Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102

The rapidity element of a rapid repetitive motion injury does not require proof of “a notably high rate of activity.”

Rudick v. Unifirst Corp. · filed 1998-01-28(5)(A)(ii)(a)

We did not adopt the Commission’s Throckmorton test for rapidity in either Lay or Kildow. We have not required a showing of “a notably high rate of activity.”

Section 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii)(a) requires tasks to be repetitive and the repetitive motion to be rapid.

Malone v. Texarkana Public Schools · filed 1998-05-27(5)(A)(ii)(a)

Reviewing these prior decisions interpreting “rapid repetitive motion,” the standard is a two-pronged test: (1) the tasks must be repetitive, and (2) the repetitive motion must be rapid. As a threshold issue, the tasks must be repetitive, or the rapidity element is not reached.

A rapid repetitive motion injury requires proof that the work tasks were repetitive and the motion was rapid.

Jobe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 1999-04-07(5)(A)(ii)(a)

We have previously observed that rapid repetitive motion claims require proof that tasks associated with an injury be repetitive and that the repetitive motion be rapid. ... In our view, the Commission’s opinion displays a substantial basis for its denial of the relief sought.

Rapid repetitive motion is assessed by considering both the position of the affected body part and the number of movements the work requires.

Patterson v. Frito Lay, Inc. · filed 1999-04-14(5)(A)(ii)(a)

The Commission must consider the positioning of the part of the body as well as the number of movements the claimant has to undergo to determine if the movement is “rapid and repetitive.”

Section 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii)(a) does not require separate proof of rapid repetitive motion when the claimant has a diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome.

Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ · filed 1998-05-21(5)(A)(ii)(a)

Because we hold that it is unnecessary to prove rapid repetitive motion when there is a diagnosis of CTS, we do not reach the merits of this argument.

The gradual-onset exception for back injuries does not extend to neck injuries.

Hapney v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. · filed 1999-06-02(5)(A)(ii)(b)

The Commission held that the gradual-onset exception for back injuries does not extend to the neck. ... Given the requirement of strict construction, we conclude that the Commission’s interpretation of the statute was correct.

Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(b) does not treat a neck or cervical spine injury as a gradual-onset back injury.

Hapney v. Rheem Manufacturing Co. · filed 2000-09-14(4)(A)(ii)(b)

For these reasons, we grant Rheem’s request for rehearing, and hold the commission was correct in rejecting Hapney’s argument that she sustained a compensable back injury under § 11-9-102(4) (A) (ii) (b).

Section 11-9-102 requires a claimant with a gradual-onset injury to prove that it arose from employment, caused physical harm requiring treatment or resulting in disability or death, and was a major cause of the disability or need for treatment.

Cottage Café, Inc. v. Collette · filed 2006-02-01(4)(A)(ii) and (4)(E)(ii)

A claimant seeking workers’ compensation benefits for a gradual-onset injury must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the injury arose out of and in the course of his or her employment; (2) the injury caused internal or external physical harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; and (3) the injury was a major cause of the disability or need for treatment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) and (E)(ii) (Repl. 2002). ... The record supports these findings, and we cannot say that the Commission erred in finding that the claimant’s carpal-tunnel and cubital-tunnel injuries were compensable.

A gradual-onset injury qualifies under the rapid repetitive motion provision only when the evidence shows that repetitive work activities were performed rapidly.

Holland Group, Inc. v. Hughes · filed 2006-06-14(4)(A)(ii)(a)

In the instant case, although Hughes’s testimony undoubtedly evidences that her work activities were repetitive, there is no evidence in this record to indicate that these activities were performed rapidly. Therefore, as reasonable minds could not reach the decision of the Commission, substantial evidence does not support its decision, and we are compelled to reverse and remand.

A claimant seeking compensation for a gradual-onset injury must prove that rapid, repetitive motion caused it.

Jenkins v. It's Fashion · filed 2010-11-03(4)(A)(ii)(a)

To establish that her bilateral Achilles tendinitis was a compensable injury, Jenkins had to prove, among other things, that it was caused by rapid, repetitive motion.

Repeated fast walking across a field throughout the workday can satisfy the rapid repetitive motion requirement for a gradual-onset injury.

Pearson v. Worksource · filed 2011-12-07(4)(A)(ii)(a)

In this case it is clear that Mr. Pearson’s duties were repetitive in that he was required to walk back and forth across a field over and over all day long. We hold that this repetitive motion met the requirement of being rapid as well.

A rapid-repetitive-motion injury requires repetitive tasks performed rapidly; repetitive tasks and rapid work alone do not satisfy the definition.

Webb v. Letha's Pies · filed 2014-01-22(4)(A)(ii)(a)

As a threshold issue, the tasks must be repetitive, or the element of rapidity is not reached; even repetitive tasks and rapid work, standing alone, do not satisfy the definition—the repetitive tasks must be completed rapidly.

A gradual-onset carpal tunnel injury requires proof that it arose out of and in the course of employment and was the major cause of the need for medical treatment.

Serrano v. Westrim, Inc. · filed 2011-12-14(4)(A) & (E)

Serrano’s CTS claim, a gradual-onset injury, requires proof that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment and that the work-related injury was the major cause of the need for medical treatment. ... The Commission failed to make any findings whatsoever as to whether Serrano sustained a compensable right CTS injury during any other time in 2007.

A claimant seeking benefits for a gradual-onset neck injury must prove that the injury was the major cause of the disability or need for medical treatment.

Kimble v. Labor Force, Inc. · filed 2013-10-23(4)(E)(ii)

Substantial evidence also supports the Commission’s finding that Kimble failed to prove that a work-related neck injury was the major cause of his need for treatment.

A claimant seeking benefits for a gradual-onset injury must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was the major cause of the disability or need for medical treatment.

Thrapp v. Smith Blair, Inc. · filed 2013-11-20(4)(E)(ii)

A claimant seeking benefits for a gradual-onset injury must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury (1) arose out of and in the course of his employment; (2) caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; and (3) was the major cause of the disability or need for medical treatment.

A gradual-onset back injury must be the major cause of the need for treatment to be compensable.

Lowe's Home Centers, Inc. v. Pope · filed 2016-02-10(4)(E)(ii)

From this evidence, reasonable minds could conclude that Shawn sustained a compensable gradual-onset back injury, arising out of her employment, which was the major cause of her need for treatment.

A carpal tunnel syndrome diagnosis before the asserted injury date does not defeat a gradual-onset injury claim when the condition arose from employment.

W L Harper Co. v. Woods · filed 2016-09-21(4)(A)(ii)(a)

The fact that appellee’s diagnosis of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome occurred in the nine months prior to the date of his asserted injury does nothing to negate appellee’s claim. The very nature of the injury acknowledges that awareness of the injury and its causation will take time.

Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(a) requires repetitive tasks performed rapidly for a compensable gradual-onset injury.

Carlat v. Ark. Highway & Transp. Dep't · filed 2018-02-28(4)(A)(ii)(a)

An injury is caused by a rapid-repetitive motion when, as the term naturally suggests, the task or tasks performed are repetitive, and the repetitive motion is done rapidly. ... On the whole, however, given this record, we cannot say that the Commission's decision was insufficiently supported.

A worker’s testimony that repetitive tasks had to be performed quickly can support a finding of rapid, repetitive motion.

International Paper Company v. Steward · filed 2024-10-02(4)(A)(ii)(a)

The ALJ found and the Commission affirmed that Steward’s testimony that he performed the repetitive motion rapidly constitutes some evidence of rapid, repetitive motion under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii)(a). ... Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the ALJ and the Commission, we hold that there is substantial evidence to support the finding that Steward rapidly performed the repetitive motions required for his work.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iv)(b) allows alcohol’s presence to be established without a medical test and creates a rebuttable presumption that alcohol substantially caused the injury.

Flowers v. Norman Oaks Construction Co. · filed 2000-06-01(4)(B)(iv)(b)

When this testimony is coupled with Flowers’s own admission of heavy beer consumption the night before as well as the circumstantial evidence of beer consumption on the jobsite and Flowers’s habitual consumption of beer, we hold that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding of the presence of alcohol.

A positive test for marijuana metabolites triggers a rebuttable presumption that an injury was substantially occasioned by marijuana use.

Wood v. West Tree Service · filed 2000-04-12(5)(B)(iv)(b)

It is now clear that testing positive for marijuana metabolites is sufficient to establish a rebuttable presumption that Mr. Wood’s injury was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) creates a rebuttable presumption that an injury was caused by alcohol or drugs, but a positive test taken two days after an injury and after the employee took codeine did not establish the presumption here.

Morrilton Manor v. Brimmage · filed 1997-09-03(5)(B)(iv)

We agree with appellant that under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) (B)(iv) (Repl. 1996), when the presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician’s orders is detected in an employee following an injury, the burden is on the claimant to rebut the presumption that the injury was substantially occasioned by the alcohol or drugs. ... Under these circumstances, we do not think the presumption arises at all, but if it does, it has been effectively rebutted.

The rebuttable presumption that drug use substantially occasioned an injury is constitutional because promoting a drug-free workplace provides a rational basis for it.

Ester v. National Home Centers, Inc. · filed 1998-03-18(5)(B)(iv)(b)

Another potential reason for the presumption that provides a rational basis of a deliberate nexus with state objectives is to promote a drug-free workplace. Therefore, the Commission’s conclusion that the statute is constitutional is correct.

A claimant’s credible testimony alone can provide substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that drug use substantially occasioned an injury.

Express Human Resources III/Spirit Homes, Inc. v. Terry · filed 1998-04-15(5)(B)(iv)

We note that in the case at bar, appellee’s testimony alone provides substantial evidence upon which it could be determined that he rebutted the statutory presumption of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv), even had his co-workers not provided corroborating testimony.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) requires use of illegal drugs, not impairment, for the statutory presumption.

Graham v. Turnage Employment Group · filed 1998-07-02(5)(B)(iv)

This argument is also misplaced because the statute only requires the “the use” of illegal drugs and not impairment.

The presence of illegal drugs creates a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by drug use, placing the burden on the injured employee to prove otherwise.

Woodall v. Hunnicutt Construction · filed 2000-02-17(5)(B)(iv)(b)

He both readily admitted smoking crack cocaine the night before the incident and admitted that he tested positive for a drug screen on the date of the accident. This automatically raises the presumption that drugs were the cause of the accident and placed the burden on the injured employee to prove that they were not.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) permits a urine test showing marijuana metabolites to support the presumption that an accident was substantially occasioned by drug use, without requiring a particular test or drug level.

Brown v. Alabama Electric Co. · filed 1998-01-21(5)(B)(iv)

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(b)(iv) does not require that the Commission promulgate drug testing procedures or specify particular types of tests to be used as a precondition to the intoxication presumption. The Arkansas General Assembly could have required testing that would show a certain level of illegal drugs, as it has required to invoke the presumption in D.W.I. cases, but it has not made such a requirement. The Commission has broad discretion with reference to admission of evidence, and its decision will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of its discretion. We find no abuse of discretion in the Commission's considering the report on urine testing as evidence of the presence of drugs under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) (Repl.1996). Neither do we find that there was an absence of substantial evidence for the Commission to invoke the presumption that appellant's accident was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b) does not require a particular drug test or proof of a specified drug level before the intoxication presumption may arise.

Graham v. Turnage Employment Group · filed 1998-01-21(5)(B)(iv)(b)

As we said today in Brown v. Alabama Electric Co ., Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv)(b) (Repl.1996) does not require that the Commission promulgate drug testing procedures or specify particular types of tests to be used as a precondition to the intoxication presumption. The Arkansas General Assembly could have required testing that would show a certain level of illegal drugs, as they have required to invoke the presumption in D.W.I. cases, but they have not made such a requirement.

The presence of an illegal drug triggers a mandatory rebuttable presumption that it substantially occasioned the injury.

Ester v. National Home Centers, Inc. · filed 1998-12-10(5)(B)(iv)(b)

Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-102(5) (B)(iv) states that the “presence” of an illegal drug in the claimant’s system triggers a mandatory rebuttable presumption that the claimant’s injury was substantially occasioned by the use of that drug.

The presence of alcohol creates a rebuttable presumption that it substantially occasioned an accident; whether the evidence rebuts that presumption is a question of fact for the Commission.

Continental Express v. Harris · filed 1998-04-08(5)(B)(iv)(b)

Since whether a presumption is rebutted is a fact question, we must affirm the Commission unless we are persuaded that fair-minded persons, with the same facts before them, could not have reached the conclusion reached by the Commission. We think fair-minded persons could interpret the evidence as the Commission did; therefore, we affirm the Commission’s finding that appellee had rebutted the presumption that the accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol.

An injury is excluded as substantially occasioned by alcohol use only when that use directly caused the injury; an injury caused by alcohol withdrawal does not meet that test.

ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson · filed 1998-11-05(5)(B)(iv)

We, therefore, conclude that the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol” requires that there be a direct causal link between the use of alcohol and the injury in order for the injury to be noncompensable. ... In the instant case it is undisputed that Mr. Robertson’s injury was caused by his withdrawal from alcohol. Thus, we must also conclude that the Commission properly applied the plain and ordinary meaning of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) when it determined that Mr. Robertson’s injury was not substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iv) requires a direct causal link between alcohol use and an injury for the injury to be noncompensable; evidence that another driver caused the collision can rebut the presumption arising from alcohol’s presence.

Clark v. Sbarro, Inc. · filed 1999-10-06(5)(B)(iv)

However, the evidence did show that the “immediate and direct” cause of the accident was instead the other driver’s crossing onto Clark’s side of the road. Given the supreme court’s definition of the words “substantially occasioned,” we cannot say that fair-minded persons using the facts presented in this case could reach the conclusion reached by the Commission.

The smell of alcohol on an injured worker’s breath, without sufficient proof of alcohol in the worker’s system, does not trigger the rebuttable presumption that alcohol substantially occasioned the injury.

Flowers v. Norman Oaks Construction Co. · filed 1999-12-08(5)(B)(iv)(b)

In the present case, there was no proof presented of the “presence” of alcohol in appellant’s system. Although medical personnel testified that there was a “smell” of alcohol about appellant’ s breath, we cannot find sufficient proof of “presence” in his system to trigger the presumption.

The presence of illegal drugs creates a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by their use.

Systems Contracting Corp. v. Reeves · filed 2004-03-03(5)(B)(iv)(b)

Given the testimony by appellee’s coworkers that appellee was not acting as if he were impaired, that the brakes were bad on the truck, and that all of the employees involved in the situation agreed that appellee’s action in jumping out of the truck was not only reasonable but wise, there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision that appellee had rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence the presumption that the accident was substantially occasioned by the use of an illegal drug.

An injury substantially occasioned by illegal drugs is not compensable, but the presumption arising from their presence can be rebutted.

Arkansas Electric Cooperative v. Ramsey · filed 2004-09-01(4)(B)(iv)

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iv)(a) (Repl.2002) provides that an injury is not compensable if it is the result of an accident that is substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician's orders. "The presence of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician's orders shall create a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or prescription drugs used in contravention of physician's orders." Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iv)(b) (Repl.2002). ... As substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision, we affirm.

An employee may receive compensation despite illegal drug use by proving that the drugs did not substantially occasion the injury or accident.

Apple Tree Service, Inc. v. Grimes · filed 2006-02-15(4)(B)(iv)(d)

And “[a]n employee shall not be entitled to compensation unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the . . . illegal drugs. . . did not substantially occasion the injury or accident.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (B)(iv)(d). ... Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision, we conclude that the decision was supported by substantial evidence.

The presumption that illegal drugs substantially occasioned an accident can be rebutted by coworker testimony that the worker showed no signs of impairment.

Ward v. Hickory Springs Manufacturing Co. · filed 2007-01-31(4)(B)(iv)(b)

When we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission’s decision, we conclude that reasonable minds can find that the testimony of Ward’s co-workers rebuts the presumption that Ward’s accident was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs.

The presence of illegal drugs after a workplace accident creates a rebuttable presumption that drug use substantially occasioned the injury; the employee must rebut it by a preponderance of the evidence.

Hickey v. Gardisser Construction · filed 2009-11-04(4)(B)(iv)(b)

This raises a rebuttable presumption that the drug use was the substantial reason for the accident. ... Because the concentrations were still high three days after the last known use, Dr. Simmons opined that appellant would have had to have taken a pharmacologically, toxicologically-significant dose of methamphetamine. He further stated that an eighth of a gram of methamphetamine would have still been circulating in appellant’s system at the time of the accident and would have been consistent with an effect on appellant’s judgment. Therefore, we hold that the Commission had before it a substantial basis for denying the requested relief.

A positive test for marijuana metabolites triggers the rebuttable presumption that illegal drug use substantially occasioned an employee's injury.

Waldrip v. Graco Corp. · filed 2008-01-09(4)(B)(iv)(b)

This court has previously concluded that testing positive for marijuana metabolites is sufficient to establish a rebuttable presumption that the employee's injury was substantially occasioned by the use of marijuana. ... Accordingly, we are compelled to conclude that the rebuttable presumption was created.

The presumption that alcohol or drugs substantially occasioned an injury arises from their presence, not from an employee’s refusal to take a drug test.

Curt Bean Transport, Inc. v. Hill · filed 2009-11-11(4)(B)(iv)(b)

The plain language of the statute does not specify that a refusal of a drug test is sufficient to create the presumption. Rather it states specifically that the presence of alcohol or drugs creates the presumption, and this court will not interpret the statute, as appellant requests, to mean that Hill’s refusal to submit to a drug test creates the rebuttable presumption.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iv) creates a rebuttable presumption that an injury was substantially occasioned by prescription drugs used in contravention of a physician’s orders; the employee bears the burden of rebutting it by a preponderance of the evidence.

Telling Industries v. Petty · filed 2010-09-15(4)(B)(iv)

As we are bound by the Commission’s credibility determinations, we hold that the Commission did not err by accepting appellee’s testimony in concluding that appellee successfully rebutted the statutory presumption.

When illegal drugs are present, the employee must rebut the presumption that drug use substantially occasioned the injury; the employer need not prove impairment before the accident.

Prock v. Bull Shoals Landing · filed 2012-01-11(4)(B)(iv)

It was not incumbent upon Bull Shoals Landing to produce evidence that Prock was impaired prior to the explosion. Rather, once the presumption arose, it was Prock’s burden to prove that the explosion and resulting injury were not substantially occasioned by Prock’s use of marijuana.

The presence of illegal drugs creates a rebuttable presumption that their use substantially occasioned a workplace accident; the claimant must rebut it by a preponderance of the evidence.

Prock v. Bull Shoals Boat Landing · filed 2014-02-27(4)(B)(iv)

Once evidence is admitted showing that such drugs were in the claimant’s system at the time of the accident, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant, requiring him to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident was not substantially occasioned by intoxication from one of these substances. ... We are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same set of facts could not have found that ... Prock failed to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence; rather, we conclude that fair-minded persons would find that the accident and the injuries were the direct result of Prock’s practice of opening barrels in an unsafe manner with an acetylene torch.

The presence of marijuana metabolites can trigger a rebuttable presumption that an injury was substantially occasioned by illegal drug use.

Jackson v. Smith Blair, Inc. · filed 2010-10-20(4)(B)(iv)(b)

Our case law clearly states that the presence of marijuana metabolites is evidence of the presence of marijuana. ... We reject Jackson’s premise that there was no presumption that his injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs, and we find substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that he failed to overcome the presumption.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iv) creates a rebuttable presumption when illegal drugs are present and requires the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that drug use did not substantially occasion the injury or accident.

Edmisten v. Bull Shoals Landing · filed 2014-02-27(4)(B)(iv)

In this case, medical testing established the presence of marijuana metabolites, which triggered the statutory presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs. ... This shifted the burden of proof to Edmisten to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury or accident was not substantially occasioned by his use of illegal drugs.

The presence of an illegal drug creates a rebuttable presumption that it substantially occasioned the injury; the employee must prove otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence to receive compensation.

Reed v. Turner Industries · filed 2015-01-28(4)(B)(iv)

In sum, medical testing demonstrated that an illegal drug was in Reed’s system when he fell from the ladder. This triggered the presumption that Reed’s accident was substantially occasioned by the use of the illegal drug. We affirm the Commission’s finding that Reed failed to rebut the presumption because substantial evidence demonstrated that the ladder was not unsafe and did not cause Reed’s fall.

The presumption that an injury was substantially occasioned by illegal drugs does not require a positive drug test, but the employer must establish that the drugs were present when the injury occurred.

Nat'l Transit Staffing, Inc. v. Norris · filed 2018-04-04(4)(B)(iv)(b)

A positive drug-screen result is not required to trigger the statutory presumption. The basic point is merely that the Commission lacked objective scientific evidence in this case that Norris had, in fact, ingested methamphetamine around the time the injury occurred.

Marijuana metabolites in an employee’s urine are sufficient to trigger a rebuttable presumption that an injury was substantially occasioned by illegal drug use.

Blair v. American Stitchco, Inc., and Bridgefield Casualty Insurance · filed 2020-01-22(4)(B)(iv)(b)

Marijuana metabolites in a person’s urine are sufficient to invoke a rebuttable presumption that the injury or accident was substantially occasioned by the use of the illegal drug.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iv) presumes that an injury was substantially occasioned by illegal drug use after a positive drug test, unless the claimant rebuts that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.

Allen v. Employbridge Holding Co. and Galagher Bassett Services, Inc. · filed 2020-02-19(4)(B)(iv)

On the basis of this testimony, the Commission found that Allen failed to rebut the statutory presumption that the accident was substantially occasioned by the use of illegal drugs. We agree.

Medical opinions addressing compensability must express reasonable certainty that an accidental injury caused the claimant’s physical harm; no particular phrase is required.

Service Chevrolet v. Atwood · filed 1998-04-08(16)(B)

Section ll-9-102(16)(B) changes prior law. Now, medical opinions addressing compensability under § ll-9-102(5)(A)(i) must be stated in terms expressing the medical expert’s reasonable certainty that the claimant’s internal or external physical harm was caused by his accidental injury.

Medical opinions that an injury can, could, may, or possibly have a work-related cause lack the certainty required to prove causation.

Frances v. Gaylord Container Corp. · filed 2000-06-08(16)(B)

We expressly agree with the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Paulsen that expert opinions based upon "could," "may," or "possibly" lack the definiteness required to meet the claimant's burden to prove causation pursuant to section 11-9-102(16)(B).

Medical opinions addressing compensability must state causation within a reasonable degree of medical certainty; a theoretical possibility is insufficient.

Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc. · filed 2000-07-07(16)(B)

Dr. Moore’s medical opinion, like that which we rejected in Frances v. Gaylord Container, supra, is nothing more than a statement of theoretical possibility. He states only that Mr. Crudup’s working conditions could have caused his symptoms. We must therefore conclude that Dr. Moore’s opinion lacks the requisite definiteness required by § ll-9-102(16)(B).

Medical opinions on compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty; an opinion clearly attributing an illness to work can satisfy that requirement without claiming absolute certainty.

Howell v. Scroll Technologies · filed 2001-01-04(16)(B)

“Medical opinions addressing compensability and permanent impairment must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(B) (Supp. 1999). ... As the court of appeals correctly noted here, Dr. Squire’s testimony attributed Ms. Howell’s illness to her employment. ... It was thus stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty and may be called upon to support Ms. Howell's claim of compensability.

Medical opinions addressing permanent impairment must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty; an unequivocal diagnosis of herniations satisfies that requirement.

Polk County v. Jones · filed 2001-06-13(16)(B)

While it is true that medical opinions addressing permanent impairment must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Ihmeidan’s opinion met this requirement in that he was not equivocal in his assessment of permanent impairment in the form of herniations.

Medical opinions addressing compensability satisfy the reasonable-degree-of-medical-certainty requirement when they say an outcome probably occurred.

Wackenhut Corp. v. Jones · filed 2001-03-21(16)(B)

We hold that use of the word “probably” is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) (B) (Supp. 1999) that medical opinions addressing compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Medical evidence is not required to establish work-related causation in every case, but a medical opinion offered on causation must go beyond speculation or mere possibility.

Freeman v. Con-Agra Frozen Foods · filed 2001-03-29(16)(B)

To summarize, this court has held that medical evidence supported by objective findings is not essential in every case, but if medical opinions are offered, they must do more than state that the causal relationship between work and the injury is merely a possibility. This court has never required that a doctor be absolute in an opinion or that the magic words "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty" even be used by the doctor. Rather, this court has simply held that the medical opinion be more than speculation.

An unequivocal medical opinion that work caused an injury satisfies the requirement that opinions addressing compensability be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC. v. Davis · filed 2007-05-02(16)(B)

Analogously to Polk County, because Dr. Capocelli’s opinion regarding causation was unequivocal, we conclude that his opinion was stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

When a claimant relies on medical evidence to establish causation, section 11-9-102(16)(B) requires the medical opinion to be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty; an opinion that an injury “could” have been caused by an accident is insufficient.

Hawley v. First Security Bancorp · filed 2011-09-14(16)(B)

However, where the claimant relies on medical evidence to establish causation, such medical evidence |8must satisfy the statutory requirement under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(B) (Supp.2009), that medical opinions be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. ... In this case, Dr. Raben diagnosed Hawley with degenerative-disc dessication, degenerative-disc herniation, and radiculi-tis, and stated that these injuries “could” have been caused by her September 11, 2008 accident at work. Thus, this medical opinion fails to meet the required standard of medical certainty.

Subsection (16)(B) requires medical opinions addressing compensability to be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty; the court found that requirement satisfied by Dr. Goodman’s opinion.

St. Edward Mercy Medical Center v. Chrisman · filed 2012-09-12(16)(B)

While St. Edward contends that Dr. Goodman’s opinion addressing compensability was not stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(B) (Repl.2012), we do not agree.

Medical opinions used to establish causation must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Ozark Natural Food v. Pierson · filed 2012-02-08(16)(B)

Where the claimant does rely on medical evidence to establish causation, however, such medical evidence must satisfy the statutory requirement under Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-102(16)(B) (Supp.2009), that medical opinions be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

A medical opinion relied on to establish compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Bledsoe v. Viskase Companies, Inc., and Trumball Insurance Company · filed 2020-01-29(16)(B)

However, when a medical opinion is relied on to establish compensability, it must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(B) (Repl. 2012).

When a claimant relies on a medical opinion to establish causation, the opinion must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Rowland · filed 2022-09-14(16)

Though causation need not be proved by medical-opinion evidence, when a claimant relies on medical opinion, that opinion must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) (Repl. 2012).

Medical opinions addressing compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Hymes v. Pinewood Health & Rehab. · filed 2014-05-21(16)(B)

“Medical opinions addressing compensability . . . must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(B) (Repl. 2012).

A nonwork-related event does not become an independent intervening cause merely because it prolongs disability or treatment; the claimant's activity must be unreasonable under the circumstances.

Davis v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. · filed 2000-06-29(5)(F)(iii)

The statutory language at issue tracks the language in Guidry but leaves the standard of unreasonableness intact.

A nonwork-related independent intervening cause does not require claimant negligence or recklessness; unreasonable conduct may constitute such a cause.

K II Construction Co v. Crabtree · filed 2002-07-03(4)(F)(iii)

A nonwork-related independent intervening cause does not require negligence or recklessness, but if the claimant is engaged in unreasonable conduct, the result may be an independent intervening cause. Davis v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 341 Ark. 751, 20 S.W.3d 326 (2000); see Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(F)(iii) (Supp.1999).

A later event does not cut off benefits when it is causally connected to the compensable injury and the claimant’s activity was reasonable under the circumstances.

Pafford Medical Billing Services, Inc. v. Smith · filed 2011-03-02(4)(F)(iii)

Despite Pafford’s disagreement with the holding in Davis, supra, our supreme court’s interpretation of the statute is controlling, and as the ALJ found, Smith’s conduct was not unreasonable in this case. ... Thus, there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision that Smith’s motor-vehicle accident was not an independent intervening cause precluding further liability on the part of Pafford.

Section 11-9-102(4)(F) excludes benefits when unreasonable conduct after a compensable injury causes a nonwork-related independent intervening condition.

Loar v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. · filed 2014-04-23(4)(F)

Consequently, we hold that the Commission could reasonably find, on this record, that the decedent’s overdose and resultant death was unreasonable and thus was an independent intervening cause not related to the work.

Section 11-9-102(4)(F)(iii) does not cut off benefits after a later accident when the need for treatment remains causally connected to the compensable injury and the worker’s conduct was reasonable.

Nabholz Constr. Co. v. White · filed 2015-02-18(4)(F)(iii)

Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s conclusion that the 2004 car wreck was not an independent intervening cause of White’s need for further medical treatment. White’s conduct was not unreasonable in this case.

Benefits are unavailable for a condition caused by a non-work-related independent intervening cause after a compensable injury; the cause need not involve claimant negligence or recklessness.

Lovejoy v. Ken's Signs · filed 2017-03-01(4)(F)(iii)

However, the statute specifically states that “benefits shall not be payable for a condition which results from a non-work-related independent intervening cause following a compensable injury which causes or prolongs disability or a need for treatment.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(F)(iii). The “independent intervening cause does not require negligence or recklessness on the part of the claimant.” Id. ... In sum, there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s conclusion that Lovejoy was not entitled to additional medical benefits. We affirm the Commission’s decision on this point.

Section 11-9-102(4)(F)(iii) bars benefits for a condition resulting from a non-work-related independent intervening cause after a compensable injury when that cause creates or prolongs disability or the need for treatment.

Bush v. Sherwood Tractor, Inc. · filed 2023-04-19(4)(F)(iii)

Benefits are not payable for conditions resulting from a non-work-related independent intervening cause following a compensable injury which causes or prolongs a disability or need for treatment. ... Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission as we must do, there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings.