Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308

Section 16-22-308 applies to an action commenced before it took effect because it permits attorney’s fees to be collected as costs.

City of Fayetteville v. Bibb · filed 1989-12-20

Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-22-308 provides for attorney’s fees which may be assessed by the court to be “collected as costs.” ... Courts of other states which have considered the specific issue raised here have held that statutes providing for attorney’s fees to be taxed as costs are to be given retrospective application. ... We agree.

Section 16-22-308’s attorney-fee provision applies retrospectively when judgment is entered after the provision takes effect.

Barnett v. Arkansas Transport Co., Inc. · filed 1990-11-05

We, in turn, adopt the court of appeals’ rationale in holding that a statute providing for attorney’s fees to be taxed as costs is to be given retrospective application. Since the trial court’s judgment was not entered until after the statute went into effect, the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees was valid.

Section 16-22-308 permits an attorney’s fee award to the prevailing party, but the award is reversed when the judgment in that party’s favor is reversed.

Brookside Village Mobile Homes v. Meyers · filed 1990-01-16

Arkansas Code Annotated Section 16-22-308 (Supp. 1989), the statute relied upon by the court in authorizing the award of attorney’s fees, provides for such an award to the prevailing party. Since the judgment in favor of the prevailing party is reversed, the award of attorney’s fees is also reversed.

A plaintiff who obtains a money judgment can be the prevailing party under § 16-22-308 even if other claims were dismissed.

ERC Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Luper · filed 1990-09-12

We agree with the view of the trial court here that the appellee was the “prevailing party” under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits an attorney’s fee award to a defendant who prevails in a contract action by showing that no contract existed.

Cumberland Financial Group, Ltd. v. Brown Chemical Co. · filed 1991-05-29

Because the party in whose favor the verdict compels a judgment is considered to be the prevailing party, ERC Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Luper, 32 Ark. App. at 24, 795 S.W.2d at 364, appellee was clearly a “prevailing party” within the terms of the statute. Accordingly, the circuit judge did not err in awarding appellee its attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 makes a request for attorney’s fees based on prevailing on a contract claim moot when the underlying judgment is reversed.

Hardison v. Jackson · filed 1994-03-02

Because appellees’ cross-appeal for additional attorney’s fees is predicated on their having prevailed on their contract claim against appellants, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1991), and we have reversed that judgment, appellees’ cross-appeal is rendered moot.

Section 16-22-308 permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award to the prevailing party in a breach of contract action, even when that party obtains only part of the relief sought.

Gill v. Transcriptions, Inc. · filed 1995-02-13

While § 16-22-308 allows for the award of attorney’s fees for breach of contract, the decision whether to award a fee in such cases is a decision within the trial court’s discretion. ... We hold that the chancellor did not abuse her discretion in finding Transcriptions to be the prevailing party.

A fee award under § 16-22-308 is reversed when the judgment supporting it is reversed.

American States Insurance v. Tri Tech, Inc. · filed 1991-07-03

American’s final argument questions the authority of the trial court to award an attorney’s fee in this case under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1989), which provides for an award of a fee to the prevailing party in certain civil actions. Since the judgment in favor of Tri Tech is reversed, the award of the attorney’s fee is also reversed.

Section 16-22-308 permits discretionary attorney fee awards to prevailing parties in breach of contract actions.

TCBY System, Inc. v. RSP Co. · filed 1994-08-26

We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding RSP and the Paulsons their attorneys’ fees under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party to receive an attorney's fee award even when another party paid the fees and the prevailing party need not repay them.

Marsh & McLennan of Arkansas v. Herget · filed 1995-06-19

Appellant's final argument for reversal is that Herget was not entitled to an award of an attorney's fee because Rebsamen paid Herget's attorney's fee and Herget is under no obligation to repay Rebsamen. ... We reject these arguments. Appellant cites no authority for his assertion that the purpose of section 16-22-308 is to make whole the prevailing party. The statute itself requires only that, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the movant must have prevailed on the merits of one of the causes of action enumerated in the statute.

Section 16-22-308 permits a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in enumerated civil actions.

Boatmen's Trust Co. v. Buchbinder · filed 2000-11-30

The total fee award of $206,952.05 included fees for actions filed in (1) Georgia federal court, (2) Arkansas circuit court, (3) Arkansas federal court, and (4) Arkansas chancery court. Significantly, the three actions filed prior to the chancery action were dismissed or nonsuited, and there was no prevailing party. As a result, section 16-22-308 does not authorize an assessment against the trust, Barbara Laney, or David Thompson for fees arising from those actions. However, the trustee claims that it prevailed in the chancery court action, while the trust, Barbara Laney, David Thompson, and Lyle Thompson were all unsuccessful litigants in that proceeding. Specifically, the trustee asserts that the chancery court’s favorable treatment of the other appellees, by failing to assess fees against them, constituted an abuse of discretion. We disagree. Given the chancellor’s intimate acquaintance with the litigation and the considerable weight afforded his opinion on whether to assess fees against a party, we cannot say that he abused his discretion in denying an award pursuant to section 16-22-308 or § 259 of the Restatement.

Section 16-22-308 requires a party to prevail on the merits to qualify as a prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees.

Burnette v. Perkins & Associates · filed 2000-12-14

We find the language in Marsh to be persuasive and consequently hold, consistent with the trial court, that one must prevail on the merits in order to be considered a prevailing party under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney's fees for the prevailing party and leaves the extent of the award to the court's discretion.

Delta Remanufacturing of Mariana, LLC v. O'Connor · filed 2001-05-15

Carlos Crisp appeals from the district court’s1 order awarding attorneys’ fees to defendants under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 in this diversity-jurisdiction action for breach of contract. ... we agree with the district court that defendants were prevailing parties when Crisp voluntarily dismissed his complaint with prejudice. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in the extent of the award or in denying Crisp’s motion for reconsideration.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a civil action to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee for a breach of contract unless otherwise provided by law or contract.

Bailey v. Delta Trust & Bank · filed 2004-11-18

The general rule is that attorney’s fees are not allowed except when expressly provided for by statute. Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990). Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999) provides as follows: ... In any civil action to recover on ... [a] breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs. ... In order to be eligible for attorney’s fees, a litigant must be a “prevailing party.” ... Because Frank and Christy were not prevailing parties, the trial court erred in awarding them fees, even in the conditional manner in which it did so here.

Section 16-22-308 permits a court to award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in specified civil actions.

C & W ASSET ACQUISITIONS v. Whittington · filed 2005-03-09

Applying the appellate case precedents, we hold that the trial court erred. Appellant was the prevailing party because judgment was rendered in its favor on its complaint for a money judgment regarding this credit card account. The status of the prevailing party is not determined by the amount of recovery, see ERC, supra, but rather by who came out “on top” and was awarded a money judgment. See Marcum, supra. Therefore, we reverse the award of attorney fees.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney's fees to a prevailing party in covered civil actions, and prevailing-party status requires resolution of the underlying merits.

BKD, LLP v. Yates · filed 2006-10-05

Nevertheless, in order to be a prevailing party under section 16-22-308 there must be resolution of the underlying merits of the claims at issue.

Section 16-22-308 allows reasonable attorney’s fees in a contract case only for the prevailing party, determined from the case as a whole rather than individual issues.

Perry v. Baptist Health · filed 2006-11-16

The above statute gives the trial court the discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees only to the “prevailing party.” ... We continue to agree with the above reasoning. Prior to awarding attorney’s fees, the trial court is required to make a determination of which party, if any, prevailed on the merits of the case as a whole, and need not make such a determination for particular issues within the case.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in a breach-of-contract action, with the prevailing party determined by considering the case as a whole.

CJ Building Corp. v. TRAC-10 · filed 2007-02-08

To be the prevailing party under section 16-22-308, the litigant must be granted some relief on the merits of its claim. ... Under Arkansas law, the prevailing party is determined by analyzing each cause of action and its subsequent outcome. ... In essence, we must look at the case as a whole to determine whether there was a prevailing party and who that party is.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in certain civil actions, but who prevailed cannot be determined until all issues are decided and final judgment is entered.

2200 Commercial Street Warehousing, LLC v. Hastings Development Co. · filed 2007-04-11

Although in certain civil actions an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party is allowed, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, the determination of which party has prevailed cannot be made until all the issues are decided and a final judgment is rendered.

Section 16-22-308 permits a reasonable attorney’s fee award to the prevailing party in a breach of contract action.

Brackelsberg v. Heflin · filed 2011-11-09

Under the particular circumstances presented in this case, we hold that neither party was the “prevailing party” for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 or the terms of the parties’ real estate contract.

Section 16-22-308 allows the prevailing party in a contract action to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, with prevailing status determined by the entire case.

Armstrong Remodeling & Construction, LLC v. Cardenas · filed 2012-06-13

The supreme court has indicated that fees under section 16-22-308 are for parties who prevail on the merits of a case. ... However, we have construed “prevailing party” in terms of the entire case and not in terms of particular issues or actions therein. ... Therefore, Cardenas was the “prevailing party” in terms of the entire case, and the circuit court did not err in denying the Armstrongs’ motions for attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits a reasonable attorney’s fee to a prevailing party in a qualifying civil action, and a successful contract defendant may qualify as the prevailing party.

Harrill & Sutter, P.L.L.C. v. Kosin · filed 2012-10-11

This court has recognized that to be the prevailing party under section 16-22-308, the litigant must be granted some relief on the merits of its claim. ... The prevailing party is determined by analyzing each cause of action and its subsequent outcome. ... Moreover, this court has recognized that a successful defendant in a contract action may be considered a “prevailing party” for the purposes of section 16-22-308. Perry v. Baptist Health, 368 Ark. 114, 243 S.W.3d 310 (2006). Accordingly, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that Kosin was the prevailing party.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney's fee in a civil action involving a promissory note or breach of contract.

FIRST STATE BANK OF CROSSETT v. Fowler · filed 2010-03-22

The Court agrees with the bankruptcy court’s that, “[t]here are no allegations of negligence or violations of a statute in the case at bar, rather this action was brought because of alleged failure to abide by the terms of the promissory note. This is the type of action § 16-22-308 was designed to cover.” (Doc. 1-14, pg. 4). Therefore, the Court finds no error in the bankruptcy court’s ruling for attorney’s fees for Appellee.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, but leaves the award discretionary.

Spann v. Lovett & Co. · filed 2012-02-01

Arkansas allows a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl.1999). A trial court is not required to award attorney’s fees under this statute, however, and any amounts awarded are discretionary.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee in a civil action to recover on a breach of contract, with the fee assessed by the court and collected as costs.

Sluyter v. Toney · filed 2014-04-23

The trial court is wrong. Appellants prevailed in appellee’s breach-of-contract claim against them and in their breach-of-contract counterclaim against appellee. Appellee lost on all of her claims against appellants. Indisputably, appellants came out “on top.” ... We hold that the trial court incorrectly determined that appellants were not the prevailing parties in this case. Appellants were the prevailing parties. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion in reconsidering appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee, subject to the court’s discretion.

Southern Building Services, Inc. v. City of Fort Smith · filed 2014-09-03

We reverse the attorney’s fee award to the City and remand to the circuit court for it to exercise its discretion in reconsidering Southern’s motion for attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits the prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action to seek attorney fees.

Washington v. Kingridge Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2014-12-10

A prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action is permitted to seek attorney fees. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999).

A defendant is not a prevailing party under section 16-22-308 when the complaint is dismissed without prejudice and therefore cannot recover attorney’s fees under the section.

Crain Automotive Holdings, LLC; Crain Kia of North Little Rock; Crain Hyundai of Springdale, LLC, D/B/A Crain Hyundai of · filed 2020-11-04

Accordingly, because appellants’ complaint was dismissed without prejudice, appellees were not the prevailing parties under section 16-22-308. They were thus not entitled to attorney’s fees under the statute.

Section 16-22-308 requires a party seeking attorney’s fees to be the prevailing party.

King v. Barton · filed 2023-09-20

We have held that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999) and its requirement that to be awarded fees, one must be the “prevailing party” is inapplicable in actions involving trusts.

Section 16-22-308 determines the prevailing party for attorney’s fees from the case as a whole; that status remains unresolved when a claim is remanded for further consideration.

Grayson & Grayson, P.A. v. Couch · filed 2023-10-25

Because we reverse and remand on the unjust-enrichment claim, the “prevailing party” in the case as a whole has yet to be determined. Therefore, we decline to address Couch’s argument on cross-appeal concerning the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees, and we dismiss the cross-appeal as moot.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action, but a dismissal without prejudice does not establish a prevailing party.

Unruh v. Five Star Painting Services, LLC · filed 2024-02-28

Furthermore, as a result of this holding, we reverse the $350 in attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court because Five Star Painting Services, LLC, has not prevailed on the merits of the case as contemplated by Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action to recover reasonable attorney’s fees; prevailing-party status is determined by the case as a whole, not by success on individual motions.

Hobson v. Hobson · filed 2025-05-14

Montie’s contention that George was not entitled to attorney’s fees because he did not prevail on several motions is not well founded. In determining the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney’s fees, “the analysis is in terms of cases, not in terms of discrete ... issues within cases[.]”

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing defendant to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for defeating a breach of contract claim on the ground that no contract existed.

Just Funky, LLC v. Think 3 Fold, LLC · filed 2026-03-13

Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Think 3 Fold attorney’s fees under § 16-22-308 related to its successful “no contract” defense at summary judgment.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney fees for a party who prevails in a foreclosure action to enforce a promissory note by successfully defending on rescission grounds.

Hudson v. Hilo · filed 2004-11-17

Both parties agree that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999), which allows for attorney fees in cases involving various actions such as breach of contract and negotiable instruments, does not allow attorney fees in contract rescission cases. See Barnhart v. City of Fayetteville, 335 Ark. 57, 977 S.W.2d 225 (1998); Friends of Children, Inc., supra. However, this case began as a proceeding to foreclose on a home and enforce a promissory note. The Hilos defended the suit by alleging grounds for rescission and prevailed on those grounds. We find that under these facts, the Hilos were the prevailing party in a foreclosure action, entitling them to attorney fees. Therefore, we affirm the award.

Section 16-22-308 permits reasonable attorney's fees for a party that successfully defends a contract claim and prevails in the case as a whole.

Smith v. Casali · filed 2008-08-05

A party that successfully defends against a contract action may be a prevailing party under § 16-22-308. ... Thus, the district court correctly determined that Dr. Smith was the prevailing party below. ... The district court awarded Dr. Smith $12,000 in attorney's fees for successfully defending against the breach of contract counterclaim. It did not abuse its discretion in so doing.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action, but a fee award based on a dismissal cannot stand when that dismissal is reversed.

Russenberger v. Thomas Pest Control, Inc. · filed 2012-01-25

The Thomas appellees argued that they were entitled to fees pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308, which authorizes the court to award fees to the prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action. In light of our decision reversing the court’s order dismissing appellant’s complaint, we reverse the court’s award of attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 leaves an award of attorney’s fees to the court’s discretion.

Reliance Insurance v. Tobi Engineering, Inc. · filed 1990-04-02

Thus, it is apparent that an award of attorney’s fees under § 16-22-308 is discretionary with the court.

Section 16-22-308 gives the trial court discretion to award attorney’s fees in a breach of contract action.

Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc. · filed 1990-12-21

We find, within the context in which the word “may” is employed in this case, that section 16-22-308 is permissive and discretional with the trial court.

Section 16-22-308 leaves an attorney's fee award to the trial court's discretion, subject to review for abuse of that discretion.

Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co. · filed 1995-12-18

The award of attorney's fees is discretionary under the statute. ... Neither party cites authority or presents argument indicating that the Trial Court abused his discretion. Absent such authority or argument, we find no abuse of discretion in denying attorney's fees pursuant to the statute.

Section 16-22-308 permits, but does not require, a trial court to award attorney fees in covered cases.

Logue v. Seven-Hot Springs Corp. · filed 1991-02-22

The statute is clearly not mandatory and the decision whether to award attorney fees in eases governed by section 16-22-308 is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Section 16-22-308 permits, but does not require, an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a contract action.

General Trading International, Inc., Appellee/cross-Appellant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Appellant/cross-Appellee · filed 2003-02-25

While the District Court’s opinion might have been more explicit in its reasoning, we agree with Wal-Mart that the District Court clearly understood that, under Arkansas law, the award of attorney fees for this type of action is discretionary.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney’s fees for breach of an oral contract and for labor or services recovered in quantum meruit, but not for materials supplied.

Woodhaven Homes, Inc. v. Kennedy Sheet Metal Co. · filed 1991-02-04

The applicable statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1989) provides that an attorney’s fee may be awarded in an action to recover for a breach of contract. Without question, under the language of the statue, the Chancellor could make an award of attorney’s fees for the recovery for the breach of the oral contract. The same statute provides that an attorney’s fee may be awarded in an action to recover for “labor or services.” Clearly, a good part, if not most, of the quantum meruit recovery was for the reasonable value of appellee’s labor or services which unjustly enriched the appellant, and an award of attorney’s fees on this amount would be allowable under the language of the statute. The statute does not provide for attorney’s fees in an action to recover for the materials supplied. However, none of the award for attorney’s fees is shown to be based upon materials supplied and, therefore, we cannot say the Chancellor erred in her award of attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize a trial court to award additional attorney’s fees after an appellate mandate leaves only execution of the judgment.

National Cashflow Systems, Inc. v. Race · filed 1991-11-04

Nothing in the statute provides a basis for this Court to overturn the Fortenberry rule.- The first Court of Appeals mandate awarding costs incurred on appeal left nothing open for the Trial Court except execution on the supersedeas bond. The award of additional fees went beyond execution and was in error.

Section 16-22-308 allows a trial court to assess reasonable attorney’s fees but does not apply on appeal.

University Hospital v. Undernehr · filed 1991-12-23

However, this statute allows a trial court to assess a reasonable attorneys’ fee and is inapplicable upon appeal.

Section 16-22-308 permits a reasonable attorney's fee for the prevailing party in covered civil actions and allows courts to enforce a contractual fee provision when the statute's other conditions are met.

First Nat. Bank of Crossett v. Griffin · filed 1992-06-29

The legislature has thus granted to the courts the discretion to award a reasonable attorney's fee to a prevailing party under specific circumstances even absent agreement of the parties providing for payment of such fees. This grant of authority to award such fees absent agreement between the parties implicitly authorizes the courts to enforce such an agreement between the parties where one exists, as long as the other conditions of the statute are met.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize appellate courts to award attorneys’ fees.

Mosley Machinery Co. v. Gray Supply Co. · filed 1992-09-21

The court of appeals has held that in such cases an appellate court may award attorneys’ fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1991). ... We have re-examined the statute and have again concluded that it is not applicable to appellant courts.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize attorney’s fees for services rendered in appellate court.

215 Club v. Devore · filed 1992-12-14

In Mosley, we stated regarding § 16-22-308: “We have reexamined the statute and again concluded that it is not applicable to appellate courts.” ... We, therefore, deny the motion of appellees/petitioners for attorney’s fees for services rendered in appellate court.

Section 16-22-308 allows reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action, subject to the contract’s terms; the guarantors did not waive that right by agreeing to pay the other party’s fees if they defaulted.

Arkansas Industrial Development Commission v. FABCO of Ashdown, Inc. · filed 1993-02-08

Section 16-22-308 specifically provides for reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a civil action involving breach of contract but does so subject to the terms of the contract. ... On the other hand, appellees in no way waived their rights to attorney’s fees under the circumstances here since they did not default and, in fact, prevailed in their argument by showing appellants had failed to comply with the parties’ agreement. Accordingly, we further hold that the appellees are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees under § 16-22-308, and remand this cause to the trial court to determine the amount.

Section 16-22-308 permits a trial court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action on a warranty deed, which is a contract.

Murchie v. Hinton · filed 1993-03-03

However, Act 800 amended Act 519 of 1987 to permit a trial court to allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in an action for breach of contract (codified, as amended, at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1991)). A warranty deed should be considered a contract between a grantor and his grantee who has accepted it. ... Consequently, the trial court may allow appellant a reasonable attorney fee for that portion of appellant’s attorney’s fees attributable to prosecution of her third-party action against appellees.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize attorney’s fees or costs on appeal.

Precision Steel Warehouse, Inc. v. Anderson-Martin MacHine Co. · filed 1993-05-24

We deny that motion since we have held that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1991) is not applicable to attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney’s fees for breach of contract claims but not for tort claims, even when a contract claim was also pleaded.

Security Pacific Housing Services, Inc. v. Friddle · filed 1993-11-22

While appellees included a claim for breach of contract in their counterclaim, and while section 16-22-308 allows for attorney’s fees in breach of contract cases, that statute does not allow attorney’s fees in tort actions.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach of contract action to request reasonable attorney's fees, which the trial court may award at its discretion.

P.A.M. Transport, Inc. v. Arkansas Blue Cross & Blue Shield · filed 1994-01-10

Under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1993), the prevailing party, in a breach of contract action, may request reasonable attorneys' fees and a Trial Court may award fees at its discretion. PAM alternatively requested attorneys' fees pursuant to the Statute. The Trial Court denied this request. We cannot say that the Trial Court abused its discretion.

Section 16-22-308 provides for attorney’s fees in breach of contract actions but does not apply when a specific statute covers the subject.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown · filed 1995-02-01

However, section 16-22-308 is a general statute providing for the recovery of attorney’s fees in actions on breach of contract, and a general statute does not apply where there is a specific statute covering a particular subject matter.

Section 16-22-308 permits a reasonable attorney’s fee for the prevailing party in an action alleging breach of oil and gas lease terms.

Sunbelt Exploration Co. v. Stephens Production Co. · filed 1995-04-10

Under the plain terms of § 16-22-308, Stephens and Chevron prevailed against Sunbelt’s allegations that they breached their lease terms, and the trial court was therefore authorized to award reasonable attorney’s fees in these circumstances.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize attorney's fees for a claim that a school district violated the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act's mandatory procedures.

Piggee v. Jones · filed 1996-05-24

... (ii) a claim for violation of the TFDA's mandatory procedures is not a claim "for labor or services, or breach of contract" for which attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing party under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 authorizes attorney’s fees in a breach-of-contract action without a specified dollar limit.

Marshall School District v. Hill · filed 1997-03-05

Mr. Hill’s action against Marshall School District was for breach of contract, and pursuant to the above statute, the circuit court was authorized to award attorney’s fees, which were not subject to a specified limit.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney fees when an action is primarily based in contract, even if it also includes tort claims.

Trakru v. Mathews · filed 2014-03-12

Having done so, we affirm the award of attorney’s fees to Mathews on the ground that his action was primarily based in contract. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl.1999).

Section 16-22-308 permits an award of attorney’s fees and costs for breach of a settlement agreement.

In re Griffin · filed 2014-04-28

Pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308, the Court awards Arvest its attorneys fees and costs in this matter from the date of the debtors’ breach of the settlement agreement on November 16, 2011, to the date of the entry of this order.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case, but does not support fees in a land-use case with no contract.

Shonting v. Connor · filed 2020-03-04

In Crockett, the supreme court affirmed an award of attorney’s fees based on a different statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, which allows for attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case. Id. at 12, 381 S.W.3d at 801. This case is about land use. No contract is involved.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney’s fees in certain civil actions, including actions for breach of contract, but does not support a fee award where no contract breach is argued.

Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corp. v. Waelder Oil & Gas, Inc. · filed 1998-04-16

And while not argued, we mention Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1994), which allows for the award of attorney’s fees in certain civil actions, including actions for breach of contract. However, this statute fails to help Southwestern Glass and Waelder, since no contract breach is argued here, and as discussed in this court’s opinion, infra, AOG’s surety bond in no way specifies or provides for attorney’s fees in these circumstances.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize attorney’s fees in an in rem action where the only recovery is a materials-and-labor lien against property and the lien statute does not authorize fees.

Transportation Properties, Inc. v. Central Glass & Mirror of Northwest Arkansas, Inc. · filed 1992-04-15

The parties agree that the fees were allowed under the authority of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1991), which provides as follows: ... We think the issue turns on the fact that the only recovery that can be made in this case is under the statute that grants a lien against the property for the materials and labor furnished. That statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 18-44-101 (1987), simply does not provide that the supplier of the materials or labor shall have a lien for attorney’s fees. Since the general rule in Arkansas requires specific statutory authorization before attorney’s fees are recoverable, cf. Bryant & Sons Lumber Co. v. Moore, 264 Ark. 666, 573 S.W.2d 632 (1978) (statute allows contractor a lien for materials and labor furnished but not for his profit), we believe the trial court erred in allowing those fees in this case.

Section 16-22-308 gives courts power to award attorney’s fees in breach-of-contract cases.

Rogers v. Jennings · filed 2010-05-12

In addition to the circuit court’s inherent power to award attorney’s fees in domestic-relations proceedings12 and the statutory power to award them in breach-of-eon-tract cases,13 the property-settlement agreement itself had a provision allowing attorney’s fees incurred to bring the other party in compliance with the agreement.14 Further, as was the case in Rogers I, a finding of contempt is not a prerequisite to an award of attorney’s fees.15 Thus, we affirm the attorney-fee award as well.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney’s fees for a prevailing party in the listed actions, but does not cover claims for a materialman’s lien, unjust enrichment, or detrimental reliance.

Westside Galvanizing Services, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation and Southeastern Conveyor Fabricators, Inc., Aaa Steel Detailing, Inc., Intervenor · filed 1991-01-24

Westside brought an action to recover on a materialman’s lien, unjust enrichment, and detrimental reliance and not on any of the instruments or contracts expressly listed in the statute. Westside obtained only partial relief on its detrimental reliance claim and cannot be said to have prevailed on its unjust enrichment claim because Georgia-Pacific conceded at the outset that West-side and AAA Steel were entitled to the excess money withheld from Southeastern.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney’s fees when a prevailing employee recovers back pay for labor or services the employee should have been allowed to perform.

City of Fort Smith v. Driggers · filed 1991-05-06

The recovery he received is pay for “labor or services” he should have been allowed to perform had he been promoted to captain when he deserved to be promoted. In Woodhaven Homes, Inc. v. Kennedy Sheet Metal Co., 304 Ark. 415, 803 S.W.2d 508 (1991), we held that recovery could be had for attorney’s fees where the underlying recovery was for “labor or services” on the basis of quantum meruit regardless whether a contract was shown. While this is not a quantum meruit claim, we find that it is a claim for “labor or services” within the meaning of the statute.

Section 16-22-308 permits an attorney's fee award for breach of an employment contract.

Crain Industries, Inc. v. Cass · filed 1991-06-03

An attorney's fee was awarded by the trial court to the employees pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp.1989). Crain argues the award was erroneous because the provision in the statute that the fee be for "labor or services" applies only to labor or services which have been performed. The argument misses the point that the statute also provides that an attorney's fee may be awarded for "breach of contract." Barnett v. Arkansas Trans. Co. Inc., 303 Ark. 491, 798 S.W.2d 79 (1990). As the holding of the trial court was that there was an employment contract which was breached, the awarding of an attorney's fee was not improper.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize attorney’s fees for an appeal from a civil service commission’s employment decision.

City of Little Rock v. Quinn · filed 1991-06-26

Here, Quinn appealed from a decision of the Civil Service Commission. Again, this proceeding does not fit within the language of the statute.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize attorney's fees in an interpleader action.

Construction MacHinery of Arkansas v. Roberts · filed 1991-11-18

Cross-appellees ask us to approve the fee under the relatively new statute providing for attorneys' fees in an action based on a contract. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp.1991). The interpleader action does not come within the statute. Accordingly, we also reverse on cross-appeal.

Section 16-22-308 authorizes attorney’s fees in civil actions to recover for breach of contract, but not in paternity cases.

Green v. Bell · filed 1992-03-09

We awarded attorney’s fees in Lockley v. Easley, 302 Ark. 13, 786 S.W.2d 573 (1990) and premised the award on Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Supp. 1991), which provides for payment in civil actions to recover for breach of contract. ... The case before us is a paternity case, and we find no statutory authority for awarding attorney’s fees in these cases.

Section 16-22-308 does not authorize attorney’s fees in an equitable restitution action based on unjust enrichment because a quasi-contract is not a contract under the statute.

Friends of Children, Inc. v. Marcus · filed 1994-06-01

The case at bar was an action in equity seeking restitution. The appellees argue that since unjust enrichment is based on the concept of “quasi-contract,” the cause of action will fit as a suit on a contract under the statute. But the implied-in-law contract, or quasi-contract, is indeed no contract at all; it is simply a rule of law that requires restitution to the plaintiff of something that came into defendant’s hands but belongs to the plaintiff in some sense. Dobbs, supra, § 4.2 at 235. We conclude that there was no authority for an award of attorneys’ fees in this case.

Section 16-22-308 applies to Teacher Fair Dismissal Act actions because they are civil claims for labor or services.

Junction City School District v. Alphin · filed 1997-02-19

An action brought pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act is both a civil action and “a claim for ‘labor or services’” within the meaning of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, the general statute authorizing attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award to the prevailing party in a Teacher Fair Dismissal Act action.

Hall v. Kingsland School District · filed 1997-02-26

Because this court has determined that attorneys’ fees are recoverable in a TFDA action, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court to determine if an award of fees is warranted.

Section 16-22-308 permits a trial court to award attorney’s fees in a Teacher Fair Dismissal Act action because it is an action in contract for labor or services.

Love v. Smackover School District · filed 1997-06-09

We now determine that actions brought pursuant to that Act are actions in contract for labor or services such that attorney’s fees may be awarded by the trial court pursuant to section 16-22-308, the general statute authorizing attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 does not apply to attorney's fees for representation before a school board or the Employment Security Division because neither is a civil action.

Nettleton School District v. Owens · filed 1997-07-14

Thus, the attorney’s fees statute, Ark. Code-Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1994), does not apply, and the trial court was correct in denying Ms. Owens’s request in his March 12 order.

Section 16-22-308 allows the prevailing party in a civil action for breach of contract to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Village Market, Inc. v. State Farm General Insurance · filed 1998-06-11

As such, the insurer, as the prevailing party in such an action, is entided to an attorney’s fee under the plain language of section 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 provides attorney's fees in breach of contract actions only when the statute expressly authorizes the award, and it does not authorize fees to insurers for prevailing on an insured's policy claim.

Village Market, Inc. v. State Farm General Insurance · filed 1998-07-16

Next, in reading § 16-22-308, that statute never mentions insurance policies and never expressly provides attorney's fees for either insureds or insurers. Because attorney's fees are awarded only when expressly allowed by statute or rule, the silence of such fee awards to insurers in §§ 16-22-308 and 23-79-208 can only be interpreted to mean that the General Assembly never intended that attorney's fees be awarded to insurers when an insured has filed an action seeking recovery for a claim under his or her policy.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee in specified civil actions, including breach of contract actions.

Barnhart v. City of Fayetteville · filed 1998-11-05

Regardless of how she now tries to label her lawsuit, Barnhart previously sought to show that Fayetteville imposed an illegal tax on its residents when enacting an unlawful ordinance intended to fund an unlawful agreement, and she requested that ordinance be adjudged an illegal exaction. This allowed her attorney’s fees under § 26-35-902, not § 16-22-308. It is too late now for Barnhart to re-characterize her suit (assuming she could) as one for breach of contract in order to trigger an attorney’s fee award under § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a contract action to receive attorney's fees.

Natl. American Ins. v. Hogan Construction · filed 1999-04-08

An award of attorney's fees under this statute will be reversed only if the trial court abused its discretion.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a contract action to receive attorney’s fees.

National American Insurance Company, a Nebraska Corporation v. Brenda H. Hogan, Individually · filed 1999-04-08

The trial court awarded Brenda Hogan attorney’s fees under section 16-22-308 of the Arkansas Code, which provides that a prevailing party in a contract action may be awarded attorney’s fees. ... An award of attorney’s fees under this statute will be reversed only if the trial court abused its discretion. ... No such abuse of discretion is apparent on the record.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case; the fee award must be reconsidered when the damages supporting it are reduced to nominal damages.

Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc. · filed 1999-04-15

By law, the prevailing party is entided to attorney’s fees in breach-of-contract cases. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1994). ... We now have held that only nominal damages are appropriate in this case. Clearly, the fees awarded must be reviewed in that light as well as the other factors set out in Chrisco v. Sun Indus., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990). We reverse the fee award and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of appropriate fees in light of this opinion.

The section allows a trial court to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action involving breach of contract.

Bharodia v. Pledger · filed 1999-05-26

With regard to the chancery court’s award of a $5,000 fee to appellees’ counsel, we note that pursuant to statute a trial court may award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action involving breach of contract. Ark Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1994).

Section 16-22-308 permits a discretionary attorney’s fee award for a breach of contract claim, but not for tort claims.

State Auto Property & Casualty Insurance v. Swaim · filed 1999-06-10

The trial court specifically made reference to § 16-22-308 in its judgment, and that statute includes an award of fees for breach of contract and not for torts.

Section 16-22-308 does not allow an insurer to recover attorney’s fees as the prevailing party when an insured sues for recovery under an insurance policy.

Employers Surplus Insurance v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. · filed 1999-07-01

The trial court was therefore precluded by our ruling in Village Market II, supra, from awarding an attorney’s fee to ESLIC. ... Thus, the trial court was without authority under both statutory and case law to award attorney’s fees to ESLIC as the prevailing party in Murphy Oil’s action for indemnification under the ESLIC policy.

Section 16-22-308 permits an attorney's fee award to the prevailing party in a civil action.

Bendinger v. Marshalltown Trowell Co. · filed 1999-07-15

First, since we conclude that the chancellor erred in enforcing the restrictive covenant, Marshalltown is no longer the prevailing party and entitled to attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1996).

Section 16-22-308 permits a trial court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in an action involving an allegation of breach of contract, but does not require an award.

Jones v. Abraham · filed 1999-09-29

Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1994), the prevailing party in an action involving an allegation of breach of contract may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the trial court. ... The decision to award attorney’s fees and the amount to award are discretionary determinations that will be reversed only if the appellant can demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party to receive a reasonable attorney fee in specified civil actions, including breach of contract.

Bharodia v. Pledger · filed 2000-03-02

Arkansas Code Annotated Section 16-22-308 states: In any civil action to recover on an open account, statement of account, account stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services, or breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs. ... The award of an attorney's fee is a matter which is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, in the absence of abuse, its judgment will be sustained on appeal. ... Because we have held that the chancellor erred in granting specific performance, we must also hold that the granting of the sellers' request for attorneys' fees was erroneous.

Section 16-22-308 permits, but does not require, a trial court to award reasonable attorney's fees in a civil action to recover for breach of contract.

Jones v. Abraham · filed 2000-04-13

The operative word in this statute is may. The word may is usually employed as implying permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, action or conduct and is construed in a permissive sense unless necessary to give effect to an intent to which it is used. Chrisco v. Sun Industries Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990). A trial court is not required to award attorney’s fees and, because of the trial judge’s intimate acquaintance with the trial proceedings and the quality of service rendered by the prevailing party’s counsel, we usually recognize the superior perspective of the trial judge in determining whether to award attorney’s fees. Chrisco, supra.

The section permits a court to award attorney's fees in its discretion in contract cases.

Sandra Jarrett, - Appellee/ Cross v. Erc Properties, Inc., - Appellant/ Cross · filed 2000-05-02

Following entry of judgment in her favor, Jarrett filed a motion to recover $36,360 in attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party on her FLSA and wrongful discharge claims. The district court awarded $21,816 as a reasonable fee and later denied Jarrett’s motion for reconsideration of the fee award under the FLSA and the Arkansas statute that permits discretionary fee awards in contract cases, see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. In her cross appeal, Jarrett argues that she is entitled to the full fee requested. We review the award for abuse of discretion under both the FLSA and Arkansas law. See Herman, 569 F.2d at 1036; Caplener v. Bluebonnet Milling Co., 322 Ark. 751, 911 S.W.2d 586, 591 (Ark.1995). The district court expressly considered the relevant factors in making a fee award. Jarrett complains that the court improperly considered her contingent-fee agreement with her attorneys, but that factor was considered as well in Chrisco v. Sun Indus., Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ark.1990). We conclude the fee award was not an abuse of the district court’s substantial discretion.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney fees when damages are awarded for breach of contract.

MDH Builders, Inc. v. Nabholz Construction Corp. · filed 2000-05-17

Finally, appellant asks us to reverse the attorney fees awarded under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999) because the chancellor awarded damages based upon promissory estoppel rather than breach of contract. Without deciding whether promissory estoppel would support a fee award, we uphold the award based upon our interpretation that the chancellor’s decree awarded damages for breach of contract.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a covered civil action to receive a reasonable attorney fee, but leaves the award to the trial court's discretion.

Ouachita Trek & Development Co. v. Rowe · filed 2000-06-01

The word “may” is usually employed as implying permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, action or conduct and is construed in a permissive sense unless necessary to give effect to an intent to which it is used. We find, within the context in which the word “may” is employed in this case, that section 16-22-308 is permissive and discretional with the trial court.

Section 16-22-308 allows the prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee in a civil action for breach of contract unless the contract provides otherwise.

Marcum v. Wengert · filed 2000-06-28

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308 provides for the recovery of a reasonable attorney’s fee by the prevailing party in any civil action for breach of contract unless otherwise provided by the contract.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a qualifying contract action to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee at the trial court’s discretion.

Marcum v. Wengert · filed 2001-03-08

In awarding fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, the trial court has broad discretion on whether to award fees, and his decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

Section 16-22-308 permits an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, assessed using recognized factors and reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Phi Kappa Tau Housing Corp. v. Wengert · filed 2002-10-24

However, a court should be guided in that determination by the following long-recognized factors: (1) the experience and ability of the attorney; (2) the time and labor required to perform the service properly; (3) the amount in controversy and the result obtained in the case; (4) the novelty and difficulty of the issues involved; (5) the fee customarily charged for similar services in the local area; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed upon the client in the circumstances; and (8) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the attorney.

Section 16-22-308 allows the prevailing party to recover attorney's fees in a contract action, but it does not authorize all fees when multiple claims are pursued.

FMC CORPORATION, INC. v. Helton · filed 2005-02-03

In ruling as it did, the trial court relied on Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 2001), which provides for the recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party in a contract action. Nothing in that statute, nor in section 4-88-113(f), provides that a party is entitled to an award of all fees in cases where multiple claims have been pursued. In Stein v. Lukas, 308 Ark. 74, 823 S.W.2d 832 (1992), this court affirmed a trial court's denial of attorneys' fees under section 16-22-308, because the appellant's cause of action primarily sounded in tort. Moreover, in Wheeler Motor Co., Inc. v. Roth, 315 Ark. 318, 867 S.W.2d 446 (1993), this court held that attorneys' fees were not justified in a case prosecuted under multiple theories, where it appeared that the jury's verdict was predicated upon a theory sounding in tort.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney fees in contract actions, but not tort cases, and permits them in mixed actions only when the action is primarily based in contract.

Barringer v. Hall · filed 2005-02-09

The statute does not, however, permit an award of attorney fees in a tort case. Id. Where both contract and tort claims are advanced, an attorney fee award is proper only when the action is primarily based in contract. Id.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney’s fees when a civil action is based primarily on a contract, even if it asserts other grounds for recovery.

Jiles v. UNION PLANTERS BANK · filed 2005-03-16

When an action asserts a contract claim in addition to other bases for recovery, attorney’s fees may be awarded under § 16-22-308 when the action is based primarily in contract.

The section allows the prevailing party to recover reasonable attorney's fees in a civil action to recover on a negotiable instrument.

Douglas Companies, Inc. v. Commercial National Bank of Texarkana · filed 2005-08-19

The district court awarded attorney's fees to Douglas and Wells Fargo based on Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 which provides in relevant part: "In any civil action to recover on . . . [a] negotiable instrument . . . the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs." (emphasis supplied). ... Douglas’s claim against CNB was premised on its failure to use ordinary care in complying with Ark. Code Ann. §4-4-202, requiring a collecting bank to exercise ordinary care in presenting a check (negotiable instrument) for payment to a payor bank. The district court's focus on whether CNB acted with ordinary care in fulfilling those statutory duties did not transform this into an action for common law negligence. ... Section 16-22-308, however, contains no requirement that an action to recover on a negotiable instrument be only against a party to the negotiable instrument.

Section 16-22-308 permits a discretionary attorney-fee award, and a reduction in hourly rates requires an explanation.

Swink v. Lasiter Construction, Inc. · filed 2006-02-22

Lasiter sought fees under both the general fee statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999), and under Ark. Code Ann. § 18-44-128 (Repl. 2003), for enforcing its lien. The trial court’s order relied on section 16-22-308. The trial court granted a fee after reducing the hourly rates charged but did not explain why it was necessary to reduce the rates. ... This failure to explain the reason for the reduction in the hourly rates warrants a remand for further explanation. Bailey v. Rahe, 355 Ark. 560, 142 S.W.3d 634 (2004).

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee in covered civil actions, but makes the award discretionary.

Van Carr Enters., Inc. v. Hamco, Inc. · filed 2006-03-16

The award of attorney’s fees is discretionary under the statute. ... Thus, we hold it was not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to deny an award of attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a civil action to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee assessed by a trial court, but appellate courts cannot assess such fees.

Millwood-RAB Marketing, Inc. v. Blackburn · filed 2006-05-24

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999) provides that the prevailing party in a civil action, including breach of contract, may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs. ... Accordingly, the granting of an attorney’s fee was proper under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. ... In a per curiam opinion, our supreme court stated that Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 permits trial courts, but not appellate courts, to assess attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees in a civil action to recover on a contract for labor or services.

City of Little Rock v. Hudson · filed 2006-05-25

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party to recover attorney’s fees “[i]n any civil action to recover on [a] . . . contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services, or breach of contractf.]” Unlike Love, Hudson had no contract with the Fire Department. Accordingly, we hold that the reasoning of Love is inapposite; further, under Quinn, Hudson is not entitled to attorney’s fees because there is no statutory provision that would permit a recovery of such fees.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney’s fees in breach-of-contract actions but does not allow them when the prevailing party obtains only a declaratory judgment.

Hanners v. Giant Oil Co. of Arkansas, Inc. · filed 2008-05-15

The circuit court erred in its interpretation of § 16-22-308. ... Because Giant Oil prevailed in a declaratory-judgment action, and not a breach-of-contract action, the circuit court did not have discretion to award attorney’s fees pursuant to § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party to recover a reasonable attorney's fee in specified civil actions, including breach of contract actions, but does not authorize an insurer to recoup fees in this case.

Medical Liability Mutual Insurance v. Alan Curtis Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2008-06-26

Here, there is no breach of contract at issue or other applicable provision within the plain language of § 16-22-308 that would allow for an insurer to recoup attorney's fees.

Section 16-22-308 allows a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party on a contract claim, including a party that successfully defends against the claim.

Baptist Health v. Smith · filed 2008-08-05

A party that successfully defends against a contract action may be a prevailing party under § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 allows a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in covered civil actions, but the award is discretionary.

Southern Bank of Commerce v. Union Planters National Bank · filed 2008-12-04

An award of attorney’s fees under section 16-22-308 is not mandatory; rather, it is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Considering the deference that we give to a trial court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees, we cannot say that Union Planters has demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request for attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee assessed by the court and collected as costs, unless otherwise provided by law or contract.

Asbury Automotive Used Car Center v. Brosh · filed 2009-03-05

Again, Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308 provides that “the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.” Yet, as already stated, a circuit court is not required to award attorneys’ fees.

Section 16-22-308 authorizes attorney’s fees in certain civil actions involving a contract for the sale of goods or a breach of contract.

Hearne v. Diane Banks · filed 2009-09-16

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308 (Repl.1999), which authorizes an award of fees in certain civil actions, does not apply because this case does not involve a contract for the sale of goods or a breach of contract.

Section 16-22-308 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party on a contract claim.

River Valley Land, Inc. v. Hudson · filed 2009-09-23

Arkansas law authorizes an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party on a contract claim. See Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 allows the prevailing party in a qualifying civil action involving a contract to recover a reasonable attorney's fee as costs.

In Re Dequeen General Hosp. · filed 2009-10-20

The state statute provides in relevant part, In any civil action to recover on [a] ... contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods ... or breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Michie 1994). ... As demonstrated above, the state statute, the APA, and the Management Agreement provide for the award of reasonable attorney's fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits a court to award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee in qualifying civil actions involving contracts.

Streetman & Meeks, PLLC v. JCE Healthcare Group, LLC (In re DeQueen General Hospital) · filed 2009-10-20

As demonstrated above, the state statute, the APA, and the Management Agreement provide for the award of reasonable attorney’s fees. Much time and effort has been spent by the Plaintiff, his counsel, and other professionals in attempting to determine what assets and liabilities remained after the sale. Therefore, an award of attorney’s fees from JCE and DMC to Plaintiff is appropriate.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach of contract action to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee, with prevailing-party status determined at the end of the case.

Heflin v. Brackelsberg · filed 2010-03-17

The prevailing party in a breach of contract action may be entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl.1999). “[T]he prevailing party is determined by who comes out ‘on top’ at the end of the case.” Marcum v. Wengert, 344 Ark. 153, 162, 40 S.W.3d 230, 236 (2001).

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case to recover reasonable attorney fees, subject to the trial court's discretion.

Conway Commercial Warehousing, LLC v. Fedex Freight East, Inc. · filed 2011-01-26

Additionally, Arkansas allows a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case to recover reasonable attorney fees. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl.1999). A trial court is not required to award attorney fees, however, and any amounts awarded are discretionary. Swink v. Lasiter Constr., Inc., 94 Ark. App. 262, 229 S.W.3d 553 (2006).

Section 16-22-308 permits a discretionary award of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in specified civil contract actions.

In Re Cameron · filed 2011-05-17

The Debtors and Saville have each asked for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-22-308. The Debtors are the prevailing party, and, therefore, the only party that could be awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to this statute; however, given the facts it is not appropriate to award the Debtors any attorneys’ fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits a court to award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party in specified civil actions.

In Re Johnson · filed 2011-09-28

Under Arkansas law, an award of prevailing party attorney fees under this statute are permissive and discretionary. ... This action was brought by the Debtors to determine whether they owed the foreclosure fees and costs incurred by J.P. Morgan in conducting non-judicial foreclosure proceedings on its promissory notes. The Debtors are the prevailing party in these matters, and as such, the Court awards the Debtors a reasonable amount for their attorney fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, but does not require an award.

Worley v. City of Jonesboro · filed 2011-10-05

Arkansas allows a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl.1999). A trial court, however, is not required to award attorney’s fees under this statute, and any amounts awarded are discretionary.

Section 16-22-308 allows a court to award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee in specified civil actions, including actions for breach of contract.

Caine v. First State Bank (In re Caine) · filed 2011-12-08

This section 544 cause of action allows the debtor-in-possession to set aside a lien due to the debtor-in-possession’s bona fide purchaser status. It is a cause of action peculiar to the Bankruptcy Code and differs from the types of actions which § 16-22-308 addresses. Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-22-308 is inapplicable to the case at bar. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Debtors are not entitled to attorneys’ fees.

Section 16-22-308 authorizes attorney’s fees in a contract case primarily based on breach of contract, even when the remedy is rescission.

Beck v. Inter City Transportation, Inc. · filed 2012-05-30

Whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-22-308 depends not on whether the remedy of rescission was granted but on whether the case is one primarily based on breach of contract.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a contract suit to receive a reasonable attorney's fee assessed by the court.

Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken Communications, LLC · filed 2012-10-17

In Arkansas, a prevailing party in a contract suit “may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. ... Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits discretionary attorney’s fees in breach-of-contract cases, including wrongful-discharge actions treated as exclusive contract causes of action.

Marlow v. United Sys. of Ark. Inc. · filed 2013-11-14

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999) allows for attorney’s fees to be awarded in a breach-of-contract case. Because we have held that when an employee brings a wrongful-discharge action in violation of public policy there is an exclusive contract cause of action, attorneys fees may be properly awarded in this type of case at the circuit court’s discretion pursuant to section 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney’s fees in breach-of-contract actions, but not in mandamus actions.

Lonoke County v. City of Lonoke · filed 2013-11-14

The Hanners court held that attorney’s fees were not recoverable in declaratory-judgment cases, even when the underlying dispute arose from a contract, as nothing in Arkansas’s statutory law governing declaratory judgments allowed the court to award attorney’s fees, “even where the underlying dispute arises from a contract,” and because the party “prevailed in a declaratory-judgment action, and not a breach-of-contract action, the circuit court did not have discretion to award attorney’s fees pursuant to § 16-22-308.” Id. at 426, 284 S.W.3d at 475. Similarly, the City prevailed on its petition for a writ of mandamus, not a breach-of-contract action, and nothing in Arkansas’s statutory law on mandamus actions permits recovery of attorney’s fees even if a writ of mandamus is an action to enforce an underlying agreed order. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in awarding attorney’s fees and reverse the award.

Section 16-22-308 allows attorney-fee awards to the prevailing party in a contract action.

Adams v. Howard · filed 2014-05-28

Nor is Adams the prevailing party for the purpose of an award of attorney’s fees under section 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 allows the prevailing party in a civil action for breach of contract to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee assessed by the court as costs.

Futurefuel Chemical Co. v. Lonza, Inc. · filed 2014-06-27

“In any civil action . . . for . . . breach of contract . . . the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. ... Therefore, the district court correctly determined that the award of attorney’s fees was appropriate in this case pursuant to section 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action to recover reasonable attorney’s fees, subject to the court’s discretion.

Taekwondo v. Landers · filed 2015-06-18

The prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action may recover reasonable attorney’s fees. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (Repl. 1999). The decision to award attorney’s fees is discretionary and will be reversed only if the appellant can demonstrate that the circuit court abused its discretion. Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Kosin, 2011 Ark. 51, 378 S.W.3d 135. Here, Landers’s argument is meritless. Because there was no contract between the parties, the attorney’s fees cannot be recovered in the instant case. For these reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Landers’s request for attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits the prevailing party in a qualifying breach of contract action to receive a reasonable attorney's fee assessed by the court and collected as costs.

Stuart C. Irby Company, Inc. v. Tipton · filed 2015-08-06

The district court awarded the defendants more than $200,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. This provision states that “[i]n any civil action to recover . . . for . . . breach of contract . . . the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.” Id. Because of our disposition of this appeal, the defendants are no longer prevailing parties under the statute. See Bendinger, 994 S.W.2d at 475; Armstrong Remodeling & Constr., LLC v. Cardenas, 417 S.W.3d 748, 757 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012). We therefore vacate the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney’s fees when a case is primarily based on breach of contract.

Gladden v. Trustees of the Pruitt Family Trust · filed 2015-12-02

Whether an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate under section 16-22-308 depends on whether the case is one primarily based on breach of contract.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach of contract action to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee assessed by the court and collected as costs.

Coleman v. Fields (In re Fields) · filed 2016-01-20

Since the debtor conceded that he breached the Contract with Coleman, section 16-22-308 applies, and the court must determine what “reasonable attorney’s fee” should be awarded.

The amount of an attorney’s fee award under § 16-22-308 is within the circuit court’s discretion; an award exceeding damages is not excessive without evidence that the work or hourly rate makes it so.

Watson Chapel School District v. Vilches · filed 2016-02-10

In her complaint, Ms. Vilches pleaded a statutory action and a breach-of-contract action and requested attorney’s fees pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. ... The decision to award attorney’s fees and the amount to award is discretionary and will be reversed only if the appellant can demonstrate that the circuit court abused its considerable discretion. Harrill & Sutter, P.L.L.C. v. Kosin, 2012 Ark. 385, at 9, 424 S.W.3d 272, 277. In this case, while the fees were greater than the damages awarded, the District has not provided any evidence that they are excessive in light of the work required to pursue and prosecute this case. Nor has it offered any evidence that the hourly rate charged is outside the normal range in the area for attorneys of the same experience. Consequently, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its considerable discretion and affirm its decision.

Section 16-22-308 permits a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case when a multiple-claim action is primarily based in contract.

Patton Hospitality Management, LLC v. Bella Vista Village Coopershares Owners Ass'n · filed 2016-05-25

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308 provides for the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in a breach-of-contract case.” ... However, where multiple claims are advanced—including a breach-of-contract claim—an attorney’s fee award is proper when the action is primarily based in contract. ... This action was clearly based primarily in contract, and accordingly, the circuit court was authorized to award a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits a reasonable attorney’s fee in an action alleging breach of express warranty and breach of contract.

Nissan North America, Inc. v. Harlan · filed 2017-04-05

Relying on her complaint, which alleged breach of express warranty in paragraph 15 and breach of contract in paragraph 16, the evidence as set forth by Harlan at the hearing on damages, and contention that he had worked twenty hours on the case, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $5000 in attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 does not permit an award of attorney’s fees in a tort case.

Franklin v. Waldron Nursing Center, Inc. · filed 2017-09-13

Here, Nathan’s cross-claim sounds in tort for fraud in creating false and forged documents to oust him from the LLC. There are no allegations of a breach of contract. The statute does not, however, permit an award of attorney’s fees in a tort case.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a contract action to recover a reasonable attorney's fee assessed by the court and collected as costs.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cuker Interactive, LLC · filed 2018-03-31

The Court believes that in both the Contract and the statute, “attorneys’ fees” simply means “attorneys’ fees,” “costs” simply means “costs,” and that when the statute says “collected as,” it simply refers to the manner in which an award of attorney fees may be “collected,” rather than to some mysterious transubstantiation.

Section 16-22-308 authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees and costs in a breach of contract action.

Washington Regional Medical Center v. Raber · filed 2018-10-26

WRMC is entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs on the breach of contract action pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney fees for the prevailing party in a breach of contract case but not in a tort action.

Contreras v. Arguelles · filed 2019-10-09

For example, attorney fees and costs may be awarded to the prevailing party in a breach of contract case but not in a tort action. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308; see also Wheeler Motor Co., Inc. v. Roth, 867 S.W.2d 446, 451 (Ark. 1993) (“When the prevailing party’s claim is based in tort, an award of attorney’s fees cannot be justified under section 16-22-308.”).

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney's fees in Arkansas breach of contract actions.

Northport Health Services of Arkansas, LLC v. Posey · filed 2019-10-30

The only potential basis for fees is the allowance in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 for fees in an Arkansas breach of contract action. The action before this Court was an action to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, not an Arkansas breach of contract action.

Section 16-22-308 allows an employer to recover attorney fees for successfully defending a former employee’s wrongful-discharge claim, subject to a reasonable fee determination.

McCabe v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. · filed 2019-12-04

First, the circuit court had the authority to award an attorney fee against McCabe and Purdy after the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Arkansas is an at-will employment state, and our supreme court has interpreted Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 to allow an employer to recover fees for successfully defending a former employee’s wrongful-discharge claim. Marlow v. United Sys. of Ark., Inc., 2013 Ark. 460. But the power to award a fee does not mean that the court can do so without first informing its discretion as to the reasonableness of the requested amount.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 allows recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and costs in certain civil actions, including actions to recover on an open account or for breach of contract.

Helena Agri-Enterprises, LLC v. Unruh · filed 2020-06-26

Unless otherwise barred by law or contract, Arkansas allows the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs “[i]n any civil action to recover to recover on an open account, statement of account, account stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services, or breach of contract.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. This breach-of-contract case involves Plaintiff’s attempts to recover on an open account, and the parties’ agreement explicitly contemplates the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees for collection purposes. Accordingly, Plaintiff may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in collecting Defendant’s unpaid balance.

Section 16-22-308 permits, but does not require, an award of attorney’s fees on a breach of contract claim.

Moore v. BancorpSouth Bank · filed 2020-07-08

This provision states that attorney’s fees “may be allowed” on a breach of contract claim. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. Thus, such an award is discretionary, not mandatory.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a foreclosure action to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Nichols v. Home Point Financial Corp. · filed 2020-07-21

As Home Point correctly points out, this statute allows the prevailing party in a foreclosure action to recover their attorney’s fees.

Section 16-22-308 permits attorney’s fees for prevailing breach of contract claims but does not permit recovery when the action is based primarily in tort.

Adeli v. Silverstar Automotive, Inc. · filed 2020-08-31

Attorney’s fees are not recoverable under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 when a party prevails in tort, Wheeler Motor Co., Inc., 867 S.W.2d at 451, and will not be awarded pursuant to that authority.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a civil action to recover on a breach of contract to receive a reasonable attorney's fee unless law or the contract provides otherwise.

Randy Kinder Excavating v. JA Manning Construction Compan · filed 2021-08-09

Thus Manning, as the prevailing party in this breach of contract action, is entitled to attorneys’ fees unless the subcontract provides otherwise. ... Accordingly, we find that the subcontract’s silence as to Manning’s ability to recover attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party does not operate as a waiver of its right to recover such fees under § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 allows the prevailing party in a breach of contract action to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee at the court’s discretion.

Elite Aviation Service, LLC v. Ace Pools, LLC · filed 2021-09-22

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 provides in a civil action for breach of contract “the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.” Pursuant to the statute, an award of attorney’s fees is discretionary.

Section 16-22-308 permits, but does not require, a court to award a prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees in a breach-of-contract action when no contrary law or contract provision applies.

Dye v. Precision Foundation Specialties & Flow Rite Drainage Solutions, Inc. · filed 2022-05-11

The word “may” in the statute implies permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, action or conduct and is construed in a permissive sense. Chrisco, 304 Ark. at 229, 800 S.W.2d at 718. A circuit court, therefore, is not required to award attorney’s fees under this statute, and any amounts awarded are discretionary. Conway Comm. Warehousing, LLC v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 51, 381 S.W.3d 94. Accordingly, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 gives a court discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees in the absence of an agreement of the parties providing for payment of such fees. See First Nat’l Bank of Crossett v. Griffin, 310 Ark. 164, 832 S.W.2d 816 (1992). Therefore, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a breach of contract action to recover a reasonable attorney’s fee at the court’s discretion.

Crain v. Crain · filed 2022-07-15

Arkansas law permits Plaintiffs, as prevailing parties in a breach-of-contract action, to request a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees from the breaching party—which, in this case, is Dude’s Estate. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 (“In any civil action to recover on [a] . . . breach of contract . . . the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.”). Whether and how much to award in attorney’s fees are left to the trial court’s discretion.

Section 16-22-308 allows a prevailing party in a breach of contract action to receive a reasonable attorney's fee assessed by the court.

Pro-Fab, LLC v. Phillip Smith Contracting, Inc. · filed 2022-09-30

Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, which provides that the prevailing party in a breach of contract action may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by a court. The Court finds that Plaintiff is a prevailing party under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 allows recovery of attorney's fees in breach of contract actions.

Welspun Tubular LLC v. Phenix Energy Group Incorporated · filed 2022-11-14

Attorneys’ fees are recoverable in breach of contract actions, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308.

Section 16-22-308 permits, but does not require, a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a qualifying civil action.

McDermott Brandon Properties, LLC v. Wheeler · filed 2023-05-10

The word “may” in the statute implies permissive or discretional, rather than mandatory, action or conduct and is construed in a permissive sense. ... A circuit court, therefore, is not required to award attorney’s fees under this statute, and any amounts awarded are discretionary.

Section 16-22-308 permits a court to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action, with whether and how much to award left to the court's discretion.

Carroll Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Alltel Corporation · filed 2023-07-24

Defendant seeks to recoup its attorneys’ fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308, which permits the Court to award reasonable fees to the prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action. Whether and how much to award in fees are left to the Court’s discretion.

Section 16-22-308 permits a prevailing party in a breach-of-contract action to receive a reasonable attorney’s fee, subject to statutory or contractual exceptions.

Arkansas Oklahoma Gas Corporation v. BP Energy Company · filed 2023-07-31

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308 states that “[i]n any civil action to recover . . . for . . . breach of contract, unless otherwise provided by law or the contract which is the subject matter of the action, the prevailing party may be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee to be assessed by the court and collected as costs.” An award of attorney’s fees under this statute “is permissive and discretional with the trial court.”