Can a plaintiff's lawyer contact the defendant's liability insurer or its claims representative directly when the defendant is represented by counsel?

Plain-English summary

The Committee revisited Ethics Opinion 78-4, which had concluded that a plaintiff's attorney in personal injury litigation may not contact or continue discussions with a claims representative of the defendant's liability insurer without the consent of the insured's attorney. The opinion concluded that the bar of Opinion 78-4 was no longer valid: unless the plaintiff's attorney has actual knowledge that the insurer is represented by counsel in the matter at issue, contacting or communicating with a claims representative or other agent of the defendant's insurer about the matter does not violate Rule 4.2.

The opinion focused on Rule 4.2, which bars a lawyer, in representing a client, from communicating about the subject of the representation with a party or person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer, absent that lawyer's consent or legal authorization. The Committee reasoned that the insurer is a separate entity from the insured defendant, and that the insured's representation by defense counsel does not, by itself, make the insurer a represented "party or person" for purposes of Rule 4.2. The controlling question was the plaintiff's lawyer's actual knowledge of whether the insurer itself was represented by counsel on the matter.

The opinion accordingly vacated Ethics Opinion 78-4 and recognized that a plaintiff's attorney may communicate with the defendant's insurer or its claims representative about the matter, so long as the attorney lacks actual knowledge that the insurer is separately represented by counsel in that matter.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998, before Alaska's adoption of the 2009 revisions to the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct. Subsequent rule amendments or later opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current guidance. Verify against current rules before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or requirement mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could a plaintiff's lawyer call the defendant's insurance adjuster directly?

A: The opinion concluded the lawyer may contact the defendant's insurer or its claims representative about the matter, unless the lawyer has actual knowledge that the insurer is itself represented by counsel in that matter.

Q: Doesn't the defendant having a lawyer trigger the no-contact rule for the insurer too?

A: Per the opinion, the insurer is a separate entity from the insured; the insured's representation by defense counsel does not by itself make the insurer a represented person under Rule 4.2.

Q: What changed from the old Opinion 78-4?

A: The opinion held that the flat bar of Opinion 78-4 was no longer valid and vacated it, replacing it with an actual-knowledge standard tied to whether the insurer itself is represented.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interpreted Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 (communication with a person represented by counsel; Model Rule 4.2), which turns on the lawyer's knowledge that the person is represented. It applied that rule to the relationship among a plaintiff, an insured defendant, and the defendant's liability insurer, and vacated the Committee's earlier Ethics Opinion 78-4.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Alaska RPC 4.2 (communication with represented persons)

Other opinions cited:

• Alaska Ethics Opinion 78-4 (vacated)

See also

• ABA Formal Op. 95-396: The No-Contact Rule (4.2)
• AK Bar Ethics Op. 2011-2: Contacting Org Employees
• ABA Op. 97-408: Contacting a Represented Agency (4.2)

Source

• Landing page: https://alaskabar.org/ethics-discipline/ethics-opinions/adopted-ethics-opinions-chronological/
• Original PDF: https://alaskabar.org/wp-content/uploads/98-1.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHICS OPINION No. 98-1
Contact With Defendant’s Insurer

The Committee has been asked to revisit Ethics Opinion No. 78-4
concerning the propriety of direct contact with an insured’s insurer by an
attorney representing the plaintiff when the plaintiff’s attorney knows that the
insured is represented by counsel. In Ethics Opinion No. 78-4, the Committee
concluded that the plaintiff’s attorney in personal injury litigation is not
entitled to either contact or continue discussion with a claims representative of
the defendant’s liability insurer without the consent of the insured’s attorney.
In the Committee’s view, the bar of Opinion No. 78-4 is no longer valid. Unless
the plaintiff’s attorney has actual knowledge that the insurer is represented by
counsel in the matter at issue, an attorney representing the plaintiff in
personal injury litigation does not violate Rule 4.2 by contacting or
communicating with a claims representative or other agent of the defendant’s
insurer concerning the matter.
DISCUSSION
Rule 4.2 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct (“ARPC”) provides
the focus for the Committee’s analysis:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not
communicate about the subject matter of the representation
with a party or person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer, unless the lawyer has the
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
ARPC 4.2 (emphasis added). In light of Rule 4.2, the specific issue is
whether the plaintiff’s attorney, having knowledge of the insured’s
representation, is barred from communicating with the insurer on the premise
that “knowledge” that an insured is represented by counsel constitutes the
“knowledge” that the insurer1 is also represented by that same lawyer.
1

The insurer is not the same “person or party” as the insured. To establish this, we
need only point out that Alaska is not a direct action jurisdiction. A claim, suit, or
judgment against an insured is separate from a claim, suit, or judgment against the
insurer. Meyers v. Robertson, 891 P.2d 199 (Alaska 1995). Therefore, the insured and
insurer cannot be considered to be the same “person or party” within Rule 4.2. Absent

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The word “’knows’ denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A
person’s knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.” ARPC 9.1(f).
Thus to violate Rule 4.2, the plaintiff’s lawyer must have actual knowledge that
the insurer is represented by insured’s counsel.
While multiple representation by the insured’s attorney is often
allowable, there is clearly no rule of law in Alaska which requires2 the insured’s
lawyer to represent the insurer. See AS 21.89.100 (separate counsel for
insured, paid for by the insurer, is authorized in certain circumstances); Chi of
Alaska v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1118 n.10 (Alaska
1993); Ethics Opinion 90-2 (attorneys hired by an insurance company to
represent the insured must honor insured’s objection to the insurer’s direction
to send an offer of judgment, even if the insured’s objection might breach
insurance contract). Consequently, absent a requirement in all cases that an
insured’s lawyer must also represent the insurer, knowledge of the insured
being represented by a lawyer does not constitute knowledge that the same (or
a different) lawyer represents the insurer.3
Additionally, the plaintiff’s attorney is authorized by law to communicate
with the insurer and the insurer is under an affirmative duty to communicate
with the plaintiff or, if represented, the plaintiff’s attorney, including
specifically identifying the agent of the insurer who is handling the claim. AS
such a requirement, it would be inaccurate to presume knowledge of such a
relationship by plaintiff’s counsel.
2

A determination that the insured’s counsel may represent an insurer is far different
than determining that the insured’s counsel must represent the insurer.

3 The Committee acknowledges that Opinion No. 78-4 states in part:

In typical personal injury litigation, the defendant is
insured. A portion of the contract of insurance entitles
the defendant’s insurer to control the litigation, and
designate the counsel for defense of that litigation.
Alaska Bar Association Ethics Op. 78-4. Thus, where a defendant in litigation is
insured, in many instances, the insurer will have a direct interest in the subject
matters of the litigation consistent with that of the insured and, in some cases, a
contractual right to control the litigation. This does not necessarily mean that the
insured’s attorney represents the insurer.

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21.36.125(2); 3 AAC 26.040(b)(1). The plaintiff’s attorney is therefore
authorized by law to contact the insurer until notice is received identifying the
insurer’s lawyer as such.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff’s attorney has actual knowledge that
the insurer is represented by counsel, whether it be the insured’s attorney or a
separate attorney, then the communication is clearly prohibited (without
consent).4 In such a case, communication with the insurer is accomplished
through its counsel.
In summary, ARPC 4.2 prohibits a lawyer from communicating with an
insurer who the lawyer knows to be represented by counsel. While knowledge
may be inferred from certain circumstances, knowledge of attorney
representation of the insured is not by itself sufficient to establish that the
same lawyer represents the insurer.

Approved by the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee on November 6, 1997.
Adopted by the Board of Governors on January 16, 1998.

G:\DS\COMM\EC&OPS\OPINIONS\98-1.DOC

4 The Alaska Rule extends to any person or organization and is not limited to matters

in litigation. Thus, if plaintiff’s attorney knows the insurer is represented by counsel
with respect to the pending matter, the plaintiff’s attorney may not contact the insurer
without the consent of counsel. ARPC 4.2.

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