Cal. Civ. Code § 51

Section 51(f) makes an ADA violation a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, so facts sufficient to establish an ADA claim also establish an Unruh Act claim.

Gilbert v. K & R Beer & Wine LLC · filed 2022-03-08(f)

The Unruh Act also incorporates an individual's rights under the ADA by reference, such that a violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges and services in a business establishment based on his disability. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 34-41.) Moreover, because Plaintiff's complaint properly alleges a prima facie claim under the ADA, Plaintiff has also properly alleged facts establishing the necessary elements for an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim.

Section 51(f) makes a violation of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Gilbert v. Modesto Group Inc. · filed 2022-03-24(f)

A violation of the ADA also violates the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

An ADA violation also violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act under Section 51(f).

Trujillo v. Malwa Food Mart Inc · filed 2022-04-25(f)

A violation of the ADA also violates the Unruh Act.

Section 51(f) makes an ADA violation a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Whitaker v. Sheikh · filed 2022-04-28(f)

As expressly provided by statute, a violation of the ADA also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f); see also Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 664-65 (2009). Here, because plaintiff’s FAC properly alleges a prima facie claim under the ADA, plaintiff also properly alleges facts supporting a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Section 51(f) makes a violation of an individual’s rights under the ADA a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Johnson v. Lo · filed 2022-05-09(f)

Here, the Court, having assumed as true the factual allegations in the Complaint, finds Nguyen, as owner of Kim Anh Spa, and Hankee Ii, as owner of Han Kee Restaurant, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (see Compl. ¶¶ 1, 12-16, 20-21, 25-26, 30-31, 36, 45-46, 49-53), and, consequently, the Unruh Civil Rights Act ("Unruh Act"), see Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (providing "[a] violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of [the Unruh Act]").

An ADA violation also constitutes a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act under Section 51(f).

Garcia v. Woldemichael · filed 2022-08-22(f)

The Unruh Act provides that “[a] violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of” the Unruh Act.

Section 51(f) makes any violation of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Whitaker v. D.S.A. Sports, Inc. · filed 2022-09-15(f)

Mr. Whitaker has also sufficiently alleged an Unruh Act claim because “[a]ny violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act.” M.J. Cable, 481 F.3d at 731; Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

Section 51(f) makes an ADA violation an Unruh Act violation but does not require a Title III entity to give primary consideration to a requested accommodation.

MARK BAX V. DOCTORS MED. CTR. OF MODESTO · filed 2022-10-18(f)

The Baxes also argue that the “primary consideration” rule applies to DMC under the Unruh Act. We reject this contention. The plain text of the Unruh Act provides: “A violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336) shall also constitute a violation of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). Under the ADA, “primary consideration” does not apply to Title III entities like DMC.

Section 51(f) makes a violation of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Johnson v. Lo · filed 2022-10-19(f)

Johnson has also sufficiently alleged an Unruh Act claim because “[a]ny violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act.” M.J. Cable, 481 F.3d at 731; Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

Under section 51(f), sufficiently alleging an ADA violation also sufficiently alleges an Unruh Act claim.

Gastelum v. Pinnacle Hotel Circle LP · filed 2022-12-05(f)

A violation of the ADA is also necessarily a violation of the Unruh Act., see Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f) (“A violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA] also constitutes a violation of this section.”); Vogel, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1011, and the DPA, see Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(d) (“A violation of the right of an individual under the [ADA] also constitutes a violation of this section[.]”). Because Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an ADA claim, see supra Section II.B.1, he has also sufficiently alleged claims under both the Unruh Act and the DPA.

Section 51(f) treats a violation of the ADA as a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Patterson v. Six Flags Theme Parks Inc. · filed 2023-01-06(f)

A violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

Section 51(f) makes an ADA violation a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Johnson v. Akkaya · filed 2023-08-15(f)

Johnson has therefore established Defendants violated the Unruh Act by proving that they violated the ADA.

Section 51(f) makes a violation of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Gilbert v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2023-10-02(f)

Because Gilbert has established a violation of the ADA, he has also established a violation of the Unruh Act.

Section 51(f) makes a violation of an individual’s ADA rights a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Dozier v. Gasco Inc. · filed 2023-11-07(f)

Plaintiff has standing to bring his Unruh Civil Rights Act claim because a violation of the right of any individual under the ADA “shall also constitute a violation of this section,” and, unlike the ADA, entitles the Plaintiff to relief for past harm. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51(f), 54(c).

Section 51(f) makes an ADA violation a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, so a sufficiently pleaded ADA claim also states an Unruh Act claim.

Shaw v. Pin Setters, Inc. · filed 2024-04-10(f)

“Any violation of the ADA necessarily constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 731 (citing Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f)). Therefore, if plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an ADA claim in the first cause of action, he has also alleged the elements for a claim under the Unruh Act in the second cause of action.

Section 51(f) makes a violation of Title III of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

(PS) Dozier v. Mai · filed 2024-06-17(f)

Under California's Unruh Act, “[a] violation of the right of any individual under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990...shall also constitute a violation of this section.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). ... Because Plaintiff has shown that Defendant is in violation of Title III of the ADA, he has also shown that Defendant is in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Section 51 treats a violation of the ADA as a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Sepulveda v. Garcia · filed 2024-10-09

The Unruh Act provides that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. ... Since plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim is predicated on defendants’ alleged violation of the ADA, he is entitled to $8,000 in statutory damages for the two occasions he denied access the business.

An ADA access violation at a business establishment also supports an Unruh Act claim under section 51.

Sepulveda v. Gray · filed 2024-10-09(f)

The Unruh Act provides that a violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of the Unruh Act. ... Since plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim is predicated on defendant’s alleged violation of the ADA, he is entitled to $8,000 in statutory damages for the two occasions on which he was denied access to the business.

Section 51(f) treats conduct that violates the ADA as a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Sanchez v. North Beach Alliance, LLC · filed 2024-10-22(f)

Conduct that violates the ADA also violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Disabled Persons Act.

Section 51(f) makes an ADA violation a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Nordheim v. JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. · filed 2025-07-11(f)

An ADA violation also is a violation of California’s Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

Section 51(f) makes a violation of the ADA a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's LLC · filed 2008-07-29(f)

Mervyn’s failure to provide access by alternative methods constitutes a violation of the ADA, and thus a violation of both the Act and the DPA. (42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v); Civ. Code, §§ 51, subd. (f), 54, subd. (c).)

An adequately pleaded ADA access claim also states a claim under Section 51.

Whitaker v. AllSaints Spitalfields USA Retail LTD · filed 2022-01-27(f)

Thus, to the extent Whitaker has stated a ... claim under the ADA, he also has stated a claim under the Unruh Act.

Section 51(f) makes a violation of an individual's rights under the ADA a violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Raglin v. May · filed 2025-04-03(f)

Thus, by adequately pleading his ADA claim, Raglin has also adequately pleaded his Unruh Act claim ... Court thus finds this factor weighs in favor of default judgement.

Section 51(f) treats an ADA violation as an Unruh Act violation, allowing an Unruh Act claim to proceed when the complaint states an ADA claim.

Pilling v. Bay Area Rapid Transit · filed 2012-07-25(f)

However, because Plaintiff has stated a claim under the ADA against each defendant, Defendants’ Motion is denied as to Plaintiffs Unruh Act claim. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

Section 51(b) applies only to discrimination occurring within California.

Warner v. Tinder Inc. · filed 2015-07-31(b)

Thus, by its own terms, it is expressly limited to discrimination that takes place within California’s borders.

Section 51(b) limits Unruh Act claims to persons who were within California when the claim arose.

Strojnik v. 574 Escuela, LLC · filed 2020-03-31(b)

The California Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “within the jurisdiction of this state” in accord with its plain meaning as “within the state.” Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 46 Cal. 4th 661, 668 n.4 (2009); 1959 Cal. Stat. 4424. Since Strojnik has not alleged he was in California when his claim arose, the cause of action under the Unruh Act is not plausible.

Section 51(b) limits Unruh Act claims to injuries that occur in California.

Brooke v. Cosumnes River Land LLC · filed 2020-04-29(b)

Because the Unruh Act only applies to injuries that occur in California, Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action is DISMISSED without leave to amend.

Section 51(b) requires an injury within California; alleging a California office alone does not establish that an out-of-state claimant was injured there.

Brooke v. IA Lodging Santa Clara LLC · filed 2020-07-08(b)

Here, Brooke, a resident of Arizona, does not claim that she accessed the reservation website within California. Instead, she merely alleges that she has a San Jose office. FAC ¶ 1. That bare allegation is not enough to show that she was injured “within the jurisdiction of” California. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).

Section 51(b) requires a California connection for an online access claim, such as the plaintiff’s California residency or accessing the website while in California.

Langer v. Home Depot Product Authority, LLC · filed 2020-11-24(b)

Accordingly, the Unruh Civil Rights Act may only apply in the present action if Mr. Langer is a resident of California or if he accessed Home Depot’s website while in California.

Section 51(b) applies only to discrimination that occurs in California.

Juarez v. Social Finance, Inc. · filed 2021-04-12(b)

It therefore expressly applies only to discrimination that occurs in California.

An out-of-state plaintiff must allege that she was in California when she experienced the alleged discrimination; merely having a California office does not establish standing under section 51(b).

Brooke v. Superb Hospitality LLC · filed 2021-03-29(b)

The Unruh Act limits its scope to “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of [California].” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). ... The Court finds this to be a reasonable and common sense application of the Unruh Act and its limitation to people “within the jurisdiction of [California].” ... The FAC does not allege that Brooke was in her San Jose office when she experienced the alleged discrimination. Therefore, dismissal of Brooke’s Unruh Act claim for lack of standing is appropriate.

Section 51(b) does not apply to discrimination experienced by a person physically outside California, even when the business is based in California.

Gomez v. Tribecca, Inc. · filed 2022-05-10(b)

Given this, the Court is persuaded by the weight of authority that the statute does not apply to persons who were not physically in California when they experienced discrimination by a California-based business.

Section 51(b) applies only to discrimination occurring within California; an Arizona resident who does not allege discrimination in California cannot state an Unruh Act claim.

COLLEEN HUBER V. BIDEN · filed 2022-12-20(b)

Here, Huber, a resident of Arizona, does not allege that she suffered the challenged discrimination while in California. Huber cites no authority applying the Unruh Act extraterritorially, nor offers any basis to overcome the statute’s plain language or the presumption against extraterritorial application of California law.

Section 51 does not apply to alleged conduct by a Missouri state agency in Missouri.

McCoy v. The State of Missouri · filed 2023-08-29(b)

The Unruh Act, for instance, is a California state law, and has no bearing here.

Section 51(b) does not require California residency when the alleged discrimination occurred in California.

Faris v. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention · filed 2024-09-30(b)

The limited precedent they cite for this proposition doesn’t reflect a California residency requirement for Unruh Act claims.

Section 51 covers discrimination that takes place within California, so allegations of discrimination only in another state do not state a claim under it.

Boose · filed 2025-12-19

Boose’s complaint does not identify any discrimination taking place within California’s borders and instead focuses on the sex discrimination purportedly suffered in the State of Georgia. Therefore, Boose’s claim for sex discrimination against Defendants fails as a matter of law.

Section 51 applies only within California and does not govern hotel practices in Hawaii.

Archibald v. Cinerama Hawaiian Hotels, Inc. · filed 1977-09-06

Section 51 by its express language applies only within California. It cannot (with its companion penalty provisions in § 52) be extended into the Hawaiian jurisdiction.

Section 51 applies only to discrimination within California’s jurisdiction; a flight’s California destination alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Keum v. Virgin America Inc. · filed 2011-03-04(b)

Keum’s complaint did not allege that the events in question took place in California; moreover, the fact that the flight was due to terminate in California is insufficient to bring the entire flight under California’s governance. Therefore, Virgin’s motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Keum’s Unruh Act claim is GRANTED.

Section 51(b) protects persons within California’s jurisdiction; an alleged injury occurring in Arizona does not satisfy that requirement.

Brooke v. Rihh LP · filed 2020-02-18(b)

Plaintiff has failed to show she is a person within the jurisdiction of California — indeed, her ... and thus her Unruh claim is DISMISSED WITH prejudice.

An independent Unruh Act claim requires intentional discrimination; a policy’s disparate impact on people with disabilities alone is insufficient.

Cullen v. Netflix, Inc. · filed 2012-07-13(b)

Thus, to sufficiently state a cause of action under the Unruh Act, Cullen’s claim cannot be based solely on the disparate impact of Netflix’s policies on hearing-impaired individuals but must be grounded in allegations of intentional discrimination.

Section 51 requires intentional discrimination through willful, affirmative misconduct; a facially neutral policy does not violate it merely because it disproportionately affects people with disabilities.

Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc. · filed 2014-02-05(b)

Here, GLAAD has similarly failed to establish the intentional discrimination needed to sustain an Unruh Act claim. At the time GLAAD initiated this action, CNN did not offer closed captioning on any news video displayed on CNN.com. As such, its policy of displaying online video programming without closed captioning applied equally to all CNN.com visitors, hearing-impaired or not. Such conduct does not demonstrate CNN’s “willful, affirmative misconduct” or intentional discrimination and, therefore, it cannot form the basis of an Unruh Act violation.

Section 51 requires proof of intentional discrimination to prevail on an independent Unruh Act claim.

Greater Los Angeles Agency on v. Cnn · filed 2014-02-05

We concluded that GLAAD was unable to prove a probability of prevailing on its Unruh Act claims as a matter of California law because GLAAD could not establish that CNN engaged in intentional discrimination.

Section 51 requires willful, affirmative misconduct to establish intentional disability discrimination independent of an ADA claim; deliberate indifference alone does not suffice.

Greater Los Angeles Agency on v. Cnn · filed 2014-02-05(b)

We decline to adopt the deliberate indifference standard in light of the California Supreme Court’s statement that a showing of intentional discrimination under the Unruh Act contemplates “willful, affirmative misconduct.”

A plaintiff alleging disability discrimination under Section 51 may plead discriminatory intent generally to survive a motion to dismiss.

Castaneda v. Burger King Corp. · filed 2009-02-18(b)

Although intent is pled generally, defendants offer no authority suggesting that intent must be pled with particularity. Defendants motion to dismiss the state claims for failure to state a claim is therefore denied.

Section 51 requires a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination based on transgender status to plausibly allege that the defendant knew of that status.

Duronslet v. County of Los Angeles · filed 2017-06-20(b)

To show that the County intended to discriminate against her based on her transgender status, Plaintiff must plausibly allege that the County knew of her transgender status.

Section 51 permits an Unruh Act claim independent of an ADA violation only for facial or intentional discrimination.

Doe v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. · filed 2018-12-12(b)

Otherwise, only facial or intentional discrimination is actionable under the Unruh Act.

Section 51 requires a claimant pursuing an Unruh Act violation independent of an ADA violation to plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations.

Jones v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation · filed 2019-10-10(b)

To establish a violation of the Unruh Act independent of a violation of the ADA, a party “must ‘plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act.’” Greater L.A. Agency on Deafness, Inc. v. CNN, Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 425 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 627 (Cal. 2009)).

Section 51(b) requires facts supporting a plausible inference of racial discrimination; awareness of a person’s race and racial differences between groups alone do not suffice.

Fanaro v. County of Contra Costa · filed 2020-01-08(b)

The mere fact that the deputies may have been aware of Fanaro’s race does not make a racial discrimination claim plausible, nor does the fact that most Norteños are a different race.

Section 51 discrimination claims require a plausible allegation of discriminatory intent.

Domen v. Vimeo, Inc. · filed 2020-01-15(b)

Both the California Unruh Act and the New York Human Rights Law require that Plaintiffs show discriminatory intent.

Section 51 requires a plaintiff to allege intentional discrimination; conclusory allegations that officers discriminated do not state an Unruh Act claim.

Mann v. City of Chula Vista · filed 2020-09-28(b)

The Court has concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations that Officers Dominguez and Martinez discriminated against Plaintiff are conclusory. The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation of the Unruh Act.

A claim of intentional discrimination under section 51 requires supporting facts; conclusory allegations do not suffice.

Estate of Linda Miller v. County of Sutter · filed 2020-11-02(b)

Plaintiffs must plead intentional discrimination to obtain relief under the Unruh Act. ... Plaintiffs pursuing Unruh Act claims in federal courts may not rely on a conclusory allegation of intentional discrimination. ... Here, the complaint asserts conclusions rather than alleging facts to claim HIG and Wellpath discriminated intentionally.

Section 51(b) requires facts plausibly showing that sex motivated the denial of full and equal accommodations; an inadequate response to a sexual harassment complaint alone does not establish that motivation.

Jane Doe 1 v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District · filed 2020-05-19(b)

As discussed in detail above, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to plausibly allege discrimination on the basis of sex. Plaintiff argues in her Opposition that the School District’s inadequate response to her allegations of rape was motivated by her sex. However, the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to infer motivation on the basis of sex. Rather, the complaint centers on the School District’s interest in protecting its “star athletes.” The court dismisses Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action and grants Plaintiff leave to amend.

A plaintiff can state a claim under section 51 by alleging either an ADA violation or intentional discrimination.

Brooke v. Torrey Inn LP · filed 2021-01-19(f)

Likewise, under the Unruh Act, a plaintiff must allege either that the defendant violated the ADA or had the intent to discriminate.

Section 51(b) generally requires intentional discrimination for an Unruh Act claim independent of an ADA violation.

Love v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc. · filed 2021-03-29(b)

In general, the Unruh Act only “prohibit[s] intentional discrimination in access to public accommodations.” Harris v. Capital Growth Inv’rs XIV, 805 P.2d 873, 874 (Cal. 1991).

Section 51 permits a disability discrimination claim to proceed when the plaintiff alleges that disability was a substantial motivating reason for a failure to accommodate.

L.J. v. Poway Unified School District · filed 2020-12-02

Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged that the substantial motivating reason for Ju’s alleged discriminatory conduct by failing to accommodate was due to Plaintiff’s disability. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

An Unruh Act disability discrimination claim brought separately from an ADA claim requires allegations of intentional discrimination.

Johnson v. Birks Properties, LLC · filed 2022-01-11

However, where a plaintiff pleads an Unruh Act claim separate from an ADA claim, as here, she must allege intentional discrimination.

Section 51(b) permits a medical-condition discrimination claim to proceed when the complaint alleges an arrest following disclosure of medication use and remarks about that use.

Herzog v. Lopez-Cuen · filed 2022-03-15(b)

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint provides specific allegations of discrimination against Plaintiff based on his medical ... condition. ... As stated above, admitting to taking fluoxetine earlier in the day is insufficient on its own to support a finding that Plaintiff was driving under the influence. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Unruh Act claim is thus DENIED.

Section 51 requires intentional discrimination to state an Unruh Act claim.

Ryan v. County of Imperial · filed 2022-09-29(b)

Intentional discrimination is required for violations of the Unruh Act.

An independent Unruh Act claim requires specific facts showing intentional discrimination when the accompanying ADA claim fails.

Lloyd v. Facebook, Inc. · filed 2022-10-03(b)

The claim also cannot be maintained independently because Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts showing intentional discrimination.

Section 51 requires facts showing intentional discrimination and that a protected characteristic motivated the denial of business services.

Austin v. Zhang · filed 2022-05-18(b)

Similar to the claim for discrimination under section 1981, Austin has failed to allege facts to establish that Green Dot intentionally discriminated against him or that his protected characteristic was a motivating factor for the denial of a refund. He has therefore failed to state a claim under the Unruh Act.

Section 51(b) permits an Unruh Act claim when a bank allegedly closes an account with discriminatory intent based on a protected characteristic.

Nia v. Bank of America, N.A. · filed 2022-05-18(b)

The Unruh Act prohibits certain forms of discrimination against individuals by businesses. ... Plaintiff alleges sufficient factual allegations to state a claim that BANA closed his account with an intent to discriminate at this stage.

Section 51 requires facts supporting intentional discrimination; a bare conclusion that a customer was stopped because of race does not state a claim.

Jimenez v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. · filed 2023-08-07

Merely concluding that plaintiffs were stopped because of their race, without alleging any facts in support of that conclusion, is insufficient to state a claim under the Unruh Act.

Section 51 requires facts supporting a reasonable inference that a protected characteristic motivated the alleged discrimination; conclusory allegations of bias do not suffice.

Johnson v. United States · filed 2024-01-08(b)

These allegations are entirely conclusory. There are no facts in the complaint that support a reasonable inference that race or sex was a motivating factor in Kennedy’s alleged misconduct.

Section 51 requires facts supporting intentional discrimination; conclusory allegations of different treatment do not state a claim.

Bridges v. Kohl's Stores, Inc. · filed 2024-02-13(b)

However, these allegations are conclusory and thus insufficient to state a cognizable claim under the Unruh Act.

Section 51 supports a disparate-treatment claim, but not a disparate-impact claim.

Oliver v. Navy Federal Credit Union · filed 2024-05-30

Disparate treatment is the only theory available under Section 1981, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and Florida Section 725.07.

Section 51(b) requires evidence of intentional discrimination to survive summary judgment on an Unruh Civil Rights Act claim.

Doe v. State Farm General Insurance Company · filed 2024-10-11(b)

But Plaintiff must also present evidence of intentional discrimination to survive a motion for summary judgment on this claim, which he has failed to do.

An Unruh Act disability access claim based on California Building Code violations requires proof of intentional discrimination; a claim premised on an ADA violation does not.

Stiner v. Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. · filed 2024-12-13

“[T]o establish a violation of the Unruh Act independent of a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (‘ADA’), [Plaintiffs] must ‘plead and prove intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act.’” ... Accordingly, summary judgment as a matter of law is appropriate with respect to Plaintiffs’ Unruh Act claims that are predicated on violations of California law, including the CBC. Since “no showing of intentional discrimination is required where the Unruh Act violation is premised on an ADA violation,” the Court’s intentional discrimination analysis does not bear on those Unruh Act access barrier claims that rest on alleged ADA violations.

Section 51 requires proof of intentional discrimination for an independent Unruh Act claim based on a denial of public accommodations; negligent medical treatment alone does not suffice.

Valadez v. Sutter Health Memorial Hospital Los Banos · filed 2025-07-07(b)

While plaintiff has provided evidence that points to the Hospital’s negligence when treating Valadez, she has not provided sufficient evidence to create a dispute of material fact that the Hospital intentionally discriminated against Valadez.

Section 51(b) permits a discrimination claim to proceed when the evidence could allow a reasonable jury to find that a business terminated a membership because of race or sexual orientation rather than a legitimate reason.

Floyd v. Saber Fitness Hegenberger, LLC · filed 2025-07-31(b)

Therefore, a question of fact exists as to whether Saber terminated the Agreement because of Floyd’s protected characteristics or because of a legitimate reason.

Section 51 does not require a plaintiff alleging intentional racial discrimination to prove that a white customer received different treatment.

Orji v. Superstores · filed 2025-09-30(b)

As to Defendant’s argument about whether Plaintiff can “prove” her treatment was unequal compared to a white customer, the Court notes at the outset that there is no such requirement for Unruh claims.

Section 51(b) requires plausible allegations that access to a business establishment was denied because of intentional discrimination when no ADA violation is plausibly alleged.

Ydigoras · filed 2025-12-02(b)

Because Plaintiff has not plausibly pled a violation of the ADA, he must establish that Defendant denied him access to a business establishment based on intentional discrimination. Plaintiff has failed to do so.

Section 51 permits an inference of intentional discrimination at the pleading stage when a store stops a Black customer from using a checkout method that other shoppers, including a white customer, use without interference.

Nwanonyiri · filed 2026-01-07(b)

These allegations, which are credited at this stage, are specific and point to conduct and instances where others not in Plaintiff’s protected class were treated differently. ... Defendant’s motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

Section 51 requires intentional race discrimination and does not cover disparate impact.

Mackey v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. · filed 2019-01-23(b)

The Unruh Act requires proof of intentional acts of race discrimination and does not cover disparate impact .

Section 51(b) requires intentional discrimination for an Unruh Act claim independent of the ADA; failing to offer a deaf-accessible alternative to an aural identification system used for all customers does not meet that requirement.

Earll v. Ebay, Inc. · filed 2015-04-01(b)

Its failure to provide a deaf-accessible alternative to its ... aural identification system does not amount to willful, affirmative misconduct sufficient to constitute intentional discrimination under the Unruh Act.

Section 51 requires facts supporting a plausible inference of intentional discrimination; a conditional, conclusory allegation is insufficient.

Anofienem v. WeWork Companies · filed 2026-01-15(b)

Because Plaintiff has failed to cure this defect, alleging in conclusory and conditional fashion here that “[i]f discrimination occurred based on race, gender, or other protected characteristics, Defendant violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act,” Compl. ¶ 26 (emphasis added), the Court dismisses this claim without leave to amend.

Section 51 prohibits unreasonable age-based restrictions on children in rental housing, including rules limiting their use of apartment facilities.

Iniestra v. Cliff Warren Investments, Inc. · filed 2012-07-31

Having found that the Adult Supervision Rule, the Pool Usage Rule, the Unsúpervised Children Memo, the June 2011 Memo, and the Curfew Rule violate the Fair Housing Act, the Court now finds that they also violate the Unruh Act.

Section 51 covers real estate brokers and businesses selling or leasing residential housing.

Mulkey v. Reitman · filed 1966-05-10

The Un-ruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, §§ 51, 52) prohibited discrimination on grounds of “race, color, religion, ancestry, or natural origin” by “business establishments of every kind.” On its face, this measure encompassed the activities of real estate brokers and all businesses selling or leasing residential housing.

Section 51 prohibits landlords from refusing to rent an apartment to a person solely because of that person’s sexual orientation.

Hubert v. Williams · filed 1982-05-26

Accordingly, we hold that under the Unruh Act, landlords may not refuse to rent an apartment to a homosexual solely because of that person’s sexual preference.

Section 51 does not prohibit a residential covenant aimed at commercial use when the covenant does not bar any age group from residing there.

Barrett v. Lipscomb · filed 1987-09-24

Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, discrimination by business establishments based on race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin is prohibited. (Civ. Code, §§ 51, 53.) ... There is no language in the covenants to suggest that any age group is barred from residency.

Section 51(f) incorporates the entire federal ADA, including later amendments.

Department of Fair Employment & Housing v. Law School Admission Council Inc. · filed 2012-09-18(f)

The Court, therefore, finds that § 51(f) of the Unruh Act incorporates by reference the whole of the federal ADA “not only in [its] contemporary form, but also as [it] may be changed from time to time.”

A person who visits a business’s website intending to use its services has standing to claim denial of Section 51’s equal access rights if the person encounters exclusionary terms, even without entering an agreement or transaction.

White v. Square, Inc. · filed 2019-08-12(b)

We conclude that a person who visits a business’s website with intent to use its services and encounters terms or conditions that exclude the person from full and equal access to its services has standing under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, with no further requirement that the person enter into an agreement or transaction with the business.

The Act does not require a victim of discrimination to demand equal treatment and be refused before filing a legal action.

Angelucci v. Century Supper Club · filed 2007-05-31

As can be seen from the statutory language quoted above, the Act does not contain express language requiring that before a legal action may be filed, the victim of the asserted discrimination must have demanded equal treatment and have been refused.

A plaintiff who did not transact with an online business has standing under Section 51(b) only if it alleges that it visited the business’s website, encountered discriminatory terms, and intended to use its services.

Republican National Committee v. Google Inc. · filed 2026-01-16(b)

The RNC’s Unruh Act claim arises under Section 51(b), Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b), so White applies. See White, 7 Cal. 5th at 1025 (addressing claim under Section 51(b)). To establish statutory standing in cases involving “an online business” with which “the plaintiff did not actually transact,” the plaintiff “must allege” that it “visited the business’s website, encountered discriminatory terms, and intended to make use of the business’s services.” Gilbert, 157 F.4th at 1067–68 (quoting White, 7 Cal. 5th at 1032). The RNC did not transact with Gmail, does not allege that it intended to sign up for Gmail services or that it encountered discriminatory terms, and does not allege that it was a user or prospective user of Gmail. Accordingly, the RNC cannot establish Unruh Act standing.

A person who encounters an ADA accessibility violation while transacting with a business has standing under the Unruh Act even if motivated to visit by a desire to sue.

Gilbert v. 7-Eleven, Inc. · filed 2025-10-24(f)

But nothing in the Unruh Act nor any case interpreting it bars a claim by a plaintiff who can show injury—e.g., that they encountered alleged discrimination when they transacted with the defendant business—just because they were motivated by a desire to initiate litigation.

A plaintiff must suffer discriminatory conduct to have statutory standing to bring a claim under the Unruh Act.

White v. Square, Inc. · filed 2018-06-07(b)

To have statutory standing under the Unruh Act, a plaintiff must suffer discriminatory conduct.

Section 51 protects clients, patrons, and customers of business establishments, but does not cover a service provider denied a contract to furnish services.

Our Peculiar Family v. Inspire Charter Schools · filed 2020-06-23(b)

Expanding the Unruh Act to include this kind of discrimination would improperly extend its scope beyond what the California Supreme Court has determined the legislature intended.

A plaintiff suing under Section 51 must allege and ultimately prove a bona fide intent to use the defendant’s services to have statutory standing.

Rafael Arroyo, Jr. v. Golbahar · filed 2022-01-03

As White, Thurston, and Reycraft make clear, a plaintiff suing under the Unruh Act must allege—and ultimately prove—a bona fide intent to avail himself of the defendant’s services to have statutory standing.

To recover damages for a construction-related Unruh Act claim, a plaintiff must actually intend to use the business’s services, even if an ADA violation underlies the claim.

Rafael Arroyo, Jr. v. Golbahar · filed 2023-02-17

On the record before us, Arroyo has not shown that the district court erred by requiring that in order to obtain damages under UCRA, Arroyo, at trial, had to establish that he actually intended to utilize Rainbow Cleaners’ services.

A disabled person who personally experiences discrimination at a business has standing under the Unruh Act without paying a discriminatory fee.

Osborne v. Yasmeh · filed 2016-07-28

We therefore depart from Surrey’s bright-line rule and hold that tender of payment of a discriminatory fee is not required to establish standing under the Unruh Act where a disabled individual has personally experienced discriminatory treatment at a business establishment.

Section 51 incorporates ADA violations and also provides independent grounds for liability for discriminatory conduct.

Abelardo Martinez, Jr. v. Greatcollections.com, LLC · filed 2019-09-27

In the present context, a predicate ADA violation may serve as one avenue for liability under the Unruh Act, but alternate avenues to Unruh Act liability exist as well; the Unruh Act wholly incorporates ... the ADA alongside independent proscriptions on other discriminatory conduct.

Section 51 permits Unruh Act liability through an ADA violation or through independent prohibitions on discriminatory conduct.

Thurston v. Spectrum Wine Auctions, LLC · filed 2019-12-04

In the present context, a predicate ADA violation may serve as one avenue for liability under the Unruh Act, but alternate avenues to Unruh Act liability exist as well; the Unruh Act wholly incorporates ... the ADA alongside independent proscriptions on other discriminatory conduct.

Section 51 permits Unruh Act liability on multiple grounds, including intentional discrimination and an ADA violation; an ADA violation is not required for every claim.

Rusty Rendon v. Bracketron, Inc. · filed 2020-01-07

In the present context, Unruh may be violated in a number of ways, only one of which is an ADA violation. See generally Cal. Civ. Code § 51.

An ADA violation is one way to establish an Unruh Act violation, but the Act also allows independent non-ADA theories of liability.

Licea v. The Home Depot, Inc. · filed 2020-12-17(f)

In the present context, Unruh and the CDPA may be violated in a number of ways, only one of which is an ADA violation.

Section 51(b) provides an independent basis for an Unruh Act claim without relying on an ADA violation.

Langer v. Roya Nikzad PHD Allergy & Acupuntcure · filed 2023-09-12(b)

Here, Plaintiff specifically pleads a claim under § 51(b), a separate provision of the Unruh Act that does not rely on an ADA violation.

Section 51(f) makes an ADA violation an Unruh Act violation, while the Act also permits a disability discrimination claim based on independent state law rights.

Sandoval v. Ace Hardware Corporation · filed 2025-08-28(f)

Plaintiff alleges violations of the UCRA (1) under the California Civil Code Section 51 et seq., which guarantees specific rights to people with disabilities, and (2) under California Civil Code Section 51(f), which provides that a violation under the ADA also violates the UCRA. (FAC ¶¶ 66-67.) The UCRA provides for liability independent of the ADA, and Plaintiff’s claim is not dependent on federal law.

Section 51(d) does not bar an Unruh Act claim seeking construction that another provision of law requires.

Wilkerson v. Fujinaka Properties, LP · filed 2020-04-01(d)

Accordingly, Section 51(d) does not bar plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim.

Section 51 protects airline passengers against discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin and is not preempted by the Federal Aviation Act.

Abou-Jaoude v. British Airways · filed 1991-02-27

We conclude the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt the Unruh Civil Rights Act protecting all persons, including airline passengers, against discrimination on grounds of sex, race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin.

Section 51 does not prevent legislative bodies from enacting ordinances that distinguish among adults by age.

Burnett v. San Francisco Police Department · filed 1995-07-18

Nothing in the Act precludes legislative bodies from enacting ordinances which make age distinctions among adults.

Section 51 does not override Insurance Code limits on coverage or its administrative process for challenging underwriting rules.

Wilson v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission · filed 1996-06-27

Third, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, by its own terms, is designed not to encroach upon the Insurance Code or other existing law. Civil Code section 51 provides in part: “This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law . . . .” Wilson’s right, if any, to be covered under National Vitamin’s policy is clearly subject to the comprehensive provisions of the Insurance Code regarding underwriting practices, including the provision that administrative claims by persons allegedly aggrieved by an underwriting rule are to be submitted to the Insurance Commissioner.

Section 51 does not support an age discrimination claim against a car rental company for refusing to rent to drivers under 25 when section 1936 authorizes a minimum rental age.

Lazar v. Hertz Corp. · filed 1999-02-17

It is also significant that the Act specifically provides that it must not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is otherwise conditioned or limited by law. (§51.) Hence, that provision anticipates that if there is a conflict between its provisions and those of another statute, the former defers to the latter. For all these reasons, we are confident that section 1936 bars an Act claim of age discrimination on the basis of a refusal to rent vehicles to persons under age 25.

Section 51(b) protects equal access to business services, including the right to seek a contract without citizenship-based discriminatory terms.

Chattopadhyay v. Bbva USA · filed 2021-10-26(b)

Thus, Section 1981 and the Unruh Act protect Plaintiffs’ right to contract free of citizenship discrimination, which includes making contracts on the same terms offered to U.S. citizens.

Section 51(b) protects equal access to business services regardless of immigration status; at the pleading stage, a creditor’s categorical ban based on that status cannot be deemed justified by public policy on this record.

Camacho v. Alliant Credit Union · filed 2023-01-10(b)

The Court cannot find, at this point or on this record, that Alliant’s categorical ban on ... the basis of immigration status is supported by public policy such that, as a matter of law, it does ... not constitute a violation of the Unruh Act.

Section 51 does not protect speech or prohibit discrimination based on viewpoint.

Huber v. Biden · filed 2022-03-18(b)

But the premise of Plaintiff’s argument is false—the Unruh Act does not protect speech.

Section 51 does not support a national-origin discrimination claim over a tuition exemption conditioned on California high school attendance.

Martinez v. Regents of University of California · filed 2008-10-07(b)

Plaintiffs contend they adequately pleaded a claim under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51), in that they are American citizens from states other than California who are being discriminated against on the basis of national origin (reverse discrimination) and geographic origin. We shall conclude plaintiffs fail to show grounds for reversal regarding the Unruh Civil Rights Act claim. ... Section 68130.5 does not discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis of national origin. Plaintiffs are denied the exemption from nonresident tuition, not because they are United States citizens, but because they have not attended high school in California.

Section 51 requires a plaintiff alleging discrimination based on non-lawyer status to plead facts showing that the status is a protected personal characteristic.

Williams v. American Arbitration Association · filed 2025-11-25

While it may be possible for occupation or profession to qualify as a personal characteristic under the Act in some circumstances, Williams has failed to plead any facts establishing that his non-lawyer status is such a personal characteristic.

Section 51(b) does not treat wealth as a protected classification under the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

(PS) Decker v. Johnson · filed 2022-10-18(b)

Wealth is not a protected classification and Plaintiffs allegations are conclusory.

Section 51 protects people denied full and equal facilities and privileges of a business establishment because of race, color, or creed.

Crowell v. Isaacs · filed 1965-07-16

One who violates the act is liable for damages “suffered by any person denied the rights” granted by section 51. That is the right to “full and equal” facilities and privileges of defendant’s business establishment, regardless of race, color or creed. The statute protects those so discriminated against.

Section 51 prohibits a business establishment from excluding customers based on sex, even when the practice serves its economic self-interest.

Easebe Enterprises, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board · filed 1983-04-18

An entrepreneur’s discriminatory practice based upon ostensible rational economic self-interest still violates public policy as codified in Civil Code section 51.

Section 51 prohibits a business establishment from arbitrarily excluding or terminating members based on sex because membership is an advantage or privilege under the Act.

Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary International · filed 1986-03-17

Because we conclude that membership in an organization constituting a business establishment is clearly an “advantage” or “privilege” under the Unruh Act, exclusion from or termination of membership arbitrarily on the basis of sex is prohibited.

Section 51’s listed grounds of discrimination are not exclusive.

Rolon v. Kulwitzky · filed 1984-03-20

We glean from those cases: ... (1) that the listing of discriminations in section 51 is not exclusive; and (2) that the common law rules relating to the obligation of a business devoted to public service not to discriminate in providing service remains an enforceable duty apart from the prohibition in section 51.

Section 51 does not recognize nonsmokers as a protected class.

King v. Hofer · filed 1996-02-08

We conclude based on the statutory language and history, legitimate business interests, and adverse consequences of inclusion, that nonsmokers are not a protected class under the Act.

Section 51 prohibits sex-based price discounts by businesses absent a compelling social policy supporting them.

Koire v. Metro Car Wash · filed 1985-10-17

The plain language of the Unruh Act mandates equal provision of advantages, privileges and services in business establishments in this state. Absent a compelling social policy supporting sex-based price differentials, such discounts violate the Act.

Section 51 permits a movie theater to offer discounted tickets to children and senior citizens when the discounts do not rest on an arbitrary class-based generalization.

Starkman v. Mann Theatres Corp. · filed 1991-02-27

Thus, we apply the Koire standard to determine if the discounts offered to seniors and children involve an arbitrary class-based generalization. We find they do not.

Section 51 did not require this insurer to offer joint umbrella policies to unmarried, cohabiting couples.

Beaty v. Truck Insurance Exchange · filed 1992-05-29

In light of the foregoing considerations, we must decline to extend the protection of the Unruh Act to plaintiffs even as we would to an unmarried, cohabitating heterosexual couple.

Section 51 prohibits a business from favoring married couples over registered domestic partners.

Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club · filed 2005-08-01

We conclude that the Unruh Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination against domestic partners registered under the Domestic Partner Act in favor of married couples.

Section 51 protects access to public accommodations with trained service dogs, but not dogs still in training.

Miller v. Corporaton · filed 2017-09-12(f)

Accordingly, we hold that the Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations with respect to trained service dogs, but not to service-dogs-in-training.

Section 51 permits a person alleging disability discrimination related to a service dog to bring an Unruh Act claim alongside a Disabled Persons Act claim.

Flowers v. Prasad · filed 2015-07-17(f)

In sum, because there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the Unruh Act and the DPA, a plaintiff alleging disability discrimination relating to the use of a service dog may assert claims under both statutory schemes, subject to any specific limitations stated in them.

Section 51 uses the definitions of mental and physical disability in Government Code sections 12926 and 12926.1.

Roman v. Bre Properties, Inc. · filed 2015-06-17(e)(1)

Similarly, the Unruh Civil Rights Act incorporates the definitions of mental or physical disability included in Government Code sections 12926 and 12926.1.

Section 51 treats HIV infection as a disability as a matter of law.

Maureen K. v. Tuschka · filed 2013-04-17(e)(1)

We conclude as a matter of law that HIV is a disability within the meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Section 51(e)(1) uses the FEHA definition of disability; the court held that an impairment must adversely affect a person's ability to do the job to qualify.

Nesson v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital District · filed 2012-02-10(e)(1)

Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the term “disability” means any mental or physical disability as defined in the FEHA. (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (e)(1).) In order for any impairment to amount to a “disability” it must have an adverse impact on the employee’s ability to do his job.

Section 51 requires accommodations for learning or reading-related disabilities under a facially neutral testing policy only to the extent the ADA requires them.

Turner v. Association of American Medical Colleges · filed 2008-10-30(c), (f)

Simply put, in addressing a claim that a facially neutral testing policy has a disparate impact on persons with learning and reading-related disabilities, accommodations are required to the extent they are required under the ADA.

A disability discrimination claim under section 51(b) requires factual allegations supporting discrimination.

(PC)Greene v. Price · filed 2023-01-06(b)

First, even assuming that the Unruh Civil Rights Act applies to state hospitals who house civil detainees, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to sustain a disability discrimination suit.

Section 51 supports a plausible claim when a landlord responds to a tenant’s assistance dog by threatening a rent increase and citing a no-pet policy to terminate the tenancy.

Weatherspoon v. Arfaei · filed 2023-02-13

Wayne Weatherspoon alleges that he has epilepsy, that he utilizes a trained assistance dog to protect him during seizures, that he rents a residential property from Reza Arfaei, and that after he told Arfaei he had an assistance animal, Arfaei told him he was going to raise the rent and later provided Weatherspoon with a notice of termination that specifically cited a no-pet policy as a reason for the tenancy termination. Compl. ¶¶ 9–17. When these allegations are taken as true, as they must be on a motion to dismiss, they are sufficient to support Weatherspoon’s claims against Arfaei, for violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–19, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12900– 96, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.

Section 51(b) permits an Unruh Act claim when an insurer allegedly uses a different claims investigation process because of a claimant’s mental illness; the claimant need not plead that the coverage decision would have differed.

Doe v. State Farm General Insurance Company · filed 2023-11-08(b)

However, at the pleading stage, Plaintiff does not need to “show” the coverage investigation would have turned out differently if he had no mental illness; he need only plausibly allege he was denied “full and equal . . . services,” which he has done. Plaintiff has plausibly pled State Farm treated him differently because of his mental illness.

Section 51 requires business establishments to provide equal accommodations regardless of race or disability; a sufficiently pleaded race discrimination theory can proceed even when the disability discrimination theory is insufficiently pleaded.

West v. PBC Management LLC · filed 2024-05-07

Because the Court finds West’s race discrimination claim under Section 1981 to be sufficiently pleaded but finds his disability discrimination claim under Title III to be insufficiently pleaded, the Court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 51 claim as to West’s race discrimination theory but grants with leave to amend defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 51 claim as to West’s disability discrimination theory.

Section 51 permits a sufficiently pleaded race discrimination claim against a business establishment, but a disability discrimination claim fails when the underlying disability allegations do not state a claim.

West v. PBC Management LLC · filed 2024-10-21

The Court therefore denies defendants’ motions to dismiss West’s Section 51 claim for race discrimination for the reasons set forth in the prior order, but grants defendant’s motions to dismiss West’s Section 51 claims for disability discrimination for the same reasons it grants defendants’ motions to dismiss his Title III claim under the ADA.

Section 51 prohibits a restaurant from intentionally denying disabled patrons restroom access when its policy and premises allow other patrons to use a restroom and an accessible restroom is available.

Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. · filed 1998-04-22

Rather, a combination of its policy and the physical layout of its premises allowed patrons who were not physically handicapped to use a restroom while dining at the restaurant (the one on the second floor), but denied that same service to physically handicapped patrons even though there was a restroom on the premises (the one behind the kitchen) that a physically disabled person could otherwise use. El Torito’s policy thus discriminated against disabled patrons.

Section 51 prohibits a restaurant from intentionally denying disabled patrons access to a usable restroom while providing restroom access to other patrons.

Hankins v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. · filed 1998-04-22

In sum, the record supports a finding that El Torito intentionally discriminated against Hankins in violation of section 51.

Section 51 does not bar a homeowners association from enforcing an architectural restriction when there is no evidence that its decision discriminated against a homeowner based on disability.

Cabrini Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. Haghverdian · filed 2003-08-04

We are also not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that the association discriminated against her based upon her disability in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51) because it “was advised of appellant’s health condition and ignored her disability in connection with its attempt to enjoin appellant’s conduct.” The evidence was to the contrary. ... There was no evidence that the new air conditioner was in any way ameliorative of appellant’s health problems. Thus, there was no evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that the association’s decision to have appellant remove the air conditioner was somehow discriminatory.

Section 51 protects a person regarded as having a mental condition that has no present disabling effect but may become disabling in the future.

Patrice L. Goldman, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. Standard Insurance Company · filed 2003-08-29

Because Goldman established that Standard refused to insure her based on a mental condition that has no present disabling effect, but that may become a mental disability that will substantially limit Goldman’s ability to engage in a major life function, she has established that she was “disabled” in 1997 within the meaning of the Unruh Act.

Section 51(b) does not establish disability discrimination when the evidence does not show that an exclusion was motivated by disability.

Kao v. University of San Francisco CA1/3 · filed 2014-08-05(b)

Kao argues that, by banning him from campus, USF violated the Unruh Civil Right’s act prohibition against disability discrimination (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b)). ... Moreover, the thrust of the evidence was that USF did not know what was causing Kao’s behavior, not that it had determined his behavior resulted from a disability. ... The evidence did not as a matter of law establish that USF had a discriminatory motive in keeping Kao away from campus.

A claim under Section 51(b) for disability discrimination in access to accommodations is subject to a three-year limitations period when it rests on the Unruh Act’s statutory protections.

Adams v. Community Housing Partnership · filed 2024-04-15(b)

Claim 7 is based in a violation of a statute (the Unruh Act) that protects against discrimination in provision of services by a public entity (HomeRise, as discussed in the next section). A three-year statute of limitations applies.

Section 51 does not entitle anyone to convenient access to medicinal marijuana.

The Kind and Compassionate v. City of Long Beach CA2/8 · filed 2016-07-12(b)

The Unruh Act entitles all persons, including those with disabilities, to “full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (b).) It does not entitle anyone to convenient access to medicinal marijuana.

Section 51 permits a claim for racially unequal treatment at checkout even when the customers ultimately complete their purchase.

Thomas v. Costco Wholesale Corp. · filed 2024-12-16(b)

Without more, Costco fails to persuade the Court that Plaintiffs’ ability to proceed with their transaction precludes their Unruh Act claim.

Section 51(b) requires denial of equal access to a business’s goods; discriminatory comments during a completed purchase do not alone state an Unruh Act claim.

(PS) Orji v. Walmart Superstores, Inc · filed 2025-01-14(b)

Because Plaintiff cannot show that she was denied the right to purchase Defendant’s goods, she cannot plead sufficient facts to support a claim under the Unruh Act.

Section 51 prohibits a theater from using a ticket’s seat-assignment term to segregate patrons by race or color.

Jones v. Kehrlein · filed 1920-10-23

...for the right to full and equal treatment, as prescribed in section 51 of the Civil Code, is subject only to conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens. This provision in the ticket, if meant to give the management the right to discriminate against plaintiff in seating him on account of his race and color, is to that extent illegal and void.

Section 51 requires equal accommodations regardless of race; a finding that a customer was denied full accommodations because of race supports a violation.

Hutson v. the Owl Drug Co. · filed 1926-09-28

While it is often difficult, as will be found from a review of the decisions in re violation of civil rights, to show that the complainant was denied full accommodations simply and solely on account of complainant’s race or color, the finding in this instance is direct and certain and clearly answers the assignment of error set forth in specification 2.

Section 51 requires equal access to municipal bathhouses open to the public, and alleged racial exclusion can be remedied by mandamus if the allegations are true.

Stone v. Board of Directors of Pasadena · filed 1941-11-14

Obviously, the cited case is of little value in the instant situation, for the reason that the acts here complained of are expressly enjoined by the provisions of section 5.1 of the Civil Code, to-wit: ... For the reasons stated, the first amended petition stated a cause of action against respondents, and, if the facts there alleged are all true, mandamus is the proper remedy to secure the relief sought.

Section 51 permits a race track to charge an admission fee that applies equally to all citizens; failure to pay it does not violate the statute.

Orloff v. Hollywood Turf Club · filed 1952-04-09

It is at once apparent that under the provisions of sections 51 and 52 of the Civil Code if a charge is made for admission to a race track, equally applicable to all citizens, that a failure or refusal by a citizen to pay such charge does not create a liability under the statute.

Section 51’s equal access rights at race tracks are statutory and may be changed by valid legislation.

Flores v. Los Angeles Turf Club, Inc. · filed 1961-05-08

Accordingly, the rights declared by Civil Code, sections 51-54, are statutory and, as such, are subject to such constitutional change as the Legislature may choose to make.

Section 51 protects against an owner's arbitrary exclusion of people from private property.

Ames v. City of Hermosa Beach · filed 1971-03-19

Section 20-10 purports to give the owner of private property the arbitrary power to exclude anyone at his whim, under penalty of criminal prosecution. Such an ordinance is clearly an interference with the civil rights guaranteed by Civil Code sections 51 and 52.

Section 51 permits a claim based on a dress rule requiring men, but not similarly dressed women, to wear ties to survive a general demurrer when the rule’s reasonableness depends on facts to be determined at trial.

Hales v. Ojai Valley Inn and Country Club · filed 1977-08-31

In re Cox constructed the Unruh Act as prohibiting only arbitrary discrimination, not all discrimination. Whether the requirement that men wear ties but women need not is arbitrary or reasonable turns not on the bare facts pleaded by Hales but upon other facts.

Section 51 permits a business to deny access on justified, nonarbitrary grounds; repayment of a debt does not by itself end a lawful exclusion.

Wynn v. Monterey Club · filed 1980-11-05

There is nothing in the language or underlying purpose of Civil Code section 51 or the cases interpreting it to indicate that its application or nonapplication turns on the narrow question of whether the potential customer is indebted to the establishment. The overriding issue is always whether the denial , of access to public accommodation is based on race, sex, religion or other arbitrary and unjustified grounds.

Section 51 protects equal accommodations and services in business establishments but does not address a disabled person's right to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle.

Buhl v. Hannigan · filed 1993-06-30

In the first place, we do not read either the ADA or the Unruh Act to address the issue of the right of a disabled person to operate a motor vehicle or motorcycle.

Section 51 protects a person accompanying bank customers to help with their business from racial discrimination in that accommodation.

Jackson v. Superior Court · filed 1994-12-08

We conclude that petitioner was pursuing an accommodation, advantage or privilege of the bank within the meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act when he accompanied his clients to the bank to aid them in transacting their business and that he has stated a cause of action under the Unruh Civil Rights Act by alleging that he was discriminated against in the exercise of this accommodation because of his race.

Section 51 does not make a broker liable when the broker acts in good faith, does all within his power to serve a buyer, and the sale fails solely because the owner refuses to sell based on race or color.

Vargas v. Hampson · filed 1962-03-26

In some circumstances, of course, both a broker and an owner may be guilty of discrimination, but a broker who in good faith does all within his power to serve a member of a racial minority is not liable if the broker’s failure to complete the transaction is due solely to the owner’s refusal to sell because of the buyer.’s race or color.

Section 51 may be enforced by the Attorney General in the name of the People through an action for injunctive relief, despite lacking express authorization for such an action.

Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County · filed 1963-09-11

The Unruh Act does not expressly authorize such an action to be brought in the name of the People, but it would seem that the reason for authorizing an action in the name of the People for injunctive relief under the Unfair Practices Act would be applicable in an action for injunctive relief under the Unruh Act. In view of the Supreme Court eases above cited, involving situations substantially analogous to the situation in the present case, it is concluded that the contention of the Attorney General (relative to maintaining the action) should be sustained.