When did a D.C. judge's former law-enforcement work or police commander spouse require recusal?
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This page answers the general question as of 1992. Ask about yours and see what the current rules of professional conduct in your state say for your facts, with citations.
Plain-English summary
A Superior Court judge had formerly served with the Metropolitan Police Department and the U.S. Attorney's Office. The judge's spouse commanded MPD's First District. The Committee addressed whether either relationship required disqualification from cases involving police testimony, alleged assaults on officers, or police conduct.
The Committee applied the objective appearance standard in the then-effective Canon 2 and Canon 3C. It rejected automatic recusal based on the judge's employment history or on testimony by any MPD officer. But it concluded that the spouse's command of First District officers created a distinct appearance concern. It called for recusal when one of those officers was scheduled to testify or when that officer's conduct as a victim or actor was in issue.
The opinion recognized further case-specific grounds. Personal knowledge of disputed facts required recusal. A challenge to police policy or supervision in which the spouse's responsibilities were implicated could also call for disqualification. For a matter handled during the judge's prosecutorial employment, the judge's own work as counsel or a particular former association with counsel in that matter could matter.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1992 under the judicial Code then in force. The D.C. Courts' Opinion No. 5 records a revised Code effective June 1, 1995, and Opinion No. 12 records another effective January 1, 2012. Treat this page as historical context and verify current recusal provisions.
Common questions
Q: Did the judge's prior service as a police officer require recusal from all police cases?
A: No. The Committee said earlier police or prosecutor employment alone did not establish bias or require blanket disqualification.
Q: What if an officer from the spouse's First District testified?
A: The opinion called for the judge to disqualify herself from a proceeding in which such an officer was scheduled to testify.
Q: Did the same answer cover an assault on a First District officer?
A: Yes. The Committee applied its recusal conclusion when that officer's conduct as a victim or actor was in issue.
Q: Could a case involving another MPD officer still raise a concern?
A: Yes. The opinion identified challenges to police policy or practices linked to the spouse's senior responsibilities and the judge's own knowledge of disputed facts as possible grounds.
Background and rules framework
The opinion applied Canon 2's appearance standard and Canon 3C(1)'s disqualification provisions in the 1972 Code then in effect. It discussed the proposed 1990 Code for comparison, including provisions on a spouse's interest and prior government-lawyer associations.
Citations and references
Judicial conduct provisions cited in the opinion:
- Canon 2 and Canon 2B, appearance and family relationships.
- Canon 3C(1)(a), disputed-fact knowledge and bias.
- Canon 3C(1)(b), former service as counsel or association with counsel.
- Canon 3C(1)(c) and (d), interests of a judge or spouse.
Cases:
- Gregory v. United States, 393 A.2d 132 (D.C. 1978), background alone insufficient to show bias.
- Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745 (D.C. 1989), objective appearance standard.
See also
Source
- Landing page: D.C. Code of Judicial Conduct and advisory opinions
- Original PDF: Advisory Opinion No. 2
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