Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105

Section 6-1-105(1)(e) covers a repairer who knowingly makes a false promise to provide a cost estimate before repairing an appliance, then repairs it without authorization.

People Ex Rel. Moore v. Burgess TV Service · filed 1975-04-01(1)(e)

If one knowingly and falsely represents that he will make such an examination and cost estimate prior to repairing an appliance as an inducement for the owner to use his services, rather than one of his competitors, and then does not comply, but repairs the product without authorization, such conduct is actionable as a deceptive trade practice under § 6-1-105(1) (e), C.R.S.1973, (1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 55-5-2(1)(f)) of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.

Section 6-1-105(1)(e) covers false representations about a distributorship because a distributorship is property.

Rocky Mountain Rhino Lining, Inc. v. Rhino Linings USA, Inc. · filed 2002-01-14(1)(e)

Hence, because a distributorship is a franchise over which a dealer exercises a right of possession, use, and enjoyment, we conclude that a distributorship is "property" as referenced in the CCPA.

A claim under § 6-1-105 alleging deceptive conduct fails when the plaintiff did not rely on the alleged conduct and the defendants made no misrepresentation.

Pauley v. Bank One Colorado Corp. · filed 1997-02-14

Similarly, the alleged violations of Colo.Rev.Stat. § 6-1-105 are defective in that there was no element of reliance by the Pauleys upon the alleged misdeeds of the Defendants. Nor do I find there were any misrepresentations by Defendants concerning the CPI.

Section 6-1-105 covers false warranty representations made in the course of business when they significantly affect consumers and cause injury.

PopSockets LLC v. Y.E.F. Trading Inc · filed 2020-11-04

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action asserts a claim for deceptive trade practices under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”), C.R.S. § 6–1–105. ... Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants engaged in a deceptive trade practice in the course of their business by falsely representing to consumers that the products Defendants sold came with a warranty. ... Plaintiff has, therefore, established that it is entitled to default judgment on this claim.

Section 6-1-105(1)(b) and (c) covers false representations about the source of services or their affiliation with another; allegations that a company incorporated another’s mark can plausibly state a deceptive trade practice.

HealthONE of Denver, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Group Inc. · filed 2011-03-28(1)(b)-(c)

After reviewing Plaintiffs’ Complaint as a whole, I find that it contains allegations sufficient to plausibly support an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the CCPA. The Complaint alleges that United wholly appropriated Plaintiffs’ HEALTHONE marks in their entirety, thus constituting a “false representation as to the source, sponsorship, or approval of United’s health insurance and managed health care services and/or products as to the affiliation, connection or association” with Plaintiffs’ marks.

Section 6-1-105(1)(e) permits a deceptive trade practices claim based on alleged false representations to the USPTO and FDA about a drug’s patents.

In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litig. · filed 2018-11-08(1)(e)

And, I am persuaded by the reasoning in In re DDAVP and find that EPPs' allegations state a claim under § 6-1-105(1)(e) of the CCPA.

A plaintiff cannot establish deception under subsection (1)(e) based on representations the plaintiff did not know about.

Cagwin v. Centralized Showing Service, Inc · filed 2022-03-30(1)(e)

Put differently, one cannot be actually or potentially deceived by representations of which they are not aware.

Section 6-1-105(1)(e) does not require a reasonable consumer standard to determine whether a representation is deceptive.

Colorado v. Center for Excellence · filed 2025-12-24(1)(e)

Contrary to CollegeAmerica’s assertion, the reasonable consumer standard has not been adopted by either Colorado’s legislature or Colorado’s courts.

Section 6-1-105(1)(e) treats a knowing false representation about goods’ characteristics or approval status as a deceptive trade practice.

Meijer, Inc. v. Ferring B.V. · filed 2012-10-17(1)(e)

Under the CCPA, “[a] person engages in a deceptive trade practice when ... such person ... [kjnowingly makes a false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, alterations, or quantities of goods ... or a false representation as to the ... approval [or] status ... therewith.” Colo. Rev.Stat. § 6-1-105(1)(e).

Section 6-1-105(1)(e) covers knowing or reckless false representations of affiliation that induce action or have the tendency to attract customers.

Epic Mountain Sports LLC v. Vail Corporation, The · filed 2020-07-16(1)(e)

In other words, Epic Mountain Sports must plead that Defendants knowingly or recklessly made some false representation as to an affiliation with Epic Mountain Sports that either did in fact or had the tendency to induce business from or attract customers.

Section 6-1-105 covers false or misleading statements in the advertisement or sale of real property.

People Ex Rel. MacFarlane v. Alpert Corp. · filed 1982-10-28(1)(e), (1)(g), (1)(i), (7)

Although less than precise in its articulation, we conclude that the General Assembly has determined that false or misleading statements in the advertisement or sale of real property are subject to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act.

Section 6-1-105 does not make a health club’s refusal to rescind an already terminated membership or refund its payments an additional deceptive trade practice.

Robinson v. Lynmar Racquet Club, Inc. · filed 1993-03-11(1)(t)

Because of our conclusion, we also disagree with Robinson’s assertion that Lynmar’s refusal to grant rescission and to refund her payments were additional deceptive trade practices pursuant to § 6-1-105, C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) for which Lynmar was liable to Robinson.

Section 6-1-105 applies to attorneys who misrepresent the quality of their services when they know or should know otherwise, or advertise services they do not intend to provide as advertised.

Crowe v. Tull · filed 2006-01-09(1)(g), (1)(i)

Sections 6 — 1—105(1)(g) and (i) are applicable here. Section 6-l-105(l)(g) creates liability when an advertiser represents that services are of a particular quality when the advertiser “knows or should know” they are of another quality. Section 6 — 1—105(l)(i) creates liability for advertising services with intent not to provide them as advertised.

Section 6-1-105 does not treat a hospital’s failure to disclose that it is following legally required billing practices as a deceptive or unfair trade practice.

Wainscott v. Centura Health Corp. · filed 2014-08-14

Centura's failure to advise the Wainseotts that it was obeying the law did not constitute a deceptive or unfair trade practice.

Section 6-1-105’s list of prohibited practices is not exhaustive; requiring vehicle owners to sign a release falsely stating they inspected their cars can be an unfair or deceptive trade practice.

Shekarchian v. Maxx Auto · filed 2019-04-26

We are not persuaded by Maxx Auto’s argument that because its conduct in forcing customers to sign the release is not expressly included in the statutory list of prohibited practices, the conduct cannot qualify as an unfair or deceptive trade practice. As Maxx Auto concedes, the statutory list is not exhaustive.

Section 6-1-105 does not apply to an alleged deceptive practice without a sufficient connection to Colorado; a customer's stay at a Colorado hotel alone does not establish that connection.

Thomas v. Kimpton Hotel & Restaurant Group, LLC · filed 2020-06-30(1)

Under Colorado law, "a statute cannot be presumed to have any extraterritorial effect." See Peerless Ins. Co. v. Clark, 29 Colo. App. 436, 439-41 (1971). Plaintiffs cite to no exception to this rule. Nor do plaintiffs allege that Thomas was in Colorado when he made a reservation, that either Kimpton or Sabre is a resident of Colorado or engaged in any act in Colorado that induced Thomas to make a reservation, or that Sabre's reservation system is located in Colorado. Although plaintiffs rely on their allegation that one of the Kimpton hotels at which Thomas stayed is located in Colorado (see TAC ¶ 11.iv.), plaintiffs fail to allege any facts from which it reasonably can be inferred that a causal or any other legally cognizable relationship exists between the location of the hotel where Thomas stayed and the harm he is alleged to have incurred. Accordingly, the Fifth Claim for Relief is subject to dismissal.

Selling goods in the course of business without required governmental clearance can satisfy the deceptive trade practice and business activity elements of a Colorado Consumer Protection Act claim.

Telebrands Corp. v. VindEx Solutions LLC · filed 2022-04-08(1)(z)

For the first and second elements of a CCPA claim, Telebrands points to a provision of the CCPA enumerating that deceptive trade practices include where a person “[r]efuses or fails to obtain all governmental licenses or permits required to perform the services or to sell the goods, food, services, or property as agreed to or contracted for with a consumer.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105(1)(z). By alleging that Defendants sold TENS units within the course of their business without the requisite FDA clearance, Telebrands argues it has adequately pled the first and second elements of a CCPA claim. See Motion, ECF No. 61 at 19. Given the clear language of the CCPA provision Telebrands cites, the Court agrees.

Section 6-1-105(1)(ss) treats an intentional violation of manufactured-home installation rules as a deceptive trade practice; allegations of negligent installation alone do not suffice.

Stoecklein v. Fayette Farms · filed 2024-12-12(1)(ss)

The CCPA overlaps with the regulatory scheme for manufactured homes by making “[a]ny intentional violation of the installation provisions of this part 33” a deceptive trade practice subject to enforcement under section 6-1-105(1)(ss), C.R.S. 2024. ... The Stoeckleins’ allegations that Fayette Farms “failed” to properly install the house asserts, at most, negligent conduct.

Subsection (1)(z) does not make QDRO preparation a deceptive trade practice on the theory that it requires a law license when the preparer was already found not to be practicing law without a license.

McBride v. Johnson · filed 2025-11-13(1)(z)

Because Johnson’s claim that McBride was engaged in a deceptive trade practice was premised on his argument that McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that McBride’s activities “do not constitute a deceptive trade practice.”

Section 6-1-105 permits claims based on passing off goods and false source or affiliation representations when the complaint alleges supporting facts; a deceptive geographic-origin claim fails without factual support.

Duran v. Clover Club Foods Co. · filed 1985-08-29

Plaintiffs have alleged facts in the complaint which, when construed in their favor, are sufficient to support claims with respect to those deceptive trade practices stated in Colo.Rev.Stat. § 6-l-105(l)(a), (b), and (e). Thus, dismissal of these claims would be improper under Rule 12(b)(6). However, plaintiffs themselves admit in their brief that the allegation of deceptive trade practice under Colo.Rev.Stat. § 6-1-105(l)(d) cannot be supported by the facts. Accordingly, this particular claim is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 6-1-105(3) preserves unfair trade practice claims under other laws, but a CCPA claim must allege a deceptive practice enumerated in subsection (1).

Coors v. Security Life of Denver Insurance Co. · filed 2004-05-24(3)

The plain language of the statute expresses that, although an action brought under the CCPA must be for a deceptive trade practice expressly enumerated in § 6-1-105(1), conduct not expressly enumerated in § 6-1-105(1) may be actionable as an unfair trade practice under a different legal theory or statute, including an action brought by the insurance commissioner under the UCDPA.

Section 6-1-105 covers representations a seller knows or should know are false and failures to disclose material information known at the time of sale to induce a transaction.

Anderson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2005-07-20(1)(e), (1)(g), (1)(u)

Because State Farm’s prior explanations of UM/UIM coverage reflected a reasonable interpretation of the existing case law, it did not either make any representations which it knew or should have known to be false or act with reckless disregard. Furthermore, State Farm cannot be said to have failed to disclose a fact that was not known at the time. Anderson has therefore failed to state a claim for violations of the CCPA because, accepting all facts alleged as true, State Farm did not engage in a deceptive trade practice.

Section 6-1-105 requires the challenged practice to occur in the course of the defendant’s business, vocation, or occupation; a one-time sale outside that activity does not meet the requirement.

Cleary Building Corp. v. David A. Dame, Inc. · filed 2009-12-01

Defendant here is selling ONE used post frame building. It is not his business, vocation, or occupation to sell post frame buildings. As such, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the second element is present because Defendant’s actions did not occur in the course of defendant’s business, vocation, or occupation.

A claim based on omitted material information under § 6-1-105(1)(u) requires significant public impact; a general informational posting alone does not establish it.

Colorado Coffee Bean, LLC v. Peaberry Coffee Inc. · filed 2010-04-01(1)(u)

To hold that every such informational posting satisfies the public impact requirement, if it fails to include all "material information concerning goods, services, or property," § 6-1-105(1)(u), C.R.S.2009, would significantly expand the CCPA.

A claim under § 6-1-105 based on a false “patent pending” label must plead specific facts showing that the seller knew the label was false.

Two Moms & a Toy, LLC v. International Playthings, LLC · filed 2012-09-30

To assert a claim under the CCPA, Two Moms must meet the heightened Rule 9(b) pleading standard. ... As the Court discussed above, these facts are insufficient to show that IPT sanctioned the use of the “patent pending” label on the Yookidoo toys with the knowledge that the label was false.

A plaintiff claiming deceptive trade practices under § 6-1-105 must present evidence of injury caused by the challenged conduct to survive summary judgment.

Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler · filed 2003-08-06

As for injury—a further required element under the Lanham Act as well as the CCPA—ISR fails on two counts: it does not develop its argument and it advances no evidence whatsoever of loss of business or loss of profits.

Section 6-1-105(1)(a) uses “passing off” in its ordinary sense, so a jury instruction need not define the phrase further.

Heller v. Lexton-Ancira Real Estate Fund, Ltd., 1972 · filed 1991-05-06(1)(a)

We hold that the phrase “passing off” as used in the Act is sufficiently plain in its meaning as to need no sophisticated definition.

Section 6-1-105(1)(z) requires a comparative advertising reference price to be a bona fide price at which the seller intends to sell a significant number of products.

State Ex Rel. Woodard v. May Department Stores Co. · filed 1993-04-12(1)(z)

In order to avoid violating the CCPA, May D & F must set the initial (PMU) reference price as a bona fide price at which it intends to sell a significant number of products.

Section 6-1-105(1)(h) requires evidence that the challenged statement refers to another’s goods and falsely or misleadingly represents fact to support a disparagement claim.

Nutting v. RAM Southwest, Inc. · filed 2000-07-10(1)(h)

Defendants fail to present any competent evidence that Mr. Nutting was referring to their fangs. ... Defendants also fail to show any evidence that the statement “these copies of our fang attachment do not contain such specially formulated thermoplastic, customers who buy these copies will be subjected to the possibility of partial plates that are hard to make, and fangs that easily fall out,” Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, is a false or misleading representation of fact. For these reasons, I grant Mr. Nutting’s motion for summary judgment on Defendants’ counterclaim for deceptive trade practices.

Section 6-1-105(1) supplies the deceptive trade practice element of a private consumer protection claim; allegedly misleading product marketing can support that claim when it significantly affects consumers.

Loughridge v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. · filed 2002-03-13(1)

To establish a private claim under the CCPA, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice as set forth in Colo.Rev.Stat. § 6-1-105(1); (2) the challenged practice occurred in the course of the defendant’s business, vocation, or occupation; (3) the challenged practice significantly impacts the public as actual or potential consumers of the defendant’s goods, services, or property; (4) the plaintiff suffered injury in fact to a legally protected interest; and (5) the challenged practice caused the plaintiffs injury. ... Further, Goodyear branded the Entran II to imply certain characteristics that it allegedly knew were untrue. ... The evidence indicates that the alleged fraud impacted a large number of Colorado consumers and has significant potential to do so in the future. I therefore decline to grant summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ CCPA claims.

Section 6-1-105(1)(l) concerns false or misleading statements about prices or price reductions; a claim under that subsection requires allegations about pricing.

In re Heartland Payment Systems, Inc. · filed 2011-12-01(1)(l)

The complaint alleges that Heartland violated the subsection of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. that prohibits, as a deceptive trade practice, “false or misleading statements of fact concerning the price of goods, services, or property or the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions.” ... The complaint, however, refers only to subsection (1 )(l). This claim is dismissed, without prejudice and with leave to amend.

Section 6-1-105 covers misleading statements about prices; advertising “plus 10%” savings can plausibly be deceptive when the seller adds 10% at checkout.

Martinez v. Nash Finch Co. · filed 2012-08-13(1)(i)

Finding that the Plaintiffs’ understanding of the language “great way to save — plus 10%” is plausible satisfies Iqbal and is sufficient to create a legal and factual issue as to whether such language is deceptive.

Defamatory statements about a competitor are not, by themselves, a deceptive trade practice under § 6-1-105.

Electrology Laboratory, Inc. v. Kunze · filed 2016-03-14(1)

In this case, Mr. Kunze’s action in making defamatory statements about ELI is not a deceptive trade practice.

Disclosing a price does not automatically defeat a claim that the price is deceptive.

State Ex Rel. Coffman v. Castle Law Group, LLC · filed 2016-07-05(1)(l)

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, for purposes of a deceptive trade practices claim under the CCPA, disclosure of a price charged does not automatically insulate a party from claims that the price is deceptive.

Section 6-1-105(e) does not make vague marketing puffery actionable as a deceptive trade practice.

Renfro v. Champion Petfoods USA, Inc. · filed 2020-07-31(e)

At least two of the statements relied on by Plaintiffs—“Trusted Everywhere” and “Ingredients We Love [From] People We Trust”—are puffery and thus not actionable misrepresentations.

Section 6-1-105(e) does not make vague, unprovable advertising claims actionable as false representations of fact.

Renfro v. Champion Petfoods USA · filed 2022-02-15(e)

We agree that testing for falsifiability is helpful in determining whether a claim is actionable as a misrepresentation of fact or mere puffery. ... Consequently, we conclude these claims are protected puffery.

A deceptive trade practices claim cannot rest on statements the court finds to be true.

Otter Products, LLC v. Triplenet Pricing Inc. · filed 2021-11-10

The Court has already found that the allegedly false statements identified by Triplenet in its paragraph 392 are true, they therefore cannot form the basis of Triplenet’s CCPA claim.

Section 6-1-105(1)(h) treats a false or misleading factual representation that disparages another’s business as a deceptive trade practice.

Double Diamond Distribution, Ltd. v. Crocs, Inc. · filed 2024-03-11(1)(h)

For the reasons discussed previously, the Court finds that the complaint plausibly alleges that the press release disparaged Double Diamond’s business by making a false or misleading representation of fact related to the judgment in the 2006 Action.

Section 6-1-105(h) treats false or misleading factual disparagement of another’s business as a deceptive trade practice.

Allstate Insurance Company v. Cruz · filed 2025-08-13(h)

Regarding the first element, the Court agrees that PIP engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice. The CCPA provides that “[d]isparag[ing] the goods, services, property, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact” qualifies as a deceptive trade practice. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105(h).

A claim for deceptive trade practices based on disparagement requires proof of injury to the plaintiff’s reputation or business.

Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc. · filed 2004-04-02(1)(g)

Although NIPP has arguably met the first three factors in proving a claim, NIPP has utterly failed to show any injury to NIPP’s reputation or business. ... Accordingly, Clear Channel’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to NIPP’s claim for violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act.

Section 6-1-105 cannot bar credit card late fees that a national bank may charge under the National Bank Act.

Copeland v. MBNA America, N.A. · filed 1994-10-24

In his complaint, plaintiff contends that the late fees violate ... § 6-1-105, C.R.S. (1992 Repl. Vol. 2) of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act and that they have unjustly enriched defendant. ... Therefore, any Colorado law prohibiting such a charge stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the Bank Act. Thus, as a matter of law, plaintiffs claims are preempted and the complaint was properly dismissed.

Section 6-1-105(1)(q) prohibits promoting a pyramid promotional scheme, and a claim that a bank did so must specify how it promoted the scheme or induced investors.

Brooks v. Bank of Boulder · filed 1995-07-01(1)(q)

The Colorado Consumer Protection Act prohibits the contriving, preparation, setting up, operation, publication by means of advertising, or promotion of any pyramid promotional scheme. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 6-1-105(l)(q) (1992). ... Plaintiffs, however, have not alleged how the Bank promoted a Ponzi scheme, induced investors to participate in it or that they had any direct communication with potential investors. Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to provide the requisite particularity for this claim. Therefore, I dismiss the fourteenth claim.

Section 6-1-105(u) requires a failure to disclose material information to be intended to induce a consumer to enter a transaction.

In Re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export Antitrust Litigation · filed 2004-12-08(u)

The plaintiffs also have not alleged that the withholding of information about the conspiracy "was intended to induce the consumer to enter into a transaction,” another requirement of subsection (u).

Section 6-1-105(u) requires an omission of material information to be intended to induce a consumer to enter a transaction.

Campfield v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2008-07-15(u)

But because there is no evidence that defendants believed long cracks to be repairable, the Lynx representatives’ failure to inform insureds that they may opt for repair rather than replacement could not have been intended to “induce the consumer to enter into a transaction.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105(u).

Section 6-1-105(1)(u) requires a plaintiff alleging failure to disclose information to establish that the information was material.

Valley Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Western Skyways, Inc. · filed 2019-09-25(1)(u)

Because plaintiffs have failed to establish materiality, Western is entitled to summary judgment on their failure-to-disclose claim under the CCPA.

Section 6-1-105(1)(u) requires evidence that the seller omitted material information to induce a consumer to enter a transaction.

Platt v. Winnebago Industries · filed 2020-06-03(1)(u)

There is no evidence Winnebago failed to disclose material information to the Platts in order to induce them to purchase the RV. ... Accordingly, their claim under § 6-1-105(1)(u) must fail.

Section 6-1-105(1)(u) treats a seller’s failure to disclose known, material product information to induce a purchase as a deceptive trade practice.

Faulhaber v. Petzl America, Inc · filed 2023-02-14(1)(u)

A plaintiff may also meet the CCPA’s “unfair or deceptive practice” element by showing that the defendant made a material omission about the product. See C.R.S. § 6–1–105(1)(u). ... For these reasons, Mr. Faulhaber has pleaded sufficient factual content to demonstrate that Petzl omitted material information regarding the Shunt’s use for top rope soloing that constitutes an unfair or deceptive trade practice under the CCPA, and therefore dismissal of his CCPA claim based on a theory of material omissions is inappropriate.

Section 6-1-105(1) covers deceptive advertising and intentional failure to disclose known material information to induce a sale; allegations about how dairy cows were raised and fed can state a claim.

In Re Aurora Dairy Corp. Organic Milk Marketing · filed 2010-09-15(1)(i), (1)(u)

For example, the class plaintiffs allege Aurora engaged in various deceptive trade practices in violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-105(1). ... The class plaintiffs allege Aurora engaged in deceptive advertising practices by, among other things, “misrepresenting the manner in which its dairy cows were raised and fed,” and “suppressing or omitting material facts regarding the production of its ‘organic’ milk or milk products, specifically that . . . the dairy cows were not raised at pasture.” This claim sufficiently states a cause of action at this stage of the proceedings.

Section 6-1-105 does not support a deceptive trade practices claim based on an alleged omission when the supposedly concealed fact follows from information already disclosed.

Pitts v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. · filed 2021-02-10

Where the allegedly concealed fact is an obvious result of information that was disclosed—like the loss of engine power leading to the loss of power brakes and steering—there is no cause of action based on the omission.