

Noor v. Agsalud · filed 1981-10-20(g)

In view of the record, the circuit court could not set aside the referee’s findings of fact since, on the record, they were demonstrably not “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; . ..” Accordingly, the question presented here is whether the decree below and the decision of the referee are “affected by other error of law”.
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Section 91-14(f) confines circuit-court review to the designated agency record when no trial de novo is available and no procedural irregularity outside the record is alleged.

McGlone v. Inaba · filed 1981-11-13(f)

However, having determined that a trial de novo or trial by jury is unavailable to Appellants in this action, and insofar as Appellants have not argued that this is a case alleging irregularities in procedure before the BLNR, we believe that the court’s review was properly confined to the designated record. As such, the lower court did not err in refusing to allow Appellants and their expert witnesses to testify in court.
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Section 91-14(g)(5) limits judicial disturbance of agency findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders to those clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Application of Hawaiian Telephone Co. · filed 1982-09-29(g)(5)

In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act, PUC’s “findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders” will not be disturbed upon judicial review unless “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.” HRS § 91-14(g)(5) (1976).
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Section 91-14(g) governs judicial review of an agency decision, not appellate review of the lower court’s decision on that review.

Foodland Super Market, Ltd. v. Agsalud · filed 1982-12-27(g)

Hawaii Revised Statutes § 91-14(g) relates to judicial review of an agency’s decision, not the appellate review of a lower court’s review of that decision.
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Section 91-14(f) requires judicial review of an agency ruling to be confined to the record.

City & County of Honolulu v. Ambler · filed 1981-02-27(f)

Since HRS § 91-14(f) (1976) requires the review to be confined to the record, it is difficult to understand how or why Civil 44761 was consolidated with Civil 43549 for trial purposes.
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Section 91-14(f) confines judicial review of an agency decision to issues properly raised in the record of the agency proceedings.

Aetna Life Insurance v. Park · filed 1984-03-28(f)

It is explicit in the provisions of HRS § 91-14, and in the case law interpreting those provisions, that a review of the Commissioner’s decision is confined to the issues properly raised in the record of the proceedings leading up to that decision, McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 636 P.2d 158 (1981); Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission, 58 Haw. 292, 568 P.2d 1193 (1977); Waikiki Shore Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 2 Haw. App. 43, 625 P.2d 1046 (1981); City and County of Honolulu v. Ambler, 1 Haw. App. 589, 623 P.2d 93 (1981). But see Armed Forces Co-op, Etc. v. Dept. of Ins. 622 P.2d 1318 (Wyo. 1981); Motor and Equipment Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. E.P.A., 627 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Belco Petroleum Corp. v. State Board of Equal., 587 P.2d 204 (Wyo. 1978).
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Section 91-14(e) permits a reviewing court to order additional evidence before the agency, but leaves that decision to the court’s discretion.

Kilauea Neighborhood Ass'n v. Land Use Commission · filed 1988-03-11(e)

Under HRS § 91-I4(e), ... the court may order that “additional evidence be taken before the agency upon such conditions as the court deems proper[;]” however, the court is not obligated to do so. The decision is purely discretionary.
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Section 91-14(g) permits a court reviewing an agency decision on the record to affirm, remand, reverse, or modify the decision.

Lanai Co., Inc. v. Land Use Com'n · filed 2004-09-17(g)

According to HRS § 91-14(g), the court could either affirm, remand, reverse, or modify the administrative agency decision after reviewing the record. The administrative agency creates the record, and the circuit court reviews it.
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Section 91-14(e) permits a court to deny leave to present additional evidence when the applicant has not shown good reasons for failing to present it before the agency.

Yasumura v. Child Support Enforcement Agency · filed 2005-05-09(e)

Clearly, it was not “shown to the satisfaction” of the family court “that there were good reasons for [Father’s] failure to present ... in the proceeding before the agency” the additional evidence Father sought to introduce.
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Section 91-14 confines judicial review of an agency decision to issues properly raised in the administrative proceedings.

Colony Surf, Ltd. v. Director of the Department of Planning & Permitting · filed 2007-12-26

Inasmuch as the ZBA did not rule on whether the type of daytime operation itself (a wedding business) constituted an “expansion” of the nonconforming use, the matter was not properly before the circuit court, and the circuit court’s finding that the daytime operation violates ROH § 21—4.110(e)(1) should be reversed.
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Section 91-14(g) requires a circuit court reviewing an agency decision to judge the order under the law in effect when the agency issued it.

Chung Mi Ahn v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. · filed 2011-10-04(g)

Although the circuit court’s agency appeal hearing took place in October 2006, after the effective date of Act 198, pursuant to HRS § 91-14(g), the circuit court sat as an appellate court reviewing an agency decision, and was ruling on whether the Insurance Commissioner’s Final Orders were correct under the law at the time of issuance.
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Section 91-14(f) confines judicial review to the agency record when no motion to supplement the record is made under subsection (e), so documents not before the agency should be stricken.

DW Aina Le'a Development, LLC v. Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC. · filed 2014-11-25(f)

The circuit court was therefore “confined to the record” under HRS § 91-14(f).
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Section 91-14(g) allows a reviewing court to affirm, remand, reverse, or modify an agency decision, providing relief that can be equivalent to an injunction against enforcement of that decision.

Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC v. State of Hawaii Land Use Commission · filed 2015-08-25(g)

The state courts, in reviewing an administrative decision, have the ability to “affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or ... reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced.” Haw.Rev. Stat. § 91-14. Given that authority, the state administrative appeal made available relief that would lead Bridge to essentially the same result sought by its requests for injunctive relief in this action.
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Section 91-14(f) ordinarily confines judicial review of a contested case appeal to the administrative record.

Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. University of Hawaii. · filed 2016-10-06(f)

By contrast, judicial review of an appeal from a contested case proceeding brought pursuant to HRS § 91-14 (Supp. 2004) “shall be confined to the record.”
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Section 91-14 does not give a court jurisdiction to review the propriety of agency decisions made in public meetings rather than contested cases.

Kia'i Wai O Wai'Ale'Ale v. Board of Land and Natural Resources · filed 2024-06-28

BLNR's decisions to continue the Permit for 2021 and 2022 were made in public meetings, not contested cases. The Environmental Court did not have jurisdiction to review the propriety of those decisions in this HRS § 91-14 appeal.
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Section 91-14(d) requires the agency to transmit the certified record to the reviewing court, which should compel compliance before deciding a record-dependent jurisdictional dispute.

In re: Bassett v. 90210 Grand Wailea Mgmt Co LLC. · filed 2023-06-20(d)

On remand, the circuit court should order that DLIR transmit the certified agency record of Bassett's claim as required by HRS § 91-14(d) and, if necessary, take further steps to clarify whether Bassett elected to receive the ESARO decision in electronic format in lieu of by mail.
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Section 91-14(e) permits a circuit court to order that new evidence be presented to the agency, but does not permit a party to present it directly to the court on appeal.

Akana v. Hawai'i State Ethics Commission · filed 2024-01-22(e)

Her motion cited HRS § 91-14(e) (2012), which lets the circuit court order that new evidence be presented to the agency, which may then change its findings, decision, and order. Akana's motion sought to present new evidence "to this [Circuit] Court on appeal." This procedure is not allowed by HRS § 91-14(e). See also HRS § 91-14(f) (Supp. 2018) ("The review shall be . . . confined to the record[.]"). The circuit court did not err by denying Akana's motion.
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Section 91-14 makes a circuit court reviewing a contested case an appellate court, so it cannot make its own findings of fact from the agency record.

Kaua'i Springs, Inc. v. Planning Department of the County of Kaua'i · filed 2024-09-23

A circuit court reviewing an agency's decision and order in a contested case under HRS § 91-14 acts as an appellate court; it does not review the evidence in the agency record to make its own findings of fact.
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Section 91-14 requires the circuit court to review the agency decision as an appellate court, without making its own findings of fact.

Kendrick v. Planning Department of the County of Kaua'i. · filed 2024-10-25

However, when a circuit court acts as an appellate court, it may not make its own findings of fact. ... Thus, we do not consider the circuit court's findings of fact, but review the agency's decision pursuant to HRS § 91-14.
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Section 91-14 allows appellate review of an agency’s denial of a required contested case hearing and the ensuing permit decision that completes the same proceedings.

Kia'i Wai o Wai'ale'ale v. Board of Land and Natural Resources · filed 2025-09-30

On this record, following Sierra Club I, we hold that the Environmental Court had HRS § 91-14 appellate jurisdiction to review BLNR’s decisions denying Petitioners’ contested case hearing requests and continuing the permit.
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On a section 91-14 appeal from an agency decision, the circuit court acts as an appellate court and may not make findings of fact.

Lucas v. Civil Service Commission · filed 2025-03-31

However, in a Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 91-14 appeal from an agency decision, the circuit court acts as an appellate court and may not fact-find.
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Under § 91-14, a circuit court reviewing an agency decision acts as an appellate court and may not make its own findings of fact from the agency record.

Ka Malu O Kahālāwai v. Board of Land and Natural Resources · filed 2025-07-28

A circuit court reviewing an agency's decision and order under HRS § 91-14 acts as an appellate court; it does not review the evidence in the agency record to make its own findings of fact.
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Section 91-14(f) generally limits judicial review of an agency decision to the administrative record.

Lewis v. Hawaiian Homes Commission · filed 2025-12-15(f)

The circuit court ... was therefore limited to considering the evidence before the Commission and was required to determine whether the Commission's findings based on the evidence were clearly erroneous.
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Standards of review

Section 91-14(g)(5) allows a court to set aside an agency credibility finding when the whole record leaves it firmly convinced the finding is mistaken, even if credibility ordinarily belongs to the agency.

De Victoria v. H & K CONTRACTORS · filed 1976-01-22(g)(5)

But where the record reveals no conflict in the evidence or impeachment of any witness, the court will not sustain a finding as to credibility which it is firmly convinced is mistaken.
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Section 91-14(g)(5) permits reversal of agency findings under the clearly erroneous standard when the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

In Re Kauai Electric Division of Citizens Utilities Co. · filed 1978-12-19(g)(5)

Under the clearly erroneous standard, the court will reverse an agency’s findings if the court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
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Section 91-14(g)(5) permits reversal of an agency finding as clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that the finding is mistaken in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Homes Consultant Co., Inc. v. Agsalud · filed 1981-09-15(g)(5)

Under the “clearly erroneous” standard a reviewing court cannot reverse an agency’s findings unless it is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.
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Section 91-14(g)(5) requires courts to review an agency finding for clear error in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Tsuchiyama v. Kahului Trucking & Storage, Inc. · filed 1982-01-15(g)(5)

Under HRS § 91-14(g)(5), the question before us is whether the board’s determination that appellee fell within the scope of the odd-lot doctrine is “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.”
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Under § 91-14(g)(5), a court reviewing the whole record upholds a LIRAB decision when its factual finding is not clearly erroneous.

Survivors of Cariaga v. Del Monte Corp. · filed 1982-10-29(g)(5)

We hold that the LIRAB did not violate HRS § 91-11, and we further hold that the LIRAB’s decision in denying the claim, based on the whole record, was not clearly erroneous. HRS § 91-14(g)(5).
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Section 91-14(g) permits a court to set aside agency findings and conclusions as clearly erroneous when review of the record leaves it with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Aio v. Hamada · filed 1983-06-03(g)

Under the clearly erroneous test articulated above, a reviewing court will not disturb agency findings and conclusions unless it is left, after examining the record, with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
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Section 91-14(g)(5) allows reversal of an agency decision as clearly erroneous when review of the complete record leaves the court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made.

Agsalud v. Lee · filed 1983-06-09(g)(5)

HRS § 91-14(g). Under the clearly erroneous standard thereby established, an agency’s decision will not be reversed unless examination of the complete record leaves the reviewing court with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
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Section 91-14(g)(5) permits reversal of an appeals board finding as clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

DeFries v. ASSOCIATION OF OWNERS, 999 WILDER · filed 1976-10-06(g)(5)

Under the clearly erroneous standard, this court will reverse findings by the appeals board if this court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
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Section 91-14(g) requires a reviewing court to uphold agency findings supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.

Application of Hawaii Elec. Light Co., Inc. · filed 1979-04-24(g)

An agency’s findings, if supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence, will be upheld.
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Section 91-14(g)(5) makes agency fact findings conclusive on appeal when substantial evidence supports them.

National Tire of Hawaii, Ltd. v. Kauffman · filed 1977-08-09(g)(5)

Findings of fact by the Department if supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. ... Upon a review of the record, we cannot say that the above findings are “[cjlearly erroneous, in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record____” HRS § 91-14(g)(5).
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Section 91-14(g) requires a reviewing court to assess whether an agency decision was clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or an abuse of discretion that prejudiced substantial rights.

Yoshino v. Saga Food Service · filed 1978-04-19(g)

Our review of the record fails to reveal that the Board’s action was clearly erroneous or that it was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. We are consequently unable to conclude that the substantial rights of Saga or Mullen will be prejudiced by the result reached by the Board.
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Section 91-14(g) permits a court to revise or modify an agency decision only when a listed ground may have prejudiced an appellant’s substantial rights.

Application of Kaanapali Water Corp. · filed 1984-03-01(g)

In Outdoor Circle, supra, we said that HRS § 91- 14(g) requires that in order for the court to revise or modify an agency decision, it must find that an appellant’s substantial rights may have been prejudiced by an agency under one of the six subsections of the statute. ... Kaanapali has not shown that the Commission’s Decision violates any of the provisions of HRS § 91-14(g) and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
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Section 91-14(g)(5) requires a court to sustain agency findings unless it is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.

Chung v. Animal Clinic, Inc. · filed 1981-09-24(g)(5)

The “clearly erroneous” standard requires the court to sustain the Board’s findings unless the court is “left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.”
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Section 91-14(g) permits a board determination to be overturned when the record shows clear error, arbitrariness, caprice, or abuse of discretion.

Danuser v. JA Thompson and Son, Inc. · filed 1982-12-21(g)

The Board’s determination will not be overturned on appeal unless the record reveals it to be clearly erroneous, or arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.
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Section 91-14(g)(5) limits judicial review of agency factual findings to the clearly erroneous standard.

Foster Village Community Ass'n v. Hess · filed 1983-08-09(g)(5)

The standard of judicial review of administrative action is governed by the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (HAPA), chapter 91, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) (1976, as amended). HRS § 91-14 (1976, as amended) provides in part: § 91-14 Judicial review of contested cases. ... On the other hand, judicial review of factual matters is limited by the clearly erroneous rule.
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Under § 91-14(g)(5) and (6), an Appeals Board finding of good cause for joinder stands absent proof of clear error or abuse of discretion.

Kalapodes v. E. E. Black, Ltd. · filed 1983-09-20(g)(5), (6)

The Board after a hearing found good cause for joinder and this court will not disturb its finding absent proof that it was clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.
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Section 91-14(g) must be applied to the agency decision when an appellate court reviews a circuit court’s decision on an agency appeal.

Outdoor Circle v. Harold K.L. Castle Trust Estate · filed 1983-12-09(g)

In order to determine whether the circuit court’s decision was right or wrong, we must also apply HRS § 91-14(g) to the agency’s decision.
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On a secondary appeal from circuit court review of an agency decision, the appellate court determines whether the circuit court was right or wrong by applying § 91-14(g) standards to the agency decision.

Chock v. Bitterman · filed 1984-03-01(g)

The standard of review in such cases is one in which we must determine whether the lower court was right or wrong in its decision, applying the standards set forth in HRS § 91-14(g) to the agency’s decision.
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Section 91-14(g)(5) permits reversal of an agency’s findings as clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

Jones v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc. · filed 1982-01-25(g)(5)

Under the clearly erroneous standard, the court will reverse an agency’s findings if the court is left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
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Section 91-14(g)(5) permits a reviewing court to set aside agency findings as clearly erroneous when substantial evidence does not support them or the whole record leaves a definite and firm conviction of mistake.

Feliciano v. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System · filed 1983-02-22(g)(5)

Under § 91- 14(g)(5), a reviewing court may not set aside the findings of an administrative agency except where they are clearly erroneous in that they are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or where the court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record.
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On secondary appeal, § 91-14(g)(5) governs review of agency findings, and § 91-14(g)(1) governs review of whether an agency appeal complied with statutory requirements.

Williams v. Hawaii Housing Authority · filed 1984-10-26(g)

In the instant case, the question whether the hearing board’s findings are correct is governed by HRS § 91-14(g)(5). Review of the issue of the conduct of the appeal to the commission is governed by HRS § 91-14(g)(1).
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Section 91-14(g) assigns different standards of review to agency legal conclusions, procedural defects, factual findings, and discretionary decisions.

Sussel v. Civil Service Commission · filed 1993-05-06(g)

Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects under subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection (5); and an agency’s exercise of its discretion under subsection (6).
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Section 91-14(g) assigns review of agency legal conclusions, procedural defects, factual findings, and discretionary decisions to different standards under its respective subsections.

UNIV. OF HAWAII PROF. ASSEM. v. Tomasu · filed 1995-07-21(g)

Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects under subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection (5); and an agency's exercise of its discretion under subsection (6).
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Section 91-14(g) assigns review of agency legal conclusions to paragraphs (1), (2), and (4), procedural defects to (3), factual findings to (5), and exercises of discretion to (6).

Smith v. State, Department of Labor & Industrial Relations · filed 1995-11-06(g)

Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3); findings of fact are reviewable under subsection (5); and an agency’s exercise of discretion is reviewable under subsection (6).
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Section 91-14(g)(4) supplies the standard for reviewing an agency decision for an error of law in statutory construction.

In Re the Claim of Maldonado · filed 1984-05-11(g)(4)

In determining whether the circuit court’s decision was right or wrong, we apply the appropriate subsection of HRS § 91-14(g) to the agency’s decision. Since . the issue here is whether the Commissioner made an error of law in her construction of HRS § 294-5(b), the standard under HRS § 91-14(g)(4) is applicable.
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Section 91-14(g) requires a reviewing court to conclude that an agency factual finding is clearly erroneous before overturning it.

Myers v. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System · filed 1985-08-12(g)

If such a finding was made, then under HRS § 91- 14(g) the court below would have had to make a legal conclusion that that finding was clearly erroneous in order to overturn it.
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Section 91-14(g) governs review of an administrative decision; the decision is presumed valid, and the appellant bears a heavy burden to show it is invalid.

Medeiros v. Hawaii County Planning Commission · filed 1990-09-11(g)

HRS § 91-14(g) establishes the standard of review of an administrative decision. ... However, an administrative agency’s decision is accorded a presumption of validity, and the appellant bears the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that the agency decision is invalid because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences.
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Agency factual findings are presumptively correct and may be set aside on judicial review when clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Sifagaloa v. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System · filed 1992-11-10(g)(5)

We reiterate that an administrative agency’s factual findings are presumptively correct and cannot be set aside on appeal unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence ... on the whole record.
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Section 91-14(g) calls for clear error review of an agency’s findings of fact and free review of its conclusions of law.

Topliss v. Planning Commission · filed 1993-01-06(g)

Under HRS 91-14(g), an administrative agency’s findings of fact are reviewable for clear error, while its conclusions of law are freely reviewable.
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Section 91-14(g)(1) requires review of an agency’s statutory interpretation under the right/wrong standard.

Vail v. Employees' Retirement System of Hawai'i · filed 1993-08-12(g)(1)

The precise issue presented to the circuit court concerned a question of statutory interpretation and, therefore, should have been reviewed under HRS § 91-14(g)(1), applying the right/wrong standard and not the clearly erroneous standard of review.
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Section 91-14(g) governs Supreme Court review of Appeals Board decisions and requires the court to sustain factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous on the whole record.

Diaz v. Oahu Sugar Co. · filed 1994-10-24(g)

Appeals to the Hawaii Supreme Court from the Appeals Board are governed by HRS § 91-14(g) (1985) of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act. ... The clearly erroneous standard requires this court to sustain the Board’s findings unless the court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. ... Against this standard, we address the merits of Diaz’s appeal.
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Section 91-14(g) assigns review of agency legal conclusions, procedural defects, factual findings, and exercises of discretion to different statutory grounds.

Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners · filed 1995-03-23(g)

Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3); findings of fact are reviewable under subsection (5); ánd an agency’s exercise of diseretion is reviewable under subsection (6).
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Section 91-14(g)(4) makes a legal determination in an agency appeal freely reviewable by an appellate court.

Locations, Inc. v. Hawai'i Department of Labor & Industrial Relations · filed 1995-07-28(g)(4)

The circuit court’s determination that Locations-agents are independent contractors and not employees is a question of law freely reviewable by an appellate court under HRS § 91-14(g)(4).
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Section 91-14(g)(5) permits agency findings to stand when reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole record supports them, even if other evidence conflicts.

Protect Ala Wai Skyline v. Land Use & Controls Committee · filed 1987-01-23(g)(5)

But the law does not require that all the evidence put before an administrative agency must support the agency’s findings. It is legally sufficient if the findings are supported by the reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the whole record.
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Section 91-14(g) presumes agency findings of fact correct and permits them to be set aside on appeal only when clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Dedman v. Board of Land & Natural Resources · filed 1987-07-14(g)

The Board’s findings of fact are presumptively correct, and cannot be set aside on appeal unless they are shown to be “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.”
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Under § 91-14(g), an agency credibility finding is treated as a finding of fact for appellate review even if the agency labels it a conclusion of law.

Bumanglag v. Oahu Sugar Co., Ltd. · filed 1995-04-06(g)

Although the FOF was denominated a COL, the determination whether Dr. Hendrick-son’s testimony was credible is binding upon this court as an FOF.
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Section 91-14(g)(6) permits reversal of an agency’s discretionary determination only for abuse of discretion.

Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations · filed 1988-10-06(g)(6)

Upon judicial review of an agency’s decision before this court, the agency’s discretionary determination will not be reversed in the absence of abuse. See HRS § 91 — 14(g)(6).
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Section 91-14 gives an agency decision a presumption of validity on judicial review, but that presumption does not apply to an original declaratory judgment action under § 632-1.

Hawai'i's Thousand Friends v. City & County of Honolulu · filed 1993-09-16

Although an agency’s decision carries a presumption of validity in a generic agency appeal under the applicable provision of HAP A, HRS § 91-14, ... Friends’ petition for declaratory judgment in the present case was brought as an original action under HRS § 632-1. Therefore, the circuit court was not required to defer to the DLU’s determination on the potential environmental impact of the park project.
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Under subsection (g)(5), agency findings supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence are not clearly erroneous.

Mauna Kea Power Co. v. Board of Land & Natural Resources · filed 1994-05-24(g)(5)

Based on the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence set forth above, we cannot conclude that the BLNR’s findings were clearly erroneous.
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Section 91-14(g) assigns review of agency conclusions of law, procedural defects, findings of fact, and exercises of discretion to different statutory grounds.

Zemis v. SCI Contractors, Inc./E.E. Black, Inc. · filed 1996-02-15(g)

Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3); findings of fact are reviewable under subsection (5); and an agency’s exercise of discretion is reviewable under subsection (6).
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Section 91-14(g) assigns review of agency conclusions of law to paragraphs (1), (2), and (4), procedural defects to paragraph (3), factual findings to paragraph (5), and discretionary decisions to paragraph (6).

Claim of Bragg v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 1996-05-08(g)

Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3); findings of fact are reviewable under subsection (5); and an agency’s exercise of discretion is reviewable under subsection (6).
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Section 91-14(g) provides distinct standards of review for agency conclusions of law, procedural defects, findings of fact, and exercises of discretion.

Hardin v. Akiba · filed 1997-02-28(g)

Under HRS § 91—14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects under subsection (3); findings of fact under subsection (5); and an agency’s exercise of discretion under subsection (6).
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Section 91-14(g) assigns review of agency conclusions of law to paragraphs (1), (2), and (4), procedural defects to paragraph (3), findings of fact to paragraph (5), and exercises of discretion to paragraph (6).

In Re Gray Line Hawai'i, Ltd. · filed 2000-03-30(g)

Under HRS § 91-14(g), conclusions of law are reviewable under subsections (1), (2), and (4); questions regarding procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3); findings of fact are reviewable under subsection (5); and an agency’s exercise of its discretion is reviewable under subsection (6).
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Notes 1–150 of 329, oldest cases first.

197 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Mortensen v. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System, the court mentions § 91-14 only as the route to judicial review and decides the hearing requirements under other provisions of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act. opinion →
In Re Hawaiian Telephone Company, the only discussion of § 91-14(g) is in Justice Abe’s separate concurrence and dissent; the court’s opinion does not decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Town v. Land Use Commission, the cited statement is in a dissent and describes a holding in an earlier case, not this court’s decision here. opinion →
Save Hawaiiloa Ridge Ass'n v. Land Use Commission, No. The court cites § 91-14 only as the route of appeal to the circuit court; its holding construes § 205-4. opinion →
Tangen v. State Ethics Commission, the court decides the meaning of § 84-14, while § 91-14 supplies the route for judicial review; the reference to § 91-14(g)(5) only explains the circuit court’s ruling. opinion →
Association of Apartment Owners of the Governor Cleghorn v. M.F.D., Inc., the court applies the Honolulu ordinance’s ten-day deadline for an appeal to the Board; § 91-14 is cited only as the route for the later circuit court appeal, and the court does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Fasi v. State of Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board, the court cites § 91-14 only as the route to circuit-court review; its decisions concern the Board’s standing to appeal under § 91-15 and declaratory-ruling authority under § 91-8. opinion →
Life of the Land v. LAND USE COM'N, ETC., the opinion recounts earlier § 91-14 rulings; this decision addresses standing for declaratory relief under §§ 91-7 and 632-1 and certification of a defendant class. opinion →
Waikiki Resort Hotel, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu, the opinion mentions § 91-14(a) only as the route for judicial review and does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
Clarkin v. Reimann, the court mentions § 91-14(g) only to distinguish agency review from the trial-court review at issue; it does not decide any rule under that section. opinion →
Neighborhood Board No. 24 v. State Land Use Commission, the court decided the special-permit requirements under § 205-6 and expressly declined to decide whether § 91-14 governed review of this proceeding. opinion →
Travelers Insurance v. Hawaii Roofing, Inc., the court mentions § 91-14 only while recounting an earlier appeal; its ruling here applies the workers’ compensation review scheme under HRS § 386-73. opinion →
Santos v. STATE, DEPT. OF TRANSP. KAUAI DIV., the court only identifies § 91-14(g) as governing circuit court review in a footnote; it decides preclusion and exhaustion, not any rule of this section. opinion →
Akau v. Olohana Corp., the court uses administrative standing cases only as an analogy and expressly says its decision does not affect interpretations of § 91-14. opinion →
In Re Will Estate of Campbell, the court cites § 91-14(a) only as the route for circuit court review after a zoning board decision; it decides the Land Court’s authority under § 501-85. opinion →
In re Hawaiian Electric Co., the court uses § 91-14 as the appeal and review framework but decides the burden of proof, agency procedure, and lifeline-rate issues under other laws; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Jacober v. Sunn, the court only raises, without deciding, whether a declaratory judgment action may substitute for a § 91-14 appeal; it dismisses the appeals under a different appellate-jurisdiction rule. opinion →
Armbruster v. Nip, the court decided HERB’s jurisdiction under Act 82 and HERA; it cited § 91-14(g)(1) only as the vehicle for reversing the agency decision, without deciding that subsection’s own rule. opinion →
Komatsu v. BD. OF TRUSTEES, EMP. RET. SYS., the court cites § 91-14 only as the route to judicial review; its decision construes the occupational-hazard requirement of § 88-79, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City Council, No. The majority mentions § 91-14(g) only to identify the route appellants used to appeal; its holdings concern the City Council’s exemption under § 91-1 and the CZMA hearing requirements, not any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Hawaii Blind Vendors Ass'n v. Department of Human Services, the exclusive administrative hearing and § 91-14 review theory was DHS’s argument, and the court expressly declined to decide it. The court instead applied primary jurisdiction and construed agency hearing rules, so question 2 is also no. opinion →
Hawai'i Government Employees' Ass'n, Local 152 v. Public Employees Compensation Appeals Board, the court decided whether the pricing appeal was a contested case under HRS §§ 77-4 and 91-1(5); it cited § 91-14(a) only for the resulting lack of appellate jurisdiction, without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Ko'olau Agricultural Co. v. Commission on Water Resource Management, the court cites § 91-14(b) as part of the route for a direct appeal, but dismisses for untimeliness under HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) and expressly reserves whether the designation decision permits a direct appeal. opinion →
Raquinio v. Nakanelua, the court recites § 91-14(g) but decides appealability under HRCP Rules 58 and 72(k) and Jenkins, without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, the court says this section was not invoked and does not decide any of its rules. opinion →
State v. LOUISIANA RIVERBOAT GAMING COM'N & HORSESHOE ENTERT., the discussion of HRS § 91-14(a) quotes and reports a Hawaii court’s decision; this court decides the Division’s appeal rights under Louisiana law. opinion →
Souza v. County of Hawaii, the court mentions § 91-14 only to report that the plaintiffs did not appeal a permit decision; its ruling concerns their federal due-process claim. opinion →
Misischia v. Pirie, the court cites § 91-14 as the unused state-court appeal route and decides preclusion and federal supplemental jurisdiction, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of State of Hawaii, Incidental index hit: the full opinion concerns federal Communications Act § 401(b), the Johnson Act, and preclusion; it contains no citation to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 91-14. opinion →
Application of Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., the court cites § 91-14(g) as the source of the review standard and reports another court’s interpretation, but decides whether the PUC could proceed by adjudication rather than construing this section’s own rules. opinion →
Richard v. Metcalf, the court decides standing under § 91-7; it uses § 91-14 only as a comparison, without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Alvarez v. Liberty House, Inc., the court recites § 91-14(g) as its standard of review, but decides the tolling rules of §§ 386-87 and 386-89, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
In Re Carl Corp. v. State, Department of Education, the court mentions § 91-14 only to compare it with the procurement review statute, whose jurisdiction and review rules it decides. opinion →
In Re Peterson v. Hawaii Electric Light Co., the court construed HRS § 269-16(f) to decide whether a direct appeal lay; it cited § 91-14 only as the ordinary review route and did not decide a disputed rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. County of Maui, the court invokes § 91-14(g) as the standard of review but decides the environmental assessment requirements of Chapter 343, not a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Waikiki Marketplace Investment Co. v. Chair of Zoning Board of Appeals, the court decided the timeliness of an appeal to the ZBA under the zoning rules and ordinance; it discussed § 91-14 to distinguish appeals to circuit court and cited subsection (g) for the review standard. opinion →
Chun v. Board of Trustees, the reference recounts the Retirees’ appeal to the circuit court; it is not this court’s own decision about § 91-14. opinion →
Steinberg v. Hoshijo, the opinion quotes § 91-14(g) as a standard of review but decides the agency’s authority under § 368-13 and a deposition ruling, without deciding § 91-14’s own rules. opinion →
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Dang, No. The court invokes § 91-14(g) as the review standard but decides the meaning of § 431:10C-308.6, without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Potter v. Hawaii Newspaper Agency, the court invokes § 91-14(g) as the general standard for reviewing an agency decision but decides workers’ compensation law, not any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Hyman, the court cites § 91-14(g) only for the standard of review on a secondary appeal; it decides the meaning and application of the no-fault insurance statutes, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Southern Foods Group, L.P. v. State, Department of Education, the court applies the procurement review statute, HRS § 103D-710(e); it mentions § 91-14(g) only through a cited case saying the provisions are virtually identical. opinion →
Citizens for the Protection of the North Kohala Coastline Ex Rel. Withington v. County of Hawai'i, the court decides standing for this declaratory action under § 632-1 and invokes § 91-14 only to distinguish the separate contested case proceeding. opinion →
Hayashi v. Scott Co., the court recites the established standard of review under § 91-14(g), but decides when a workers’ compensation claim accrues under § 386-82 rather than deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Flor v. Holguin, the opinion recites the established standard of review under § 91-14(g), then addresses compensability under the workers’ compensation law; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
In Re Water Use Permit Applications, the citation to § 91-14(g)(2) appears in Justice Ramil’s dissent, not the court’s decision. opinion →
In the Interest of Doe, the court decided whether the IDEA administrative process had been exhausted; it cited § 91-14(b) as a route for judicial review without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
Skysign International, Inc. v. City and County of Honolulu Does 1-100, the court decided the preclusive effect of the ZBA decision, while § 91-14 appeared only as the route for an unfiled appeal; it did not decide the section’s own rules. opinion →
Coon v. City and County of Honolulu, the opinion reports the Trustees’ requested declaration and quotes the statute in a footnote, but does not itself decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Poe v. Hawai'i Labor Relations Board, State, the court cites § 91-14 only as the route for circuit-court review and decides the appellate filing deadline under HRAP Rule 4 and the effect of an amended judgment. opinion →
Nickells v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the § 91-14(a) ruling appears in a quotation from the supreme court’s Bocalbos decision; this court decides the appeal deadline and finality under § 386-87(a), not § 91-14. opinion →
Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Commission, the court cites § 91-14(g) only as a tentative comparison to possible state-court relief while deciding the limits of its own federal remedial authority; it does not decide the section’s rules. opinion →
Sierra Club v. Hawaii Tourism Authority, the court mentions § 91-14 as a comparison while deciding standing under § 343-7(a); the petitioner did not invoke HAPA, so the court does not decide § 91-14’s own rules. opinion →
Grievance Arbitration Between State of Hawai'i Organization of Police Officers ex rel. Mejia v. Hawai'i County Police De, the court mentions § 91-14 only as an unused route for judicial review; it decides arbitral jurisdiction under other statutes, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Claim of Hoffacker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the court recites the established judicial-review standard under § 91-14(g), but decides the burden of proof under § 91-10(5) and the motor vehicle insurance statutes, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
TIG Insurance Co. v. Kauhane, the court cites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the agency, but decides the insurer’s obligations and the commissioner’s authority under other statutes, without deciding a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Schmidt, the court cites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the agency decision, but decides the meaning and application of the insurance statutes rather than any rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
University of Hawai'i v. Befitel, the court cites § 91-14 to describe the route and standard for judicial review, but decides the meaning and application of § 383-7(9)(B), not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Hawaii Management Alliance Ass'n v. Insurance Commissioner, the court relies on § 91-14’s existing judicial-review route in deciding ERISA preemption of § 432E-6, but does not decide a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Honda Ex Rel. Honda v. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System, the court recites the circuit court’s general review powers under § 91-14(g), but decides the retirement board’s duties and the evidentiary record; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Concerned Citizens of Pālolo, the court cites § 91-14(g) to identify the circuit court’s appellate jurisdiction; its decision that jurisdiction ended after final judgment rests on HRCP Rule 72(k) and appellate finality, not a rule it decides under § 91-14. opinion →
Freitas v. Administrative Director of the Courts, the opinion cites § 91-14(g) in its standard-of-review discussion, but its own decision addresses the constitutional right to a public hearing rather than deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Medeiros v. Hawai'i Department of Labor & Industrial Relations, the court recites § 91-14(g) as the standard for a secondary appeal, while the decision addresses disqualification for misconduct under § 383-30 and the administrative rule rather than deciding § 91-14’s own rules. opinion →
Honda Ex Rel. Kamakana v. Board of Trustees of the Employees' Retirement System, the court mentions § 91-14 as the route for administrative appeal and remand while deciding ERS fiduciary duties and reconsideration; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Ermocida v. Destination Resorts Hawaii, Inc., the court recites § 91-14(g) as the review standard but decides the scope of the workers’ compensation offset under § 386-33, without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Survivors of Young v. Island Feeling, Inc., the court recites § 91-14(g) as its standard of review, but decides the death-benefit rules in §§ 386-41 and 386-43 rather than any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Janet G. v. Hawaii, Department of Education, the court recites the agreed standard for reviewing the administrative decision, but decides the Section 504 claim and requested reimbursement rather than any disputed rule or limit of § 91-14. opinion →
Maui Tomorrow v. State, Board of Land & Natural Resources, the court mentions § 91-14 only while declining to address an argument about attorney fees in appeals under the section; it decides no rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Keahole Defense Coalition, Inc. v. Board of Land & Natural Resources, the court decided whether collateral estoppel barred relitigation of standing; it cited § 91-14 only to identify the earlier proceedings as agency appeals, without deciding a rule of the section. opinion →
Singleton v. Liquor Commission, the court recites the general review standard under § 91-14(g), then decides liquor-license issues under chapter 281 without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Trivectra v. Ushijima, the court cites § 91-14(g) for the standard of review, but decides whether the agency correctly classified the program as a security under chapter 485, without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Hui Kako'o Aina Ho'opulapula v. Board of Land & Natural Resources, the supplied opinion is a concurrence and dissent, and the quoted § 91-14 rule is reproduced from the circuit court’s conclusions rather than adopted as this court’s decision. opinion →
Diamond v. State, Board of Land & Natural Resources, the court recites § 91-14(g) as the general standard for a secondary appeal, but decides mootness and the meaning of the shoreline statute rather than a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Tamashiro v. Department of Human Services, the majority decides whether HRS § 102-14(b) adopts chapter 91 adjudicatory procedures, and mentions § 91-14 only as an example; the specific arguments about § 91-14 come from the dissent. opinion →
In Re Brandon, the court cites § 91-14(b) as the general route for contested case appeals and mentions § 91-14(a) within the PUC appeal statutes, but decides the reconsideration requirement and appellate jurisdiction under §§ 271-32(e) and 271-33 rather than a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Holi v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc., the § 91-14(b) reference is in a quotation from Peterson about § 269-16(f), not this court’s own decision about § 91-14. opinion →
Kay v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, the court decides remedies under the federal Telecommunications Act; it lists § 91-14 only as a comparison for state appeal periods and review standards, without deciding that section’s rules. opinion →
Kay v. Verdes, the court cites § 91-14 only as one state-law comparison while deciding remedies under the federal Telecommunications Act; it does not decide the Hawaii section’s rules. opinion →
Sierra Club v. Department of Transportation, the court drew on § 91-14(g) by analogy in an original HEPA action to select a standard for reviewing exemption decisions; it did not decide the section’s own contested-case review rules. opinion →
Capua v. Weyerhaeuser Co., the court recites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the agency decision, but decides the validity of HAR § 12-14-36 under HRS § 386-25 rather than a disputed rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Schmidt v. REAL ESTATE COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, the only reference to § 91-14(g) is Schmidt's argument; the court did not adopt a ruling about that section. opinion →
Pono v. Molokai Ranch, Ltd., this is a concurring opinion recounting the supreme court’s holding in Kona Old, not this court’s own decision about § 91-14. opinion →
Gillan v. Government Employees Insurance Co., the cited discussion is in a concurrence, not the court’s holding. It also says this is not an appeal under § 91-14(g). opinion →
Kapuwai v. City & County of Honolulu, Department of Parks & Recreation, the court recites the standard of review from Nakamura but decides the PPD award under § 386-32(a), not any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
County of Kauai v. OIP, the court mentions § 91-14(g)(6) only to explain the source of a standard announced in Paul's Electrical; it does not decide this section's own rules, and says the outcome here is the same under either review standard. opinion →
County of Kaua'i v. Office of Information Practices, the § 91-14(g)(6) discussion describes the supreme court’s reasoning in Paul’s Electrical, not this court’s own decision about that section. This court held that the circuit court did not err regardless of which standard applied. opinion →
Baldauf v. AOAO REGENCY PARK, the court cites § 91-14(g) for the general standard of review, but decides the workers’ compensation causation inquiry without deciding any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Save Diamond Head Waters LLC. v. Hans Hedemann Surf, Inc., the court used § 91-14(g) as the framework for reviewing the agency decision, but decided whether the use complied with the land use ordinance rather than a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Kapuwai v. City & County of Honolulu, Department of Parks & Recreation, the opinion quotes § 91-14(g) only as the standard of review; its decisions concern the workers’ compensation award and ripeness, not the meaning or limits of § 91-14. opinion →
Fratinardo v. Employees' Retirement System of the State of Hawai'i, the court decides the remedy under the primary jurisdiction doctrine for an original claim; it cites § 91-14(a) appeals only to distinguish their dismissal rule, without deciding this section’s own requirements. opinion →
Gilbert v. Board of County Commissioners of Park County, the § 91-14 proposition is Gilbert’s characterization of a Hawaii case, which this Wyoming court rejects; it makes no decision about § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Bart v. BOARD OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES, the court recites § 91-14 as the administrative-review standard and appeal route, but decides the chairperson’s authority to deny a contested-case hearing under HAR § 13-1-29.1 and related delegation law, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
In the Matter of United Public Workers, Afscme Local 646, Afl-Cio v. Watada, section 91-14(g) supplies the standard of review, while the court decides whether the HLRB violated § 89-14; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
County of Hawai'i v. Ala Loop Homeowners, the section-specific discussion is in a dissent that repeatedly disputes the majority, so it is not this court’s holding. opinion →
Kaleikini v. Thielen, the discussion of § 91-14 is in Justice Acoba’s concurring opinion, not this court’s own decision. opinion →
In re Aloha Island Enterprises LLC, the court decides appellate jurisdiction under HRS §§ 271-32 and 271-33; § 91-14 supplies only the general circuit-court rule and a cross-reference. opinion →
State v. Pratt, the opinion only recounts an argument and standing discussion in PASH; this court does not decide a rule under § 91-14. opinion →
Alaka'i Na Keiki, Inc. v. Hamamoto, the court decides that Chapter 103F precludes judicial review and rejects a procedural objection to its treatment of the Chapter 91 argument; it does not decide any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Lee v. United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, the court cites § 91-14(a) for the availability of judicial review, but decides the HLRB’s jurisdiction and the constitutionality of § 89-14 rather than any rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
AlohaCare v. Ito, the discussion of § 91-14 is in a concurring and dissenting opinion that expressly disagrees with the majority on the section’s role in judicial review; it is not this court’s holding. opinion →
Alohacare v. Department of Human Services, State of Hawaii., the court expressly declined to consider whether § 91-14(a) allowed review; the argument appeared only in the respondent’s position. opinion →
Alaka'i Na Keiki, Inc. v. Matayoshi, the discussion of § 91-14 appears in a concurring and dissenting opinion, not this court’s majority decision. opinion →
In re 'Īao Ground Water Management Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications, the section 91-14 analysis appears in a separate opinion that refers to the majority’s contrary analysis, so it is not this court’s holding. opinion →
Davis v. County of Maui, the Ninth Circuit cites § 91-14 as an available state-court route while deciding federal claim preclusion; it does not decide a rule of the Hawaii section. opinion →
Dancil v. Arakawa, the court mentions § 91-14 only as the eventual path to judicial review; it decides primary jurisdiction under other law and does not construe this section’s own rules. opinion →
Fratinardo v. Employees' Retirement System of the State, the court recites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the agency, but resolves the meaning of compensation under chapter 88 rather than deciding any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Jou v. Schmidt., the court mentions § 91-14 only as the route for the agency appeal; it decides attorney’s fees under § 431:10C-211(a), not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Liberty Dialysis-Hawaii, LLC v. Rainbow Dialysis, LLC., the opinion is from Justice Acoba’s concurrence and dissent, proposing a remand that the majority did not adopt. opinion →
Sierra Club v. Castle & Cooke Homes Hawai'i, Inc., the court cites § 91-14(a) only to establish a route for judicial review; it does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Asato v. Procurement Policy Board, State of Hawaii., No. the opinion is a dissent recounting an earlier § 91-14 standing ruling while disputing standing under § 91-7. opinion →
In re Attorney's Fees to McLaren v. Paradise Inn Hawaii, Inc., the court imposed a reason-giving requirement for attorney-fee reductions under the workers’ compensation statutes; it cited § 91-14 only as the route for possible judicial review, without deciding that section’s own rules. opinion →
United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 636, AFL-CIO v. Abercrombie., the section appears only in the court’s account of the plaintiffs’ jurisdictional basis in Kona Old, an earlier case; this court does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
'O Haleakalā v. University of Hawai'i, this sentence reports a prior Hawaiʻi Supreme Court decision; the court does not itself decide a rule under § 91-14. opinion →
Gour v. Honsador Lumber, LLC, the court decided the LIRAB’s jurisdiction over an appeal from the Director under the workers’ compensation statutes; § 91-14(a) appears in a quotation from Tam about judicial review and is not itself construed here. opinion →
Scotto v. Hawaii Public Housing Authority, State of Hawaii, the court cites § 91-14 only as part of the route for filing an appeal in circuit court, without deciding the section’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Nakaneula., the court mentions § 91-14 only as an administrative appeal route while deciding the availability of remedies under chapter 89; it does not decide § 91-14’s own rules. opinion →
State v. Nakanelua, the court cites § 91-14 as an available route to appeal an HLRB decision while deciding the chapter 89 arbitration-enforcement scheme and the circuit court’s jurisdiction; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
McDermott v. Ige, the section appears in the court’s account of an earlier decision, while this court decides standing to challenge the Marriage Equality Act, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Ramos v. Estate of Elsenbach, the court mentions § 91-14(b) only in its account of Rivera; its own decision concerns the deadline under HRS § 560:3-806(a) and HPR Rule 10(d). opinion →
Martinez v. State Board of Nursing, the court cites § 91-14(g) for the standard of review but decides whether the amended disciplinary petition satisfied administrative pleading requirements. opinion →
Waltrip v. TS Enterprises, Inc., the opinion recites § 91-14(g) as the established standard of review, but does not decide any rule of that section; its procedural discussion concerns other authorities. opinion →
Yoshii v. State, University of Hawaii., the court recites the § 91-14(g) review standard, but decides whether the employer rebutted the workers’ compensation presumption under § 386-85, without deciding a disputed rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Gao v. State, Department of the Attorney General, the court recites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing LIRAB but decides the meaning and application of the workers’ compensation statutes, not a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Zhang v. State, the court recites § 91-14(g) as the standard of review, then decides the workers’ compensation benefits issue under other provisions; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Robert D. Ferris Trust v. Planning Commission of Kaua'i, the court invokes § 91-14(g) as the standard of review, but decides who may apply for a nonconforming use certificate under the county zoning ordinance, not any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Ford v. Leithead-Todd, the court decides the standard for a quo warranto action and cites § 91-14 only to contrast an agency appeal; it does not decide § 91-14’s own rules. opinion →
Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. University of Hawaii, this correction order only directs insertion of a reference to § 91-14(f) in an earlier opinion; it states no rule about the section. opinion →
Ihara v. State., the court cites § 91-14(g) in its general standards of review, but decides the workers’ compensation provisions rather than any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Haw. Health Sys. Corp. v. United Pub. Workers, § 91-14(c) appears only as HHSC’s contention; the court did not adopt or decide a rule under that section. opinion →
In re Kuamoo., the court decides whether the undisclosed promotion policy violates the merit principle; § 91-14(g)(4) supplies reversal authority for that error of law, without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Kalaeloa Ventures, LLC v. City and County of Honolulu., the court describes the earlier Kinkaid ruling to distinguish it; the court does not decide a rule of § 91-14(a) in this case. opinion →
Flores v. Board of Land and Natural Resources., the court recites § 91-14(g) as the review standard but decides whether a contested case hearing was required under other law, not a rule of § 91-14. The § 91-14(e) remand was the environmental court’s action below (question 1). opinion →
Tax Foundation of Hawaiʻi v. State., the court mentions § 91-14 standing as background while deciding standing for a § 632-1 declaratory judgment action; it does not decide § 91-14’s own rules. opinion →
Unite Here! Local 5 v. Department of Planning and Permitting/Zoning Board of Appeals., the court invoked § 91-14(g) to remand due-process and zoning-permit issues, but did not decide any rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Quel v. Board of Trustees, Employees' Retirement System of Hawai'i., the court invokes § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the agency, but decides the meaning and application of “occupational hazard” under HRS § 88-79 and HAR § 6-22-2, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Bridge Aina Le'a, LLC v. State of Hawaii Land Use Comm., the court decides the requirements for issue preclusion and describes an earlier decision concerning § 91-14; it does not decide this section’s own rules. opinion →
Lana'ians for Sensible Growth v. Land Use Commission., the court cites § 91-14(g) to state the standard of review, but decides the meaning of the LUC’s Condition 10 rather than a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
In re United Public Workers v. Kishimoto, the court cites § 91-14(g) for the general standard of review but decides whether summary judgment was proper under the bargaining record and stipulation, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
In re Office of Information Practices Opinion Letter No. F16-01., the reference appears in the Law Center’s argument, not in a rule adopted by this court. opinion →
Cadiz v. QSI, Inc., the court recites § 91-14(g) as the general standard for agency review, then decides the workers’ compensation presumption under § 386-85 rather than any disputed rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Conner v. Aila, the court decides claim preclusion from an unappealed administrative decision, while the section’s 30-day review period is only reported from the agency notice; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
IES Residential Inc. v. Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, the court cites § 91-14(g)(5) as the standard for reviewing the Board’s factual determination, but decides the occupational safety violation and does not decide a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Watanabe v. Employees' Retirement System., the opinion recites § 91-14(g) as the general standard for reviewing an agency decision, but decides whether a filing constituted exceptions under HAR § 6-23-19 and whether the agency must consider them under § 91-11. opinion →
George Young, Jr. v. State of Hawaii, the court used § 91-14 as a possible route to judicial review while deciding ripeness of a due process claim; it expressly left the availability of the administrative procedure uncertain and did not decide this section’s rules. opinion →
Yoshikawa v. City and County of Honolulu, the court used the available appeal under § 91-14(b) as the basis for a procedural due process claim, but did not decide the section’s own rules. opinion →
Protect and Preserve Kahoma Ahupua'a Association v. Maui Planning Commission., the court recites § 91-14(g) as the review standard but decides standing and due process under other law, without deciding a rule of § 91-14(g). opinion →
Higuchi v. Otaka, Inc., the court cited § 91-14(g) as the general source of appellate review standards, but decided waiver, preclusion, and apportionment under other law rather than a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Dairy Road Partners v. The Maui Planning Commission, the court applies the general mootness rule because effective relief is unavailable; § 91-14 identifies the route for judicial review, and the earlier ruling on aggrieved-person standing is only recounted. opinion →
In re: The Petition of Association of Unit Owners of 988 Halekauwila for Declaratory Relief and for Hearing, the court decides direct-appeal jurisdiction under § 206E-5.6(h); it cites § 91-14(a) only to describe a type of preliminary ruling and does not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Nitta, M.D. v. Department of Human Services., the court invokes § 91-14(g) as its standard of review, but decides eligibility and repayment under the Medicaid statute and rules, without deciding a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Ho'omoana Foundation v. Land Use Commission, the court cites § 91-14(g) for the established standard of review, but decides land-use and due-process issues rather than a rule of this section. opinion →
Middleton v. Betts, the court cites § 91-14 only as an available appeal route while deciding whether mandamus is warranted; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Arbles v. Merit Appeals Board., the court cites § 91-14 for the route and standard of judicial review, but decides the compensation requirements of § 89C-3(b)(2), not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Shook v. County of Hawaii Police Department, the court decides the preclusive effect of the MAB decision; it cites § 91-14(a) only to show that judicial review was available, without deciding a rule of that section. opinion →
Birnbaum v. Municipality of Anchorage, the court cites § 91-14 only as the available Hawaii state-court review route in another case; its own decision concerns supplemental jurisdiction over Alaska municipal claims. opinion →
Spirit of Aloha Temple v. County of Maui, the federal court cites § 91-14(g) as an available route for state review while assessing federal claims; it does not decide the section’s own procedure. opinion →
Yoshikawa v. City and County of Honolulu, the federal court lists § 91-14 among available review routes while deciding exhaustion under local law; it does not construe § 91-14. opinion →
Nitta v. Department of Human Services., the court quotes § 91-14(g) as the standard of review but decides eligibility under the federal Medicaid statute, without deciding any rule of § 91-14. opinion →
City and County of Honolulu v. Honolulu Police Commission., the opinion recites § 91-14(g) review standards, but decides entitlement to representation under § 52D-8 rather than a disputed rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Ho'omoana Foundation v. Land Use Commission., the court cites § 91-14(g) for the standard of review but decides the availability of special use permits under §§ 205-4.5 and 205-6, without deciding a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Bernabe v. Employees' Retirement System, the court recites the section 91-14(g) review standard, then decides eligibility for disability retirement under section 88-79(a); it does not decide a rule of section 91-14. opinion →
Academic Labor United v. Board of Regents of the University of Hawai'i., the § 91-14 reference is the court’s description of an appeal ALU apparently had in mind, not the court’s own decision about that section. The court decides the availability of an administrative declaratory judgment instead. opinion →
Dicks v. Schatz, the court cites § 91-14 only while explaining that it cannot review state court decisions; it does not decide any rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Paro v. Hawaii Home Management & Cleaning Service LLC, the court quoted § 91-14(g) as its review framework, but decided when a director’s decision is “sent” under § 386-87(a), not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Survivors of Paul Jokiel v. University of Hawaii., the court cites § 91-14(g) as the standard of review but decides how to calculate death benefits under §§ 386-41 and 386-31, without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Josiah v. Target Corporation, the court cited § 91-14(g) for the standard of review but decided whether the evidence met § 386-33’s preexisting-disability requirement, without deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
In re: Elaban v. Department of Transportation, the court cites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the agency decision, but decides exhaustion under the collective bargaining agreement rather than a rule of this section. opinion →
Bardin v. Planning Department of the County of Kauai, the court uses § 91-14 to identify the route and standard for judicial review, but decides hearing-officer disqualification under due process and Planning Commission rules rather than deciding a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Campos v. Planning Commission of the County of Kaua'i., the court recites § 91-14(g) as the review standard and denies relief based on zoning, due process, and waiver issues; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
City and County of Honolulu v. Department of Health, the court cites § 91-14(g) as the standard of review while deciding the meaning of § 342D-6(c), without deciding § 91-14’s own rules. opinion →
Davis v. Bissen, JR., the court uses § 91-14 as the route for judicial review, while the stated decision concerns constitutional due process and the resulting need for a hearing; the opinion text does not decide a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Hart v. Real Estate Commission, the court invokes § 91-14(g) as its review standard but decides challenges under other statutes and rules without deciding any rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Sierra Club v. Board of Land and Natural Resources. Dissenting Opinion by Nakasone, J. Consolidated with CAAP-22-0000519, this is Nakasone, J.'s dissent, so its proposed construction of § 91-14 is not this court's holding. opinion →
Board of Land and Natural Resources v. Crabtree. Petition for Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition, filed 08/09/2023. S.Ct., the opinion only reports the environmental court’s reliance on § 91-14(g); the supreme court does not decide or adopt a rule under that section. opinion →
Dailey v. Department of Land and Natural Resources, the court decided the direct-appeal rule and exception in HRS § 183C-9; it mentions § 91-14 only as a jurisdictional citation in the Daileys’ filing. opinion →
Ihara v. State, the court cites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the Board’s disability rating but decides the workers’ compensation issue, not a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Green v. Zoning Board of Appeals, the court invokes § 91-14(g) as its review standard but decides the zoning variance and accessory-use issues, without deciding a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Seghorn v. State, the court cites § 91-14(g) as its review standard while deciding whether the Board correctly found medical stability; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Honoipu Hideaway, LLC v. State., the court recounts Kanahele’s treatment of § 91-14, while its own decision concerns the circuit court’s authority to transfer the appeal nunc pro tunc under § 603-21.9(6). opinion →
Noborikawa v. Host International. Inc., No. The court cites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the agency decision, but decides the workers’ compensation PPD award rather than a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Frankel v. Board of Land and Natural Resources. Opinion by Hiraoka, J. Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part., the opinion is from a separate concurrence and dissent, not the court’s holding; its references to § 91-14 are parentheticals describing other decisions. opinion →
Dailey v. Department of Land and Natural Resources., the § 91-14 references report the appellants’ citation and a rule from an earlier case; this court makes no decision about § 91-14 here. opinion →
Mālama Kakanilua v. Board of Land and Natural Resources. Consolidated with CAAP-22-0000067., the court uses § 91-14(g) as the review framework but decides whether BLNR breached its constitutional duty, without deciding a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Cheng v. Department of Planning and Permitting, the court cited § 91-14 as the route to judicial review and for the general secondary-appeal standard, but decided whether the zoning board had jurisdiction under local zoning rules, not a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Costa v. County of Hawai'i. ICA s.d.o., filed 02/23/2024 [ada], 154 Haw. 40. ICA Order of Correction, filed 02/27/2024 [, the court recites § 91-14(g) as a standard of review and reports a prior appealability ruling, but its decision concerns payment and penalties under chapter 386 rather than a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Abrams v. Maui Planning Commission, the court decides the direct-appeal rule of HRS § 205-19(a); its references to § 91-14(a) and (b) do not decide those subsections’ own rules. opinion →
Noborikawa v. Host International. Inc. ICA s.d.o., filed 09/20/2024 [ada], 155 Haw. 90. Application for Writ of Certiora, the court cites § 91-14(g) for the review standard but decides the sufficiency of LIRAB’s findings and the disability award, without deciding a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Coconut Plantation Beach Investors, LLC v. Roversi, the court recites § 91-14(g) as its review standard but decides whether the county workforce-housing ordinance applies; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14 itself. opinion →
Gour v. The Pepsi Bottling Group, the court uses § 91-14(g)(5) as its review standard, but decides whether the evidence supports the benefit suspension under § 386-79; it does not decide a rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Gutschmidt v. Maui Planning Commission, the court decides good cause for an untimely intervention petition under MPC Rule 12-201-40; § 91-14 appears only in a cf citation to Pele. opinion →
Choi v. Tachibana Enterprises, LLC, the court recites § 91-14(g) as the standard for reviewing the agency, while its decision addresses unemployment misconduct under other law rather than any disputed rule of § 91-14. opinion →
Ralston v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, the majority cites subsection (g) only as the standard of review for BLNR’s decision; it decides the constitutional due process hearing issue, not a rule of § 91-14. The separate jurisdiction discussion appears only in the dissent. opinion →
Novak v. County of Hawai'i, the statement about § 91-14(a) is quoted from Suzuki in a see-generally citation. This court decides LIRAB jurisdiction, not a rule of § 91-14(a). opinion →
Hui Ho’opulapula Nā Wai o Puna v. Department of Land and Natural Resources, the court cites § 91-14 as an available appeal route while deciding whether a separate declaratory action under § 632-1 may proceed. opinion →
Department of Public Safety v. Forbes, the court identifies § 91-14(g) as the route for circuit-court review, but its holding concerns the Merit Appeals Board’s authority under chapter 76. opinion →
Novak v. County of Hawai‘i, the quoted § 91-14(a) proposition comes from Suzuki in a see-generally citation; this court decides LIRAB jurisdiction under workers’ compensation law. opinion →
Choi v. Tachibana Enterprises, LLC, the court cites the section for the standard of review while deciding whether the agency properly disqualified Choi from unemployment benefits. opinion →

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