Ala. Code § 6-11-20

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages in a tort action when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice.

IRIZARRY v. 3M COMPANY · filed 2023-06-22

See Horn v. Brown, 4 So. 3d 1106, 1109 (Ala. 2008); see also Ala. Code § 6-11-20 (authorizing punitive damages awards “in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice”). Based on the foregoing, Irizarry’s separate cause of action for punitive damages will be deemed abandoned, and summary judgment on that separate claim granted in Defendant’s favor. However, this does not preclude Irizarry from pursuing punitive damages at trial to the extent permitted by Alabama law.

Section 6-11-20 requires proof of conscious or deliberate oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice for punitive damages; requesting school records does not meet that standard.

Tombrello v. USX Corp. · filed 1991-04-26

As to plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, the court holds plaintiff did not allege in his complaint or establish that “the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff.” Ala. Code § 6-11-20 (Supp.1990). A request for school records would not fall within the statute definition.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for fraud when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant acted consciously or deliberately.

King Motor Co., Inc. v. Wilson · filed 1992-11-25(a)

This evidence, in addition to evidence that King had failed to disclose prior damage to other purchasers, is sufficient to support an inference by the jury that King "consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to" Wilson. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(a).

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for conversion when clear and convincing evidence shows willful conduct in known violation of the owner's rights.

Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Caddell · filed 1997-06-06(a)

Section 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975, states, in pertinent part: "(a) Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action ... other than in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." ... After carefully reviewing the record, with the applicable legal principles in mind, we conclude that the plaintiff presented sufficient legal evidence to allow a jury to consider the issue of punitive damages. We further conclude that the jury could have inferred from the evidence that the conversion was done willfully, in known violation of Caddell's rights; therefore, the $100,000 punitive damages award is supported by the evidence.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice before punitive damages may be awarded in a tort action.

Delchamps, Inc. v. Morgan · filed 1992-05-15(a)

Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(a), provides, in pertinent part: "Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action, except civil actions for wrongful death pursuant to §§ 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff. Nothing contained in this article is to be construed as creating any claim for punitive damages which is not now present under the law of the state of Alabama." (Emphasis added.) We find no evidence in the record that the Delchamps employee engaged in any oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to Morgan.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages in a malicious-prosecution action when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant consciously and deliberately acted with malice toward the plaintiff.

Mitchell v. Folmar & Associates, LLP · filed 2003-01-10(a)

At the discretion of the trier of fact, punitive damages may be awarded in a malicious-prosecution action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence [2] that the defendant consciously and deliberately acted with malice [3] with regard to the plaintiff.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages only in a tort action with clear and convincing proof of oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice; a breach of contract claim alone cannot support them.

Sellew v. Terminix International Co, The · filed 2020-03-06(a)

Indeed, “[p]unitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action . . . other than in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff.” Ala. Code § 6-11-20(a); see In re St. Laurent, 991 F.2d 672, 676 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Ordinarily, punitive damages may not be recovered in breach of contract actions. Punitive damages, however, may be recovered when the acts constituting the breach also amount to an independent cause of action in tort.”) (citations omitted). Because Plaintiff may not recover punitive damages on her breach of contract claim, and because they are barred by the terms of her contract with Terminix, Plaintiff may not seek an award of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 limits punitive damages to tort actions involving oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice.

Tuscaloosa Hyundai Inc v. Hyundai Motor America Inc · filed 2023-09-27

Under Alabama law, “[p]unitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action … other than in a tort action where … the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff.” ... Plaintiff does not assert any tort causes of action. Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard of others' rights and safety.

Shoals Ford, Inc. v. Clardy · filed 1991-10-18(b)(3)

In Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3), "wantonness" is defined as "conduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others." ... From our review of the record, and without restating the facts of this case, we hold that from that testimony and from that evidence the jury could have found the wantonness on the part of Shoals Ford necessary to justify the award of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing proof of conscious or deliberate wantonness to award punitive damages; the defendant must know its conduct makes injury likely or probable, rather than merely increasing the risk.

Toole v. McClintock · filed 1993-09-02

Under Alabama law, to award punitive damages, the jury must have found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Baxter "consciously or deliberately engaged in ... wantonness ... with regard to the plaintiff." Ala.Code § 6-11-20 (Supp.1990). ... Wantonness means knowledge that an act or failure to act does not merely increase risk of injury, but that the act makes injury "likely" or "probable." ... We conclude that there was insufficient evidence of wantonness in this case to permit the jury to award punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of wanton conduct to support punitive damages.

Vaughn v. Butler · filed 1995-01-13

The facts do not show by clear and convincing evidence that Vaughn knew that his conduct would likely or probably result in injury to the Butlers or the Lovelaces, that he consciously did any act that harmed them, or that he harmed them by any conscious omission of duty. § 6—11—20, Ala.Code 1975.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness for punitive damages as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard of others' rights or safety.

Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Stripling · filed 1993-06-04(b)(3)

The Legislature, in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3), has defined "wantonness" as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless disregard of the rights or safety of others." ... Stripling failed to offer clear and convincing evidence that Coca-Cola acted with reckless or conscious disregard of the rights and safety of persons like Stripling.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of others' rights or safety.

Boyd v. Sears Roebuck and Co. · filed 1994-06-17(b)(3)

The summary judgment was also properly granted as to Ms. Boyd's wantonness claim. "Wantonness" is defined as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." § 6-11-20(b)(3), Ala.Code, 1975. "Implicit in wanton ... misconduct is an acting, with knowledge of danger, or with consciousness, that the doing or not doing of some act will likely result in injury." Big B, Inc. v. Cottingham, 634 So.2d 999 (Ala.1993). The mechanic's act of summoning Ms. Boyd into the service area in order to point out a condition in the engine of her automobile is not wanton conduct.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South · filed 1994-08-19(b)(3)

"Wantonness" is statutorily defined as "Conduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). ... The Bozemans presented substantial evidence of wantonness; that evidence created a jury question.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety; intentional fraud does not establish wantonness.

General Motors Corp. v. Bell · filed 1996-09-20(b)(3)

The legislature has defined "wantonness" as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). This definition is consistent with our basic understanding of the difference between willfulness and wantonness. ... A concept of a "wanton intentional fraud" would be an unacceptable contradiction in the law.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages on clear and convincing proof that the defendant acted with reckless or conscious disregard for others’ rights or safety.

Harco Drugs, Inc. v. Holloway · filed 1995-10-27(a), (b)(3)

Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3), defines "wantonness" as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Section 6-11-20(a) provides that punitive damages may be awarded in a tort action when it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant engaged in wantonness. ... The extreme unusualness of a prescription from a cancer specialist supposedly calling for a dangerous heart medication, combined with the alleged illegibility of the prescription, is sufficient evidence of a reckless disregard of the safety of others to create a jury question as to whether Harco acted wantonly.

Section 6-11-20 defines wantonness as reckless or conscious disregard of others' rights or safety, requiring awareness that injury is likely to result.

AALAR, Ltd., Inc. v. Francis · filed 1998-04-17

Wantonness is conduct that is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20. This Court has emphasized that wantonness requires some degree of consciousness on the part of the defendant that injury is likely to result from an act or omission.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of wantonness before a punitive-damages claim may go to the jury.

Daniels v. East Alabama Paving, Inc. · filed 1999-06-04(a)

The record is devoid of any clear and convincing evidence of a conscious disregard on the part of EAPI. ... Accordingly, the trial court properly granted EAPI's motion for a JML on the wantonness count.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of conscious or deliberate wantonness to award punitive damages.

Toole v. Richmond C. McClintock, Jr · filed 2000-12-14

In determining whether there was sufficient evidence of conduct warranting punitive damages, we apply Alabama substantive law. "Under Alabama law, to award punitive damages, the jury must have found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Baxter 'consciously or deliberately engaged in ... wantonness ... with regard to the plaintiff.' " Toole I, 999 F.2d at 1436 (quoting Ala.Code §§ 6-11-20 (Supp.1990)). ... On review of the record, we reaffirm our earlier view that while Heyer-Schulte could have done or said more, it did not exhibit wantonness as defined by Alabama law.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of conscious or deliberate wantonness to award punitive damages.

Brenda Griffin Toole, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · filed 2000-12-28

In determining whether there was sufficient evidence of conduct warranting punitive damages, we apply Alabama substantive law. “Under Alabama law, to award punitive damages, the jury must have found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Baxter ‘consciously or deliberately engaged in ... wantonness ... with regard to the plaintiff.’ ” ... On review of the record, we reaffirm our earlier view that while Heyer-Schulte could have done or said more, it did not exhibit wantonness as defined by Alabama law.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as reckless or conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety; evidence of a later cover-up of possible negligence alone does not establish wantonness for punitive damages.

Flagstar Enterprises, Inc. v. Davis · filed 1997-09-12(b)(3)

Wantonness is "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). ... The evidence of a "cover up" of what may have been negligence on the part of Annetta Cohill in packaging Davis's food cannot logically support a finding of wantonness and a consequent assessment of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as reckless or conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety; evidence of speeding and failing to slow despite known hazards can warrant submitting a wantonness claim to the jury.

Hicks v. Dunn · filed 2001-10-12(b)(3)

These facts could have supported a verdict that Dunn had acted with a "reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." § 6-11-20(b)(3), Ala.Code 1975. Therefore, the Hickses' wantonness claim should have been presented to the jury.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as reckless or conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety; it does not require a specific intent to injure.

Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush · filed 1998-09-11(b)(3)

"Wantonness" is statutorily defined as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). "Wantonness" has been defined by this Court as the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result. Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South, 646 So.2d 601 (Ala.1994). To prove wantonness, it is not essential to prove that the defendant entertained a specific design or intent to injure the plaintiff. Joseph v. Staggs, 519 So.2d 952 (Ala.1988). We pause here to note the concern expressed by the bench and bar over the definition of wantonness set out in Lynn Strickland Sales & Service, Inc. v. Aero-Lane Fabricators, Inc., 510 So.2d 142, 145 (Ala.1987). Certain language in Lynn Strickland suggested that a specific design or intent to injure the plaintiff was an element of a claim for wantonness. To the extent that Lynn Strickland deviates from the statutory definition of wantonness, as followed by this Court, it is hereby overruled.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.

Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2000-01-21(b)(3)

"Wantonness" is defined as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." § 6-11-20(b)(3), Ala.Code 1975. ... Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that the Cackowskis failed to present substantial evidence of wantonness.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard for others’ rights or safety; intentional conduct is unnecessary, but negligence alone is insufficient.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Thompson · filed 1998-12-18(b)(3)

"Wantonness" is statutorily defined as "conduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). ... Accordingly, to prove "wantonness," one need not prove intentional conduct; however, proof of wantonness still requires evidence of a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others. This Court recognizes a distinction between negligence and wantonness. Mrs. Thompson did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding of wantonness.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard for others’ rights or safety; knowledge of the danger may be inferred from the circumstances.

Lance, Inc. v. Ramanauskas · filed 1999-03-05(b)(3)

We therefore hold that the trial court properly presented to the jury the question whether Lance was guilty of "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3).

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.

Hornady Truck Line, Inc. v. Meadows · filed 2002-08-16(b)(3)

"Wantonness" is statutorily defined as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). ... The speed of the Hornady tractortrailer truck, coupled with the weather conditions, the failure of the driver of the tractor-trailer truck to check his side-view mirrors, Martin's testimony that without warning the tractor-trailer truck moved into the left lane and into the AEA automobile, was sufficient to permit the trial court to submit the wantonness claim against Hornady to the jury; the trial court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial on the weight of the evidence.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard for others’ rights or safety; proving wantonness requires evidence of the defendant’s knowledge.

AMMON EX REL. WAUSAU INS. v. Tesker Mfg. Corp. · filed 2002-12-20(b)(3)

"The Legislature has defined `wantonness' as `[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.' Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3)." Hobart Corp. v. Scoggins, 776 So.2d 56, 58 (Ala.2000). ... In short, Wausau produced no substantial evidence of wantonness. The trial court did not err, therefore, in granting Tesker's motion for a JML on the wantonness-based claims.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

Zuicarelli v. Clark · filed 2003-09-12(b)(3)

Wantonness has been statutorily defined as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." § 6-11-20(b)(3), Ala.Code 1975. ... The evidence does not indicate that State Farm acted with a conscious disregard of Zuicarelli's rights when it mislabeled its letters to her.

Wantonness includes conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard of another's rights or safety; clear and convincing evidence of that conduct can support punitive damages.

SOUTHERN PINE ELEC. CO-OP. v. Burch · filed 2003-10-24(b)(3)

If the jury believed Burch, and disbelieved Southern Pine — as it apparently did — it could have found the evidence that Southern Pine terminated Burch's electrical service in "reckless or conscious disregard of [his] rights," Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3), clear and convincing.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) does not require intent to harm to establish wantonness; conscious disregard of a known danger can suffice.

Mobile Infirmary Medical Center v. Hodgen · filed 2003-10-31(b)(3)

Thus, in order to support his claim that the overdose was the result of wantonness in the administration of the digoxin, Hodgen was not required to show that Espiritu and Byrd acted with an intent to harm him. Instead, Hodgen merely had to produce clear and convincing evidence demonstrating that Espiritu and Byrd, while conscious of the potential danger of their actions, acted with reckless disregard as to the consequences of those actions.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) requires evidence of reckless or conscious disregard of another person's rights or safety to support punitive damages for wantonness.

Rentz v. Grant · filed 2006-01-13(b)(3)

As for Rentz's wantonness claim, nothing in the record before us indicates that Grant acted "with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of" Rentz in attempting to have her evicted, so as to entitle Rentz to punitive damages under § 6-11-20(b)(3), Ala. Code 1975, other than Rentz's contention that Grant was without the authority to do so because of the oral agreement.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety.

Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. · filed 2008-10-20(b)(3)

By statute, wantonness is defined as “conduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” 1975 Ala.Code § 6-11-20-(b)(3). ... Almost by definition, Wal-Mart cannot have “consciously,” “recklessly,” or “intentionally” disregarded a safety hazard of which it was unaware and had no notice.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages for wantonness proved by clear and convincing evidence, including a conscious omission of a duty in reckless disregard of others' safety.

Shiv-Ram, Inc. v. McCaleb · filed 2004-04-02(a), (b)(3)

We conclude that there was substantial evidence of wantonness and clear and convincing evidence that Shiv-Ram acted with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others in its conscious omission of its duty to furnish safe premises to Linda McCaleb.

Section 6-11-20(b)(4) defines clear and convincing evidence as proof that produces a firm conviction about each essential element and a high probability that the conclusion is correct.

Flint Constr. Co. v. Hall · filed 2004-12-30(b)(4)

Section 6-11-20(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975, defines "clear and convincing evidence" as follows: "Evidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt." ... Accepting Hall's view of the evidence, as we are required to do when reviewing a jury verdict at the request of the movant, Waddell & Reed, Inc., supra, Flint's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to support an award of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for wantonness when clear and convincing evidence shows the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in it.

Southeast Environmental Infrastructure, L.L.C. v. Larry Rivers. · filed 2008-12-19(a)

All of that evidence, in conjunction with the evidence of SEI's spoliation, provided clear and convincing evidence of wantonness. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing to strike the entire punitive-damages award.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of wantonness to support an award of punitive damages.

Galaxy Cable, Inc. v. Davis ex rel. Davis · filed 2010-09-10

Next, Galaxy argues that the trial court erred in finding that Pamela presented clear and convincing evidence of wanton conduct as required by § 6-11-20, Ala.Code 1975, for an award of punitive damages. ... Accordingly, Pamela failed to present sufficient evidence of wantonness on Galaxy’s part. ... We therefore remand the case for the trial court to set aside the punitive-damages award.

Section 6-11-20(b)(3) defines wantonness as conduct carried on with reckless or conscious disregard for others’ rights or safety; a wanton supervision claim requires evidence that the employer knew injury would probably result.

Pritchett v. ICN Medical Alliance, Inc. · filed 2006-03-10(b)(3)

"`Wantonness' is statutorily defined as `[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.' Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). `Wantonness' has been defined by this Court as the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result." Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So.2d 1250, 1256 (Ala.1998). Pritchett has not met her burden of presenting substantial evidence indicating that ICN recklessly or consciously disregarded the safety of others in that ICN knew that the use of wet gauze during the procedure using the Nlite laser device, in lieu of the goggles or corneal shield it provided, would probably result in injury to patients.

Section 6-11-20 defines wanton conduct as reckless or conscious disregard for others' rights or safety and requires clear and convincing evidence to justify punitive damages.

Miller v. Bailey · filed 2010-09-30(b)(3)

Our legislature has defined wanton conduct as "[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others," § 6-11-20(b)(3), Ala.Code 1975, and, to justify an award of punitive damages, must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence," § 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975. See also § 6-11-20(b)(4), Ala.Code 1975 (defining "clear and convincing evidence"). We cannot conclude that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude under the aforesaid statutes that Dr. Miller had engaged in conduct that was "carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard for the rights or safety" of Bailey.

Section 6-11-20 sets the standard of proof for awarding punitive damages, but does not govern summary judgment on a wantonness claim.

Boudousquie v. Marriott Management Serv. Corp. · filed 1995-11-17

As to Boudousquie's claim of wantonness, Marriott argues that Boudousquie failed to satisfy the burden placed on him by Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20. In Hines v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 655 So.2d 909, 925 (Ala.1994), our supreme court stated that § 6-11-20 is irrelevant in regard to motions for summary judgment; "rather, it defines the standard of proof for determining whether the trier of fact has, or had, the authority to award punitive damages." (Emphasis added.)

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence to recover punitive damages.

In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. · filed 1997-04-02(a)

These two states, however, require different standards of proof. In Alabama, Plaintiff must prove punitive damages are recoverable clear and convincing evidence. Ala.Code § 6-11-20(a).

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence to support punitive damages on a fraud claim that accrued after June 11, 1987.

First Bank of Boaz v. Fielder · filed 1991-11-15

However, because the plaintiff's fraud claims accrued after June 11, 1987, and because punitive damages were awarded under the suppression count, the applicable standard of review with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence under that count is the "clear and convincing evidence" rule. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20; see, also, Berry v. Fife, 590 So.2d 884 (Ala.1991).

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence to award punitive damages for oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice, but does not require proof of absent probable cause by that standard.

Eubanks v. Hall · filed 1993-07-23(a)

We find, however, that this statute requires "clear and convincing evidence" only for awarding punitive damages in cases of oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(a). Nowhere does this statute require that the absence of probable cause be proven by the same standard.

A punitive damages claim may go to a jury when the evidence is sufficient under the clear and convincing evidence standard.

Baker v. Pi Kappa Phi Fraternity · filed 1993-08-27(b)(4)

The applicable standard for reviewing Baker's claim for punitive damages is, however, governed by the "clear and convincing evidence" standard. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20; see Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp., 619 So.2d 1320 (Ala.1993), Berry v. Fife, 590 So.2d 884 (Ala.1991). ... The evidence, when viewed favorably toward Baker, was sufficient under both the "substantial evidence" and the "clear and convincing evidence" standards of review to allow a jury to determine whether the ranking members of Pi Kappa Phi used Anlage as a means of "crowd control" during parties and whether they expected him to use physical force to accomplish his job.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of wantonness before a punitive damages claim may go to the jury.

Pitt v. Century II, Inc. · filed 1993-12-22(a)

Section 6-11-20(a) allows an award of punitive damages only "where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice." ... We have carefully researched this record and conclude that Pitt failed to present clear and convincing evidence of wantonness; therefore, his evidence did not warrant the submission of the wantonness count to the jury.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for wantonness when clear and convincing evidence shows that a manufacturer consciously disregarded the risk its product posed to others.

Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Harris · filed 1994-01-07(a)

We hold, therefore, that the evidence set out above, together with other evidence in the record, constituted clear and convincing evidence that Sears and State Industries consciously disregarded the rights and safety of the plaintiffs when they designed, manufactured, and distributed the Kenmore II gas water heater.

Punitive damages for willful or wanton conduct require clear and convincing evidence; contradictory defense testimony does not by itself defeat that showing.

Superskate, Inc. v. Nolen by Miller · filed 1994-02-25(a)

They argue that, therefore, punitive damages may not be awarded, citing Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(a), and Berry v. Fife, 590 So.2d 884 (Ala.1991). After reviewing the record, however, we hold that the plaintiffs did present clear and convincing evidence of willful or wanton conduct. The mere fact that the defendants contradict the plaintiffs cannot preclude a finding of clear and convincing evidence.

Punitive damages for wantonness are permissible when clear and convincing evidence supports the claim.

Mead Coated Bd., Inc. v. Dempsey · filed 1994-04-29(a)

The evidence of wantonness, already discussed in this opinion, [3] is sufficient to produce in the minds of the jurors "a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion"; thus, it meets the clear and convincing standard. § 6-11-20(b)(4), Ala.Code 1975. We therefore hold Mead's argument to be without merit.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence to support an award of punitive damages.

Sealing Equip. Products Co. v. Velarde · filed 1994-05-27

Although only substantial evidence is required to prove fraud, punitive damages are awarded only if supported by clear and convincing evidence. § 6-11-20, Ala.Code 1975.

Evidence supporting punitive damages reaches the jury if it could produce a firm conviction about each essential element and a high probability that the conclusion is correct.

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore · filed 1995-01-23(b)(4)

We find that the evidence was legally sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion; therefore, it was a jury question whether that evidence produced "in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion"; see Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(4).

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of wantonness to support punitive damages; substantial evidence alone is insufficient when the court rules on a directed verdict or J.N.O.V. motion.

Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Trzcinski · filed 1996-07-12(a)

Section 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides that punitive damages may be awarded in tort actions "where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in ... wantonness" that caused injury to the plaintiff. ... Thus, the "clear and convincing" standard requires the trial judge to do more than merely determine whether the nonmoving party has presented substantial evidence to support the claim for punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing proof for an award of punitive damages, but that standard does not govern liability for wantonness.

Ex Parte Gradford · filed 1997-04-18(a)

The "clear and convincing evidence" standard applies only to an award of punitive damages: ... Although the Court in Hines was reviewing a summary judgment, the principles stated therein show why an instruction requiring clear and convincing evidence for a recovery under a wantonness count is erroneous.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence to award punitive damages, but not to establish wantonness for compensatory damages.

Gradford v. Nichols Concrete Equipment Co. · filed 1997-04-18(a)

We also hold that the jury instruction on wantonness was erroneous. The circuit court instructed the jury that, to recover under his -wantonness counts, Gradford was required to present clear and convincing evidence. ... Although the Court in Hines was reviewing a summary judgment, the principles stated therein show why an instruction requiring clear and convincing evidence for a recovery under a wantonness count is erroneous.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of conscious or deliberate wanton conduct when a plaintiff seeks punitive damages.

Berry v. Fife · filed 1991-11-15(a)

To the extent that Berry sought punitive damages through her claim of wantonness, she bore the burden of presenting "clear and convincing" evidence that Fife acted "with a conscious and reckless disregard of the rights and safety of others."

Section 6-11-20(a) allows punitive damages only on clear and convincing proof of conscious or deliberate oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice.

Oxford Furniture Companies, Inc. v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc. · filed 1993-01-14(a)

Under Alabama law, punitive damages may be awarded when "it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." Ala.Code § 6-11-20(a) (Supp.1992). ... Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Oxford, we do not opine that a reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that Masco had engaged in oppressive, wanton, or malicious conduct.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages only on clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice.

Oxford Furniture Companies v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc. · filed 1993-01-14(a)

Under Alabama law, punitive damages may be awarded when “it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff.” Ala. Code § 6-11-20(a) (Supp.1992). ... Therefore, Masco did not consciously disregard Oxford’s rights. We are persuaded that Copeland’s actions did not rise to the level required under Alabama law for the imposition of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in wantonness to support punitive damages.

Senn v. Alabama Gas Corp. · filed 1993-03-05(a)

Thus, even if there was "substantial evidence" of wantonness on the part of Sizemore, the directed verdict with respect to Senn's claim for punitive damages was nonetheless proper unless there was "clear and convincing evidence" that Sizemore had consciously or deliberately engaged in "wantonness" ("[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others"), § 6-11-20(a).

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence to authorize punitive damages, but that standard does not govern whether an underlying tort claim survives summary judgment.

Hines v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. · filed 1995-01-13(a)

By its very language, § 6-11-20 does not apply to determine whether, in opposition to a motion for a summary judgment, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence creating a genuine issue of fact to submit to the trier of fact as to one or more elements of a claim. Section 12-21-12, not § 6-11-20, governs the question whether the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence creating a genuine issue as to a fact material to one or more elements of a claim. By contrast, § 6-11-20 establishes the degree of proof necessary to permit the trier of fact to award punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of conscious or deliberate oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice to support punitive damages.

Motion Industries, Inc. v. Pate · filed 1996-03-15(4)

Under § 6-11-20, Ala.Code 1975, Pate must present clear and convincing evidence that the defendant "consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." ... This Court holds that Pate's evidence, weighed against the evidence in opposition, could produce in the minds of jurors a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages for fraud proved by clear and convincing evidence.

Haleyville Health v. Winston Cty. Hosp. · filed 1996-05-10

It claims that the hospital's evidence did not satisfy the "clear and convincing" standard set out in § 6-11-20, Ala.Code 1975. We have already held that the trial court's conclusion that the hospital satisfied its burden of proving fraud by clear and convincing evidence was not in error. Therefore, the trial court was authorized to award punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence to support punitive damages for fraud.

Cabnetware, Inc. v. Birmingham Saw Works · filed 1993-03-12(b)(4)

However, because the cause of action accrued after June 11, 1987, our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the claim for punitive damages under the fraud count is the "clear and convincing evidence rule." Ala. Code 1975, §§ 6-11-20, 6-11-30. ... Clearly, no substantial evidence (and, consequently, no clear and convincing evidence) of fraud was presented in this case.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence to support punitive damages; that standard requires a firm conviction about each essential element of the claim.

Big B, Inc. v. Cottingham · filed 1993-09-10(b)(4)

However, the applicable standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on the punitive damages claim is the "clear and convincing evidence" rule. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20. "Clear and convincing evidence" is defined in § 6-11-20(b)(4) as follows: "Evidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt."

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of wantonness for punitive damages on claims accruing on or after June 11, 1987.

prod.liab.rep.(cch)p. 13,892 John Richards, as Conservator, Etc. v. Michelin Tire Corp., the Budd Company Ford Motor Co. · filed 1994-05-31(a)

However, for claims accruing on or after June 11, 1987, wantonness must be shown by clear and convincing evidence to be awarded punitive damages. Ala.Code § 6-11-20(a) (Supp.1989). Here, Richards' claim accrued prior to June 11, 1987. Thus, the district court erred in charging that his burden of proof for punitive damages was the "clear and convincing evidence” standard. However, because we hold that Richards has failed to prove even substantial evidence of wantonness, this error is harmless.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of the facts supporting a punitive damages claim.

Rooney v. Southern Dependacare, Inc. · filed 1995-08-25

Under Alabama law, the plaintiff must prove the facts supporting a punitive claim, by "clear and convincing evidence." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20. This burden was not met by the plaintiffs in this case.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of willful, wanton, or intentional conduct before a jury may consider punitive damages.

Gradford v. Nicholas Concrete Equipment Co. · filed 1996-02-16

In order for the jury to consider awarding punitive damages, the plaintiff must first prove willful, wanton, or intentional conduct and must prove it by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 6-11-20 sets a clear and convincing evidence standard for a punitive damages claim.

Grimes v. Stewart · filed 1993-09-03

However, the applicable standard for reviewing Stewart's punitive damages claim is the "clear and convincing evidence" rule. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages in a tort action when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice toward the plaintiff.

S & D GRINER, INC. v. Colwell · filed 1995-07-14(a)

"Punitive damages may not be awarded ... other than in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(a). The worker presented ample evidence that the company made conscious and deliberate efforts to mislead her about the availability of her former position. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has indicated that punitive damages are particularly appropriate in retaliatory discharge cases, because of "the gravity of wrongfully depriving [the worker] of what was her livelihood, [and] ... the chilling effect of retaliatory discharges." Lozier Corp. v. Gray, 624 So.2d 1034, 1037 (Ala.1993). We conclude that the trial court properly submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits a punitive damages claim to go to the jury when reasonable jurors could find clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in fraud.

Ex Parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co., Inc. · filed 1996-07-03(a)

Thus, in this case, the trial court should have determined whether the evidence warranted submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury, i.e., whether there was evidence of such quality and weight that a jury of reasonable and fairminded persons could find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in fraud; then the court should have instructed the jury that, to award punitive damages, it must find that Rosa Iliff had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Hodges consciously or deliberately defrauded her.

Punitive damages for fraud or wantonness require clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in the conduct defined by the section.

Thompson v. UNITED COMPANIES LENDING · filed 1997-05-02(b)

Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Thompsons, this court cannot hold that they presented "clear and convincing evidence" that United consciously or deliberately engaged in fraud and wantonness with regard to the Thompsons.

Section 6-11-20 permits a punitive damages claim to go to the jury when substantial evidence supports a finding of conscious or deliberate fraud.

Barlow v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. · filed 1997-08-22(a)

After a review of the evidence in this case, we conclude that there was substantial evidence to support a jury question on whether Liberty National consciously, or deliberately, defrauded Barlow in such a manner as would support a claim for punitive damages according to the standards set forth in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20. Therefore, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of Liberty National on the issue of Barlow's punitive damages claim and in denying Barlow's motion for a new trial.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for fraud when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant deliberately intended to deceive the plaintiffs.

Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau · filed 1997-09-05(a)

The evidence in this case would have permitted the jury to find, by a clear and convincing standard, that Ford "consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff[s]," § 6-11-20(a), Ala. Code 1975, by intending to deceive and mislead them by overestimating the true profit potential of the dealership and underestimating the amount of capital required to run it, in order to increase Ford's minority dealer count.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages for fraud when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant acted consciously or deliberately.

Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Payton · filed 1997-10-10(a), (b)(4)

In order to recover punitive damages, a plaintiff must prove by "clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." § 6-11-20(a), Ala. Code 1975; Ex parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co., 680 So.2d 245 (Ala.1996). Clear and convincing evidence is "[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion." § 6-11-20(b)(4). After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that there was evidence, if believed by the jury, to support a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Alfa consciously, or deliberately, suppressed or misrepresented the coverage available under the builders risk insurance policy and that the jury could have believed that the fraud was malicious, oppressive, or gross. Therefore, the trial court did not err in submitting Payton's punitive damages claim or her claim for mental anguish damages to the jury.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice to support punitive damages.

Gold Kist, Inc. v. Hood · filed 1999-07-09(a)

To recover punitive damages, Hood had to show by clear and convincing evidence that Gold Kist "consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice" with regard to Hood. § 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975. ... Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonably have found that Gold Kist acted consciously and deliberately in terminating Hood's employment after he filed his claim for workers' compensation benefits. The evidence supports an award of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of conscious or deliberate misconduct to award punitive damages outside wrongful-death actions; reckless conduct alone is insufficient.

Morgan Building and Spas, Inc. v. Gillett · filed 2000-03-10(a)

In actions (except wrongful-death actions) involving rights that accrue after June 11, 1987, punitive damages may be awarded only where the plaintiff presents clear and convincing evidence indicating that the defendant acted consciously or deliberately. §§ 6-11-20(a) and 6-11-30, Ala.Code 1975.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice before punitive damages may be imposed.

Liberty National Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders · filed 2000-11-17(a)

Punitive damages must be supported by clear and convincing evidence "that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." § 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975. ... Therefore, Sanders's proof meets the criteria for the imposition of punitive damages not only upon the agent Mahone but also upon the principal Liberty National.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of conscious or deliberate oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice to support punitive damages.

New Plan Realty Trust v. Morgan · filed 2000-12-29(a)

An award of punitive damages must be supported by clear and convincing evidence "that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." § 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975. ... Morgan presented clear and convincing evidence that Babineaux's disposal of her belongings was intentional, malicious, or oppressive.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice before punitive damages may be awarded.

Ex Parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. · filed 2001-04-13(a)

Punitive damages must be supported by clear and convincing evidence "that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." § 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975. ... Therefore, White's proof meets the criteria for the imposition of punitive damages upon Liberty National.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of conscious or deliberate wrongful conduct to support punitive damages.

Noletto v. NationsBanc Mortgage Corp. (In Re Noletto) · filed 2001-07-25

Punitive damages require “clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged” in wrongful conduct.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of wrongful conduct, but not of an agency relationship.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Washington · filed 1998-03-13(a)

Section 6-11-20, however, does not require that evidence of an agency relationship (which is, of course, not wrongful in and of itself) be clear and convincing.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence to support an award of punitive damages.

Oliver v. Towns · filed 1999-01-15

The order denying Oliver's post-trial motion does not address whether the evidence supporting the punitive award was "clear and convincing" as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for fraud when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant acted consciously or deliberately.

Chrysler Corporation v. Schiffer · filed 1999-02-26(a)

Considering this evidence, in conjunction with evidence discussed elsewhere in this opinion, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Chrysler (1) substantially damaged the truck; (2) made a haphazard attempt to repair it; (3) shipped the truck for delivery to Schiffer as a "new" truck; and (4) destroyed, or refused to produce, the documentary evidence of those facts. Such a scenario satisfies § 6-11-20(a). It demonstrates clearly and convincingly that Chrysler "consciously or deliberately engaged in ... fraud."

Punitive damages for wantonness require clear and convincing evidence, weighed against the opposing evidence.

Hobart Corp. v. Scoggins · filed 2000-05-26(b)(4)

Under § 6-11-20(b)(4), these factors must be weighed in opposition to the evidence presented by Scoggins. Having so weighed them, we conclude that Scoggins failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Hobart designed and manufactured the slant-blade saw with knowledge that it had dangerous propensities and therefore conclude that the jury should not have been allowed to consider an award of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud, malice, or wantonness to recover punitive damages for retaliatory discharge.

ConAgra, Inc. v. Turner · filed 2000-07-07(a)

In order to recover punitive damages under the statutory cause of action for retaliatory discharge, the statute requires the employee to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, oppression, fraud, malice or wantonness. § 6-11-20, Ala.Code 1975. ... As stated by the trial judge, the facts clearly support the jury's finding that Turner proved by clear and convincing evidence that ConAgra acted with oppression, malice or wantonness towards him.

Section 6-11-20(4) defines clear and convincing evidence as proof that creates a firm conviction and a high probability that the claim is correct.

Lm v. Ddf · filed 2002-07-12(4)

"Clear and convincing evidence" is "[e]vidence that, when weighed against evidence in opposition, will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the correctness of the conclusion. Proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a level of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence or the substantial weight of the evidence, but less than beyond a reasonable doubt." § 6-11-20(4), Ala.Code 1975.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence to sustain a punitive-damages award for conversion.

INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES v. Jacobs Bank · filed 2003-04-25(a)

Consistent with Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(a), a punitive-damages award will not be vacated where the evidence supporting the award is "of such quality and weight that a jury of reasonable and fair-minded persons could find by clear and convincing evidence," Ex parte Norwood Hodges Motor Co., 680 So.2d 245, 249 (Ala.1996), that the conversion was associated with "malice, willfulness, insult, or other aggravating circumstances."

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages when clear and convincing evidence shows a reckless or conscious disregard of others’ rights or safety.

Kmart Corp. v. Peak · filed 1999-09-24(b)(3)

In short, there was substantial evidence of wantonness and clear and convincing evidence that Kmart acted with "a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others." Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). Thus, the evidence supported an award of punitive damages. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages in a tort action when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in wantonness toward the plaintiff.

Stamp v. Jackson · filed 2003-11-07(a)

As stated by Stamp in his brief to this court on appeal, § 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975, sets out when punitive damages may be awarded. That section states, in pertinent part, as follows: "(a) Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action... other than in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff." ... As discussed above, Jackson presented sufficient evidence in support of her wantonness claim; given that the jury in this case was the ultimate trier of fact, we cannot say that it erred in determining that the evidence supporting that claim was clear and convincing, and it does not appear that the verdict was otherwise "plainly and palpably wrong and unjust."

Section 6-11-20’s clear and convincing evidence standard governs the authority to award punitive damages, not whether a wantonness claim survives summary judgment.

K.M. v. Alabama Department of Youth Services · filed 2005-03-09

Aseme contends that § 6-11-20 of the 1975 Ala.Code requires wantonness to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. This is incorrect.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages for fraudulent suppression when clear and convincing evidence establishes deliberate fraud.

CNH America, LLC v. Ligon Capital, LLC · filed 2013-11-08(a)

We disagree. As the evidence recited in this opinion indicates, .CNH orchestrated and carried out a months-long scheme to fraudulently suppress information from Ligón and HTI. Ample evidence of this “plan of trickery and deceit,” as the trial court referred to the scheme in its postjudgment order, was adduced at trial and is contained in the record so as to constitute “clear and convincing evidence.”

Section 6-11-20(b)(4) leaves the weighing of evidence for punitive damages to the jury; an appellate court reviews whether the evidence could firmly convince a reasonable jury.

Ala. River Grp., Inc. v. Conecuh Timber, Inc. · filed 2017-09-29(b)(4)

To the extent the ARG defendants may be urging this Court to engage in a weighing (or reweighing) of the evidence submitted to the jury below, both the relevant statute and cases compel us to decline.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing proof that the defendant engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice toward the plaintiff; evidence bearing on liability also bears on punitive damages.

Guyoungtech USA, Inc. v. Dees · filed 2014-06-06(e)

Under Alabama law, an award of punitive damages requires proof “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff.” § 6-11-20(e), Ala.Code 1975. The evidence affecting liability is thus intermingled with the evidence necessary to determine punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires clear and convincing evidence of wantonness to award punitive damages based on wanton conduct.

Mazda Motor Corp. v. Hurst · filed 2017-07-07(a)

Because there was not "substantial evidence" of wantonness so as to support the jury's verdict of liability under the applicable "preponderance of the evidence" standard on Sydney's separate wantonness claim, a fortiori, we must recognize that there was not sufficient evidence to support a finding of wantonness under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard required for an award of punitive damages to Sydney under her AEMLD claim.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires proof that the defendant acted consciously or deliberately to recover punitive damages, but does not require the complaint to use those words.

Matthews v. Ankor Energy, LLC · filed 2018-08-13(a)

However, § 6- 11-20 does not state that Plaintiff must specifically allege in the complaint that the conduct was conscious or deliberate, but only that to recover punitive damages it must be proven to be consciously or deliberately done.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages in a tort action when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice toward the plaintiff.

Louis v. Victory Police Motorcycles LLC · filed 2019-07-19

Under Alabama law, a plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages “in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff.” Ala. Code § 6-11-20 (1975). ... In light of the foregoing considerations as to the factors to be considered by the Court when evaluating punitive damages, the Court finds that punitive damages are appropriate in this case.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages on a fraud claim when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in fraud.

Krikorian v. Ford Motor Company · filed 2019-11-06(a)

Under Alabama law, punitive damages are potentially available on Krikorian’s fraud claims. See Ala. Code § 6-11-20(a) (“Punitive damages may not be awarded in any civil action, except civil actions for wrongful death pursuant to Sections 6-5-391 and 6-5-410, other than in a tort action where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff.”).

Punitive damages on a fraud claim require clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in fraud; allegations alone may not satisfy that burden.

Hickman v. American Specialty Alloys, Inc. · filed 2020-08-31(a)

These allegations alone do not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Boggs consciously or deliberately engaged in fraud such that he is entitled to punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(a) requires sufficient support for a finding of wantonness before punitive damages based on wantonness may be awarded under an AEMLD claim.

Eady v. Fort Metal Plastic Co., Ltd. · filed 2020-09-08(a)

For reasons to be discussed below, this Court cannot conclude that the second amended complaint contains adequate factual allegations to support a claim of wantonness; therefore, punitive damages based on wantonness under the AEMLD are disallowed.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for fraud when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in it.

Hickman v. American Specialty Alloys, Inc. · filed 2020-10-15(a)

Boggs’ numerous misrepresentations about repayment of the loan and payment of the severance package, coupled with the misleading notation on the promissory note constitute clear and convincing evidence that Boggs consciously or deliberately engaged in fraud sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing proof of conscious or deliberate fraud for punitive damages, but an award is discretionary even if that standard is met.

Overseas Hardwoods Company, Inc. v. Hogan Architectural Wood Products, LLC · filed 2021-03-16

OHC would need to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ogilvie and Upshaw’s committed fraud “consciously or deliberately” in order to be awarded punitive damages. Ala. Code § 6-11-20. However, even if these elements are met, an award of punitive damages is not required. See id. The Court declines to award punitive damages in this case, making any consideration of whether OHC proved fraud by clear and convincing evidence unnecessary.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages in tort actions involving oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice, but not for simple negligence.

Wilder v. Genie Healthcare Inc · filed 2022-09-08

Finally, Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages through any of their claims. Under Alabama law, punitive damages are only available in two types of civil actions: wrongful death cases and tort actions involving “oppression, fraud, ... wantonness, or malice.” See Ala. Code § 6-11-20. This is not a wrongful death case and, if there is a viable tort claim at all,’ it would be simple negligence completely devoid of allegations of oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages in a civil tort case when clear and convincing evidence shows that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice toward the plaintiff.

Savage v. J and J Transports of Alabama, Inc. · filed 2021-11-03

Under Alabama law, punitive damages may only be awarded in civil tort cases “where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the plaintiff.” See Ala. Code § 6-11-20. Based on the facts alleged in the complaint and other relevant documents this Court finds that Savage has proven his allegations claims of fraud and deceit by clear and convincing evidence, warranting punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20(b)(4) defines clear and convincing evidence as proof that produces a firm conviction about each essential element and a high probability that the conclusion is correct.

Ka'Toria Gray v. Birchfield · filed 2025-07-15(b)(4)

Under Alabama law, clear and convincing evidence “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm conviction as to each essential element of the claim and a high probability as to the cor- rectness of the conclusion.” Ala. Code § 6–11–20(b)(4). ... We conclude that a reasonable jury, taking all evidence and inferences in favor of Gray, could have found that she proved her punitive-damages case by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 6-11-20 includes intentional fraud as a basis for punitive damages, and evidence of intent to deceive can defeat summary judgment on that request.

Henig Furs, Inc. v. JC Penney Co., Inc. · filed 1993-01-29

However, the definition of “fraudulent” encompasses the idea of intentional fraud. Because plaintiff has presented some evidence that agents of the defendant might have made statements or suppressed statements with the intent to deceive, the court is unable to grant summary judgment as to punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 permits punitive damages for fraud when clear and convincing evidence shows intentional deceit.

Reserve Nat. Ins. Co. v. Crowell · filed 1993-02-05(a)

Because there was sufficient credible evidence for a jury to award punitive damages against both defendants pursuant to § 6-11-20, we conclude that the award of punitive damages in this case was appropriate.

Section 6-11-20 makes intent material to a claim for punitive damages based on fraud; a genuine dispute about that intent prevents summary judgment on punitive damages.

Willingham v. United Ins. Co. of America · filed 1994-05-13(b)(1)

On the issue of punitive damages, the intent of the party allegedly making misrepresentations is a question of material fact. Ala. Code 1975, § 6-11-20.

Section 6-11-20(b)(1) permits punitive damages for fraud when clear and convincing evidence shows the required gross, oppressive, or malicious conduct and intent to cause injury.

Talent Tree Personnel Serv., Inc. v. Fleenor · filed 1997-09-12(b)(1)

We must determine whether the jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants' conduct amounted to "[a]n intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact the concealing party had a duty to disclose, which was gross, oppressive, or malicious and committed with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person or entity of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." § 6-11-20(b)(1), Ala.Code 1975. ... We conclude that the jury could have found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendants acted with the malicious intent or gross conduct required to justify the imposition of punitive damages.

Section 6-11-20 limits punitive damages to cases involving conscious or deliberate misconduct, including wantonness.

Abston v. Kelley Bros. Contractors · filed 1998-01-16(a)

Section 6-11-202 generally limits the imposition of punitive damages to cases involving “conscious” and “deliberate” acts by a *1394defendant including acts of wantonness which is defined as “conduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”

Punitive damages for fraud may be supported by clear and convincing evidence of a gross intentional misrepresentation or concealment; a gross misrepresentation or failure to disclose is inexcusable, flagrant, or shameful.

Alfa Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Thomas · filed 1999-04-16(b)(1)

In the context of this case, we must determine whether the jury could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants' conduct amounted to "[a]n intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact that the concealing party had a duty to disclose, which was gross, oppressive, or malicious and committed with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person or entity of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." § 6-11-20(b)(1), Ala.Code 1975. ... After carefully reviewing the evidence, we conclude that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendants' representation that Mrs. Thomas had full coverage and their failure to disclose that Mrs. Thomas could not even qualify for full coverage were shown by clear and convincing evidence to be "gross"; that is, inexcusable, flagrant, or shameful.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for a retaliatory discharge upon clear and convincing proof of oppression or malice; proof of a pattern and practice of retaliation is not required.

AutoZone, Inc. v. Leonard · filed 2001-04-27(a)

To be entitled to punitive damages, Leonard was required to present clear and convincing evidence indicating that AutoZone "consciously or deliberately engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to [him]." Heil Co. v. Crowley, 659 So.2d 105, 108 (Ala.1995) (quoting § 6-11-20(a), Ala.Code 1975). ... This Court has never held that a plaintiff must establish a pattern and practice of retaliatory discharge before he will be entitled to punitive damages in a case based on a retaliatory discharge, and we decline to do so today.

Section 6-11-20(b)(1) permits punitive damages for fraud when an intentional misrepresentation is gross, oppressive, or malicious and is made with the intent to deprive someone of property or legal rights or otherwise cause injury.

Wholesale Motors, Inc. v. Williams · filed 2001-06-15(b)(1)

In this case, punitive damages could be awarded only upon a finding of "fraud," which the Legislature has defined as "[a]n intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact the concealing party had a duty to disclose, which was gross, oppressive, or malicious and committed with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person or entity of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." Section 6-11-20(b)(1), Ala.Code 1975. A "gross" misrepresentation is one that is inexcusable, flagrant, or shameful. Talent Tree Personnel Servs., Inc. v. Fleenor, 703 So.2d 917, 924 (Ala.1997). Our review of the record convinces us the jury could have reasonably concluded that Williams's evidence regarding Wholesale Motors' misrepresentations about the mileage was "clear and convincing" and showed that the misrepresentation was "gross."

Section 6-11-20(a) makes punitive damages available in fraud actions, and parties cannot waive that remedy in a predispute arbitration agreement.

Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson · filed 2001-10-05(a)

The Legislature intended that punitive damages be available as a remedy in fraud actions, as evidenced by the enactment of § 6-11-20(a). ... Thus, we conclude that it is not within the province of parties to a predispute arbitration agreement to waive a punitive-damages award.

Section 6-11-20 expresses Alabama’s policy allowing punitive damages for specified intentional, malicious, or reckless conduct, so a contract cannot waive liability for those damages.

Ex Parte Thicklin · filed 2002-01-11

The public policy of this State, as articulated by the Legislature at § 6-11-20, Ala. Code 1975, recognizes that certain circumstances —namely, gross, oppressive, or malicious fraudulent acts committed intentionally; malicious wrongful acts with an intent to injure or acts committed under circumstances to which the law will imply an evil intent; and conduct carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others—warrant the recovery of punitive damages. ... It is equally sound to conclude that it violates public policy for a party to contract away its liability for punitive damages, regardless whether the provision doing so was intended to operate in an arbitral or a judicial forum.

Section 6-11-20 expresses Alabama’s policy that punitive damages remain available for qualifying misconduct, so a contract cannot waive liability for them.

Thicklin v. Fantasy Mobile Homes, Inc. · filed 2002-01-11

The public policy of this State, as articulated by the Legislature at § 6-11-20, Ala. Code 1975, recognizes that certain circumstances ... warrant the recovery of punitive damages. ... It is equally sound to conclude that it violates public policy for a party to contract away its liability for punitive damages, regardless whether the provision doing so was intended to operate in an ar-bitral or a judicial forum.

Punitive damages for fraud require clear and convincing evidence that the defendant intended to deprive the plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise cause injury.

Guaranty Pest Control, Inc. v. Bush · filed 2002-12-30(a)

Although we have already concluded that there is substantial evidence of a material misrepresentation upon which the Bushes reasonably relied and of damage that could ultimately have resulted from that reliance, so as to support a finding of liability, there was not clear and convincing evidence that Guaranty, in making misrepresentations that it had "thoroughly" treated and inspected the Bushes' property, had any intent to deprive the Bushes of their property or legal rights or to otherwise cause them injury.

Section 6-11-20 requires clear and convincing evidence of intentional fraud to support punitive damages; a promise followed by defective work does not, by itself, satisfy that requirement.

Argo v. Walston · filed 2003-12-30(b)(1)

As used in § 6-11-20(a), "fraud" means "[a]n intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact the concealing party had a duty to disclose, which was gross, oppressive, or malicious and committed with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person or entity of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury." § 6-11-20(b)(1), Ala.Code 1975. The evidence presented in this case regarding Argo's promise that he would construct a lake for $5,000, and the subsequent result that the lake was defective, does not satisfy the requirements imposed by § 6-11-20.

Section 6-11-20 requires time-specific proof of the defendant’s knowledge and culpable conduct to support punitive damages.

Houston County Health Care Authority v. Williams · filed 2006-12-01

Punitive damages in this case would have to relate to, and therefore require time-correlated proof of, what SAMC knew or should have known about fungal contamination at any given point in time and consciously or deliberately withheld oppressively, fraudulently, wantonly, or maliciously. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20.

Section 6-11-20 requires proof of what a defendant knew or should have known when it acted oppressively, fraudulently, wantonly, or maliciously to support punitive damages.

Houston County Health Care Auth. v. Williams, 1021253 (Ala. 1-12-2007) · filed 2007-01-12

Punitive damages in this case would have to relate to, and therefore require time-correlated proof of, what SAMC knew or should have known about fungal contamination at any given point in time and consciously or deliberately withheld oppressively, fraudulently, wantonly, or maliciously.

For punitive damages based on fraud, § 6-11-20(b)(1) does not require a separate finding that intentional fraud was gross, oppressive, or malicious.

McIver v. Bondy's Ford, Inc. · filed 2007-03-09(b)(1)

Therefore, when the trial court expressly found that McIver had committed intentional fraud, it was not necessary to then expressly find that such fraud was "gross, oppressive, or malicious," because such a finding would have been "redundant."

Section 6-11-20 defines fraud to include intent when punitive damages are sought.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. ALA. DEPT. OF CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCES · filed 2007-11-01(b)(1)

When, as here, punitive damages are sought, fraud is statutorily defined to include intent.

Section 6-11-20(a) permits punitive damages for conscious or deliberate fraud proven by clear and convincing evidence.

GRUPO HGM Tecnologias Submarina, S.A. v. Energy Subsea, LLC · filed 2021-10-13(a)

Grupo is entitled to punitive damages, as Energy Subsea and Ingvartsen consciously and deliberately engaged in fraud with regard to Grupo. See Ala. Code § 6-11-20(a). ... As required by Alabama Code § 6-11-20, the Court finds Energy Subsea and Ingvartsen’s fraud was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

Section 6-11-20 defines the conduct that can support punitive damages and, together with Alabama case law, gives notice of the potential punishment.

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore · filed 1997-05-09

Thus, § 6-11-20, in conjunction with the sizable body of case law supplementing it, serves as clear notice to all of the action Alabama deems sufficiently reprehensible to warrant an award of punitive damages and the level to which a defendant may be punished for such conduct.

Malice for punitive damages includes circumstances in which the law implies an evil intent.

Shoney's, Inc. v. Barnett · filed 1999-04-30(b)(2)b.

Under § 6-11-20(b)(2)b., the definition of malice includes circumstances under which "the law will imply an evil intent." Therefore, because the jury was free to determine the disputed facts in this case, it could have concluded that Hunter acted with malice simply because she testified falsely at Barnett's preliminary hearing.

Section 6-11-20(b)(2)’s malice standard for punitive damages can be met by clear and convincing evidence of purposeful property damage and rude, insulting conduct accompanying a trespass.

Downs v. Lyles · filed 2009-10-09(b)(2)

Downs and Dudley further argue that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that any actions taken by Downs or Dudley were malicious, as required by Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(2), for the imposition of punitive damages. ... Thus, we cannot agree that the evidence presented to the jury regarding the “rudeness,” “insulting manner,” and “malice” accompanying Dudley’s actions was not clear and convincing evidence warranting the imposition of punitive damages.

Deliberately refusing to withdraw improperly filed lis pendens notices can constitute malice, wantonness, or oppression supporting punitive damages under § 6-11-20.

Chamblee v. Duncan · filed 2015-06-26(b)

By 'his own admission, Chamblee consciously and intentionally refused to withdraw the lis pendens notices after he had determined that they had been improperly filed. Therefore, the trial court did not err in determining that Chamblee had consciously or deliberately engaged in malice, wantonness, or oppression, as those terms are defined in § 6-ll-20(b).

Section 6-11-20(b)(2)b. allows a finding of malice when the law implies an evil intent, including in a defamation per se claim.

Ponder v. Lake Forest Property Owners Ass'n. · filed 2015-06-26(b)(2)b.

Therefore, the ... trial court did not err in finding, pursuant to § 6-ll-20(b)(2)b., malice “[u]nder such circumstances that the law will imply an evil intent.”