Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102

Section 11-9-102(9) includes medicine reasonably necessary to treat a compensable injury within compensation.

Northwest Tire Service v. Evans · filed 1988-04-18(9)

In both the Aired case and the case now before us, the court of appeals noted that “compensation” includes the furnishing of medicine only to the extent that it is “reasonably necessary” for treatment of the compensable injury. See Ark. Code Ann. §§11-9-102(9), 11-9-508(a), and 11-9-509 (1987). This correct conclusion blunts the argument that by merely having a prescription refilled at the employer’s expense an injured employee can forever prevent the statute from running.

Section 11-9-102(17) permits compensation for out-of-state treatment in a discipline regulated through Arkansas licensing, without requiring proof that no Arkansas physician can provide the treatment.

Milligan v. West Tree Service · filed 1997-04-02(17)

If, as cross-appellant concedes, section 11-9-102(17) does not prohibit treatment by out-of-state medical-service providers, there is no language in the statute which places on a claimant the burden of first proving that there are no physicians licensed in Arkansas who can provide the necessary treatment. We think a more logical meaning of section 11-9-102(17) is that a claimant may receive compensation only for treatment that is provided by the community of medical-service providers whose discipline is regulated in the State of Arkansas through its licensing procedures.

Section 11-9-102(3)(A) requires three people to be regularly employed by the same employer in the same business for the employment to fall under the workers’ compensation law.

Stone v. Patel · filed 1988-11-09(3)(A)

The determinative factor in ascertaining the requisite number of employees under the compensation act is whether three'persons are regularly employed by the same employer in the same business.

An insurer may be estopped from using a sole proprietor’s failure to file the written election for employee coverage to defeat workers’ compensation coverage.

INA/Cigna Insurance v. Simpson · filed 1989-04-26(2)

We hold that, under the circumstances presented, the Commission was correct in holding that INA may not rely on Simpson’s failure to file an A-18 form to defeat coverage.

A sole proprietor who intended to be covered and obtained workers’ compensation insurance can substantially comply with the election requirement without filing an A-18 form.

Jenny's Cleaning Service & Wausau Insurance v. Reddick · filed 1994-05-11(2)

Thus, the question here is whether the appellee, who wanted to be covered by workers’ compensation insurance and obtained a policy for that purpose, necessarily had to file an A-18 form in order to be a covered employee. The appellants contend the filing of the A-18 form is mandatory. Under the circumstances of this case, we do not agree.

Under the 1987 version of § 11-9-102(2), a sole proprietor must file written notice of election with the Workers’ Compensation Commission to be covered as an employee.

Jenny's Cleaning Service v. Reddick · filed 1994-12-19(2)

Having failed to comply with the statutory requirement of filing with the Commission written notice of election to be treated as an “employee” for workers’ compensation insurance purposes, Mrs. Reddick is not covered, and we must reverse the Commission.

An institution may qualify for the public charity exception to employment even if it receives fees from a service district.

Sloan v. Voluntary Ambulance Service · filed 1992-03-11(3)(A)(iii)

We do not think the fees paid to VAS by EMSD prevents, as a matter of law, VAS from being an institution maintained and operated “wholly” as a public charity under the Marion Hospital decision; and it is our conclusion that there is substantial evidence to support the facts found by the Commission and its decision that VAS was exempt from liability under the workers’ compensation law because of the exception provided by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(3)(A)(iii) (1987).

Section 11-9-102(3)(C) covers employment with at least one employee when the employer subcontracts part of work it contracted to perform.

Wright v. ABC Air, Inc. · filed 1993-11-03(3)(C)

In holding that Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(3)(C) was not applicable to this claim, the Commission noted that a subcontractor is defined as one who enters into a contract for the performance of work which another has already contracted to perform, id., and found that Mr. Atkinson was responsible for setting up the operations and generally arranged all contracts for the corporation's services himself. Under the circumstances of this case, we think that the Commission's opinion provides a substantial basis for the denial of relief, and we hold that its decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 11-9-102(2) does not include a step-grandchild in its definition of child, so a step-grandchild is not a covered dependent for workers’ compensation death benefits.

Taylor v. Lubritech · filed 2001-09-12(2)

The word “step-grandchild” is absent from the language of both Arkansas Codes Annotated sections 11-9-527 and 11-9-102(2). The word grandchild is conspicuously absent from the current statutory definitions in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102. We hold that the Legislature did not include a step-grandchild as a covered dependent under the statute. Applying the plain meaning of the statutes, we hold that a step-grandchild is not a dependent under the workers’ compensation statutes.

Section 11-9-102(9)(A) can include a rehabilitation-program participant as an employee when the participant performs required work that benefits the organization under an implied contract of hire.

Dixon v. Salvation Army · filed 2004-04-28(9)(A)

It is also significant that the statutory provision determining who is an “employee” for the purpose of inclusion within the scope of the protection of our workers’ compensation laws includes specific exclusions that cannot be said to apply to Dixon. His duties were clearly not casual and were within the course of the well-known and long-standing commercial trade, business, profession or occupation of the Salvation Army.

Work performed for a person’s own rehabilitation rather than for another’s benefit does not establish employment under the workers’ compensation definition.

Dixon v. Salvation Army · filed 2005-01-20(11)

Where a person engages in conduct that might be considered work, but does it to further his own benefit rather than to further the benefit of another, the person is not an employee. ... Likewise, Dixon was not in the employment of the Salvation Army at the time he was injured, and he is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

Section 11-9-102(9)(D)’s certificate-of-noncoverage presumption applies to sole proprietors and partners, and a certificate does not automatically bar an employee’s claim for benefits.

Cloverleaf Express v. Fouts · filed 2005-04-27(9)(D)

The Commission found that, when Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 was read in conjunction with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-402, the use of the more general term “individual” in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 referred only to a sole proprietor or a partner in a partnership as in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-402. ... When the statutes are considered as a combined whole, we cannot say in the present case that the Commission was clearly wrong in its interpretation. We agree that interpreting Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(9) (D) in the manner suggested by appellants would create a conflict with Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-108(a) and would be contrary to the purposes and objectives of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Section 11-9-102(9)(A) requires an express or implied contract of hire or apprenticeship for a person to be an employee of a given employer.

Phillips v. United States · filed 2005-09-06(9)(A)

We note, however, that Arkansas law requires the presence of an express or implied contract of hire or apprenticeship before an individual may be termed the employee of a given employer. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(9)(A). Because the record contains no evidence of a contract between Phillips and USPS, it is insufficient to show that Phillips was USPS’s employee.

Section 11-9-102(20)(A) defines a widow as the decedent’s legal wife who was living with or dependent on him for support when he died; she need not have been married to him when he was injured.

Estate of Slaughter v. City of Hampton · filed 2008-06-04(20)(A)

Hence, a person claiming to be a widow must show that she was legally married to and either living with or dependent upon the decedent when he died. See Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-102(20)(A).

Ownership of land and leased equipment does not alone make an owner an employer under § 11-9-102(10) when the owner does not manage the business or its workers.

Grady v. Estate of Smith · filed 2011-09-28(10)

For purposes of workers’ compensation, an employer is an “individual, partnership, limited liability company, association, or corporation carrying on any employment, the receiver or trustee of the same, or the legal representative of a deceased employer.” Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(10) (Supp. 2011). ... We find no merit to appellants’ argument that Mr. Smith was the de facto owner and employer of Bunker Hill Golf Course.

Section 11-9-102(2) includes a stepchild in the definition of “child” for workers’ compensation benefits.

Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Myers · filed 2014-02-12(2)

Under our state’s workers’ compensation statutes, “child” is defined as “a natural child, a posthumous child, a child legally adopted prior to injury of the employee, a stepchild, an acknowledged illegitimate child of the deceased or of the spouse of the deceased, and a foster child.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(2) (Repl. 2012). ... Here, before us, there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s award of death benefits to Andrew’s three stepchildren, and we affirm the Commission’s decision on this issue.

Section 11-9-102(11)(A)(iii) excludes farm employment from workers’ compensation coverage.

Lowry v. McCorkle · filed 2015-10-21(11)(A)(iii)

Because Shawn Lowry was employed on a farm, this case falls under the agricultural exemption of the workers’ compensation laws.

Section 11-9-102(9)(A) includes people employed unlawfully in its definition of “employee,” so undocumented workers may receive workers’ compensation benefits.

Packers Sanitation Services, Inc. v. Quintanilla · filed 2017-04-05(9)(A)

It is clear that our legislature intended to provide workers’-compensation benefits to people in Cecilia’s position, as our statute expressly includes in its definition of any person, whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.

Section 11-9-102(5) defines disability by whether an injury incapacitates a worker from earning the wages received at the time of injury.

County Market v. Thornton · filed 1989-05-03(5)

In cases controlled by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-519 (1987) (formerly codified at Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1313 (Repl. 1976)), such as the case at bar, temporary total disability is not based on the claimant’s healing period, but is instead awarded where the claimant is incapacitated because of injury to earn the wages he was receiving at the time of the injury. Breshears, supra; see Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) (1987).

Section 11-9-102(9)'s definition of disability includes physical impairment and impairment of earning capacity.

Golden v. Westark Community College · filed 1997-07-02(9)

Consequently, although the definition of “disability” fails to include any specific reference to physical impairment, Arkansas law clearly indicates that both physical and earning impairment are components of “disability.”

Section 11-9-102 distinguishes an accidental injury from disability, which is the resulting inability to earn the wages received at the time of injury.

Montgomery v. Delta Airlines · filed 1990-06-27(d), (e)

Furthermore, there is a statutory distinction between an injury and a disability. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1302 (Repl. 1976) [now codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (1987)] provides the following definitions: (d) “Injury” means only accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment, including occupational diseases .... (e) “Disability” means incapacity because of injury to earn, in the same or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.

Section 11-9-102(5) treats “any other employment” as work taken in place of the job in which the employee was injured, so an existing concurrent job does not count.

Stevens v. Mountain Home School District · filed 1993-04-07(5)

We find that the Commission erred in its interpretation of “the same or any other employment,” and hold that, for the purpose of defining disability, “any other employment” ' means any other employment in lieu of the one in which the employee was injured. Since appellant was working both jobs when she was injured, the job with HUD was not “any other employment” undertaken in the place of the part-time bus driving job.

Section 11-9-102(13) defines the healing period as the time for healing from an accidental injury; it can continue while further treatment could improve the worker’s condition.

Harvest Foods v. Washam · filed 1996-02-14(13)

Arkansas Code Annotated §11-9-102(13) (Supp. 1995) ... defines “healing period” as that period for healing of an injury resulting from an accident. ... The Commission concluded that this evidence demonstrated that the appellee had not reached the end of his healing period. Under our substantial evidence standard of review, we find no error in that determination.

A claimant must prove permanent physical impairment resulting from a compensable injury before receiving wage-loss disability benefits in excess of that impairment.

Needham v. Harvest Foods · filed 1998-12-02(F)(ii)(a)

Because we find that there is a substantial basis to deny permanent partial disability benefits, we need not address appellant’s argument regarding wage-loss disability benefits. In order to be entitled to any wage-loss disability in excess of permanent physical impairment, the claimant must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained permanent physical impairment as a result of the compensable injury. Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-102(F)(ii)(a); see Smith v. Gerber Prods., 54 Ark. App. 57, 922 S.W.2d 365 (1996).

Section 11-9-102(9) defines disability as incapacity caused by a compensable injury to earn the wages the worker received when injured, whether in the same or other employment.

Hope Livestock Auction Co. v. Knighton · filed 1999-06-23(9)

“Disability” is defined as “incapacity because of a compensable injury to earn, in the same or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the compensable injury.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(9) (Supp. 1997). With respect to the inability to earn wages, there was testimony from Knighton, his wife, Dr. Bohmfalk, and Dr. Tobey of Knighton’s problems being around people and functioning in society.

Section 11-9-102(13) defines the healing period as the time needed to heal an injury from an accident, lasting until the employee is as far restored as the injury permits.

Dallas County Hospital v. Daniels · filed 2001-06-13(13)

The healing period is statutorily defined as “that period for healing of an injury resulting from an accident.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(13) (Supp. 1998). We have interpreted this period as including the time until the employee is as far restored as the permanent character of the injury will permit.

Section 11-9-102(5) defines disability as the inability, because of a compensable injury, to earn the wages the worker received at the time of injury.

Rice v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 2000-12-13(5)

Disability is defined under Arkansas law as the “incapacity because of compensable injury to earn, in the same or other employment, the wages which the employee was. receiving at the time of the injury.” Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-9-102(5).

Section 11-9-102(5) defines disability as an injury-caused inability to earn wages, so an unrelated later condition cannot support disability benefits.

Goodwin v. Phillips Petroleum Co. · filed 2001-01-24(5)

“Disability” was defined as an “incapacity because of injury to earn, in the same or any employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) (1987). “Injury” was defined as an “accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment ....” Ark. Code Ann. § 11 — 9— 102(4) (1987). Under this statutory rubric, it was anticipated that a claimant could receive partial disability benefits in excess of the employee’s percentage of permanent physical impairment so long as the disability was caused by an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.

For disability purposes, “any other employment” means work taken in place of the job in which the employee was injured; a job the employee already held concurrently does not qualify.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Westbrook · filed 2002-04-17(8)

Because appellee was working both jobs when he was injured, his job as a minister was not “any other employment” undertaken in place of his employment at WalMart. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s award of temporary total disability-benefits.

Section 11-9-102(12) defines the healing period for a work injury; a worker who still needs medical testing may remain in that period.

Clairday v. the Lilly Co. · filed 2006-04-19(12)

Our statutes define "healing period" as "that period for healing of an injury resulting from an accident." Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12) (Repl.2002). The healing period ends when the underlying condition causing the disability has become stable and nothing in the way of treatment will improve that condition; the determination of when the healing period has ended is a factual determination for the Commission and will be affirmed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. ... As such, we hold that the Commission erred in determining that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to temporary-total-disability compensation after April 24, 2003, as he clearly was in need of the additional medical testing as recommended by Dr. Moore's expert opinion on which the Commission relied.

Section 11-9-102(12) defines the healing period as the period for healing an injury from an accident; treatment for an unrelated condition does not extend the healing period for a compensable injury.

Towler v. Tyson Poultry, Inc. · filed 2012-10-03(12)

The healing period is “that period for healing of an injury resulting from an accident.” Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12) (Repl.2012). ... We hold that the Commission did not err in denying Ms. Towler’s claim for additional temporary total disability benefits because there was a substantial basis for its finding that her healing period for the compensable injury had ended by March 9, 2010.

The healing period is the time during which an employee heals from an accidental injury.

Jordan v. Home Depot, Inc. · filed 2013-10-09(12)

The healing period is that period for healing of an injury resulting from an accident. ... We hold that substantial evidence supports the factual findings that the healing period ended by February 2011 and that Mr. Jordan was not totally incapacitated from earning wages.

Section 11-9-102(8) excludes a job held alongside the injured worker’s regular job from “any other employment” when determining disability.

Walgreen Co. v. Goode · filed 2012-03-07(8)

When there is tandem employment, the other job is not “any other employment” undertaken in lieu of the employment in which the worker was injured. See id. Section 11-9-102(8) has not been revised by our legislature since our interpretation in the Stevens and Wal-Mart opinions; it and our opinions remain good law. In this claim, the evidence was that Goode supplemented his income by intermittent work with his family’s businesses, as he had done for years. Thus, the ALJ’s finding, that he was entitled to TTD while he remained in his healing period and was unable to earn his pharmacist wages in other employment, is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 11-9-102(12) defines the healing period as the time necessary for an injury resulting from an accident to heal.

Bankston v. University of Arkansas Little Rock · filed 2017-02-01(12)

The “healing period” is defined as the period necessary for the healing of an injury resulting from an accident. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12)(Repl. 2012).

The healing period is the time needed to heal an accidental injury and ends when the condition is stable and nothing further will improve it.

Marten Transport, Ltd. v. Morgan · filed 2017-11-01(12)

The “healing period” is defined as the period necessary for the healing of an injury resulting from an accident. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12). ... When the underlying condition that caused the disability becomes stable and when ... nothing further will improve that condition, the healing period has ended. ... Sufficient ... evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Morgan had reached the end of his healing period no later than April 28, 2016.

A worker remains disabled under section 11-9-102(8) while an injury continues to impair the worker’s ability to earn preinjury wages, even if the type of disability benefit changes.

Lewis v. Calfrac Well Services Corp. · filed 2015-03-04(8)

“Disability” under our workers’ compensation act means “incapacity because of compensable injury to earn, in the same or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the compensable injury.” ... It is clear from this record that appellant has suffered only one period of disability; there has been no cessation of it.

Section 11-9-102(8) defines disability as an incapacity caused by a compensable injury to earn the wages the employee received when injured.

Mullin v. Alco · filed 2016-02-24(8)

Disability means “incapacity because of compensable injury to earn, in the same or any other employment, the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the compensable injury.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(8). The healing period is “that period for healing of an injury resulting from an accident.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12). Mullin was released by Dr. Schlesinger to perform light-duty work, and there was no evidence presented that Mullin was totally incapable of earning wages. Thus, there was substantial evidence presented to support the Commission’s decision that she was not entitled to TTD benefits.

Section 11-9-102(12) defines the healing period as the time needed for an accidental injury to heal.

Cent. Moloney, Inc. v. Scoles · filed 2018-11-28(12)

The "healing period" is defined as the period necessary for the healing of an injury resulting from an accident. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12) (Repl. 2012). ... In the instant case, the temporary total-disability award corresponds to the opinions of both doctors that Scoles has not reached maximum medical recovery.

The healing period continues while treatment needed to improve the injury remains pending.

Easley v. College Hill Middle School and Arkansas School Boards Association · filed 2024-12-04(12)

The “healing period” is defined as the period necessary for the healing of an injury resulting from an accident. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12) (Supp. 2023). ... Further, Easley is still in her healing period because Dr. Ardoin has not yet been able to perform the recommended surgery, and Dr. Ardoin estimated that even after the surgery, she would not reach MMI for another nine months.

Section 11-9-102(8) defines disability as an incapacity caused by a compensable injury to earn the wages the employee received at the time of injury, in the same or any other employment.

McDonald's and Ar McDonald's Self Insured trust/risk Management Resources v. Key III · filed 2023-09-20(8)

Therefore, we affirm the Commission’s finding that Jimmy suffers a total incapacity to earn wages, and we affirm its award of additional TTD benefits.

The healing period does not continue or restart when treatment provides only temporary relief without improving the underlying condition.

Grubbs v. S. Personnel Mgmt. · filed 2025-06-04(12)

The healing period is defined as “that period for healing of an injury resulting from an accident.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12) (Supp. 2021). ... Even though the Commission approved continued conservative treatment for Grubbs, this did not extend his healing period or cause him to reenter a healing period because the injections and physical therapy provided only temporary relief. ... We hold that there is a substantial basis for the denial of additional TTD benefits because Grubbs did not prove that he reentered a healing period after October 22, 2020.

Section 11-9-102(4) includes a work-related angina attack that causes disability as an injury even if the underlying heart condition does not change.

Nashville Livestock Commission v. Cox · filed 1990-04-16(4)

Our holding here is that an attack of angina pectoris which results in disability as defined in the workers' compensation act may constitute an injury giving rise to compensation under the act if it arises out of and occurs in the course of employment.

Under the 1987 version of § 11-9-102(4), an injury caused by sexual harassment may be compensable if it arose out of and in the course of employment.

Phillips v. Arkansas State Highway & Transportation Department · filed 1996-02-28(4)

Arkansas Workers’ Compensation laws provide a remedy to workers injured or killed from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (1987). ... Thus, the inquiry the Commission must make is whether the claimant sustained a compensable injury arising out of and in the course of the employment relationship. In this case, the Commission failed to make such an inquiry. Instead, it erroneously adopted a rule that sexual harassment could never arise out of and in the course of an employment relationship.

A workplace incident that aggravates a pre-existing condition can be a compensable injury.

ST. VINCENT INFIRMARY NEDICAL CENTER v. Brown · filed 1996-03-20(5)(A)(i)

Although appellee had other episodes in her past when her shoulder popped out, the employer “takes the employee as he finds him,” and employment circumstances that aggravate pre-existing conditions are compensable.

A claimant must prove that an accidental injury arose from a specific incident identifiable by time and place, with medical evidence supporting that account.

Mikel v. Engineered Specialty Plastics · filed 1997-03-05(5)(A)(i)

Mikel, who has the burden of proving her injury by a preponderance of the evidence, filed her claim with the Commission pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-102(5)(A)(i). ... The issue before this court is whether any medical evidence exists to support the fact that appellant experienced an injury due to a specific incident, as opposed to her injuries being gradual. ... After reviewing the medical testimony by both doctors, this court agrees that the appellant did not prove her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Section 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) covers a compensable injury caused by a specific incident in the course of employment.

Jordan v. J.C. Penney Co. · filed 1997-04-30(5)(A)(i)

Based on the only evidence in the record —■ both testimonial and medical documentation — it is impossible for us to imagine how fair-minded persons with the same cold record before them could agree that appellant did not suffer a compensable specific-incident injury in the course of her employment.

Section 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) limits compensable gradual-onset injuries to those caused by rapid repetitive motion, back injuries, and hearing loss.

Tillman v. Baldwin & Shell Construction · filed 1997-07-02(5)(A)(ii)

In light of this declaration, and in the absence of any assertion that the injury resulted from rapid repetitive motion, we hold that the Commission correctly found that appellant’s hemorrhoids did not constitute a compensable injury under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) (A) (ii) (Repl. 1996).

A compensable injury requires a causal relationship between the claimant’s employment and the injury.

McMillan v. U.S. Motors · filed 1997-10-15(5)(A)(i)

Thus, in order to prove a compensable injury appellant must prove, among other things, a causal relationship between his employment and the injury.

Whether a later injury is a nonwork-related independent intervening cause is a question of fact for the Workers' Compensation Commission.

Oak Grove Lumber Co. v. Highfill · filed 1998-05-06(5)(F)(iii)

Thus, the question of whether appellee's second injury was a nonwork-related independent intervening cause was not to be determined as a matter of law; rather, it was a question of fact for the Commission's determination.

A claimant must prove the compensability of a workers’ compensation claim by a preponderance of the evidence.

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Carter · filed 1998-05-27(5)(E)(i)

Appellee had the burden to prove the compensability of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(i) (Repl. 1996); Jordan v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 51 Ark. App. 100, 911 S.W.2d 593 (1995).

A compensable accidental injury must result from a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

Barnett v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. · filed 1998-06-24(5)(A)(i)

An injury is accidental only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. ... We cannot say that the Commission erred in finding that appellant failed to prove that he suffered a compensable injury.

A claimant must prove that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment before the court needs to decide whether the work was rapid and repetitive.

Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ · filed 1999-09-22(5)(A)(ii)

However, because appellant has failed to establish the threshold requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the cubital tunnel syndrome injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, we need not address the issue of whether her work was rapid and repetitive. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) (Repl. 1996).

Subsection (5)(A)(ii) requires carpal tunnel syndrome to arise out of and in the course of employment to be compensable.

Lloyd v. United Parcel Service · filed 2000-02-02(5)(A)(ii)

We hold that the Commission erred in finding that Mrs. Lloyd failed to prove that her condition arose out of and in the course of her employment as required by Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(A)(ii) (Repl.1996).

A claimant seeking compensation for a specific-incident injury must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury is identifiable by time and place, arose out of and in the course of employment, and required medical services.

Tucker v. Roberts-McNutt, Inc. · filed 2000-11-02(4)(A)

To be entitled to compensation, Mr. Tucker was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained an injury that is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, arose out of and in the course of his employment, and required medical services. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A), -102(E)(i) (Supp. 1999).

Section 11-9-102(5)(A)(i) defines an injury as physical harm caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place, arising out of and in the course of employment, and requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death.

Cromwell v. University of Arkansas · filed 2001-11-28(5)(A)(i)

Such an injury is one caused by a specific incident that is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, and which causes physical harm, arises out of and in the course of the employment, and requires medical services or results in disability or death.

Work-related scratches followed by an infection may qualify as a compensable accidental injury if the claimant establishes a causal link between the scratches and the infection.

Heptinstall v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. · filed 2003-12-10(4)(a)

Therefore, appellant was not required to prove that his staph infection qualified as an occupational disease. The appellant needed only to establish a causal link between the original injury and the subsequent complications for the injury to be compensable. ... Because the Commission made no findings with regard to whether appellant sustained a compensable accidental injury, we remand the case to the Commission to make a finding of fact on whether appellant established the requirements of a compensable accidental injury under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(a).

An injury can be compensable when employment conditions contribute to its risk, even if the injury has a personal cause.

Crawford v. Single Source Transportation · filed 2004-06-30(4)(A)(I)

A compensable injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(I) (Repl.2002). ... Here, we believe that appellant's employment conditions contributed to his injury and thus cannot consider it to be a noncompensable idiopathic injury.

Section 11-9-102 defines an accidental injury as one caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place, and does not require proof that the injury was the major cause of disability or the need for treatment.

Estridge v. Waste Management · filed 2000-12-15(4)(A)(i)

Second, under Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (Supp.1999), two types of injuries are recognized: accidental and gradual onset. An accidental injury is defined as caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). For an accidental injury, it is not necessary that the claimant prove that the injury is the major cause of the disability or need for treatment.

Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) requires an accidental injury to be identifiable by time and place, but does not require the claimant to identify its precise time or date.

Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass · filed 2001-11-08(4)(A)(i)

A strict construction of the statute does not require, as a prerequisite to compensability, that the claimant identify the precise time and numerical date upon which an accidental injury occurred. Instead, the statute only requires that the claimant prove that the occurrence of the injury is capable of being identified.

A claimant must prove a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence.

Searcy Industrial Laundry, Inc. v. Ferren · filed 2003-04-30(4)(E)(i)

As the claimant, appellee had the burden of proving a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(i) (Repl.2002). ... Because we cannot say that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission, we affirm.

Section 11-9-102 excludes injuries caused by participation in horseplay from compensable injuries and places the burden on the employee to prove a compensable injury.

Morales v. Martinez · filed 2004-11-10(4)(B)(i), (4)(E)

Insomuch as the employee in a workers’ compensation case has the burden of proving a compensable injury, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E) (Repl. 2002); see Carman v. Haworth, Inc., 74 Ark. App. 55, 45 S.W.3d 408 (2001), the Commission correctly held that appellant in the present case had the burden to prove that he sustained an injury while engaged in the performance of employment services rather than while engaged in horseplay.

A specific-incident injury arising out of and in the course of employment is compensable; a worker’s medical condition alone does not make the injury idiopathic.

Swaim v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. · filed 2005-05-25(4)(A)

In summary, this was a specific-incident injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. The finding that this was a non-compensable idiopathic injury is not supported by substantial evidence.

Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) covers a workplace injury caused by a specific, identifiable incident, including a new injury to a worker with prior injuries.

Allen Canning Co. v. Woodruff · filed 2005-09-07(4)(A)(i)

We hold that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that appellee suffered a compensable injury and that it was not a recurrence of his prior back injuries.

A compensable injury is an accidental injury causing physical harm that arises out of and in the course of employment.

Wilson v. CORNERSTONE MASONRY · filed 2006-03-22(4)(A)(i)

Our workers’ compensation statutes define a “compensable injury” as an “accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body . . . arising out of and in the course of employment. . . .” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2005). ... Accordingly, we remand for an award of benefits.

A compensable injury must arise out of and in the course of employment, which requires a causal relationship between the work and the injury.

Stutzman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. · filed 2007-05-09(4)(A)

A “compensable injury” is one “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A). In order to prove a compensable injury the claimant must prove, among other things, a causal relationship between his employment and the injury. ... Here, the Commission determined that Stutzman was not a credible witness, and it noted the medical opinions of Drs. Walker and Smelz that her work activity at Baxter did not cause or aggravate her carpal tunnel syndrome. Because it is the Commission’s function to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, we hold that its decision displays a substantial basis to deny this claim.

An organic-brain injury claim is assessed under the definition of a compensable accidental injury and requires proof of an injury causally related to the workplace incident.

Arbaugh v. AG Processing, Inc. · filed 2005-02-03(4)(A)(i)

Because the record contains testimony and reports from medical experts that Arbaugh did not sustain an organic-brain injury during the June 2 incident, and that his organic-brain problems were not causally related to the incident, we are not convinced that fair-minded persons could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission.

Section 11-9-102 generally treats an accidental injury caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place as compensable.

Dorris v. Townsends of Arkansas, Inc. · filed 2005-11-30(4)(A)(i)

Gradual onset injuries are compensable only under limited conditions under the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Law; in contrast, accidental injuries, caused by a specific incident and identifiable by time and place of occurrence, are generally compensable. Compare Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) and (ii) (Supp.2005).

A compensable accidental injury requires proof of a specific workplace incident; showing that symptoms appeared at work is insufficient.

Weaver v. Nabors Drilling USA · filed 2007-03-14(4)

He only proved that he had an injury and that he felt pain while at work—he failed to show that a specific incident occurred at work.

An injury may qualify as a compensable specific-incident injury when the worker identifies when knee pain began at work, even if he cannot identify its precise cause.

Cedar Chemical Co. v. Knight · filed 2007-06-06(4)(A)(i)

We agree with Knight's argument and hold that this case is distinguishable from Hapney . In the instant case, Knight knew the day and time of when his knee began to hurt. He reported the pain to his supervisor and sought medical treatment the next day.

An injury may qualify as a compensable specific-incident injury when credible, detailed evidence links the onset of pain to the employee's work activities, even if the precise cause is unexplained.

Cedar Chemical Co. v. Knight · filed 2008-01-31(4)(A)(i)

Also notable is the fact that Appellee's testimony regarding his job duties and the requirement that he ascend and descend multiple flights of stairs repeatedly over the course of a twelve-hour shift was much more detailed and supports a conclusion that his injuries were compensable as a specific-incident workplace injury.

A compensable accidental injury must be tied to a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

Williams v. Baldor Elec. Co. · filed 2014-01-22(4)(A)(i)

An accidental injury is caused by a specific incident, identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012). ... While Williams argues that substantial evidence does not support the Commission’s decision that he failed to prove that he suffered a compensable injury to his right shoulder, we hold that there is no error and issue a memorandum opinion affirming the Commission’s ... decision.

An accidental compensable injury must arise out of and in the course of employment and be caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place.

Sandeford v. United Parcel Serv. Inc. · filed 2014-04-09(4)(A)(i)

We hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s opinion that Sandeford did not suffer a compensable injury.

A compensable injury includes later conditions naturally resulting from it when the conditions are causally connected.

Wright v. Conway Freight · filed 2014-09-10(4)(A)(i)

If an injury is compensable, then every natural consequence of that injury is also compensable. ... The basic test is ... whether there is a causal connection between the two episodes. ... We disagree. As discussed above, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision. The Commission found that the symptoms of sciatica resulting from the knee injury, as opposed to a back injury, and anything related to it should be covered as spelled out in the Commission’s decision.

An accidental injury must result from a specific incident identifiable by time and place; differences in eyewitness accounts do not prevent the Commission from finding that the incident occurred.

Potlatch Corp. v. Word · filed 2009-11-18(4)(A)(i)

An injury is “accidental” only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. ... While they are correct that none of the testimony from witnesses Ricky Howard, Jimmy Barrett, or Jim Grice exactly mirrors appellee’s testimony — and in pointing out inconsistencies between testimony at the hearing and previously signed statements — we hold that these were issues of credibility properly weighed by the Commission.

An aggravation of a preexisting condition can be a compensable injury if it meets the requirements for a new compensable injury.

Gladden v. Georgia Pacific Corp. · filed 2010-12-08(4)(A)(i)

An aggravation, being a new injury with an independent cause, must meet the requirements for a compensable injury. ... However, the Commission failed to take the next step and determine whether his preexisting left-shoulder condition was aggravated by the December 12, 2007 incident.

An aggravation of a preexisting condition must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings to qualify as a compensable injury.

Grothaus v. Vista Health, L.L.C. · filed 2011-02-16(4)(D)

Thus, to be compensable, Grothaus’s alleged aggravation of a preexisting condition must itself have been a compensable injury—that is, it must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

The assault exclusion applies only when the injured worker was an active participant in the assault.

Odd Jobs & More & Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Reid · filed 2011-06-22(4)(B)(i)

It is clear that the assault upon Mr. Reid does not fall within this exclusion because he |6was not an active participant in the assault. That finding by the Commission is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 11-9-102 requires a claimant seeking compensation to prove that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.

Flynn v. J.B. Hunt Transportation · filed 2012-02-01(4)(A)

In order to prevail on a claim for a compensable injury, the claimant must prove that the injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (Supp.2011). ... Determining Flynn’s credibility was within the exclusive province of the Commission, and we hold that there is substantial evidence to support the Commission’s decision.

Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) does not require a claimant to identify the exact moment an injury appeared if the occurrence of the injury can be identified.

Pearson v. Worksource · filed 2012-11-01(4)(A)(i)

The fact that Pearson could not identify the exact moment that the blister emerged and became visible because he was wearing a boot is not determinative. Rather, “the statute only requires that the claimant prove that the occurrence of the injury is capable of being identified.” Edens, 346 Ark. at 492, 58 S.W.3d at 373.

A specific-incident compensable injury must arise out of employment, cause bodily harm requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death, be supported by objective medical findings, and be identifiable by time and place.

Willis v. Great Dane Trailers · filed 2014-10-08(4)(A)(i)

To prove the occurrence of a specific-incident compensable injury, the claimant must establish by a ... preponderance of the evidence (1) that an injury occurred arising out of and in the scope of employment; (2) that the injury caused internal or external harm to the body which required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) that the injury is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings; and (4) that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

A claimant must prove a compensable injury, including a causal relationship between the injury and employment, by a preponderance of the credible evidence.

Vijil v. Schlumberger Technology Corp. · filed 2013-05-22(4)(E)(i)

Vijil has the burden of proving a compensable injury by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(i) (Repl. 2012). ... As such, because Vijil failed to establish a causal relationship between his injury and his employment, the Commission’s conclusion that Vijil did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had sustained a compensable injury is supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm its decision denying Vijil workers’ compensation benefits.

A claimant must prove the elements of a specific-incident compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence.

Halliday v. North Arkansas Regional Medical Center · filed 2016-09-14(4)

The claimant has the burden of proving these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4).

A compensable accidental injury must be caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place.

Johnson v. NPC Int'l, Inc. · filed 2018-01-24(4)(A)(i)

We affirm the Commission's decision. ... But there was simply no evidence of a specific injury occurring on February 27 other than Johnson's own testimony. ... Based on this record, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision.

An injury is compensable under section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) if it arises out of and in the course of employment.

GALE A. ASKINS v. KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP I AND SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT · filed 2018-01-25(4)(A)(i)

A compensable injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment. ... Because Askins failed to prove that there was a causal connection between the fall and her employment, we affirm.

A compensable injury must arise from a specific work incident identifiable by time and place and be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Collier v. Walmart Assocs., Inc. · filed 2018-02-14(4)(A)(i)

To prove a compensable injury, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) an injury arising out of and in the course of employment; (2) that the injury caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(16) (Repl. 2012), establishing the injury; and (4) that the injury was caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. ... The Commission found that Collier was barred from receiving benefits, not because he failed to give notice, but because the alleged trauma was not supported by any medical evidence or credible testimony. There is substantial evidence to support the Commission's denial of Collier's claim.

A claimant seeking compensation for a specific-incident injury must prove that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment.

McCutchen v. Human Dev. Ctr. · filed 2018-04-04(4)(A)(i)

To prove a compensable injury as a result of a specific incident that is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) an injury arising out of and in the course of employment; ... Thus, the Commission's finding that appellant's right-knee injury was not work related is supported by the evidence.

A claimant must prove that a specific work incident caused the injury; the employer need not prove an alternative cause.

Hargis v. Lovett · filed 2018-04-04(4)(A)(i)

It is appellant's burden to demonstrate that he sustained a compensable work-related injury rather than appellee's burden to provide an alternate non-work-related cause for appellant's back condition. ... Appellant is required to prove a causal connection between his injury and the alleged May 9, 2016 boulder-lifting incident. ... Viewing the Commission's decision in the light most favorable to its findings, we hold that the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

A claimant must prove that a specific work incident caused the claimed injury; degenerative findings alone do not establish that connection.

Davis v. Remington Arms Co. · filed 2018-09-05(4)(A)(i)

The evidence was that Davis did not report injuries to her hands, wrists, or thumbs during her treatment with Dr. Moore on April 22 and 25, 2016. Further, Dr. Blankenship's MRI of Davis's lumbar spine showed chronic degenerative problems with no reference to an acute injury, and x-rays of her thumbs revealed degenerative arthritis. Based on this evidence and the Commission's province of determining facts and credibility, we affirm the Commission's determination.

A claimant must prove that a specific-incident injury arose from employment, caused harm requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death, is supported by objective medical findings, and is identifiable by time and place.

Halliday v. N. Ark. Reg'l Med. Ctr · filed 2016-09-14(4)(A)(i)

To prove the occurrence of a specific-incident compensable injury, the claimant must establish that (1) an injury occurred arising out of and in the scope of employment; (2) the injury caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) the injury is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) (Repl. 2012); and (4) the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). ... As to the December 26, 2012 incident, we hold that the Commission’s finding that Halliday failed to establish a compensable injury is supported by substantial evidence.

A specific-incident compensable injury must arise out of and in the course of employment and be identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

Yates v. Boar's Head Provisions Co., Inc. · filed 2017-03-08(4)(A)(i)

To prove a compensable injury as a result of a specific incident that is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence ... (4) that the injury was caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). ... Accordingly, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision that Yates failed to establish a specific-incident injury arising out of and in the course of his employment at Boar’s Head.

A claimant seeking benefits for a specific-incident injury must prove bodily harm supported by objective medical findings that requires treatment or causes disability.

Grantham v. Hornbeck Agricultural Group, LLC · filed 2017-10-04(4)(A)(i)

We hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Grantham failed to prove physical bodily harm, supported by objective findings, requiring medical treatment or producing disability.

Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) requires a specific-incident compensable injury to arise from employment, cause bodily harm, have objective medical support, and be identifiable by time and place.

Newby v. Century Industries, Inc. · filed 2017-10-18(4)(A)(i)

To prove the occurrence of a specific-incident compensable injury, the claimant must establish that (1) an injury occurred arising out of and in the scope of ... employment; (2) the injury caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) the injury is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16); and (4) the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). ... We hold that there was a substantial basis for the Commission to find that Newby failed to establish a compensable lower-back injury.

A specific-incident injury is compensable only if the claimant proves an injury arising from employment, supported by objective medical evidence and tied to an identifiable time and place.

White v. Butterball, LLC · filed 2018-01-10(4)(A)(i)

To prove a compensable injury as a result of a specific incident that is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) an injury arising out of and in the course of employment; (2) that the injury caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) (Repl. 2012), establishing the injury; and (4) that the injury was caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). ... Furthermore, no physician causally related White's left-side carpal-tunnel syndrome to the April 29 incident; in fact, Dr. Guthrey attributed White's carpal-tunnel syndrome symptoms to her morbid obesity.

Section 11-9-102 requires a claimant seeking benefits for a specific-incident injury to prove a work-related injury, harm requiring medical care or causing disability, objective medical findings, and an incident identifiable by time and place.

Ark. Dep't of Corr. v. Clary · filed 2018-01-31(4)(A)(i)-(ii)

To prove the occurrence of a specific-incident compensable injury, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that an injury occurred arising out of and in the scope of employment; (2) that the injury caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) that the injury is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) ; and (4) that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. ... Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, we hold that substantial evidence supports its decision that appellee had proved a compensable specific injury to his left knee and that he was entitled to medical expenses and temporary total-disability benefits.

A specific-incident compensable injury requires proof that an identifiable work incident caused the injury.

Clark v. Williamson G.C., Inc. · filed 2018-05-30(4)(A)(i)

The Commission did not err by finding that Clark failed to establish a causal connection between any event on March 8, 2016, and the elbow condition established by the medical evidence.

A claimant must prove that a specific-incident injury arose out of and in the course of employment.

Godwin v. Garland County Landfill · filed 2016-10-26(4)(A)(i)

To prove the occurrence of a specific-incident compensable injury, the claimant must establish that the injury was one “arising out of and in the course of employment.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012).

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(i) does not bar compensation for a workplace assault victim who did not actively participate in the assault.

Dorn v. Housing Authority of Pine Bluff · filed 2017-05-17(4)(B)(i)

Because Dorn was not an active participant, his claim is not barred.

An injury during a robbery can be compensable when the employee is performing work for the employer and the assault is connected to the employment rather than a personal dispute.

Herrera-Larios v. El Chico 71 · filed 2017-11-29(4)(A)(i), (4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury is an accidental injury causing internal or external harm that arises out of and in the course of employment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012). ... With these standards in mind, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Herrera was killed during and in the course and scope of his employment.

A trainee's injury can arise out of and in the course of employment while logged off if the trainee remains in the truck and is expected to study or practice for work.

P.A.M. Transport, Inc. v. Eason · filed 2018-01-31(4)(A)(i)

A compensable injury is defined as "an accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body ... arising out of and in the course of employment." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). ... Eason's situation is unique in that he was a trainee expected to study or practice backing up the truck, which benefited P.A.M. Further, the injury occurred within the truck during a period when Eason was not enjoying a leisure time off or free to do as he pleased. ... Accordingly, on the facts of this case, substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision and we affirm.

A claimant proving a specific-incident compensable injury must establish work-related harm requiring medical services or causing disability or death, supported by objective medical findings and identifiable by time and place.

M.A. Mortenson Companies and Arch Insurance company/gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Reed · filed 2019-12-04(4)

To prove the occurrence of a specific-incident compensable injury, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that an injury occurred arising out of and in the scope of employment; (2) that the injury caused internal or external harm to the body that required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) that the injury is established by medical evidence supported by objective findings; and (4) that the injury was caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (Repl. 2012).

A specific incident at work can be a compensable injury when it significantly worsens a preexisting condition.

Arkansas Department of Health v. Lockhart · filed 2020-03-11(4)(A)(i)

The Commission was correct in finding that Lockhart sustained a compensable injury because substantial evidence shows there was a significant change in Lockhart’s condition following the September 20, 2013 work accident.

A compensable accidental injury must arise from a specific incident identifiable by time and place; attributing symptoms generally to work over multiple shifts does not establish one.

Nolen v. Walmart Associates · filed 2021-02-10(4)(A)

Here, unlike the facts in Crawford and Cedar Chemical, we are lacking evidence of a specific-incident injury. Nolen is unable to point to one specific instance while working on his shifts where he felt or experienced a physical manifestation of sustaining an injury while he was at work. His testimony generally attributed his injury due to lifting excessive weight over the two shifts on June 14 through June 16, but he first noted something was wrong and experienced the symptom of bleeding while at home. While being unable to provide a specific date of injury may not be detrimental to a claimant’s argument, Nolen is unable to point to a time, a place, or an occurrence.

A compensable injury requires a causal connection between the claimant’s condition and a specific incident at work.

Osburn v. Pepsi Cola Metro Bottling Co.; Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America Insurance; And Death and Permanent · filed 2021-04-07(4)(A)(i)

From this evidence, reasonable minds could conclude that Osburn failed to meet his burden of proving a causal connection between his left-shoulder and neck issues and a specific incident occurring at work.

The employee must prove a specific-incident compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence.

Jones v. Embassy Suites, Little Rock; States National Insurance Company; And Death and Permanent Total Disabilit · filed 2021-09-01(4)(E)(i)

The burden of proving a specific-incident compensable injury is the employee’s and must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(i). ... The Commission obviously did not believe Jones’s explanation that her cervical injury was causally connected to the March 9, 2018 coffee-pot incident.

A compensable accidental injury must be caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

Bean v. Reynolds Consumer Products · filed 2022-06-01(4)(A)(i)

An injury is “accidental” only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence.

A specific-incident compensable injury must arise from employment, cause harm requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death, be supported by objective medical findings, and be identifiable by time and place.

Springfield Grocer Co. and Indemnity Ins. Co. of North america/sedgwick Claims Services, Inc. v. Chaulsett · filed 2023-02-08(4)(A)(i)

With these facts, we cannot say that substantial evidence does not support the Commission’s finding that Chaulsett’s sustained a specific-incident injury to his lower back on July 19, 2021.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Ark. Dep't of Transportation v. Evans · filed 2025-01-29(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D). ... Thus, we find that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision that Evans proved compensable injuries to his back.

Credited testimony that an employee heard a “pop” while performing work can support a compensable specific-incident injury.

Rock Region Metro and Ata Wc trust/risk Management Resources v. Bearfield · filed 2025-02-26(4)(A)

Rock Region’s arguments are nothing more than a challenge to Bearfield’s credibility. Bearfield testified that she heard a “pop” while at work moving a shield on March 15, 2022, and that she did not engage in any other activities that would have caused the “pop.”

A claimant must prove a compensable injury by a preponderance of the evidence.

Mohler v. Robert A. Young III Dba Cross Creek Ranch, LLC, Employer; Midwest Insurance Company, Carrier · filed 2026-02-18(4)(E)(i)

The claimant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she sustained a compensable injury. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(E)(i) (Supp. 2025). ... In light of this evidence, fair-minded persons could not reach the Commission’s conclusion. Therefore, there is no substantial evidence to support that Mohler did not sustain a compensable injury.

Section 11-9-102 defines employment as work carried on in Arkansas; an employee’s Arkansas residency alone does not establish Commission jurisdiction over an out-of-state injury.

Patton v. Brown & Root, Inc. · filed 1990-06-06

As we have noted, the act limits coverage to injuries arising out of employments carried on in the state, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-9-102 and 11-9-401 (1987), and the cases cited above all contain circumstances which, viewed in the light of liberal construction, connect the employment, and not merely the employee, to Arkansas. As noted, by stipulation of the parties, the only circumstance in the case at bar bearing on jurisdiction is that the appellant is an Arkansas resident, and facts connecting the state with the employment perse are entirely lacking. Therefore, the statutory basis required for the Commission’s jurisdiction is absent, see Tidwell, supra, and we hold that the Commission correctly decided that the appellant’s Arkansas residency, standing alone, is not a sufficient basis to invoke its jurisdiction.

Employment in Arkansas requires a sufficient connection between the work and the state; driving through Arkansas, using a fuel stop, and accessing an unsupervised drop yard did not establish one.

Baker v. Frozen Food Express Transport · filed 1998-09-23(12)(A)

Under the new law, “employment” is defined as “every employment in the state,” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(12)(A) (Repl. 1996), and “administrative law judges, the commission, and any reviewing courts shall construe the provisions of [the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Law] strictly.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9— 704(c)(3) (Repl. 1996). ... Neither do we think, under a strict construction of our workers’ compensation law, that having a designated fuel stop in West Memphis, trucks on the road in Arkansas, and a drop yard without supervisory personnel provide that link. Thus, under the facts of this case, the statutory basis needed for the Commission’s jurisdiction is lacking.

Employer contributions to medical, life, and disability insurance are excluded from wages when the employee has no right to receive them unless a covered event occurs.

Tabor v. Levi Strauss & Co. · filed 1990-12-26(8)

We find the majority view to be persuasive and decline to find that the employer contributions to appellant’s fringe benefits of medical, life, and disability insurance in the instant case be included in the term “wages.” Appellant had no right to receive any part of these contributions or any benefit from such unless she or her dependent became eligible through illness, death, or disability. Moreover, these benefits accrued to appellant not by virtue of any individual effort on her part but solely through the collective bargaining efforts of the union. Therefore, under the circumstances of this case, those benefits should not be included in the determination of appellant’s proper compensation rate.

Section 11-9-102(19) includes per diem payments made in place of salary when calculating an employee’s wages for workers’ compensation benefits.

Eckhardt v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc. · filed 1998-08-26(19)

While certain forms of wages, as set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(19) would also qualify as “remuneration” under the NCCI guidelines, the statute embraces a much more inclusive concept of what constitutes compensation. ... These payments were clearly compensation.

Section 11-9-102(19) defines wages as payment for services rendered; vacation pay received while no services are rendered is not wages for purposes of the disability-benefits offset.

St. Edward Mercy Medical Center v. Howard · filed 2012-11-28(19)

Instead, the entire phrase defining wages as “the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed,” from section 11-9-102(19), must be examined in order to determine the plain meaning of section ll-9-807(b). In doing so, we hold that “full wages” under ll-9-807(b) refers to the money rate paid to recompense services rendered and that vacation pay is that sum received as an employee benefit when no services are rendered.

Section 11-9-102(5) defines compensation as money payable to an employee or a dependent, so payments to someone who is neither do not count as compensation.

Royal v. Bypass Diesel & Wrecker, Inc. · filed 2014-02-12(5)

Compensation is the “money allowance payable to the employee or his or her dependents.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5). ... Because Crystal was not Jeremy’s dependent, the $246.16 that Bypass Diesel paid her each week cannot be counted as weekly death benefits or as compensation. Consequently, these payments do not accrue as a credit against its responsibility to the Trust Fund.

Section 11-9-102(5) defines compensation as the money allowance payable to an employee or dependents; the employee’s share of attorney’s fees comes from that compensation.

Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n v. Gerard · filed 2018-03-29(5)

Third, "compensation," as referenced in section 11-9-715 is defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (5) as: " 'Compensation' means the money allowance payable to the employee or to his or her dependents." ... For Gerard, that one-half is derived from the compensation payable to him because of his compensable injury.

Section 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) requires proof that an injury is the major cause of disability only when the injury was not caused by a specific incident.

Farmland Insurance Co. v. Dubois · filed 1996-06-19(5)(E)(ii)

Therefore, there was no requirement for it to be shown that the compensable injury was the major cause of her disability. Under Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-102(5)(E)(ii), that becomes a requirement only when the injury was not occasioned by a specific incident.

Major cause means more than 50% of the cause of disability or need for treatment, and a physician need not identify it for the claimant to prove it.

High Capacity Products v. Moore · filed 1998-02-25(14)(A)

"Major cause" means more than 50% of the cause of the disability or need for treatment and it is established by a preponderance of the evidence presented to the Commission. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(14)(A) (Repl.1996). Appellant asserts that an expert, meaning a physician, must state what the major cause was. However, the legislature did not so limit the acceptable evidence that could be considered.

Section 11-9-102(5)(F)(ii)'s major-cause requirement for permanent benefits does not apply to an injury that occurred in 1991, before Act 796 took effect.

Ellison v. Therma-Tru · filed 1999-05-12(5)(F)(ii)(a)-(b)

The Commission did not refer to § 11-9-102(5)(F)(ii)(a) and (b) in its opinion; however, its decision regarding Ellison's permanent physical impairment demonstrates that Act 796 reasoning was employed in deciding her impairment. Under the law in 1991 when Ellison was injured, it was not necessary that employment activities be the "major cause" for permanent disability.

Section 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) permits separate injuries or conditions occurring at about the same time to be compensable when each meets the major-cause requirement, even if they affect the same body member.

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Griffin · filed 1998-04-08(5)(E)(ii)

We do not view Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Supp. 1997), as precluding a finding that separate injuries or conditions that occur simultaneously or near in time to each other can be compensable. This is true even though the statute requires that both compensable injuries or conditions are the major cause of the disability or need for treatment. Neither does the fact that injuries are located in the same body member, as here, act to disqualify an award of benefits when a claimant meets the statutory requirements of the need for treatment.

For a gradual-onset injury, the injury must be the major cause of the disability or need for treatment; the claimant need not prove that work was the major cause of the disability.

Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc. · filed 2000-03-01(5)(E)(ii)

Thus, in the instant case, Mr. Crudup’s burden was to prove that his injury was caused by his work, and further that his carpal tunnel syndrome was the major cause of the disability or need for treatment. See id. He did not have to prove that his work was the major cause of his disability.

Section 11-9-102 defines “major cause” as more than fifty percent of the cause.

Huffy Service First v. Ledbetter · filed 2002-03-13(14)(A)

Major cause means more than fifty percent of the cause. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(14)(A) (Supp. 2001).

Section 11-9-102(5)(F) does not require a compensable injury to be the major cause when a worker seeks medical benefits and temporary total disability rather than permanent benefits.

Williams v. L & W JANITORIAL, INC. · filed 2004-02-04(5)(F)(ii)

Here, as in Farmland, supra, appellant thus far is only seeking medical benefits and temporary total disability. Thus, the major-cause analysis is not applicable.

Permanent benefits require a finding that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment, including when it combines with a preexisting condition.

Excelsior Hotel v. Squires · filed 2003-09-03(4)(F)(ii)

Further, “[permanent benefits shall be awarded only upon a determination that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11 — 9— 102(4)(F)(ii)(a) (Repl. 2002). And “[i]f any compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition ... to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, permanent benefits shall be payable for the resultant condition only if the compensable injury is the major cause of the permanent disability or need for treatment.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11 — 9-102(4)(F)(ii)(b) (Repl. 2002). “Major cause” is defined as “more than fifty percent ... of the cause.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11 — 9—102(14)(A) (Repl. 2002). Here, neither the ALJ nor the Commission made specific findings of fact supporting a conclusion that appellee’s injury was the major cause of his impairment.

For a permanent impairment claim, § 11-9-102(4)(F)(ii) requires a finding on whether the compensable injury was the major cause of the impairment.

Michael v. Keep & Teach, Inc. · filed 2004-06-16(4)(F)(ii)

We hold that the Commission's decision is based on a flawed application of Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(F)(ii). Although the Commission's opinion appropriately examined appellant's claim regarding the issue before it of permanent impairment, the Commission's conclusions addressed whether the compensable injury was the major cause of the permanent disability or need for treatment.

A compensable aggravation of a pre-existing condition can satisfy the major-cause requirement for permanent impairment.

Pollard v. Meridian Aggregates · filed 2004-09-29(4)(F)(ii)(a)

In light of our decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Westbrook, supra, we agree that the Commission erred in finding that an aggravation of a pre-existing condition is not capable of meeting the major-cause requirement.

The major-cause requirement can be met when a work-related aggravation makes a previously asymptomatic condition symptomatic and requires treatment.

Parker v. Atlantic Research Corp. · filed 2004-06-30(4)(E)(ii)

In consideration of the above standard and the purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act, we hold the Commission was clearly wrong in its decision that the “major cause” requirement of Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-102(4)(E) categorically cannot be established by a showing that an asymptomatic preexisting condition became symptomatic, and thus required treatment, due to a work-related aggravation of that condition.

When a compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition, permanent benefits for the resulting impairment require the injury to be the major cause of the permanent disability or need for treatment.

Hickman v. Kellogg, Brown & Root · filed 2008-02-28(4)(F)(ii)(b)

We note that when a compensable injury combines with a preexisting condition to cause the need for treatment, such as knee surgery, permanent benefits are payable for the resulting impairment only if the injury is the major cause of the permanent disability or need for treatment.

Major cause means more than fifty percent of the cause of the physical harm.

J Mar Express, Inc. v. Poteete · filed 2011-02-16(14)(A)

The Workers’ Compensation law provides that a death-resulting heart attack is compensable when extraordinary and unusual work-related activity is the injury’s majority cause, which means more than fifty percent of the cause. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(14)(A) (Repl.2002); see also Huffy Serv. First v. Ledbetter, 76 Ark.App. 533, 69 S.W.3d 449 (2002).

An injury that aggravates an asymptomatic preexisting condition so that it becomes symptomatic and requires treatment satisfies the major-cause requirement for permanent benefits.

Wright v. St. Vincent Doctors Hospital Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America · filed 2012-02-15(4)(F)(ii)(b)

Like in Leach, Wright’s degenerative condition was asymptomatic prior to the accident and then ^symptomatic thereafter; thus, we hold that the major-cause requirement was satisfied.

Permanent benefits require a determination that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment.

O'Guinn v. Little River Memorial Hospital · filed 2013-10-23(4)(F)(ii)(a)

Permanent benefits shall be awarded only upon a determination that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment. ... Because the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for denying Ms. O’Guinn’s claim for permanent partial impairment, we affirm on this issue.

Permanent benefits require the compensable injury to be the major cause of the disability or impairment, including when it combines with a preexisting condition.

Firestone Building Products v. Hopson · filed 2013-10-30(4)(F)(ii)

The Commission found the ratings in accord with the AMA Guidelines, accepted the ratings, and found that Hopson had proved her compensable bilateral knee injuries to be the major cause of impairment. ... Substantial evidence thus supports the Commission’s decision on this issue, and we affirm.

A gradual-onset neck injury is compensable only if the claimant proves that the work injury was the major cause of the disability or need for medical treatment.

Weaver v. Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 2015-05-27(4)(E)(ii)

Dr. Abraham opined that appellant’s extensive neck disease was probably caused by a combination of factors and that her work activity was a definite causative element. He did not state that the alleged work injury was the major cause of the need for treatment as required for this to be a compensable injury.

For a gradual-onset neck injury, a medical opinion that work obligations most likely contributed to the condition and neck pain can satisfy the major-cause requirement.

Harrison v. Street & Performance, Inc. · filed 2017-11-15(4)(E)(ii)

Here, the Commission relied on Dr. Moore’s July 27, 2015 letter, which clearly states, “the significant work-related obligations that Mr. Harrison performed most likely contributed to this underlying condition and the development of his neck pain and radiculopathy.” We hold this satisfies that Harrison’s injury was a major cause of the disability or need for medical treatment.

When a work injury combines with a preexisting condition, permanent benefits require the injury to be the major cause of the disability; the Commission may consider evidence beyond a doctor's apportionment when deciding whether that requirement is met.

Ark. State Military Dep't v. Jackson · filed 2019-02-13(4)(F)(ii)(b)

If a compensable injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, a claimant will not receive an award for permanent benefits unless the injury was the major cause of the permanent disability or need for treatment. ... Here, the Commission not only had Dr. Gordon's opinion with regard to apportionment, it also had Jackson's testimony that he had remained quite physically active prior to the accident, including skiing and playing sports. Jackson also testified that, prior to his accident, he was able to move around with only the aid of a right-leg brace and a crutch, but after the accident he was practically confined to a wheelchair or scooter and had significant difficulties moving around his house and to and from his car. Additionally, there was no evidence that Jackson had complained of any knee problems at or near the time of the accident. Given these facts, we cannot say that the Commission's decision with regard to the disability rating was without substantial evidence.

Permanent benefits require a determination that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment.

Ark. Dep't of Corr. v. Jackson · filed 2019-02-20(4)(F)(ii)(a)

Permanent benefits may be awarded only upon a determination that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment. ... Moreover, the Commission found that the compensable back injury is the major cause of disability. The Commission's finding is supported by Jackson's testimony that his symptoms persisted both before and after the surgery.

Permanent benefits require a determination that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment.

Central Moloney, Inc., and Risk Management Resources v. Holmes · filed 2020-08-26(4)(F)(ii)(a)

Permanent benefits may be awarded only upon a determination that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment. ... Therefore, we hold that reasonable minds could conclude the Holmes was entitled to 40 percent wage-loss disability.

Permanent benefits require the compensable injury to be the major cause of the disability or impairment.

Arkansas Forestry Commission; And Arkansas Insurance Department, Public Employee Claims Division v. Lindsey · filed 2021-12-08(4)(F)(ii)(a)

A claimant will not receive an award for permanent benefits unless the injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(F)(ii)(a). ... Thus, we cannot say that the Commission’s finding that Lindsey’s 2017 compensable work-related injury was the major cause of his impairment was not supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm on this point.

A claimant seeking permanent impairment benefits must prove that the compensable injury was the major cause of the impairment, meaning more than 50 percent of its cause.

Melton v. Clarksville School District · filed 2023-05-17(4)(F)(ii)(a)

Judy was also required to prove the compensable injury was the “major cause” (i.e. more than 50 percent of the cause) of the permanent impairment.

Permanent impairment benefits require proof that the compensable injury was the major cause of the impairment, meaning more than 50 percent of its cause.

Booneville Human Development Center and Arkansas Insurance Department, Public Employee Claims Division v. Foster · filed 2024-12-11(4)(F)(ii)(a), (14)(A)–(B)

Permanent benefits shall be awarded only upon a determination that the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (4)(F)(ii)(a) (Supp. 2023). ... Evidence supporting a major-cause determination is required. ... We hold that the Commission’s finding of major cause is not supported by substantial evidence.

Permanent benefits require a compensable injury that is the major cause of the disability or impairment.

Johnson v. Land O' Frost, Inc. · filed 2025-01-29(4)(F)(ii)(a)

Permanent benefits may be awarded only if the compensable injury was the major cause of the disability or impairment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(F)(ii)(a). ... We agree that because we have affirmed the Commission’s decision that Johnson did not prove a compensable injury to his back or his head, he necessarily is not entitled to any disability benefits related to those alleged injuries.

A claimant receives permanent benefits only if the compensable injury is the major cause of the disability or impairment.

Pederson v. Optum Care, Inc. · filed 2026-02-25(4)(F)(ii)(a)

A claimant will not receive an award for permanent benefits unless the injury is the major cause of the disability or impairment. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(F)(ii)(a). ... Having reviewed the record, we cannot say that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the Commission’s conclusion that Marion failed to prove that she sustained a permanent anatomical impairment as a result of the compensable fall at work.

Travel that is essential to an employer’s business counts as performing employment services, even if the employee is not paid for travel time.

Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey · filed 1996-12-23(5)(B)(iii)

Whatever "performing employment services" may mean in the context of Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii), it must include the performance of those functions which are essential to the success of the enterprise in which the employer is engaged.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) excludes injuries sustained while an employee is merely walking to or from a car on the employer’s premises because the employee is not performing employment services.

Hightower v. Newark Public School System · filed 1997-04-30(5)(B)(iii)

The language of Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-102(5)(B)(iii) excludes from being compensable injuries that occur “at a time when employment services were not being performed.” This provision seems clearly aimed at eliminating the premises exception to the going-and-coming rule since, under a strict construction of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) (B)(iii), merely walking to and from one’s car, even on the employer’s premises, does not qualify as performing “employment services.”

Travel to patients’ homes is an employment service when it is a necessary part of the employee’s duties and benefits the employer, even if the employee is not paid for travel.

Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey · filed 1997-05-05(5)(B)(iii)

The fact that Appellee had yet to begin her nursing duties that day does not preclude our conclusion that she was nonetheless performing employment services at the time of the accident. Whether she was being directly compensated for her travel is not pertinent to our decision, as the facts of this case clearly demonstrate that travel was a necessary part of her employment. Further, such travel was clearly for the benefit of Appellant, as its business livelihood depended upon the in-home care of patients provided by its nursing assistants.

An employee performs employment services while traveling to complete an employer-required medical test for the employer’s benefit and returning with the results.

Fisher v. Poole Truck Line · filed 1997-05-14(5)(B)(iii)

Consequently, Fisher was performing employment services when he traveled from his employer's premises to retake the urine test and was injured on the return trip.

An injury during a personal errand is not compensable when the errand is neither required nor an essential part of the employee’s work.

Coble v. Modern Business Systems · filed 1998-05-06(5)(B)(ii)

Under these circumstances, we agree that her decision to drive to the mall was personal in nature, was not a requirement or essential component of the services she provided, and did not constitute “employment services” for purposes of the new Act.

An injury is excluded from the definition of compensable injury when the employee is not performing employment services; checking an employer’s alarm system is an employment service.

Shults v. Pulaski County Special School District · filed 1998-10-07(5)(B)(iii)

This act excludes from the definition of “compensable injury” any injury inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) (B) (iii) (Supp. 1997). ... We believe this duty was an activity that carried out the employer’s purpose or advanced the employer’s interests, and therefore constitutes employment services.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) excludes an injury sustained during an optional lunch break when the employee is not advancing the employer's interests, even if the employer pays for the meal.

Beaver v. Benton County Child Support Unit · filed 1999-04-14(5)(B)(iii)

This act excludes from the definition of "compensable injury" any injury inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) (Supp.1997). ... There is substantial evidence to support a finding that appellant was not advancing her employer's interest when she was on her lunch break walking to the buffet.