Ala. Code § 6-3-2

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) does not control venue for a workers’ compensation action; the Act requires venue in the court that would have heard the employee’s tort claim against the employer.

Fleet Force, Inc. v. Adams · filed 2008-04-11(a)(3)

However, the employee’s argument overlooks the relationship between general venue provisions, such as those contained in § 6-3-2, and special venue provisions, such as those contained in the Act. Alabama caselaw holds that general venue provisions, such as those generally specifying where proceedings in equity should be brought, do not control over statutes that provide for a particular venue in a specific class of actions, such as in divorce actions or actions to enforce a common-carrier permit. ... The Legislature has provided that actions may be brought by employers or employees under the Act to determine the benefits owed to an employee. The Legislature has also provided that such actions are to be heard by the circuit court that would have heard an ordinary tort claim arising from the injuries in question had the Act not become law.

Section 6-3-2 does not govern venue in workers’ compensation actions; the Workers’ Compensation Act’s venue provisions govern instead.

Ex parte Associated General Contractors Workers' Compensation Self-Insurers Fund, Alabama Branch · filed 2017-01-06

In Ex parte Adams, 11 So.3d 243, 246 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), this court held that § 6-3-2 did not apply in an action brought pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act; instead, we held that the specific venue provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act governed the determination of venue. ... Therefore, pursuant to the venue provisions in the Workers’ Compensation Act, § 6-3-7 governs the determination of venue in the workers’ compensation action underlying the present petition.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits a personal action against an individual with an Alabama permanent residence in the county of that residence or in the county where the complained-of act or omission occurred; consequences occurring elsewhere do not establish venue.

Ex Parte Smith Wrecker Service, Inc. · filed 2007-12-21(a)(3)

We agree with Smith Wrecker's contention that, so far as the claims against Frey are concerned, only § 6-3-2(a)(3) applies, because negligence and fraud claims are classified as personal actions when determining proper venue. ... The complaint does not charge Smith Wrecker with participating in Bizzell's arrest and the seizure of the vehicle in Wilcox County; those acts are described only as consequences of the acts or omissions that took place in Elmore County. Therefore, none of the alleged acts or omissions of Smith Wrecker occurred in Wilcox County, and venue is improper in Wilcox County as to Frey under § 6-3-2(a)(3).

Section 6-3-2 permits a personal injury action against an individual in the county where the defendant resides or where the injury occurred.

Ex Parte Hawkins · filed 1986-10-31

Alabama Code 1975, § 6-3-2, provides among other things that an individual may be sued for personal injuries either in the county of the defendant's residence or in the county in which the incident occurred.

Section 6-3-2 permits a personal injury action against an individual in the county where the defendant resides or where the injury occurred.

Hawkins v. Montgomery Industries International · filed 1986-10-31

Alabama Code 1975, § 6-3-2, provides among other things that an individual may be sued for personal injuries either in the county of the defendant’s residence or in the county in which the incident occurred.

Section 6-3-2 requires contract actions to be brought where a defendant resides and permits personal actions such as fraud there or where the underlying act or omission occurred.

Ex Parte Canady · filed 1990-04-27(a)(2), (a)(3)

An action on a contract, "except as may be otherwise provided, must be commenced in the county in which the defendant or one of the defendants resides." ... In personal actions, such as fraud, venue is proper both in the county where the defendant resides and in the county where the act or omission that gave rise to the claims occurred. ... Venue was appropriate in Tuscaloosa County for all of the claims in Canady's original complaint, as that was the county where the defendants resided.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) allows a transitory personal action against a nonresident individual in any Alabama county if the defendant is personally served in Alabama or appears in the action.

Ex Parte Lashley · filed 1992-03-13(a)(3)

However, because this is a personal action at law, and because § 6-3-2(a)(3), and predecessor statutes, have been construed to provide that a nonresident defendant in a transitory action could be sued in any county of the state where such defendant is personally served or personally appeared, we conclude that the writ of mandamus is due to be denied.

Under § 6-3-2(a)(3), the act or omission in a newspaper libel action against an individual occurs in the county where the newspaper was printed.

Ex Parte Arrington · filed 1992-05-15(a)(3)

Consequently, we hold that in actions against individuals alleging the publication of libelous matter in a newspaper article, venue lies in the county in which the newspaper was printed.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits a fraud or conversion action against an Alabama resident to be brought where the alleged act occurred or where the defendant permanently resides.

Ex Parte Sierra Development, Inc. · filed 1994-12-16(a)(3)

In an action against a person "having a permanent residence in this state" venue is proper "in the county where the defendant . . . resides, . . . except that if the action is a personal action other than an action on a contract, it may be brought either in the county where the act or omission complained of occurred, or in the county of the permanent residence of the defendant." Ala.R.Civ.P. 82(b)(1)(A);accord, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-2(a)(3). A claim alleging fraud or conversion is a "personal action" within the exception stated in the rule. Ex parte Lundy, 429 So.2d 998, 1000 (Ala. 1983).

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits venue for a personal action against an individual in the county where the complained-of act occurred.

Ex Parte Blount · filed 1995-06-30(a)(3)

Under this statute, venue as to Phillips would be proper in Madison County, where the accident occurred, and not in Baldwin County.

Section 6-3-2 does not provide for venue of actions against nonresident individuals.

Jones v. Ingram · filed 1996-06-07

Section 6-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, governs venue of actions against individuals, but it does not provide for venue of actions against nonresident individuals.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits a personal action against an individual with a permanent Alabama residence in the county of that residence or the county where the alleged act or omission occurred.

Ex Parte Wiginton · filed 1999-09-17(a)(3)

Page is an "individual." An action for fraud, which is the gravamen of all the plaintiffs' claims, is a "personal action" as well as a "personal injury action." ... Therefore, the venue statute applicable to him is § 6-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, which provides, in pertinent part: ... "(3) All other personal actions, if the defendant or one of the defendants has within the state a permanent residence, may be commenced in the county of such residence or in the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred." ... Under these statutes, venue as to Page and Kennedy is proper in Franklin County.

Personal actions against individuals may be commenced where the defendant resides or where the complained-of act or omission occurred.

Ex Parte Windom · filed 2000-02-11(a)(3)

Proper venue for Ivey's action is determined by § 6-3-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975. That section provides that personal actions against individuals may be commenced in the county in which the defendant resides or in the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been committed or occurred.

Section 6-3-2 does not govern venue in actions against estates; Section 43-2-130 does.

Tolbert v. Tolbert · filed 2004-10-08

As the estate points out in its brief, however, venue of actions against estates is governed not by § 6-3-2, but by § 43-2-130, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[c]ivil actions may be brought against executors or administrators in their representative character, in all cases, in the county in which letters were granted."

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits venue for a personal action against an individual in the county where the defendant resides or where the complained-of act or omission occurred; filing an answer to an administrative complaint elsewhere does not establish venue there when the alleged conduct occurred in the defendant’s county of residence.

Ex Parte Silver Chiropractic Group, Inc. · filed 2007-06-15(a)(3)

These alleged "act[s] or omission[s] complained of necessarily occurred in Montgomery County, where Sturbridge Chiropractic is located and where Dr. Havel and Dr. Hart are employed, and not in Chilton County, where the individual defendants filed their answers to the administrative complaints. Therefore, venue as to the individual defendants is proper in Montgomery County, and not Chilton County.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits venue for an action against an individual in the county of residence or the county where the complained-of act or omission occurred.

Alabama State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Sturbridge Chiropractic · filed 2007-06-15(a)(3)

These alleged “act[s] or omission[s] complained of’ necessarily occurred in Montgomery County, where Sturbridge Chiropractic is located and where Dr. Havel and Dr. Hart are employed, and not in Chilton County, where the individual defendants filed their answers to the administrative complaints. Therefore, venue as to the individual defendants is proper in Montgomery County, and not Chilton County.

Section 6-3-2(a)(2)'s residence rule for contract actions does not prevent joining individual defendants in a county where venue was proper for the original action.

Welch v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. · filed 2008-04-25(a)(2)

Section 6-3-2(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides that, as to actions against individuals, “[a]ll actions on contracts, except as may otherwise be provided, must be commenced in the county in which the defendant or one of the defendants resides if such defendant has within the state a permanent residence.” ... Because venue was proper in Houston County in the original action, the joinder of the Welches in the Houston County action was proper under Rule 82(c).

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits an action against an individual in the county where the individual resides or where the complained-of act or omission occurred.

Ex Parte Aig Baker Orange Beach Wharf · filed 2009-01-09(a)(3)

The action against Rouzie, an individual, would have been proper only in the county in which he resides or "the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred." § 6-3-2(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975. It is undisputed that Rouzie is not a resident of Jefferson County and that the act or omission complained of did not occur there.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits an action against an individual in the county where the individual resides or where the complained-of act or omission occurred.

Be-Jeweled, L.L.C. v. AIG Baker Orange Beach Wharf, L.L.C. · filed 2009-01-09(a)(3)

The action against Rouzie, an individual, would have been proper only in the county in which he resides or "the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred.” § 6-3-2(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975. It is undisputed that Rouzie is not a resident of Jefferson County and that the act or omission complained of did not occur there.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits a personal action against an individual in the county where the defendant or one of the defendants resides.

Ex Parte Charles Bell Pontiac-Buick-Cadillac-GMC, Inc. · filed 1986-10-03(a)(3)

Ala.Code 1975, § 6-3-2(a)(3), provides that personal actions of a legal nature against individuals may be commenced in the county in which the defendant or one of the defendants has a personal residence. ... The complaint charges that Charles Bell personally participated in the alleged fraud; thus, venue in Montgomery County is proper.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits a personal action against a resident individual in the county of the defendant’s permanent residence or the county where the complained-of act or omission occurred.

Nunnelee v. City of Decatur · filed 1991-02-22(a)(3)

In addition, Ala.Code 1975, § 6-3-2(a)(3), provides: “All other personal actions, if the defendant or one of the defendants has within the state a permanent residence, may be commenced in the county of such residence or in the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred.” Defendants Mayfield, Sherrill, and Hale all reside in Morgan County, and the City of Decatur is located there. The “act or omission” complained of occurred in Morgan County. ... Pursuant to § 6-3-11, as well as § 6-3-2 and Rule 82, A.R.Civ.P., the trial court’s motion to transfer was correct.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits a legal action against an individual in the county where the defendant resides or where the act or omission complained of occurred.

Booker v. McKenzie · filed 2009-10-30(a)(3)

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) provides that venue in civil actions of a legal nature (as opposed to an equitable nature) against individuals is proper either in the county where the defendant resides or the county where the act or omission complained of occurred. ... We hold that, based on the evidence before the trial court at the time of its ruling, the court should have granted McKenzie’s motion for a change of venue, and we direct the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion and to transfer the action to Monroe County.

Section 6-3-2 governs venue for actions against individuals and does not apply to a state official sued only in his official capacity.

Little v. State · filed 2010-02-26

The statutory basis for confining the action to the county where the land is situated is § 6-3-2; it applies only to actions against individuals. ... Here, Governor Riley was sued only in his official capacity; therefore, unlike Ex parte AU Hotel, in which the president of Auburn University had been sued in both his official and his individual capacity, § 6-3-2 does not apply.

Section 6-3-2(a)(2) makes an individual defendant’s county of residence a proper venue for a breach-of-contract action.

Ex Parte Hughes · filed 2010-06-18(a)(2)

However, because Hughes is the only defendant in this breach-of-contract action, venue in Pickens County is proper pursuant to § 6-3-2(a)(2), and the trial court accordingly exceeded its discretion in failing to grant Hughes's motion and transfer the case.

Section 6-3-2 does not permit venue against an individual in a county where the individual does not reside and the alleged acts did not occur.

Ex Parte Green Tree Financial Corporation, 1090110 (Ala. 1-14-2011) · filed 2011-01-14

Looking, as we must, only to those facts before the trial court, Ex parte Movie Gallery, Inc., 81 So.3d 104, 109 (Ala.2009), and recognizing that proper venue is determined at the commencement of an action, Ex parte Chapman Nursing Home, Inc., 903 So.2d 818, 815-16 (Ala.2004), and not after additional parties have been joined to possibly repair a mislaid venue, it is obvious that Green Tree’s motions to the trial court properly referenced the governing statutory authority that defines a proper venue, §§ 6-3-2, 6-3-7, and 6-3-21.1, Ala.Code 1975. ... The acts complained of, i.e., the alleged trespass and assault, did not occur in Hale County. The individual defendant does not reside in Hale County, and no corporate defendant maintains a principal office, employees, or agents in Hale County. ... Considering these facts and absent evidence to the contrary, we hold that when this action was commenced venue lay in the wrong county, and the trial court erred in denying Green Tree’s motion for a transfer of the case to Tuscaloosa County, a proper venue, from Hale County, an improper venue.

Section 6-3-2 permits venue for conversion and money-had-and-received claims in the county where an individual defendant resides, but did not provide a basis for venue in Blount County on these facts.

Estate of Wells v. Motte · filed 2013-01-18(a)(3)

Section 6-3-2 does not provide a basis for venue in Blount County of either the conversion claim or the money-had-and-received claim asserted in the conversion action.

Section 6-3-2 makes venue proper in the county where a material individual defendant resides.

Ex Parte Shelby County · filed 1987-09-11

An action against an individual "must be brought in the county where the defendant or any material defendant resides." Rule 82(b), A.R.Civ.P., and Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-2. Defendant A.M. Harper, an owner of property purportedly annexed into Birmingham, resides in Shelby County. ... In the instant case, the interests of the defendant landowners are certainly antagonistic to the interests of Shelby County. ... We find that venue was proper in Shelby County; thus, the trial court erred in transferring the underlying lawsuit to Jefferson County.

Section 6-3-2(a) makes venue proper in the county where an individual defendant resides.

Delaney Exchange, LLC v. Engineering Design Group, LLC · filed 2016-02-05(a)

Venue is proper in St. Clair County because Bras-cho is a resident of St. Clair County, see § 6-3-2(a), Ala.Code 1975, and KBE’s principal place of business was in St. Clair County, see § 6-3-7(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975.

Section 6-3-2 makes venue proper in the county where an individual defendant resides.

Ex Parte Fuller · filed 2006-10-06

Under Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-3-2 and-7, venue is appropriate in either Macon County or Lee County; therefore, Fuller and M M Trucking must demonstrate either that Lee County is a more convenient forum than Macon County or that having the case heard in Lee County would more serve the interest of justice before this Court will issue the writ of mandamus.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) applies to the filing of foreign judgments and does not permit venue in a county with no connection to the judgment debtor.

Ex Parte Wells · filed 1990-07-25(a)(3)

Wells properly raised the issue of venue with her motion to transfer pursuant to Rule 82, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, and relying on § 6-3-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975. ... Because venue over foreign judgment actions is not provided for within the act or elsewhere, we find that the general venue statutes apply to filing foreign judgments under the Act.HBE Leasing, supra.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits venue where a defendant resides or where the complained-of act or omission occurred; an unsupported allegation that an act occurred in another county does not establish venue there.

Ex Parte Jones · filed 1991-03-29(a)(3)

All the doctors reside in Houston County, so, for venue purposes, the action may properly be brought in Houston County. Venue is proper in Montgomery County only if the "act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred" in Montgomery County. § 6-3-2(a)(3). ... The evidence does not sufficiently support AERAS's argument that Dr. Jones violated a fiduciary duty in Montgomery County and thereby created proper venue in Montgomery County.

Under § 6-3-2(a)(3), an individual's alleged misrepresentation by letter occurs in the county from which the letter was mailed; the plaintiff's reliance elsewhere does not establish venue.

Ex Parte Pikeville Country Club · filed 2002-09-13(a)(3)

Similarly, the parties agree that the Covington Circuit Court is an appropriate venue for this civil action against Green, only if, under these facts, Covington County is "the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred." See § 6-3-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975. We hold that venue for this civil action is not proper in Covington County under either of those statutes. ... Insofar as Green is concerned, it would be illogical and inconsistent to conclude that his "act or omission" occurred anywhere other than in Marion County, from where he mailed the letter made the basis of this action. Hugghins's alleged reliance on that letter in Covington County is not the "act or omission" of Green.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits venue in a legal action against an individual in the defendant’s county of residence or the county where the complained-of act or omission occurred.

de Vega v. Shelton · filed 2010-12-17(a)(3)

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) provides that venue in “proceedings of a legal nature against individuals” is proper in either the county in which the defendant resides or “in the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred.” ... Because Tom Shelton has demonstrated that he took no action related to the generator in Jefferson County, we conclude that venue in Jefferson County was improper.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits venue for a personal action where a defendant resides or where the complained-of act or omission occurred; an allegedly defamatory email is sent where the sender acts, not where the recipient may open it.

Ex parte WMS, LLC · filed 2014-12-12(a)(3)

Even if Simms had shown that the e-mail was opened in Chambers County, venue still would not be proper there because "an individual who makes an allegedly defamatory statement should be sued where the defamatory remark was made," not where a recipient possibly opened an e-mail or otherwise received the defamatory remark.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits a defamation action against an individual in the county where the defendant resides or made the allegedly defamatory statement; a newspaper’s later republication elsewhere does not establish venue there.

Ivey v. Windom · filed 2002-07-12(a)(3)

We cannot draw from the plain meaning of the statute any basis upon which the conduct of a newspaper in reprinting in Walker County an account of remarks Windom made elsewhere would be relevant in determining venue.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits venue in the county where the act or omission complained of occurred.

Ex Parte Walter Industries, Inc. · filed 2003-06-06(a)(3)

It is undisputed that Tuscaloosa County is a proper venue — it is the county in which the "act or omission complained of" and "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" occurred. Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-3-2(a)(3) and 6-3-7(a)(1).

Section 6-3-2(b)(3) permits an equitable action against individuals in the county where a material defendant resides; involuntary imprisonment in another county does not change that residence.

Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Co. v. Sides · filed 1992-02-07(b)(3)

Venue is determined pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-2. ... In other words, her removal to Elmore County (Tut-wiler Prison) was involuntary, in that she had neither the right nor the power to resist and, therefore, her removal did not constitute a change of residence from Cull-man County for venue purposes. Further, we find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in its determination that Lynda Sides is a material defendant.

For venue in an equitable action, involuntary imprisonment in another county does not change a defendant’s residence absent evidence that she intended to change it.

Ex Parte Sides · filed 1992-02-07(b)(3)

It is undisputed that Lynda Sides was a resident of Cullman County when she was convicted and incarcerated at Tutwiler Prison in Elmore County, and there was no evidence presented to indicate that she had intended to change her residence. In other words, her removal to Elmore County (Tutwiler Prison) was involuntary, in that she had neither the right nor the power to resist and, therefore, her removal did not constitute a change of residence from Cullman County for venue purposes.

An action against an individual to recover money owed under a contract must be brought in the county where the defendant resides, even when the debt is secured by real estate in another county.

Ex Parte Diamond · filed 1992-02-28(a)(2)

Because the action is one on a contract, not an action of which the subject matter is real estate, proper venue is in the county of the defendant's residence, and the trial court erred in not transferring the action.

Section 6-3-2(3) permits venue for a fraud action in the county where the alleged fraud occurred.

Ex Parte Swift Loan and Finance Co., Inc. · filed 1995-08-11(3)

Venue in this case would be appropriate in Russell County, where the alleged fraud occurred. See § 6-3-2(3), Ala.Code 1975.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) permits a conversion action against an individual in the defendant's county of residence or the county where the complained-of act or omission occurred.

Ex Parte Overstreet · filed 1999-10-22(a)(3)

Section 6-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, governs venue of actions against individuals. It provides that such an action must be brought in the county of the defendant's residence or "in the county in which the act or omission complained of may have been done or may have occurred." § 6-3-2(a)(3); see also Rule 82(b)(1)(A), Ala. R. Civ. P. That Code section applies to cases, such as this one, in which a plaintiff alleges conversion of property.

Section 6-3-2 permits tort claims against individuals in the county where the alleged acts or omissions occurred and requires contract actions against individuals to be brought in their county of residence.

KAUFMANN & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. Davis · filed 2004-07-30(a)(2), (a)(3)

With respect to venue, because Kaufmann's principal place of business is located in the Bessemer Division and Davis's residence and Blue Dot's principal place of business are located within the Birmingham Division, both divisions were proper forums for the adjudication of Kaufmann's claims. Compare Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-3-2(a)(3) and 6-3-7(a)(1) with §§ 6-3-2(a)(2) and 6-3-7(a)(2) (providing that while tort claims against individuals and corporations may be brought in county where acts or omissions allegedly occurred, civil actions against corporations may also be brought in the county of the corporation's principal office in this state, and contract actions against individuals must be brought in individual's county of residence).

Section 6-3-2(a) does not apply to actions against domestic corporations.

Ex Parte Alabama Power Co. · filed 1994-04-15(a)

Section 6-3-2(a) does not apply to actions against domestic corporations, see Ex parte Pickens, supra.

Section 6-3-2(a) does not apply to actions against domestic corporations.

Sullivan v. Russell Corp. · filed 1994-01-21(a)

Section 6-3-2(a) does not apply to actions against domestic corporations, see Ex parte Pickens, supra.

Section 6-3-2(b) governs venue in equitable actions against individuals and does not provide venue authority for equitable actions against state agencies.

Ex Parte Neely · filed 1995-01-13(b)

Section 6-3-2, which applies only to equitable actions against individuals, not to equitable actions against state agencies, is not "specific statutory authority" contrary to the rule stated in Ex parte City of Birmingham.

Section 6-3-2(b)(1) requires an action against an individual whose subject matter is real estate to be brought where the property is located, even when a business entity is also a defendant.

Ex parte E3 Pest Control, LLC, d/b/a E3 Termite and Pest Control, and Michael Adams PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Timothy Garfield and Angela Garfield v. E3 Pest Control, LLC, d/b/a E3 Termite and Pest Control) (Mobile Circuit Court: CV-23-902662). · filed 2024-09-27(b)(1)

Thus, the fact that Rule 82(c) is generally applicable to domestic corporations does not mean that the pendent venue principles provided by that subsection also supersede or override the mandatory language of Rule 82(b)(1)(B) and § 6-3-2(b)(1).

Section 6-3-2(b)(1) requires venue where the real estate is located when real estate is the subject matter of the action; an in personam action concerning a lease does not meet that requirement.

Ex Parte AU Hotel, Ltd. · filed 1996-03-08(b)(1)

Indeed, the principles discussed above compel the conclusion that this action is in personam and not in rem. The real estate located in Lee County is not the "subject matter" of this action as contemplated by § 6-3-2(b)(1).

Section 6-3-2(b)(1) places venue where the land is situated when an equitable action’s subject matter is the land, as determined by the nature of the claim and relief sought.

Ex Parte Jim Walter Homes, Inc. · filed 1998-03-20(b)(1)

"Subject matter," as that term is used in § 6-3-2(b)(1), refers to the nature of the cause of action and the nature of the relief sought. ... Therefore, we conclude that lot # 12 is not the "subject matter" of the Thomases' action and, therefore, that venue is not proper in Lowndes County.

Under § 6-3-2(b)(1), real estate is not the subject matter of a partnership accounting and fiduciary duty action that alleges no harm to the land and seeks no change to its title.

Ex Parte Ambrose · filed 2001-06-01(b)(1)

Thus the subject-matter criterion of neither §6-3-2(b)(1) nor Rule 82(b)(1)(B) is satisfied for venue in Shelby County.

Section 6-3-2(b)(1) places venue for an action concerning real property in the county where the property is located.

Schreck v. Friedman · filed 2007-07-13(b)(1)

Based on Ala. Code 1975, § 6-3-2, the proper venue for the present case is in *Page 1128 Baldwin County because the real property at issue is located in Baldwin County.

Section 6-3-2(b)(1) requires an equitable action against individuals involving real estate to be brought in the county where the property or a material portion of it is situated, even when the action also seeks legal relief.

Taylor v. Loma Alta Towers, Inc. · filed 1991-06-14(b)(1)

Read together, Rule 82(b)(1)(B) and § 6-3-2(b)(1) clearly require that venue in the present action, seeking equitable relief and with real estate as its subject matter, is proper only in Baldwin County.

Section 6-3-2’s separate venue provisions for legal and equitable actions against resident individuals are incorporated into Rule 82(b)(1)(B), which governs venue when real estate is the subject matter.

Ex parte Richard Mullen and Cheryl Mullen. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Karl Leo and Fay Leo v. Richard L. Mullen and Cheryl C. Mullen) (Jefferson Circuit Court: CV-22-902788). · filed 2024-01-12

In light of the foregoing history, we take this opportunity to clarify the proper standard for evaluating whether the location of particular real property dictates the venue of an action involving that property asserted against resident individuals. Pursuant to §§ 6-1-1(b) and 6-1-2, we conclude that Rule 82(b)(1)(B) governs that issue. As the Committee Comments on the 1973 Adoption of Rule 82 make clear, Rule 82(b)(1)(B) was intended to incorporate the pertinent provisions of the predecessor statutes to § 6-3-2(a) and § 6-3-2(b) to provide a uniform rule to govern venue for "specific actions involving land."

Section 6-3-2(b)(3) permits an equitable action against an individual to enjoin trespass on land to be filed where the defendant resides or where the land is located.

Walden v. Es Capital, 1091474 (Ala. 5-20-2011) · filed 2011-05-20(b)(3)

Under the Shomo analysis, and pursuant to § 6 — 3—2(b)(3), which governs proper venue in actions against individuals sounding in equity, the action must have been commenced either in Elmore County, where Ensley’s undisputed, affidavit testimony indicates he resides, or in Autauga County, where the apartments are located.

Section 6-3-2 governs venue in actions against individuals but does not provide for venue in actions against nonresident individuals.

Del Mercado v. Owens · filed 1998-10-23

“Section 6-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, governs venue of actions against individuals, but it does not provide for venue of actions against nonresident individuals. ... Here, in accord with the principles reaffirmed in Ex parte Jones, venue was clearly proper in Jefferson County with regard to the nonresident defendant Owens; therefore, it was also proper with regard to the remaining defendants.

Section 6-3-2(b)(3) generally places venue in the defendant’s county of residence, but yields when another statute provides a different venue.

Ex Parte State Ex Rel. CM · filed 2002-03-08(b)(3)

Section 6-3-2(b)(3) states that an action must be commenced in the county in which the defendant resides, unless otherwise provided. Section 26-17-10(f) allows the filing (i.e., the commencement) of an action in the county in which the defendant resides or the county where the child resides. Therefore, under § 26-17-10(f) venue may be appropriate in two counties.

A personal action against an Alabama resident may be brought in the county of the defendant’s residence, even if the underlying event occurred elsewhere.

Ex Parte State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. · filed 2004-06-04(a)(3)

It is undisputed that Bibb County is a proper venue, even if the accident did not occur there, because it is the county of Corley's residence.

Section 6-3-2(b)(3) requires an action to begin in the defendant’s county of residence unless another provision allows a different venue.

State ex rel. C.M. v. C.H. · filed 2002-03-08(b)(3)

Section 6-3-2(b)(3) states that an action must be commenced in the county in which the defendant resides, unless otherwise provided. Section 26 — 17—10(f) allows the filing (i.e., the commencement) of an action in the county in which the defendant resides or the county where the child resides.

Section 6-3-2 governs venue for partnerships, which reside where their partners reside for venue purposes.

Ex Parte Burr & Forman, LLP · filed 2008-09-12

The statute governing venue for individuals, § 6-3-2, Ala.Code 1975, also governs venue for partnerships. For purposes of venue, a partnership is deemed to reside where its partners reside.

For venue under § 6-3-2(a)(3), a defendant's permanent residence is determined by domicile when the action is filed, and the person asserting a change of domicile bears the burden of proving it.

Ex Parte Coley · filed 2006-05-12(a)(3)

Therefore, the action was properly brought in Jefferson County only if Jefferson County was the county of Coley's permanent residence at the time the action was commenced. ... Because of the presumption against a change of domicile, the conflicting evidence as to domicile, and the fact that the burden rests on Coley to prove the change of domicile, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that in January 2005 Coley had not abandoned Jefferson County as her county of permanent residence and established permanent residency in Perry County.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) governs venue against a sole proprietorship as an individual and permits suit in the proprietor’s county of residence or the county where the complained-of act or omission occurred.

Ex Parte Hampton Insurance Agency, 1101211 (Ala. 11-18-2011) · filed 2011-11-18(a)(3)

Because, under § 6-3-2, venue in Hale County was improper as to Hampton, a sole proprietorship, the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the motions to transfer the case to Tuscaloosa County, where venue was proper.

Section 6-3-2 does not govern venue for an action against a limited-liability company; the corporate venue statute applies.

Ex parte Honda Manufacturing and Development of Alabama, LLC PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS · filed 2023-03-10

The notion that the proper venue for an action against limited-liability companies is governed by § 6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975, is implausible.

Section 6-3-2 does not govern venue in actions against limited-liability companies; § 6-3-7 applies.

Ex parte Phillip H. Rivers, Steven Nobles, Todd Martin, Stan Roberts, Laurie Dungan, Macy Matthews-Smith, and Dylan Kemper PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Phillip H. Rivers, Steven Nobles, Todd Martin, Stan Roberts, Laurie Dungan, Macy Matthews-Smith, and Dylan Kemper v. Warren Averett, LLC, and Warren Averett Companies, LLC (Mobile Circuit Court: CV-25-900226). · filed 2025-09-26

Accordingly, we conclude that the Mobile Circuit Court erred in granting the motion to change venue, which was based on the rationale that the applicable venue statute is § 6-3-2.

Section 6-3-2(a)(3) governs venue for an action against a limited liability company treated as a partnership, as well as the individual defendants.

Ex Parte Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom · filed 2006-03-10(a)(3)

Therefore, by process of elimination, we must conclude that § 6-3-2(a)(3), which governs venue insofar as the individual defendants are concerned, also governs venue insofar as the law firm is concerned.

Section 6-3-2(b)(2) does not provide venue for an action to enforce another court’s judgment unless the action seeks to enjoin proceedings on that judgment.

Teague v. John Hamm, in his official capacity as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (Appeal from Lawrence Circuit Court: CV-21-900046). · filed 2024-01-05(b)(2)

The action that Teague commenced in the Lawrence Circuit Court does not seek to enjoin any proceedings of the Morgan Circuit Court. Therefore, § 6-3-2, the lynchpin of Teague's argument regarding venue, has no application to this case.