Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111

Section 13-21-111(3) bars a plaintiff from recovering when the plaintiff's negligence or fault is equal to or greater than the defendant's.

Nelson v. United States · filed 2014-02-06(3)

Thus, a plaintiff may not recover from a defendant when the plaintiffs negligence or fault is equal to or greater than the negligence or fault of the party against whom relief is sought.

Section 13-21-111 requires the trier of fact to assign the plaintiff's comparative fault and reduces damages by that percentage unless the plaintiff is at least equally negligent.

Hendrickson v. Doyle · filed 2015-12-11

Colorado’s comparative negligence statute requires the trier of fact to determine the amount of negligence, if any, attributable to the plaintiff, and the overall damages award must be reduced, by that percentage (unless the plaintiff was equally or more negligent than the defendant, in which case the plaintiff receives nothing).

Section 13-21-111(1) reduces recoverable damages according to the parties' respective degrees of fault under comparative negligence.

Stoker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company · filed 2021-02-22(1)

Colorado law recognizes comparative negligence,9 and provides that comparative negligence may dimish the amount of damages recoverable depending on the degree of fault attributable to the parties. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111(1).

Section 13-21-111(1) does not eliminate the requirement that a plaintiff’s negligence be a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff’s damages before comparative negligence may apply.

Spence v. Aspen Skiing Co. · filed 1993-05-10(1)

The language of the comparative negligence statute is inconclusive on the issue before the court. All of the authorities which I have discussed recognize, consistent with the Colorado statute, that contributory negligence may properly be asserted in certain medical malpractice cases. The statute does not eliminate the requirement that the plaintiffs negligence be a proximate or legal cause of her own damage.

Section 13-21-111(4) generally leaves comparative negligence to the jury; a court may decide relative fault as a matter of law only when the facts permit one reasonable inference.

Voight v. Colorado Mountain Club · filed 1991-08-01(4)

Generally, the jury is responsible for deciding the comparative negligence of the parties. ... Only in the clearest of cases, in which the facts and the inferences therefrom are essentially undisputed and reasonable minds can draw only one inference from them, should relative fault be determined as a matter of law.

Colorado’s comparative negligence statute applies to an accident outside Colorado when Colorado has the most significant contacts, and disputed relative negligence is for the jury.

Sabell v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. · filed 1975-04-22

Accordingly, Colorado's comparative negligence statute is the appropriate law to be applied. Applying comparative negligence principles to the evidence presented, we hold that a determination of the relative negligence of the plaintiff and defendant P.I.E. presented a factual issue that should have been submitted to the jury.

Section 13-21-111 does not reduce a plaintiff’s recovery when no negligence by that plaintiff is proven.

Dunham v. Kampman · filed 1976-03-15

The comparative negligence statute is inapplicable where no negligence on the part of the plaintiff can be proven.

Section 13-21-111(1) allows a plaintiff to invoke res ipsa loquitur despite contributory negligence; the jury compares the parties’ negligence instead.

Tracy v. Graf · filed 1976-06-07(1)

This case, however, was tried under the comparative negligence statute, § 13-21-111(1), C.R.S.1973, which provides that "[c]ontributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action ... for negligence... if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought." ... Consequently, we look to Wisconsin's treatment of this issue and hold that evidence of contributory negligence no longer operates to preclude the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur from being utilized in a negligence action.

Section 13-21-111 allows a plaintiff whose negligence contributed to an injury to rely on res ipsa loquitur and recover if the plaintiff's negligence was less than the defendant's.

Gordon v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. · filed 1979-08-20

Under our comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar recovery so long as plaintiff's negligence is not as great as defendant's. Section 13-21-111, C.R.S.1973. ... "Even if the jury were to find that plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence contributed to his injury, plaintiff's negligence does not preclude the operation of the res ipsa doctrine because, under the comparative negligence system, the jury could infer from the circumstances that the defendant's negligence exceeded the plaintiff's negligence, thus permitting plaintiff to recover in spite of his contributing negligence. Whenever the jury could reasonably find that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury and that the event is of a kind which ordinarily would not occur in the absence of the defendant's negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies even though plaintiff's negligence also contributed to his injury." ... We approve and adopt the rule stated in Cramer.

Section 13-21-111 permits a plaintiff to rely on res ipsa loquitur despite contributory negligence and requires the jury to compare the parties’ negligence.

Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon · filed 1980-11-10(1)

We find the logic of their position persuasive and hold that Colorado’s comparative negligence statute eliminates the requirements that the plaintiff be free from contributory negligence.

Section 13-21-111 does not reduce an innocent plaintiff’s recovery to a negligent defendant’s percentage of fault; joint tort-feasors remain jointly and severally liable to the innocent plaintiff.

Kampman v. Dunham · filed 1977-02-22

The court of appeals concluded that the comparative negligence statute, section 13-21-111, C.R.S. 1973 has no application where an innocent party seeks recovery from a party adjudged negligent and that liability of joint tort-feasors remains joint and several with respect to a third party injured by their actions. ... We expressly approve and adopt the opinion of the court of appeals and its treatment of this case.

Section 13-21-111 reduces an owner-passenger’s recovery by the driver’s share of negligence when that negligence is imputed to the passenger.

Hover v. Clamp · filed 1978-03-02

Consequently, we hold that, because the wife was a joint owner of the automobile, it is presumed that she had the right to control the manner in which her husband was driving it, and thus his negligence, if any, would be imputable to her. On retrial, therefore, Mrs. Hover will be entitled to recover 70% of the amount of damages determined by the jury to have been sustained by her and proximately caused by the accident.

Section 13-21-111 calls for comparative fault only when the jury finds causal negligence.

Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation · filed 1984-01-30

There could not be any comparative fault when there was no finding of causal negligence against any party.

Section 13-21-111(4) leaves the percentage of negligence to the jury unless undisputed facts permit only one reasonable inference about relative fault.

Whitlock v. University of Denver · filed 1986-01-31(4)

The issue of percentage of negligence is one for the jury. Section 13-21-111(4), C.R.S. (1984 Cum.Supp.); Holmes v. Gamble, 655 P.2d 405 (Colo.1982). Only in the clearest of cases where the facts are undisputed and reasonable minds can draw only one inference from them should relative fault be determined as a matter of law.

Assumption of risk does not completely bar recovery; the trier of fact considers it when apportioning negligence.

Wills v. Bath Excavating & Construction Co. · filed 1992-05-11

The doctrine of assumption of risk is the law in Colorado and poses a question for the trier of fact. And, while not a complete bar to recovery, the assumption of a risk is to be considered by the trier of fact in apportioning negligence. See § 13-21-111, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A).

Under § 13-21-111, momentary forgetfulness and justifiable distraction are facts the jury may consider when assessing reasonable care, but neither requires a separate jury instruction.

Rodriguez v. Morgan County R.E.A., Inc. · filed 1994-03-31

We adopt the reasoning of the New York court and similarly conclude that there is no longer any reason or need for a separate doctrine of momentary forgetfulness or justifiable distraction in Colorado and no necessity for a separate jury instruction. The doctrine has now been absorbed by Colorado’s comparative negligence scheme.

Comparative negligence applies only when evidence supports a finding that both parties were at fault.

DeBose Ex Rel. DeBose v. Bear Valley Church of Christ · filed 1995-01-24

Comparative negligence principles, however, are applicable only if there is evidence that would support a finding that both parties are at fault.

Section 13-21-111(1) permits a comparative negligence defense when both parties' negligence caused the plaintiff's injury, even if the defendant violated a statute protecting disabled pedestrians.

McCall v. Meyers · filed 2004-06-17(1)

This statute applies when the comparative negligence of the plaintiff has been raised as a defense, there is evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent, and such negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries. ... Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on comparative negligence.

A defaulted defendant cannot raise comparative negligence at a damages hearing because it is a substantive defense concerning liability.

Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corporation · filed 2015-11-19(1)

For these reasons, we conclude that the doctrines of comparative negligence and pro rata liability, even though they may affect an assessment of damages, are primarily substantive defenses that go to the plaintiff’s right of recovery and the defendant’s liability. They are not, therefore, available to defaulted defendants at the damages hearing.

Comparative negligence is an affirmative defense that a defaulted defendant cannot raise at a hearing limited to damages.

Dickinson v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc · filed 2015-11-19(1)

For these reasons, we conclude that the doctrines of comparative negligence and pro rata liability, even though they may affect an assessment of damages, are primarily substantive defenses that go to the plaintiff’s right of recovery and the defendant’s liability. They are not, therefore, available to defaulted defendants at the damages hearing.

Section 13-21-111(1) provides a comparative negligence defense that a defendant in default cannot raise at a damages hearing.

Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp · filed 2015-12-17(1)

Comparative negligence works to reduce a defendant’s damages by his degree of fault so that the defendant is not responsible for more than his fair share of the ultimate award. See § 13-21-111(1), C.R.S. 2015; Stone v. Satriana , 41 P.3d 705 (Colo. 2002). ... For these reasons, we conclude that the doctrines of comparative negligence and pro rata liability, even though they may affect an assessment of damages, are primarily substantive defenses that go to the plaintiff’s right of recovery and the defendant’s liability. They are not, therefore, available to defaulted defendants at the damages hearing.

Section 13-21-111 permits an employer that accepts vicarious liability for an employee’s negligence to be held responsible for the employee’s fault without changing the plaintiff’s comparative fault.

Ferrer v. Okbamicael · filed 2017-02-27(1)

We conclude, as have other courts in comparative negligence jurisdictions, that the McHaffie rule is compatible with Colorado’s comparative negligence regime.

A comparative negligence defense requires evidence that the plaintiff’s own negligence caused the collision and injuries.

Crowell v. Alford · filed 2023-09-12

Of course, this affirmative defense cannot be established without some evidence that the negligence of Mr. Crowell was a cause of the collision and his injuries.

A plaintiff's comparative negligence may go to the jury when evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff acted unreasonably.

Hesse v. McClintic · filed 2008-01-14(1)

As a result, we find that Hesse presented sufficient evidence of McClintic's negligence to reach the jury on the issue of comparative negligence.

Section 13-21-111(1) compares the parties’ negligence that caused the plaintiff’s claimed injuries, damages, and losses.

Reif v. Priebe · filed 2025-09-11(1)

Accordingly, the negligence that must be considered when comparing the negligence of a plaintiff and a defendant is “negligence resulting in death or in injury” — in other words, negligence that was a cause of the plaintiff’s claimed injuries, damages, and losses.

Section 13-21-111(1) permits a comparative negligence instruction when evidence supports a finding that both parties were at fault for the loss.

Dillon Companies v. Hussman Corporation · filed 2006-01-20(1)

Because there was ample evidence presented that would support a jury finding that both parties were at fault for the loss of the building, the district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting the comparative negligence instruction to the jury.

Section 13-21-111 bars the pilot’s widow from recovery if his negligence exceeds 50%, but his negligence does not bar the passenger’s widow from proportionate recovery.

Combined Communications Corp. v. Public Service Co. of Colorado · filed 1993-07-01

The other instruction explained that, consistent with Colorado’s comparative negligence statute, if the pilot was found to be more than 50% negligent, this would preclude his widow from recovery, but that this would not preclude recovery by the passenger co-plaintiff. ... There was no conflict among the two instructions, the judge’s answer to the jurors’ question upon this subject, or the verdicts returned.

Section 13-21-111 bars recovery when the plaintiff's contributory negligence is as great as or greater than the negligence of the person sued.

Tomuel Lee v. United States · filed 1996-03-28

Under Colorado law, "[c]ontributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person ... if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought...." Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111. The district court found that Lee's negligence was greater than any negligence of the United States as a ground for dismissing this action. We review this determination under the clearly erroneous standard. ... Given these facts we cannot hold that the district court's determination that Lee's negligence exceeded the negligence of the United States was clearly erroneous.

The statute bars a negligence plaintiff from recovering when the plaintiff's negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant's, directs the jury to determine total damages before percentages, and requires judgment for the defendant when that threshold is met.

Weaver v. Blake Ex Rel. Blake · filed 2006-07-11(1), (2), (3)

In fashioning the verdict form, the district court applied Colorado’s comparative negligence law, which provides that a plaintiff is not entitled to collect any damages from a defendant if the plaintiff’s percentage of responsibility is fifty percent or more. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111(1) (2005) (“Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in any action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought . . . .”) (emphasis added); Lonardo v. Livtak Meat Co., 676 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing this principle). ... It is true that the procedure specified in Colorado law also calls for a jury to first determine “[t]he amount of the damages which would have been recoverable if there had been no contributory negligence” and then determine “[t]he degree of negligence of each party, expressed as a percentage.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111(2). ... We conclude that the jury’s procedural error in filling out the verdict form is harmless because their apportionment of fault is entirely dispositive under Colorado law. ... Upon receiving a jury’s verdict that the proportion of Plaintiffs’ negligence “is equal to or greater than the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought,” Colorado’s comparative negligence law requires the court to “enter a judgment for the defendant.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111(3).

Section 13-21-111(1) bars recovery when the plaintiff’s negligence is as great as or greater than the defendant’s.

Graf v. Tracy · filed 1977-09-06(1)

Section 13-21-111(1), C.R.S. 1973 precludes the plaintiffs recovery if his negligence was as great as or greater than the defendant’s.

Section 13-21-111 bars recovery when the plaintiff’s negligence is equal to or greater than the defendant’s, even if the plaintiff suffered damages.

Lonardo v. Litvak Meat Co. · filed 1983-10-27

However, because comparative negligence principles apply, such a finding does not mandate an award to the injured plaintiff, even if the fact of damage is not controverted, unless the plaintiff’s own negligence is found to have been less than that of the defendant.

Section 13-21-111 bars recovery when a plaintiff is found 70% negligent.

Bell v. Boklund · filed 1985-10-24

The jury found that Bell was 70% negligent, and therefore, he was not entitled to any recovery. See § 13-21-111, C.R.S.

Section 13-21-111 requires the jury to determine full damages without reducing them for the parties’ comparative negligence; ordinary rules for challenging an inadequate verdict still apply.

Reynolds v. Farber · filed 1978-03-16

The jury is required to determine the full amount of damages without regard to the degree of the parties' negligence, see § 13-21-111, C.R.S.1973. Therefore, the jury's function in the determination of damages remains essentially the same now as before the passage of the comparative negligence statute. Thus the established rules concerning the inadequacy of jury verdicts are still applicable.

Section 13-21-111 bars recovery when the plaintiff’s negligence exceeds the defendant’s.

Padilla v. Warren · filed 1980-04-10

In contrast here, the jury found that Padilla’s negligence was greater than Warren’s, thereby precluding recovery of damages under the comparative negligence statute, § 13-21-111, C.R.S.1973.

Subsection (2) requires a special jury verdict only in actions governed by subsection (1), so it does not apply to F.E.L.A. cases brought in Colorado.

Felder v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1983-01-13(2)

Significantly, § 13-21-111(2), C.R.S.1973, which mandates the return of the special jury verdict is limited in its application to those actions to which subsection (1) applies. As discussed, § 13-21-111(1), C.R.S. 1973, has no application in a case brought in Colorado under the F.E.L.A. Accordingly, the mandates of § 13-21-111(2) by its own terms, can likewise have no application.

Subsection (2) requires findings sufficient to show the basis for the court’s negligence decision on review; more detailed findings are unnecessary.

Robinson v. Poudre Valley Federal Credit Union · filed 1984-03-15(2)

Plaintiff also contends that by failing to make more specific factual findings pertaining to Robinson’s negligence in its order and judgment after remand, the trial court failed to follow our mandate in Robinson I and contravened § 13-21-111(2), C.R.S. Again, we disagree. The order and judgment reveal that the trial court fully complied with our directive. The findings are sufficient to apprise us, for purposes of review, of the basis upon which the trial court reached its decision. No more is required.

A trial court’s findings satisfy subsection (2)(b) when they make clear that one party was 100% negligent, even without stating the comparative degree of negligence as a percentage.

McKinley v. Willow Const. Co., Inc. · filed 1984-09-20(2)(b)

Also, we find no merit in Barnett’s contention that the trial court failed to comply with the mandate of § 13-21-111(2)(b), C.R.S., in that it did not specifically state as a percentage the comparative degree of negligence of Barnett and Willow. The findings are sufficient to apprise us that the trial court found Barnett to be 100% negligent and that such negligence proximately caused the total damage • to plaintiffs in the sum of $59,309.20.

A court’s failure to state damages and each party’s percentage of negligence may be harmless when a zero-damages award and the court’s clear intent show that the parties were equally negligent.

Comcast of California/Colorado, L.L.C. v. Express Concrete, Inc. · filed 2007-12-27(2)

Although the court did not make a specific determination of damages or the percentage of negligence of each party, the award of zero damages is consistent with the view that the court found Comcast's negligence was equal to that of defendant. Because the court's intention was clear that Comeast not recover any damages, we conclude that the failure to compute the amount of damages and express the percentages of the parties' negligence was harmless.

A plaintiff cannot recover damages when the plaintiff’s negligence equals or exceeds the defendant’s negligence.

Ironshore v. Pool · filed 2025-04-24(1)

That determination — which we uphold in this appeal — precluded Ironshore from recovering any damages on its negligence claims under the comparative negligence statute and the instruction that was given to the jury.

Section 13-21-111(4)'s requirement that the jury be instructed on the effect of its negligence apportionment does not control a federal diversity action when it conflicts with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51.

Platis v. Stockwell · filed 1980-09-09(4)

The Rule expressly states that a party must object to the giving or the failure to give an instruction as a prerequisite to the assignment of error, a requirement which the parties agree is in direct conflict with the Section 13-21-111(4) of the Colorado comparative negligence statute as it has been construed by the courts of that state. ... We therefore hold that the requirements of Rule 51 must be adhered to in diversity actions in federal court.

Subsection (3.5) provided for proportionate fault in comparative-negligence cases, but did not address the combined-comparison rule; § 13-21-111.5 later established proportionate fault in all cases.

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Clark · filed 1989-10-10(3.5)

Defendants’ contention that the 1985 repeal of a portion of Colorado’s comparative negligence statute, i.e., Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111(3.5), overturned Mountain Mobile Mix is without merit. That subsection provided for proportionate fault in comparative negligence cases, and became redundant when Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-111.5 established proportionate fault in all cases. It does not address the combined comparison rule, and did not even exist when Mountain Mobile Mix was decided.

Comparative negligence does not displace joint and several liability among joint tortfeasors when the plaintiff is also negligent.

Stefanich v. Martinez · filed 1977-10-24

The principle logically obtains even when, as here, the plaintiff is also negligent; and, in this case, we perceive no viable distinction between apportionment and contribution among the joint tortfeasors. In any event plaintiff should not be barred from collecting the full amount of his judgment from any person found to be liable to plaintiff. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering judgment against the defendants jointly and severally.

Section 13-21-111 preserves joint and several liability among negligent defendants even when the injured plaintiff is also negligent.

Martinez v. Stefanich · filed 1978-05-08

The doctrine of joint and several liability in the context of comparative negligence continues to insure that negligently injured persons will be able to obtain adequate compensation for their injuries from those tortfeasors who have negligently inflicted the harm.

Section 13-21-111 compares a plaintiff’s negligence with each defendant’s negligence individually and bars recovery against a defendant whose negligence is equal to or less than the plaintiff’s.

Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford · filed 1981-05-04

Accordingly, we hold that, under § 13-21-111, C.R.S.1973, if the percentage of a plaintiff’s negligence is the same as, or greater than, the percentage of negligence of a defendant against whom he seeks recovery, the plaintiff cannot recover against that defendant.

Section 13-21-111 permits comparison of negligence only among parties to the tort action.

National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton · filed 1981-11-27

Colorado’s comparative negligence statute contemplates that the comparison of negligence be made only between parties to the tort action.

When both parties are negligent, the jury must compare their negligence under section 13-21-111.

Fay v. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. · filed 1982-01-28

Thus, since Kroblin was also found negligent, the jury must compare Kroblin's negligence to the deceased's negligence.

Section 13-21-111 permits comparison of negligence only among parties to the tort action; a nonparty’s negligence must not be included.

National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton · filed 1982-05-03

Colorado’s comparative negligence statute contemplates that the comparison of negligence be made only between parties to the tort action.

Section 13-21-111 requires comparison of the parties’ fault even when the conduct involves simple, gross, or willful and reckless negligence.

G.E.C. Minerals, Inc. v. Harrison Western Corp. · filed 1989-05-18(1)

In our view, the statute requires the comparison of each party’s fault irrespective of whether such fault is attributable to simple negligence, gross negligence, or willful and reckless negligence.

Section 13-21-111 requires the fault of multiple defendants to be combined when compared with the plaintiff’s fault; a plaintiff less than 50% at fault may recover from each defendant.

Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford · filed 1983-02-22(1)

We hold that in cases where there are multiple defendants who proximately cause the injury, the degree of fault of each defendant will be combined and compared with the degree of fault of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is less than 50% at fault, each defendant will be jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s damages even if the degree of fault of a particular defendant is less than that of the plaintiff.

Section 13-21-111 limits the comparison of negligence to parties who participate in the trial; the jury may not consider absent tortfeasors.

National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Frackelton · filed 1983-05-02

We conclude that the comparative negligence statute precludes consideration of the negligence of absent tortfeasors by the trier of fact. In determining factual issues only the negligence of the parties to the lawsuit who participate in the trial should be considered in resolving liability under the comparative negligence statute.

Section 13-21-111(3) includes a settling nonparty defendant’s negligence with the defendant’s negligence when comparing it with the plaintiff’s negligence to determine whether the plaintiff may recover.

Wong v. Sharp · filed 1990-03-28(3)

The application of C.R.S. § 13-21-111 should be broad enough to include settling nonparties.

A designated nonparty assigned fault counts among the persons whose combined negligence is compared with the plaintiff’s to determine whether the plaintiff may recover.

Painter v. Inland/Riggle Oil Co. · filed 1996-02-26(1)

Viewing the comparative negligence statute as a whole and paying particular attention to the terms the General Assembly used, we conclude that, when determining whether a negligent plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against a negligent defendant, any designated nonparty under § 13-21-111.5 to whom partial fault has been attributed must be considered as a “person against whom recovery is sought.”

Section 13-21-111's comparative negligence rule does not apply to products liability actions under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.

Kinard v. Coats Company, Inc. · filed 1976-05-13

The defendant's principal argument on appeal is that the concept of comparative negligence as embodied in § 13-21-111, C.R.S.1973, should be applied in products liability cases under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. ... Although some other jurisdictions have chosen to apply comparative negligence to products liability cases, see Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55, in our view the better-reasoned position is that comparative negligence has no application to products liability actions under § 402A.

Section 13-21-111 does not reduce damages when the defendant committed an intentional tort.

Carman v. Heber · filed 1979-07-05

In finding for Carman, the trial court determined that Heber had committed an intentional tort. A finding of intentional wrongdoing on the part of the defendant renders the comparative negligence statute inapplicable.

Section 13-21-111 did not impliedly repeal the Colorado Guest Statute.

Huydts v. Dixon · filed 1980-02-25

The guest statute, however, is not derived from the common law doctrine of contributory negligence; but stems from a legislative decision that one who rides as a guest in another person’s vehicle should not be allowed to recover for injuries caused by the operator’s simple and ordinary negligence. ... Since the guest statute was in effect on the date of the Kelty accident, the trial court had no choice but to apply its provisions.

Section 13-21-111 does not allow failure to wear a seat belt to be used in determining a plaintiff’s degree of negligence.

Churning v. Staples · filed 1981-04-16

While Fischer has not been extended to preclude the seat belt defense in cases brought under the comparative negligence statute, § 13-21-111, C.R.S. 1973, we find the logic in Fischer still compelling and hold that the seat belt defense is not available for purposes of determining the degree of plaintiff’s negligence under the comparative negligence statute.

Section 13-21-111(1) applies comparative negligence to pecuniary loss from negligent misrepresentation: a plaintiff’s damages are reduced if the plaintiff is less than 50% negligent, and recovery is barred if the plaintiff is 50% negligent or more.

Robinson v. Poudre Valley Federal Credit Union · filed 1982-08-12(1)

In Colorado, the comparative negligence principles set forth in § 13-21-111, C.R.S.1973, also apply to negligence which results in pecuniary loss. ... If the trial court finds that Robinson was less than 50% negligent, his total damages must be reduced by the percentage of his negligence. If the trial court concludes that Robinson was 50% negligent or more, judgment must be entered for the Credit Union.

Section 13-21-111 does not require use of its special verdict forms in a FELA action.

Betoney v. Union Pacific Railroad · filed 1984-08-02

Finally, the railroad contends the trial court erred in refusing to submit its three tendered instructions which were the special verdict forms required under § 13-21-111, C.R.S. We disagree; Felder v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 660 P.2d 911 (Colo.App.1982) is dispositive of this issue.

Section 13-21-111 does not override the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy provision or require fault to be apportioned to an injured employee’s employer.

Tex-Ark Joist Co. v. Derr & Gruenewald Construction Co. · filed 1986-03-27

we hold that the comparative negligence statute does not alter or abrogate the effect of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Section 13-21-111(1) makes comparative negligence a defense to negligence actions, but not to trespass actions.

Burt v. Beautiful Savior Lutheran Church of Broomfield · filed 1990-10-25(1)

Comparative negligence, however, is an affirmative defense only to negligence actions, that is, to liability based on fault. Section 13-21-111(1), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A); see Carman v. Heber, 43 Colo.App. 5, 601 P.2d 646 (1979). Hence, it is not a proper issue for consideration in a trespass action.

Section 13-21-111 applies to compensatory damages even when the defendant’s conduct is willful and wanton, but the plaintiff’s equal fault does not bar exemplary damages.

White v. Hansen · filed 1991-08-05

“The statute [13-21-111] requires the comparison of each party’s fault irrespective of whether such fault is attributable to simple negligence, gross negligence, or willful and reckless negligence.” Thus, the trial court did not err in applying § 13-21-111 to the award of compensatory damages. ... Under the rationale of Jacobs and Bodah it would be inconsistent to disallow an award of exemplary damages when, as here, plaintiff is 50 percent negligent and defendant is guilty of wanton and willful conduct.

Section 13-21-111 does not reduce a fixed wrongful death solatium award based on the decedent’s comparative fault.

Dewey v. Hardy · filed 1995-09-14

Therefore, considering the purpose of the solatium statute, we conclude that, by granting a fixed award of $50,000 to the plaintiff upon a finding or admission of a defendant’s liability, the General Assembly intended the solatium award to be exempt from reduction by operation of the comparative fault statute.

Section 13-21-111(1) does not bar the state’s independent Medicaid reimbursement claim because of the recipient’s negligence.

Tucker Ex Rel. Edwards v. Gorman · filed 1997-10-20(1)

While the CMAA prohibits the percentage of the recipient’s negligence from being used to defeat the state’s claim under § 13-21-111(1), it does not prevent application of § 13-21-111.5; therefore, defendant is liable for only 30% of the state’s expenditures.

Section 13-21-111 does not reduce a statutory solatium award based on the defendant's percentage of fault.

Gross v. B.G. Inc. · filed 2000-08-21

In Dewey v. Hardy, 917 P.2d 305 (Colo.App.1995), a division of this court considered the issue of whether the amount of statutory solatium damages may be reduced by operation of the comparative fault statute, § 13-21-111, C.R.S.1999, such that the award against a defendant would be reduced based on the percentage of his or her fault. ... Accordingly, we agree with the conclusion in Dewey that the General Assembly intended that the solatium award be exempt from reduction by operation of the comparative fault statute.

Section 13-21-111 applies to premises liability actions and limits recovery based on the injured party's comparative negligence.

Union Pacific Railroad v. Martin · filed 2009-06-08(1)

Despite its silence concerning the defenses of comparative negligence and pro rata liability, it is therefore apparent, without resort to extrinsic aids to statutory interpretation like legislative history, that section 115 functions harmoniously with see-tions 111 and 111.5 to govern different aspects of a single statutory scheme.

A hospital that takes custody of a known suicidal patient to prevent self-harm cannot assert comparative negligence for a foreseeable suicide attempt within the scope of that duty.

In re P.W. v. Children's Hospital Colorado · filed 2016-01-25

This case provides a straightforward rule: If a hospital assumes a. duty to protect and treat a patient for a specific condition, and if the patient is injured by a foreseeable event directly related to that- condition, then the hospital cannot assert that occurrence as part of a comparative negligence defense.

Section 13-21-111(1) reduces negligence damages in proportion to the claimant’s negligence, but does not reduce damages for breach of implied warranty.

e Village Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Brooktree Village, LLC · filed 2020-11-19(1)

While, pursuant to section 13-21-111(1), C.R.S. 2020, damages awarded for negligence “shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person” who recovers, such a diminution does not apply to claims for breach of implied warranty.