Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5

Section 13-21-111.5 does not apply to actions commenced before its July 1, 1986 effective date.

Alling v. American Tool and Grinding Co., Inc. · filed 1986-11-26

The recent enactment of Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111.5 (Cum.Supp.1986) would require such a result because the statute effectively abolishes joint and several liability. ... The instant case, however, was commenced long before the effective date of July 1, 1986. It is therefore not applicable.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) does not apply to amended claims that relate back to an action filed before July 1, 1986; an intervening subrogee may also benefit from relation back.

Halliburton v. Public Service Co. · filed 1990-06-28(3)(b)

However, it argues that defendant should have been allowed to apply the designation of non-party provision of § 13-21-111.5(3)(b), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A) to the new claims. We disagree. ... Here, the lawsuit was filed before July 1, 1986, and thus, the amended pleadings relate back to the filing date. ... Glen Falls Insurance Co., however, is interested in the litigation only as subrogee of the policy owners’ claims which were already presented, and it was, therefore, entitled to the benefits of the relation-back doctrine.

Section 13-21-111.5(1) does not abolish joint and several liability for accidents that occurred before its adoption.

Unigard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Mission Insurance Co. · filed 1994-11-10(1)

Because the accident here occurred before the adoption of § 13-21-111.5(1), see Colo.Sess.Laws 1986, ch. 108 at 680, both McKinley and Western were jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff.

Section 13-21-111.5 applies to strict product liability cases.

O'QUINN v. Wedco Technology, Inc. · filed 1990-10-01

For several reasons, I conclude that § 13-21-111.5 should apply to strict product liability cases.

Section 13-21-111.5(1) applies pro rata liability to product liability claims for property damage, including claims based on non-tort theories.

Loughridge v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. · filed 2002-03-25(1)

The word “action” indicates that the statute is applicable to non-tort claims. ... Therefore, the General Assembly clearly intended that the statute apply to product liability actions.

Section 13-21-111.5(1) limits each defendant’s liability for actual damages to its percentage of fault.

Perez v. Sunbeam Products, Inc · filed 2025-05-29(1)

Newell is liable for 63% of Ms. Perez’s actual damages, namely, $2,205,000 in non-economic damages and $1,260,000 for physical impairment and disfigurement.

Section 13-21-111.5(3) does not permit allocation of fault to nonparties for breach of contract claims.

Acquest Holdings FC, LLC v. Johnson Controls, Inc. · filed 2024-08-13(3)

Following the line of cases above, the Court has already determined that subsection (3)’s reference to “negligence or fault” has the same meaning as “tortious acts,” which do not include breach of contract claims.

Section 13-21-111.5 does not permit apportioning fault on a federal § 1983 claim.

Estate of Charles Anthony Hurtado v. Smith · filed 2022-07-05

Because comparative fault is not available for Plaintiff’s federal claim—the lone remaining claim in this action—the court concludes that Defendant’s Designation of Nonparties at Fault [Doc. 54] is of no operative legal effect.

Section 13-21-111.5 apportions damages according to fault; it does not create a defense to liability or apply to Title VII claims.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Chris the Crazy Trader, Inc. · filed 2025-03-31

Because § 13-21-111.5 neither creates a legal defense nor applies to EEOC’s claims, the Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is respectfully GRANTED as to CDR’s fourteenth affirmative defense.

Section 13-21-111.5(1) does not provide for comparative fault or nonparty liability on claims under the ADA, FHAA, and Rehabilitation Act.

Roe v. Housing Authority of City of Boulder · filed 1995-12-26(1)

Citing § 13-21-111.5(1), C.R.S., the Colorado state comparative fault statute, BHA seeks to be held liable only for any damages it caused Roe, not damages caused by Roe himself or these designated non-parties. However, BHA cites no authority for the application of Colorado’s comparative fault statute to the federal question claims in this action. Indeed, the ADA, the FHAA, and the Rehab Act do not provide for comparative fault. Consequently, I will grant Roe’s motion to strike BHA’s designation of non-parties.

Section 13-21-111.5 does not govern UM/UIM coverage limits or offsets under § 10-4-609(5).

Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Star · filed 1997-08-21

Thus, § 13-21-111.5 is irrelevant in applying the setoff amounts and limits of UM/UIM coverage as provided in § 10-4-609(5).

Section 13-21-111.5 applies only to tort actions and does not permit designation of a nonparty at fault on a breach of contract claim.

Core-Mark Midcontinent, Inc. v. Sonitrol Corp. · filed 2012-07-19

Consistently applying this interpretation, we read section 13-21-111.5 as also limited to tort actions.

Section 13-21-111.5(1) does not apply to probate surcharge proceedings under section 15-10-504.

In re Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A · filed 2017-08-24(1)

In this context, the plain language of section 13-21-111.5(1) demonstrates that it does not contemplate surcharge proceedings, since it applies to those actions brought “as a result of a death or an injury to person or property.”

Section 13-21-111.5(1) limits each wrongdoer’s liability to that wrongdoer’s share of fault but does not eliminate a partner’s vicarious liability for another partner’s wrongdoing.

Hughes v. Johnson · filed 1991-06-06(1)

The basis for DiCola’s motion is that section 7-60-115(1)(a) allegedly conflicts with more recent tort reform legislation embodied in Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111.5(1) (1987 Repl.Vol.). Section 13-21-111.5(1) specifies that “[i]n an action brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or property, no defendant shall be liable for an amount greater than that represented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or fault attributable to such defendant.” The perceived conflict between the two statutes is chimerical, and the motion for summary judgment is denied.

Section 13-21-111.5 requires the jury to find total damages and each defendant’s percentage of fault, and limits each defendant’s liability to the damages attributable to that fault.

Cook v. Rockwell International Corp. · filed 2008-06-02(1), (2)

The judgment to be entered under Plaintiffs’ proposal meets all of these requirements, as it is based on the jury’s special findings allocating fault between Dow and Rockwell on each claim, and ensures that neither Defendant is liable for an amount greater than that represented by the degree of fault found by the jury on one of the two claims decided.

Section 13-21-111.5(2) requires the trier of fact to apportion fault, even when incomplete records make the allocation difficult.

Bethel v. United States · filed 2012-02-01(2)

Clearly, the trier of fact is obliged to apportion fault. Here, the district court suggested there was negligence on the part of Slover and/or McDermott and Kirson. Nevertheless, because it believed the federal government was responsible for the negligence of all three of these individuals, it did not apportion fault among them. As it now stands, the federal government cannot be held liable for Slover’s negligence so fault must be apportioned.

Section 13-21-111.5(2) requires fault findings for each party and designated nonparty, but does not require separate findings for each employee of a defendant.

Bethel v. United States Ex Rel. Veterans Administrative Medical Center · filed 2013-10-31(2)

The Colorado statute requires the court to find the percentage of fault attributable to each party and any designated non-parties.

Section 13-21-111.5 limits each defendant’s liability to its own share of fault even if another defendant is dismissed.

Trantham v. Super T. Transp., Inc. · filed 2018-04-30(1)

Regardless of whether Moving Defendants are in the case, Opposing Defendants will not be liable for Moving Defendants' portion of liability, if any.

Section 13-21-111.5 limits a defendant’s liability to damages representing its percentage of causal fault, even when another potentially responsible party is dismissed.

Couture v. United Airlines, Inc. · filed 2022-11-16

Additionally, Simplicity’s Twelfth Affirmative Defense adequately protects it; to wit, pursuant to Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111.5, its liability will be limited to the amount of damages that is representative of its percentage of causal fault. Thus, regardless of CASI’s presence in this case, Simplicity will only be held liable for its own degree of fault and is therefore not adversely affected by the dismissal of CASI from this case.

Section 13-21-111.5 allows a designated nonparty’s negligence to be combined with a defendant’s negligence when comparing their fault with the plaintiff’s.

Wong v. Sharp · filed 1990-03-28

This interpretation of the statute would require that we combine the negligence attributable to defendant, Sharp with the negligence attributable to nonparty defendant, Club Med. The result would be that plaintiff would be able to recover 20% against Sharp.

Section 13-21-111.5 accounts for a settling nonparty’s share of fault through pro rata allocation, so a settlement smaller than that share does not require a further reduction of the judgment.

Herrera v. Gene's Towing · filed 1992-02-27

We reject defendant’s alternative motion to alter or amend the judgment. The settlement plaintiff received from the non-party has been subsumed into the percentage of causation assessed against the non-party and is in an amount substantially less than the percentage of total damages chargeable to her. See § 13-21-111.5, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Section 13-21-111.5 limits a tortfeasor’s liability to its percentage of fault when courts account for settlements by non-parties at fault.

Smith v. Zufelt · filed 1993-07-26

Therefore, when determining whether defendants are entitled to set off settlement monies from non-parties at fault as a collateral source, we must reconcile these statutes to effectuate the General Assembly’s intent to limit a tortfeasor’s liability to his percentage of fault, §§ 13-21-111.5, C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.) and 13-50.5-105, and to prevent injured parties from receiving a double recovery.

Section 13-21-111.5 requires liability to be apportioned by fault before the noneconomic damages cap is applied to each award.

Niemet v. General Electric Co. · filed 1993-01-04(2)

Accordingly, we perceive no error in the trial court’s determination that liability should be apportioned pursuant to § 13-21-111.5, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A) before damages for each award are capped pursuant to § 13-21-102.5, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Section 13-21-111.5(2) requires a single award for an indivisible injury, apportioned among tortfeasors, unless the evidence supports separate injuries caused by each defendant.

DeBose Ex Rel. DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ · filed 1995-01-24(2)

Upon retrial, any verdict assessing the minor's actual damages should be limited to a single amount, apportioned under § 13-21-111.5(2), unless the evidence would allow a determination that the minor suffered a separate injury from the actions of each of the two defendants.

Section 13-21-111.5 reduces a verdict by the percentage of fault attributed to settling defendants, regardless of the amounts they paid in settlement. If no fault is attributed to them, the verdict is not reduced.

Sprung v. Adcock · filed 1995-08-10

The amount to be deducted, if any, from the trial verdict should be calculated by multiplying the total percentage of liability attributed to the settling defendants by the total trial verdict awarded the plaintiff. Therefore, in those instances in which the settling defendants are not determined to be at fault, the plaintiffs trial award should not be reduced.

Section 13-21-111.5 limits a defendant’s liability on an independent state Medicaid reimbursement claim to the defendant’s percentage of fault.

Tucker Ex Rel. Edwards v. Gorman · filed 1997-10-20(1)

While the CMAA prohibits the percentage of the recipient’s negligence from being used to defeat the state’s claim under § 13-21-111(1), it does not prevent application of § 13-21-111.5; therefore, defendant is liable for only 30% of the state’s expenditures.

Section 13-21-111.5 limits pro rata liability to actions brought as a result of death or injury to person or property.

Broderick v. McElroy and McCoy, Inc. · filed 1998-01-08(1)

We reject this assertion, however, because § 13-21-111.5(1), C.R.S.1997, limits the scope of § 13-21-111.5, C.R.S.1997, concerning pro rata liability of defendants to those actions "brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or property." We conclude that, under this state of the record, § 13-21-111.5(2) is not applicable, and thus, the trial court's imposition of joint and several liability will not be disturbed.

Section 13-21-111.5(1) apportions liability between a negligent defendant and an intentional tortfeasor when the defendant failed to use reasonable care to prevent the foreseeable intentional harm.

Harvey v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 1999-09-13(1)

We therefore hold that § 13-21-111.5(1) is intended to apportion fault, and therefore liability for damages, between defendants, or between defendants and designated non-parties at fault, where one or more of such persons or entities are negligent by failing to use reasonable care to prevent the foreseeable harm resulting from the intentional tort of one or more of the others.

Section 13-21-111.5(1) requires apportionment of liability among tortfeasors who contribute to an indivisible injury, even when one acts intentionally.

Slack v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 2000-06-19(1)

Accordingly, we conclude that section 13-21-111.5(1) applies even when one of several tortfeasors commits an intentional tort that contributes to an indivisible injury.

Section 13-21-111.5(2) does not require a plaintiff’s fault to be considered when defendants are alleged to have committed intentional torts.

Toothman v. Freeborn & Peters · filed 2002-11-21(2)

However, nothing in the statute persuades us that the General Assembly intended a plaintiffs fault or degree of culpability to be considered when the defendants are alleged to have committed intentional torts.

Section 13-21-111.5(2) requires a special verdict determining each party’s percentage of fault in tort cases involving multiple defendants.

Morales v. Golston · filed 2005-12-15(2)

Second, Colorado requires the use of a special verdict in tort cases involving multiple defendants.

Section 13-21-111.5(5) permits attorneys to argue how the court's fault instruction applies to the facts without informing the jury of the legal effect of allocating fault among defendants.

Blood v. Qwest Services Corp. · filed 2009-05-28(5)

Although Qwest asserts that Blood and Xcel impermissibly "informed [the jury] as to the effect of its finding" Qwest 100% at fault, we conclude that Blood and Xcel merely "argue[d] the effect of the [trial court's] instruction on the facts" of the case.

Section 13-21-111.5 limits a defendant’s liability according to its share of fault, including in premises liability actions.

Union Pacific Railroad v. Martin · filed 2009-06-08

Rather than prescribing additional or different duties of care or altering the grounds for recovery in any way, the statutory provisions for comparative negligence and pro rata liability dictate only that the recovery of damages resulting from injury or death be limited on the basis of relative fault. Despite its silence concerning the defenses of comparative negligence and pro rata liability, it is therefore apparent, without resort to extrinsic aids to statutory interpretation like legislative history, that section 115 functions harmoniously with see-tions 111 and 111.5 to govern different aspects of a single statutory scheme.

Section 13-21-111.5(1) limits a defendant’s liability to its own degree of fault, even when noneconomic damages exceed the statutory cap.

Hoffman v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2010-03-04(1)

The pro rata liability statute, on the other hand, has no such inherent flexibility. That statute plainly and unequivocally does not allow the court to apportion to a defendant more than its own degree of fault.

Section 13-21-111.5 allows a defendant to reduce its share of liability by attributing fault to a nonparty, but a defendant in default cannot raise that defense at a damages hearing.

Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp · filed 2015-12-17(1)

Similarly, pro rata liability permits a defendant to designate nonparties as “wholly or partially at fault” to lessen the degree of fault attributable to the defendant and to ensure that damages are apportioned accordingly. See § 13-21-111.5(1), C.R.S. 2015; Union Pac. R.R. , 209 P.3d at 189. ... They are not, therefore, available to defaulted defendants at the damages hearing.

Section 13-21-111.5(1)’s pro rata liability defense is unavailable to a defaulted defendant at a damages hearing because it concerns liability.

Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corporation · filed 2015-11-19(1)

For these reasons, we conclude that the doctrines of comparative negligence and pro rata liability, even though they may affect an assessment of damages, are primarily substantive defenses that go to the plaintiff’s right of recovery and the defendant’s liability. They are not, therefore, available to defaulted defendants at the damages hearing.

A defendant in default cannot raise pro rata liability at a damages hearing because it is a defense concerning liability.

Dickinson v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc · filed 2015-11-19(1)

For these reasons, we conclude that the doctrines of comparative negligence and pro rata liability, even though they may affect an assessment of damages, are primarily substantive defenses that go to the plaintiff’s right of recovery and the defendant’s liability. They are not, therefore, available to defaulted defendants at the damages hearing.

Section 13-21-111.5 limits a defendant’s liability to the percentage of its own fault and requires jurors to apportion fault among responsible parties and designated nonparties.

Landsberg v. Hutsell · filed 1992-11-16

After Greenemeier was announced, the General Assembly amended § 13-50.5-105(l)(a) (1987 RepLVol. 6A) and adopted § 13-21-111.5, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A) so as to limit a defendant’s liability to the degree or percentage of his own negligence or fault in causing a plaintiff’s injury. ... Under those amended statutes, jurors are now required to apportion fault among joint tortfeasors, whether named as parties defendant or as designated non-parties, whose fault or negligence contributed to a plaintiff’s injuries.

A nonparty designated under § 13-21-111.5(3)(b) is included with defendants when their combined fault is compared with the plaintiff’s fault to determine whether the plaintiff may recover.

Painter v. Inland/Riggle Oil Co. · filed 1996-02-26(3)(b)

Therefore, when comparing a plaintiffs negligence with those persons against whom recovery is sought in order to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a portion of his damages, we conclude that the General Assembly intended for designated nonparties under § 13-21-111.5(3)(b) to be included within the group described as “person[s] against whom recovery is sought.”

Section 13-21-111.5 permits fault to be assigned to an immune nonparty, leaving the plaintiff to bear that nonparty’s share of the loss.

In Re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport · filed 1989-01-05

The statutory effect of shifting the loss caused by an immune tortfeasor to the plaintiff is rationally related to the legitimate government interest in requiring defendants to pay no more than their judicially determined share of the loss.

Section 13-21-111.5 does not permit designation of a nonparty at fault merely because that person was named as a defendant in an earlier case.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Clark · filed 1989-10-10

We have again considered and reject defendants assertion that the mere naming of any actor as a defendant in the prior adjudication of the fraud in a separate action supports their designation as non-parties pursuant to § 13-21-111.5 of the Colorado Revised Statutes.

Section 13-21-111.5 allows fault to be apportioned to designated nonparties, but the defendant must establish their negligence to support an allocation of fault to them.

Virgil A. Stearns Donna M. Stearns v. Paccar, Inc. · filed 1993-01-22

Moreover, in light of Paccar's failure to establish the negligence of the non-party defendants--Aircom, Porteous, and Kosaka Koygo--we have little trouble finding sufficient evidence to hold Paccar 100% liable.

Section 13-21-111.5 permits parties in negligence actions to designate nonparties as wholly or partially negligent and permits the finder of fact to consider their share of fault when apportioning liability.

Elliot v. Turner Construction Co. · filed 2004-08-24

Turner’s immunity from suit does not necessitate a new trial because we have no reason to believe that either the presentation of proof or the jury instructions would be any different. Colorado’s pro rata liability statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5, provides that, in civil actions based on claims of negligence, plaintiffs and defendants may designate nonparties as wholly or partially negligent, and authorizes the finder of fact to consider the percentage of a nonparty’s negligence in apportioning ultimate liability.

Section 13-21-111.5 does not bar a later contribution claim against a joint tortfeasor who was not joined or designated in the first action.

Watters v. Pelican International, Inc. · filed 1989-02-17(3)(b)

Accordingly, the plain language of the statute does not provide an exclusive mechanism for litigating the relative fault of all joint tortfeasors.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) requires a defendant designating nonparties at fault to state the basis for believing each is at fault or explain why that detail is unavailable.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche · filed 1993-04-13(3)(b)

I conclude that Deloitte’s designation fails to comply with basic notice pleading requirements. A defendant designating non-party defendants must come forward with individual statements showing the basis for believing each nonparty to be at fault or provide an explanation why such particularity is not possible.

Section 13-21-111.5(3) requires a proper designation before fault may be apportioned to a nonparty, but it permits evidence that the nonparty’s conduct was the sole cause of the injury.

Staley v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. · filed 1997-02-12(3)

The district court here refused to allow the jury an opportunity to apportion fault to Goodyear or Brad Ragan, but permitted evidence of their conduct to establish causation. We hold this is a proper distinction from the situation involved in Thompson. Firestone can only be held liable if its conduct was a contributing cause of the injury. It surely must be allowed to defend itself by showing someone else’s action or inaction was the sole cause of the injury. That is different from apportionment between two parties both of whose fault contributed to the injury.

Section 13-21-111.5 permits a defendant to attribute liability to a designated nonparty, including a former plaintiff.

Fairfield Development, Inc. v. J.D.I. Contractor & Supply, Inc. · filed 2011-03-18

Moreover, JDI will still be able to attribute liability to Development as a non-party under Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111.5.

A defendant seeking to attribute fault to a designated nonparty must provide credible evidence establishing each essential element of the nonparty fault defense.

Nelson v. Toyota Motor Company · filed 2023-04-18(3)(a)

In these specific circumstances, this Court finds that the appropriate framework is one for partial summary judgment as to the affirmative defense of a nonparty’s fault. Thus, this Court will apply such standard to its analysis herein, i.e., Defendants must provide credible evidence establishing each essential element of the defense.

Section 13-21-111.5 permits parties to designate nonparties at fault and allows the factfinder to consider a nonparty’s share of fault when apportioning liability.

Nelson v. Toyota Motor Company · filed 2023-09-12

In turn, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5 provides that in civil actions, plaintiffs and defendants may designate nonparties as being wholly or partially at fault for the plaintiff’s injuries, and authorizes the finder of fact to consider the percentage of a nonparty’s negligence or fault in apportioning ultimate liability.

Section 13-21-111.5(3) requires a party to designate a nonparty at fault by alleging facts showing the nonparty would be legally liable for negligence; alleging causation alone is insufficient.

Stoker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2021-02-22(3)

Additionally, State Farm has not designated any non-parties at fault in this civil action pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5(3). To do so, “[a] party must allege the basis for believing the non-party legally liable to the extent the non-party’s acts or omissions would satisfy all the elements of a negligence claim. A designation that alleges only causation is insufficient as a matter of law.”

A person may be a nonparty at fault for claims against one defendant while remaining a party to other claims in the same litigation.

Loughridge v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2005-12-20(3)(b)

However, with regards to non-party status in this context, persons and entities are nonparties in their relation to claims, not the litigation.

At the pleading stage, a nonparty-at-fault designation satisfies subsection (3)(b) when its allegations support a prima facie negligence claim and identify the occurrence underlying the alleged fault.

McGraw v. Cobra Trucking Incorporated · filed 2020-12-08(3)(b)

Because I conclude that the factual allegations set forth in Defendants’ designation are sufficient to (a) support a prima facie case of negligence against Mr. Wickwire, and (b) permit Plaintiff to identify the occurrence underlying Mr. Wickwire’s alleged negligence, I find that Defendants have thus satisfied the requirements of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b).

Section 13-21-111.5(3) permits a defendant to designate a nonparty at fault so the jury can consider that person’s share of fault when apportioning liability.

Estate of Deramus DeWayne Lemuel v. El Paso County, Colorado · filed 2021-09-27(3)

To facilitate this scheme, Colorado Revised Statute § 13-21-111.5(3) allows a defendant to designate a non-party at fault so that, even if a potentially liable party is not sued by a plaintiff, the jury may still consider that non-party’s degree of fault.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) allows a court to extend the ninety-day deadline for designating a nonparty at fault when a longer period is necessary, and the court may consider the designating party’s diligence.

Pryor v. United States · filed 2022-11-10(3)(b)

But Antolovich does not preclude the Court from considering the diligence of the party when determining, in its discretion, whether a longer period was necessary to identify and designate nonparties at fault.

Section 13-21-111.5 permits a nonparty at fault designation in a UIM bad faith case when the claim requires determining the driver's liability and the nonparty may share fault for the accident.

Stovall v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2024-07-17(3)(a)

Accordingly, because the claims in this case require a determination of the tortfeasor’s (Mr. Thomas’) liability, it is appropriate to permit the designation of a non-party at fault under § 13-21-111.5 in circumstances where a non-party may share a “degree or percentage of negligence or fault” in the accident.

Section 13-21-111.5 does not permit a separate defamer to be designated as a nonparty at fault merely because similar statements caused similar harm; the nonparty must have contributed to the injury attributed to the defendant.

Coomer v. Lindell · filed 2024-08-29(3)(b)

The fact that a party and a nonparty defamed Plaintiff in the same way, allegedly causing or contributing to similar harm around the same time, does not mean that the nonparty is “at fault” for the party’s statements within the contemplation of Colorado law.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) requires notice that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault and a brief statement of the basis for that belief.

Stovall v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2024-10-17(3)(b)

The statute requires the defending party to give “notice that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault . . . together with a brief statement of the basis for believing such nonparty to be at fault.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b). Defendant’s designation plainly does that.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) requires a nonparty-at-fault designation to identify the nonparty and briefly state the basis for believing it is at fault; the designation can satisfy that requirement before discovery is complete.

Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2024-10-29(3)(b)

The Court concludes that, at this early stage of the case and without the benefit of discovery, Defendants’ Amended Designation satisfies the requirement of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(a) allows a factfinder to consider a nonparty’s fault, but a nonparty designation cannot stand when the nonparty was not at fault.

Reams · filed 2026-03-09(3)(a)

Colorado law allows the finder of fact in a civil action to consider the degree of negligence or fault of a non-party to the action when determining the degree of negligence or fault of a party to the action. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5(3)(a). ... Thus, because defendants agree that Home Depot did not breach any duty owed to trespassers under the CPLA, the Court finds that Home Depot was not at fault for Mr. Gill’s injuries. Accordingly, the Court will grant plaintiff’s first motion for summary judgment.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) permits a court to extend the 90-day deadline to designate nonparties at fault when additional time is warranted.

Hardy-Roy v. Shanghai Kindly Enterprise Development Group Co. Ltd · filed 2020-03-24(3)(b)

For this reason, the court will grant a 90-day extension to the April 12, 2020 deadline, thereby extending the deadline to July 13, 2020.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) permits consideration of a settling codefendant’s fault without requiring a nonparty designation notice that meets the statute’s notice requirements.

Blatchley v. St. Anthony Summit Med. Center · filed 2020-07-17(3)(b)

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) allows a court to consider a nonparty’s fault either if the nonparty settled with the plaintiff or if the defendant gives notice compliant with the requirements set forth in the statute.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b)’s notice-of-non-party-at-fault procedure does not apply to CWCA or HFWA wage claims.

Rosales v. Prestige Maintenance USA, Ltd. · filed 2024-06-27(3)(b)

The Court agrees with the Plaintiffs that this request should be denied because such notices of non-party at fault are tort concepts inapplicable to this case. The CWCA and the HFWA, like the FLSA, impose joint and several liability on all statutory employers. Comparative negligence and fault are tort concepts irrelevant to the statutory claims asserted. Therefore, Prestige’s request to file a notice of non-party at fault is also DENIED.

Section 13-21-111.5 does not permit an insurer to assign fault to a nonparty whose conduct caused underlying property damage but did not contribute to the insurer’s alleged bad faith handling of the claim.

Lucia Family Trust, The v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, S.I. · filed 2025-09-25(1)

Accordingly, based on Fried and the plain text of § 13-21-111.5, the Court concludes that American Family’s designation of CAT as a nonparty at fault was improper.

Section 13-21-111.5 permits a parent protected by parental immunity to be designated as a nonparty for fault allocation when the parent owes the injured child a duty of care.

Doering Ex Rel. Barrett v. Copper Mountain, Inc. · filed 2001-07-31(3)(b)

Thus, despite the effect of the parental immunity doctrine, Kathleen was properly designated as a nonparty whose alleged negligence could be considered by the jury.

Section 13-21-111.5 permits allocation of fault to a nonparty whose separate tort contributed to the plaintiff’s injury; the nonparty need not have committed the same tort as the defendant.

Moody v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. · filed 1992-12-03(3)(a)

Hence, apart from § 13-21-111.5(4), the acts on the part of a designated nonparty which have contributed to a plaintiff’s injury are not required to have been the same tortious acts as those of a defendant.

Section 13-21-111.5(3) requires a jury to find a nonparty negligent or at fault before reducing the fault attributed to parties.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ascher · filed 1993-12-21(3)

For a jury to reduce the portion of fault attributable to parties to a tort suit, it must first find the non-party “negligent or at fault.”

Section 13-21-111.5(2) requires evidence supporting a nonparty’s fault before the jury may be instructed to allocate fault to that nonparty; speculation about how debris reached a highway is insufficient.

Ramirez v. Mixsooke · filed 1994-08-25(2)

The only way that negligence of a nonparty could be found to be present here would be by application of pure speculation, surmise, or conjecture. Liability cannot be founded on such a basis. ... The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial without the nonparty instruction unless evidence is presented that would justify such an instruction.

Section 13-21-111.5 does not allow a defendant to wait until after judgment to seek apportionment of fault among defendants and nonparties.

Montoya v. Grease Monkey Holding Corp. · filed 1994-11-07(3)

Instead, Grease Monkey waited until after the trial court entered the judgment to invoke the provisions of § 13-21-111.5. In our view, the language of this statute does not accommodate post-trial motions to apportion fault among defendants and non-parties.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) permits a driver's fault to be considered without keeping the driver as a party.

Lego v. Schmidt · filed 1990-08-23(3)(b)

In addition, contrary to plaintiff's suggestion in her reply brief, insofar as the driver's degree of fault may be important in any continuing suit against the unidentified defendants who are not parties to this appeal, such fault may be considered without maintaining the driver as a party. Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b), C.R.S. (1987 Repl. Vol. 8A).

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) does not bar a defendant who settles the injury claim from seeking contribution from a tortfeasor the defendant failed to designate as a nonparty at fault.

Graber v. Westaway · filed 1991-03-28(3)(b)

Because of the above conclusion, the issue arises whether Graber’s failure to designate Westaway as a non-party at fault bars his post-settlement third-party contribution claim. We conclude that it did not.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) requires the best identification of a nonparty possible under the circumstances; merely saying the nonparty’s name is unknown does not satisfy that requirement.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Isham · filed 1992-01-16(3)(b)

Under the circumstances of this case, defendants’ designation of non-parties by categories is not the best identification possible. For example, defendants have personal knowledge of the role in this case played by Colantuno and his firm. Although the statute does not define what constitutes the best possible identification, a party cannot satisfy the requirement merely by reciting that it does not currently know the name of a potential nonparty.

A court may allocate fault to a nonparty only if the defendant properly raises that nonparty's fault in a pleading that meets the section's designation requirements.

Thompson v. COLORADO AND EASTERN R. CO. · filed 1993-03-25(3)

We hold that a court may not allow the finder of fact to consider the negligence or fault of a nonparty unless such issue has properly been raised by the defendant in a pleading which complies with the requirements of § 13-21-111.5(3), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Section 13-21-111.5 permits the factfinder to consider the fault of nonparties and settling parties when allocating fault.

Stubbs v. Copper Mountain, Inc. · filed 1993-11-15(3)(a), (3)(b)

Sections 13-21-111.5(3)(a) and 13-21-111.5(3)(b) permit the finder of fact, in determining the degree or percentage of negligence or fault of those persons who are parties, to consider the negligence or fault of a person never made a party to the action and of a person who has been a party if the claimant has entered into a settlement agreement with that party.

A person designated as a nonparty at fault under § 13-21-111.5 generally must owe or have owed a legally recognized duty to the injured plaintiff before that person’s fault may be measured.

Miller v. Byrne · filed 1995-10-05

Consequently, we hold that, generally, the person or entity designated under § 13-21-111.5 must, in order for his . or her fault or negligence to be measured under the statute, owe or have owed a duty recognized by the law to the injured plaintiff.

Section 13-21-111.5 requires a defendant to designate nonparties or seek more time within 90 days after the action begins.

Federal Deposit Insurance v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. · filed 1996-07-10

Here, the action was filed on December 22, 1992. Pursuant to § 13-21-111.5, C.R.S., REFCO was required to either designate nonparties or move for an enlargement of time by March 22, 1993. This deadline was not met.

A nonparty-at-fault designation may stand when evidence shows a substantial causal connection between the nonparty’s alleged fault and the plaintiff’s injury.

King v. McKillop · filed 2000-08-29(3)(b)

Hence, there is sufficient evidence to establish a substantial causal connection between the alleged fault or negligence of the USFS and Plaintiffs’ damages. Furthermore, there are genuine issues of material fact as to the negligence, if any, of the USFS. Thus, I deny the Rule 56 motion, the motion to strike, and the motion in limine.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(a) allows a defendant whose judgment was not appealed to be treated as a designated nonparty at fault when fault is allocated on retrial.

BOHIER v. DeHart · filed 1997-01-13(3)(a)

Hence, while the jury on retrial must include the Church in any allocation of fault so that on remand the damage award against the other two defendants may be properly calculated, the Church cannot be liable for any amount other than the judgment already entered. It should therefore be treated on retrial as a designated nonparty at fault pursuant to § 13-21-111.5(3)(a), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Section 13-21-111.5 permits a defendant to designate a settling independent contractor as a nonparty at fault even when the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff is nondelegable.

Kidwell v. K-Mart Corp. · filed 1997-08-18

Accordingly, we conclude that K-Mart was entitled to designate SSCI as a non-party at fault after the settlement was accomplished and thus to seek a determination of the percentage of negligence attributable to SSCI.

Section 13-21-111.5(8)(b) permits a defendant to designate an unidentified person as a nonparty at fault when the designation sufficiently identifies the person under the circumstances and states a basis for believing the person was at fault.

Pedge v. RM Holdings, Inc. · filed 2002-12-19(8)(b)

The primary issue in this appeal is whether unidentified or unknown persons may be designated as non-parties pursuant to Colorado's pro rata apportionment statute, § 13-21-111.5, C.R.S. 2002. Because we conclude they may be so designated, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

Section 13-21-111.5 does not permit liability to be prorated to nonparties whose conduct merely created a preexisting condition, rather than causing its aggravation.

Fried v. Leong · filed 1997-03-20(1)

As a result, liability cannot be prorated among nonparties whose conduct merely created a pre-existing condition, even though in doing so they were “negligent or at fault.”

Section 13-21-111.5 permits fault to be allocated to an immune nonparty employer; its notice procedure and burden on the designating defendant withstand constitutional challenge.

Salazar v. American Sterilizer Co. · filed 2000-06-08(2), (8)

Colorado's apportionment statute provides for notice to the plaintiff of the designation of a non-party early in the proceeding. Implicit in this procedure is that the burden is on the designating defendant to establish the non-party's fault. ... Consequently, we reject plaintiff's constitutional challenges to § 18-21-111.5.

Section 13-21-111.5 permits fault to be attributed to nonparties, relieving a defendant of the portion of liability attributed to them.

Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance · filed 2004-06-29

This statute provides a procedural mechanism whereby negligence or fault may be attributed to non-parties, thus relieving a party-defendant from the portion of liability attributed to the non-party. It is through this, or some similar procedural mechanism, rather than summary judgment against Dean Witter, that Dean Witter’s own contribution to the loss, if any, should be assessed.

An immune parent may be designated as a nonparty at fault, and the parent's share of fault may reduce or eliminate the child's recovery from other defendants.

Paris Ex Rel. Paris v. Dance · filed 2008-02-21(8)(a)

Moreover, to the extent plaintiff contends that designation of an otherwise immune parent as a nonparty under section 18-21-111.5 is improper because the practical effect may be to bar a child's recovery against other tortfeasors because of his or her parent's negligence, we disagree. As discussed, the plain terms of the statute precisely require that the determination of a nonparty's fault may completely or partially deny a plaintiff recovery, even if the plaintiff is, as here, a minor child.

A nonparty whose liability is solely vicarious cannot be designated as a nonparty at fault.

Just in Case Business Lighthouse, LLC v. Murray · filed 2013-07-18(3)

No Colorado case has addressed a nonparty at fault designation where the party’s fault is only vicarious. For the following three reasons, we conclude that a designation based on only vicarious liability is insufficient.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) does not bar a defendant who has not designated a nonparty at fault from offering evidence that the nonparty alone caused the plaintiff’s injury.

Danko v. Conyers · filed 2018-02-08(3)(b)

Dr. Conyers did not seek to apportion fault between him and the other providers. Instead, he sought to admit evidence that their care — not his — had caused Ms. Danko’s amputation. Under Redden, such evidence is admissible even if a nonparty at fault has not been designated under section 13-21-111.5.

Section 13-21-111.5 requires each designated nonparty to be listed separately on the verdict form so the jury can apportion fault.

Ross v. Public Service · filed 2025-03-20(1), (2)

And regardless, section 13-21-111.5’s clear requirements obligated the district court to list each nonparty separately so the jury could apportion the nonparties’ fault.

Section 13-21-111.5(3)(b) permits a nonparty designation in an answer, but the designation must allege facts supporting duty, breach, causation, and damages.

Torres v. Barnhart · filed 2025-07-03(3)(b)

The plain language of the statute doesn’t require that a nonparty designation be separate from a party’s answer, and we decline to read such a requirement into the statute. ... This means that Barnhart was required to allege in his nonparty designation the unknown driver’s duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages. ... But Barnhart’s nonparty designation only addressed causation and damages; it didn’t address the unknown driver’s duty to Torres or breach thereof. Thus, his nonparty designation wasn’t sufficient to establish the unknown driver’s negligence.

A late designation of a nonparty at fault can be harmless when the jury has already been instructed that the nonparty is liable and caused the plaintiff’s damages.

v LFI Fort Pierce · filed 2020-10-08(3)(b)

By instructing the jury that Tecmire, now a nonparty, was liable to the Suydams, the court, in effect, designated Tecmire as a nonparty at fault after the deadline for designating nonparties at fault had passed. ... For these reasons, we conclude that, even if the court erred by dismissing the Suydams’ claims against Tecmire on the second day of trial, the error was harmless because it did not result in unfair prejudice to LFI.

A designation of a licensed professional as a nonparty at fault requires a certificate of review when expert testimony is needed to establish a prima facie negligence case.

Baer v. Weaver · filed 2025-11-26(3)(b)

In civil liability cases, defendants may designate nonparties they contend are wholly or partially at fault by giving notice under section 13–21–111.5(3)(b), C.R.S. 2025. ... If the nonparty is a licensed professional and expert testimony is necessary to establish a prima facie case of negligence, the designation must also include a certificate of review under section 13-20-602(1), C.R.S. 2025. ... Strictly construing Weaver’s designation of nonparties at fault, as we must, we conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that expert testimony was required to explain the applicable standards of care.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) makes civil conspirators jointly and severally liable for damages proved to result from the conspiracy.

T.A. Pelsue Co. v. Grand Enterprises, Inc. · filed 1991-12-30(4)

Liability for civil conspiracy is joint and several.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) does not require evidence of an express agreement to establish a conspiracy claim.

Loughridge v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. · filed 2002-03-13(4)

To establish a claim pursuant to section 13-21-111.5(4), evidence of an express agreement is not necessary.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) imposes joint liability on people who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan to commit a tortious act.

Ziegler v. Inabata of America, Inc. · filed 2004-04-12(4)

Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5(4), “[j]oint liability shall be imposed on two or more persons who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.” Because Ziegler has presented a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether defendants pursued a common plan to commit tortious acts, I find that summary judgment is not appropriate on the claim for joint liability.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) does not require an express agreement for joint liability based on civil conspiracy, and negligent entrustment can be the predicate tortious act.

Schneider v. Midtown Motor Co. · filed 1992-10-08(4)

However, we conclude that § 13-21-111.5(4) does not require evidence of an express agreement. ... We also find merit in plaintiff’s final assertion that the tort of negligent entrustment can constitute the predicate “tortious act” required to establish joint liability pursuant to § 13-21-111.5(4).

Section 13-21-111.5 permits joint liability only when defendants consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan to commit a tortious act; negligence that combines with another person’s acts is insufficient.

Messler v. Phillips · filed 1993-10-07(4)

However, while defendant’s negligence ultimately combined with the actions of Lockley to cause plaintiffs loss, we do not find support in the record for the proposition that defendant and Lockley “consciously conspired and deliberately pursued a common plan” to commit a tortious act or to cause the loss. Indeed, the trial court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that defendant had either participated in, or had prior knowledge that Lockley intended to commit fraud or theft against plaintiff. Nor do we perceive that it is possible to “conspire” to be negligent. Therefore, the imposition of joint and several liability cannot stand.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) allows a defendant to be held jointly liable for a concerted tortfeasor’s fault even when that tortfeasor has settled; § 13-50.5-105 does not reduce that liability.

Pierce v. Wiglesworth · filed 1994-08-11(4)

Accordingly, we conclude that § 13-50.5-105 does not apply to reduce a defendant’s liability under § 13-21-111.5(4).

Section 13-21-111.5(4) imposes joint liability on tortfeasors who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan to commit a tortious act.

Smith v. Vincent · filed 2003-08-14(4)

That statute provides that when two or more persons "consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act," the tortfeasors shall be held jointly liable for the damages resulting from their actions. Section 18-21-111.5(4), C.R.S.2002. ... Here, however, there was no allegation or jury finding that Vincent and Smith's former wife deliberately or consciously conspired to commit a tortious act.

Subsection (4) permits joint liability for a noncontractual civil wrong causing injury or damages, and a tacit agreement to act in concert may be inferred from a course of conduct.

Resolution Trust Corp. v. Heiserman · filed 1995-06-26(4)

We conclude that the term “tortious act” appearing in section 13-21-111.5(4) includes any conduct other than breach of contract that constitutes a civil wrong and causes injury or damages. ... In some situations, evidence of a course of conduct may well be sufficient to imply a tacit agreement to consciously conspire and deliberately act in concert.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) permits joint liability for a conspiracy involving fraudulent transfers because such transfers are wrongful acts within its “tortious act” requirement.

Double Oak Construction L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Development International, L.L.C. · filed 2003-09-25(4)

Thus, “tortious act” encompasses any wrongful conduct. ... We have held that fraudulent transfers are wrongful acts that may justify an award of actual damages in addition to equitable relief. Where those circumstances exist, a cause of action for conspiracy may be asserted.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) requires a jury finding on the elements of joint liability; a finding of aiding and abetting alone does not establish joint liability.

Anstine v. Alexander · filed 2006-02-21(4)

Here, the court should have instructed the jury on the elements necessary to find joint liability under § 13-21-111.5(4), as well as the elements necessary to find aider and abettor liability.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) imposes joint liability on people who consciously conspire to commit a tortious act, including liability for civil conspiracy damages based on civil theft and fraudulent transfer.

Pentelute v. Batenburg · filed 2024-12-19(4)

Civil conspiracy is an independent tort and “joint liability shall be imposed on two or more persons who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.” § 13-21-111.5(4), C.R.S. 2024; see also Heiserman, 898 P.2d at 1055-56 (“[T]he term ‘tortious act’ encompasses any wrongful act, other than breach of contract, causing injury or damages . . . .”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding in the challenged order that all parties that conspired to commit civil theft and fraudulent transfer were jointly and severally liable for the corresponding civil conspiracy damages (even if the civil theft damages were trebled).

Section 13-21-111.5(4) permits joint and several liability when two or more persons consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan to commit a tortious act.

Home Street v. Castle Rock Senior · filed 2026-06-04(4)

Joint and several liability can only be imposed on “two or more persons who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.” § 13-21-111.5(4), C.R.S. 2025. Thus, the court necessarily found that HSO and MCP “consciously conspire[d] and deliberately pursue[d] a common plan or design” to violate CUFTA — in other words, it found that the violation was intentional.

Section 13-21-111.5(4) allows joint liability for a Colorado civil conspiracy claim based on an underlying federal statutory cause of action.

LuckyShot LLC v. Runnit CNC Shop, Inc. · filed 2020-09-24(4)

But I have found no law suggesting a federal statute cannot underlie a Colorado conspiracy claim for joint liability under C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5(4).

Section 13-21-111.5(4) permits joint liability for concerted action only when there is an underlying tort.

Smart v. Stropas · filed 2025-01-23(4)

Plaintiffs cite section 13-21-111.5(4), C.R.S. 2024, which provides for joint liability for “two or more persons who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.” But there can be no joint liability in the absence of an underlying tort.

Section 13-21-111.5 abolishes unmodified joint and several liability and limits recovery against a defendant to that defendant’s proportionate fault.

Dorr v. Briggs · filed 1989-03-07

Moreover, both Colorado and Texas have abolished unmodified joint and several liability. C.R. S. § 13-21-111.5; Tex.Civ.Pra. & Rem. Code § 33.013. Both states’ laws evidence a policy to limit recovery against a defendant to that defendant’s proportionate fault.

Section 13-21-111.5(6)(d)(I) voids a construction agreement’s requirement that one party insure another against liability for the other party’s own negligence.

Higby Crane Services, LLC v. National Helium, LLC · filed 2017-08-14(6)(d)(I)

Because the 2008 Work Order was a new contract entered into after the effective date of the Anti-Indemnification Act, Higby’s agreement to obtain insurance covering DCP for DCP’s own negligence is void under Colorado law. Id. § 13-21-111.5(6)(d)(I).

Section 13-21-111.5(6)(e)(I) does not treat an agreement to repair equipment alone as a construction agreement.

BKV Barnett, LLC v. Electric Drilling Technologies, LLC · filed 2024-02-27(6)(e)(I)

However, the repair of “equipment” is not included in the statutory definition. The amended complaint provides no indication that BKV contracted with EDT to repair a building, structure, gas or other distribution system.

An agreement to install utility poles and repair overhead cables is a construction agreement under § 13-21-111.5(6)(e)(I).

BKV Barnett, LLC v. Electric Drilling Technologies, LLC · filed 2024-09-26(6)(e)(I)

Because EDT’s work involved the construction and repair of a structure, the Court finds that the parties’ agreement is a “construction agreement” under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111.5(6)(e)(I).