Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102

An employee performs employment services during a paid break when the employer requires the employee to remain available to perform work duties.

Ray v. University of Arkansas · filed 1999-04-28(5)(A)(i)

We hold that appellant was performing employment services at the time she was injured based on the fact that appellant was paid for her fifteen-minute breaks and was required to assist student diners if the need arose.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) excludes an injury from compensation when the employee was not performing employment services, even if a break indirectly benefited the employer.

White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1999-05-19(5)(B)(iii)

Act 796 of 1993 excluded from the definition of “compensable injury” an injury inflicted upon an employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. ... We think that this case is governed by the Harding case, and that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the Commission that appellant was not performing employment services at the time of his injury, which occurred as he was exiting his work area to take a smoking break. Although appellant’s break may have indirectly advanced his employer’s interest, and although under former law and the personal-comfort doctrine the injury sustained en route to a break would have been in the course of employment, under Act 796 of 1993 this claim is barred by the finding that appellant was not performing employment services at the time of injury.

An employee performs employment services while doing an incidental activity inherently necessary to the primary job, such as preparing a truck for a work trip.

Ray v. Wayne Smith Trucking · filed 1999-11-17(5)(B)(iii)

We conclude that appellant was performing an incidental activity which was inherently necessary for the performance of his primary employment activity. On the day appellant sustained his injury, he was preparing his truck for a cross-country drive by equipping it with items necessary for the effective administrator of his job.

An employee who monitors equipment and remains ready to resume work during a break performs employment services, so an injury during that break is not excluded on that ground.

White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. · filed 1999-12-16(5)(B)(iii)

Relevant to the case at bar is the change that excludes from the definition of "compensable injury" any injury received by an employee at a time when employment services are not being performed. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) (Supp.1997). ... Likewise, in this matter Georgia-Pacific also gleaned benefit from White remaining near his work station in order to monitor the progress of the dryers and immediately return to work if necessary. ... Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's determination that White was not performing employment services at the time of his injury.

Section 11-9-102(5)(B)(iii) excludes an injury suffered while an employee is walking through the employer’s parking lot on the way to work because the employee is not performing employment services.

Srebalus v. Rose Care, Inc. · filed 2000-02-09(5)(B)(iii)

Under that act, a compensable injury does not include an injury suffered at a time when employment services are not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11 -9-102(5)(B)(iii) (Repl. 1996). ... Here, it is not disputed that appellant fell in appellee’s parking lot while on her way to work. Thus, there is no fact issue to determine, and under Hightower we can say as a matter of law that the Act does not apply.

An injury is excluded from the definition of compensable injury when the employee was not performing employment services; the Commission must consider the Matlock factors when deciding that question.

Collins v. Excel Specialty Products · filed 2001-07-05(4)(B)(iii)

“Compensable injury,” however, does not include an “[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed....” Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-102(4)(B)(iii)(1999). Last week, this court handed down a decision in Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. 322, 49 S.W.3d 126 (2001), that sets forth a list of factors to be considered when determining whether an employee is engaged in employment services. Because the Commission did not have the Matlock decision at its disposal when deciding whether appellant was performing employment services, we remand this case so that, after considering the factors listed in Matlock, the Commission may reconsider its holding that appellant was not engaged in employment services.

An injury during a necessary restroom break is not excluded from compensable injury when the break directly or indirectly advances the employer’s interests.

Pifer v. Single Source Transportation · filed 2002-03-07(4)(B)(iii)

Based on the record in this case, we hold that Mr. Pifer’s restroom break was a necessary function and directly or indirectly advanced the interests of his employer. Consequently, his injury is not excluded from the definition of “compensable injury” under section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) because the injury did not occur at a time when he was not performing employment services.

An employee performs employment services when following a required locker policy advances the employer's interest, even during a break while clocked out.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Sands · filed 2002-12-04(4)(B)(iii)

Pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(b)(iii) (Repl.2002), an injury inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed is not compensable. ... On this record, reasonable minds could quite clearly find that the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment, while appellee was carrying out Wal-Mart's purpose or advancing Wal-Mart's interest, and we therefore hold that the Commission did not err in finding that appellee was performing employment services at the time she was injured.

An activity that benefits an employer to some extent is compensable only if it is also inherently necessary to the employee’s primary job.

Smith v. City of Fort Smith · filed 2004-01-28(4)(A)

Although at the time of his injury appellant was engaging in an activity that benefitted appellee to some extent, in order to be compensable the activity must also have been inherently necessary for the performance of his primary job activity. See Harding, supra . Whether or not an employee is performing employment services is a factual determination to be made by the Commission. Under our standard of review, we find that the Commission's decision that appellant was not performing employment services at the time of his injury is supported by substantial evidence.

Required entry procedures and walking to a time clock can be employment services when they advance the employer’s interest, even if the employee is not yet being paid.

Caffey v. Sanyo Manufacturing Corp. · filed 2004-03-10(4)(B)(iii)

We do not, however, view payment for these services as determinative of employment services. Appellant’s actions were not only required by appellee, but the acts also advanced appellee’s interest. We hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision that claimant was performing “employment services” when she slipped and fell on her way to clock in for the morning shift and therefore, affirm on cross appeal.

Routine morning grooming during an off-duty overnight rest break is not the performance of employment services.

Cook v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc. · filed 2004-10-06(4)(B)(iii)

We thus conclude that the facts of this case are most analogous to Kinnnebrew, supra, and that the performance of routine personal grooming and related tasks upon arising in the morning, even under the circumstances present in this case, is not the performance of employment services for the purposes of compens-ability.

An injury is not compensable when an employee is pursuing a personal errand that does not advance the employer’s interest at the time of injury.

Robinson v. St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center · filed 2004-10-27(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an injury “inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (B) (iii). ... Based on the foregoing, we hold that the Commission did not err in finding that appellant was not performing employment services that advanced her employer’s interest, either directly or indirectly, at the time of her injury.

An employee returning to work from a permitted restroom break performs employment services when that return advances the employer's interest.

Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield · filed 2001-06-27(4)(B)(iii)

Nevertheless, Matlock was manifestly advancing the employer's interest by returning to work after an authorized or permitted rest period. ... Accordingly, we reverse the Commission's decision that appellant was not performing employment services when she fell while returning to her work station from the employer's restroom.

An injury during a restroom break at an employer-provided facility is not excluded from compensable injuries when the break directly or indirectly advances the employer’s interests.

Collins v. Excel Specialty Products · filed 2002-03-07(4)(B)(iii)

Based on the record in this case, we hold that appellant’s restroom break was a necessary function and directly or indirectly advanced the interests of her employer. Consequently, her injury is not excluded from the definition of “compensable injury” under section 11-9-102(4) (B)(iii) because the injury did not occur at a time when she was not performing employment services.

An injury during a paid break is not compensable merely because the break is part of an employment contract; the employee must be performing employment services.

McKinney v. Trane Co. · filed 2004-01-28(4)(B)(iii)

McKinney, on his way to his smoke break, was involved in nothing generally required by his employer and was doing nothing to carry out the employer’s purpose; thus, the employer gleaned no benefit from his activities on break. See Pifer v. Single Source Transp., supra. We reject McKinney’s argument that his left-knee injury was compensable because it occurred during a paid break taken pursuant to a union-negotiated contract. Thus, we affirm the Commission’s finding that the jump and landing that caused the injury did not occur at a time when the claimant was performing employment services.

Traveling to a required meeting at an employee’s usual workplace does not constitute employment services merely because the meeting benefits the employer.

Linton v. Arkansas Department of Corrections · filed 2004-09-01(4)(B)(iii)

However, it is essential to every employer that its employees come to work, and merely traveling to and from the workplace is not an activity covered under our workers’ compensation statutes.

An injury sustained while an employee returns to work from a break is compensable when the employee is advancing the employer's interests at the time of injury.

Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc. · filed 2005-02-16(4)(A)(i)

We hold that appellant's crossing the board in order to return to work was an activity that directly advanced his employer's interests and therefore constituted employment services.

An employee performs employment services while obtaining meals if the activity advances the employer’s interests, directly or indirectly.

Arkansas Methodist Hospital v. Hampton · filed 2005-03-23(4)(B)(iii)

We are not persuaded that the authorities relied upon by appellants compel reversal; therefore, we hold that the Commission did not err in holding that appellee was performing employment services when she was injured.

An employee performs employment services when, with the employer's knowledge and consent, she assists an employer's client during scheduled work hours, even outside that client's assigned time.

Brotherton v. White River Area Agency on Aging · filed 2005-12-14(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an "[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed." Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). ... Here, the claimant's injury was compensable considering the specific facts that, with the employer's knowledge and implicit consent, she was clearly performing a service for her own agency client that she was specifically contracted to perform and did so during her agency-scheduled hours.

An employee performs employment services when injured while advancing the employer’s interests in an area where those services are expected, even before reaching a desk.

Foster v. Express Personnel Services · filed 2006-01-04(4)(B)(iii)

A com-pensable injury does not include an “[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). ... We reverse the Commission’s decision and remand for further proceedings because, regardless of the fact that Foster had not reached her desk or the cashier’s desk or was outside of the building in which her office was located, she was unquestionably injured in an area in which employment services were expected of her.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) excludes injuries occurring when an employee is not performing employment services, eliminating the premises exception to the going-and-coming rule.

Farler v. City of Cabot · filed 2006-04-26(4)(B)(iii)

Act 796 of 1993 and Ark. Code Ann. § 11 — 9— 102 redefined “compensable injury” to exclude an injury that was inflicted upon the employee “at a time when employment services were not being performed,” clearly eliminating the premises exception to the going-and-coming rule.

An employee performs employment services during a break when answering a client's work-related question advances the employer's interest.

Kimbell v. Association of Rehab Industry & Business Companion Property & Casualty · filed 2006-05-11(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an "[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Repl. 2002). ... While explaining to Minor how he would be affected by the "ticket to work," Kimbell was advancing his employer's interest. At the time of the injury, Kimbell was at work directly advancing his employer's interest.

The employment-services exclusion does not bar a claim when an employee is injured while following immediate travel instructions that advance the employer’s interest.

Moncus v. Billingsley Logging & American Ins. Co. · filed 2006-05-18(4)(B)(iii)

Thus, we conclude that because Moncus’s death occurred while he was carrying out the express and immediate instructions of his employer, doing something specifically required by his employer, and because by the employer’s admission, the meeting at the assembly point was an unusual measure undertaken to further the employer’s interest by insuring that the logging crew arrived at the jobsite intact, the Commission’s conclusion that Moncus was not performing employment services at the time of his death was clearly erroneous.

An injury is excluded from compensation when the employee is not performing employment services; activities that advance the employer’s interests at a mandatory company retreat can qualify as employment services.

Engle v. Thompson Murray, Inc. · filed 2006-09-20(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include injuries "inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed." Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). ... Appellant was indeed acting within the course of her employment and providing employment services at the time of her accident.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) permits compensation for an on-premises injury to an on-call residential employee whose presence indirectly advances the employer’s interests under the increased-risk doctrine.

Jivan v. Economy Inn & Suites · filed 2007-06-28(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an “[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (B)(iii) (emphasis added). ... Based upon our well-established standard of review, we follow Deffenbaugh, supra, and hold that, under the increased-risk doctrine, Nimisha’s fatal injury is compensable as a residential employee who indirectly advanced the interests of her employer.

An injury is not excluded for lack of employment services when a driver is returning to a truck to stay overnight and protect the truck and its cargo.

Toia v. HTI LOGISTICS · filed 2007-11-14(4)(B)(iii)

Limiting our review to that one issue, under the analysis recently set forth in Jivan, we hold that reasonable minds could not reach the result found by the Commission because appellant's activities related to returning to the "premises," i.e., his truck, in preparation of staying overnight in the truck to protect it and the cargo, advanced the interests of his employer.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) excludes an injury sustained while an employee is walking to work through a common area before beginning work, even if the employee used a key card to enter the building.

Parker v. Comcast Cable Corp. · filed 2007-12-05(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. ... The facts of this case are more like those in Hightower, supra, and Srebalus, supra, and it is our conclusion that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision that appellant was not performing employment services when she tripped while emerging from the elevator.

An employee performs employment services when the employee advances the employer’s interests, even if the injury occurs outside the usual time and space boundaries of employment.

Texarkana School District v. Conner · filed 2008-05-08(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an “[ijnjury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2003). ... It is clear that in a case such as the present one, where an injury occurs outside the time and space boundaries of the employment, the critical inquiry is whether the employer’s interests were being advanced, either directly or indirectly. ... In attempting to unlock the gate and provide access to the back entrance, Conner was advancing his employer’s interests by allowing other employees to enter or exit this parking lot, even if he was the only employee attempting to access the lot at the exact time of his accident.

An employee who has finished a break and is returning through the work area to receive instructions is performing employment services.

Mitchell v. Tyson Poultry, Inc. · filed 2009-02-11(4)(B)(iii)

It is undisputed that he was within the time and space boundaries of his employment, finished with his break, and en route to receive further instructions. This constitutes performance of employment services under Sands.

An injury is not compensable when the employee is not performing employment services; a manager who watches over an employee’s safety can be performing those services by advancing the employer’s interest.

CV's Family Foods v. Caverly · filed 2009-02-25(4)(B)(iii)

However, an injury is not compensable when sustained by an employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark.Code Ann. § 11 — 9— 102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp.2007). ... We hold that the Commission could properly find, on these facts, that appellee was performing employment services when he was injured.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) excludes injuries sustained when an employee is not performing employment services; returning to work after an authorized break can qualify when the employee is advancing the employer's interests.

Wallace v. West Fraser South, Inc. · filed 2006-01-26(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an "[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. . . ." Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). ... We need not address that issue because we conclude, on the facts of this case, that Wallace was performing employment services at the time of his injury.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) excludes injuries sustained when an employee is not performing employment services; required travel between job sites can qualify as employment services.

Jones v. Xtreme Pizza · filed 2006-12-20(4)(B)(iii)

An injury is not compensable if it was inflicted upon an employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Id. § 11-9 — 102(4)(B)(iii). ... First, the going-and-coming rule does not preclude benefits where the journey itself is part of the employment service; that is, where the employee must travel from jobsite to jobsite, whether or not he or she is paid for that travel time. ... Accordingly, the Commission in the instant case erred in denying benefits.

An injury sustained while an employee is not performing employment services is not a compensable injury; intending to discuss work during a smoke break does not make the walk to that break an employment service.

Haynes v. Ozark Guidance Center, Inc. · filed 2011-06-01(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an “[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2009). ... Accordingly, we hold that the Commission’s decision that Haynes was not performing employment services at the time of her injury is supported by substantial evidence.

An injury is not compensable when the employee is not performing employment services; returning a lunch box to a car during a lunch break for personal convenience does not qualify.

Shelton v. Qualserv · filed 2013-09-04(4)(B)(iii)

Qualserv neither directly nor indirectly benefited from Shelton’s actions. Shelton’s actions were for his own convenience. Substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that Shelton’s shoulder injury did not occur within the time and space boundaries of his employment and, thus, was not compensable.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) excludes injuries suffered when employment services are not being performed; an optional golf outing can qualify as employment services when it advances the employer’s purpose.

Curtis v. Lemna · filed 2013-11-06(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include injuries “inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed.” Ark. Code Ann. §11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). ... Based on this testimony, the Commission determined that the golfing activity occurred ... during the space and bounds of employment and that “Curtis and Lemna were carrying out Dial’s purpose or advancing Dial’s purpose directly or indirectly.” After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision, we are satisfied that the decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.

An injury sustained while merely traveling to work is not compensable when the employee is not performing employment services.

Black v. First Step Inc. · filed 2014-05-28(4)(B)(iii)

Because reasonable minds could conclude that Barbara was not performing employment services when the accident occurred, we affirm the Commission’s decision.

An injury is not compensable if it occurs when the employee is not performing employment services.

Best Western Inn & Union Insurance of Providence v. Paul · filed 2014-10-01(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an injury inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services are not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). ... Based on the applicable standard of review, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that appellee was performing employment services at the time she was injured.

An injury is not compensable when the employee was not performing employment services at the time of injury.

Trezza v. USA Truck Inc. · filed 2014-10-22(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). ... Here, appellant’s work day had ended when he was injured because he had logged “off-duty” and did not intend to perform any further job functions for thirty-four hours.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) excludes injuries sustained when an employee is not performing employment services; complying with required site-entry rules can qualify as employment services before the employee clocks in.

Continental Construction Co. v. Nabors · filed 2015-02-04(4)(B)(iii)

We hold that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that Nabors was injured while engaged in conduct that benefited Continental, making his injury compensable.

An employee performs employment services during a break when the employee’s activity advances the employer’s interests, even indirectly.

Hudak-Lee v. Baxter County Regional Hospital · filed 2011-02-03(4)(B)(iii)

Clearly, at the time of her injury, Appellant was advancing the interests of her employer, and the Commission’s finding that Appellant was not performing employment services was not supported by substantial evidence.

An employer-sponsored golf outing that advances the employer’s business can fall within the scope of employment rather than being recreation for the employee’s personal pleasure.

Curtis v. Lemna · filed 2014-09-18(4)(B)(ii)

At issue are Ark. Code Ann. sections 11-9-102(4)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii), and 11-9-105. ... Based on our standard of review, the Commission’s decision that Curtis’s injury occurred within the scope of his employment is supported by substantial evidence.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) excludes an injury from compensable injuries when the employee was not performing employment services at the time of injury.

Ganus v. St. Bernard's Hospital, LLC · filed 2015-03-11(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. ... The evidence noted by the Commission was that appellant was on a personal errand to retrieve food for her own benefit. The employee handbook provided that an employee should be considered to be “completely relieved” of her work responsibilities while on break. And appellant specifically left her patient in the hands of another employee before she went to retrieve her lunch. Based on these considerations and being bound by the standard of review, we hold that a reasonably minded person could reach the same result as the Commission.

An injury sustained while an employee is on a personal errand during a break is not compensable because the employee is not performing employment services.

Fulbright v. St. Bernard's Medical Center · filed 2016-09-21(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an injury that was inflicted on the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). ... As in Hill, Fulbright was performing a personal errand that was not related to her employment when she was injured, and thus, the injury is not compensable.

The employment-services requirement governs eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits; it does not determine an employee’s status in a negligence suit.

Kirshberger v. Frost · filed 2017-10-18(4)(B)(iii)

The concept of “performing employment services” is a workers’-compensation creation; it relates solely to whether a claimant is entitled to workers’-compensation benefits.

An injury is not compensable when the employee was not performing employment services, including when the employee is injured in the employer’s parking lot before beginning work duties.

Webster v. Arkansas Department of Correction · filed 2017-10-25(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an injury incurred at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). ... Similarly, appellant was injured in the parking lot of her employer before she had clocked in or had any job-related responsibilities. See also Parker v. Comcast Cable Corp., 100 Ark. App. 400, 269 S.W.3d 391 (2007). Thus, the Commission’s decision that appellant was not entitled to compensation for her injury is supported by substantial evidence and is affirmed.

An injury is not compensable when the employee was not performing employment services at the time of the accident.

Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. Jamestown Health and Rehab, LLC, and Amtrust North America · filed 2019-11-13(4)(B)(iii)

Accordingly, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision that Rodriguez failed to establish a compensable injury because she was not performing employment services at the time of the accident.

An injury while walking from a designated public parking area to clock in is not compensable when the employee is not performing employment services.

Pratt v. Bentonville · filed 2021-04-21(4)(A)(i)

Merely parking in a designated parking area opened to the public is not enough to lead us to hold that appellant was performing employment services once he parked in the lot. Therefore, we affirm the Commission’s finding that appellant failed to prove he suffered a compensable injury on April 11 as he was not preforming employment services at the time of his fall.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) excludes an injury from compensation when the employee was not performing employment services; sleeping in optional housing outside work hours did not qualify.

Lopez v. James Divito Racing Stable and Meadowbrook Insurance Group · filed 2021-05-26(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an “[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2019). ... We therefore hold that there was a substantial basis for the denial of benefits. Lopez was not within the time and space boundaries of his employment when he was injured.

An employee performs employment services when an activity indirectly advances the employer’s interest and is necessary to complete required job duties, even after clocking out.

Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. v. Willie Anderson and Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund · filed 2022-01-12(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. ... In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s conclusion that Anderson was performing employment services when he fell from his truck.

Section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) does not exclude an injury during a break when the employer requires the employee to remain available to resume work.

University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences and Public Employee Claims Division v. Hines · filed 2019-12-04(4)(B)(iii)

As in Ray, supra, the fact that Hines was on a personal call at the time of her injury is of no consequence because evidence indicated the employer required her to resume her duties when called.

An employee may be performing employment services during a lunch break when the employee remains on duty and available to respond to work needs.

Mineral Springs - Saratoga School District And Arkansas School Boards Association v. Bron Bell And Death and Permanent T · filed 2023-10-18(4)(B)(iii)

Thus, evidence was presented upon which the Commission could find that Bell was required to remain on campus; that he was not, in fact, duty-free during his lunch break; and that he was, therefore, performing employment services at the time of his injury.

An injury is not compensable if the employee was not performing employment services when it occurred.

Williams v. Malvern School District and Arkansas School Boards Association · filed 2025-04-09(4)(B)(iii)

While Williams was certainly performing a good deed at the time of his fatal injury, he was not performing any activity inherently necessary for the performance of his job, nor was he directly or indirectly advancing his employer’s interest. We hold that reasonable minds could reach the conclusion that Williams was not performing employment services at the time of his injury and affirm the Commission’s decision.

An injury is not compensable if it occurs when the employee is not performing employment services.

Ness v. Ft. Smith Pub. Sch. Dist. · filed 2014-02-12(4)(B)(iii)

A compensable injury does not include an “[i]njury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed.”

Section 11-9-102(16)(A)(i) excludes test results based on a patient's voluntary responses from objective findings, even when the tests include safeguards against malingering.

Duke v. Regis Hairstylists · filed 1996-12-23(16)(A)(i)

Construing the Act strictly, as we must, it is apparent that the tests performed by Dr. Peeples did not produce objective findings within the meaning of § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i).

A physician’s direct observation of a fibrous mass qualifies as an objective finding under § 11-9-102(16).

Daniel v. Firestone Building Products · filed 1997-04-23(16)(A)(i)

We hold that Dr. Green’s direct observation of a “5 cm by 5 cm fibrous mass” constituted an objective finding pursuant to § 11-9-102(16), and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A limitation in range of motion that can come under a patient’s voluntary control is not an objective finding for a compensable injury.

Cox v. CFSI Temporary Employment · filed 1997-05-28(16)(A)(i)

Construing the Act strictly, it is apparent that appellant’s inability to bend more than ninety degrees is not an “objective finding” within the meaning of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i). Appellant’s limitation could clearly have come under his voluntary responses, his manipulation, and control.

Section 11-9-102(5)(D) requires objective medical evidence to establish the existence and extent of a compensable injury.

Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican · filed 1997-09-17(5)(D)

Consequently, we hold the requirement that a compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings applies only to the existence and extent of the injury.

Section 11-9-102(5) requires objective medical findings to establish a compensable injury, but those findings need not prove how or when the injury occurred.

Aeroquip, Inc. v. Tilley · filed 1997-11-12(5)

However, in Stephens Truck Lines v. Millican, 58 Ark. App. 275, 950 S.W.2d 472 (1997), we held that a claimant need not offer objective medical evidence to prove the circumstances under which the injury was sustained or the precise time of the injury’s occurrence. ... The statutory definition of compensability as set out in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5) contains many elements that simply are not susceptible of proof by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

A physician’s observation of involuntary muscle spasms can qualify as objective findings supporting a compensable injury.

University of Arkansas Medical Sciences v. Hart · filed 1997-12-22(16)(A)(i)

Substantial evidence supports the determination that appellee’s muscle spasms constitute “objective findings” in support of her claim of a compensable injury. Upon examination of appellee, Dr. Lewis observed back and neck spasms. This observation of “[a]n involuntary muscular contraction” or “[i]ncreased muscular tension and shortness which cannot be released voluntarily” constitutes an objective finding.

Objective findings exclude symptoms under the patient’s voluntary control; intracranial bleeding, cranial nerve damage, and CAT scan results qualify.

Swift-Eckrich, Inc. v. Brock · filed 1998-09-30(16)

Although Brock’s complaints of pain and headaches are indications over which she has voluntary control, and are not to be considered as objective findings, her intracranial bleeding, cranial nerve damage with loss of smell and taste, and the results of her CAT scan are objective findings according to Duke, supra.

A claimant must establish a compensable injury through medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Ford v. Chemipulp Process, Inc. · filed 1998-10-28(5)(D)

Additionally, the claimant must establish a compensable injury by medical evidence, supported by objective findings. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D). ... Because there is no medical evidence supported by objective findings to establish the existence of an injury, appellant has failed to establish a compensable injury.

Section 11-9-102(5)(D) requires objective findings to establish a compensable injury, but they are not required for additional medical treatment or temporary total disability benefits after compensability is established.

Williams v. Prostaff Temporaries · filed 1998-11-18(5)(D)

The issue of whether or not there was objective evidence arises when determining whether an injury is compensable. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(5)(D) (Supp. 1997); see also Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(1)(B) (Repl. 1996). The law concerning medical treatment and temporary total disability benefits does not concern itself with whether there were objective findings of an injury because that question applies to compensability and impairment determinations.

An internal spinal contusion diagnosed without an observable finding may fail to satisfy the objective findings requirement for a compensable injury.

Meister v. Safety Kleen · filed 1999-03-10(16)

... and we hold that reasonable minds could conclude that a contusion to such an internal structure could not be seen and therefore does not constitute objective medical evidence of an injury.

Section 11-9-102 allows muscle spasms observed by a physical therapist to count as objective findings supporting a compensable injury.

Continental Express, Inc. v. Freeman · filed 1999-03-24(16)(A)(i)

Also unpersuasive is Continental’s alternative argument that the findings of muscle spasms by a physical therapist cannot constitute objective findings because a physical therapist is unqualified to state a medical opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. In the first place, Continental’s argument rests on the faulty premise that an objective finding is somehow synonymous with or otherwise based on medical opinion. No Arkansas court has ever made such a connection.

Section 11-9-102(4)(D) requires objective medical findings to establish a compensable injury, but does not require additional objective findings for treatment of headaches related to an accepted injury.

Green Bay Packaging v. Bartlett · filed 1999-09-29(4)(D)

In regard to appellant’s argument that there are no objective findings to support appellee’s claim of headaches, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (D) (Supp. 1999) requires that a compensable injury be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. ... Appellant has cited no case or statutory law that requires objective findings in this case. ... We do not believe more is required.

Objective findings are outside the patient’s voluntary control, and an x-ray examination may provide objective evidence corroborating a diagnosed contusion.

Meister v. Safety Kleen · filed 1999-11-04(16)(A)(i)

In conclusion, while the Commission found that the record revealed no objective medical findings of a hematoma or bruise (contusion), Dr. Moseley’s x-ray examination was such an objective finding that existed and could well have been considered as corroborating the contusion that Meister’s treating physician originally diagnosed.

Objective findings are findings beyond the patient’s voluntary control; a claimant relying on active range-of-motion tests for an impairment rating must show that the tests meet that definition.

Department of Parks & Tourism v. Helms · filed 1998-01-14(16)(A)(i)

“Objective findings” are those findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i) (Repl. 1996). ... It was incumbent upon appellee to present evidence that active range-of-motion tests are objective tests. In other words, it was incumbent upon her to present proof that those tests do not come under the voluntary control of the patient. She did not do so.

Section 11-9-102(5)(D) requires objective medical evidence of an injury’s existence and extent, but not of its causal relationship to a work-related accident.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner · filed 1999-05-06(5)(D)

We therefore adopt the holding in Millican that objective medical evidence is necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury but not essential to establish the causal relationship between the injury and a work-related accident.

Observed muscle spasms constitute objective findings under the workers’ compensation definition.

Continental Express, Inc. v. Freeman · filed 1999-11-11(16)(A)(i)

We conclude that the court of appeals’ reasoning in Hart and its progeny is persuasive, and we therefore adopt the holding that muscle spasms constitute objective findings as required by section 11—9— 102(16).

Section 11-9-102(16) treats radiographic discogram images as objective findings even when the test also considers the claimant’s subjective pain response.

Smith v. County Market/Southeast Foods · filed 2001-04-25(16)

However, radiographic images of the dye, once injected into the spine, are clearly not subject to a claimant’s manipulation. Results of x-ray, CT scan, MRI, and other radiographic and computerized diagnostic studies are “objective findings” for purposes of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act. Therefore, we must conclude that an x-ray and CT scan of the spine, with dye contrast, cannot be rendered meaningless in a Workers’ Compensation context just because a patient’s pain response during the injection of the dye is taken into account.

Muscle tightness does not qualify as an objective finding without evidence that it is involuntary.

Carman v. Haworth, Inc. · filed 2001-05-30(16)

However, appellant has not presented us with convincing argument or authority that “muscle tightness” can be equated with “muscle spasms” in this situation. There is no evidence to suggest that the physical therapist’s findings of muscle tightness were actually muscle spasms or that the tightness was involuntary. Certainly, muscle tightness can come under the voluntary control of the patient. Without evidence of objective medical findings, the Commission had a substantial basis for denying appellant’s claim, and we affirm that denial.

Section 11-9-102(4)(D) requires medical evidence supported by objective findings to establish a compensable injury.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts · filed 2001-07-05(4)(D)

"A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by `objective findings.'" Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp.1999). ... We hold that Dr. Thrash's report constitutes substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding that appellee sustained a compensable injury.

Abnormalities observed on an x-ray can qualify as objective findings supporting a compensable injury.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts · filed 2001-10-10(16)(A)(i)

Although not specifically stated in his report, it is implicitly clear that Dr. Thrash based his diagnosis on abnormalities observed in the x-ray results. Results of x-ray diagnostic studies are "objective findings" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. Smith v. County Market/Southeast Foods, 73 Ark.App. 333, 44 S.W.3d 737 (2001). We, therefore, hold that there was substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that appellee presented medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Section 11-9-102(4)(D) requires medical evidence supported by objective findings to establish a compensable injury; other objective evidence can support a brain injury when neuropsychological testing involves patient responses.

Wentz v. Service Master · filed 2001-10-24(4)(D)

"A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by `objective findings.'" Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp.1999). ... However, in the case at bar, there is other objective evidence that indicates appellant suffered an injury to her brain. ... Based on the evidence, we hold that fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusions as the Commission if presented with the same facts.

Section 11-9-102 requires objective medical findings to establish a compensable injury; straight-leg-raising and range-of-motion tests do not qualify without evidence that their results are outside the patient’s voluntary control.

Mays v. Alumnitec, Inc. · filed 2001-12-19(16)(A)

We take this opportunity to clarify our holding that neither test is objective for purposes of determining compensability. The American Medical Association Guides must give way to the statutory definition of objective findings as defined by the General Assembly.

Neuropsychological test results alone do not establish a compensable closed-head injury without other objective evidence of injury.

Watson v. Tayco, Inc. · filed 2002-10-02(16)(A)(i)

Here, the only evidence suggesting that appellant sustained a compensable closed-head injury was found in the results of the neuropsychological testing; there was no other objective evidence establishing a closed-head injury. The results of the neuropsychological testing standing alone is not enough to establish a compensable injury; therefore we affirm the Commission.

A positive bone scan showing increased uptake can establish the objective medical findings required for a compensable injury.

Heritage Baptist Temple v. Robison · filed 2003-06-18(4)(D)

The positive bone scan is an objective medical finding of injury that was out of Robison’s control, and it formed the basis for the recommendation of surgery.

A compensable injury must be established by objective findings.

Hargis Transport v. Chesser · filed 2004-09-08(4)(D)

Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2002) requires that a compensable injury be established by objective findings. ... We hold that the MRI report of December 2001 and the February 2002 operative report of Dr. Johnston-Jones, both introduced at the second hearing, constitute sufficient evidence to uphold this finding.

Objective findings may be established by an emergency-room notation reasonably indicating observed muscle spasms and a prescription for medication to treat them.

Fred's, Inc. v. Jefferson · filed 2004-12-15(16)

Objective findings are "those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient." Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) (Repl.2002). ... Contrary to Fred's assertion, the Flexeril prescription also constitutes objective findings in light of Estridge v. Waste Management, 343 Ark. 276, 33 S.W.3d 167 (2000). ... In light of Continental Express and Estridge , we hold that Jefferson presented medical findings supported by objective evidence.

X-ray evidence of a lumbar subluxation qualifies as an objective finding because a dislocation is outside the patient’s voluntary control.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Stotts · filed 2001-07-05(16)(A)(i)

Obviously, a dislocation cannot come under the voluntary control of a patient. Although not specifically stated in his report, it is implicitly clear that Dr. Thrash based his diagnosis on abnormalities observed in the x-ray results. Results of x-ray diagnostic studies are “objective findings” for purposes of the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Section 11-9-102 requires objective medical findings establishing the compensable injury for which benefits are sought.

Liaromatis v. Baxter County Regional Hospital · filed 2006-05-24

The question is not whether there are new objective findings, but whether there is a new compensable injury. It is the injury for which appellant seeks benefits that must be proved with objective medical findings.

A compensable injury, including an aggravation of a preexisting condition, must be supported by medical evidence with objective findings.

Long v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2007-02-21(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. ... The record in this case is void of medical evidence supported by objective findings demonstrating that appellant suffered a compensable injury on September 2, 2003. ... As with the discussion of an alleged new injury, appellant has failed to put forth any medical evidence supported by objective findings demonstrating that he suffered a compensable aggravation of the previous condition.

Section 11-9-102(4)(D) requires medical evidence supported by objective findings to establish a compensable injury; neuropsychological testing alone does not satisfy that requirement for an organic brain injury.

Rippe v. Delbert Hooten Logging · filed 2007-10-31(4)(D)

However, neuropsychological testing, without more, is not adequate to establish organic brain injury by "objective findings" within the meaning of Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D).

A compensable injury must be supported by objective medical findings; muscle guarding can qualify if it is involuntary, as determined from the medical evidence.

Steak House v. Weigel · filed 2007-12-19(4)(D)

We hold that the Commission’s conclusion in this case — that “guarding is an objective finding” — sweeps too broadly. Our contrary dicta in Polk County that guarding is subjective does too, and we disavow it. Guarding can be beyond the patient’s control or within the patient’s control. This issue is therefore a matter of fact on which the Commission should make a specific finding case by case based on the medical evidence.

A compensable brain injury requires objective findings beyond neuropsychological testing alone.

Parson v. Arkansas Methodist Hospital · filed 2008-09-24(4)(D)

Neuropsychological testing, without more, is not adequate to establish an organic brain injury by “objective findings” within the meaning of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D).

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Fred's, Inc. v. Jefferson · filed 2005-03-31(4)(D)

We agree with the ALJ’s findings and hold that substantial evidence was presented that Jefferson suffered an “accidental injury,” as defined by § ll-9-102(4)(A)(i), and that substantial evidence was presented that Jefferson’s compensable injury was established by medical evidence supported by “objective findings,” as required by § 11-9-102(4)(D).

A compensable aggravation must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings; a physical therapist’s observation of decreased lumbar lordosis can help establish a new injury.

King v. Peopleworks · filed 2006-12-06(4)(D)

Furthermore, a compensable injury must be established by medical evidence, supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4) (D). ... We hold that this evidence constitutes substantial evidence to support the Commission’s conclusion that King suffered a new injury on February 7, 2001, and a compensable aggravation resulting from the independent incident.

A compensable injury requires medical evidence supported by findings outside the patient’s voluntary control; a prescription that may be prophylactic and a contusion notation consistent with tenderness need not establish those findings.

Rodriguez v. M. McDaniel Co., Inc. · filed 2007-03-07(4)(D), (16)(A)(i)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp. 2005); see also Watson v. Tayco, Inc., 79 Ark. App. 250, 86 S.W.3d 18 (2002). Objective findings are those findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i) (Supp. 2005); see also Watson, supra. ... This case is distinguishable from Fred’s, however, because there was medical testimony in this case indicating that Robaxin could be prescribed for prophylactic purposes. ... As to Rodriguez’s second issue, that there is an emergency room report noting a contusion to her hip, Dr. Yawn testified that the notation in the record most likely referred to tenderness and not to visible darkening or bruising. ... In light of Dr. Yawn’s testimony, we must conclude that reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the Commission. Therefore, we affirm.

An unequivocal diagnosis of shoulder and knee contusions, with no conflicting testimony about their nature, satisfies the objective-findings requirement.

Ellis v. J.D. & Billy Hines Trucking, Inc. · filed 2008-12-10(4)(D)

This case is about Dr. Nix’s unequivocal diagnosis of contusions to Ellis’s left shoulder and left knee. We are convinced that reasonable persons with the same facts before them could not have arrived at the Commission’s conclusion about Ellis’s contusions. ... We therefore reverse and remand for the Commission to re-examine its decision about the compensability of Ellis’s shoulder and knee injuries in light of our conclusion that Ellis satisfied the statute’s objective-findings requirement.

Section 11-9-102(4) requires medical evidence supported by objective findings to establish a compensable injury; observed skin lesions and muscle atrophy qualify.

Cossey v. Gary A. Thomas Racing Stable · filed 2009-10-07(4)

The findings of skin lesions and muscle atrophy were objective findings.

A compensable injury requires medical evidence supported by objective findings.

United Farms, Inc. v. Gist · filed 2009-10-28(4)(D)

Contrary to United Farms’s assertion, the record does contain objective medical findings sufficient to establish compensability. A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp.2009).

Objective findings used to support a physical impairment rating must be beyond the patient's voluntary control; complaints of pain do not qualify.

Vite v. Vite · filed 2010-09-01(16)(A)

“Objective findings” are defined as findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. ... Complaints of pain may not be considered in determining physical or anatomical impairment. ... The Commission’s conclusion that Mr. Vite was not permanently totally or partially disabled, and that he had not suffered wage-loss disability, was based upon two findings: the ten-percent impairment rating assigned by Dr. Routsong was not supported by objective measurable physical findings, and the opinion of Dr. Peeples was entitled to greater weight |1Tthan that of Dr. Routsong. ... We hold that the Commission’s opinion, with its assignment of greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Peeples, displays a substantial basis for the denial of these claims.

Section 11-9-102(4)(D) requires medical evidence supported by objective findings to establish a compensable injury, whether it results from a specific incident or develops gradually.

Mooney v. AT & T · filed 2010-09-15(4)(D)

In addition, Mooney had to establish his injury with “medical evidence supported by objective findings.” Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp.2009). ... Mooney neither provided medical evidence supported by objective findings establishing either a specific-incident or a gradual-onset injury nor proved that his injury, whether specific-incident or gradual-onset, arose out of and in the course of his employment with AT & T.

An aggravation of a preexisting condition requires objective medical findings to qualify as a compensable injury.

Kelley v. Courtyard Marriott · filed 2011-11-16(4)(D)

However, objective medical findings to that effect would still be required to prove a compensable injury, and no such findings were offered in this case.

Objective findings are findings a patient cannot voluntarily control; an MRI showing ankle swelling and a tendon tear can satisfy this requirement.

Lexicon Holding Co. v. Howard · filed 2015-05-06(16)(A)(i)

The MRI—which showed swelling in the ankle joint and that Howard’s right peroneus longus tendon was torn—is a diagnostic test that is objective and outside Howard’s control. There was no prior medical history showing that Howard had been diagnosed with a torn peroneus longus tendon before the November 10 fall occurred at work. We therefore conclude that there was substantial medical evidence, supported by objective findings, to satisfy Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i).

Objective findings must be beyond the patient’s control; medical evidence based on subjective complaints does not satisfy that requirement.

Leming v. La-Z-Boy, Inc. · filed 2015-05-20(16)

However, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(16), “[o]bjective ... findings are those findings which cannot come under the control of the patient[,]” and all of the medical evidence related to the July 8 injury, other than the x-ray, were based on Leming’s subjective complaints.

Objective findings can include MRI abnormalities that support a permanent impairment rating.

St. Francis County v. Watlington · filed 2015-09-23(16)(A)

The 10% rating is supported by objective medical findings, including the post injury MRI, which confirmed abnormalities in Watlington’s brain.

Objective findings must be beyond the patient’s voluntary control, but medical testimony need not rely solely on them when objective evidence supports the injury and impairment.

Emergency Ambulance Services v. Pritchard · filed 2016-08-31(16)(A)(i)

Furthermore, there is no requirement that medical testimony be based solely or expressly on objective findings—only that medical evidence of the injury and impairment be supported by objective findings. ... Noting medical reports of swelling, discoloration, and the failed fusion itself, the Commission interpreted the pin-prick test results to reflect the “partial wrist denervation” mentioned in the surgical report. ... Applying the proper standard of review, we hold that there is substantial evidence to uphold the findings and conclusion of the Commission.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Kennan v. Cawood Trucking, Inc. · filed 2016-11-16(4)(D)

Furthermore, the injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Objective findings must support a claimed brain injury; skull fractures, pneumocephalus, and an MRI finding that might be a shear injury did not establish one.

Multi-Craft Contractors, Inc. v. Yousey · filed 2017-03-08(16)(A)(i)

We hold that the evidence cited by the Commission does not satisfy the statute’s requirement for objective findings to support a brain injury.

Section 11-9-102(4)(D) requires objective medical findings to establish the injury for which benefits are sought, but those findings need not be new if the evidence establishes a new compensable injury.

City of El Dorado v. Smith · filed 2017-05-10(4)(D)

The question is not whether there are new objective findings, but whether there is a new compensable injury.

Objective findings supporting a brain-injury impairment must show injury to the brain; skull fractures, pneumocephalus, and an inconclusive MRI do not suffice.

Multi-Craft Contractors, Inc. v. Yousey · filed 2017-05-24(16)(A)(i)

Although Yousey’s fractures and pneumocephalus were objective findings, they supported an injury only to his skull or his head, not his brain. ... We hold that the evidence cited by the Commission does not satisfy the statute’s requirement for objective findings to support a brain injury.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Garcia v. Jensen Construction Co. · filed 2017-09-13(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, which are findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Johnson v. Pam Transport, Inc. · filed 2017-10-04(4)(D)

Furthermore, “[a] compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D). ... Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s finding that Johnson failed to prove that objective findings supported his injuries.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings; a finding of “hypo” lordosis without a causal link to the accident did not suffice.

Wall Farms, LLC v. Hulsey · filed 2017-11-15(4)(D)

On this record, reasonable minds could conclude that the “hypo” lordosis detected by Dr. Curtis was not an objective finding causally related to the April 23, 2014 accident, and therefore the Commission did not err in finding that no compensable injury occurred on that date.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, which cannot be under the patient’s voluntary control.

Wright Steel & MacHine, Inc. v. Heimer · filed 2017-11-29(4)(D), (16)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D). “Objective findings” are those findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16).

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Gunter v. Bill's Super Foods, Inc. · filed 2018-02-21(4)(D)

Here, we agree with the Commission's decision that Gunter did not satisfy her statutory burden of proof. She failed to establish the existence of any cervical spine injurythat occurred while working at Bill's. As noted above, a compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Neuropsychological testing alone does not establish an organic brain injury through objective findings.

Multi-Craft Contractors, Inc. v. Yousey · filed 2018-04-05(16)(A)(i)

We agree that neuropsychological testing, without more, is not adequate to establish an organic brain injury by "objective findings" within the meaning of Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102.

A scalp contusion is an objective medical finding that can support a compensable injury.

Nw. Ark. Cmty. Coll. v. Migliori · filed 2018-05-02(16)(A)(i)

We hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that Migliori established a compensable head injury by medical evidence supported by objective findings, namely a scalp contusion. We have held that a contusion is an objective medical finding.

A compensable injury must be supported by objective medical findings; an MRI and operative note showing an acute shoulder tear can satisfy that requirement.

Kiswire Pine Bluff, Inc. v. Segars · filed 2018-05-09(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Repl. 2017). ... Shortly after the November 4 incident, an MRI and related operative note showed that Segars had suffered an acute injury (tear) in his right shoulder, which is an objective finding.

A compensable injury requires medical evidence supported by objective findings, with evidence connecting the injury to the workplace accident.

Myers v. City of Rockport · filed 2015-12-16(4)(D)

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-102(4)(D) requires that a compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. ... Based on the evidence that there were no complaints regarding appellant’s head or brain having been injured in the accident until more than two years following the event, and there was no evidence that the MRI finding was related to appellant’s accident, reasonable minds could have concluded, as the Commission did, that appellant did not prove the necessary causal connection.

A specific-incident injury requires objective medical findings establishing the injury, but causation is a factual question for the Commission.

Hosey v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. · filed 2016-04-06(4)(A)(i)

To prove a compensable injury as a result of a specific incident which is identifiable by time and place of occurrence, the claimant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1) an injury arising out of and in the course of employment; (2) that the injury caused internal or external harm to the body which required medical services or resulted in disability or death; (3) medical evidence supported by objective findings, as defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16) (Repl. 2012), establishing the injury; and (4) that the injury was caused by a specific incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i). ... We disagree with appellant’s contention that the ALJ required objective medical evidence to establish the causal relationship between the alleged neck injury and the work-related accident.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Bittle v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. · filed 2017-11-29(4)(D)

Because there were no objective medical findings to support Bittle’s claim that she sustained work-related injuries or an aggravation of a preexisting condition, we hold that the Commission’s opinion displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief.

Section 11-9-102(4)(D) requires objective medical evidence to establish the existence and extent of a compensable injury; other evidence may establish its connection to work.

St. Jean Industries, Inc. v. Ezell · filed 2016-11-02(4)(D)

We find no error in the Commission’s finding that Ezell’s compensable injury was established by objective medical evidence and that there was sufficient other evidence that the injury was work related.

A compensable injury must be established by objective findings, which cannot come under the patient’s voluntary control; complaints of pain and muscle tenderness do not qualify.

Foxx v. Bill's Superfoods, Inc. · filed 2017-10-25(4)(D); (16)(A)(i)

Compensable injuries must be established by objective findings, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D), and “objective findings” are those findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i). Furthermore, complaints of pain and muscle tenderness are not considered objective findings under the statute. ... Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision.

Section 11-9-102 treats significant soft-tissue swelling as an objective medical finding because it is outside the patient’s voluntary control.

Ark. Sec'y of State v. Young · filed 2018-10-24(16)(A)(i)

Compensable injuries must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D), and objective findings are those that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. ... The significant soft-tissue swelling is an objective medical finding.

A diagnosis of contusion can supply the objective medical finding required for a compensable injury when the Commission reasonably resolves the evidence about the contusion.

TJX Cos. v. Lopez · filed 2019-04-24(4)(D), (16)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by "objective findings." ... In the present case, the conflict alleged by appellants is contained within the same emergency-room record. ... We cannot say that reasonable minds could not have reached the same conclusion as the Commission.

Section 11-9-102 treats muscle spasms as objective medical findings when determining whether an injury is compensable.

Reed v. First Step, Inc. · filed 2019-05-22(16)(A)(i)

Muscle spasms constitute objective medical findings. ... Therefore, the Commission's finding that the record lacked evidence of objective medical findings of a trauma injury is not supported by substantial evidence, as spasms were clearly noted from the date of the injury.

Objective findings must be beyond the patient’s voluntary control; pain complaints and range-of-motion tests do not qualify.

White County Judge and Association of Arkansas Counties Risk Management Services v. Menser · filed 2019-11-06(16)

Section 11- 9-102(16) defines “objective findings” as findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Moreover, the statute provides that neither complaints of pain nor range-of-motion tests shall be considered objective medical findings.

Objective medical findings establish the existence and extent of an injury, but are not required to establish causation.

Greene County Judge and Association of Arkansas Counties Risk Management Services v. Rick L. Penny · filed 2019-11-20(16)

Although objective medical findings are required to establish the existence and extent of an injury, objective medical findings are not required to establish causation.

A compensable injury requires medical evidence supported by objective findings, but objective findings need not establish every element of compensability.

Tempworks Management Services, Inc. v. Jaynes · filed 2020-02-05(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D). ... While it is true that the legislature has required medical evidence supported by objective findings to establish a compensable injury, it does not follow that such evidence is required to establish each and every element of compensability. ... The Commission’s decision is supported by objective medical findings––most notably those of a neurologist, Dr. Miles Johnson.

Section 11-9-102(16) requires objective findings beyond the claimant’s voluntary control to establish a compensable injury.

Evans v. Firestone Building Products, Ltd., and Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. · filed 2020-02-05(16)

Objective findings are those that cannot come within the claimant’s voluntary control. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16); Greene Cty. Judge v. Penny, 2019 Ark. App. 552, 589 S.W.3d 478. ... The ALJ’s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of Evans’s claims. The ALJ made a specific finding that Evans lacked credibility, and aside from the MRI, which supported the compensated injury to Evans’s thumb, the ALJ weighed the medical evidence and concluded there were no other objective medical findings of injuries to the left hand attributable to the work injury and no reports of impairment aside from an active range-of-motion evaluation, to which she gave little weight.

Tenderness does not qualify as an objective finding needed to establish a compensable injury.

Marshall v. Arkansas Department of Correction; And Arkansas Insurance Department, Public Employee Claims Division · filed 2020-02-12(16)(A)(i)

While “tenderness” was reported, tenderness does not amount to an objective finding.

Objective medical findings may be established through prescribed treatment for muscle spasms even when no medical provider directly observes a spasm.

Melius v. Chapel Ridge Nursing Center, LLC, and Amtrust North America Insurance · filed 2021-02-10(16)(A)(i)

In addition, there is no requirement under Arkansas law that a doctor, physical therapist, or other medical provider actually observe a patient having a muscle spasm before an employee’s injury can be compensable.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings; abrasions, contusions, and swelling can provide those findings.

Bronco Industrial Services, LLC; Gray Insurance Company; And Cannon Cochran Management Services, Inc. v. Brooks · filed 2021-06-02(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D). ... In finding that Brooks proved that he sustained compensable injuries to his left arm and shoulder, the Commission pointed to objective findings by Drs. Brenza, Cullom, and Dickson that included abrasions, contusions, and swelling involving Brooks’s left upper extremity. ... We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision that Brooks proved compensable injuries to his left arm and shoulder, in addition to his admittedly compensable left-knee injury.

Section 11-9-102(16)(A) defines objective findings as those outside a patient’s voluntary control and excludes pain complaints, straight-leg-raising tests, and range-of-motion tests.

North Hills Surgery Center and Risk Management Resources v. Otis · filed 2021-12-01(16)(A)

“Objective findings” are those that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient and specifically exclude complaints of pain, straight-leg-raising tests, and range-of-motion tests. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A) (Supp. 2021); Vangilder v. Anchor Packaging, Inc., 2011 Ark. App. 240. In this case, we hold that the Commission’s decision that Otis is entitled to a 7 percent impairment rating is supported by substantial evidence. Otis’s MRIs show a disc abnormality at L4-5/L5-S1.

Objective findings must be outside the patient’s voluntary control; complaints of pain do not qualify.

Carrick v. Baptist Health, Claims Administrative Services And Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund · filed 2022-03-16(16)(A)

“Objective findings” are those findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient, and complaints of pain are not to be considered objective medical findings.

A claimed new injury or aggravation must be supported by objective medical findings outside the patient’s control.

Carter v. Gea North America,, Inc. · filed 2023-03-08(16)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings, which are findings that cannot come under the control of the patient, such as complaints of pain or tenderness. ... Carter did not establish by medical evidence supported by objective findings that he had sustained a new injury or an aggravation of a preexisting injury.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings; complaints of pain do not satisfy that requirement.

Hice v. Logan County and Association of Arkansas Counties · filed 2024-10-30(4)(D)

Failure to establish a compensable injury supported by objective findings is fatal to Hice’s claim.

A specific-incident compensable injury requires objective medical evidence of the injury’s existence and extent, but other evidence may establish its causal connection to a work-related accident.

Sears Roebuck & Co.; Ace American Insurance Co.; And Sedgwick Cms v. Brown · filed 2020-02-12(4)(A)(i)–(ii)

While appellants challenge the medical evidence in support of causation, it should be mentioned that objective medical evidence is necessary to establish the existence and extent of an injury but not essential to establish the causal relationship between the injury and a work-related accident.

Section 11-9-102(16)(A)(iii)(b) does not require a confirmatory hearing test or its results to be identical to the first test, or require adjustment for presbycusis in every case.

Craighead County and Aac Risk Management Services v. Tipton · filed 2020-09-23(16)(A)(iii)(b)

The statute does not provide that the test to confirm the hearing loss must be identical to the original test or that the results of the two tests must be identical. ... We disagree that the statute requires adjustment in all cases.

Section 11-9-102(16)(A)(ii)(b) excludes range-of-motion tests as objective findings when rating physical or anatomical impairment of the spine.

Willis v. Arkansas Department of Correction, Public Employee Claims Division · filed 2021-02-03(16)(A)(ii)(b)

Contrary to Willis’s argument, decreased range-of-motion findings do not support her claim for an impairment rating. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(ii)(b) (for the purpose of making physical or anatomical impairment ratings to the spine, range-of-motion tests shall not be considered an objective finding).

Section 11-9-102(16)(A)(ii)(a) bars consideration of pain complaints when determining physical or anatomical impairment.

Eldridge v. Pace Industries, LLC; Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund; And Sentry Casualty Company · filed 2021-05-19(16)(A)(ii)(a)

Further, the statutes provide that “[w]hen determining physical or anatomical impairment, neither a physician, any other medical provider, an administrative law judge, the Workers’ Compensation Commission, nor the courts may consider complaints of pain.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(ii)(a). ... Therefore, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that Eldridge was entitled to the requested additional medical treatment but that he was only entitled to a 37 percent anatomical-impairment rating to the left lower extremity.

A compensable injury must be supported by objective medical findings; a diagnosed muscle strain treated with medication and pain management can satisfy that requirement.

Bradford v. Stracener Brothers Construction Corporation · filed 2021-09-01(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective medical findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D). ... A diagnosis of muscle strain along with prescribed treatment of medications and pain management is sufficient to establish objective findings of a compensable injury. ... This record supports a finding of a compensable injury.

Objective findings are findings outside the patient’s voluntary control; credited medical evidence of an annular tear and disc herniation can support a compensable injury.

Sheridan School District, Arkansas School Boards Association, and Death & Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Jenni · filed 2021-11-17(16)(A)(i)

“Objective findings” are those findings which cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A)(i) (Supp. 2021). ... We therefore conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings, is such that reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion of the Commission without resort to speculation or conjecture.

Section 11-9-102 requires objective medical evidence to establish a compensable injury but does not require it again to prove entitlement to additional benefits for that injury.

Gerdau MacSteel and Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc. v. Hindmarsh · filed 2019-10-16(4)(D)

We note, however, that a ... claimant like Hindmarsh who has sustained a compensable injury is not required to offer objective medical evidence to prove entitlement to additional benefits.

A lumbar-sprain diagnosis together with prescribed medication for muscle spasms, physical therapy, and pain management can establish the objective findings required for a compensable injury.

Nucor Yamato Steel Co. v. Shelton · filed 2025-04-23(4)(D)

In sum, we agree with Shelton’s argument that his diagnosis of lumbar sprain along with the prescribed course of medications for muscle spasms, physical therapy, and pain management is sufficient to establish objective findings.

A compensable brain injury requires medical evidence supported by objective findings of that injury; a forehead abrasion and swelling alone do not suffice.

City of Conway and Arkansas Municipal League Workers' Compensation Trust v. Ellis · filed 2025-05-28(4)(D)

In the present case, as in both Parson and Rippe, there were objective findings of external injuries to Ellis’s head in that he was initially reported to have a small abrasion and soft-tissue swelling on his forehead above his left eyebrow. However, these findings were not sufficient to support a compensable injury to Ellis’s brain.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Melius v. Chapel Ridge Nursing Center, LLC; And Amtrust North America · filed 2025-09-03(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. ... In sum, Melius cites no objective medical evidence or definitive medical opinion that her symptoms of pain in her right gluteal area were caused by an injury to her lumbar spine on July 11, 2018.

A compensable injury requires medical evidence supported by objective findings; complaints of pain alone do not satisfy that requirement.

Taylor v. Hino Motors Manufacturing U.S.A., Inc.; And Sompo American Insurance Co. · filed 2025-09-03(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp. 2023). ... Because Taylor failed to present proof of objective medical findings to support her claim of a lower back injury, the Commission did not err in concluding that she failed to demonstrate she sustained a compensable injury to her lower back.

Objective findings cannot be under a patient’s voluntary control, and complaints of pain do not qualify as objective medical findings.

Mhm Support Services and Sister of Mercy Health Systems v. Tammy Miller · filed 2025-11-12(16)(A)(i)

“Objective findings” are those finding that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient, and complaints of pain are not to be considered objective medical findings.

A compensable injury requires medical evidence supported by objective findings; complaints of pain alone do not qualify.

Coleman v. Youth Home, Inc. · filed 2026-02-04(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp. 2023). ... Accordingly, Coleman failed to establish a compensable injury supported by objective findings, and we affirm the Commission’s decision denying her benefits.

Complaints of pain may not be considered when determining physical or anatomical impairment.

Michael v. Booneville School District · filed 2025-01-29(16)(A)(ii)(a)

When determining physical or anatomical impairment, complaints of pain may not be considered.

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings.

Pharmerica v. Seratt · filed 2008-06-18(4)(D)

Furthermore, any compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp. 1999).

A compensable injury must be supported by medical evidence of objective findings, which can include muscle spasms reported by a physician or occupational therapist.

Ray Baxter, P.A. v. Baxter · filed 2012-04-11(4)(D)

A compensable injury must be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D), “Objective findings” are those findings that cannot come under the voluntary control of the patient. Ark.Code Ann. § 11 — 9—102(16)(A)(i). Muscle spasms reported by a physician or occupational therapist have been held to fulfill the requirement of objective findings.

Section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i)’s accidental-injury definition does not apply to gradual-onset injuries.

Estrada v. AERT, Inc. · filed 2014-11-19(4)(A)(i)

Here, the governing law when the Commission decided to apply section 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) to Estrada’s gradual-onset injury was that the section does not apply to gradual-onset injuries.

Section 11-9-102 requires rapid repetitive motion for an injury to qualify under this theory; motions separated by several minutes or more do not qualify.

Lay v. United Parcel Service · filed 1997-06-04(5)(A)(ii)(a)

Although we do not provide a comprehensive definition of what constitutes “rapid repetitive motion,” we conclude that the motions as described by Lay, separated by periods of several minutes or more, do not constitute rapid repetitive motion under the meaning of section 11 — 9-102(5) (A) (ii) (a).

Carpal tunnel syndrome claimants must prove rapid repetitive motion to establish a compensable injury.

Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ · filed 1997-07-02(5)(A)(ii)(a)

While we reverse for lack of substantial evidence supporting the Commission's decision, we affirm the Commission on its holding that carpal tunnel syndrome claimants must prove rapid repetitive motion to sustain a claim for a compensable injury.