Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1

A Bane Act claim based on harassment and racist behavior requires facts supporting a threat of violence and harm caused by the conduct.

Crosby v. Siordia · filed 2025-06-12

The amended complaint’s allegation that defendant Siordia harassed Plaintiff and demonstrated racist behavior towards Plaintiff fails to state a Bane Act claim because the Court cannot reasonably infer from this conclusory and vague allegation that defendant Siordia threatened to commit violence against Plaintiff and because the amended complaint fails to allege any harm caused by the alleged harassment and racist behavior.

Section 52.1 permits a claim based on allegations of intentional interference, by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with a state or federal constitutional or legal right.

(PC) Tillman v. State of California · filed 2024-11-26

Out of an abundance of caution, the court clarifies that plaintiff’s allegations in his second amended complaint are sufficient to state a cognizable claim against Drake for intentionally “interfer[ing] by threat, intimidation, or coercion” with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, in violation of the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff to plead interference or attempted interference with a legal right by threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Bernal v. County of San Diego · filed 2025-04-25

To successfully plead a claim under the Act, a plaintiff must show (1) interference with or attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) that the interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation, or coercion.

Section 52.1 requires a Bane Act claim to allege interference with a protected right through threats, intimidation, or coercion; the court dismissed the claim where no threatened or committed violence or injury was alleged.

Lopez · filed 2025-11-24

The Court DISMISSES with prejudice Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims. ... The elements of a Bane Act claim are: (1) the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s constitutional or statutory right by threatening or committing violent acts; (2) the plaintiff reasonably believed that if he exercised his constitutional right the defendant would commit violence against him; (3) the defendant injured the plaintiff to prevent him from exercising his constitutional right; (4) the plaintiff was harmed; and (5) the defendant’s actions were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's harm. ... Here, there is no allegation that defendant Ronnenberg threatened or committed violent acts or that defendant Ronnenberg injured Plaintiff.

A Section 52.1 claim must identify the incidents, alleged rights violations, and defendants involved, and plead facts plausibly showing each defendant specifically intended to violate a constitutional right.

Mascorro · filed 2025-11-21

Here, the Amended Complaint does not specify which incidents are the basis of the Bane Act claim, the constitutional violations that allegedly occurred in each of those instances, or the defendants implicated in each violation during each of those incidents. Nor does it plead facts for each of those incidents plausibly establishing that each identified defendant had a specific intent to violate a constitutional right. The Court therefore dismisses Claim Nine as to all Defendants for failure to state a claim, and will grant Plaintiff leave to amend as set forth below.

An excessive force claim under Section 52.1 requires state action.

Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2015-02-26

Because an excessive force claim under the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, also requires state action, see Jones v. Kmart Corp., 949 P.2d 941, 943 (Cal. 1998), that claim fails as well.

Section 52.1 permits suit against a county.

Reynolds v. County of San Diego · filed 2016-10-03

With respect to the claims asserted against County, this Courts finds that Venegas v. County of Los Angeles does not prohibit suit against County under California Civil Code § 52.1.

Section 52.1 applies to municipalities.

Spath v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2023-04-17(b)

Following the reasoning of those cases, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis that the Bane Act does not apply to municipalities is DENIED.

Section 52.1 permits a Bane Act claim directly against a municipality.

Galley v. County of Sacramento · filed 2023-07-13

Thus, plaintiffs may assert a Bane Act claim directly against a municipality.

Section 52.1(b) does not impose direct liability on cities, but a city may be vicariously liable for an employee’s Bane Act violation.

Yaple v. County of Riverside · filed 2024-03-25(b)

However, although the Bane Act does not provide for direct liability, a government entity can be held vicariously liable for a Bane Act violation as an employer of the specific government employee or employees.

Section 52.1(n) removes Government Code § 844.6 immunity for Bane Act claims against public entities that employ peace or custodial officers.

Ramirez v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-05-15(n)

Effective January 2022, the California legislature revoked public entities’ immunity for Bane Act violations, including for injuries to prisoners under California Government Code § 844.6.

Section 52.1(n) does not retroactively remove Government Code section 844.6 immunity for Bane Act claims arising from acts before 2022.

Doe v. County of Plumas · filed 2025-08-15(n)

However, California courts have held that the application of this amendment to the Bane Act is not retroactive; in other words, it does not remove immunity for acts prior to the 2022 amendment. See Wiley v. Kern High Sch., 107 Cal. App. 5th 765, 778–81 (2025). As the acts at issue here occurred prior to 2022, the County is entitled to immunity under section 844.6 for Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims.

Section 52.1(h) provides for attorneys' fees, so a request for fees remains viable when the Bane Act claim survives dismissal.

Scalia v. Cnty. of Kern · filed 2018-04-10(h)

The Court has denied Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims, so the possibility of an award of attorneys' fees, as is statutorily provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(h), remains alive.

Section 52.1(i) permits a court to award a plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees in addition to damages, an injunction, or other equitable relief.

Myles v. County of San Diego · filed 2023-09-29(i)

The Bane Act, likewise, permits a court to award plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees “in addition to any damages, injunction, or other equitable relief awarded.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(i).

Section 52.1 does not apply to claims by a Minnesota resident against Minnesota state agents arising from Minnesota laws.

Hollie v. Roy · filed 2019-08-13

Plaintiff’s reference to the “Bane Act” is in fact a reference to the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, a California state statute. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. A California state statute has no applicability to a case involving a Minnesota-resident civil detainee suing agents of the state of Minnesota based on the application of Minnesota laws.

Section 52.1 does not provide relief to a Minnesota civil detainee suing Minnesota state officials in their official capacities.

Jacobson v. Roy · filed 2019-08-27

Contrary to Jacobson’s objection, however, the Bane Act cannot provide Jacobson relief in this action.

Section 52.1 does not provide relief to a Minnesota civil detainee suing Minnesota officials over the application of Minnesota law.

Black Elk v. Roy · filed 2019-08-26

The Magistrate Judge presumed, and the Court agrees, that the “Bane Act” is a reference to the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that a California statue has no applicability to a case involving a Minnesota-resident civil detainee suing agents of the state of Minnesota based on the application of Minnesota laws.

Section 52.1 does not apply to Maine-based claims.

CANTRELL v. BRUNSWICK MAINE POLICE · filed 2024-04-29

But the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, is a California state law, and I see no way that it could apply to Cantrell’s Maine-based claims.

Section 52.1 applies only to cases governed by California law.

Dibrell v. PNC Bank · filed 2025-02-13(d)

The California state law Plaintiff relies on (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1) is only applicable to cases governed by California law.

A Bane Act claim requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Banks-Reed v. Bay Area Rapid Transit · filed 2019-11-15(a)

As discussed with respect to the due process claim, plaintiffs have not provided any evidence that Sgt. Mateu acted with specific intent to violate Tindle’s rights. As such, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the Bane Act claim is GRANTED.

A Bane Act claim against officers must allege specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights.

Villalobos v. City of Vallejo · filed 2020-04-01

To state a claim under the Tom Bane Act, plaintiff must allege that the involved officers acted with specific intent to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights.

A Bane Act claim based on excessive force requires allegations of excessive force and specific intent to violate the arrestee’s rights.

Pyper v. Oceanside Police Department · filed 2020-06-24(a)

Following Reese, these allegations are sufficient to state a Bane Act claim because they allege the requisite excessive force and specific intent.

Section 52.1 requires proof that an officer intended the force used and its unreasonableness; an objectively unreasonable use of force alone is insufficient.

L.F. v. City of Stockton · filed 2020-07-17

To establish specific intent, “[e]vidence simply showing that an officer’s conduct amounts to a constitutional violation under an ‘objectively reasonable’ standard is insufficient . . . .” Losee v. City of Chico, 738 F. App’x 398, 401 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Reese, 888 F.3d at 1045). Instead, plaintiffs “must show that [Wells] ‘intended not only the force, but its unreasonableness, its character as more than necessary under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Reese, 888 F.3d at 1045). Here, for the same reasons discussed in the Fourteenth Amendment analysis above, plaintiffs have pointed to evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial regarding whether Wells’s possessed the requisite “specific intent9 to violate [Friday’s] right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1043. Defendants’ motion is DENIED as to plaintiffs’ Bane Act claims.

Section 52.1 requires officers to intend not only their use of force, but its unreasonableness under the circumstances.

Vasquez v. City of San Jose · filed 2020-08-17

In other words, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants “intended not only the force, but its unreasonableness, its character as more than necessary under the circumstances.”

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff to show specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights; allegations of intent must have factual support.

Gillespie v. County of Alameda · filed 2020-08-31

A plaintiff must show that an officer had a “specific intent” to violate the plaintiffs’ rights. ... The complaint does allege intent with respect to the assault and battery claim but fails to allege any facts supporting intent with respect to the other claims.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate the right to be free from unreasonable seizure, beyond proof of a constitutional violation.

Gomez v. City of Vacaville · filed 2020-09-02

Although there has been some lack of clarity regarding whether the Bane Act requires more than a finding of a constitutional violation, the Ninth Circuit recently adopted the position that the Bane Act also requires “a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure,” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1043 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Cornell v. City & County of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 801 (2017)).

Section 52.1’s specific-intent requirement is sufficiently alleged when a plaintiff adequately pleads deliberate indifference involving reckless disregard.

Luttrell v. Hart · filed 2020-09-22(a)

As to the question of the specific intent inquiry, if a plaintiff adequately pleads a claim for deliberate indifference, which requires a pleading of reckless disregard, then he has sufficiently alleged the intent required for the Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires evidence from which a jury could find that the defendant acted with the specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Soler v. San Diego, County of · filed 2020-10-05(a)-(b)

Here, contrary to Banuelos’ assertion, there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Banuelos acted with the requisite intent to establish liability under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff alleging excessive force to show that the officer specifically intended to violate the right to be free from unreasonable seizure.

AGG v. City of Hayward · filed 2020-10-13

A plaintiff must also show that an officer had a “specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.”

Section 52.1 requires allegations showing that the defendant specifically intended to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Cook v. City of Fremont, California · filed 2020-10-28

Cook has not alleged sufficient involvement or knowledge by Romley with respect to Tang’s use of excessive force showing that Romley possessed the specific intent to violate Cook’s rights. Accordingly, Cook’s failure to allege such facts provides a separate basis, in addition to the statute of limitations, to dismiss the Bane Act claim against Romley.

Reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights can satisfy the Bane Act’s specific intent requirement.

Greer v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-02-17(a)

As the Ninth Circuit suggested in Reese, a showing of reckless disregard can satisfy the Bane Act’s requirement of specific intent to interfere with a person’s constitutional rights.

Section 52.1(b) requires specific intent to violate the asserted right; reckless disregard for constitutional rights can be evidence of that intent.

Rocha v. City of Antioch · filed 2021-03-10(b)

... and, although a Bane Act claim requires an additional showing that the defendant "had a specific intent to violate the arrestee's right from unreasonable seizure," see Reese, 888 F.3d at 1043 (internal quotation and citation omitted), a "reckless disregard for a person's constitutional rights" can be "evidence of [such] specific intent," see id. at 1045 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement can be supported by evidence of reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights.

Gomez v. Fachko · filed 2021-04-30

Defendants are incorrect. As the Ninth Circuit held in Reese, “reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.” ... Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Gomez, the qualified immunity analysis above shows that Officer Fachko acted with reckless disregard for Gomez’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force. ... Thus, summary judgment is inappropriate on the Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires a Bane Act plaintiff to show specific intent to violate protected rights; allegations permitting an inference of that intent can support the claim.

Almahmodi v. City of La Mesa · filed 2021-06-22

A Bane Act plaintiff must show the defendant acted with specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s protected rights. ... For these reasons, the Court finds the Complaint’s allegations are sufficient to support the specific intent requirement.

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement can be satisfied by allegations that officers acted with reckless disregard for the person’s rights.

Sanz v. City of Vallejo · filed 2021-06-30

While there is no indication Defendants specifically intended to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the Court finds the facts alleged adequately show Defendants “acted with reckless disregard” towards Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.

A Section 52.1 claim arising from an allegedly unlawful arrest must plead each defendant’s conduct individually so the claim gives fair notice of the alleged specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Reyes v. United States of America · filed 2021-02-16(b)

In this case, Plaintiff fails to plead the actions of each Defendant individually pursuant to the Bane Act. Plaintiff groups all Defendants together in alleging that his rights pursuant to Civil Code section 52.1 and Article I, Section 13 of the California Constitution were violated. However, group pleading does not provide Defendants fair notice of the claims against them because “the egregiousness required by Section 52.1 is tested by whether the circumstances indicate the arresting officer had a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure . . . .” Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 801-02.

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff alleging an unreasonable seizure to show specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to be free from that seizure.

Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim · filed 2021-08-03

California’s Bane Act, codified as Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1, requires plaintiffs to demonstrate “a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of liability under the Bane Act.

A Bane Act plaintiff must allege and prove specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s protected rights.

Shine v. Fuston · filed 2021-09-29(b)

Instead, a Bane Act plaintiff must allege and prove specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s protected rights.

A Bane Act claim must allege with particularity each officer’s conduct and specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Melendez v. City of Mountain View · filed 2021-11-17(b)

Melendez must allege what each officer did, and that each officer had the requisite specific intent to violate his constitutional rights.

Whether an officer had the specific intent required for a Section 52.1 claim can be a jury question when the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct is disputed.

Dudgeon v. Sonoma · filed 2021-11-18

For the reasons discussed above, however, the Court finds that the reasonableness of Deputy Woodworth’s conduct, and by extension, whether he had the specific intent required for a Bane Act claim, are questions that must be decided by a jury.

A Bane Act claim requires facts showing that the defendant specifically intended to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

G. v. City of Lafayette · filed 2021-11-29(b)

Plaintiffs do not assert in the FAC or in their Opposition that any defendant had the specific intent to violate their rights, as is required to show a violation of the Bane Act.

Section 52.1’s specific-intent element can be plausibly pleaded by alleging that an officer acted to stop a person from protesting and intentionally interfered with First Amendment rights.

Burgess v. County of San Diego · filed 2021-12-07

Plaintiff also sufficiently pleads the second element of specific intent by alleging that Defendant Huff’s actions were “taken in order to prevent Plaintiff from continuing to protest” and that he “intentionally interfered with or attempted to interfere with Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.” SAC ¶ 53. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim against Defendant Huff.

Section 52.1 requires intent beyond an objectively unreasonable use of force; evidence of reckless disregard can support that intent.

Evans v. Jacobsen · filed 2021-12-09

However, “[e]vidence simply showing that an officer’s conduct amounts to a constitutional violation under an ‘objectively reasonable’ standard is insufficient to satisfy the additional intent requirement under the Bane Act.” ... A jury could reasonably find that Jacobsen acted in “reckless disregard” when he shot into the dimly lit balcony.

For an excessive force claim under the Bane Act, allegations that an officer used more force than necessary can satisfy the specific intent requirement at the pleading stage.

Estate of Jose Alfredo Castro Gutierrez v. Castillo · filed 2021-12-17(b)

Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to support that the amount of force used by Defendant Castillo could be considered “more than necessary under the circumstances” to satisfy the specific intent requirement for a Bane Action violation.

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement in an excessive force claim may be satisfied by allegations showing reckless disregard of the person’s rights.

Pogue v. County of San Diego · filed 2022-01-19

While Deputy Hayek contends that “Plaintiff[] do[es] not identify any facts showing Deputy Hayek applied excessive force with a criminal intent of violating [Decedent]’s Constitutional rights,” (see id.), he fails to address whether Plaintiff adequately alleges that he exhibited “reckless disregard” of Decedent’s rights. ... The Court therefore DENIES the County Motion as to Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action against Deputy Hayek under the Bane Act.

A Bane Act excessive force claim can survive summary judgment when the evidence permits a jury to find that officers acted in reckless disregard of the person’s constitutional rights.

Harris v. City of Tulare · filed 2022-01-24(a)

Moreover, if a jury were to conclude that Jontell did not have the baton raised above his head and were to also determine that officers Clinton and Valencia were sufficiently far away from him when he was shot, the jury could also reasonably conclude that officers Clinton and Valencia acted in reckless disregard of Jontell’s constitutional rights. Therefore, the court concludes that defendants are not entitled to summary judgment in their favor with respect to plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate a person’s rights, which may be inferred at the pleading stage from allegations that an officer repeatedly clubbed the person.

Shirazi v. Oweis · filed 2022-02-14

The Bane Act requires a “specific intent” to violate a person’s rights. Reese v. Cty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cornell v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 801-02 (2017)). Construing the alleged facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, “specific intent” may be reasonably inferred from the allegation that Bates surrounded her and clubbed her repeatedly on the head, neck, shoulder, and body.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate protected rights, which allegations supporting an excessive force claim may establish at the pleading stage.

Johnson v. City of San Jose · filed 2022-03-16

While it is “incorrect that proving a Fourth Amendment violation vicariously triggers Bane Act liability,” Sandoval v. Cty. of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 520 (9th Cir. 2018), the Court finds that Johnson’s allegations in support of the excessive force claim against Officer Adgar meet the requirements to allege a specific intent to violate Johnson’s rights under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1(a)’s specific-intent requirement can be satisfied by allegations of deliberate indifference.

Armstead v. County of Alameda · filed 2022-03-26(a)

That reasoning is persuasive: by pleading deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs here alleged the specific intent required for the Bane Act claim.

A Bane Act plaintiff must show that the defendant specifically intended to violate the state or federal right at issue.

Wood v. City of Sacramento · filed 2022-06-02

A plaintiff pursuing a Tom Bane Act claim must also show that “the [defendant] officer had a specific intent to violate” the state or federal right at issue.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate a protected right, and a claim may proceed when a reasonable jury could find that intent.

Thurston v. City of Vallejo · filed 2022-08-04

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Thurston, it is possible that a reasonable jury could find the officers had the specific intent necessary to prove up a Bane Act claim. The court denies summary judgment on this clam.

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement can be satisfied by allegations that an official was deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s medical needs in violation of constitutional rights.

Estate of Haile Neil v. County of Colusa · filed 2022-09-16(b)

The plaintiff must demonstrate specific intent behind the deprivation of the constitutional right. ... Courts have also found that prisoners who sufficiently allege officials acted with deliberate indifference to their medical needs in violation of their constitutional rights also adequately allege a Bane Act violation. See M.H., 90 F. Supp. 3d at 899. In the instant case, the Court has identified facts sufficient to support a finding of deliberate indifference on the part of Cunningham. See supra Section III.C. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claim Seven is DENIED.

Section 52.1(b)’s specific intent requirement is satisfied by an adequately pleaded claim of deliberate indifference.

Frost v. County of San Diego · filed 2022-09-30(b)

An adequately pled claim for deliberate indifference satisfies the specific intent requirement under the Bane Act.

Section 52.1’s specific-intent requirement can be satisfied by evidence of recklessness.

Cortesluna v. Leon · filed 2022-10-12

However, evidence of recklessness can be sufficient to demonstrate specific intent.

Section 52.1 permits an excessive-force claim when the defendant acts with specific intent to violate a clearly delineated right; reckless disregard of that right can satisfy the intent requirement.

The Estate of Demetrius Stanley v. City of San Jose · filed 2022-11-09

For present purposes, viewing the complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the Court concludes that allegations indicating that Officer Baza shot Mr. Stanley while Mr. Stanley was retreating from Officer Baza’s vehicle, are sufficient at the pleading stage to state a plausible claim for violation of the Bane Act based on a clearly delineated right and reckless disregard of that right.

Section 52.1 requires a defendant to have specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s protected rights.

Coleman v. Shasta County · filed 2022-12-08(b)

Absent any evidence or argument establishing that Defendants had the specific intent to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Claim Five.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights; retaliatory excessive force can support a finding of that intent.

Cordero v. City of San Francisco · filed 2022-12-12

In light of the Court’s ruling on the Section 1983 claim, a reasonable trier of fact could find Officers Cotter and Oesterich liable on the Bane Act claim, but not the other officers. This includes the specific intent requirement. A reasonable trier of fact could find that the officers were retaliating for Plaintiff having, in their view, intentionally assaulted Officer Oesterich.

A Bane Act claim based on unlawful arrest or detention requires allegations that the officer specifically intended to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Dalton v. County of San Diego · filed 2022-04-25(b)

This Court is both persuaded by those cases reading Shoyoye narrowly and compelled by Reese to follow Cornell. Thus, whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a Bane Act violation depends on whether the allegations indicate “the arresting officer had a specific intent to violate” Steven and/or Pizzo’s constitutional rights.

A Bane Act claim requires facts showing that each defendant intended to interfere with the plaintiff’s rights.

Abu v. County of San Diego · filed 2022-06-17

Moreover, the current allegations are insufficient for any DOE defendant to be held liable under the Bane Act because there are no facts indicating DOES 1-10 had the required intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s rights.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate protected rights; a Bane Act excessive force claim fails when there is no evidence of unreasonable force or intent to use it.

Gutierrez v. Nangle · filed 2023-04-27

However, also as discussed above, no reasonable jury could find the officers violated plaintiff’s right against the use of excessive force, and plaintiff has not offered any evidence supporting a claim that officers had the specific intent to use unreasonable force, Reese, 888 F.3d at 1045, so the court grants defendants’ motion regarding the excessive force component of the Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 leaves to the jury whether a defendant acted with the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of a clearly delineated and plainly applicable right.

Mollica v. County of Sacramento · filed 2023-05-16

The second, factual question -- whether defendants acted with the purpose of depriving plaintiff of her constitutional rights -- is one properly reserved for the trier of fact.

Section 52.1’s specific-intent requirement may be satisfied by evidence that officers intended to use unnecessary force or detain someone without probable cause.

Payne v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2023-07-03(b)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers acted with the specific intent to use more force than was necessary under the circumstances and to detain Richard without probable cause.

Section 52.1 permits an excessive-force claim to survive summary judgment when the evidence could allow a jury to find that officers acted in reckless disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.

Tucker v. City of Elk Grove · filed 2023-07-27(c)

Plaintiff’s claim against defendants for violation of the Bane Act is based on the same alleged facts as his claim of use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court has concluded that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant officers acted unreasonably under the Fourth Amendment when they shot plaintiff. From this same evidence, a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant officers acted in reckless disregard for plaintiff’s rights.

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement can be satisfied by adequately pleading reckless disregard of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Agro Dynamics, LLC v. Drug Enforcement Administration · filed 2023-09-19

As to the second question in Sandoval, construing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Plaintiff has adequately pled that County Officers acted with reckless disregard for its Fourth Amendment rights.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to interfere with a clearly delineated and plainly applicable right; a vague or novel application of the Fourth Amendment fails the first prong of that requirement.

Sanchez v. County of Sacramento · filed 2023-09-25(b)

However, the “clearly established” standard applies to federal qualified immunity; under California’s Bane Act, the “clearly delineated” standard governs, which is different. ... Although “the right to be free from warrantless seizures of personal property is well-established and clearly delineated[,]” Sandoval, 912 F.3d at 520, the Court concludes that it would be a vague and novel application of the Fourth Amendment to find that Allbee violated Plaintiff’s federal and state constitutional rights by impounding her vehicle on the bases of a suspended license and no vehicle insurance despite the presence of other licensed drivers. Because the first prong of specific intent is not met, the Court need not address the second prong.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to interfere with a protected right; reckless disregard can support that finding, and the coercion need not be separate from the alleged violation.

Douglas v. City of Los Angeles · filed 2023-10-03

The Bane Act does not require that such coercion be “independent from the constitutional violation alleged,” but does require “a specific intent” to violate the right. ... Moreover, as addressed with the retaliation and ADA claims, a reasonable jury could find that the Officers acted with at least reckless disregard, if not a specific intent, to violate Douglas’s rights. Accordingly, summary judgment must be DENIED as to this claim.

A Bane Act excessive force claim requires specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights; allegations of continued painful force after the officer was told of the pain can satisfy that requirement at the pleading stage.

Lua v. McNett · filed 2023-10-12(a)

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations sufficiently allege specific intent to deprive him of his constitutional rights and properly allege a Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1’s specific-intent requirement can be satisfied at the pleading stage by allegations that defendants violated constitutional rights with reckless disregard for those rights.

Smith v. City of Marina · filed 2024-01-03

At the motion to dismiss stage, however, allegations of conduct that violates constitutional rights coupled with allegations that the conduct was done with reckless disregard for a party’s rights can be sufficient to establish specific intent.

Section 52.1’s intent requirement can be met by evidence that a defendant recklessly disregarded a person’s constitutional rights.

Johnson v. City of San Jose · filed 2023-11-13(b)–(c)

The Court agrees that Mr. Johnson has established a triable issue of fact as to whether Officer Adgar evinced reckless disregard for Mr. Johnson’s constitutional rights for the same reasons it denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity—that is, because there is a material issue of fact as to whether Mr. Johnson had a clearly established right to be free from the force Officer Adgar is alleged to have inflicted, there is a related issue of fact as to whether Officer Adgar struck Mr. Johnson with a 40mm PIW and thereby recklessly disregarded that clearly established right.

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff to plead that the defendant acted with specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights.

A.H. v. West Contra Costa Unified School District · filed 2023-09-28

To state a claim under the Bane Act, A.H. must plead that the District acted with the specific intent to violate her civil rights.

Section 52.1’s specific-intent requirement can be satisfied by reckless disregard of a detainee’s right to adequate medical care.

Estate of William Hayden Schuck v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-02-08

“Reckless disregard of the ‘right at issue’ is all that [i]s necessary,” Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 803, and this Court has found above that Plaintiffs plausibly allege the mental health provider acted with “objective deliberate indifference” to Schuck’s right to adequate medical care, which is equivalent to a showing of reckless disregard.

A Bane Act claim can survive a motion to dismiss when the alleged sequence of events supports an inference of retaliatory intent to violate civil rights.

Adjaye v. Cook · filed 2024-02-15

For now, it is sufficient that Adjaye has alleged a chronology of events that could support an inference of retaliation.

Section 52.1 liability depends on the defendant’s subjective intent, so a genuine dispute about that intent can preclude summary judgment.

Fink-Carver v. Kuhn · filed 2024-02-22

Because subjective intent matters for liability under the Bane Act, summary judgment in favor of Kuhn is inappropriate.

Section 52.1 requires intent beyond the underlying rights violation; facts showing reckless disregard can satisfy that requirement.

Doe v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-03-05(b)

Thus, for any Bane Act claim, “some showing of intent in addition to showing the constitutional violation” is required. Reese, 888 F.3d at 1044 (emphasis added); see also Losee v. City of Chico, 738 F. App’x 398, 401 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting the “additional intent requirement under the Bane Act”). But facts demonstrating “reckless disregard” meet that burden, because “a reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1045.

A Bane Act claim requires proof that the defendant specifically intended to violate the plaintiff’s rights; a constitutional violation alone does not establish reckless disregard of those rights.

Olfati v. City of Sacramento · filed 2024-03-27

Moreover, although the court grants summary judgment on plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search of plaintiff’s residence curtilage and unreasonable seizure of plaintiff’s person by defendants Robinet and Stanionis, plaintiff fails to establish either defendant recklessly disregarded her rights.

Section 52.1(b) requires an officer to have specific intent to violate an arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.

Langham v. City of Union City · filed 2024-04-10(b)

This provision provides that an officer must have had a “a specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” Reese v. City of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). ... With these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated sufficient facts to support an allegation for violation of the Bane Act.

Section 52.1 requires facts showing the defendant specifically intended to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Yang v. County of Yuba · filed 2024-06-13

However, even if Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Title 15 safety checks were enough to satisfy the Bane Act’s predicate constitutional violation requirement — which the Court has already found they are not sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claim against Ramos and Palmer — Plaintiffs do not allege any facts which suggest Ramos or Palmer acted with the specific intent to violate Yang or Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement can be satisfied by reckless disregard of the right at issue.

Brink v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-07-03

As noted, under the Bane Act, “[r]eckless disregard of the ‘right at issue’ is all that [i]s necessary.” Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 803.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate a right that is clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances.

Ottele v. Martinez · filed 2024-08-23(b)

In addition, the Bane Act requires a specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights. ... There is a two-part test for finding specific intent: (1) “is the right at issue clearly delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case,” and (2) “[d]id the defendant commit the act in question with the particular purpose of depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests protected by that right?” ... The Court finds the Bane Act claim cannot proceed under this standard.

A Bane Act claim may be based on allegations sufficient to state a constitutional deliberate indifference claim.

Ahn v. GEO Group, Inc. · filed 2024-03-25

Because these allegations are sufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they also are sufficient to maintain a Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires a plaintiff to allege intentional interference with a constitutional right.

D.T. v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-09-19

To state a valid Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant both interfered with (or attempted to interfere with) one of their constitutional rights, and said interference must have been intentional.

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement can be satisfied by reckless disregard of the right at issue; objective deliberate indifference is akin to such disregard.

Estate of Abdiel Sarabia Hernandez v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-09-30

As noted, under the Bane Act, “[r]eckless disregard of the ‘right at issue’ is all that [i]s necessary.” Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 803. In the Section 1983 context, a claim under the objective deliberate indifference standard is akin to showing reckless disregard.

A Bane Act claim plausibly alleges specific intent when the defendant acted with reckless disregard of the right at issue.

Estate of William Hayden Schuck v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-11-20

As noted above, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendant Kahl acted with reckless disregard to Schuck’s right to adequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss Kahl from Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim.

A Bane Act claim requires specific intent to violate a right; allegations of a constitutional violation coupled with reckless disregard can satisfy that requirement.

Hills v. City of Chula Vista · filed 2024-11-26

Plaintiff’s TAC is silent regarding any allegations as to intent or reckless disregard—which courts in the Ninth Circuit have held to be sufficient when joined with allegations of constitutional rights violations to establish specific intent in a Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires facts supporting an inference that the defendant specifically intended to violate protected rights.

Edgerly v. County of Alameda · filed 2024-12-02

The Complaint, as pleaded, does not contain facts from which I could infer that the County or the Doe Defendants acted with specific intent to violate Brand’s rights.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights for a Bane Act claim.

Yang v. County of Yuba · filed 2024-12-03(b)

However, the Bane Act still requires “a showing of the defendant’s specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement can be met by alleging reckless disregard of the underlying constitutional right.

Essex v. County of Imperial, a Governmental Entity · filed 2025-02-18

In addition, a plaintiff meets the specific intent requirement by alleging that the defendant acted with a reckless disregard of the underlying constitutional right.

A claim under Section 52.1 requires specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Cheslik v. Madera County Sheriff's Department · filed 2025-03-31

In addition, the Bane Act requires a specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

Section 52.1 requires facts supporting a defendant’s specific intent to violate a constitutional right; a conclusory assertion of intent is insufficient.

Herrera v. United States · filed 2025-04-01

Specifically, Plaintiff makes only a conclusory statement of Defendants’ intent. ... Plaintiff alleges no facts that support such conclusions. ... Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED, the Bane Act claim is DISMISSED against Does 11-20, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend.

Section 52.1 requires allegations that state actors specifically intended to violate the plaintiff’s rights.

(PC) Kohut v. Allison · filed 2025-05-12(b)

Rather, the Bane Act merely requires that allegations establish that state actors exhibited “specific intent” to violate an individual’s rights.

Section 52.1(b) requires specific intent to violate a protected right; a Bane Act claim fails when the plaintiff offers no argument supporting that intent.

Sinsukthaworn v. County of Napa · filed 2025-05-19(b)

Further underscoring this conclusion is Plaintiffs’ failure to advance any argument as to Deputy Scannell or Officer Walsh’s specific intent, which is required for a Bane Act claim.

Section 52.1 requires specific intent to interfere with a protected right, and reckless disregard for that right can establish the required intent.

Gold v. California Highway Patrol · filed 2025-05-22(a)

If the jury credited Gold’s account over Officer Cho’s, the jury could reasonably find that Officer Cho recklessly disregarded Gold’s rights when she decided to open fire after Gold tossed away his gun instead of using other methods to bring Gold out of the bathroom.

Evidence of excessive force can support an inference of the specific intent required for a Section 52.1 claim.

(PS) Hanible v. County of Solano Sheriff's Office · filed 2025-06-23

A jury could draw a reasonable inference from that evidence of the necessary specific intent.

Section 52.1(b) requires specific intent to interfere with protected rights, and evidence of reckless disregard can create a triable issue on that intent.

Mullins v. County of Fresno · filed 2025-07-28(b)

The Bane Act requires a “specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable seizure.” Reese v. County of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). “[A] reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.” United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 885 (9th Cir. 1993). Consistent with the analysis of plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, there is a triable issue as to whether Curtice acted with reckless disregard when he fired his weapon at Mullins. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim is denied.

A Bane Act excessive force claim can satisfy the specific intent requirement at the pleading stage through allegations of intentional interference with, or reckless disregard for, the right to be free from excessive force.

Calvin Rush and Jayme Rush v. City of Vallejo · filed 2025-09-09(a)

Based on these factual allegations, the Court finds it plausible that Doe Officers intentionally interfered with, or at least acted with reckless disregard for, Jayme’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force. Plaintiffs’ allegations are therefore sufficient at the pleading stage.

Section 52.1(a) requires a plaintiff bringing a Bane Act excessive force claim to show that the officer specifically intended to violate a constitutional right.

Poslof · filed 2025-10-27(a)

The elements of a Bane Act claim are essentially identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim, with the added requirement that the government official had a specific intent to violate a constitutional right. ... Here, if Mr. Poslof can provide facts suggesting officers indeed slammed his face into the ground twice, that would be sufficient to state a claim under the Bane Act against those officers.

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement is satisfied by an adequately pleaded claim of deliberate indifference.

Estate of Matthew Settles v. County of San Diego · filed 2025-10-30

An adequately pleaded claim for deliberate indifference satisfies the specific intent requirement of the Bane Act.

Section 52.1’s specific intent requirement can be satisfied by reckless disregard of the right at issue.

Mascorro · filed 2025-11-17

The intent requirement is satisfied where the defendant allegedly acted with “[r]eckless disregard of the right at issue.” ... Therefore, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a Bane Act claim against Defendant Officers and Garcia.

A Bane Act claim against officers may proceed when the complaint alleges a rights violation and sufficient facts to support reckless disregard.

Cruz · filed 2026-01-30

However, contrary to Defendants’ wholesale dismissal, Plaintiffs have alleged a violation of Decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights by Defendant Officers and pleaded sufficient facts to support that Defendant Officers acted with reckless disregard.

Section 52.1 permits vicarious liability for an employee’s conduct, but imputing another entity’s employee’s conduct requires a viable respondeat superior theory.

Diaz v. Tesla, Inc. · filed 2019-12-30

But Diaz fails to articulate any viable theory under which the actions of Martinez—a Chartwell employee—could be imputed to either nextSource or CitiStaff under respondeat superior.28 ... The motions for summary judgment on the Ralph and Bane Act claims are GRANTED.

A public entity may be vicariously liable under the Bane Act for an employee’s conduct within the scope of employment when the complaint plausibly alleges that basis for liability.

Astorga v. County of San Diego · filed 2022-05-17

Because the Court finds Plaintiff’s FAC plausibly pleads vicarious liability, it is incorrect to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under the Ralph and Bane Acts.

Section 52.1 permits employers to be held vicariously liable for Bane Act violations committed by their employees.

D.J.M.J. v. City of Lincoln · filed 2023-01-19

In general, employers can be vicariously liable for Bane Act violations committed by their employees.

Section 52.1 permits a municipality to be held vicariously liable for alleged Bane Act violations by specific employees.

Spath v. County of Santa Clara · filed 2023-07-07(b)

Accordingly, Santa Clara’s motion to dismiss on the basis the Bane Act does not apply to municipalities is DENIED on the grounds Santa Clara may be vicariously liable.

An employer is not liable under the Bane Act for threats made by a former employee after her termination; any liability for those threats is the former employee’s personally.

Frazier v. Ulta Beauty Inc. · filed 2023-03-30

Accordingly, to the extent that anyone is liable under the Bane Act, it would be Ms. Beck personally, not Defendant.

Section 52.1 permits a school district to be held vicariously liable for an employee’s Bane Act violation under the general scope of employment test.

EP. v. Tehachapi Unified School District · filed 2024-04-22

Thus, the Court agrees that vicarious liability may be imposed on school districts in the context of a Bane Act cause of action and concludes that the general scope of employment test is the correct one moving forward.

Section 52.1 permits a Bane Act claim against a county for jail staff’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when the county may be vicariously liable under Government Code section 845.6.

Bouman v. County of San Diego · filed 2024-04-05

To the extent that the County may be vicariously liable for the conduct of Does 1–12 under California Government Code section 845.6, the Complaint states a valid Bane Act claim against the County.

Section 52.1(b) permits claims against public officials, and their employers may be vicariously liable for the officials’ Bane Act violations.

Bailey v. Shasta Union High School District · filed 2024-11-19(b)

Although the district may not be liable directly, public officials may be liable under the Bane Act, and if so, their employer may be vicariously liable.

Section 52.1(c) permits a private Bane Act claim only by the individual whose rights were allegedly violated through threats or intimidation.

Icon Desert Logistics v. City of Blythe · filed 2020-12-07(c)

As such, a claim brought pursuant to the Bane Act is not cognizable unless it is brought by the individual person whose rights have allegedly been violated due to the threats or intimidation.

Section 52.1 does not provide a wrongful death cause of action.

Calonge v. City Of San Jose · filed 2021-03-05(b)

Because the Bane Act does not include a wrongful death cause of action, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim without leave to amend because this pleading cannot be cured by the allegation of additional facts.

Section 52.1(c) allowed the estate to bring the decedent’s Bane Act claim, but gave the other plaintiffs no standing to bring it.

The Estate of Elisa Serna v. County of San Diego · filed 2022-03-18(c)

It provides standing only to Serna’s Estate in this case. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(c) (injured individual “may institute and prosecute [civil action] in their own name and on their own behalf”); Bay Area Rapid Transit Distr. v. Superior Ct., 38 Cal. App. 4th 141, 144 (1995).

Federal qualified immunity does not bar a claim under § 52.1.

Mendoza v. National City, City of · filed 2021-07-09

As Plaintiff argues in opposition, qualified immunity is a federal doctrine that does not extend to state claims. ... The Court finds Defendants have not satisfied their initial burden on summary judgment with regard to the Bane Act claims, and Defendants’ motion on this issue is DENIED.

Statutory damages can be available on a Bane Act claim even without proof of actual damages.

Moody v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation · filed 2022-10-04(c)

Statutory damages (described as “nominal” in Klein) are available on Jones’ Bane Act claim in the absence of any actual damages.

Section 52.1 permits a Bane Act claim against a sheriff based on supervisory conduct.

Greer v. County of San Diego · filed 2023-03-01

The California Supreme Court has implicitly held that a Bane Act claim can be brought against a sheriff based on supervisory conduct.