Did a D.C. senior judge have to recuse from prosecutions over offenses dating to the judge's Justice Department employment?
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This page answers the general question as of 1995. Ask about yours and see what the current rules of professional conduct in your state say for your facts, with citations.
Plain-English summary
A senior Superior Court judge had worked at the Justice Department on department-wide debt-collection oversight and training, without handling individual cases or directly supervising litigation. The judge asked whether criminal cases prosecuted by the D.C. U.S. Attorney's Office required recusal when the alleged offense occurred during that federal employment.
The Committee applied its earlier Opinion No. 2 and the then-applicable Code provisions. It said the date of the alleged offense and common employment within the Justice Department were insufficient on their own. The relevant questions were whether the judge had personal knowledge of disputed material facts, served as a lawyer in the particular matter, or had a particular association with a lawyer in that matter that reasonably called impartiality into question.
The opinion distinguished a judge's earlier employment from a judge's active pursuit of a position with a prosecuting agency. It concluded that the requesting judge did not have to disqualify himself from the described prosecutions absent one of the identified circumstances.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in January 1995. Its footnote says the D.C. Courts' revised Code adopted at that time would take effect June 1, 1995, after the opinion; the D.C. Courts' Opinion No. 12 records a further revision effective January 1, 2012. Treat this page as historical context and verify current disqualification rules before relying on its analysis.
Common questions
Q: Did the offense date during the judge's Justice Department employment trigger recusal by itself?
A: No. The Committee found that timing alone insufficient on the facts presented.
Q: What if the judge knew disputed facts from the earlier job?
A: The opinion said personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts required disqualification.
Q: Did common employment with a prosecutor at the Justice Department automatically disqualify the judge?
A: No. The Committee said government lawyers were not ordinarily associated in the required sense merely because they worked for the same agency, though a particular association could raise an impartiality issue.
Background and rules framework
The opinion applied the then-effective Code's Canon 3C(1)(a) on personal bias or knowledge of disputed facts and Canon 3C(1)(b) on prior service as a lawyer in the matter. It discussed corresponding provisions of the Code adopted but not yet effective in January 1995 and Canon 2's objective appearance standard.
Citations and references
Judicial conduct provisions cited in the opinion:
- Canon 2, avoiding impropriety and its appearance.
- Canon 3C(1)(a) and (b) of the then-effective Code, prior knowledge and work as counsel.
- Canon 3E(1)(a) and (b) of the adopted 1995 Code, corresponding disqualification provisions.
Cases:
- Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745 (D.C. 1989), active employment negotiations with a prosecuting department distinguished.
- Gregory v. United States, 393 A.2d 132 (D.C. 1978), background alone insufficient to show partiality.
Other opinions cited:
- D.C. Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct Opinion No. 2, former prosecutorial employment.
See also
Source
- Landing page: D.C. Code of Judicial Conduct and advisory opinions
- Original PDF: Advisory Opinion No. 5
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