Anti-SLAPP Pre-Suit Notice / Reconsider-Demand Letter - Universal

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PRE-SUIT NOTICE — ANTI-SLAPP RIGHTS AND REQUEST TO WITHDRAW THREATENED OR ASSERTED CLAIMS

[LAW FIRM NAME]
Attorneys at Law
[FIRM ADDRESS LINE 1]
[CITY, STATE ZIP]
Tel: [TELEPHONE]
Email: [EMAIL]

SENT VIA CERTIFIED MAIL, RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
AND BY EMAIL TO: [OPPOSING COUNSEL EMAIL] / [PLAINTIFF EMAIL]

[DATE]

[PLAINTIFF NAME / COUNSEL FOR PROSPECTIVE PLAINTIFF]
[FIRM NAME, if applicable]
[ADDRESS LINE 1]
[CITY, STATE ZIP]

Re: NOTICE OF ANTI-SLAPP RIGHTS AND DEMAND TO WITHDRAW THREATENED CLAIM
Your Client / Prospective Plaintiff: [PROSPECTIVE PLAINTIFF]
Our Client / Prospective Defendant: [CLIENT NAME]
Subject Communication / Activity: [BRIEF NEUTRAL DESCRIPTION — e.g., "online review dated [DATE]"; "public comments at the [DATE] city council meeting"; "investigative article published [DATE] in [PUBLICATION]"]
Demand or Threatened Action Referenced: [DEMAND LETTER DATED ___ / DRAFT COMPLAINT / PUBLIC THREAT DATED ___]
Response Deadline: [DATE — typically 14–21 days from delivery]

Dear [PLAINTIFF / COUNSEL]:

This firm represents [CLIENT NAME] in connection with the [demand letter / draft complaint / public threat] received from you on [DATE], in which you assert or threaten to assert claims for [defamation / libel / slander / tortious interference / business disparagement / intentional infliction of emotional distress / civil conspiracy / other] arising from our Client's [speech / publication / petitioning activity / consumer review / report to a government agency] described above.

We write — before any complaint is filed — to put you and your client on formal notice that the threatened claims squarely target activity protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, the parallel free-speech and petition clauses of the [STATE] Constitution, and the [CITE APPLICABLE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE]. If the threatened lawsuit is filed, our Client will move promptly under that statute to dismiss/strike the action, will seek the mandatory award of attorneys' fees and costs that the statute imposes on the prevailing movant, will invoke the automatic stay of discovery, and (in jurisdictions providing one) will exercise the right of immediate interlocutory appeal from any denial.

This letter is a formal request that you reconsider and withdraw the threatened claim. Proceeding to file will expose your client to a fee award that, in published cases, has ranged from the low five figures into the low six figures, and will expose you personally to whatever sanctions and discipline are available where counsel persists with a SLAPP after notice.

I. NOTHING HEREIN IS AN ADMISSION

Our Client denies that the communication or conduct at issue is actionable in any respect. Nothing in this letter — including the neutral description of the speech in Section II — constitutes an admission of any fact, element, or claim asserted or threatened by you. All facts, defenses, privileges, and immunities are expressly reserved, including the constitutional, statutory, and common-law defenses described below.

II. THE PROTECTED ACTIVITY

The communication and conduct on which your client's threatened claim is based consist of:

[NEUTRAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SPEECH OR PETITIONING ACTIVITY — e.g., "a 312-word consumer review of [BUSINESS] posted by our Client on [PLATFORM] on [DATE]"; "remarks delivered by our Client at the publicly-noticed regular meeting of the [BODY] on [DATE]"; "the investigative article titled '[TITLE]' published on [DATE] in [OUTLET], which addresses [TOPIC]"; "our Client's complaint dated [DATE] to the [REGULATORY AGENCY] regarding [SUBJECT]"].

This activity falls within the protected categories recognized by every modern anti-SLAPP statute:

1. Speech in a public forum on a matter of public interest — including consumer reviews, social-media posts, broadcast and print journalism, and public commentary on businesses, professionals, public officials, public figures, products, services, and matters of public health, safety, environment, civil rights, governance, and consumer protection.

2. Petitioning activity — including communications to legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative bodies; reports to regulators or law enforcement; testimony at public hearings; and filings in litigation. See Noerr-Pennington doctrine; E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).

3. Expressive conduct in connection with a public issue — including association, assembly, boycotts, protests, and other lawful conduct in furtherance of constitutional rights of free speech, press, association, and petition.

III. THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE THAT WILL APPLY

Option A — California: Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16

California's anti-SLAPP statute applies to "[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue." § 425.16(b)(1). On a special motion to strike:

• The motion must be filed within 60 days of service of the complaint (later only on leave of court). § 425.16(f).
• The court applies a two-step test: (i) movant shows the claim "arises from" protected activity; (ii) the plaintiff must then demonstrate, with admissible evidence, a "probability" of prevailing — a summary-judgment-like standard. Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376 (2016); Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc., 7 Cal. 5th 871 (2019).
• All discovery is automatically stayed upon filing, except by noticed motion for good cause. § 425.16(g).
• A prevailing defendant shall recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. § 425.16(c)(1). The fee award is mandatory, not discretionary.
• An order denying the motion is immediately appealable as of right. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 425.16(i), 904.1(a)(13).

Option B — Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA) States

UPEPA, drafted by the Uniform Law Commission in 2020, has been adopted (as of early 2026) in: Washington (2021), Kentucky (2022), Hawaii (2022), Oregon (substantially conformed), New Jersey, Utah, Maine (effective 1/1/2025), Minnesota (2024), Pennsylvania (2024), Ohio (January 2025), Idaho (effective 1/1/2026), Montana (2025), Iowa (2025), Delaware (September 2025), Michigan (October 2025), and South Dakota (March 2026). UPEPA provides:

• A special motion for expedited relief, filed within 60 days of service (subject to extension for good cause). UPEPA § 3.
• All proceedings, including discovery, stayed on filing of the motion (with narrow exceptions). UPEPA § 4.
• The plaintiff must establish the claim is legally and factually sufficient under a summary-judgment-equivalent standard, or the court grants the motion. UPEPA § 7.
• The court shall award the prevailing movant court costs, reasonable attorneys' fees, and reasonable litigation expenses. UPEPA § 10.
• Interlocutory appeal as of right from an order denying the motion in whole or in part. UPEPA § 9.

Option C — Texas Citizens Participation Act (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001 et seq.)

The TCPA permits a motion to dismiss within 60 days of service. § 27.003(b). Discovery is stayed. § 27.003(c). The movant must show the claim is based on or in response to the exercise of the right of free speech, the right to petition, or the right of association. § 27.005(b). If shown, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by clear and specific evidence. § 27.005(c). Prevailing defendants are entitled to court costs, attorneys' fees, and reasonable expenses, and the court may award sanctions sufficient to deter future similar conduct. § 27.009(a). Denial is immediately appealable. § 51.014(a)(12).

Option D — New York (CPLR § 3211(g); Civ. Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a, as amended November 2020)

The 2020 amendments broaden New York's statute to cover "any communication in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest" and "any other lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public interest." Civ. Rights Law § 76-a(1)(a). Defendant may move to dismiss; plaintiff must demonstrate a "substantial basis in law." CPLR § 3211(g). Costs and attorneys' fees shall be recovered upon a demonstration that the action was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law. Civ. Rights Law § 70-a(1)(a). Compensatory and punitive damages available against the SLAPP-filer.

Option E — Florida (Fla. Stat. § 768.295), Illinois (735 ILCS 110), Colorado (C.R.S. § 13-20-1101), Nevada (NRS § 41.660), Oklahoma (12 Okla. Stat. § 1430)

[As applicable — provide the corresponding citation, filing deadline, burden-shifting standard, discovery-stay provision, fee-shifting standard, and appeal provision for the operative state.]

IV. INDEPENDENT GROUNDS THAT WILL DEFEAT THE THREATENED CLAIM

In addition to anti-SLAPP relief, the threatened claim is independently defective on at least the following grounds:

☐ Constitutional Privilege. A public-official or public-figure plaintiff must plead and prove actual malice — knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth — with clear and convincing evidence. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). A private-figure plaintiff suing on a matter of public concern must plead and prove at least negligence and may not recover presumed or punitive damages absent actual malice. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).

☐ Opinion / Rhetorical Hyperbole / Non-Falsifiable Statements. Statements of pure opinion, hyperbole, and non-falsifiable assertions are not actionable. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).

☐ Substantial Truth. A defamation claim cannot succeed where the gist or "sting" of the publication is substantially true. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).

☐ Fair Report Privilege / Neutral Reportage / Section 230. [As applicable — fair report of official proceedings; common-law qualified privileges; 47 U.S.C. § 230 immunity for interactive computer services.]

☐ Noerr-Pennington Immunity. Petitioning a government body, including regulatory complaints and litigation, is constitutionally immunized from tort liability absent the narrow "sham" exception.

☐ No Special Damages / Pleading Defect. [Where business-disparagement, IIED, or tortious-interference claims are threatened: identify the missing element — special damages, extreme and outrageous conduct, valid contract or expectancy, improper means.]

☐ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 / Civil Rights Counterclaim (if state actor involved). Where the prospective plaintiff is a government actor or has acted under color of state law, the threatened suit may itself constitute retaliation against protected First Amendment activity, exposing the prospective plaintiff to liability under § 1983 and a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

V. FEE-SHIFTING REMINDER AND COST EXPOSURE

We urge you and your client to weigh, before filing, the economic reality of pursuing a SLAPP claim:

• Mandatory fee award. In California, UPEPA jurisdictions, Texas, and similar regimes, an award of attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing defendant is mandatory, not discretionary.
• Order-of-magnitude exposure. Published anti-SLAPP fee awards routinely range from $25,000 to well into six figures; awards exceeding $500,000 are documented.
• Sanctions. TCPA § 27.009 and certain other statutes authorize additional sanctions "sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar actions."
• Discovery stay. Your client will not be permitted to take discovery into our Client's finances, communications, or sources during the pendency of the motion or any appeal.
• Interlocutory appeal. Denial of the motion is immediately appealable in most jurisdictions, extending the litigation by 12 to 24 months at your client's risk.
• Insurance. Defamation and "personal and advertising injury" coverage may respond to our Client's defense and indemnity; your client should not assume our Client lacks resources to litigate.

VI. DEMAND TO WITHDRAW AND RECONSIDER

On behalf of our Client, we respectfully but firmly demand that your client:

1. Withdraw the demand letter dated [DATE] and any associated threats of litigation, in writing, by [RESPONSE DEADLINE];
2. Confirm in writing that no civil action will be filed against our Client arising from the protected activity described in Section II; and
3. Cease any further demand, threat, retraction request (other than a good-faith § 47 / state-equivalent retraction demand strictly conforming to statute), or public statement intended to chill our Client's protected expression.

In exchange for a timely, substantive withdrawal, our Client is prepared to forego — at this time — affirmative claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, declaratory relief, and (where applicable) § 1983 retaliation. No such forbearance will be available after suit is filed.

VII. PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE / LITIGATION HOLD

You and your client are on notice to preserve all documents, communications, electronically stored information, and tangible things relevant to the threatened claim and to any anti-SLAPP and counter-claims, including but not limited to:

• All internal and external communications discussing our Client, the speech at issue, or any decision to threaten or file suit;
• All evidence of damages and any business records used or to be used to support the threatened claim;
• All communications between counsel and client bearing on the purpose of the threatened suit, to the extent discoverable under crime-fraud and similar exceptions where the suit is filed in bad faith.

Spoliation will be pursued aggressively.

VIII. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

All rights, defenses, privileges, immunities, and counterclaims of our Client are expressly reserved, including but not limited to: anti-SLAPP relief; First Amendment defenses; Noerr-Pennington immunity; statutory privileges; common-law privileges; § 230 immunity; § 1983 and § 1988 remedies where state action is implicated; malicious prosecution; abuse of process; tortious interference (where applicable to your client's interference with our Client's contracts or relationships); and declaratory relief. This letter is not a complete recitation of our Client's defenses or counterclaims.

This communication is sent for the purpose of pre-litigation resolution and is protected by, among other things, the litigation privilege, [Fed. R. Evid. 408 / state analog], and applicable anti-SLAPP litigation-conduct protections.

IX. RESPONSE

Please direct your written response to the undersigned by [DATE]. We encourage you to consult independent First Amendment counsel before responding. The strategic, economic, and reputational consequences of filing a SLAPP after express notice are severe — to your client and, in many jurisdictions, to counsel personally.

Govern yourselves accordingly.

Sincerely,

[ATTORNEY NAME]
[BAR NUMBER]
[LAW FIRM NAME]

cc: [CLIENT]
[INSURANCE CARRIER — media liability / personal & advertising injury]

SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (Uniform Law Commission, 2020) and state adoptions through Q1 2026
• Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16; Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal. 5th 376 (2016); Wilson v. CNN, 7 Cal. 5th 871 (2019)
• Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.001 et seq.
• N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 70-a, 76-a (Nov. 2020 amendments); CPLR § 3211(g)
• Fla. Stat. § 768.295; 735 ILCS 110; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-1101; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.660; 12 Okla. Stat. § 1430
• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991)
• E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965)
• Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Anti-SLAPP Legal Guide (current edition)
• Institute for Free Speech, Anti-SLAPP Statutes: 2025 Report Card

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