Which employees of an opposing organization can a lawyer contact directly under Rule 4.2 during litigation?

Plain-English summary

The Committee was asked what "managerial responsibility," used in the commentary to Alaska Rule 4.2, means when a lawyer litigating against a corporation or government entity wants to contact its employees. It concludes that employees who have sufficient authority to speak on behalf of and legally bind the organization are covered by Rule 4.2, and other employees are not.

The opinion frames the problem as drawing a line that neither makes investigation of claims unduly hard nor erodes the organization's attorney-client relationship and privilege. Alaska's Rule 4.2 text is identical to the Model Rule, but the Alaska commentary is narrower: it bars contact with persons "having managerial responsibility," whereas the Model Rule comment also reaches constituents who supervise or consult with the organization's lawyer, can obligate the organization, or whose acts may be imputed to it for liability. The opinion reasons that the Alaska Supreme Court's deliberate choice of the narrower commentary signals an intent to bar contact more narrowly than the Model Rule.

The Committee adopts the "managing-speaking agent" test, first articulated in Wright v. Group Health Hospital and followed in Palmer v. Pioneer Inn, under which only employees with authority to speak for and bind the organization are protected, and the rule does not shield a corporation from disclosure of prejudicial facts by other employees. So an attorney could not interview the company president about an accident, but could interview the employee who was driving. The opinion notes this aligns with its prior Opinions 71-1 and 84-11. It cautions that the test does not eliminate the attorney-client privilege (counsel may not ask an employee to disclose privileged communications) and that counsel must still observe Rules 4.1 (truthfulness), 4.3 (unrepresented persons), and 4.4 (rights of third persons) when interviewing employees.

In practice

Under this opinion, as the Alaska rule stood at the time, a lawyer litigating against an organization may contact and informally interview employees who lack managerial authority to bind the organization, but may not contact those who can speak for and legally bind it on the matter. The opinion applies the managing-speaking agent test and notes that an employee does not become protected merely because a statement could be a party-opponent admission or the conduct could be imputed to the organization. It stresses that counsel may not elicit privileged communications and must comply with Rules 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4, taking care that interviews are not misleading about their nature and purpose.

Common questions

Q: Can a lawyer interview a low-level employee of the company they are suing?

A: Generally yes. The opinion concludes only employees with authority to speak for and legally bind the organization are protected by Rule 4.2; others may be interviewed.

Q: What is the managing-speaking agent test?

A: Per the opinion, it protects from contact only those employees with sufficient authority to speak on behalf of and legally bind the organization on the matter; it does not protect employees merely because they witnessed or caused the event.

Q: Does it matter that the employee's statement could be used as an admission?

A: No. The opinion says an employee does not "speak for" the organization simply because a statement may be admissible as a party-opponent admission; the question is whether the employee can bind the organization.

Q: Can the lawyer ask the employee about privileged matters?

A: No. The opinion stresses the test does not eliminate the attorney-client privilege, and counsel may neither ask nor permit an employee to disclose privileged communications.

Background and rules framework

The opinion interprets Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 (communication with represented persons, analog of Model Rule 4.2) and its narrower Alaska commentary, with Rules 4.1 (truthfulness), 4.3 (unrepresented persons), and 4.4 (rights of third persons). It adopts the managing-speaking agent test from out-of-state case law and aligns with prior Alaska Opinions 71-1 and 84-11.

Citations and references

Rules of Professional Conduct:

• Alaska RPC 4.2 (communication with represented persons) and commentary
• Alaska RPC 4.1 (truthfulness), 4.3 (unrepresented persons), 4.4 (third persons)

Cases:

• Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984)
• Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs., Ltd., 59 P.3d 1237 (Nev. 2002)
• Brown v. State, Dep't of Corrections, 173 F.R.D. 265 (D. Or. 1997)

Other opinions cited:

• Alaska Ethics Opinions 71-1 and 84-11

See also

• ABA Formal Op. 95-396: Communications With Represented Persons
• ABA Formal Op. 91-359: Contact With a Former Employee of an Adverse Corporate Party
• AK Bar Ethics Op. 2017-2: Contacting a Represented Government Official

Source

• Landing page: https://alaskabar.org/ethics-discipline/ethics-opinions/adopted-ethics-opinions-chronological/
• Original PDF: https://alaskabar.org/wp-content/uploads/2011-2.pdf

Original opinion text

Reproduced from the official source for research purposes. The linked source is authoritative.

ALASKA BAR ASSOCIATION
ETHICS OPINION NO. 2011-2
PROPRIETY OF COMMUNICATION WITH AN
EMPLOYEE OF A CORPORATE OR
GOVERNMENT ENTITY BY A LAWYER
ENGAGED IN LITIGATION AGAINST THAT ENTITY

QUESTION PRESENTED
What constitutes “managerial responsibility” discussed in the Comment to ARPC 4.2
concerning communications with a represented person?
CONCLUSION
Employees of an organization who have sufficient authority to speak on behalf of the
organization and thus legally bind the organization, are subject to the provisions of Rule 4.2.
Other employees are not.
DISCUSSION
Bar counsel has frequently received inquiries regarding when it is appropriate for an
attorney to contact an employee of a corporation, governmental entity or other organization
during the course of a lawsuit. The question implicates Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2,
which provides:
Communication with Person Represented by Counsel.
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party or person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer
or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.
The problem lies in drawing a line between those employees of an organization that are be
covered by the rule, and thus cannot be contacted, and those employees who are not covered, and
are thus accessible to opposing counsel. Too strict an interpretation will make reasonable
investigation of claims unnecessarily difficult, while too lenient an interpretation runs the risk of
interfering with the attorney client relationship between the organization and its attorneys, or
destroying the right of the organization to the protections of the attorney client privilege.1
1

As one court has stated:
The Rule’s protections undisputedly extend to organizational parties, who must act
through their directors and employees. Accordingly, at least some of the organization’s
agents must be viewed as the equivalent of a “party” for the rule to have any effect. A

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For example, an attorney would be prohibited from interviewing the president of a
company regarding an automobile accident, because the president of the company would have
authority to bind the company with his or her statements. But is the attorney also prohibited
from interviewing the employee who was actually driving the automobile involved in the
accident?
The Commentary to the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct addresses this issue:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a
lawyer concerning the matter with persons having managerial responsibility on
behalf of an organization.
ARPC 4.2, Comment at paragraph 6. Thus, according to the commentary, the Rule prohibits a
lawyer from contacting anyone having “managerial responsibility” in litigation involving an
organization. At the same time, the corollary also appears to be true: it is permissible for an
attorney to contact employees of an organization who do not have “managerial responsibility.”
Although the language of Rule 4.2 as adopted in Alaska is identical to the language of
Rule 4.2 under the Model Rules, the Alaska commentary to Rule 4.2 appears to narrowly define
the scope of the rule as it applies to organizational entities. In contrast, the commentary to the
Model Rule suggests a broader interpretation of the Rule:
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits communications with
a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs, or consults with the
organization’s lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the
organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection
with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or
criminal liability.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 4.2, Comment [7]. 2

conflict between policies arises, however. On one hand, the rule’s protective purposes
are best served by defining this pool of agents broadly. On the other hand, defining the
pool more narrowly fosters the use of informal discovery methods…. The question then
becomes how to apply the rule in a way that best balances the competing policies.
Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Assocs. Ltd. 59 P.3d 1237, 1240-41 (Nevada 2002)(footnotes omitted).
2

The application of the Model Rule and its commentary has resulted in diverse
interpretations and applications in jurisdictions across the country. For example, some
jurisdictions have found that statements constituting an admission of a party opponent under
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D) qualify as acts or omissions to be “imputed to the
organization” under the commentary to the model rules. See Richards v. Holsum Bakery, Inc.,
2009 WL 3740725 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2009). (“Statement is admission for purposes of Rule 4.2 if

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The Alaska Supreme Court’s choice to adopt different language cannot be ignored. The
Court chose to adopt a different and much narrower commentary, a signal that the Court intended
the bar on contacting non-managerial employees to be narrower than in the Model Rules.
Several jurisdictions have used an approach which appears to satisfy the requirements of
Rule 4.2 and which is consistent with the commentary adopted in Alaska. The so-called
“managing-speaking agent test” interprets the prohibition against contacting corporate or agency
employees narrowly. Under that test, only employees who have authority to legally bind the
corporation or agency are protected from contact by opposing counsel. This test was first
articulated in Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984). The Washington
Supreme Court found that current employees of the defendant would be considered parties under
Rule 4.2 “if, under applicable Washington law, they have managing authority sufficient to give
them the right to speak for, and bind, the corporation.” Id. at 201.
The court made it clear that for purposes of the Rule employees who did not have
authority to “speak for, and bind, the corporation” could be contacted without violation of Rule
4.2.
We hold the best interpretation of “party” in litigation involving corporations is
only those employees who have the legal authority to “bind” the corporation in a
legal evidentiary sense, i.e., those employees who have “speaking authority” for
the corporation. This interpretation is consistent with the declared purpose of the
rule to protect represented parties from the dangers of dealing with adverse
counsel.… We find no reason to distinguish between employees who in fact
witnessed an event and those whose act or omission caused the event leading to
the action. It is not the purpose of the rule to protect a corporate party from the
revelation of prejudicial facts.
Id.
Nevada has adopted a similar test:
In applying this test, we specifically note that an employee does not “speak for”
the organization simply because his or her statement may be admissible as a
party-opponent admission. Rather, the inquiry is whether the employee can bind

it constitutes an admission of a party opponent under Arizona Rules of Evidence). Other
jurisdictions have concluded that the Rule prohibits contact with persons who, although not part
of the management of the organization or agency, are employees “whose conduct is at issue” in
the litigation. See Brown v. State, Department of Corrections, 173 F.R.D. 265, 268 (D. Ore.
1997). Still other courts have adopted other tests interpreting the rule. See, e.g., Weibrecht v.
Southern Illinois Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875, 883 (7th Cir. 2001) (Employee whose actions
would be imputed to corporation for purposes of finding corporate negligence protected under
Rule 4.2).

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the organization with his or her statement. Also, an employee for whom counsel
has not been retained does not become a “represented party” simply because his
or her conduct may be imputed to the organization; while any confidential
communications between such an employee and the organization’s counsel would
be protected by the attorney-client privilege, the facts within that employee’s
knowledge are generally not protected from revelation through ex parte interviews
by opposing counsel.
Palmer v. Pioneer Inn Associates, Ltd., 59 P.3d 1237, 1248 (Nev. 2002).
Absent additional guidance from the Alaska Supreme Court regarding Alaska’s Rule 4.2
and commentary, the Committee believes that the “managing-speaking agent” test comes closest
to expressing the sense of Rule 4.2 as it applies to represented organizations in Alaska. Thus,
only those employees of the organization who hold a position of sufficient authority or
responsibility so that they can be considered to be speaking on behalf of the organization with
respect to the matter at issue, and in so doing are able to legally bind the organization, are
covered by the restrictions of Rule 4.2.
This formula strikes an appropriate balance between the need to protect the clear right of
an organization from inappropriate contact by opposing counsel and the ability of opposing
counsel to conduct investigations, including informal investigations, necessary to properly
represent the counsel’s client.
This test also appears to be consistent with this Committee’s prior ethics opinions on the
subject.3
It is important to note that the managing-speaking agent rule does not do away with the
attorney-client privilege. Investigating counsel cannot ignore the possibility that a witness may
also be represented by an attorney at the time of the interview. Counsel may neither ask nor
permit a current or former employee to disclose privileged communications. See Brown v. State
of Oregon, Dept. of Corrections, 173 F.R.D. 265, 269 (D. Ore. 1997). Nor may counsel ignore
the other ethical obligations that may apply to interviews with employees of organizations,
including the ethical obligations with respect to unrepresented persons. See, e.g, Alaska Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.4 (dealing with respect for rights of third persons); Alaska Rule of
Professional Conduct 4.3 (dealing with unrepresented person); Alaska Rule of Professional
Conduct 4.1 (regarding truthfulness in statements to others). Accordingly, the Committee
believes that prudent counsel wishing to interview employees of an organization will take care to
3

See Ethics Opinion No. 71-1 (a lawyer may communicate with employees of a
government entity so long as the communication is not made with employees of the entity who
may be reasonably thought of as representing the entity in the matter in controversy); Ethics
Opinion 84-11 (attorney representing opposing party may informally interview agency employee
who is not “representing the entity in matters related to the matter in controversy” and does not
have “managerial responsibility” on behalf of the agency).

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ensure that nothing in such interviews elicits privileged information or is misleading in any way
regarding the nature and purpose of the interview.
Approved by the Alaska Bar Association Ethics Committee on December 2, 2010.
Adopted by the Board of Governors on January 27, 2011.

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