Cal. Civ. Code § 3294

To seek exemplary damages from a corporation, a plaintiff must plead oppression, fraud, or malice by an officer, director, or managing agent.

Cangrade, Inc. v. Synopsys · filed 2026-01-16(b)

Therefore, Cangrade must plead that an officer, director, or managing agent of Synopsys committed an act of oppression, fraud, or malice.

Section 3294(c)(2) defines oppression as despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.

Gaylord v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance · filed 2011-03-04(c)(2)

“Oppression” is defined as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.”

Section 3294 permits punitive damages when the defendant’s conduct is oppressive.

Schanafelt v. Seaboard Finance Co. · filed 1951-12-27

Section 3294 of the Civil Code provides for punitive damages where defendant has been guilty of oppression. The jury was properly instructed on this subject. The evidence was sufficient to prove that the conduct of Mr. Alexander was oppressive and would have sustained an award of punitive damages against him.

Section 3294(b) permits punitive damages against a corporation only when an employee who qualifies as a managing agent participated in the conduct, meaning the employee exercised substantial independent authority and judgment such that the employee’s decisions ultimately determined corporate policy.

Mitri v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2014-04-01(b)

Under California law, managing agents are “corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.” ... Although the evidence was disputed, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Hasty was a managing agent from the totality of the evidence.

Section 3294 requires a punitive-damages plaintiff to prove oppression, fraud, or malice by clear and convincing evidence.

Dorroh v. Deerbrook Insurance Co. · filed 2016-12-09

Under California law, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages must prove “that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294; ... A plaintiff must show his or her entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294; ...

Under § 3294(b), whether corporate employees have sufficient authority to qualify as managing agents is a fact-bound inquiry that is not suitable for resolution on summary judgment.

Moses v. Aerotek Inc. · filed 2021-04-27(b)

Whether either one exercised sufficient authority to qualify as a managing agent for purposes of § 3294(b) “requires a factual inquiry not suitable for summary judgment.”

Section 3294(a) permits punitive damages when the plaintiff proves oppression, fraud, or malice by clear and convincing evidence.

Laron v. Wright Medical Technology, Inc. · filed 2022-02-28(a)

California law permits an award of punitive damages when the Plaintiff proves “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). “Oppression” is defined under California law as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Id. at § 3294(c)(2). ... Defendant has failed to show that, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a jury could not find its conduct was oppressive. The Court will therefore deny Defendant’s Motion as to punitive damages.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages only when the defendant's conduct rises to the level of fraud, oppression, or malice under a clear-and-convincing standard.

Duron v. United Parcel Service, Inc. · filed 2022-11-29

Duron’s claim for punitive damages also fails as a matter of law. No reasonable jury could conclude that anyone at UPS engaged in conduct that rose to the level of fraud, oppression, or malice, especially on a clear-and-convincing standard. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294.

For corporate punitive-damages liability under § 3294(b), the employee whose conduct is at issue must be an officer, director, or managing agent with substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of the corporation’s business; hiring and firing authority alone is insufficient.

Areopaja v. Morrison Management Specialists Inc · filed 2023-03-14(b)

“The managing agent must be someone who exercises substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” ... “The mere ability to hire and fire employees does not render a supervisory employee a managing agent under section 3294(b).” ... “[T]o demonstrate that an employee is a true managing agent under section 3294, subdivision (b), a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have to show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation's business.” ... Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct pertain to her manager and Ms. Toushin. There is no evidence that either Plaintiff’s manager or Ms. Toushin have a role in determining Defendants’ corporate policy. While Plaintiff contends that Ms. Toushin’s role qualifies her as a manager, she has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Toushin had substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of Defendants’ businesses. ... This clearly shows that Ms. Toushin was not so substantially involved in Defendants’ business so as to be considered an officer, director, or managing agent. Accordingly, since none of the individuals involved in Plaintiff’s termination were officers, directors, or managing agents of Defendants, Plaintiff may not seek punitive damages.

When the evidence raises a triable issue about whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under section 3294(b), the trier of fact must decide that question.

Davis v. Kiewit Pacific CA4/1 · filed 2013-09-18(b)

If there exists a triable issue of fact regarding whether a corporate employee is a managing agent under the White test, that factual question must be determined by the trier of fact and not the court on a motion for summary adjudication.

Section 3294(c)(1) requires despicable conduct as well as willful and conscious disregard to establish malice for punitive damages.

ANGIE M. v. Superior Court · filed 1995-07-31(c)(1)

As amended, the statute now requires “despicable” conduct in addition to willful and conscious disregard for a plaintiff’s interests.

Section 3294 requires proof of despicable conduct when malice is based on willful and conscious disregard of another’s rights rather than intent to injure.

Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance · filed 1992-03-04(c)(1)

Not only must despicable conduct be established, it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. ... The trial court’s failure to include this important term in its instructions on malice was error.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for negligent conduct that is despicable and carried on with conscious disregard for others’ safety, absent a statutory prohibition.

Bommareddy v. Superior Court · filed 1990-08-08(c)(1)

We note the same statute which added Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 also expanded the definition of malice found in Civil Code section 3294 to include “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, §5, pp. 5780-5781.) ... Thus, absent a statutory prohibition, punitive damages may be awarded on what is traditionally considered a negligence cause of action if the conduct amounts to despicable conduct carried on with conscious disregard of the safety of others.

Under § 3294(c)(1), intentional malice requires intent to injure, while despicable malice requires despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard; conscious disregard is akin to recklessness and does not itself establish subjective intent to injure.

Plyam v. Precision Development, LLC (In Re Plyam) · filed 2015-05-05(c)(1)

To be clear, our holding does not eviscerate a bankruptcy court’s ability or opportunity to apply issue preclusion to a state court jury’s findings pursuant to CC § 3294. To the extent the findings are clearly and solely based on a finding of Intentional Malice, fraud, or both, such findings are sufficient to meet the willfulness requirement of § 523(a)(6). ... But, to the extent that CC § 3294 findings are stated in the disjunctive or based on Despicable Malice or oppression or both, those findings prevent the use of issue preclusion as to § 523(a)(6) willfulness.

Section 3294(c)(1) treats conscious disregard as conduct requiring an intent to act while aware of probable dangerous consequences, rather than a subjective intent to cause injury.

In re: Yuri Plyam and Natalia Plyam · filed 2015-05-05(c)(1)

Comparing the explanations of reckless conduct provided by the Donnelly court and the Restatement of Torts with the definition of conscious disregard, it becomes clear that conscious disregard proceeds from reckless conduct. The common factor between conscious disregard and reckless conduct is the accompanying state of mind; both require solely an intent to act and the focus lies there, rather than on an intent to cause the consequences of the act as required by Geiger. Degrees of recklessness may exist; but, again, whether recklessness is heightened or gross, it is insufficient for a determination of § 523(a)(6) willfulness. In defining conscious disregard, the California Supreme Court in Taylor employed a description consistent with reckless conduct. As stated, acting with a conscious disregard within the meaning of CC § 3294 requires: (1) being aware of the probable dangerous consequences of one’s own conduct; and (2) willfully and deliberately failing to avoid those consequences. Taylor, 24 Cal. 3d at 895-96.

Section 3294(a) permits punitive damages in tort actions when clear and convincing evidence shows oppression, fraud, or malice; malice includes despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety.

Grano v. Sodexo, Inc. · filed 2020-08-18(a), (c)(1)

To establish “conscious disregard,” and thus malice necessary for award of exemplary damages, a plaintiff must show that defendant was aware of probable dangerous consequences of his conduct and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. ... Plaintiffs allege a long-standing pattern of inaction, which, if proven true, may show a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. ... At this juncture, the Court’s task is not to award or ascertain whether punitive damages are warranted, but only to consider whether no set of facts can be proved under the proposed amended pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim for punitive damages.

Section 3294(c) defines malice to include despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety, supporting punitive damages when the defendant knowingly fails to avoid probable dangerous consequences.

In Re Pacific Fertility Center Litigation · filed 2021-03-08(c)

Malice is defined for purposes of this section as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” ... “Conscious disregard for the safety of another may be found ‘where the defendant is aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his or her conduct and he or she willfully fails to avoid such consequences.’” ... Chart is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim.

Section 3294(c)(1) treats conscious disregard as malice when the defendant is aware of the probable consequences of its conduct and wilfully and deliberately fails to avoid them.

Weisman v. Blue Shield of California · filed 1984-12-21(c)(1)

The plaintiff must establish the defendant was aware of the probable consequences of his conduct and wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.

Section 3294 permits evidence of other fire and safety incidents to prove conscious disregard for workers’ safety in a punitive damages claim.

Barajas v. USA Petroleum Corp. · filed 1986-08-25

Plaintiffs attempted to prove that USA operated its plant with a conscious disregard for their safety, to obtain punitive damages within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294. ... While the evidence of other incidents could have theoretically affected the liability and nonpunitive damage assessment, it was admissible on the issue of conscious disregard.

Section 3294(c)(1) requires foreseeability before conduct can constitute conscious disregard of another’s rights; malice may also rest on intent to cause injury.

Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center · filed 1986-08-25(c)(1)

Appellants use the term malice, as defined in Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c)(1), to mean conduct which is intended to cause injury or which is carried on by the defendant with a “conscious disregard” of the rights or safety of others. ... We believe that respondents could not reasonably have foreseen that their effort to preserve life was legally tantamount to a “conscious disregard” of appellants’ rights. ... Obviously, such foreseeability is a condition precedent to any “conscious disregard” of individual rights. Additionally, we find no factual basis upon which appellants may argue that Glendale Adventist intended to cause Mr. Bartling injury. Accordingly, this allegation was also properly stricken.

Punitive damages based on malice or oppression require clear and convincing evidence of despicable conduct; an insurer’s unreasonable denial of coverage alone does not meet that standard.

Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. · filed 2000-03-29(a), (c)

In our opinion, the record falls well short of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the sort of contemptible conduct that could be described by the term “despicable.”

Section 3294 requires proof that conduct based on conscious disregard of another’s rights was despicable and willful to establish malice for punitive damages.

Lackner v. North · filed 2006-01-24(c)(1)

As amended, malice, based upon a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights, requires proof that the defendant's conduct is "despicable" and "willful."

Section 3294 requires willful, despicable conduct to establish malice based on conscious disregard; recklessness alone does not suffice.

Lackner v. North · filed 2006-01-24(c)(1)

Lackner contends the evidence raises a triable issue of fact as to whether North acted with malice or oppression under Civil Code section 3294 (hereafter section 3294). We disagree and conclude no reasonable juror could find his conduct was despicable. Lackner’s claim for punitive damages fails as a matter of law.

Section 3294(c)(1) requires despicable conduct to establish malice based on conscious disregard of another person’s rights or safety.

Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court · filed 2013-02-07(c)(1)

The IRB’s conduct, as reflected in the letters, lacks any hint of the necessary element of “despicable conduct” required for malice on the theory of “conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”

Section 3294 requires clear and convincing evidence of despicable conduct carried out with willful and conscious disregard for others’ safety to support punitive damages on this theory of malice.

Echeverria v. Johnson · filed 2019-07-09(c)(1)

There was no substantial evidence to support a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of despicable conduct which JJCI carried out with a willful and conscious disregard of the safety of others.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety.

Hardeman v. Monsanto Co. (In re Roundup Prods. Liab. Litig.) · filed 2019-07-15(c)(1)

As relevant here, California law provides for an award of punitive damages where the defendant acted with malice, meaning either "conduct which [was] intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff" or "despicable conduct which [was] carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1). It was reasonable for the jury to put Monsanto's behavior in the latter category, because the evidence easily supported a conclusion that Monsanto was more concerned with tamping down safety inquiries and manipulating public opinion than it was with ensuring its product is safe.

Section 3294(c)(3) treats intentional concealment of a material fact to deprive someone of property rights as fraud; concealing a community asset during dissolution can satisfy that definition.

Rossi v. Rossi · filed 2001-06-22(c)(3)

Here, one spouse intentionally concealed a significant community property asset. She intentionally consulted with the Lottery Commission as to how to deprive Thomas of a share of the prize; used her mother’s address for all communications with the lottery; and did not disclose the winnings in the dissolution proceedings. This supports a finding of fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294.

Section 3294(c)(3) requires intent to deprive a person of property or legal rights or otherwise cause injury for punitive damages based on fraud.

Diamond Woodworks, Inc. v. Argonaut Insurance · filed 2003-06-13(c)(3)

Argonaut further asserts there is no clear and convincing evidence it intended to deprive Diamond of property or legal rights or otherwise cause Diamond injury, a requirement that must be met to prove fraud under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c)(3). Once again, we disagree.

Fraud supporting punitive damages under section 3294(c)(3) requires intent to deprive a person of property or legal rights or otherwise cause injury.

Fariba v. Dealer Services Corp. · filed 2009-10-07(c)(3)

Thus, there was no clear and convincing evidence DSC intended to deprive Fariba of his property or legal rights, or otherwise to cause injury.

Section 3294 requires malice in fact for exemplary damages.

Tresemer v. Barke · filed 1978-11-22

The only form of malice contemplated by section 3294, which creates the right to exemplary damages, is malice in fact.

Section 3294 requires an evil motive to establish malice for exemplary damages; recklessness alone is insufficient.

GD Searle & Co. v. Superior Court · filed 1975-06-10

As explicated in Davis v. Hearst, supra, section 3294 views evil motive as the central, essential factor in the malice which justifies an exemplary award. That factor calls upon the jury to assess the defendant's actual state of mind; it is not satisfied by characterizing his conduct as unreasonable, negligent, grossly negligent or reckless.

Section 3294(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, or malice for punitive damages, and section 3294(c)(1) defines malice to include despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety.

R.N. v. Travis Unified School District · filed 2020-12-08(a), (c)(1)

Punitive damages require a plaintiff show by “clear and convincing evidence” the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). Malice is “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1). ... The factual allegations regarding the events on November 14, 2018 alone state a plausible claim for punitive damages against Ms. Gumapas. If taken as true, her actions on that date represent “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1). The specificity with which plaintiffs describe Ms. Gumapas’ alleged actions allows an inference of malice on the part of Ms. Gumapas.

Section 3294(b) defines malice to include intentional injury or despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard for others’ rights or safety.

Diew v. Amazon.com Services, LLC · filed 2021-06-15(b)

“California Civil Code § 3294(a) allows for the recovery of punitive damages only where a plaintiff shows the defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud in connection with the tortious conduct at issue. Under § 3294(b), malice is defined as either: (1) conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or (2) ‘despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’” Rhynes v. Stryker Corp., No. 10-5619 SC, 2011 WL 2149095, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2011) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(b)). “California courts have defined ‘despicable conduct’ as conduct which is ‘so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary people.’” Id. (quoting Mock v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 331 (1992)). For the reasons stated in the last section — despite the court’s skepticism that the plaintiffs can establish facts to support their entitlement claim to punitive and exemplary damages — the issue involves facts within Amazon’s exclusive knowledge that are better addressed on summary judgment. Given the circumstances of this defect (an exploding battery), the court denies the motion to dismiss.

Section 3294(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, or malice for punitive damages; under section 3294(c)(1), malice requires despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard, including actual knowledge of a risk and failure to take known risk-reducing steps.

Trejo v. California Forensic Medical Group · filed 2024-08-09(a), (c)(1)

To obtain punitive damages under California law, a plaintiff must establish “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). ... Section 3294(c)(1)’s “reference to ‘despicable’ conduct seems to represent a new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards,” because “‘despicable’ is a powerful term that refers to circumstances that are ‘base,’ ‘vile,’ or ‘contemptible.’” Butte Fire Cases, 24 Cal. App. 5th at 1161. “As amended to include this word, the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” Id.

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice to include despicable conduct carried out with a willful and conscious disregard of another’s rights or safety.

Hills v. City of Chula Vista · filed 2024-11-26(c)(1)

Under California law, Plaintiff must plead that Defendants “engaged in ‘oppression, fraud, or malice.’ Malice is conduct intended ‘to cause injury to the plaintiff’ or ‘despicable conduct’ carried out ‘with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’” Terpin v. AT And T Mobility LLC, 118 F.4th 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2024) (first quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a); and then quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)). ... Plaintiff’s TAC sufficiently alleges malice. (TAC ¶¶ 31–40). Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s punitive damages request at this time.

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice to include despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety.

Kinnee v. TEI Biosciences Inc. · filed 2023-11-27(c)(1)

Malice can be shown through “despicable conduct,” or conduct that is “carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice to include despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of another person's rights.

Lomboy v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association · filed 2025-10-10(c)(1)

“‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” ... Having reviewed the record, and considering the evidence above, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law at this stage that no reasonable jury could find clear and convincing evidence that Defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard” of Plaintiff’s rights (malice) or inflicted “cruel and unjust hardship” upon him “in conscious disregard” of his rights (oppression).

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice to include despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of another person's rights.

Miller v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. · filed 2025-11-05(c)(1)

At this stage and on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that no reasonable jury could find clear and convincing evidence that Defendant acted with “willful and conscious disregard” of Plaintiff’s rights (malice) or inflicted “cruel and unjust hardship” upon him “in conscious disregard” of his rights (oppression). See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)–(2).

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for malice only when malice in fact is established; “express or implied” describes how that malice may be proved.

Davis v. Hearst · filed 1911-06-06

It should be apparent that the malice, and the only malice, contemplated by section 3294 is malice in fact, and that the phrase ‘‘express or implied” has reference only to the evidence by which that malice is established; express malice thus meaning that the malice is established by express or direct evidence going to prove the actual existence of the hatred and ill-will; implied malice .referring to the indirect evidence from which the jury may infer the existence of this malice in fact.

Section 3294 requires malice to recover punitive damages.

Wright v. Baldwin · filed 1920-04-19

Punitive damages being recoverable under section 3294 of the Civil Code, as punishment for the motive of the act complained of, after compensation for the injuries suffered by the act has been made, malice is essential to recovery.

Section 3294 requires malice in fact as a predicate for recovering punitive damages.

McDonell v. American Trust Co. · filed 1955-01-21

Those facts do not spell an intentional tort (a conscious, deliberate intent to injure the plaintiffs) or conduct so recklessly disregardful of the rights of others (sometimes characterized as wanton or wilful misconduct) as would show the “malice” in fact which the statute (Civ. Code, § 3294) requires as a predicate for punitive in addition to actual damages.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for a noncontractual obligation only when the defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or express or implied malice; malice in fact must be pleaded and proved.

Gombos v. Ashe · filed 1958-03-19

Section 3294 of the Civil Code is the governing statute. It provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

Section 3294 requires malice, oppression, or fraud as a basis for exemplary damages.

Cohen v. Groman Mortuary, Inc. · filed 1964-12-02

Predicated on an action in tort, appellants seek exemplary damages for implied malice under section 3294, Civil Code. We have hereinabove held that appellants have not sued on pleadings alleging facts which impose liability on defendants and confer rights on them (appellants). Further, the complaint has alleged no intentional tort. The extent of the pleading at bar in regard to malice is that the “wrongful conduct of defendants . . . was committed with such wanton and wilful disregard of the sensibilities of plaintiff (s) as to constitute implied malice.” No facts relative to malice are alleged, only allegations consisting of legal conclusions— that the acts were “wrongful,” “wanton” and “wilful.” This does not create a cause of action.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages when malice is shown by willful, intentional misconduct done in reckless disregard of its possible results.

Black v. Shearson, Hammill & Co. · filed 1968-10-03

Malice in fact, sufficient to support an award of punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, may be established by evidence that “the defendant’s wrongful conduct was wilful, intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its possible results.”

Section 3294 requires intentional conduct accompanied by aggravating circumstances amounting to malice before punitive damages may be awarded.

Ebaugh v. Rabkin · filed 1972-01-14

The cases interpreting section 3294 make it clear that in order to warrant the allowance of punitive damages the act complained of must not only be wilful in the sense of intentional, but it must also be accompanied by aggravating circumstances, amounting to malice.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for fraud, oppression, or malice; an intentional act can qualify as malicious even when the resulting conduct is nonintentional if harm is highly probable.

Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier Service · filed 1984-12-21

Punitive damages are recoverable from the person responsible for the wrong where the tortious conduct involves fraud, oppression or malice. ... “Nonintentional conduct comes within the definition of malicious acts punishable by the assessment of punitive damages when a party intentionally performs an act from which he knows, or should know, it is highly probable that harm will result.” ... Under this reasoning, appellant may be entitled to punitive damages by virtue of Martinez’s conduct.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for malice when the defendant intends to cause injury or engages in despicable conduct with willful and conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights.

George F. Hillenbrand, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North America · filed 2002-10-24(c)(1)

In defining malice for punitive damages, the Legislature described two elements disjunctively: The defendant must intend to cause injury to the plaintiff or the defendant must engage in despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.

Under former section 3294, negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness alone does not establish the malice required for punitive damages.

Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital · filed 1989-08-01(c)(1)

Consequently, to establish malice, “it is not sufficient to show only that the defendant’s conduct was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless.” (Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155 [230 Cal.Rptr. 276].)

Section 3294 defines malice as conduct intended to injure or carried out with conscious disregard of another’s rights.

Travelers Insurance v. Lesher · filed 1986-11-24(c)(1)

As used in section 3294, “malice” means conduct intended to injure or conduct carried on with a “conscious disregard” of another’s rights.

Section 3294(c)(1) does not require a tortfeasor to know the injured party’s specific identity for punitive damages to be assessed.

Ramona Manor Convalescent Hospital v. Care Enterprises · filed 1986-02-06(c)(1)

We reject Care’s contention that punitive damages cannot be assessed where a tortfeasor is ignorant of the specific identity , of the injured party at the time the tort was committed.

Malice under section 3294(c)(1) includes a conscious disregard of another’s property rights, which can support punitive damages for trespass.

Goshgarian v. George · filed 1984-11-21(c)(1)

Under these circumstances, Mr. George manifested an unmistakably conscious disregard for the property rights of cross-complainants, and thus could reasonably be said to have acted with malice.

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice to include conduct carried on with conscious disregard of another’s rights or safety.

Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc. · filed 1984-10-30(c)(1)

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c)(1) defines malice as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”

Section 3294 allows a jury to consider punitive damages when the evidence of malice is sufficient to survive judgment as a matter of law.

Seimon v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. · filed 1977-02-28

He claims that pursuant to section 3294 of the Civil Code, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury might infer that Southern Pacific acted with malice. ... We cannot say, as a matter of law, that there was such a paucity of evidence on the issue of malice as to preclude the juiy from considering the propriety of an award of punitive damages against defendant, Southern Pacific.

Section 3294 does not permit punitive damages based solely on an insurer’s differing interpretation of a policy when the insurer acted in good faith.

Mason v. Mercury Casualty Co. · filed 1976-12-02

However, the crux of the matter is that a finding of malice cannot be predicated on the mere fact of a divergent interpretation of an insurance contract as long as the insurer’s interpretation was rendered in good faith.

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice to include despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

Johannessohn v. Polaris Industries Inc. · filed 2022-08-22(c)(1)

“ ‘Malice’ is defined as intentional injury or ‘despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ ” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 219 P.3d 749, 765 (Cal. 2009), as modified (Feb. 10, 2010) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)).

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice as an intent to injure or despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of others' rights or safety.

Karamanoukian v. Liviakis · filed 2023-07-27(c)(1)

“Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

For exemplary damages, an allegation that the defendant wrongfully, unlawfully, and violently shot the plaintiff inferentially pleads malice.

Vaughn v. Jonas · filed 1948-03-31

It seems to us that the charge that defendant committed on plaintiff a battery by gunshot “wrongfully, unlawfully and violently,” necessarily imputes to defendant “a wish to . . . injure another person” and “an intent to do a wrongful act.” Malice, therefore, is inferentially pleaded.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for oppression, fraud, or malice, and malice must be malice in fact established by evidence.

Sturges v. Charles L. Harney, Inc. · filed 1958-11-19

Civil Code, section 3294, provides that exemplary damages áre recoverable where the defendant has been guilty-'of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied. The malice contemplated by this section is malice in fact. The phrase “express or implied” has reference only to the evidence by which malice is established.

Section 3294 permits exemplary or punitive damages for a noncontractual obligation when the defendant acted with oppression, fraud, or express or implied malice.

Ellis v. City Council · filed 1963-11-21

Pursuant to Civil Code, section 3294, exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered for breach of an obligation not arising from contract where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages when a defendant acts with malice.

Duff v. Engelberg · filed 1965-10-18

The allowance of punitive damage was proper. The complaint had alleged, and the court found, that the acts of the conspirators were malicious. (Civ. Code, § 3294.)

Section 3294 allows exemplary or punitive damages when the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or express or implied malice.

Haun v. Hyman · filed 1963-12-20

Pursuant to Civil Code, section 3294, exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages when wilful, intentional wrongdoing done in reckless disregard of its possible results establishes malice in fact.

Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc. · filed 1967-06-12

But malice in fact,' sufficient to support an award of punitive damages on 'the-basis of malice as that term is used in Civil Code section 3294, • may be established by a showing that the defendant’s wrongful conduct was wilful, intentional, and done in reckless disregard of its possible results.

Section 3294 permits a discretionary award of exemplary damages upon a finding of malice.

MacDonald v. Joslyn · filed 1969-07-29

The award of exemplary damages was a proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion upon a finding of malice (Civ. Code, § 3294).

Section 3294 permits proof of malice in fact either directly or through inferences from indirect evidence.

Bertero v. National General Corp. · filed 1974-12-10

The malice in fact,, referred to by NGC as animus malus, may be proved under section 3294 either expressly (by direct evidence probative on the existence of hatred or ill will) or by implication (by indirect evidence from which the jury may draw inferences).

Section 3294 requires evil motive for a malice-based exemplary damages award; recklessness alone is insufficient.

G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court · filed 1975-06-10

The central spirit of the exemplary damage statute, the demand for evil motive, is violated by an award founded upon recklessness alone.

Section 3294 requires malice in fact, rather than malice in law, to support punitive damages.

Simmons v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. · filed 1976-09-28

Malice as used in Civil Code section 3294 means malice in fact, not malice in law.

Section 3294 allows prior conduct and warnings to support a finding of malice for punitive damages when they show intent to injure or conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.

Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie · filed 1998-06-02(a)

It also was admissible to establish Greenstein's liability for punitive damages, i.e., that he acted with oppression or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) ... Evidence of Greenstein's past conduct, and that he had been warned or reprimanded as a result of that conduct, tended to prove that he was fully aware that similar conduct would cause injury, and acted either with the intent to cause injury or with a willful and conscious disregard of Weeks's rights.

Section 3294(c)(1) permits a finding of malice based on intent to injure without proof of actual injury.

Morgan v. Davidson · filed 2018-11-27(c)(1)

Malice requires an intent to injure, not actual injury. ( Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice to include despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of others’ safety.

Phillips v. Honeywell International Inc. · filed 2017-03-17(c)(1)

Third, as to the sufficiency of the evidence, we conclude there was adequate evidentiary support for the jury’s findings that (1) Honeywell was liable under a failure to warn theory and (2) Honeywell’s predecessor, Bendix, acted with malice—that is, a willful and conscious disregard of the safety of others.

Section 3294(d) permits punitive damages in a wrongful-death claim based on a homicide only when the defendant has been convicted of a felony.

Langley v. Guiding Hands School, Inc. · filed 2021-03-31(d)

The parties seem to agree that Plaintiffs can only recover punitive damages for the wrongful death claim pursuant to § 3294(d), which allows a plaintiff to recover punitive damages in a wrongful death claim “based upon a death which resulted from a homicide for which the defendant has been convicted of a felony.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(d). Plaintiffs also apparently concede that Wohlwend has not yet been convicted of a felony. As such, Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages according to the plain language of § 3294(d).

Section 3294(d) bars punitive damages in a wrongful-death action unless the defendant was convicted of a felony homicide related to the decedent’s death.

(PS) Schmitz v. Asman · filed 2021-08-03(d)

As previously held in the Second Dismissal findings and recommendations, under California law, punitive damages are not available for this wrongful death cause of action because no defendant has been convicted of a felony homicide in connection with William’s death. (ECF No. 85 at 38 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(d); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 450 (1976).).

Section 3294(a) permits punitive damages in a tort action only when clear and convincing evidence shows oppression, fraud, or malice.

Brown v. Takeuchi Mfg. Co. (U.S.) · filed 2021-08-23(a)

California law provides: “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). ... Because the complaint does not contain any facts to support Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, this claim is also dismissed.

Section 3294(a) permits punitive damages in a noncontractual FEHA employment discrimination action when the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.

Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court · filed 1982-08-30(a)

Therefore, as in other actions “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,” punitive damages may be recovered “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice....” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)

Section 3294(a) does not permit punitive damages for a contract claim without evidentiary support for recovery in tort.

DuBarry International, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. · filed 1991-06-12(a)

It is settled that punitive damages may not properly be recovered in a contract action.

Section 3294(a) permits punitive damages in a legal malpractice action when the attorneys themselves commit oppression, fraud, or malice; the amount depends on their misconduct and wealth.

Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP · filed 2003-06-09(a)

Of course, plaintiffs may recover punitive damages in a legal malpractice action if the attorneys, themselves, are guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a)), but the measure of punitive damages would depend on the gravity of the attorneys’ misconduct and their wealth.

Section 3294(d) allows homicide survivors to seek punitive damages when the defendant was convicted of a felony for the death, even after a criminal sentence.

Shore v. Gurnett · filed 2004-09-10(d)

In response to the adoption by the electorate in 1982 of Proposition 8 (the Victims’ Bill of Rights), the Legislature enacted Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (d), ... which expressly authorizes the survivors of homicide victims to seek punitive damages in instances, like the present case, where the homicide resulted in the defendant’s conviction of a felony.

Section 3294(d) allows punitive damages in a wrongful death claim only when the death resulted from a homicide for which the defendant was convicted of a felony.

Pearson v. State of California · filed 2022-04-26(d)

Plaintiffs may not recover punitive damages here, as such damages are only available in a ... wrongful death claim “based upon a death which resulted from a homicide for which the ... defendant has been convicted of a felony.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(d).

Section 3294 provides a form of recovery for qualifying conduct, not a separate cause of action.

Rose v. Fife · filed 1989-01-12

Plaintiff also alleged violation of Civil Code section 3294 as a cause of action. However, the provisions of section 3294 do not provide for a separate cause of action but rather for a particular type of recovery to be prayed for when the defendant’s acts have amounted to oppression, fraud, malice or homicide.

Section 3294 identifies when exemplary (punitive) damages are available under California law but does not itself create an independent cause of action.

(PS) Harris v. Shellpoint Debt Collecting Co. · filed 2022-01-20

California Civil Code § 3294 sets forth the circumstances in which exemplary, or punitive, damages are allowable under California law. ... It does not provide an independent cause of action.

Section 3294 does not create an independent cause of action for punitive damages; such damages require a viable underlying claim for breach of a noncontractual obligation.

Limpin v. Unknown Names of Federal Employees of Social Security Administration · filed 2025-07-17(a)

However, § 3294 does not create an independent cause of action; it merely “sets forth the circumstances in which exemplary, or punitive, damages are allowable under California law.” ... In the absence of a viable underlying cause of action “for the breach of an obligation not rising from contract,” a claim for punitive damages under § 3294 cannot be sustained. Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a).

Section 3294 authorizes exemplary damages in certain circumstances but does not itself create a fraud cause of action.

Watson · filed 2025-11-20

The Amended Complaint brings a claim for “fraud pursuant to [Cal.] Civil. Code § 3294.” ECF No. 1 at 13. Section 3294 provides for exemplary damages in certain circumstances, but by its terms does not create a cause of action for fraud. See, e.g., Larson v. Conewango Prods., Corp., No. CV F 09-1060 LJO SMS, 2010 WL 1135987, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010) (“A separate claim for punitive damages [under Cal. Civ. Code § 3294] is not cognizable under California law because punitive damages is merely a remedy.”).

Section 3294 does not make punitive damages an independent cause of action; they must accompany an underlying claim.

Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League · filed 1975-06-25

Punitive damages are merely incident to a cause of action, and can never constitute the basis thereof.

Section 3294 provides punitive damages as a remedy, but an award cannot stand when the underlying fraud claim fails.

Orient Handel v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 1987-06-11

Although not a cause of action, “[p]unitive or exemplary damages are remedies available to a party who can plead and prove the facts and circumstances set forth in Civil Code section 3294, the cases interpreting this code section, or by other statutory authority. ‘Punitive damages are merely incident to a cause of action, and can never constitute the basis thereof.’ [Citation.]” ... Here, of course, respondent’s award of punitive damages falls with its failure to prove justifiable reliance, an essential element of fraud.

Section 3294(a) permits punitive damages only for an obligation independent of contract; breach of contract alone does not support them, even if the breach is wilful, fraudulent, or malicious.

Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners · filed 1999-07-29(a)

The law governing this subject has been aptly summarized as follows. “[P]unitive or exemplary damages, which are designed to punish and deter statutorily defined types of wrongful conduct, are available only in actions ‘for breach of an obligation not arising from contract.’ (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a), italics added.) In the absence of an independent tort, punitive damages may not be awarded for breach of contract ‘even where the defendant’s conduct in breaching the contract was wilful, fraudulent, or malicious.’ ” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 516; see Crogan v. Metz (1956) 47 Cal.2d 398, 405 [303 P.2d 1029].) Since Talbot may not recover in tort for Transamerica’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the foregoing rule compels a reversal of the award of punitive damages in its entirety.

Section 3294(a) bars punitive damages for breach of contract unless the wrongful act is also a tort.

Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co. · filed 1993-03-11(a)

Further, Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), provides that exemplary damages are only available “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, . . .” Thus, punitive damages “ ‘are never recoverable for breach of contract, no matter how wilful or malicious, except where the wrongful act is also a tort.’ ” (162 Cal.App.3d at p. 887.)

Section 3294(a) requires a finding on a tort cause of action to support punitive damages; a breach of contract cannot support them, however gross or wilful.

Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v. Interface Technology, Inc. · filed 1993-02-24(a)

Because no special verdict finding on a tort cause of action supports the jury’s $1.1 million punitive damage verdict and punitive damages may not be awarded in connection with a breach of contract no matter how gross or wilful, we must necessarily strike the punitive damage portion of the judgment.

Section 3294(a) permits exemplary damages only for a breach of an obligation not arising from contract, even when the alleged conduct is oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious.

Veritas Technologies LLC v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc. · filed 2022-01-25(a)

Under California Civil Code Section 3294, a party is entitled to exemplary damages whenever it can show that there was a “breach of an obligation not arising from contract” due to a defendant’s oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct. ... Veritas’s request for exemplary damages, although sought in its conversion claim, is nonetheless premised on a breach of contract, because the sum Veritas requests is based on the terms of the MSA. ... Accordingly, the Court GRANTS C&W’s motion as to the request for exemplary damages.

Section 3294(a) allows exemplary damages in an action for breach of a noncontractual obligation when oppression, fraud, or malice is proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Fishell v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. · filed 2023-07-19(a)

Section 3294 provides that exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to actual damages “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a). If Plaintiffs are attempting to bring a claim for punitive damages under section 3294, they must plead the elements required for such damages as part of an action for breach of an obligation not arising out of contract, such as the alleged breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Section 3294 allows exemplary damages in non-contract cases only upon clear and convincing proof of oppression, fraud, or malice, and an award requires evidence of the defendant’s financial condition.

(PS) Claire v. County of Sutter · filed 2025-02-27

Section 3294 of the California Civil Code permits an award of exemplary damages for non-contract claims only when “the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” ... Here, the record contains no evidence of defendant’s financial condition. Accordingly, while the alleged conduct of Hollis is indisputably reprehensible, exemplary damages are not available.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for oppression, fraud, or malice; malice is not the sole ground.

St. Ores v. McGlashen · filed 1887-11-12

It will be observed that malice is but one of several causes for which examplary damages may be given, yet *151the instruction as asked would make it the sole cause, and its absence conclusive of plaintiff’s right to recover exemplary damages.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for a carrier’s wrongful expulsion of a passenger when the action sounds in tort and the required misconduct is shown.

Gorman v. Southern Pacific Co. · filed 1892-12-08

Here the action was clearly in tort for breach of duty, and under the section of the code quoted, the jury was authorized to give exemplary damages, if, in expelling the plaintiff, the defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud, or violence, actual or presumed.

Section 3294 requires facts justifying exemplary damages to be pleaded; an unjustified refusal to keep a marriage promise alone is insufficient.

Belm v. Patrick · filed 1930-11-18

Section 3294 of the Civil Code provides that in an action for the breach of an obligation not arising, from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to actual damages, may recover exemplary damages. ... In the present case the complaint contains no allegations of fraud or deceit, or that the defendant entered into the engagement .with no intention of performing or was actuated by evil motives, nor does the evidence establish any of these facts or more than a refusal without sufficient excuse to perform the contract.

Section 3294 allows exemplary damages when the evidence shows an intent to maliciously oppress the plaintiff.

Baker v. Peck · filed 1934-10-03

It will be observed that plaintiff bases his claim for punitive damages not alone upon the presence of malice, but oppression as well. Section 3294 of the Civil Code sets forth in what eases exemplary damages are allowed. ... All of which indicates a sufficient intention to maliciously oppress plaintiff.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages in a noncontract action when the defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.

Fitzpatrick v. Clark · filed 1938-06-03

The right to recover punitive damages arises solely by virtue of section 3294 of the Civil Code, to wit: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.”

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for conversion when the defendant’s conduct shows malice, fraud, or oppression.

Haigler v. Donnelly · filed 1941-10-01

Exemplary damages are properly awardable in an action for conversion, given the required showing of malice, fraud or oppression. ... Such action constitutes “oppression, fraud, or malice” within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for oppressive and malicious conduct, including intimidation.

Knox v. Wolfe · filed 1946-03-12

The allowance of exemplary damages was justified by the fact that appellants had been guilty of oppression, intimidation and malice.

Section 3294 does not allow exemplary damages for a willful breach of contract alone; the claim must arise from a noncontractual obligation involving oppression, fraud, or malice.

Chelini v. Nieri · filed 1948-08-30

The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be sustained because, by an instruction hereinafter quoted, the jury were erroneously told that they could award such damages if they found merely “wilful” breach of contract, whereas it is the settled law of this state that such damages can be awarded only “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294.)

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages when the defendant’s conduct involves oppression and malice.

Sandler v. Gordon · filed 1949-10-20

Referring to the claim that punitive damages were improperly awarded, the court found that because of its conduct, appellant was guilty of oppression and malice. In such cases, exemplary damages may be imposed under section 3294 of the Civil Code.

Section 3294 does not allow exemplary damages for breach of contract, regardless of the nature of the breach.

Freedman v. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish · filed 1951-04-27

Not only does section 3294 of the Civil Code express the policy of the law against the allowance of exemplary damages for breach of contract regardless of the nature of the breach (Chelini v.Nieri, 32 Cal.2d 480, 486 [196 P.2d 915]), but if a penalty were to be imposed it should bear some rational relationship to its purpose.

Section 3294’s restriction on exemplary damages for breach of contract supports refusing to enforce a contractual forfeiture without regard to actual damages.

Hill v. Hearron · filed 1952-10-21

While that case was concerned with forfeiture in a vendorvendee situation, the policy of the law against forfeitures and penalties, the damage provisions of the Civil Code, and the reasoning there adopted are equally applicable here. For those reasons we hold the forfeiture provision of this contract cannot be enforced without regard to the calculation of the damages actually caused by the breach.

Section 3294 gives the jury wider discretion in setting exemplary damages for fraud than in setting compensatory damages.

Hartzell v. Myall · filed 1953-01-30

Upon the question of what is an adequate sum to award as a punishment and for an example in cases of fraud the jury has a wider discretion than in the case of compensatory damages.

Section 3294 does not allow exemplary damages when the fraudulent acts violate contractual obligations and cause the claimed injury.

Doyle v. Chief Oil Co. · filed 1944-05-09

Although the acts of appellants were fraudulent, such acts were related to and affected certain obligations “arising from contract,” the violation of which resulted in the alleged damage to respondents ; therefore, the award of $500 as exemplary damages herein cannot be sustained.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for a tort claim, not an action on a contract.

Squire's Department Store, Inc. v. Dudum · filed 1953-01-14

The measure he did use finds no basis whatsoever in contract, and the demand for exemplary damage is consistent only with a tort action, not an action upon the contract.

Section 3294 does not permit punitive damages for a breach of contract, even when the breach is wilful or fraudulent.

Crogan v. Metz · filed 1956-11-30

Such an award may not be granted in an action based on a breach of contract even though the defendant’s breach was wilful or fraudulent.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for a noncontract obligation when the defendant acted with express or implied oppression, fraud, or malice.

Haurat v. Superior Court · filed 1966-04-04

Section 3294 of the Civil Code provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” The primary purpose of this limitation is to avoid injecting questions of fraud, malice, or oppression into contract actions, since most contract breaches arise from inability to perform or uncertainty as to the scope of the obligation, and the defendant is subject to strict liability upon a showing of breach regardless of his intent.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages in an action not arising from contract when the defendant has acted with oppression, fraud, or express or implied malice.

Brenner v. Haley · filed 1960-10-07

The evidence relied upon by respondent to sustain this award is predicated upon the conduct of appellant, that is, the painting out of the signs, harassment bj^ solicitation of actions by the district attorney and the city planning commission, all of which were dismissed. This evidence clearly supports a finding of malice in fact. Moreover, the amounts awarded by the trier of fact for exemplary damages will not be disturbed on appeal unless the sum appears to be excessive or to have resulted from passion or prejudice. ... Such is not the case here.

Section 3294 does not permit punitive damages for breach of contract.

Middlebrook-Anderson Co. v. Southwest Savings & Loan Ass'n · filed 1971-07-29

All of seller’s causes of action, as discussed herein, posit the existence of a subordination agreement and seek recovery for its breach. This amounts to an action on a contract: the punitive damages sought in the tenth cause of action are not recoverable in an action on a contract. (Civ. Code, § 3294.)

Section 3294 does not allow exemplary damages for a conspiracy to charge usurious interest when the wrong depends on a loan agreement.

Forte v. Nolfi · filed 1972-05-18

It should be pointed out again that the conspiracy to exact usurious compensation for the loan, which is implicit in the broader, but unwarranted, finding of the court, does not furnish a basis for awarding exemplary damages against the financier defendants. ... Therefore, the wrong involved is dependent on a contract.

Section 3294 does not permit punitive damages for breach of contract, even when the breach is willful or fraudulent.

Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers · filed 1977-01-18

It is well settled in this state that punitive damages may not be awarded in an action based on breach of contract, even though the defendant’s breach was willful or fraudulent (Civ. Code, § 3294; ...).

Section 3294 does not permit punitive or exemplary damages for breach of contract.

Ericson v. Playgirl, Inc. · filed 1977-10-03

Damages may not be punitive or exemplary and may not be imposed as a form of chastisement (Civ. Code, § 3294).

Section 3294 does not permit punitive damages when the only supportable theory of liability is breach of contract.

Sawyer v. Bank of America · filed 1978-07-26

Here, the only supportable theory of liability was for breach of contract. Hence, the award of punitive damages cannot be sustained. (Civ. Code, § 3294.)

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for fraud accompanying a breach of contract, though breach of contract alone does not support them.

Walker v. Signal Companies, Inc. · filed 1978-09-20

The application of this rule which permits punitive damages where both fraud and breach of contract exists is only consistent with the underlying policy for the application of punitive damages. (Civ. Code, § 3294.).

Section 3294(a) does not allow punitive damages on a breach-of-contract claim.

Quigley v. Pet, Inc. · filed 1984-11-28(a)

As a matter of law, plaintiffs should not have been awarded general or punitive damages on their first cause of action for breach of contract.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages only for breach of an obligation not arising from contract; a plaintiff proceeding solely on a contract theory cannot recover them.

Frazier v. Metropolitan Life Insurance · filed 1985-06-10

Yet the very words of section 3294 permit punitive damages only for breach of an obligation not arising from contract. The exact statutory words bar plaintiff from seeking damages on a contract theory since her tort claim was time-barred.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages only for breach of an obligation not arising from contract; an ordinary breach of contract does not qualify.

Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. · filed 1994-03-31(a)

Similarly, punitive or exemplary damages, which are designed to punish and deter statutorily defined types of wrongful conduct, are available only in actions “for breach of an obligation not arising from contract.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a), italics added.)

Section 3294 permits appropriate exemplary damages for fraudulent inducement of an employment contract.

Lazar v. Superior Court · filed 1996-01-29

Lazar, therefore, may proceed with his claim for fraud in the inducement of employment contract, properly seeking damages for “all the detriment proximately caused thereby” (Civ. Code, § 3333), as well as appropriate exemplary damages (Civ. Code, § 3294).

Section 3294(a) permits punitive damages only upon clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, or malice in the breach of an obligation not arising from contract.

Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. · filed 2003-05-14(a)

As we have concluded that Robinson has no available remedy in tort, and thus its claim of fraudulent concealment cannot succeed, it follows that the award of punitive damages must fall. Punitive damages may only be awarded upon clear and convincing evidence of "oppression, fraud, or malice" in the "breach of an obligation not arising from contract." (Civ.Code, § 3294, subd. (a); italics added.)

Section 3294(a) does not allow punitive damages for breach of contract without an independent tort.

Ginsberg v. Gamson · filed 2012-04-30(a)

Tort liability is a necessary predicate for punitive damages. Punitive damages may not be awarded as relief in a breach of contract claim.

Section 3294(a) does not allow punitive damages for breach of contract claims.

In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig. · filed 2018-03-09(a)

Under California law, punitive damages are not available for breach of contract claims.

Section 3294 requires evidence of malice, oppression, or despicable conduct to support punitive damages for an insurer’s bad faith claims handling.

Tomaselli v. Transamerica Insurance · filed 1994-06-13

We have reviewed the specific practices of which plaintiffs complain in an earlier portion of this opinion, in which we identified facts sufficient to support a judgment for bad faith claims administration. Nothing was revealed therein, however, which adds up to malice, oppression or despicable conduct.

Section 3294 does not support exemplary damages for an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend when the evidence shows no egregious conduct within its scope.

California Shoppers, Inc. v. Royal Globe Insurance Co. · filed 1985-11-26

Otherwise, on the cross-appeal, we hold that the trial court properly struck the exemplary damages because, as the trial court observed, in light of the undisputed evidence, and the only permissible inferences to be drawn therefrom, that there was no egregious conduct by Royal Globe, within the ambit of Civil Code section 3294, for which the jury could have properly awarded such damages.

Section 3294 does not automatically allow punitive damages for a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; the defendant must act with oppression, fraud, or malice.

Wallis v. Superior Court · filed 1984-10-16

We take this opportunity to reiterate that a party is not automatically entitled to punitive damages for a tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. “In order to justify an award of exemplary damages, the defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294.) He must act with the intent to vex, injure or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. [Citations.]”

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for an insurer’s bad faith when the conduct involves malice, fraud, or oppression; a breach alone does not establish the required intent.

Betts v. Allstate Insurance · filed 1984-04-18(a)

Thus an insurer’s bad faith may not only breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing but also can be treated for tort purposes as a basis for exemplary damages where it occurs in a context of malice, fraud or oppression.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for insurer bad faith when substantial evidence supports malice, oppression, or fraud; bad faith alone does not establish those elements.

Fleming v. Safeco Insurance · filed 1984-09-14

While there was evidence presented by Safeco which would tend to negate any finding of malice, oppression, or fraud within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294, there was also substantial evidence to the contrary presented by plaintiff which would be sufficient to sustain a finding of the jury that punitive damages were warranted. Some of this evidence has already been indicated in connection with the finding of bad faith on the part of Safeco, although we hasten to point out that bad faith does not necessarily indicate the presence of malice, oppression, or fraud.

Section 3294 requires an insured seeking punitive damages for a disability insurer’s bad faith breach to prove the insurer acted with the requisite intent; the breach alone does not suffice.

Delgado v. Heritage Life Insurance · filed 1984-06-18

The breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of disability insurance does not, however, automatically warrant the imposition of punitive damages. To justify an award of punitive damages, the insured must still establish that the insurer acted with the requisite quality of intent to award punitive damages.

Section 3294 allows a punitive damages claim to proceed with a tort claim for wrongful discharge.

Hentzel v. Singer Co. · filed 1982-12-20

Since we have held his complaint to state a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge, it follows that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to Hentzel’s third cause of action, for punitive damages.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for a trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty when fraud, malice or oppression is shown.

Vale v. Union Bank · filed 1979-01-16

In short, the trial court should have determined (1) whether the bank violated its fiduciary obligations and, in the event of such violation, (2) whether to award exemplary damages under Civil Code section 3294, which authorizes such awards in cases of fraud, malice or oppression.

Section 3294 requires fraud, malice, or oppression for punitive damages; in insurance bad-faith cases, oppression includes conscious disregard of the insured’s rights.

Miller v. Elite Insurance · filed 1980-01-08

Civil Code section 3294 requires an act which constitutes fraud, malice or oppression before punitive damages can be granted. In breach of good faith insurance cases, oppression has been defined as a conscious disregard of the insured’s rights by the insurer.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for an insurer’s bad-faith conduct when the evidence supports malice, oppression, or conscious disregard of the insured’s rights; a breach of duty alone is insufficient.

Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange · filed 1978-08-25

“In order to justify an award of exemplary damages, the defendant must be guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294.) He must act with the intent to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights. [Citations.]” (Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., supra, 11 Cal.3d 452, 462.) ... We are satisfied, after an examination of the whole record in a light most favorable to the judgment (see Bertero v. National General Corp. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 43, 65 [118 Cal.Rptr. 184, 529 P.2d 608, 65 A.L.R.3d 878]), that an award of punitive damages was here proper.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages in an insurance bad faith case when the evidence shows undue and oppressive disregard of policyholders.

Delos v. Farmers Insurance Group · filed 1979-05-30

The trial court’s statement in its order granting a new trial that the evidence was “. . . sufficient to suggest undue and oppressive disregard of plaintiffs’ status as policyholders claimants” is supported by the record and correctly states the law permitting an award of punitive damages in an appropriate bad faith case.

Section 3294 permits an insured to recover punitive damages for an insurer’s tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith, even though the covenant is implied in the insurance policy.

Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. · filed 1972-04-28

The fact that the conduct constituting the tort also involves the breach of a covenant, implied by law in the insurance policy, does not prevent the recovery of punitive damages under section 3294 by the insured from the insurer.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for fraudulently inducing a contract, but not for merely breaching it.

Kuchta v. Allied Builders Corp. · filed 1971-11-24

Fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract constitutes a tort. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that punitive damages could be awarded only for fraud and that only compensatory damages could be awarded for a breach of contract.

Section 3294(a) permits punitive damages for a tort claim under California Government Code § 7320 even when the claim incidentally involves a contractual violation, and federal pleading rules govern the adequacy of the punitive-damages allegations in federal court.

Vega v. Management and Training Corporation · filed 2023-04-19(a)

See Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a) (allowing exemplary, or punitive, damages “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract”). ... Therefore, California Civil Code section 3294 does not preclude, as a matter of law, punitive damages for a tort claim arising under California Government Code section 7320.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages, if properly pleaded, for breach of a promise to marry because the action is treated as a tort for damages purposes.

Syfert v. Solomon · filed 1928-12-03

We conclude, therefore, that this action is, so far as the matter of damages is concerned, to be classed as a tort and that exemplary damages, if properly pleaded, may be recovered therein and that it is, in the matter of damages, an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, as such words are used in section 3294 of the Civil Code.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for fraud that induces a contract when the action is based on the deceit rather than a breach of contract.

Berning v. Colodny & Colodny · filed 1930-01-16

Section 3294 of the Civil Code provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” ... We are also of the opinion that the action is based upon the deceit practiced upon the plaintiffs in inducing them to purchase the property upon the false representations as to the character of the improvements that were to be placed upon the tract of land by the defendants, and also the false representations that the land had a water right. ... Having reached the conclusion that the action is in tort, the findings are in accordance with the pleadings.

Section 3294 allows exemplary damages for an obligation imposed by law when the defendant has acted with oppression, fraud, or malice.

Ward v. Taggart · filed 1959-03-12

The word “contract” is used in this section in its ordinary sense to mean an agreement between the parties, not an obligation imposed by law despite the absence of any such agreement. ... Since Taggart’s obligation for his fraud does not arise from contract but is imposed by law, the judgment for exemplary damages clearly falls within section 3294.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages for fraud, including when the tort also involves a contract.

Southern California Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin · filed 1960-08-01

Exemplary damages are proper in cases involving fraud and may be allowed even though the tort incidentally involves a contract.

Section 3294 permits exemplary damages when fraud is the foundation of an action arising from a contract, but not when the plaintiff waives the fraud and sues on the contract.

Brockway v. Heilman · filed 1967-05-08

For example, had respondents rescinded, waived the fraud, and sued on the contract, no exemplary damages could be awarded, under Civil Code section 3294. ... The judgment roll supports the finding that appellants were guilty of fraud, and thereby justifies the award of exemplary damages.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for fraud, oppression, or malice when an action includes a tort claim, even if it also rests on contract.

Walton v. Anderson · filed 1970-04-27

Although an action may be based upon a contract, if it also properly contains a count ex delicto upon which plaintiff relies, it falls within the section quoted when fraud, oppression or malice exists.

Section 3294 permits punitive damages for fraud inducing an insurance contract when the plaintiff states a tort claim, even if the dispute also involves a breach of contract.

Wetherbee v. United Insurance Co. of America · filed 1968-09-24

However, pursuant to the second count of her complaint, plaintiff clearly stated a cause of action in tort, alleging that when she sought to cancel her policy in August 1958, defendant induced her not to do so by means of the knowingly false representation that she would receive lifetime benefit payments under said policy in the event she was permanently disabled by reason of sickness or injury. This count of plaintiff’s complaint would appear identical, in all material respects, with that in the Sharp case and accordingly stated a cause of action for which punitive as well as compensatory damages could properly be awarded.

Section 3294(b) permits punitive damages against a corporate employer for a managing agent’s oppressive or malicious conduct.

Stephens v. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc. · filed 1988-04-01(b)

Mock was a “managing agent” within the meaning of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b). Mock had immediate and direct control over the decision to demote plaintiff, and he was directly responsible for evaluating plaintiff’s performance. Substantial evidence exists to support the award of punitive damages against defendant as the corporate employer.

A corporate employer is not liable for punitive damages based on a supervisor’s misconduct when the supervisor lacks authority to make company policy and is not a managing agent.

Kelly-Zurian v. Wohl Shoe Co. · filed 1994-02-10(b)

Thus, the uncontroverted evidence established Lawicki was not in a policymaking position and therefore was not a managing agent for Wohl. Accordingly, Wohl was not liable in punitive damages to Zurian for Law-icki’s conduct.

Section 3294(b) treats an employee as a corporate managing agent when the employee exercises substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of the corporation’s business.

White v. Ultramar, Inc. · filed 1999-08-23(b)

In order to demonstrate that an employee is a true managing agent under section 3294, subdivision (b), a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have to show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation’s business.

Section 3294(b) permits punitive damages against a corporation for a managing agent’s wrongful conduct when the agent exercises substantial discretion over decisions that determine corporate policy.

Textron Financial Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance · filed 2004-06-18(b)

This evidence ... supports the jury’s conclusion TRM was defendant’s managing agent, thereby subjecting it to punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.

Section 3294(b) permits punitive damages against a corporate employer based on an employee’s conduct only when a qualifying corporate agent had the required knowledge, authorization, or ratification; a managing agent must have broad authority over corporate policy.

Roby v. McKesson Corp. · filed 2009-11-30(b)

When we spoke in White about persons having “discretionary authority *715over . . . corporate policy” (White, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 577), we were referring to formal policies that affect a substantial portion of the company and that are the type likely to come to the attention of corporate leadership. It is this sort of broad authority that justifies punishing an entire company for an otherwise isolated act of oppression, fraud, or malice. The record here does not support the conclusion that Schoener exercised that sort of broad authority or that she was a “managing agent” for purposes of awarding punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b).

Section 3294(b)'s managing agent requirement can be met by a regional sales manager with responsibility for numerous dealerships who made the decision to terminate a dealership.

Powerhouse Motorsports Group, Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA · filed 2013-11-26(b)

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), provides that a corporate employer is not liable for punitive damages based upon the acts of its employees unless the acts were committed, authorized, or ratified by a corporate officer, director, or managing agent. ... Here, there was substantial evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Rocky Aiello was a "managing agent" of Yamaha for purposes of an award of punitive damages. The evidence established that Aiello was the "Regional Sales Manager for the Western Region" which included California and three other states. His region included between 140 and 240 dealerships. He managed a group of "district managers" and, as he testified, was "ultimately responsible for the total well-being of Yamaha Motor Corporation Dealers." Further, evidence shows that Aiello was directly involved in the Powerhouse/MDK sale and was responsible for the decision to terminate the dealership.

Whether insurance claims personnel are managing agents for punitive damages is a question for the jury when evidence shows they controlled the decision to deny a claim.

Vardanyan v. AMCO Ins. Co. CA5 · filed 2015-12-11(b)

The evidence was sufficient to raise an issue of fact for the jury regarding whether Reid and Vidmar were managing agents for purposes of an award of punitive damages.

Delegated discretion to handle employee complaints can support a finding that an employee is a managing agent for purposes of corporate punitive damages.

Ginda v. Exel Logistics, Inc. · filed 1999-04-15(b)

The purposeful delegation of such discretionary authority to Bailey is sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact as to whether Bailey was a managing agent under § 3294(b).

Section 3294(c)(1) defines malice as intentional injury or despicable conduct carried on with willful and conscious disregard of others' rights or safety, while section 3294(c)(3) defines fraud as an intentional material misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment undertaken to deprive a person of property or legal rights or otherwise cause injury.

Gargano v. Plus One Holdings, Inc. · filed 2023-07-26(c)(1), (c)(3)

“‘Malice’ is defined as ‘conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’” Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 5th 442, 454 (2020) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)). “‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(3). “The mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages. . . . Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifference to the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.” Id. at 455 (quoting Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 25 Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1287 (1994)).

Section 3294 does not allow punitive damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Aquino v. Superior Court · filed 1993-12-15

Turning to the evidence in this particular case, we first note that plaintiffs’ substantive theory of entitlement to punitive damages is a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, since their alternative cause of action, negligent infliction of emotional distress, would not support an award of punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294.