Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-407

Under § 12-407's sales-tax definitions, a transaction whose true object is an intangible right rather than tangible personal property is not a taxable retail sale.

Dine Out Tonight Club, Inc. v. Department of Revenue Services · filed 1989-04-04(2)(a), (3), (13)

Only the sale of tangible personal property at retail is subject to the imposition of the Connecticut sales tax. ... The Connecticut sales tax does not, however, extend to the sale of intangible rights. ... If, therefore, what the plaintiff sells, and what its members purchase, is the intangible right to free meals and knowledge of the restaurants that provide them, the club membership fees are not subject to the imposition of the Connecticut sales tax.

Section 12-407(5) excludes a sale in the regular course of business from “use”; furnishing purchased personnel services and rented lights to the state under its direction was a sale rather than a use.

White Oak Corporation v. Dept. of Revenue Services · filed 1982-06-15(5)

“Use” includes “the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership of that property” but does not include sale of the property in the regular course of business. General Statutes § 12-407 (5). ... It is concluded that the plaintiff’s purchase of the services of watchmen and traffic officers and the rental of lighting equipment was not a “use” of those items by the plaintiff but rather that it was a sale of those items to the state, a tax exempt agency.

Section 12-407(3) excludes bona fide sales for resale from the definition of a taxable retail sale, including the statute's delivery-to-consumer provision.

Steelcase Inc. v. Crystal, No. 518072 (Oct. 28, 1994) · filed 1994-10-28(3)

If the sales and use tax law of Connecticut is to be coherent and consistent, the entire definition of "retail sale" set forth in § 12-407 (3) must be read as excluding sales for resale. ... It follows from this analysis that, if the sales and use tax law is to be read as a coherent whole, § 12-407 (3) must be read as exempting from taxation all sales for resale. ... This specifically means that the second sentence of § 12-407 (3) implicitly contains such an exemption.

Subsection (3) defines a retail sale as a sale for any purpose other than resale in the regular course of business.

American Totalisator Co. v. Dubno · filed 1989-03-14(3)

Where, as here, the primary function and purpose of the taxpayers was to provide wagering systems and the ownership, use and maintenance of certain personal property and equipment were necessary to enable them to furnish those systems, those taxpayers, not the state, were the ultimate users or consumers of that property and equipment within the meaning of the sales and use tax statutes.

Section 12-407(3) treats a service sale as a retail sale when it is for a purpose other than resale in the ordinary course of business.

CCH Computax, Inc. v. Dubno · filed 1989-05-23(3)

We therefore agree with the trial court that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of establishing that the sale of its computer services to its customers is a sale for resale and is not a sale at retail.

Section 12-407 treats an affiliated corporation’s provision of personnel services to another corporation as a taxable retail sale when the services are used to perform the recipient’s own contracts rather than resold.

American Totalisator Systems, Inc. v. Dubno · filed 1989-03-14(2)(i)(C) and (3)

Consequently, the sale of Systems’ personnel services to AmTote was a “retail sale” as defined by § 12-407 (3). ... Moreover, we can find nothing in the statutes or the regulations that would dictate reading § 12-407 (2) (i) (C) to require that Systems has held itself out to the public as a personnel agency before its transactions with AmTote were subject to the imposition of a sales tax.

Section 12-407 treats a transaction as a sale for resale when the property is provided as an independent part of the contractual relationship, with the primary purpose of its purchase and use controlling taxability.

Sanitary Services Corp. v. Meehan · filed 1995-10-17(2)(j)

Whether a transaction qualifies as a “sale for resale” depends upon “a determination of the true object of the contracts between the parties.” ... “It is the primary purpose for which the personal property was purchased and put to use that controls the determination of the property’s taxability.” ... The trial court’s analysis of the plaintiffs tax liability is fully supported by the record before it and by the authorities upon which it relied.

Section 12-407(3) treats services purchased for a purpose other than resale in the regular course of business as retail sales.

United Technologies Corp. v. Groppo · filed 1996-08-13(3)

Consequently, the purchase and subsequent sale of services by the plaintiffs was a “retail sale” as defined by § 12-407 (3) and not a sale for resale.

Section 12-407(3) treats delivery as occurring where the seller places goods with a common carrier under an F.O.B. factory term, so an out-of-state delivery is not a Connecticut retail sale.

Steelcase, Inc. v. Crystal · filed 1996-08-06(3)

Accordingly, Steelcase did not deliver the goods in this state and, therefore, did not make a retail sale within the meaning of § 12-407 (3).

Section 12-407(3) treats a printer’s sale of advertising preprints to a retailer as a retail sale when newspaper buyers give no consideration for the preprints.

Caldor, Inc. v. Heffernan · filed 1981-04-21(3)

There is no sale of the preprint at the time the newspaper is purchased. Therefore, the taxable event occurs when the printer sells the pre-prints to the retailer.

Separately stated expenses for property management employees who do not work solely for the service recipient at its property are included in sales price and gross receipts.

Renaissance Management Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 2003-12-30(8)(f), (9)(f)

The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that it had failed to satisfy its burden of proving that the exemption described in General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 12-407 (8)... and (9)... includes the separately stated expenses of ...employees who are not located at, and who do not solely devote their time to, a single housing project. ... The issues were resolved properly in the trial court’s concise and well reasoned memorandum of decision. ... The judgment is affirmed.

Section 12-407(9)(d) excludes separately stated transportation charges incurred after a sale from gross receipts; that exclusion defines what is taxable rather than creating a tax exemption.

Plasticrete Block & Supply Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 1990-07-31(9)(d)

This language is definitional in nature, and serves to determine whether certain charges are taxable, not whether certain charges that are ordinarily taxable should be exempt from taxation as a matter of legislative grace.

Section 12-407(9)(A) defines gross receipts to include total payments or periodic payments from leases or rentals of tangible personal property by a retailer.

Air Tiger v. Commissioner of Revenue, No. Cv99 0496956s (Mar. 27, 2002) · filed 2002-03-27(9)(A)

General Statutes § 12-408 imposes a sales tax on retailers (as defined in § 12-407 (12)) for the privilege of making any sales defined in General Statutes § 12-407 at the rate of six percent of the gross receipts of the retailer derived from the sale. "Gross receipts" as used in this case means "the total amount of payment or periodic payments from leases or rentals of tangible personal property by a retailer." General Statutes § 12-407 (9)(A). Air Tiger comes within the statutory definition of a retailer subject to payment of taxes on gross receipts from the lease or rental or tangible personal property. Simply put, Air Tiger leases the Gulfstream to ATO, and therefore, unless exempt from paying a sales tax on the gross receipts from the lease, is obligated to pay such a sales tax.

Section 12-407 defines sales to include leasing or rental of tangible personal property and gross receipts to include payments for lease terms occurring on or after July 1, 1975.

Harris Data Communications, Inc. v. Heffernan · filed 1981-02-17(2)(j), (9)

Therefore, it is clear that the statute applies to all payments which are received for the use of tangible personal property where the use is to occur on or after July 1, 1975. ... As quoted above, § 12-407 (2) includes leasing or rental within the definition of “sale.”

Section 12-407(8) and (9) include lease payments without deductions for expenses, so lessee reimbursements to a lessor for personal property taxes are subject to sales tax.

Geckle v. Dubno · filed 1984-04-05(8), (9)

We consequently find that the payments by the lessees to the plaintiff under the reimbursement arrangement comprise part of the total amount of payment or periodic payments received for the rental of personal property and thus fall within the definitional language of the Sales and Use Tax Act. We are bound to conclude, therefore, that those payments are subject to the sales tax.

Section 12-407(a)(9)(A) includes vehicle registration renewal fees paid by lessees directly to the department in a lessor's gross receipts.

HVT, INC. v. Law · filed 2011-04-19(a)(9)(A)

On the basis of the plain language of the statute, we conclude that renewal fees paid by lessees directly to the department are gross receipts as defined by § 12-407(a)(9)(A).

The section's definitions exclude a skilled welder providing personal repair services from being a retailer or seller when the transaction is primarily for labor and materials are incidental.

Bowne v. Brown · filed 1973-02-05(11), (12)(a)

A welder is not a “retailer” or “seller” within the meaning of the applicable statutes under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, since the plaintiff rendered personal services as a skilled welder.

Section 12-407 treats a city operating a public parking garage as a retailer and seller even if the operation is unprofitable.

Stamford v. Comm., Dept. of Revenue Ser., No. Cv99 0493545s (Dec. 13, 2000) · filed 2000-12-13(10)

Analyzing the terms of the lease cited in this decision, only one conclusion can be drawn, and that conclusion is that the City was a retailer and a seller as that term in defined in § 12-407 and is therefore liable under § 12-408 for collecting and remitting sales tax on the motor vehicle parking services provided to the public during the audit period.

Section 12-407 (5) treats directing catalogs into Connecticut as control incident to ownership, even when the retailer cannot withdraw or redirect them.

Sharper Image Corp. v. Miller · filed 1996-06-19(5)

Ownership was never relinquished. The plaintiffs control was the direction; relinquishing the right to withdraw or redirect does not for purposes of “ownership” relinquish control.

Section 12-407(5) requires ownership of tangible personal property for its use to be taxable.

Val-Pak of Central Connecticut North, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 1994-12-02(5)

If the fallback argument of the department is to succeed, it must first be established that Val-Pak “owned” the coupons that the department seeks to tax. ... Val-Pak at no time had title to the coupons here.

Section 12-407(2) includes a transfer of title to personal property for consideration in the definition of a sale; when an agreement vests title to building materials in the customer, the sale is to the customer.

Pervel Industries, Inc. v. Groppo · filed 1987-06-09(2)

A “sale” is defined under General Statutes § 12-407 (2) to include any transfer of title of personal property for a consideration. ... Where, as a result of an agreement between the general contractor and the customer, title to the materials is to vest in the customer, the customer as the transferee of title is the party to whom the sale is made regardless of the fact that the general contractor has participated in the transaction by sending a purchase order to the vendor and by paying the vendor’s invoices under a contractual relationship providing for the reimbursement of the general contractor by the customer.

Section 12-407 (2)(j) includes rentals of tangible personal property, including tuxedos, within the definition of a sale.

Men's World v. Commissioner of Revenue, No. Cv 99 0494630s (Mar. 27, 2002) · filed 2002-03-27(2)(j)

General Statutes § 12-407 (2)(j) defines "sale" to include "the leasing or rental of tangible personal property of any kind whatsoever." Thus, in the rental of tuxedos where the total charges for the rental are less than $50, the rental falls within this exemption and is not subject CT Page 3736 to the Connecticut sales tax.

Section 12-407(7)(a) does not treat subcontract labor, with incidental passage of the taxpayer's own materials, as a purchase of tangible personal property.

International Business MacHines Corporation v. Brown · filed 1974-08-20(7)(a)

The essence of the transaction between IBM and the subcontractor is the performance of skilled labor, .and the passage of the component materials, from IBM to the subcontractor and then back to IBM, is merely incidental to such performance and is not a purchase.

Sections 12-407(8) and (9) define taxable sales price and gross receipts to include pre-sale transportation costs while excluding separately stated post-sale transportation charges.

Greenman's Trucking, Inc. v. Department of Revenue Services · filed 1986-02-18(8) and (9)

The internal bookkeeping of accounts separating charges for materials and transportation do not control over the statutory definitions of taxable “sales price” and “gross receipts” for sales tax payments to the defendant.

Section 12-407 defines storage to include keeping or retaining tangible personal property in Connecticut for specified purposes and use to include exercising an ownership right or power over it.

Magic II, Inc. v. Dubno · filed 1988-02-16(4), (5)

General Statutes § 12-407 defines the words “storage” and “use” as follows: “(4) ‘Storage’ includes any keeping or retention in this state for any purpose except sale in the regular course of business or subsequent use solely outside this state of tangible personal property purchased from a retailer. “(5) ‘Use’ includes the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership of that property, except that it does not include the sale of that property in the regular course of business.” (Emphasis added.) The court’s findings met both of these definitions.

Section 12-407(2)(a) defines a sale as any transfer of title, exchange or barter of tangible personal property for consideration.

New England Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 1986-02-11(2)(a)

The latter subsection defines “sale” and “selling” as “[a]ny transfer of title ... of tangible personal property.” ... On the record presently before us, however, the trial court could properly find that the plaintiff in this case had transferred title to these two yachts in Connecticut and was therefore properly assessed for Connecticut sales tax with regard to these sales.

Section 12-407(2)(i)(I) exempts services rendered in the removal of hazardous waste or other contaminants of air, water or soil from sales and use tax.

Oxford Tire Supply v. Commissioner, D.R.S., No. Cv96 0564091 (Dec. 16, 1998) · filed 1998-12-16(2)(i)(I)

The department claims that the § 12-407 (2) (i) (I) exception is limited to specific hazardous waste site cleanup. The court, even reading the tax exemption narrowly, is unable to add such language of limitation. The clear meaning of the statute is to cover services rendered in the removal of hazardous waste.

Section 12-407(5) defines “use” to include exercising a right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership, except selling it in the regular course of business.

Sharper Image Corporation v. Miller, No. Cv940536540 (Feb. 1, 1995) · filed 1995-02-01(5)

Having concluded that Sharper Image's mailing of catalogs from out of state to Connecticut comes within the statutory definition of "use" in § 12-407 (5), and having concluded that the imposition of this use tax does not violate the Commerce Clause, we hold that Sharper Image is subject to the payment of the Connecticut use tax imposed on the purchase price of the catalogs mailed to Connecticut residents pursuant to General Statutes § 12-411 .

Section 12-407(5) defines “use” as exercising a right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership.

Val-Pak of Central Connecticut North, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 1996-01-23(5)

Because the plaintiff at no time exercised any ownership rights over the advertising materials prepared and mailed by Direct Marketing, the trial court concluded that the plaintiffs transactions did not constitute a taxable “use” of tangible property in this state. ... Because that memorandum of decision fully addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal, we adopt the trial court’s well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on that issue.

Section 12-407(5) defines “use” as exercising a right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership, excluding its sale in the regular course of business.

Rich-Taubman Associates v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 1996-04-16(5)

Furthermore, the plaintiff, having effected its purchases for the city with the city’s moneys and as the city’s disclosed agent, did not, and could not, exercise the rights over its purchases incident to ownership that define a “use” subject to the use tax as contemplated by § 12-411. See General Statutes § 12-407 (5).

Section 12-407(5) defines use to include exercising any right or power over tangible personal property, including distributing catalogs in Connecticut.

Sharper Image Corp. v. Miller · filed 1997-04-22(5)

We conclude that our legislature’s definition of “use” in § 12-407 (5), which is defined as including the “exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property,” encompasses, but is not limited to, the distribution of catalogs as it occurred in this case.

Section 12-407 treats leasing or renting tangible personal property as a sale and purchase, includes lease payments in gross receipts, and exempts qualifying property bought for resale or leasing.

Waterbury Motor Lease, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner · filed 1977-12-20(2), (3), (7), and (9)

Section 15 of the act amended subsection 2 of § 12-407 by redefining the words “sale” and “selling” to include “(k) the leasing or rental of tangible personal property of any kind whatsoever, including but not limited to motor vehicles, linen or towels, machinery or apparatus, office equipment and data processing equipment.” To the extent that Motor Lease rents motor vehicles to lessees, it performs a “selling” function within the purview of this section. Section 17 of the act amended subsection 7 of § 12-407 by defining the words “purchase” and “purchasing” to include “(f) any leasing or rental of tangible personal property.” Section 19 of the act amended subsection 9 of § 12-407 by redefining the word “gross receipts” to include “the total amount of payment or periodic payments received for leasing or rental of tangible personal property for the term of any such lease or rental occurring after the effective date of this act.” ... Also, § 16 of the act amended subsection 3 of § 12-407 to exempt any purchaser (including a lessor) from the imposition of a sales tax on a transaction where the property is purchased for resale or leasing, provided that the purchaser obtains the appropriate certificate to the effect that the property is purchased for resale or lease.

Section 12-407 treats the rental of tangible personal property as a taxable sale and defines tangible personal property by its perceptibility to the senses.

Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Tax Commissioner · filed 1979-02-13(2)(k) and (13)

In examining the character of the present agreement, although called a license, it is evident that under it the plaintiffs’ object was to acquire possession of the film in its finished state in order to reproduce it for profit rather than to acquire the services performed in producing the film. ... Rather, the performances were shown on film, which is tangible personal property. The transaction was therefore a lease of tangible personal property. ... The rental or license to exhibit the motion picture “Hard Times” was a taxable “sale” under the Sales and Use Tax Act.

Section 12-407 (2)(j) taxes the leasing of tangible personal property but not the leasing of equipment operators.

Smedley Crane Service, Inc. v. Crystal · filed 1993-11-08(2)(j)

The legislature, however, chose not to use such language in § 12-407 (2) (j). In this latter provision, the legislature has simply chosen to tax the leasing of tangible personal property but not the leasing of equipment operators.

Under § 12-407(13), information conveyed on magnetic tapes is not tangible personal property when the information, rather than the tapes, is the true object of the purchase.

Nerac, Inc. v. Comm. of Revenue Serv., No. Cv 99 0493548s (Nov. 30, 2001) · filed 2001-11-30(13)

The true object of the transactions between NERAC and its vendors was not to purchase the magnetic tapes used to convey the data, but rather to purchase the information contained in the vendors' databases for resale to NERAC's clients. We therefore conclude that the information conveyed to NERAC by means of computer magnetic tapes does not constitute the purchase or lease of tangible personal property subject to the use tax.

Section 12-407 (2) (i) (E) treats certain services performed for consideration as taxable services, excluding services rendered by an employee for his employer.

Town of Berlin v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 1988-05-03(2)(i)(E)

The plaintiff contends that the services rendered were not “exclusive of such services rendered by an employee for his employer” under the provisions of that statute. This argument avails the plaintiff nothing, for it flies directly in the face of the trial court’s finding that for sales tax purposes the employer-employee relationship in this case was that between the user of off-duty police services and the police officer involved.

Section 12-407(2)(i)(C) excludes services rendered by an employee for the employer from taxable employment or personnel services.

T.W.L.S. Management Co. v. Gavin · filed 1999-05-13(2)(i)(C)

Under the facts in this case, we can only conclude that the actual operation involving the plaintiffs employees and the plaintiff was for services between an employer and its employees and, therefore, was outside the scope of § 12-407 (2) (i) (C).

Section 12-407(2)(i)(C) does not tax services performed by an employer's permanent employees, and § 12-407(8)(e) excludes management services from tax.

T.W.L.S. Mangt. v. Comm. of Rev. Serv., No. Cv 98 0492493s (May 13, 1999) · filed 1999-05-13(2)(i)(C); (8)(e)

Under the facts in this case, we can only conclude that the actual operation involving T.W.L.S.'s employees and T.W.L.S. was for services between an employer and its employees, and therefore was outside the scope of General Statutes § 12-407 (2)(i)(C). In this case, the expenses of T.W.L.S. for the management services provided by T.W.L.S. to the Owner are excluded from tax under General Statutes § 12-407 (8)(e).

Section 12-407(2)(i)(G) subjects telephone answering services to sales and use tax, but does not include one-way radio paging or beeper services.

Zachs v. Groppo · filed 1988-06-07(2)(i)(G)

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the term “telephone answering service” was not intended to encompass the paging or beeper services of the plaintiff.

Section 12-407 (2) (i) (A) taxes computer and data processing services, but incidental computer use does not by itself make a service taxable.

Hartford Parkview Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Groppo · filed 1989-05-23(2)(i)(A)

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that HRS fees were not subject to the use tax because the purpose of the taxpayer in contracting for HRS services was to purchase reservations services rather than computer and data processing services.

Section 12-407 (2)(i)(A) taxes specifically enumerated services, including computer and data processing services, but does not tax the creation of intangible computer software.

Andersen Consulting v. Gavin, Com., R. S., No. Cv 98 0492505s (Feb. 3, 2000) · filed 2000-02-03(2)(i)(A)

One of the specifically enumerated services in § 12-407 (2)(i)(A) is computer and data processing services. ... As such, these software programs, and the labor used to produce these programs, are not taxable under the sales or use tax statutes.

Section 12-407 (2)(i)(A) treats computer and data processing services, including the development, creation and production of software, as taxable sales.

Andersen Consulting, LLP v. Gavin · filed 2001-03-27(2)(i)(A)

We conclude, on the basis of our analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and the legislative history, that P.A. 00-174, § 71, was intended to clarify the meaning of § 12-407 (2), namely, that the term computer services encompasses, among other things, the development, creation and production of software.

Section 12-407 (2) (i) (E) treats private protection and patrol services as taxable based on the type of service actually rendered, regardless of who decided the service was needed.

Town of Plainfield v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 1989-12-19(2)(i)(E)

Section 12-407 (2) (i) (E) looks to the type of service actually rendered, and not to the status of the person who decides that it should be rendered.

Section 12-407(15)(C) defines being engaged in business in this state to include rendering services described in subsection (2), including services to industrial, commercial or income-producing real property.

Rainforest Cafe, Inc. v. Department of Revenue Services · filed 2009-09-08(15)(C) and (2)(i)(I)

The phrase “[e]ngaged in business in this state” is statutorily defined as “rendering in this state any service described in any of the subdivisions of subsection (2) of this section . . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 12-407 (15) (C). Subsection (2) of that statute specifically includes “services to industrial, commercial or income-producing real property,” such as those provided by PCL. General Statutes (Rev. to 1999) § 12-407 (2) (i) (I); see footnote 5 of this opinion.

Section 12-407(2)(i)(I) taxes services to industrial, commercial, or income-producing real property and does not exempt services to machinery used to generate electricity for public consumption.

United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo · filed 1992-01-07(2)(i)(I)

While the generation of electricity may in some sense be a “manufacturing” process, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to exempt businesses engaged in the generation of electricity for public consumption from the tax on services rendered to machinery and production equipment under § 12-407 (2) (i) (I).

Section 12-407 (2) (i) (J) includes the actual operation of a business or other concern within “management services” subject to the sales tax.

Airkaman, Inc. v. Groppo · filed 1992-04-28(2)(i)(J)

Because actual operation of something is a commonly approved meaning of the word “management,” the words “management services” in § 12-407 (2) (i) (J) logically comprehend such an activity. ... Accordingly, we conclude that the term “management services” includes the actual operation of a business or other concern.

Sections 12-407(8) and (9) distinguish taxable janitorial and maintenance services from management services whose separately stated employee benefits may be excluded from taxation.

Bayer Corporation v. Commissioner of Rev., No. Cv97-0569016 (Jul. 7, 1998) · filed 1998-07-07(8) and (9)

Sections 12-407 (8) and (9) define two types of sales: 1) taxable services performed without deduction for the payment of employee benefits; and 2) those taxable services that can exclude payments for employee benefits. ... Accordingly, we find that the services provided by Sanitary to Bayer were janitorial services, not managerial services.

The management service exemption excludes an employee's payroll expenses from taxable gross receipts only when the employee works solely for one service recipient and is located at that recipient's property.

Renaissance Management Company, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services. · filed 2002-09-30(8)(f) and (9)(f)

A management service retailer, such as Renaissance, may exempt payroll expenses of an employee from its taxable gross receipts only when the employee works solely for one service recipient, in this case, one of the eight housing projects, and the employee is located only at that single business property.

Section 12-407(8)(f) and (9)(f) exclude a management service retailer's separately stated employee payroll expenses from taxable gross receipts only when the employee works solely for one service recipient at that recipient's property.

Renaissance Mgmt. v. Commr. of Revenue Serv. · filed 2002-09-30(8)(f) and (9)(f)

We agree with the commissioner's understanding of this exemption. A management service retailer, such as Renaissance, may exempt payroll expenses of an employee from its taxable gross receipts only when the employee works solely for one service recipient, in this case, one of the eight housing projects, and the employee is located only at that single business property.

Section 12-407 (a) (37) (I) includes management services provided to income-producing real property among taxable services.

Message Center Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 2006-08-29(a)(37)(I)

The plaintiffs activities cannot be classified as “management services” as provided in § 12-407 (a) (37) (I) because the plaintiff does not provide management services to the property owner.

Section 12-407(a)(37)(I) does not classify developing wireless communication sites at the developer’s own expense and risk as taxable real property management services.

Message Center Management, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 2007-06-19(a)(37)(I)

Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs business activities were not taxable management services within the meaning of § 12-407 (a) (37) (I), and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. ... Because that memorandum of decision fully addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal, we adopt the trial court’s well reasoned decision as a statement of the facts and the applicable law on that issue.

Section 12-407 (a) (37) (J) (iii) excludes business management services rendered in connection with qualifying aircraft from taxable services.

Key Air, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 2009-12-01(a)(37)(J)(iii)

Therefore, on the basis of the dictionary definition of “connection” and the persuasive value of the broad construction given to the phrase “in connection with” by this court and others in tax statute cases, we conclude that the “in connection with” language in § 12-407 (a) (37) (J) (iii) prescribes a factual, contextual or causal relationship.

The hazardous waste removal services exemption excludes tangible personal property purchased and consumed by asbestos removal contractors.

Petco Insulation Co. v. Crystal · filed 1994-11-15(2)(i)(I)

Because we conclude that tangible personal property purchased and consumed by asbestos removal contractors is not services within the meaning of § 12-407 (2) (i) (I), we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Section 12-407(2)(i)(I) exempts services rendered in the removal of hazardous waste from sales and use tax.

Oxford Tire Supply v. Commissioner of Rev. Ser. · filed 1998-12-16(2)(i)(I)

The clear meaning of the statute is to cover services rendered in the removal of hazardous waste.

The exemption excludes sales tax on services for the voluntary containing or removing of hazardous waste, including radioactive waste under its ordinary meaning.

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power v. Commissioner · filed 2000-04-27(2)(i)(I)

The court concludes that the term "hazardous waste" in § 12-407 (2)(i)(I) as in effect during the audit period should be given its ordinary, commonly understood meaning. Therefore, the exemption in § 12-407 (2)(i)(I) includes radwaste.

The exemption covers voluntary removal of hazardous waste and other contaminants of air, water or soil, but scrap tires themselves do not qualify as either.

Oxford Tire Supply, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services · filed 2000-07-18(2)(i)(I)

We conclude that: (1) P.A. 99-225, § 30, is retroactive and, consequently, scrap tires do not constitute hazardous waste for purposes of § 12-407 (2) (i) (I); and (2) scrap tires are not “contaminants of air, water or soil” within the meaning of § 12-407 (2) (i) (I).