Hours worked: public transit employees who start and end shifts at different locations

STATE OF CALIFORNIA GRAY DAVIS, Governor

DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT
LEGAL SECTION
320 W. 4th Street, Suite 430
Loe Angeles, CA 90013
(213)097-1511

ANNE STEVASON, Acting Chief Counsel

                                       January 29, 2002


       William J. Flynn
       Neyhart, Anderson, Freitas, Flynn & Grosboll
       600 Harrison Street, Suite 535
       San Francisco, CA 94107-1370

       Susan Itelson
       Sacramento Regional Transit District
       P.O. Box 2110
       Sacramento, CA 95812-2110


                   Re: "Hours of Work" for Public Transit Employees Required
                        to Start and End Their Shifts at Different Locations


       Dear Mr. Flynn and Ms. Itelson:


            Please accept my apologies for our delay in responding to
       your letters of March 9, 2001, and March 21, 2001, concerning the
       above-referenced issue. Under the facts presented, bus and light
       rail vehicle operators employed by the Sacramento Regional
       Transit District ("RTD") are represented by a union, Local 256 of
       the Amalgamated Transit Union ("ATU"), and are covered by a
       collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the RTD and ATU.
       These operators are either required to begin their shifts at a
       particular bus or rail yard, or at a relief point somewhere along
       the route. Operators who start their shifts at a bus or rail
       yard typically end their shifts at a relief point, where the
       relief driver starts his or her shift. Relief drivers typically
       end their shifts at a bus or rail yard. The relief points and
       the bus or rail yards are geographically separate, in some cases
       more than 30 minutes apart. RTD does not pay part-time operators
       for the time spent traveling from the locations where they end
       their shifts ("end-shift locations") to the locations where they
       started their shifts ("start-shift locations")1. RTD pays its
       full-time operators a negotiated amount, set out in the CBA, for


             1 Relieved operators are given free transportation on RTD vehicles so that
       they may ride on a bus or light rail vehicle to return to the locations where
       they started their shifts.



                                                                            2002.01.29

Page 2

William J. Flynn
January 29, 2002
Page 2

time spent traveling from end-shift locations to start-shift
locations. However, according to the facts presented, these
amounts are based on "imputed," rather than "actual" travel time.

 Operators whose shifts begin in the early morning cannot get

to work using public transportation, as the system does not
operate all night. These operators commute to the start-shift
locations using their own vehicles, so they must first travel
after their shift ends from their end-shift locations (where they
are relieved by the relief drivers) to their start-shift
locations in order to get back home. Likewise, relief operators
whose shifts end near or at the time the system shuts down must
commute to the end-shift location using their own vehicles, so
that when their shifts end, they are able to return home.
Consequently, those relief drivers must travel, before their
shift starts, from the end-shift location where they leave their
cars to their start-shift location.

 We have been asked whether, since January 1, 2001, under the

circumstances described above, time spent by relieved operators
as riders traveling from end-shift locations to start-shift
locations, constitutes "hours worked" within the meaning of
Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Order 9-2001, so as to
entitle these operators to compensation for all such time at
their regular rates of pay.

 Prior to January 1, 2001, IWC Order 9, which regulates

wages, hours and working conditions in the transportation
industry, did not apply to any public employees. RTD employees
were therefore not covered by any part of Order 9 prior to
January 1, 2001. With the IWC's adoption of the 2001 wage
orders, this changed, and effective January 1, 2001, section 1(B)
of Order 9-2001 read: "Except as provided in Sections 1, 2, 4,
10, and 20, the provisions of this order shall not apply to any
employees directly employed by the State or any political
subdivision thereof, including any city, county, or special
district." Thus, these enumerated sections of the wage order now
apply to RTD employees2.

  2 Neither Labor Code §220(b) nor §514 exempt RTD from these provisions of

IWC Order 9-2001. Pursuant to Section 220(b), Labor Code sections 200-211, and
215-219, do not apply to the payment of wages of RTD employees. But the
obligations created by the applicable sections of Order 9-2001 are not founded
upon any of the statutes listed in Labor Code §220(b). Section 514, which was
added to the Labor Code by AB60, took effect on January 1, 2000, and provided:
"This chapter [sections 500-558] does not apply to an employee covered by a valid
collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the wages,
hours and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement provides
premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay
for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage."

                                                                   2002.01.29

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 Section 2(G) of Order 9-2001 defines "hours worked" as "the

time during which an employee is subject to the control of an
employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or
permitted to work, whether or not required to do so." In
Morillion v. Royal Packing Company (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575, 582,
the Supreme Court construed identical language in IWC Order 14,
and held that the two phrases -- "time during which an employee
is subject to the control of an employer" and "time the employee
is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do
so" -- are "independent factors, each of which defines whether
certain time spent is compensable as 'hours worked'." Thus, the
Supreme Court concluded that the , "an employee who is subject to
an employer's control does not have to be working during that
time to be compensated under Wage Order No. 14-80." Ibid.

 Applying this analysis, the Supreme Court held that

agricultural employees who were required by their employer to
report at a specified time to a pick-up point, and to travel on a
company bus from that pick-up point to the fields where they
performed their tasks, and who at the end of the day were
transported back from the fields to the original pick-up point,
were subject to the employer's control, and entitled to
compensation, for all time spent from the time they were required
to be at the pick-up point until they were dropped off there at
the end of the day, including all time spent riding on the
company bus to and from the fields, notwithstanding the fact that
as bus passengers, the employees were free to read, nap, or
engage in other personal pursuits. In rejecting the reasoning
behind the Court of Appeal decision that found such time to be
non-compensable, the Supreme Court held that the federal
statutory scheme -- namely, the Portal-to-Portal Act and
regulations issued thereunder -- "differs substantially from the
state scheme" and "should be given no deference" in construing

This collective bargaining opt-out notwithstanding, the IWC retained the
authority, under Labor Code §§1171, et seq., to adopt regulations governing the
wages, hours and working conditions of employees covered by collective bargaining
agreements. The IWC wage orders, including Order 9, provide for a collective
bargaining opt-out from overtime requirements found in section 3, "Hours and Days
of Work.' This limited opt-out provides that except for certain subsections,
"this section shall not apply" to any employee covered by a CBA that meets the
prerequisites set out at Labor Code §514. None of the other sections of Order 9
are subject to the collective bargaining opt-out. Highlighting the limited nature
of the collective bargaining opt-out, the recent enactment of Senate Bill 1208
amended Labor Code §514 to now provide: "Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an
employee covered* by a CBA that meets the prerequisites. The rest of that chapter
of the Labor Code thus would apply to such employees. SB 1208 expressly states
that this amendment of section 514 is "declarative of existing law and shall not
be deemed to alter, modify, or otherwise affect any provision of any wage order
of the Industrial Welfare Commission.'

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the meaning of "hours worked" under the IWC orders. Ibid, at
588.

 The Portal-to-Portal Act, which amended the Fair Labor

Standards Act ("FLSA"), provides that employers are not obligated
to compensate employees for time spent: "walking, riding, or
traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the
principal activity or activities which such employee is employed
to perform," or while engaged in "activities which are
preliminary or postliminary to said principal activity or
activities" where such travel or activities "occur either prior
to the time on any particular workday at which such employee
commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at
which he ceases, such principal activity or activities." 29 USC
§254(a). Federal law thus generally limits compensable travel
time to that travel time that is "part of [an employee's]
principal activity." 29 CFR §785.38. State law, however, does
not follow a "principal activity" test, and does not contain an
express exemption for travel time similar to that of the Portal-
to-Portal Act. Thus, in Morillion, the Supreme Court concluded
that "time during which the employee is subject to the control of
an employer," which is compensable under the IWC orders, may
encompass so-called "preliminary and postliminary activities" and
"travel time," which is not compensable under the Portal-to-
Portal Act. Ibid, at 591.

 In a lawsuit filed under the FLSA, a federal court held that

time that city bus drivers spent traveling on city provided
shuttles, which transported the drivers to or from the city
garage/bus yard and the relief points where they started their
first run of the day or where they ended their last run of the
day, was excluded from compensable time under the Portal-to-
Portal Act. United Transportation Union Local 1745 v. City of
Albuquerque (10th Cir. 1999) 178 F.3d 1109. However, the court
ruled that under the FLSA, time that the drivers spent traveling
on these shuttles to and from different relief points at the
beginning or end of a split shift was compensable, in that such
time falls under 29 CFR §785.38, which provides, "Time spent by
an employee in travel as part of his principal activity, such as
travel from job site to job site during the workday, must be
counted as hours worked." In contrast, the time that the court
found non-compensable was deemed subject to 29 CFR §785.35, which
provides, "An employee who travels from home before his regular
workday and returns to his home at the end of the workday is
engaged in ordinary home to work travel which is a normal
incident of employment. This is true whether he works at a fixed
location or at different job sites. Normal travel from home to
work is not compensable." (Emphasis added.) Based upon this
regulation, the court held that "the fact that a driver may end

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his workday at a relief point where his own vehicle is
unavailable, does not transform what would otherwise be a simple
work-to-home commute into compensable hours worked." United
Transportation Union, supra, 178 F.3d at 1120-1121.

 The potential harshness of 29 CFR §785.35 is starkly

revealed by the decision in Kavanagh v. Grand Union Co. (2nd Cir.
1999) 192 F.3d 269, an FLSA lawsuit filed by a mechanic whose job
duties consisted of traveling over a wide geographic area (the
greater New York metropolitan area, including all of Long Island,
New York City's five boroughs, suburbs to the north of New York
City, and suburbs in New Jersey) in order to make repairs at
various stores owned by his employer. The court held that this
regulation implementing the Portal-to-Portal Act precluded the
recovery of compensation for travel to or from a distant store at
the beginning or end of his workday, regardless of the distance
that he was required to travel from his home to the first
assignment and to his home from the last assignment.

 One might ask what result would follow, under the FLSA (or

at least these judicial constructions of the FLSA), if the facts
of United Transportation Union were mixed with those of Kavanagh,
with the result that a bus driver, who commutes from her home to
a dispatch yard where he starts his first run of the day, is
relieved at the end of her last run at a location 60 miles away
from the start of his first run. Would time spent while the
driver is traveling back to the dispatch yard, to pick up her
automobile so that she could then drive home, be construed as a
"ordinary home to work travel" so as to be non-compensable under
the Portal-to-Portal Act? This is not an idle question -- there
are many transit districts with bus lines that extend at least
that distance. But whatever the answer might be under the FLSA,
for purposes of a case governed by the IWC's definition of "hours
worked," when an employer exercises control over an employee to
require the employee to end her shift in a location that is
different from where she started her shift, the time that the
employee must spend traveling back to the location where the
shift started, in order to pick up her automobile so that she can
start her normal commute back home, constitutes compensable
"hours worked."

 To be sure, the nature of the "control" exercised by the RTD

differs from that exercised by Royal Packing in Morillion. Royal
Packing "required plaintiffs to ride its buses to get to and from
the fields, subjecting them to control for purposes of the 'hours
worked' definition." Morillion, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 594
(emphasis in original). "[B]y requiring employees to take
certain transportation to a work site, employers thereby subject
those employees to its control by determining when, where, and

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how they are to travel. Ibid, at 588. But, "employers do not
risk paying employees for their travel time merely by providing
them transportation. Time employees spend traveling on
transportation that an employer provides but does not require its
employees to use may not be compensable as 'hours worked.'" Ibid.
The Supreme Court cautioned that it was not holding that all
travel time to and from work is compensable.

 However, Morillion does not stand for the proposition that

the only circumstances under which travel time will be found to
be compensable under state law is when the employer controls
when, where and how the employee must travel. The requisite
degree of control may be present under other circumstances that
were not addressed by the Supreme Court in its decision. The
facts presented herein -- employees ending their shifts at
different locations (in some cases, more than 30 minutes away)
from the locations where they are required to start working their
shifts -- were simply not before the Court in Morillion. And the
federal regulations and court decisions like Kavanagh and United
Transportation Union, founded upon the Portal-to-Portal Act, are
entitled to no deference in determining whether the RTD
operators' time spent traveling from their end-shift locations to
their start-shift locations, either following the conclusion or
preceding the start of their shifts, constitutes compensable
"hours worked" within the meaning of IWC Order 9-2001.

 There is no doubt that an ordinary commute between the

employee's home and the initial location where the employee must
report to work is not compensable under state law. Likewise, if
the employee's shift ends at that same location, the ordinary
commute from work back home is not compensable. But if, as a
result of following the employer's directions or carrying out the
employee's assigned work, the employee finishes his or her shift
at a location other than the location where the shift began, the
employee must generally travel back to the start-shift location
following the conclusion of the work shift in order to commence
his or her "ordinary commute" back home (or, with respect to the
RTD's relief drivers, must undertake this travel from the end­
shift location to the start-shift location before the work shift
begins). The employee is put in this position precisely because
the employee "is subject to the control of an employer," i.e.,
absent the employer's control, the employee would undoubtedly not
have chosen to end his or her shift at a location different from
that where it began. We believe this form of employer control is
sufficient to conclude that under California law, the time the
operator spends traveling from the end-shift to the start-shift
location, following the conclusion (or, in the case of the relief
drivers, prior to the start) of the work shift, constitutes
"hours worked" within the meaning of Order 9-2001, even though

Page 7

the RTD does not require the operator to ride on an RTD vehicle
in order to get from the end-shift location to the start-shift
location, and even though the RTD does not require the operator
to punch in, or punch out, or attend any sort of meeting or
appear anywhere, prior to the start or subsequent to the end of
the work shift.3

 The fact that the operator ends his or her shift at a

different location than that where the shift began is purely for
the benefit of the RTD, in that it is apparently easier or
somehow preferable for the RTD to schedule shifts in this manner.
The operator's "freedom" to use some other form of transportation
other than an RTD bus or light rail vehicle is illusory, at best.
The relief point is located at a bus or rail stop. Other
transportation options are likely to entail an unreasonable
expenditure of money (calling a taxi cab), of time (walking
several miles from the relief point back to the yard), or of
someone else's time and money (relying on a friend or relative
for a ride from the relief point back to the division yard). And
even if the employee is free to engage in personal pursuits once
his or her shift is over (e.g., by going shopping at a mall that
may be located at the relief point), the employer's decision to
have the shift end at a different location than where it started
forces the employee to spend some fixed amount of time traveling
between the end-shift and start-shift locations. For these
reasons, we conclude that the operator's time spent traveling
from the relief point back to the start-shift location following
the end of the work shift (and the relief operator's time spent
traveling from the end-shift location to the relief point prior
to the start of the work shift) constitutes "hours worked" so as
to be compensable under IWC Order 9-2001, to the extent that such
time represents no more than the minimum amount of time it would
take the operator to travel between the start-shift and end-shift
locations walking and/or using the most direct bus or light rail
routes, whichever method is quicker. Thus, "hours worked" would
not include any time that the operator chooses to use for
personal matters which have the effect of lengthening the time
that is required to travel between the end-shift and start-shift
locations.

 Section 4 of Order 9-2001 requires employers to pay "not

less" than the minimum wage for "all hours worked." Are the RTD
operators therefore entitled to no more than the minimum wage, or

   3 There is, of course, no question that if the RTD were to require its

operators to report to the bus or rail yard prior to the start, and subsequent to
the end of any work shift, time spent traveling between the yard and the relief
point would be time during which the operator is subject to the employer's
control.

Page 8

is each operator entitled to be paid at his or her regular rate
of pay for "hours worked" traveling between the relief point and
the start-shift or end-shift location? The answer to this
question depends on the provisions of the applicable collective
bargaining agreement. If the CBA between the RTD4 and the ATU
does no more than specify a rate for work performed (e.g., part-
time drivers will be paid $20 an hour), then that is the rate
that DLSE will enforce for all hours worked, including time spent
traveling between the relief point and the start or end-shift
location. DLSE is authorized to enforce this rate by virtue of
Labor Code §1195.5, which authorizes the Division to examine
contracts to determine "whether the wages of employees which
exceed the minimum wages fixed by the [industrial welfare]
commission have been correctly computed and paid," and to
"enforce the payment of any sums found, upon examination, to be
due and unpaid to the employees ."

 The RTD, like any other employer, can specify separate

regular rates for different types of work, provided that all
established rates must equal or exceed the minimum wage, and that
all applicable rates must be established before the hours are
worked. Thus, if the CBA expressly provides for an hourly rate
of pay for hours worked traveling between the relief point and
the start-shift or end-shift location that is lower than the
established rate of pay for driving a bus or operating an LRV,
the DLSE will enforce this lower travel rate as long as it
compensates the operators for all time spent traveling at not
less than the minimum wage. However, if the CBA purports to
compensate operators for this travel time by, say, "imputing" an
extra 15 minutes of pay at the operator's regular rate to cover
this time, we would conclude that a portion of this time is
completely unpaid ,under the CBA, to the extent that the "imputed"
time is less than the actual minimum time that it would take an
operator to travel between these locations, as explained above.
The operator would then be entitled to payment of his or her
regular rate of pay for the difference between the actual minimum
time and the "imputed" time.
CBA provisions that purport to explicitly establish a rate
of pay below the minimum wage, including those that purport to
characterize time that constitutes "hours worked" under state law
as unpaid, non-work time under the CBA, cannot defeat the

   4 The Regional Transit District is not covered by the National Labor

Relations Act or Labor Management Relations Act, in that under the NLRA, the
definition of "employer" does not include any State or political subdivision
thereof. 29 USC §152(2). The RTD is subject to the provisions of California's
Meyers- Milias-Brown Act ("MMBA", Govt. Code §3500, et seq.). State wage and hour
laws, and IWC regulations, are obviously not preempted by the MMBA.

Page 9

employee's right to payment of no less than the minimum wage for
all time that constitutes "hours worked" under the IWC orders.
The IWC definition of "hours worked" and the requirement that all
such hours be paid at no less than the minimum wage are minimum
labor standards, and are not subject to any sort of collective
bargaining agreement opt-out. As the Supreme Court explained in
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S.
728, 740-741:

 This Court's decisions interpreting the FLSA have
 frequently emphasized the nonwaivable nature of an
 individual employee's right to a minimum wage and
 overtime pay under the Act. Thus, we have held that
 FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise
 waived because this would "nullify the purposes" of the
 statute and thwart the legislative policies it was
 designed to effectuate. [cites omitted] Moreover, we
 have held that congressionally granted FLSA rights take
 precedence over conflicting provisions in a
 collectively bargained compensation arrangement. [cites
 omitted] As we stated in Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co.
 v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590 (1944) ... "The
 Fair Labor Standards Act was not intended to codify or
 perpetuate [industry] customs and contracts.... [A]n
 agreement to pay less than the minimum wage
 requirements cannot be utilized to deprive employees of
 their statutory rights."

California law parallels the FLSA in this regard. Labor Code
§1197 provides: "The minimum wage for employees fixed by the
commission is the minimum wage to be paid to employees, and the
payment of a less wage than the minimum so fixed is unlawful."
And Labor Code §1194 provides: "Notwithstanding any agreement to
work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the
legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable
to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the
unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or
overtime compensation. . . . "

 This then leads to the question of whether an employee who

is entitled to payment of the minimum wage for all hours worked,
notwithstanding a CBA that explicitly purports to pay nothing, or
less than the minimum wage, for certain activities that
constitute "hours worked" under state law, is entitled to the
unpaid balance of the minimum wage for each and every hour
standing alone, or whether the determination as to whether
minimum wages are owed is made by comparing the total
compensation received during the pay period with the total "hours

Page 10

than the minimum wage satisfied by determining whether the
employee's total compensation for the payroll period equals or
exceeds the minimum wage multiplied by the total number of hours
worked, or must the employer pay the minimum wage for each and
every separate hour (and each and every part of every hour)
worked?
The IWC wage orders provide that: "Every employer shall pay
to each employee, on the established payday for the period
involved, not less than the applicable minimum wage for all hours
worked in the payroll period, whether the remuneration is
measured by time, piece, commission or otherwise." (See, e.g.,
Order 9-2001, sect. 4(B).) Our question cannot be answered by
the plain language of the orders, as this provision is equally
susceptible to two divergent readings: l)that the obligation to
pay minimum wages attaches to each and every separate hour worked
during the payroll period, and that payment must be made for all
such hours on the established payday, or 2) that the obligation
to pay minimum wages for the total number of hours worked in the
pay period is determined "backwards" from the date that payment
is due, without considering any hour (or part of any hour) in
isolation. Federal courts, in construing minimum wage
obligations under the FLSA, have consistently followed the latter
approach. The FLSA merely requires that each employee receive,
each pay period, an amount not less than the minimum wage for the
total number of hours worked. As a general rule, an employee
cannot succeed on a claim under the FLSA if his average wage for
a pay period in which he works no overtime exceeds the minimum
wage. Blankenship v Thurston Motor Lines (4th Cir. 1969) 415
F.2d 1193, 1198; United States v. Klinghoffer Bros. Realty Corp.
(2nd Cir. 1960) 285 F.2d 487, 490; Dove v. Coupe (D.C. Cir. 1985)
759 F.2d 167, 171; Hershey v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers (8th
Cir. 1986) 786 F.2d 353, 357.

  State law, however, differs dramatically from the FLSA in a

crucial way -- the FLSA does not provide a mechanism for the
enforcement of non-overtime, contract based wages which exceed
the minimum wage, while California law provides a statutory
basis, under the Labor Code, for the enforcement of non-overtime
contract based wage claims in excess of the minimum wage.
California law explicitly prohibits employers from paying
employees less than the wages required under any statute or less
than the wages required under any contract or CBA.

 Labor Code §221 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any

employer to collect or receive from an employee any part of the
wages theretofore paid by said employer to said employee."
Section 222 provides: "It shall be unlawful, in case of any wage
agreement arrived at through collective bargaining, either

Page 11

wilfully or unlawfully with intent to defraud an employee, a
competitor, or any other person, to withhold from said employee
any part of the wage agreed upon." Finally, section 223
provides: "Where any statute or contract requires an employer to
maintain the designated wage scale, it shall be unlawful to
secretly pay a lower wage while purporting to pay the wage
designated by statute or contract."

 These statutes prevent the RTD5, or any other employer that

might be covered by a CBA or other contract that expressly pays
employees less than the minimum wage for certain activities that
constitute "hours worked" within the meaning of state law, from
using any part of the wage payments that are required under that
CBA or other contract for activities that are compensated in an
amount that equals or exceeds the minimum wage, as a credit for
satisfying minimum wage obligations for those activities that are
compensated at less than the minimum wage under the CBA or
contract. Instead, all hours for which the employees are
entitled to an amount equal or greater than the minimum wage
pursuant to the provisions of the CBA or other contract must be
compensated precisely in accordance with the provisions of the
CBA or contract; and all other hours (or parts of hours) which
the CBA or contract explicitly states will be paid at less than
the minimum wage, but which constitute "hours worked" under state
law, must be compensated at the minimum wage. Averaging of all
wages paid under a CBA or other contract, within a particular pay
period, in order to determine whether the employer complied with
its minimum wage obligations is not permitted under these
circumstances, for to do so would result in the employer paying
the employees less than the contract rate for those activities
which the CBA or contract requires payment of a specified amount
equal to or greater than the minimum wage, in violation of Labor
Code sections 221-223.

  5 Labor Code sections 221-223 apply to all employers, including public

employers. Section 220(b) makes sections 200-211, and 215-219, inapplicable to
employees “directly employed by any county, incorporated city, or town, or other
municipal corporation." Special districts, including transit districts such as
the RTD, come within this exclusion. (Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. El
Camino Hospital District (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d Supp. 30) But this exclusion does
not make sections 221-223 inapplicable to public employers. Quite the opposite
-- section 220 is part of Division 2, Part 1, Chapter 1 of the Labor Code, which
includes sections 200-243. The fact that the Legislature expressly excluded these
public employers from certain sections contained within this Chapter of the Code
indicates an intent to make the remaining sections of the Chapter applicable to
such public employers, unless the specific section provides an express exemption
therefrom.

Page 12

William J. Flynn
January 29, 2002
Page 12

 Thank you for your interest in California wage and hour law.

Feel free to contact us with any other questions.

                                    Sincerely,



                                   Anne Stevason
                                   Acting Chief Counsel

AS/mel

CC: Arthur Lujan
Tom Grogan
Roger Miller
Greg Rupp
Nance Steffen
Bridget Bane, Executive Officer, IWC
All DLSE Attorneys