Is a judge disqualified because the judge’s spouse recently left a law firm representing a party, if she never worked on the case?

Plain-English summary

The judge’s spouse had worked as a legal secretary for a firm representing a party in a case assigned to the judge. She left the firm about two months before the inquiry and stated she had not worked on the case, although a recusal motion alleged otherwise.

The Commission concluded that the judge was not disqualified under the assumption that the spouse had never been involved in the matter. It distinguished opinions addressing current employment and explained that a disqualifying circumstance ordinarily ceases when the underlying relationship ends, absent extraordinary factors.

The opinion stressed that a recusal motion is a legal matter for the judge and that the result depends on all the actual circumstances. Its ethics conclusion is conditional on the spouse’s noninvolvement.

In practice

The holding depends on both the end of the employment relationship and the spouse’s lack of involvement in the pending case.

Common questions

Q: Did the former secretarial employment itself require recusal?

A: No, under the assumption that the spouse never worked on the case.

Q: Had the spouse left the law firm?

A: Yes, about two months earlier.

Q: Did the Commission resolve the factual allegation in the recusal motion?

A: No. It stated its conclusion on the assumption that the spouse had not been involved and left the legal recusal ruling to the judge.

Background and rules framework

Canon 3C(1) governs disqualification when impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The opinion compares earlier Commission decisions about current employment, a relative’s involvement in a case, and a circumstance that has ceased.

Citations and references

Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics:

• Canon 3C(1)

Cases:

• Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So. 2d 60 (Ala. 1982)
• Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984)

Other opinions cited:

• Alabama Advisory Opinions 80-66, 81-125, 82-134, 84-206, 85-239, 91-418, 92-444, 92-454, 94-516, 96-605, 96-608, and 01-785

See also

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 05-850: Donor to a Court Program and Recusal
• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 05-851: Defendant Is the Judge’s Physician’s Son

Source

• Landing page: Alabama JIC advisory opinions
• Original PDF: Advisory Opinion 05-852

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

JUDICIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION
DATE ISSUED: JUNE 10, 2005 ADVISORY OPINION 05-852
DISQUALIFICATION WHEN A RELATIVE
OF THE JUDGE WAS A SECRETARY WITH
A LAW FIRM INVOLVED IN A CASE
ISSUES
Is a judge disqualified to hear a case in which
a party is represented by a law firm due to the
fact that his spouse was recently employed as
a secretary at that fmn? Answer: Where the
judge's spouse is no longer employed by the
firm and never had any involvement in the
case, the Commission is of the opinion that
the judge is not disqualified.
FACTS
A circuit judge's spouse was previously em­
ployed as a legal secretary by a law fIrm that
represents the plaintiff in a case assigned to
the judge. She left that employment about
two months ago, after the judge was elected to
the bench. A motion for recusal has been
filed that includes an allegation that it is the
defendant's understanding that the judge's
spouse had been involved in various aspects
ofthe case. However, she states that she was
not involved in the case while she was em­
ployed as a legal secretary.
DISCUSSION
The Commission has issued a number of
opinions concerning whether a judge is
disqualified from hearing cases due to the
employment of a close relative by a law firm
involved in the case. The Commission has
indicated in those opinions that the mere fact
of such employment of a close relative does
not cause disqualification, but that the judge
may be disqualified depending upon the
particular circumstances. See, e.g., Advisory
Opinions 81-125, 82-134 and 85-239. The
Commission has stated that, in determining
whether disqualification is required, a judge
should assess his relationship with the
.­
employee and the employee's relationship to
the proceeding. Advisory Opinions 81-125, 82­
134, 92-444 and 96-608.
In Advisory Opinion 91-418, the Commission
concluded that the mere· fact of a spousal
relationship between the judge and a
secretary to a firm representing a party was
sufficient to cause disqualification of the
judge under the general provision in Canon
3C(1)requiring disqualification wheneverthe
judge's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." However, the facts in that case
involved a possibility that the spouse might
share in a Christmas bonus that reflected the
relative financial success of the fmn. See
Advisory Opinions 84-206, 92-444 and 96-608
(disqualification would be required if the
judge's child's employment with a firm were
such that he had an interest that could be
substantially affected by the judge's ruling).
In Advisory Opinion 80-66, the Commission
concluded that the employment ofthe judge's
spouse as a bookkeeper or accountant for a
law firm, which employment would not
involve any direct assistance with any legal
matters which might come before the judge,
would not cause disqualification ofthe judge.
Other opinions by the Commission have also
identified the degree of involvement (or non
involvement) of the relative/employee in a
particular proceeding as highly relevant to
whether disqualification results from the
relative's employment by a law firm
representing a party before a judge. See
Advisory Opinions 85-239, 92-444, 96-608 and
01-785.
The foregoing opinions all involved current
employment relationships. In the situation
presented, the judge's spouse is no longer
employed with the firm. The Commissionhas
held on a number of occasions that, unless
there are extraordinary factors that would
require continued disqualification, ajudge is
not disqualified to hear an action after a
circumstance causing disqualification has
ceased to exist. See, Advisory Opinions 92­
454, 94-516 and 96-605.
ADVISORY OPINION 05-582
PAGE 2
Under Canon 3C(1), recusal is required when
"facts are shown which make it reasonable
for members of the public or a party, or
counsel opposed to question the impartiality
ofthe judge." Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420
So.2d 60, 61 (Ala. 1982). Specifically, the test
under Canon 3C(1) is: "Would a person of
ordinary prudence in the judge's position
knowing all of the facts known to the judge
find that there is a reasonable basis for
questioning thejudge's impartiality?" Matter
ofSheffield, 465 So.2d 350,355-356 (Ala. 1984).
A ruling on a recusal motion is a legal matter
for the judge, not the Commission, to make,
and whether a judge is disqualified depends
on all of the factual circumstances involved.
However, the Commission is of the opinion
thatthejudge's impartiality is notreasonably
questionable where the judge's spouse is no
longer employed as a legal secretary for a
firm representing a party, under the
assumption that she never had any
involvement in the subject case. Under these
facts, the Commission believes that the
Canons of Judicial Ethics do not require
disqualification of the judge.
REFERENCES
Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d 60 (Ala.
1982).
Advisory Opinions 80-66, 81-125, 82-134,84-206,
85-239, 91-418, 92-444. 92-454,94-516,96-605, 96­
608 and 01-785.
Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon
3C(1).
Matter ofSheffield, 465 So.2d 350 (Ala. 1984).
This opinion is advisory only and is based on
the specific facts and questions submitted by
thejudgewho requested the opinion pursuant
to Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the
JUdicial Inquiry Commission. For further
information, you may contact the Judicial
Inquiry Commission, P. O. Box 303400,
Montgomery, Alabama 36130-3400; tel.: (334)
242-4089; fax: (334) 353-4043; E-mail:
[email protected].