Must a circuit judge who does not run a drug court recuse from cases involving a large private donor to that program?

Plain-English summary

A private entity had contributed $150,000 to a county drug court. After the judge responsible for that program recused from a case involving the donor, the matter went to another circuit judge who had little involvement with the program and did not preside over it.

The Commission distinguished its earlier opinion disqualifying the drug court’s presiding judge, who had helped establish the program and handled its budget and personnel. It concluded that the second judge was not disqualified on the submitted facts unless he personally felt he might be affected.

The opinion applied Canon 3C(1)’s test of whether the circumstances would reasonably call the judge’s impartiality into question, while acknowledging that actual impartiality alone does not resolve that general test.

In practice

The difference in each judge’s responsibility for the donor-funded program drove the Commission’s comparison with Opinion 04-846.

Common questions

Q: Was the second circuit judge automatically disqualified by the donation?

A: No. The Commission found no disqualification on these facts unless he personally felt he might be affected.

Q: Why had the drug court’s presiding judge recused?

A: That judge helped establish and ran the program funded by the donor, including budget and personnel responsibilities.

Q: How much had the entity contributed?

A: $150,000 over the program’s first two years, according to the opinion.

Background and rules framework

Canon 3C(1) requires recusal when known facts provide a reasonable basis to question impartiality. The opinion compares the second judge’s limited role with the presiding judge’s role analyzed in Advisory Opinion 04-846.

Citations and references

Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics:

• Canon 3C(1)

Cases:

• Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So. 2d 60 (Ala. 1982)
• Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350 (Ala. 1984)
• Ex parte Duncan, 638 So. 2d 1332 (Ala. 1994)

Other opinions cited:

• Alabama Advisory Opinion 04-846

See also

• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 05-851: Defendant Is the Judge’s Physician’s Son
• AL Judicial Ethics Op. 05-852: Former Legal-Secretary Spouse and Law Firm

Source

• Landing page: Alabama JIC advisory opinions
• Original PDF: Advisory Opinion 05-850

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

JUDICIAL INQUIRY COMMISSION
DATE ISSUED: APRIL 5, 2005 ADVISORY OPINION 05-850
DISQUALIFICATION WHEN PRIVATE
PARTY CONTRIBUTES TO COURT
PROGRAM
ISSUE
Is a judge disqualified to hear a case due to
one of the parties, or a potential party in
interest, having made large contributions for
the funding of a particular court program?
Answer: Under the facts presented, thejudge
is not disqualified unless he personally feels
he might be affected.
FACTS
A private entity has contributed $150,000 to a
county's drug court program since the incep­
tion of that program two years ago. These
contributions are paid to the county and
maintained in a separate account for the drug
court. After the judge who is responsible for
presiding overthe drugcourt recused himself
from a case in which the donor entity is a
party, the case was assigned to the other
circuit judge in the circuit.
The case was brought by a judgment creditor
seeking to garnish stock certificates held by
the garnishee as collateral to secure a debt of
the judgment debtor. The donor entity is the
garnishee.
A motion for the recusal of the second judge
has been fIled. A similar motion has also
been filed in another suit, on the theory that,
ifthe plaintiffsecures ajudgment, it will seek
to recover that judgment from the donor
entity as well.
The secondjudge had very little involvement
in the establishment of the drug court, does
not preside over it, and does not work with its
personnel except to the extent that such is
occasionallyrequired concerningdefendants
he has ordered to attend drug court. His
other involvement with drug court is occa­
sionallyattendinggraduationceremoniesand
making further disposition ofcases in which
defendants fail to successfully complete drug
court. As the only other circuit judge in the
circuit, circumstances might arise requiring
him to become more involved with the drug
court, but he does not believe this to be likely.
DISCUSSION
In Advisory Opinion 04-846, the Commission
advised the firstjudgethat itwas the Commis­
sion's opinion that he was disqualified under
Canon 3C(l).
The entity prOViding funding in this
case is private, not a governmental
body that ordinarily is involved in or
provides funds for court operations.
The entity is not only a party before
the judge, the judge knows that this
entity has provided a large sum of
money toward the funding of a court
program which the judge was instru­
mental inestablishingand overwhich
he presides, including dealing with
budget and personnel issues. The
Commission assumes thatthe amount
ofmoneydonated represents a signifi·
cant portion of the program's funds.
Under these facts, the Commission
believes that a person of ordinary
prudence might reasonably question
the judge's impartiality. Thus, the
Commission concludes that the judge
is disqualified to hear the subject
case.
Advisory Opinion 04-846.
Thequestion is whether the differences inthe
circumstances now presented are material
with respect to the test for disqualification.
Under Canon 3C(l), recusal is required when
"facts are shown which make it reasonable
for members ofthe public or a party, or coun­
sel opposed to question the impartiality ofthe
judge." Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d
60,61 (Ala. 1982). Specifically, the issue under
ADVISORY OPINION 05-850
PAGE 2
Canon 3C(I) is: "Would a person ofordinary
prudence in the judge's position knowing all
ofthe facts known to the judge find that there
is a reasonable basis for questioning the
judge's impartiality?" Matter afSheffreld, 465
So.2d 350, 356 (Ala. 1984). The question is not
whether the judge is impartial in fact, but
rather whether another person, knowing all
ofthe circumstances, might reasonably ques­
tion the judge's impartiality. Ex parte
Duncan, 638 So.2d 1332, 1334. (Ala. 1994). The
recusal test stated in Canon 3C(I) sometimes
bars trial by a judge who has no actual bias in
the case. Matter afSheffield, 465 So.2d at 356.
The Commission finds the circumstances
presented to be materially different than
those in Advisory Opinion 04-846. The
Commission is of the opinion that the
inquiring judge is not disqualified to hear the
cases in question unless he personally feels
that he might be affected.
REFERENCES
Acramag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 SO.2d 60
(Ala. 1982).
Advisory Opinion 04-846.
Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon
3C(I).
Ex parte Duncan, 638 So.2d 1332 (Ala. 1994).
Matter afSheffield, 465 So.2d 350 (Ala. 1984).
This opinion is advisory only and is based on
the specific facts and questions submitted by
thejudgewhorequested the opinion pursuant
to Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Judicial Inquiry Commission. For further
information, you may contact the Judicial
Inquiry Commission, P. O. Box 303400,
Montgomery, Alabama 36130-3400; tel.: (334)
242-4089; fax: (334) 353-4043; E-mail:
[email protected].