Ala. Code § 6-2-38

Section 6-2-38(g) bars third-party workers’ compensation suits filed more than two years after injury, and compensation payments do not toll that period.

Hubbard v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 1992-05-15(g)

Because the Hubbards' suit was filed more than two years after Tommy Hubbard was last exposed, their claims were barred by the provisions of § 6-2-38(g); and the tolling provisions of §25-5-117 do not apply to these tort claims filed pursuant to the provisions of § 25-5-11.

Section 6-2-38(n) sets a two-year limit for claims against an employer based on an employee’s intentional tort unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that the employer directed, aided, participated in, or ratified the conduct.

Wint v. Alabama Eye & Tissue Bank · filed 1996-02-02(n)

Likewise, the two-year limitation of § 6-2-38(n) applies to bar a plaintiff's claims against an employer based upon the intentional torts of the employer's servants, unless the plaintiff's "allegations and proof show" that the defendant employer directed, aided, participated in, or ratified the alleged tortious conduct of the servant.

Section 6-2-38(n) gives a plaintiff two years to bring a conversion claim against an employer when liability rests solely on its employees’ conduct under respondeat superior.

Crowe v. City of Athens · filed 1999-03-19(n)

Thus, the applicable statute of limitations with respect to Crowe's claims against the City is § 6-2-38(n), rather than § 6-2-34(3), and we therefore must determine whether Crowe filed his complaint within two years of the accrual of his conversion cause of action.

Section 6-2-38(n) sets a two-year limitations period for conversion claims based on respondeat superior.

Ex Parte Prudential Ins. Co. of America · filed 2000-09-15(n)

If the conversion claim is based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior, it is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-38(n).

Section 6-2-38(n) gives a plaintiff two years to sue an employer for an employee’s intentional tort unless the plaintiff shows that the employer directed, aided, participated in, or ratified it.

Burroughs v. Smurfit Stone Container Corp., LP · filed 2007-03-12(n)

“[T]he two-year limitation of § 6-2-38(n) applies to bar a plaintiffs claims against an employer based upon the intentional torts of the employer’s servants, unless the plaintiffs ‘allegations and proof show’ that the defendant employer directed, aided, participated in, or ratified the alleged tortious conduct of the servant.” ... However, the evidence is insufficient to support this assertion. Accordingly, the court concludes that claims of assault and battery against Smurfit is time-barred because it was not brought within two years from June 12, 2003, the date of the incident upon which plaintiff bases her assault and battery claims.

Section 6-2-38(n) does not apply to a postjudgment action seeking to hold a shareholder liable for a corporate judgment based on disregard of the corporation’s separate identity.

Backus v. Watson · filed 1993-03-26(n)

However, the record shows that Backus sought to hold Watson personally liable for her judgment against the club. She did not allege, nor attempt to prove, that Watson had breached a duty owed to her personally or that Watson was liable for any reason other than his alleged failure to observe the club's corporate identity. Therefore, in our view, § 6-2-38(n) is not applicable.

Section 6-2-38(l) applies a two-year limitations period to claims alleging the tort of outrage.

Jenkins v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. · filed 1997-06-20(l)

Instead, a claim alleging the tort of outrage is subject to a two-year limitations provision. Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-38(l); Archie v. Enterprise Hosp. Nursing Home, 508 So.2d 693, 695 (Ala. 1987).

Section 6-2-38(l)’s two-year residual period does not apply to claims seeking to vindicate riparian rights that are corporeal hereditaments.

Cove Properties, Inc. v. Walter Trent Marina, Inc. · filed 1997-08-22(l)

We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in applying the two-year residual statute of limitations to Cove's first, second, and third claims.

Section 6-2-38(1) requires an action for trespass on the case to be commenced within two years, but does not govern a claim properly classified as trespass.

Lowery v. Densmore · filed 1998-08-21(1)

An action for trespass on the case must be commenced within two years of the act. 6-2-38(1), Ala. Code 1975. ... After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Lowery presented substantial evidence that Densmore's trespass was directly occasioned by force and injury; therefore, Lowery's action was properly for trespass and not trespass on the case.

Section 6-2-38(l)’s two-year residual limitations period does not apply to an indirect trespass claim arising from water and debris entering adjoining land.

Easterling v. Awtrey Building Corp. · filed 1999-09-17(l)

ABC’s insistence that the resulting injury to East-erling must be considered “indirect,” under Cochran’s discredited analysis, does . not, as a matter of law, require the application of the two-year residual personal-injury statute of limitations. Easterling’s cause of action sounds in trespass rather than trespass on the case.

Section 6-2-38(i)’s two-year limitations period does not apply to claims under the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

Hedegard v. BE&K · filed 2005-08-19(i)

Thus, he argues, this court should follow the federal district court’s opinion in Dooley v. AutoNation USA Corp., 218 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1276 (N.D.Ala.2002), in which that court held that the AADEA is silent with regard to the appropriate limitations period and that, therefore, the two-year statute of limitations of Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-38(i), applies to AADEA claims. Hedegard’s reliance on Dooley is misplaced. First, we are not bound by the decisions of federal district courts with regard to Alabama law. See Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 589 So.2d 165, 167 n. 2 (Ala.1991). Second, the opinion in Dooley was issued before our Supreme Court’s decision in Byrd, in which the Supreme Court clarified Alabama law with regard to the AADEA’s statute of limitations. The holding in Byrd directly conflicts with the federal court’s opinion in Dooley. The decision in Byrd controls. See generally Ex parte James, 836 So.2d 813, 834 (Ala.2002) (Houston, J., concurring specially) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Alabama is the final arbiter of Alabama law....”). Hedegard’s argument is therefore without merit.

Section 6-2-38(a)’s two-year period for the wrongful death of a fetus runs from its actual death in the womb, rather than its delivery.

Ziade v. Koch · filed 2006-06-30(a)

That language is repeated in §6-2-38(a), requiring that an action for wrongful death "be commenced within two years from the death." (Emphasis added.) ... If expert testimony establishes that the fetus died, in fact, outside the two-year limitations period, the action will be time-barred.

Section 6-2-38(g) gives a co-employee willful-conduct claim a two-year limitations period; a timely fictitious-party claim may relate back when the plaintiff promptly substitutes the defendant after learning of the defendant’s involvement.

Howard v. Mac Equipment Co. · filed 2008-08-29(g)

The statute of limitations would have run on or about April 23, 2005, and Walter was substituted as a defendant on January 31, 2006, very shortly after Howard learned of Walter’s alleged involvement. Walter was aware of the action because Mac had attempted to depose him on several occasions. The purpose of a statute of limitations was not defeated by applying the doctrine of relation-back where Walter was sufficiently alerted to the proceedings from an early stage and Howard promptly amended her complaint.

Section 6-2-38(l) sets a two-year limitations period for fraud, fraudulent suppression, and insurance bad-faith claims.

In re: Kinsman Investments, LLC v. Alfa Mutual Insurance Company and Jeffery Dimoff · filed 2026-02-27(l)

The two-year statute of limitations of § 6-2-38(l), Ala. Code 1975, applies to Kinsman's fraud claim. ... Like Kinsman's fraud claim, its suppression claim is subject to the two-year limitations period of § 6-2-38(l). ... Kinsman's bad-faith claim is subject to the two-year limitations period of § 6-2-38(l).

Section 6-2-38(i) gives a two-year limitations period to civil claims seeking recovery for injury to relatives’ burial-place rights.

Chaney v. ALA WEST-AL, LLC · filed 2008-12-31(i)

Since there is no statute of limitations enumerated within the Alabama Code for civil claims brought pursuant to these statutes, and because the claims founded thereon seek recovery for the injury of the plaintiffs’ rights regarding their relatives’ burial places, those claims are governed by a two-year statute of limitations.

Section 6-2-38(l) gives wantonness claims a two-year limitations period.

Walker v. Capstone Building Corp. · filed 2012-03-16(l)

We once again reaffirm the proposition that wantonness claims are governed by the two-year statute of limitations now embodied in § 6-2-38(l).

Section 6-2-38 gives negligence claims a two-year limitations period; filing within that period commences the action when the plaintiff has a bona fide intent to serve the defendant immediately.

Smith v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN R. CO., INC. · filed 2011-02-08(l)

Under well-settled Alabama law, Smith’s negligence claims against Norfolk Southern are subject to a two-year limitations period. ... Second, even if defendant’s timeliness argument were properly presented as a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, the Court finds unpersuasive Norfolk Southern’s contention that Smith did not commence this action within the applicable limitations period.

Section 6-2-38(l)’s two-year limitations period requires a complaint to be filed with a bona fide intent to have the defendant immediately served; the court assesses that intent objectively.

Ex parte Robert Holland PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Ashley M. Moore v. City of Pleasant Grove) (Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division: CV-22-900141). · filed 2024-10-04(l)

Rather, "[f]or statute-of-limitations ... purposes, the complaint must be filed and there must also exist 'a bona fide intent to have it immediately served.' " Precise v. Edwards, 60 So. 3d 228, 231 (Ala. 2010) (quoting Dunnam v. Ovbiagele, 814 So. 2d 232, 237-38 (Ala. 2001)). ... Thus, viewed objectively, Moore's unexplained failure to perform the necessary tasks required to effectuate service at the time of filing shows a lack of the required bona fide intent to have Holland immediately served.

Section 6-2-38(l) gives two years to file personal injury claims not specifically enumerated; reinstating a timely filed suit after dismissal reopened the original action rather than starting a new one.

Peterson v. BMI Refractories · filed 1998-01-13(l)

The reinstatement of the original suit was not the commencement of the action, rather, the action was commenced with the timely filing of the state court suit. ... We hold, under these facts, that the reinstatement of plaintiffs' suit was not the initiation of a new action and that plaintiffs' § 1981 and state law tort claims were timely filed.

For continuous toxic exposure claims governed by pre-Griffin law, § 6-2-38(i) limits recovery to damages attributable to injuries occurring within its two-year limitations period.

Jerkins v. Lincoln Electric Co. · filed 2011-06-30(i)

Jerkins’s claims, however, are not asbestos-related claims subject to § 6-2-30; rather, his claims are subject to the statute of limitations set forth in § 6-2-38(i) and, as Cazólas indicates, an implicit “function” of that statute of limitations is that Jerkins is now limited to seeking damages attributable to injuries that occurred within the period of limitations.

Section 6-2-38(l) gives negligence claims a two-year limitations period; a defendant’s assurances may equitably estop it from asserting that period if they reasonably induced the plaintiff to delay filing.

Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. v. The Water Works & Sewer Board of The City of Demopolis · filed 2019-02-25(l)

Under Alabama law, negligence claims are governed by a two-year limitations period. ... Given these record facts, the interests of equity require that a finder of fact consider Foster Farms’ estoppel claim in determining whether the statute of limitations expired prior to the initiation of suit.