Statute Annotations › Alabama › Ala. Code § 6-2-34

Ala. Code § 6-2-34

Six-year limitations for specified actions: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Case notes
119
Cited in passing
57
Citing cases indexed
78
Case dates
1979–2026
Screened through
2026-06-26
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

176 citing cases reviewed: 119 interpreted the section (annotated below), 57 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2026-06-26 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Ala. Code § 6-2-34?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Later changes in law

Changes after the earliest notes below. A note stating a rule one of these changed is marked "Law changed since".

  • 1989 Owens v. Okure required the residual personal-injury limitations period for § 1983 claims; on remand Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin applied Alabama’s two-year § 6-2-38 period, displacing the six-year § 6-2-34(1) rule for those claims. source Source
  • 1996 Madison v. BP Oil Co. applied Alabama’s two-year § 6-2-38 period to § 1981 claims, displacing the earlier six-year application of § 6-2-34(1). Source
  • 2012-03-16 Walker v. Capstone Building Corp. overruled the six-year wantonness rule associated with McKenzie v. Killian and applied the two-year period in § 6-2-38(l), subject to its transition rule for earlier accrued claims. Source

Contract limitations

Section 6-2-34(9) gives a plaintiff six years from a breach to bring a breach-of-contract claim.

Cook v. U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee · filed 2022-03-18(9)

The statute of limitations in Alabama for a breach of contract claim is six (6) years, and it begins to run when the contract is breached. AC, Inc. v. Baker, 622 So.2d 331, 333 (Ala. 1993) (citing Ala. Code § 6–2–34(9)).
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Section 6-2-34(4) gives a six-year limitations period to a claim for breach of an insurance contract based on failure to pay for covered collision damage.

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Culpepper · filed 1983-01-12(4)

The substance of the plaintiff's complaint against the insurance company is whether the collision coverage provided by the insurance policy extends to plaintiff's automobile and whether the insurance company's failure to pay resulted in a breach of the contract. This falls clearly within contract law, and that being so, the applicable statute of limitations would be six years, not one year. Ala. Code § 6-2-34 (4) (1975).
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Section 6-2-34(4) provides a six-year limitations period for breach of contract claims, including claims for unpaid insurance premiums.

The Home Indemnity Company, Cross-Appellee v. Ball-Co Contractors, Inc., Cross-Appellant · filed 1987-06-22(4)

Alabama has a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions. Ala. Code § 6-2-34(4). ... The district court therefore erred in dismissing Home Indemnity’s claim relating to the original workmen’s compensation policy, because the claim was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations for actions on open accounts but was instead governed by the longer statute of limitations for breach of contract actions.
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

Hollingshead v. Burford Equipment Co. · filed 1990-10-15

Alabama law provides a six-year statute of limitations for contract actions.
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for actions based on contracts not under seal.

McInnis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith · filed 1992-07-16

The statute of limitations for actions based on contracts not under seal is six years. Ala. Code § 6-2-34 (1991). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract is not time-barred.
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Section 6-2-34(9) supplies a six-year limitations period for an ERISA fiduciary’s action to enforce a plan reimbursement provision because that action is analogous to a simple contract action.

Blue Cross v. Sanders · filed 1998-04-13(9)

Accordingly, we apply Alabama’s six-year statute of limitations for simple contract actions, see Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9),9 and reject the Sanders’s ... proposed two-year limitations period.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives a party six years from a contract breach to sue on an oral or written contract; discovery of the breach does not toll the period.

In Re the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co. Sales Practices Litigation · filed 1999-10-14(9)

Alabama’s statute of limitations for breach of an oral or written contract is six years. Ala.Code § 6-2-34(9)(1975). The statute commences to run at the time of the breach, ... and contract claims are not subject to a “discovery rule” that tolls the statute pending discovery of the breach. ... That was when the breach occurred. Suit was not commenced until August 1997, well beyond the six year bar date for contract actions.
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Section 6-2-34 gives breach-of-contract claims under subsection (9) and conversion claims under subsection (3) a six-year limitations period.

Univalor Trust, SA v. Columbia Petroleum, LLC · filed 2016-06-21

For Count 10, “[t]he statute of limitations for a claim based on a contract is six years. Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34(9). ... For Count 11, “a conversion claim under Alabama law.. .would be subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See 1975 Ala. Code § 6-2-34(3).” ... As such, Counts 10 and 11 appear permissive and are not time-barred because they were still viable claims when the Plaintiffs filed this suit in 2015.
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Section 6-2-34(9) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims when the contract is for services rather than goods.

Wadley Crushed Stone Company, LLC v. Positive Step, Inc. (CONSENT) · filed 2019-09-09(9)

If the contract is not for goods, a six-year statute of limitations applies to the breach of contract claims.
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Section 6-2-34(5) gives six years to bring an action on an account stated.

Home Indemnity Co. v. Ball-Co Contractors, Inc. · filed 1986-06-30(5)

An account stated is subject to the six-year statute of limitations set forth in Ala. Code § 6-2-34(5) (1975).
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Section 6-2-34 gives contract actions a six-year limitations period running from the date of breach.

Wexler v. Wex-Tex Manufacturing Corporation's Pension Plan · filed 1997-10-01

In Alabama, the statute of limitations on a contract action is six years, running from the date the contract was *1317breached.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives a party six years to bring a breach of contract claim.

AFC Franchising LLC v. Fabbro · filed 2019-12-06(9)

Under the applicable statute of limitations, AFC Franchising had six years to bring its claims. Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9). AFC Franchising complied with the statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives six years to bring a breach-of-contract claim, with the period running from each actual breach of an ongoing contract rather than an earlier repudiation.

Ripps v. Powers · filed 2009-12-15(9)

The applicable statute of limitations for breach of contract claims is six years. Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9) (2005). ... The statute of limitations begins to run when the contract is breached, not when the contract is repudiated. ... Likewise, a distinct limitations period attaches to each breach of an ongoing contract.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives six years to bring a claim for breach of an express contractual warranty, measured from the breach.

Ala. Teachers Credit Union v. Design Build Concepts, Inc. · filed 2018-08-10(9)

And because more than six years passed between March 6, 2010 (the last possible date on which a breach could have occurred), and November 10, 2016 (the date ATCU filed suit), § 6-2-34(9) bars ATCU's breach of warranty claims as a matter of law.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives a plaintiff six years from a simple contract breach to bring a claim.

Sellew v. Terminix International Co, The · filed 2020-03-06(9)

9 Alabama law provides a six-year statute of limitations for causes of action based on a simple contract. Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9). The statute begins to run when the contract is breached. Ala. Teachers Credit Union v. Design Build Concepts, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1184 (N.D. Ala. 2018). From the Rule 56 record, the court can gauge that the earliest date that Defendant could have breached the contract was when Terminix performed a spot treatment of the Residence—in April 2013. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 15, 2017 (see Doc. # 1), a date well within the six-year limitations period.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives breach-of-contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Lemons v. Principal Life Insurance Company · filed 2020-10-26(9)

So when Lemons sued Principal in 2018, the six-year statute of limitations on his breach of contract claims related to the benefit update rider had run. See Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9).
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives a plaintiff six years to bring a breach-of-contract claim.

William Lemons, Jr. v. Principal Life Insurance Company · filed 2024-04-05(9)

Because Al- abama has a six-year statute of limitations on breach of contract claims, see Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9), Lemons’s 2018 suit was outside of the statute of limitations and, therefore, time-barred.
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Section 6-2-34 gives state-law contract claims a six-year limitations period.

Hsi-Sheng Lee et al. v. Harris McKay Company · filed 2026-03-02

State-law contract claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations, not two years like tort claims. See Ala. Code § 6-2-34. The Lees filed their complaint well within the six- year period, so this court finds that Count 1 would survive a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.
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Section 6-2-34(1) and (2) gives trespass and battery claims a six-year limitations period.

Bridgett Watson Adams et al. v. 3M Company · filed 2026-04-20(1), (2)

Plaintiffs’ trespass and battery claims are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See Ala. Code § 6-2-34(1) and (2).
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives six years to bring a breach of contract claim when the contract is for services.

Wadley Crushed Stone Company, LLC v. Positive Step, Inc. (CONSENT) · filed 2020-12-14(9)

However, if the contract is instead for the provision of services, a six-year statute of limitations will apply, and Wadley’s claims will not be time- barred.
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Section 6-2-34(9) sets a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions, including actions on insurance policies.

Bunk House Conversion Inc v. Atain Specialty Insurance Company · filed 2024-03-08(9)

Alabama law provides a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims. Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9).
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Section 6-2-34(5) gives six years to collect an account stated, measured from when payment became due and was not made.

Reddick v. Capouano, Beckman, Russell & Burnett, LLC (CONSENT) · filed 2021-03-18(5)

Collections on the account were therefore actionable within the six-year statute of limitations calculated from September 29, 2012, the date after which Plaintiff was required to pay and failed to do so.
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Section 6-2-34(9) provides a six-year limitations period for construction contract and implied warranty of workmanship claims, which a shorter contractual warranty period cannot displace.

Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Guntersville, The v. Glass Steel Inc · filed 2023-06-05(9)

For other contracts, Alabama provides a six-year statute of limitations. Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9). ... But the parties cannot override the six-year statute of limitations by agreement: “Except as may be otherwise provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, any agreement or stipulation, verbal or written, whereby the time for the commencement of any action is limited to a time less than that prescribed by law for the commencement of such action is void.” Ala. Code § 6-2-15; see also Turner, 903 So. 2d at 91 (holding that a warranty period that was less than the six-year statute of limitations “does not override the 6–year statute of limitations”). As a result, the six-year statute of limitations for either the breach of contract or the breach of warranty claim applies and PF Moon’s statute of limitation defense fails.
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Section 6-2-34(4) provides a six-year limitations period for actions on contracts.

Shadrick v. Johnston · filed 1990-11-09(4)

This action was brought well within the six-year statutory limitations period of Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34(4), for actions on contracts.
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Section 6-2-34 imposes a six-year limitation on breach-of-contract claims, barring a claim filed more than six years after the breach.

Seybold v. Magnolia Land Co. · filed 1979-11-09

The statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract is the six-year statute governing promises in writing not under seal. § 6-2-34, Ala. Code 1975. ... According to Plaintiff's own testimony, then, his cause of action on the contract, subject to a six-year statute, had long since expired by the time suit was finally brought.
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Section 6-2-34 gives a party six years to bring a claim based on an unsealed contract.

K & C DEVELOPMENT CORP. v. AmSouth Bank · filed 1992-04-03

Generally, a claim based on a contract is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. See § 6-2-34, Ala. Code 1975. ... Furthermore, because the action was filed more than six years after the foreclosure of the mortgage, the summary judgment for the Bank on K C and Kyatt's breach of contract claim is due to be affirmed.
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Section 6-2-34 gives a plaintiff six years to bring a conversion or breach-of-contract claim, including a claim for breach of an insurance contract.

Casassa v. Liberty Life Insurance · filed 1996-12-31

An action for conversion is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34. ... Because the alleged conversion took place when Casassa used the cash values of the original policies to purchase the Policy in 1986, nine and one-half years before this action was filed, Casassa’s conversion claim is barred by the statute of limitations. ... An action for breach of contract, including breach of an insurance contract, ... is subject to a six-year statute of limitations. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34. ... Because the alleged breaches occurred in 1986, nine and one-half years before this action was filed, Casassa’s breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34 gives a party six years to sue for breach of a contract that is not under seal.

Mitchell v. Richmond · filed 1999-12-17

The statutory limitations period for suing on a breach-of-contract cause of action is six years, if the contract is not under seal. § 6-2-34, Ala. Code 1975. ... Thus, we conclude that the claim alleging breach of contract is time-barred. § 6-2-34.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives a debtor six years to bring an Article 9 damages claim for breach of duties that become terms of a security agreement.

Weaver v. American Nat. Bank · filed 1984-05-25(9)

By statute, they become terms of the security agreement. Breach of the notice requirement is breach of the contract. Therefore, the action under § 7-9-507 (1) for damages for violation of these requirements is, in essence, a suit for breach of contract. The applicable statute of limitations is § 6-2-34 (9).
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Section 6-2-34 gives six years to bring a claim for breach of a simple contract.

City of Birmingham v. Cochrane Roofing & Metal Co. · filed 1989-03-10

Furthermore, the legislature has provided a six-year statute of limitations on a simple contract action. This Court cannot change the statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for an action to settle a partnership.

Slayton v. Slayton · filed 1988-02-05

The statute of limitations applicable to an action for the settlement of a partnership is six years. Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34; Haaker v. Lawson, 497 So.2d 99 (Ala.1986).
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for breach of an implied warranty of habitability.

Kelly v. Alexander · filed 1989-04-21

The statute of limitations for breach of implied warranty of habitability is six years. Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34.
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Section 6-2-34(5) sets a six-year limitations period for an account stated.

Defco, Inc. v. Decatur Cylinder, Inc. · filed 1992-01-03(5)

The statutory period of limitations for an account stated is six years, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34(5), and, for an open account, three years, § 6-2-37(1).
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Section 6-2-34(9) provides six years to bring a breach-of-express-warranty action; a warranty term requiring suit sooner does not shorten that period.

Turner v. Westhampton Court, L.L.C. · filed 2004-10-01(9)

However, as the Turners note, and as we stated above, the Legislature has provided a six-year statute of limitations on breach-of-warranty actions. Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34(9). Moreover, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-15, provides that "any agreement or stipulation, verbal or written, whereby the time for the commencement of any action is limited to a time less than that prescribed by the law for the commencement of such action is void." Clearly the 90-day provision in the warranty does not override the 6-year statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34(4)’s six-year limitations period applies to a claim for breach of a contract to lease land.

I-359, INC. v. AmSouth Bank · filed 2007-08-24(4)

However, I-359's first claim alleged a breach of a contract to lease the land rather than a breach of a covenant regarding the landowners' title to the land. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that I-359's first claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations specified by § 6-2-34(4) for breach-of-contract claims.
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Section 6-2-34 gives a claim for underinsured-motorist benefits, as an action on a contract, a six-year limitations period.

Ex Parte Nationwide Ins. Co. · filed 2008-04-18(9)

This Court has stated that a claim for UIM benefits is an action based on contract. ... The statute of limitations for an ex contractu action is six years.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives breach-of-contract claims a six-year limitations period that runs from the breach.

In re: Kinsman Investments, LLC v. Alfa Mutual Insurance Company and Jeffery Dimoff · filed 2026-02-27(9)

Kinsman's breach-of-contract claim is subject to the six-year limitations period set forth in § 6-2-34(9), Ala. Code 1975. ... Additionally, Kinsman's breach-of-contract claim would have accrued at the time Alfa allegedly failed to pay Kinsman for the difference in value between the roofing materials and siding used to repair the complex and the roofing materials and siding that existed at the time of the hurricane, which was 2006 at the latest.
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Section 6-2-34(4) and (9) supply a six-year limitations period for a contract claim challenging an amendment to an electric cooperative’s bylaws.

Catrett v. BALDWIN CTY. ELEC. MEMBERSHIP CORP. · filed 2008-05-23(4), (9)

Our review of the law indicates that subsections (4) and (9) of § 6-2-34, Ala. Code 1975, appear to supply the correct statute of limitations to be applied in this case, and Catrett has made no argument to the contrary. ... As noted previously, this is a contract claim, and Catrett's second amended complaint was not filed until July 5, 2006, more than six years after the alleged breach of contract.
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for claims on an account stated and actions based on a contract.

Cook v. Midland Funding, LLC · filed 2016-05-13(5) and (9)

A six-year statute of limitations is applied to claims on an account stated and for actions based on a contract. See § 6-2-34(5) and (9), AIa.Code 1975. Thus, Cook has not demonstrated that the circuit court erred by declining to enter a summary judgment in Cook’s favor based upon its apparent conclusion that the applicable statute of limitations had not expired before Midland filed its complaint.
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Section 6-2-34(4) provides a six-year limitations period for contract claims, including claims for breach of an insurer’s enhanced duty of good faith.

Sabbah v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. · filed 2017-05-11(4)

Accordingly, these claims as well are subject to a six year statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34(5) bars an action to recover money on a loan filed more than six years after the claim accrues.

Chandler v. Virciglio · filed 2008-05-30(5)

Because Virciglio did not file his claims against Chandler until January 2006, at least seven and one-half years after his claims accrued, those claims are barred by § 6-2-34 as a matter of law.
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Section 6-2-34(9) sets a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims.

Chaney v. ALA WEST-AL, LLC · filed 2008-12-31(9)

Furthermore, claims of breach of contract are governed by a six-year statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract actions, and a claim cannot be dismissed as untimely when the alleged facts could place the breach within that period.

Snider v. Morgan · filed 2012-11-30

The parties agree that an action alleging breach of contract is subject to the six-year statute of limitations found in § 6-2-34, Ala.Code 1975. ... Construing the allegations of Jeffs complaint in his favor, as we must, we conclude that he may be able to prove a set of facts under which his claim against Harold’s estate based upon Harold’s purported breach of the power of attorney providing control of Thelma’s assets is not barred by the running of the limitations period. Therefore, the statute-of-limitations ground would not support dismissal of count I under Rule 12(b)(6).
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Section 6-2-34(9) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims, including claims based on an implied contract for services.

Utilities Board. of City of Opp v. Shuler Brothers, Inc. · filed 2013-06-21(9)

Such allegations — of a breach of contract — are governed by a six-year statute of limitations, and the third-party complaint with respect to this claim was timely filed within that limitations period. See § 6-2-34(9), Ala. Code 1975.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives a plaintiff six years from a breach to bring a breach-of-contract claim.

Jakeman v. Lawrence Group Management Co. · filed 2014-03-21(9)

Therefore, the alleged first breach of the contract is barred by the six-year statute of limitations because it occurred on August 28, 2002, and Kenneth did not file this action until May 25, 2010, almost eight years later.
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Section 6-2-34(9) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims.

Nelson v. Ken Megginson · filed 2014-09-30(9)

We conclude that the plaintiffs stated a claim of breach of contract and that therefore their claim was subject to a six-year, rather than a two-year, statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives six years to bring a breach-of-contract claim, beginning when the contract is breached.

Advance Trust & Life Escrow Services, LTA v. Protective Life Insurance Company · filed 2019-09-20(9)

Alabama law provides that the limitations period for breach of contract claims is six years, and the limitations period begins when the contract is breached. AC, Inc. v. Baker, 622 So. 2d 331, 333 (Ala. 1993) (citing Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9) (1975)). ... So the court WILL DENY Protective Life’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims as time-barred by Alabama’s statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives a plaintiff six years to commence a simple-contract action; filing within that period is timely when the plaintiff takes all steps required for immediate service, even if the first service attempt fails.

Nicholson v. Bush Hog, Inc. · filed 2018-09-13(9)

Under Alabama law, the limitations period for contract actions is six years. See Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9) (“[t]he following must be commenced within six years: … Actions upon any simple contract”); Cockrell v. Pruitt, 214 So.3d 324, 330 n.2 (Ala. 2016) (“The statute of limitations for a breach-of-contract claim is six years.”). ... Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the theory of lack of bona fide intent causing untimeliness of the contract-related claims for limitations purposes.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives six years to bring a breach of contract claim.

Townsend v. CitiMortgage Inc. · filed 2021-01-06(9)

In Alabama, the statute of limitations for contract claims is six years. Ala. Code § 6-2-34(9). ... The statute began to run at that time, thereby resulting in the expiration of the six-year statute of limitations years before the date the Complaint was filed in 2019.
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Claims outside the general contract period

Section 6-2-34(9)’s six-year limit for simple contract actions does not apply to an insurer’s claim seeking a declaration of its rights under a policy.

Great American Alliance Company v. Bravo Food Service LLC · filed 2019-11-21(9)

An insurer’s claim seeking a declaration of rights is not one for breach of contract.
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Section 6-2-34(9) does not supply the limitations period for enforcing watercraft liens; those actions are subject to the six-month period in § 35-11-6.

First Maryland Leasecorp. v. M/V Golden Egret · filed 1985-07-01(9)

The district court held “that the applicable statute of limitations is six years pursuant to Ala.Code § 6-2-34(9) in view of the present version of Ala.Code § 35-11-60 which fails to include the six-month limitation which appeared in earlier forms of the statute.” The six-year statute of limitations is the statute of limitations for all general contractual claims under Alabama law. We believe the district court erred in reaching this result. ... The fact that the present version of § 35-11-60 fails to specify a limitations period does not, however, mean that the general contractual statute of limitations period should be applied. Instead, the district court should have applied the six-month statute of limitations for liens created under Chapter 11.
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Section 6-2-34(9) does not apply to an action to enforce a foreign-country judgment because the claim does not arise from a contract, mortgage, or specialty.

Vagenas v. Continental Gin Co. · filed 1992-04-09(9)

The injury that Vagenas seeks to redress does not arise from a contract, mortgage or specialty that might otherwise warrant application of the six years limitations statute. Ala.Code § 6-2-34(9).
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Section 6-2-34(9)'s general six-year contract limitations period does not govern ERISA § 510 claims seeking back pay, benefits, and retirement eligibility credit when more specific Alabama limitations provisions apply.

Musick v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber · filed 1996-04-23(9)

The plaintiffs argue that Alabama's general six-year statute of limitations governing "[a]ctions upon any simple contract or specialty not enumerated [specifically]," Ala.Code § 6-2-34(9), should govern section 510 actions in Alabama. We reject this argument for the same reason we rejected it in Clark: other provisions of state law "more narrowly and specifically contemplate[ ] the [section 510] action now before us than does the general language" of the state's statute of limitations generally governing contract actions. 865 F.2d at 1242.
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Section 6-2-34(9)’s six-year period for general contract actions does not govern ERISA § 510 claims seeking back pay, benefits, and retirement eligibility credit in Alabama.

Pens. Plan Guide P 23919j T.A. Musick and James Character v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Inc. · filed 1996-04-23(9)

The plaintiffs argue that Alabama’s general six-year statute of limitations governing “[a]etions upon any simple contract or specialty not enumerated [specifically],” Ala.Code § 6-2-34(9), should govern section 510 actions in Alabama. We reject this argument for the same reason we rejected it in Clark: other provisions of state law “more narrowly and specifically eontemplate[ ] the [section 510] action now before us than does the general language” of the state’s statute of limitations generally governing contract actions. 865 F.2d at 1242.
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Section 6-2-34(4), (6), and (9) do not bar enforcement of restrictive covenants based on a deed under seal when the claim alleges wrongful use of land but no wrongful occupation.

Bekken v. Greystone Residential Ass'n · filed 2017-01-13

The deed conveying the property to Bekken uses language indicating that the instrument was under seal. ... We conclude that Bekken did not establish that § 6-2-34(4) and (9) apply to the facts of this case. ... Furthermore, the claim against Bekken alleges only a wrongful use of the property and not a wrongful occupation of it. We therefore determine that Bekken did not establish that § 6-2-34(6) applies to this case.
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Section 6-2-34(9) sets a six-year limitations period for contract actions; a fraud claim seeking a constructive trust does not fall within that period.

Gulf States Steel, Inc. v. Lipton · filed 1990-08-02(9)

The court fails to comprehend how a contract limitations period can be applied to an action based on fraud.
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Section 6-2-34’s six-year period for simple contracts does not govern a contract for the sale of goods, which is subject to the four-year period in § 7-2-725.

RIVERS MACHINERY CO. v. Barclay Intern., Inc. · filed 1989-11-09

Rivers Machinery argues that Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34, the six-year limitations period for simple contracts, controls. Barclay, on the other hand, contends that § 7-2-725, which limits actions on "contracts for sale" to four years, applies. A reading of § 7-2-725, as well as §§ 7-2-105(1) and7-2-106(1), reveals that Barclay is correct.
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Section 6-2-34(6) does not apply to an action seeking to remove a former developer from a subdivision’s architectural control committee.

Smith v. First Sav. of Louisiana, FSA · filed 1991-01-11(6)

We hold that the facts of the instant case do not invoke the application of § 6-2-34(6), and that the doctrine of laches does not bar this action, because Smith has not shown that the delay in bringing this action resulted in any prejudice to him.
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Section 6-2-34’s six-year period does not govern an action alleging that public officials failed to perform their legal duties; the ten-year period in § 6-2-33 applies.

McMillan v. Lee · filed 1994-08-12

The trial court dismissed the case, holding that McMillan’s claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations set out in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34. ... Therefore, we hold that the 10-year statute of limitations in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-33, applies to this cause of action. Accordingly, the trial court erred in holding that this action was time-barred.
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Section 6-2-34’s six-year limitations period does not govern an employee’s linked claims for breach of a collective bargaining agreement and breach of the union’s duty of fair representation.

Kelly v. Lipham · filed 1995-02-17

This case involves an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a union and an alleged breach of the union’s duty to provide fair representation in attempting to resolve its member’s grievance. The issue in this case is whether the claims are governed by the six-year limitations provision of Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34, or are they governed by the six-month limitations provision set out in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). We hold that the employee’s claims are governed by the six-month Federal statute; therefore, we affirm the partial summary judgment.
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Section 6-2-34(4)’s six-year limitations period does not apply to an action to enforce a negotiable instrument payable at a definite time.

McKerall v. Kaiser · filed 2010-09-30(4)

Because this present action seeks to enforce obligations under a negotiable instrument that was payable at a definite time, the applicable statute of limitations is found in § 7-3-118(a), Ala.Code 1975, and not §§ 6-2-33, 6-2-34, or 6-2-37, Ala.Code 1975.
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Federal civil-rights claims

Law changed since The later two-year § 6-2-38 period displaced this six-year borrowing rule for § 1981 claims, as applied in Madison v. BP Oil Co. (1996).

Section 6-2-34(1) supplies the six-year limitations period for § 1981 claims brought in Alabama.

Larkin v. Pullman-Standard Division, Pullman, Inc. · filed 1988-09-21(1)

Section 6-2-34(1) provided that “[ajctions for any trespass to person or liberty” must be brought within six years. ... We agree with the plaintiffs that the six-year statute should be applied. Goodman directs us to adopt the same state statute of limitations for both section 1983 and section 1981 actions, and this court has already adopted the six-year statute for section 1983 claims brought in Alabama.
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Law changed since Owens v. Okure (1989) led the Eleventh Circuit to adopt Alabama’s two-year § 6-2-38 period for § 1983 claims; this note describes the earlier six-year rule and its transition.

Section 6-2-34(1) supplied a six-year limitations period for Alabama § 1983 actions, but that period was not applied retroactively where the parties had long relied on the prior one-year period.

Foster v. Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County · filed 1989-05-23(1)

Subsequently, this Court decided that the six-year limitations period provided in Ala.Code § 6-2-34(1) applies to section 1983 actions arising in Alabama. ... Based on our application of Chevron, we hold that on the facts of this case the district court was correct in denying retroactive application of the six-year limitations period established in Jones.
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Law changed since Owens v. Okure (1989) led the Eleventh Circuit to apply Alabama’s two-year § 6-2-38 period to § 1983 claims, ending this six-year borrowing rule.

Section 6-2-34(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for § 1983 actions in Alabama.

Jordan v. Wilson · filed 1986-11-25(1)

The Eleventh Circuit subsequently decided that federal courts in Alabama should apply 1975 Ala.Code § 6-2-34(1), which provides a six-year statute of limitations in section 1983 actions. ... Since they allege discriminatory acts within six years of these dates, their section 1983 claim is timely.
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Section 6-2-34(1)’s six-year period for personal injury based on trespass does not govern a § 1983 wrongful death claim subject to Alabama’s Wrongful Death Act.

Long v. Hodges · filed 1989-01-13(1)

Drawing on the legislative history of the 1871 act, the Jones court noted that it followed the War Between the States and that court likened the conduct sought to be remedied to intentional acts of trespass, *240and thus applied the 6-year statute of limitations prescribed for “personal injury” based on the trespass remedy contained in Ala.Code, § 6-2-34(l).2 Unlike the “personal injury” in Jones, however, the “essential nature” of the instant claim is for the wrongful death of the plaintiff’s decedent pursuant to § 6-5-410.
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Section 6-2-34(1)'s six-year limitations period does not apply to § 1983 claims in Alabama.

Gorman v. Wood · filed 1995-05-26(1)

The plaintiff, in his table of cases and in his argument that his cause of action is governed by the six-year statute of limitations, cites McConico v. Romeo, 561 So.2d 523 (Ala. 1990), and Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34(1). ... However, according to Morrow v. Town ofLittleville, 576 So.2d 210 (Ala. 1991) ... the only statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in Alabama is the two-year statute of limitations in Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-38(l).
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Trespass and personal liberty

Section 6-2-34(2) sets a six-year limitations period for trespass claims, including a punitive-damages claim construed as wanton trespass.

Labauve v. Olin Corp. · filed 2005-11-10(2)

By contrast, the claims for trespass and punitive damages (construed as a claim for wanton trespass) are subject to a six-year limitations period under Alabama law.
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Section 6-2-34(2) gives trespass claims a six-year limitations period.

Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chemicals Corp. · filed 2009-10-01(2)

Plaintiffs’ trespass claims are subject to a six-year limitations period.
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Section 6-2-34 gives a trespass claim six years from accrual; a permanent trespass claim accrues when the property is injured, even if the owner discovers the injury later.

Business Realty Investment Company, Inc. v. Insituform Technologies, Inc. · filed 2014-05-01

The statute of limitations is six years for trespass and two years for trespass on the case. Ala. Code §§ 6-2-34, 6-2-38 (1975). ... BRIC sustained an injury when its sewer system was filled with cement and grout without its permission and, in BRIC’s words, was “destroyed.” BRIC’s injury was not the realization of its destroyed sewer system – it was the destruction itself. Its ignorance of this destruction does not toll the statute of limitations. See Home Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d at 473. BRIC’s cause of action therefore accrued on June 1, 2001, and the statute of limitations has long since run on either a trespass or a trespass on the case claim.
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Section 6-2-34(1) gives Alabama false-imprisonment claims a six-year limitations period.

Barnett v. Baldwin County Board of Education · filed 2014-10-08(1)

The five Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims for false imprisonment under Alabama law are subject to a six-year statute of limitation.
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Law changed since Walker v. Capstone Building Corp. (Mar. 16, 2012) overruled the McKenzie six-year wantonness rule and applied § 6-2-38(l)’s two-year period, subject to a transition rule.

Section 6-2-34(1) gives six years to bring a claim for wanton conduct that results in personal injury, including a wantonness claim involving products.

Carr v. International Refining & Manufacturing Co. · filed 2009-01-16(1)

Based on the analysis adopted in McKenzie, because the former employees have alleged wanton conduct by the new defendants, which resulted in injury to them, their wantonness claims are subject to the six-year limitations period of § 6-2-34(1).
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Section 6-2-34(1) applies its six-year limitations period to wanton or intentional conduct resulting in personal injury, but wanton conduct without personal injury does not qualify as trespass to the person.

Alabama Central Credit Union v. CUMIS INSURANCE SOCIETY INC. · filed 2011-04-08(1)

Such wanton conduct that does not result in personal injury, then, cannot qualify as trespass to the person and, thus, cannot fall within the purview of § 6-2-34(1).
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for assault and battery and trespass claims.

Shuler v. Liberty Duke · filed 2019-11-15

Because these claims are subject to a six-year limitations period under Ala. Code § 6-2-34, the claims were not dismissed as time-barred.
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Section 6-2-34(1) provides a six-year limit for trespass to person or liberty, including false imprisonment and assault and battery; it is not Alabama’s general or residual personal-injury limitations statute.

Ex Parte Grubbs · filed 1989-03-03(1)

Alabama has at least two personal injury statutes of limitations — six years "for any trespass to person or liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery," Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34(1), and two years for "all actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section." § 6-2-38(l). (Emphasis added.) In Alabama, the general or residual statute of limitations for personal injury is two years.
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Section 6-2-34(1) sets a six-year limit for trespass to person or liberty, including false imprisonment and assault and battery; it is not Alabama’s general personal injury limitations provision.

Grubbs v. Alabama State Bar · filed 1989-03-03(1)

Alabama has at least two personal injury statutes of limitations — six years “for any. trespass to person or liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery,” Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34(1), and two years for “all actions for any injury to the person or rights of another not arising from contract and not specifically enumerated in this section.” § 6-2-38(Z).
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Section 6-2-34 gives a plaintiff six years to bring a false imprisonment claim.

Sims v. Geohagan · filed 1994-05-06

The limitations period for a false imprisonment claim is six years. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34. Sims commenced this state court action claiming false imprisonment within that limitations period.
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Section 6-2-34(1) requires assault and battery actions to be brought within six years after accrual.

Travis v. Ziter · filed 1996-07-12(1)

An action alleging assault and battery must be brought within six years after the accrual of the cause of action. §6-2-34(1), Ala. Code 1975.
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Section 6-2-34(1) allows six years from accrual to bring an assault and battery action against the alleged assailant.

Burroughs v. Smurfit Stone Container Corp., LP · filed 2007-03-12(1)

Under Alabama law, “[a]n action alleging assault and battery must be brought within six years after the accrual of the cause of action. § 6-2-34(1), Ala. Code 1975.”
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Law changed since Walker v. Capstone Building Corp. (2012-03-16) overruled the six-year wantonness rule and applied the two-year period in § 6-2-38(l), subject to its transition rule for earlier accrued claims.

Section 6-2-34(1) provides a six-year limitations period for trespass claims, including claims alleging wanton conduct; intent, rather than the directness of the injury, distinguishes trespass from trespass on the case.

McKenzie v. Killian · filed 2004-03-05(1)

We overrule Sasser and its progeny to the extent that those cases prefer the theory of causality over intent as the mechanism for distinguishing between actions for trespass and for trespass on the case. As the Court recognized in Johns, wanton conduct is the equivalent in law to intentional conduct. Such an allegation of intent renders the six-year statutory period of limitations applicable.
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Section 6-2-34(1) gives a false-imprisonment claim six years from the date of arrest to be filed.

Freeman v. Holyfield · filed 2015-04-17(1)

Those claims included false imprisonment, the statute of limitations for which,- under § 6—2—34(1), Ala.Code 1975, is six years,5 and conspiracy, the statute of limitations for which, under § 6-2-38(1), Ala.Code 1975, is two years.6 ... Therefore, Freeman’s false-imprisonment .claim accrued on his date of. arrest on the charge of “domestic assault,” i.e., on July 11, 1995.
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CERCLA preemption of accrual date

For covered hazardous-substance property-damage claims, CERCLA replaces an earlier accrual date under § 6-2-34 with the date the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the damage, while leaving the limitations period intact.

Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc. · filed 2008-09-23

The court finds that little doubt exists that CERCLA preempts Alabama’s relevant statutes of limitations. See Ala. Code § 6-2-34, 6-2-38. ... CERCLA § 9658 preempts the Alabama statutes of limitations in such cases to the extent that Alabama’s statutes of limitations provide a “commencement date” earlier than when the Plaintiffs knew or should have known of the property damage caused by the hazardous substances.
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Legal malpractice actions

Section 6-2-34(8) gives non-ALSLA legal malpractice claims a six-year limitations period.

Reynolds v. Behrman Capital IV L.P. · filed 2020-07-28(8)

Contrary to their contention, however, a non-ALSLA legal malpractice claim is not subject to a two-year statue of limitations, but instead to a six-year statute of limitations. See Ala. Code § 6-2-34(8) (providing for a six-year limitations period for “[m]otions and other actions against attorneys-at-law for . . . neglect or omission of duty”); Jackson v. Kimbrough, 622 So. 2d 321, 322 (Ala. 1993) (“Under Ala. Code 1975, § 6–2–34(8), the period for filing legal malpractice actions was six years.”). Section 6-2-34(8) has not been applied in a legal malpractice claim in many years because the ALSLA replaced that statute of limitations for cases covered under that Act, but it remains on the books.
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Section 6-2-34(8)'s six-year period does not govern a legal malpractice claim filed after the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act took effect, even if the claim accrued before then.

Malb's Associates, Inc. v. Phillips · filed 1991-08-09(8)

They contend that the limitations period applicable to their cause of action is six years, pursuant to § 6-2-34(8), Ala. Code 1975. We disagree. ... Thus, under § 6-5-574(a), the plaintiffs had one year from April 12, 1988, to file their action.
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Section 6-2-34(8) formerly allowed six years to file a legal malpractice action; the later Legal Services Liability Act supplies the applicable limitation period for actions filed after its enactment.

Jackson v. Kimbrough · filed 1993-06-04(8)

Under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34(8), the period for filing legal malpractice actions was six years. ... Jackson’s complaint was filed on June 12, 1992; accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is set forth in § 6-5-574.
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Conversion claims—accrual and six-year limit

Section 6-2-34(9) gives contract claims a six-year limitations period; claims filed more than six years after these contracts were completed were time-barred.

Bay Lines, Inc. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc. · filed 2002-02-15(9)

The trial court did not dismiss those claims solely because they fell outside the 10-day period permitted by Rule 78, but also because they fell outside of the 6-year statute-of-limitations period for contract claims. See § 6-2-34(9), Ala. Code 1975. The contracts to which Bay Lines alleges it was a third-party beneficiary were contracts for the sale of the panels to Stoughton; those contracts were all completed before May 1993. The claims filed in January 2000 were, therefore, more than six years after the dates of the completion of the contracts and were therefore time-barred.
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for conversion claims; a claim does not fall under the shorter open-account period without evidence of a contract with a term left open.

Morgan v. Morgan · filed 1996-07-12

The husband also argues that the wife’s conversion claim is barred by the three-year statute of limitations for recovery on an open account rather than by the six-year limitation on actions alleging conversion. ... His argument that this is a claim on an open account fails, in part, because of his failure to demonstrate that a contract existed between the parties, and that some term of the contract was left open and undetermined by the parties. ... Based on the foregoing, we find no error in the trial court’s determinations that the wife’s complaint was timely, that it was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that the check was her separate property.
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Section 6-2-34(3) allows six years to bring a conversion action, but a claim based solely on an employee’s conduct under respondeat superior is subject to the two-year limit in § 6-2-38(n).

Crowe v. City of Athens · filed 1999-03-19(3)

While § 6-2-34(3) provides for a six-year period within which to commence a conversion action against a defendant, §6-2-38(n) provides that "[a]ll actions commenced to recover damages for injury to the person or property of another wherein a principal or master is sought to be held liable for the act or conduct of his agent, servant, or employee under the doctrine of respondeat superior must be brought within two years."
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Section 6-2-34 gives a plaintiff six years to bring a conversion claim, measured from when the claim accrues.

Treadwell v. Farrow · filed 2017-10-27

To the contrary, the evidence appears to be undisputed that Treadwell continued to exercise dominion over that personal property until March 2012, at the earliest. Therefore, at the time the complaint was filed in December 2016, the six-year limitations period would not have expired, and the conversion claim would not be barred by the statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34(3) provides a six-year limitations period for actions involving detention or conversion of personal property.

Ex parte Talbott · filed 2015-09-30(3)

The statute of limitations for “detention or conversion of personal property” is six years.
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Trespass to property

Section 6-2-34’s six-year trespass period does not apply to a landlord’s claim for injury to the reversion while a tenant possesses the property.

Amsouth Bank, N.A. v. City of Mobile · filed 1986-12-05

AmSouth and Festorazzi maintained that the trespass statute of limitations, which is six years, Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34, applied. ... Any cause of action for trespass belongs to Goldstein and Sons, Inc. Any damage inflicted on AmSouth's and Festorazzi's reversionary interest entitled them to pursue an action on the case, which at *Page 1075 the time this cause of action arose was governed by a one-year statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34(2) allows six years to bring an action for trespass to real or personal property, including a claim for injury directly caused by force.

Lowery v. Densmore · filed 1998-08-21(2)

An action for trespass to real or personal property must be commenced within six years of the act. 6-2-34(2), Ala. Code 1975. ... After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Lowery presented substantial evidence that Densmore's trespass was directly occasioned by force and injury; therefore, Lowery's action was properly for trespass and not trespass on the case.
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Section 6-2-34 allows six years to file a conversion claim.

Ex Parte Prudential Ins. Co. of America · filed 2000-09-15

The statute of limitations for conversion allows six years for filing a claim. See Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34. ... The Littlejohns filed their complaint alleging conversion almost seven years after the last loan was taken. As a result, the conversion claim is time-barred.
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Section 6-2-34(2) applies a six-year limitations period to indirect trespass claims involving sewage entering property.

Snyder v. Howard Plumbing & Heating Co. · filed 2000-09-15(2)

Although Easterling and the cases it discussed concerned an indirect trespass by surface water, we perceive no meaningful distinction between those cases and the instant case, which involves intrusion onto the Snyders’ property by sewage, for the purpose of applying the test in Borland, supra. Thus, we conclude that the Sny-ders’ claim is a claim of indirect trespass *429subject to the six-year limitations period of § 6-2-34(2).
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Section 6-2-34(2) gives a six-year limitations period to an indirect trespass claim arising from surface water and debris channeled onto neighboring land.

Easterling v. Awtrey Building Corp. · filed 1999-09-17(2)

Since Cochran was decided, the Alabama Supreme Court has held that Alabama does recognize a cause of action for indirect trespass that is subject to the six-year limitations period of § 6-2-34(2), Ala. Code 1975. ... We thus conclude that the trial court erred in determining Easterling’s trespass claim to be subject to a two-year, rather than a six-year, limitations period.
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Section 6-2-34(2) bars claims for trespasses to real property committed more than six years before suit.

Jackson v. City of Auburn · filed 2006-04-07(2)

Of course, the six-year statute of limitations applicable to trespass to real property, see Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34(2), would bar an action based on any trespasses committed more than six years before the institution of the action.
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The six-year limitation does not bar a continuing-trespass claim based on methane migration when each migration gives rise to a new claim.

Baugus v. City of Florence · filed 2007-11-09

The landowners' tort claims of nuisance, negligence, and trespass accrue each time the City's maintenance and on-going operation of the landfill causes methane to migrate onto the landowners' property and, thus, those claims are not time-barred.
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A trespass claim based on the permanent installation of buried cables is time-barred if filed more than six years after installation.

Webb v. Knology, Inc. · filed 2014-10-10(2)

Because the uncontroverted evidence indicates that the cable was installed in 2002 and that the Webbs filed their complaint in 2012, in accordance with the supreme court’s ruling in Motisi, the Webbs’ trespass claim as to that installation is time-barred.
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Section 6-2-34(2) sets a six-year limitations period for trespass claims.

Ex parte INV Performance Surfaces, LLC PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden v. Dupont De Nemours, Inc.) (Etowah Circuit Court: CV-23-900332). · filed 2025-04-04(2)

The statute-of-limitations period for Gadsden Water's trespass claims is six years. See § 6-2-34(2), Ala. Code 1975.
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Section 6-2-34(2) provides a six-year limitations period for trespass claims.

Ex parte DuPont De Nemours, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden v. DuPont De Nemours, Inc.) (Etowah Circuit Court: CV-23-900332). · filed 2025-04-04(2)

The statute-of-limitations period for Gadsden Water's trespass claims is six years. See § 6-2-34(2), Ala. Code 1975.
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Accrual of contract actions

The six-year limitations period for an action on a promissory note begins when the final valid extension expires, and a subrogee may sue within six years of that accrual.

Stewart v. Jones · filed 1993-03-12

We hold that the limitations period for an action on the promissory note did not begin to run until the end of the final period of extension granted by the Bank of Moundville. That is, the bank's cause of action on the note did not accrue until March 1987. As the bank's subrogee, Stewart could bring an action on the note at any time within six years of the accrual of the bank's cause of action.
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The six-year limitations period for a contract action begins when the contract is breached, rather than when actual damage is sustained.

AC, INC. v. Baker · filed 1993-06-11(9)

The statute of limitations on a contract action runs from the time a breach occurs rather than from the time actual damage is sustained.
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

McCord-Baugh v. BIRMINGHAM CITY BD. OF ED. · filed 2002-02-15

As such, it is governed by the six-year statute of limitation contained in Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-34.
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Section 6-2-34(9) provides a six-year limitations period for contract actions.

Jones v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. · filed 2003-09-05(9)

Because the period of the statute of limitations for a contract action is six years, § 6-2-34(9), Ala. Code 1975, no statute-of-limitations defense is at issue.
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Section 6-2-34(4) gives six years to bring an insurance contract claim, measured from the insurer's breach rather than the date of the loss.

Hackleburg Church v. Great Am. Co. · filed 1995-10-13(4)

The facts of this case fall clearly within contract law. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitations is six years. Culpepper; § 6-2-34(4), Ala. Code 1975. "The statute of limitations on a contract action runs from the time a breach occurs rather than from the time actual damage is sustained."AC, Inc. v. Baker, 622 So.2d 331 (Ala. 1993). The alleged breach in this action did not occur until Great American refused to pay for the damages sustained by the church. The six-year statute of limitations, therefore, was not a bar to this action.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives a party six years to bring a breach-of-contract claim, measured here from the failure to pay when payment became due.

Cunningham v. Langston, Frazer, Sweet & Freese · filed 1999-02-12(9)

Taking Cunningham's allegations as true, we must conclude that Langston Frazer's duty to perform arose when the money was actually awarded in the Weyerhaeuser action and that the breach occurred in June 1997 when Langston Frazer paid Cunningham only. $10,000, which was less than 50% of the attorney fee. Therefore, all of Cunningham's claims were filed well within the applicable statutory limitations periods. See Ala. Code *Page 806 1975, § 6-2-34(9) (six-year limitations period for a breach-of-contract claim); Ala. Code 1975, § 6-2-38(l) (two-year limitations period for a negligence or wantonness claim).
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Section 6-2-34(9) provides a six-year limitations period for breach-of-contract claims; when the date of breach is genuinely disputed, the claim cannot be held time-barred as a matter of law.

Martin v. Hodges Chapel, LLC · filed 2011-12-16(9)

Although it is possible that the defendants’ record-keeping system was inadequate from the outset, and that the breach occurred as early as the burials of Prince, Jr., in January 2000 and Mobley in January 2004 — thus resulting in the contract claims being barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to breach-of-contract claims, see § 6-2-34(9), Ala.Code 1975 — it is also possible that the records may have been lost or may have become disorganized at some later date that was within the six-year statutory limitations period. Because there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to the accrual date of the contract claims concerning the burial sites of Prince, Jr., and Mobley, the funeral home did not establish that those claims were barred, as a matter of law, by the statute of limitations.
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Section 6-2-34(9) gives six years to bring a contract action, measured from the breach even if damage occurs later.

McCall v. Household Finance Corp. · filed 2013-03-01(9)

Based on these allegations, the breach, if any, occurred in 1996 and the six-year statute of limitations had expired by the time the complaint was filed in 2011. ... This would be an element of damage, however, and does not extend the time for filing a complaint for a precedent breach.
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The six-year limitations period for a contract claim based on an allegedly unfair term begins when the agreement is executed.

Ditech Holding Corporation · filed 2024-05-16(9)

As in McCall, in this case, the statute of limitations on a breach of contract claim predicated on an allegedly unfair term as a “breach” was triggered upon execution of the agreement.
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Compulsory counterclaims

Section 6-2-34(9)’s six-year limit for breach-of-contract actions does not bar recovery on a compulsory counterclaim, even if an independent action would be untimely.

ROMAR DEV. v. Gulf View Management Corp. · filed 1994-07-01(9)

Consequently, to the extent that Shaw holds that recovery under an untimely compulsory counterclaim is limited to the amount of the claim, Shaw is overruled, and we hold that Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34(9), does not bar the counterclaim seeking recovery of sewer tap fees in this case.
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Choice of law

Section 6-2-34(9)’s six-year limitations period applies to an indemnity action when the competing Texas limitations statute is procedural.

James v. Old Republic Surety · filed 1996-01-05(9)

The Texas statute cited by James is merely a procedural law; therefore, the trial court properly held that the Alabama six-year statute of limitations is applicable to this case. See Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34(9).
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Limitations period for wantonness claims

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 6-2-34(1) gives a six-year limitations period to personal-injury claims based on wantonness because they are treated as trespass claims.

Walker v. Capstone Building Corporation. · filed 2010-03-26(1)

First, a claim of wantonness against a defendant resulting in personal injury to the plaintiff is, in legal effect, a claim that the plaintiff was injured by an intentional act or an intentional failure to act on the part of the defendant, rather than by a negligent act or failure to act on the part of the defendant. Second, the intentional nature of the harm caused by the defendant in injuring the plaintiff results in the application of the six-year statute of limitations governing trespass claims, rather than the two-year statute of limitations that typically applies to personal-injury claims based in negligence.
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Section 6-2-34(1)’s six-year limitations period applies to wantonness claims filed before Ex parte Capstone was released.

Jerkins v. Lincoln Electric Co. · filed 2011-06-30(1)

Jerkins and any other Alabamians with wantonness claims now pending before the MDL court filed those claims before McKenzie was overruled by Ex parte Capstone. Applying the prospective nature of our decision in Ex parte Capstone to their cases, we accordingly conclude that a six-year period of limitations should apply to those wantonness claims.
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For wantonness claims that accrued by June 3, 2011, the former six-year period under § 6-2-34(1) sets the filing deadline if it expires before June 3, 2013.

Anderson v. Tate & Lyle PLC · filed 2011-09-30(1)

We specified in Capstone, however, that “litigants whose causes of action have accrued on or before the date of this decision [i.e., June 3, 2011] shall have two years from today’s date to bring their action unless and to the extent that the time for filing their action under the six-year limitations period announced in McKenzie would expire sooner.” Because Anderson’s wantonness claims accrued on November 8, 2006, the six-year statute of limitations announced in McKenzie does not expire until November 8, 2012. Therefore, for purposes of his wantonness claims there is no relation-back issue and Anderson’s amended complaint filed on August 9, 2010, was timely filed.
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Section 6-2-34(1) provides a six-year limitations period for the intentional torts it describes, but does not cover wantonness claims.

Walker v. Capstone Building Corp. · filed 2012-03-16(1)

We therefore cannot place claims of wantonness within the governance of § 6-2-34(1), which we interpret as imposing a six-year statute of limitations on the intentional torts described therein, i.e., “trespass to person or liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery.”
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Section 6-2-34(1)'s former six-year period for wantonness claims can shorten the transitional filing window if it expires before June 3, 2013.

Beddingfield v. Mullins Ins. Co. · filed 2018-06-15(1)

Under Ex parte Capstone, because their claims accrued before June 3, 2011, the Beddingfields are correct that they had until June 3, 2013, to file suit, unless the six-year statute of limitations previously applied under Alabama law had expired earlier, which it did not in this case.
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Actions of debt and liquidated accounts

Section 6-2-34’s six-year limitations period applies to an action of debt to recover a liquidated sum owed by statute.

Alabama Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery · filed 2011-06-17(5)

Our review of applicable Alabama law leads us to agree with the AIGA that the six-year statute of limitations provided in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-34, upon which the AIGA relies, does indeed apply in this situation. The AIGA’s reimbursement claim is in the nature of a common-law action of debt (as opposed to assumpsit upon an express or implied contract) for the recovery of money provided by law.
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Section 6-2-34(5) applies a six-year limitations period to statutory reimbursement claims for a liquidated sum.

Alabama Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Water Works & Sanitary Sewer Board of the City of Montgomery · filed 2012-02-10(5)

Section 6-2-34(5) provides that “[a]ctions for the recovery of money upon a ... liquidated account” are governed by a six-year statute of limitations. As the Court of Civil Appeals noted, AIGA’s right to reimbursement is “a statutory right permitting the recovery of a liquidated sum.” 93 So.3d at 97. Therefore, AIGA’s claims related to that right fall within the purview of § 6-2-34(5).
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Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for actions on stated accounts and simple contracts.

Reddick v. Capouano, Beckman, Russell & Burnett, LLC · filed 2021-10-29(5), (9)

Even viewing the record in light most favorable to Reddick, there is no evidence demonstrating that the small claims lawsuit for collection of the Zelda debt was filed outside of the six-year limitations period—either as an action to re- cover money upon an account stated or as an action to recover money upon Reddick’s breach of contract when he failed to pay following Zelda’s September 2012 demand for payment—and therefore time-barred in violation of the FDCPA.
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Recovery of personal property

Section 6-2-34 provides a six-year limitations period for a claim to recover personal property, running from when the claimant was denied access to it.

Tang v. Altimmune, Inc. · filed 2023-03-24

If the claim accrued in 2012, the statute of limitations expired in 2018. ... The Court finds, based on the allegations in the amended complaint, that any potentially viable claim for the return of laboratory notebooks first accrued in 2012 when Dr. Tang was locked out of his laboratory and denied access to them. The statute of limitations on that claim, to the extent there is a viable claim, has run, and the claim is time-barred.
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57 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

Smith v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, this court selects the limitations period for a federal fair-representation claim under federal characterization law; § 6-2-34 appears only in its account of the Alabama Supreme Court’s contrary ruling, and the court applies § 6-2-39 instead. opinion →
Nathan Rodgers Construction & Realty Corp. v. City of Saraland, Alabama, a Municipal Corporation, the court cites § 6-2-34 as background and an analogy while deciding which other limitations statute governs; it does not decide this section’s own application. opinion →
Erkins v. United Steelworkers, the court chose the federal § 10(b) limitations period for the fair-representation claim; § 6-2-34 appeared as the membership’s proposed state period, and the court did not decide that section’s own rules. opinion →
Fomby v. City of Calera, the court rejected the municipal six-month period but expressly left open whether § 6-2-34 or § 6-2-39 governed, because the action was timely under either. opinion →
Small v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast, the court recounts the Eleventh Circuit’s Alabama limitations analysis in Jones as an analogy while deciding which Maine limitations period governs § 1983 claims. opinion →
Greenfield v. District of Columbia, the Alabama provision appears only in a footnote explaining a different court’s decision; this court decides which District of Columbia limitations period governs. opinion →
Johnson v. Arnos, the opinion reports the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling about the Alabama statute; this court decides which Illinois limitations statute governs. opinion →
International Association of MacHinists and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge No. 1688 v. Allied Products Corporation, the court decides which limitations period federal law should borrow for a § 301 action to compel arbitration, rather than deciding a rule of § 6-2-34 itself. opinion →
Jong Hee Small, Personal Representative of the Estate of Delbert Small v. The Inhabitants of the City of Belfast and James Murphy, Etc., the discussion of § 6-2-34(1) reports the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Jones; this court decides which Maine limitations statute governs instead. opinion →
Epp v. Gunter, the discussion of Alabama’s statute reports the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Jones; this court decides which Nebraska limitations period to borrow. opinion →
Owens v. Okure, the Court cites § 6-2-34(1) only as one example in a footnote list of state limitations statutes; it makes no decision about that section. Its other Alabama reference reports an earlier Eleventh Circuit ruling. opinion →
Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, the court decides which state limitations period federal law borrows for a § 1983 claim after Owens; it does not decide any rule of § 6-2-34 itself. opinion →
United Paperworks International, Local 395, United Paperworkers International, Local 766 v. Itt Rayonier, Inc., the Alabama limitations discussion reports the earlier Allied Products decision; this court decides that Florida’s one-year period governs this case. opinion →
LUFKIN v. McCALLUM, the court decides the federal retroactivity of Owens's two-year limitations rule; its citation to § 6-2-34(1) only describes the earlier Jones I ruling. opinion →
Lufkin v. McCallum, the citation to § 6-2-34(1) reports the earlier Jones I ruling. This court decides the federal retroactivity of Owens, not this section’s own rules. opinion →
Kachler v. Taylor, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 6-2-34(9) barred the contract claim. opinion →
RMS Technology, Inc. v. TDY Industries, Inc., the court decides that the UCC governs these claims and applies Virginia procedural limitations law; § 6-2-34 appears in RMS’s rejected argument, without a decision construing that section’s own rules. opinion →
Ishler v. Commissioner, the court uses § 6-2-34 as an outer bound while deciding the limitations period for a claim under the Alabama Sales Representative’s Commission Contracts Act, rather than deciding § 6-2-34’s own rules. opinion →
Carn v. Medical Data Systems, Inc. (In Re Cambron), the six-year period and time-barred debt appear as factual background; the court says the sole issue it decides is whether the collection letter violates the FDCPA, not a rule of § 6-2-34. opinion →
Mann v. Darden, the court noted that no limitations defense was raised and proceeded to the battery claim’s merits; it did not decide a rule under § 6-2-34. opinion →
Brock v. Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., the court mentions the six-year period as background, but decides whether the Bankruptcy Code precludes an FDCPA claim rather than any rule of § 6-2-34. opinion →
Hurt v. Shelby County Board of Education, the section appears only in the court’s account of defendants’ limitations argument; the opinion contains no court decision on § 6-2-34. opinion →
Morse v. Life Insurance Company of North America, the citation to § 6-2-34(9) appears in Morse’s argument for Alabama’s six-year period, which the court did not adopt; it applied Michigan law. opinion →
Cooper v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., the court mentions Alabama’s six-year limitations defense as background to the collection letter, but decides Article III standing for the FDCPA claims rather than any contested rule of § 6-2-34. opinion →
The Utilities Board of Tuskegee v. 3M Company Inc., the court expressly declines to decide whether the six-year period applies to the trespass claim and dismisses that claim on the merits. opinion →
Taylor, the six-year limitations point is Taylor’s objection, and the court did not adopt or decide it; it remanded the state-law claims. opinion →
Taylor, the reference to § 6-2-34(1) reports Taylor’s argument; this order does not adopt it or decide that section’s rules. opinion →
Strozier v. Marchich, the discussion of § 6-2-34(2) is in a dissent; the court’s majority states no rule about the section. opinion →
Smith v. City of Gardendale, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 6-2-34 supplied the limitations period and resolved the case on accrual instead. opinion →
Michael v. Beasley, the six-year rule is reported as a prior holding; this opinion decides the limitations period under the LSLA. opinion →
Brooks v. Hill, the court cited § 6-2-34(9) while deciding whether a claim survived under § 6-5-462; it did not decide a limitations issue under § 6-2-34. opinion →
Birmingham Hockey Club, Inc. v. NCCI, INC., the court held that the six-year argument was not preserved for appeal; it did not decide whether § 6-2-34 applies to the claim. opinion →
McLean v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., the section-specific statement is McLean’s argument, which the court did not adopt; the court decided the claim was untimely under the bill of lading’s contractual limitation. opinion →
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Anniston Development Co., the court decides that the claim is not subject to § 6-2-37(1). It does not decide a rule of § 6-2-34; the reference to § 6-2-34(9) appears in Wal-Mart’s alternative argument. opinion →
Clothier v. Counseling, Inc., the court mentions § 6-2-34 while describing an earlier case, but decides the res judicata effect of Clothier's prior dismissal, not this section's rules. opinion →
Hensley v. Poole, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 6-2-34(3) applies and resolved the limitations dispute on other grounds. opinion →
JOHNSTON-TOMBIGBEE FURNITURE MFG. v. Berry, the court expressly declined to decide whether § 6-2-34 applies to the conversion claim. opinion →
Burrell v. Essary, the court mentions the six-year period in a footnote but resolves the trespass claim on appellate waiver, without deciding a rule under § 6-2-34(a). opinion →
Ex Parte International Refining & Mfg. Co., the six-year limitations argument is the plaintiffs’ contention, and the court expressly declines to decide it. opinion →
Cooper v. Stringfellow, the ten-year demand-note ruling is reported from the trial court; the appellate court affirms on multiple cited authorities without deciding a rule of § 6-2-34. opinion →
Coleman v. City of Dothan, the court reports the trial court’s count limitation and resolves whether the amendment related back; it does not decide § 6-2-34(2)’s own rule. opinion →
Hollander v. Nichols, the court reports the parties’ agreement rather than deciding a rule under § 6-2-34. opinion →
Prater v. Brian Nelson Excavating, LLC, the court declined to decide whether § 6-2-34(2) applied; its citation appeared in the parties’ arguments and the trial court’s order. opinion →
LPP Mortgage, Ltd. v. Boutwell, the court decides that the federal limitations period governs the SBA assignee’s claim; it does not decide a rule of § 6-2-34. opinion →
Franklin v. Mitchell, 2091053 (ala.civ.app. 9-2-2011), the court reports the Franklins’ concession but makes no decision of its own about § 6-2-34. opinion →
Ex Parte Novus Utilities, Inc., 1101127 (Ala. 12-2-2011), the discussion of § 6-2-34 reports what this court decided in Capstone; this opinion decides a relation-back issue. opinion →
Brown v. First Federal Bank, the reference to § 6-2-34(1) reports the parties’ limitations arguments; the court does not decide that section’s application. opinion →
Express Oil Change, LLC v. ANB Insurance Services, this is tentative, and the court later says Express Oil abandoned its wantonness claim. The court does not decide the application of § 6-2-34(1). opinion →
Ex parte International Refining & Manufacturing Co. d/b/a IRMCO, the quoted interpretation is from the earlier Capstone decision; this court does not independently decide § 6-2-34(1)'s rules in this opinion. opinion →
Williams v. Limestone County Water & Sewer Authority, the court did not decide whether § 6-2-34 barred the claims; it expressly declined to reach the limitations issue. opinion →
Breland v. City of Fairhope, the court applies a two-year period because Breland offered no meaningful supported argument against it; it does not decide the scope of § 6-2-34(6). opinion →
Honea v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., the quoted passage reports Honea's argument; the later discussion of the six-year rule is in a dissent. The supplied majority text does not decide the section's application. opinion →
Corley v. Richardson, the limitations discussion is a conditional observation in a special concurrence; the court affirmed without an opinion. opinion →
Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the court decided whether the policies incorporated Kentucky's limitations period; it did not decide a rule of § 6-2-34, which appears in its account of Jackson's argument. opinion →
Kendrick v. Lewis, the court decided whether the amended complaint was properly struck under Rule 15(a). Its footnote mentions § 6-2-34(1)'s six-year period but does not decide a rule of that section. opinion →
Tye v. Houston County Board of Education, the only statement applying section 6-2-34(1) reports the parties agreement; the court makes no independent ruling on the section. opinion →
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, the Court cited the section to identify the debt’s limitations period while deciding whether filing a stale bankruptcy claim violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. opinion →

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