Tinker v. Colwell
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
177 later cases cite Tinker v. Colwell; 177 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Tinker v. Colwell?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Superseded by statute
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The court held that the 1978 Bankruptcy Code displaced Tinker's lesser and reckless-disregard standard in favor of deliberate or intentional injury under § 523(a)(6).
Williams v. Bryson (In re Bryson) · N.D. Ill. Bankruptcy Court · filed
As is noted the House Report states that “willful” means “deliberate or intentional”; that to the extent that Tinker v. Colwell held that a lesser standard is intended it is overruled; and that to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that the new Bankruptcy Code displaced Tinker's less strict reckless-disregard standard for § 523(a)(6).
Alexander v. Donnelly (In re Donnelly) · D. Or. Bankruptcy Court · filed
Under the new Bankruptcy Code the Senate Judiciary Committee’s comments to § 523(a)(6) opted for the latter approach: “Paragraph (5) [sic] provides that debts for willful and malicious conversion or injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity are nondis-chargeable. Under this paragraph willful means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. [193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a reckless disregard standard, they are overruled.” (Senate Report (Judiciary Committee) No. 95-989, July 14, 1978.)
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The court held that the Bankruptcy Reform Act displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard and implied-malice standards and required intent to harm under § 523(a)(6).
Grand Piano & Furniture Co. v. Hodges (In re Hodges) · W.D. Va. Bankruptcy Court · filed
However, with the change in bankruptcy law in 1978 came a change in the standards applicable in construing Section 523(a)(6). ... Now that the “reckless” or “utter disregard” standard has been obviated by the Congressional language in the Legislative History, there recurs the need to show “maliciousness” in addition to “willfulness” in order to come within the § 523(a)(6) exception. Without the Tinker standard, that leaves but one choice “intent to do harm.” ... Maliciousness can no longer be implied; nor does it encompass the looser standard enunciated in Tinker v. Colwell.
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The court held that congressional intent displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required intent to harm under § 523(a)(6).
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Hawkins (In re Hawkins) · W.D. Ky. Bankruptcy Court · filed
Now that the “reckless” or “knowing disregard” standard has been obviated by Congressional intent, there remains the requirement of showing “maliciousness” in addition to “willfulness” in order to come within the § 523(a)(6) exception. Without the Tinker standard, that leaves the necessity of proving “intent to do harm”. ... The debtor may well be guilty of conversion under the Tinker reasoning that this conversion was a “reckless disregard” of his duty. However, he is clearly not chargeable under the standard of “willful and malicious injury” applicable to § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code.
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The court held that Congress displaced Tinker's looser nondischargeability standard and required specific willful and malicious intent to harm.
Tyson v. Webb (In re Webb) · M.D. Ga. Bankruptcy Court · filed
Nonetheless, with the legislative overruling of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1977); S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-79 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1978, p. 5787, and the necessity of showing specific willful and malicious intent to do harm to the plaintiff, the set of facts before the Court falls woefully short of nondischargeability even if nominal damages were present.
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The court held that § 523(a)(6) displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required deliberate or intentional injury.
Heritage Mutual Insurance Co. v. Naser (In re Naser) · W.D. Wis. Bankruptcy Court · filed
That § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code at page 239 under Legislative History, states: Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled. ... There is no evidence in the record herein that defendant-debtor intended to injure anyone. His conduct cannot be described as “willful and malicious” under § 523(a)(6) in that said section requires deliberate or intentional conduct.
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The court held that the new Code displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required a willful conversion intended to harm the creditor.
American Family Insurance Group v. Gumieny (In re Gumieny) · E.D. Wis. Bankruptcy Court · filed
Under the new Code, the “reckless disregard” standard of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904) has been expressly overruled, and a debt is now non-dischargeable on the grounds of conversion only if the creditor shows that the property was maliciously and willfully converted with an intent to harm the creditor.
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The court held that § 523(a)(6) displaced the Tinker line's reckless-disregard standard and required deliberate conduct with intent to harm.
In re Hinkle · D. Md. Bankruptcy Court · filed
In enacting § 523(a)(6), Congress specifically overruled a series of cases descending from Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), which indicated that a showing of “reckless disregard” of the creditor’s rights would support a finding of willful and malicious injury under the Act. ... Under the Code, a creditor is required to show that the debtor acted deliberately and with an intent to harm the creditor or his property before the debt will be held nondischargeable.
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The court held that § 523(a)(6) displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required deliberate or intentional injury.
Hartwig v. Ankowiak (In re Ankowiak) · N.D. Ill. Bankruptcy Court · filed
The legislative history to § 523(a)(6) states that: Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled. ... For the instant debt to be non-disehargea-ble, this court must find that debtor’s actions were deliberate or intentional. Debt- or was speeding and he ran a stop sign. His conduct evidenced “reckless disregard” for the safety of others, but the evidence fails to show that he intended to injure anyone or that he deliberately crashed his car into Mr. Hartwig’s.
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The court held that the Bankruptcy Code requires deliberate or intentional injury and displaced Tinker's looser reckless-disregard standard.
West Springfield M. E. Credit Union v. Finnie (In Re Finnie) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts · filed
The House version of § 523(a)(6) indicates that “willful” means deliberate or intentional, and to the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard was intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The Bankruptcy Court held that Congress displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required deliberate, intentional conduct with intent to harm under section 523(a)(6).
First National Bank of Central Jersey v. Maiolo (In Re Maiolo) · Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia · filed
Legislative history reveals that Congress intended to overrule the “reckless disregard” standard spawned by Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902).
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The court held that Congress displaced Tinker's reckless or utter-disregard standard and that the Code requires deliberate or intentional conduct.
Wilson v. Gentis (In re Gentis) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio · filed
The Congress has overruled the “reckless” or “utter disregard” standards. Maliciousness no longer encompasses a standard of gross negligence as judicially interpreted under section 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act and Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904). “Willful” under the Code, therefore, connotes “deliberate or intentional.”
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The court held that section 523(a)(6) is stricter than its predecessor and displaces the Tinker-derived reckless-disregard standard.
Laatsch v. Stanfield (In Re Stanfield) · Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio · filed
That the section is to be read in a stricter fashion than was its precedes-sor is clear from the Legislative History dealing with this section. The House Report states: Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that the Bankruptcy Code's legislative history expressly rejected Tinker's looser reckless-disregard standard.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lewis (In Re Lewis) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Arkansas · filed
The legislative history under section 523(a)(6) of the new Bankruptcy Code, however, expressly rejects these principles and the case law which asseverated them. ‘Under this paragraph, ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.’
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The district court held that the new Bankruptcy Code expressly displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard definition of willful injury, while leaving Tinker's malice definition intact.
UNITED VIRGINIA BANK v. Fussell (In Re Fussell) · United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia · filed
Under the new Code, the “reckless disregard” definition of “willful” injury enunciated in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), has been expressly overruled, and a debt is now nondischargeable on the grounds of conversion only if the creditor shows that the property was deliberately or intentionally converted in a malicious manner.
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The court held that the 1978 Code made reckless injury dischargeable and displaced Tinker's looser standard.
MA&M Inc. v. Supple (In Re Supple) · Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut · filed
The legislative history of § 523(a)(6) states that if a debt arises from willful conduct which is in reckless disregard of the property of another, that debt is still dischargeable: Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902) (sic), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court recognized that the Bankruptcy Code expressly rejected Tinker's reckless-disregard standard.
St. Peter v. Catron (In re Catron) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri · filed
Furthermore, the advent of the new Code gave those decisions additional impetus in its express rejection of the ‘reckless disregard’ standard. See the Legislative History under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code to the effect that ‘[t]o the extent that Tinker v. Colwell 1[93] U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (190[4]), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.’
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The court held that the Code rejects the constructive-malice doctrine attributed to Tinker and requires intentional and deliberate action rather than reckless disregard.
Budres v. Farmer (In Re Farmer) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia · filed
Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled. H.R.Rep. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1977); S.Rep. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2nd *114 Sess. 79 (1978) [under paragraph (5) in Senate Report.. Apparently, Congress, or at least the House and Senate draftsmen, Intended that conduct which equates with gross negligence, allowed by some decisions to support nondischargeability, 1 should be eliminated as a basis for nondischargeability and intended to emphasize that the willful and malicious acts must rise to the level of an intentional tort in order, to be nondischargeable. There is no other legislative comment or guidance on this point. 2 If the instructive guidance of the House and Senate Reports is followed, the doctrine of constructive or inferred malice developed by some courts under the prior Bankruptcy Act must be rejected. 3 It may be doubted that Tinker v. Colwell was ever appropriate authority for the doctrine of implied or constructive malice. 4 Thus, under the Bankruptcy Code, “reckless disregard” or other degree of negligence may not substitute to supply the intent demanded by “willful” as used in § 523(a)(6).
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The court held that Congress displaced any Tinker-derived reckless-disregard definition of willfulness while retaining Tinker's implied-malice rule.
Edge v. Simmons (In Re Simmons) · Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia · filed
A close reading of Tinker reveals that malice need not be specific evil intent to harm anyone but rather the deliberate, intentional doing of an act which is inherently wrong in the absence of any just or mitigating cause. See Frito Lay v. Ferguson, No. 80-0493A (B.C.N.D.Ga., June 10, 1980). Congress is certainly at liberty to give direction to statutory construction, to provide a guide in the legislative history to the definition of “willful” and further is free to delineate what “willful” does not mean — i.e.: reckless disregard — if it so chooses.
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The court held that reckless disregard is no longer sufficient under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, displacing Tinker's looser standard.
Davis v. White (In Re White) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · filed
It is clear under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 that “reckless disregard” is no longer sufficient to make a debt nondischargeable pursuant to this section. The debtor’s action in creating this injury must be deliberate or intentional. ... Congress stated in the legislative history which accompanied this section that “[p]ara-graph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.”
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The court held that Tinker was legislatively displaced insofar as it suggested specific intent to injure was unnecessary under § 523(a)(6).
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Thurston (In Re Thurston) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia · filed
To the extent that the Tinker and Young cases imply that specific intent to injure is not required for a willful and malicious injury under Section 523(a)(6), they have been legislatively overruled.
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The court recognized that the Bankruptcy Code rejected Tinker's reckless-disregard rule, while retaining a form of the prior intentional-act standard.
Callahan v. Norton (In Re Norton) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri · filed
A few other decisions, noting that the new Code’s rejection of the rule of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), and the ‘reckless disregard’ standard flowing therefrom did not significantly change the law, have continued to apply the pre-Code standard.
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The district court held that Congress circumscribed Tinker's reach by eliminating reckless disregard while preserving its rule for intentional injury.
Long v. Greenwell (In Re Greenwell) · Southern District of Ohio · filed
That is, while the legislature meant to circumscribe the scope of the Tinker case, its holding that “willful and malicious” under the statute is satisfied where there is an intentional injury remains valid.
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The court held that Congress replaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard with a deliberate-or-intentional requirement.
Whitaker v. Bratcher (In Re Bratcher) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma · filed
The accompanying report ... states: [Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Col-well, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902) [sic], held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled. ... The court’s reasoning in Bryson is incontrovertible. Where congress has clearly indicated its intent, this Court must abide by that intent.
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The court held that § 523(a)(6) displaced Tinker's looser reckless-disregard approach and requires a specific intent to injure.
Ezzo v. Cecko (In Re Cecko) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio · filed
However, the cited cases appear to be progeny of Tinker v. Colwell, supra, and are thus overruled by the enactment of Section 523(a)(6).
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The court held that the post-Code standard excludes Tinker's reckless-disregard conception and requires deliberate or intentional injury.
Clair v. Oakes (In Re Oakes) · Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio · filed
The Legislative History for 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6) however, evidences an intent on the part of Congress that this subsection be read in a more restrictive fashion than its predecessor. ... Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 [193] U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other eases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled. ... Thus, in order for this Court to hold that Plaintiff’s claim is nondischargeable in bankruptcy, this court must find that the injury to Plaintiff’s decedent was willful in the sense that it was deliberate or intentional and not in the sense that the injury arose out of a debtor’s reckless disregard for the safety of others.
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The court held that the 1978 Code rejected Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required deliberate or intentional injury.
Lee v. Silas (In Re Silas) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama · filed
These House and Senate Reports evidence a rejection of the ‘reckless disregard’ standard enunciated in Tinker v. Colwell, supra, ‘and the many cases holding various degrees of recklessness to constitute willfulness and maliciousness will no longer be controlling in construing section 523(a)(6) of the Code.’
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The court held that Congress displaced the reckless-disregard standard attributed to Tinker and required deliberate or intentional injury under § 523(a)(6).
Marwell Trucking, Inc. v. Davis (In Re Davis) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island · filed
The intent of Congress, as evidenced in the legislative history of § 523(a)(6), however, is explicit to the effect that even reckless disregard does not constitute “willful and malicious” conduct under the Bankruptcy Code: Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. 473 [193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902) [1920], held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that *582 other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court refused to follow Tinker's willfulness rule insofar as it encompassed reckless disregard, while retaining Tinker's definition of malice.
Masloski v. LaCasse (In Re LaCasse) · Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota · filed
To the extent that the Tinker definition of “willful” included reckless disregard, this court will not follow it. However, this court is persuaded by the rationale of the cases which continue to apply the Tinker definition of “malicious” rather than the more rigid standard requiring an actual and conscious intent to do harm.
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The court recognized that § 523(a)(6) overruled Tinker's looser reckless-disregard standard.
Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Purk (In Re Purk) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio · filed
Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 as to a looser standard of ‘reckless disregard’ is overruled by Section 523(a)(6) according to the legislative history.
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The court adopted the view that Congress circumscribed Tinker by excluding reckless disregard but preserved its intentional-injury rule.
Prosch v. Wooten (In Re Wooten) · Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Alabama · filed
That is, while the legislature meant to circumscribe the scope of the Tinker case, its holding that “willful and malicious” under the statute is satisfied where there is an intentional injury remains valid.
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The court held that the Code displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard conception of willfulness while leaving its implied-malice definition intact.
Lovato v. Irvin (In Re Irvin) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado · filed
The comments in the Legislative History of § 523(a)(6) directed attention to that portion of the Tinker decision dealing with the term ‘willful’ in requiring that the conduct be shown to be deliberate or intentional. Nowhere in the Legislative History is there any indication of any intention to depart from the definition of ‘malicious’, as used in the prior Act.
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The court held that the Code overruled Tinker's looser reckless-disregard definition of willfulness and substituted deliberate or intentional misconduct.
Ordmann v. Hoppa (In Re Hoppa) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin · filed
This Court in Grace added that the pre-Code Tinker common law definition for “willful” (namely, reckless disregard), established a looser standard and was overruled by the Code which required a more rigid standard of deliberate or intentional misconduct.
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The court held that the Bankruptcy Code displaced Tinker's definition of willfulness to the extent it allowed reckless disregard, but left Tinker's common-law malice rule intact.
Aguilar v. Aguilar (In Re Aguilar) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio · filed
Despite the fact that the Bankruptcy Code intended to overrule the Tinker definition of willful there was no such effect on that Court’s application of the common law definition of malice.
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The court held that § 523(a)(6) expressly displaced Tinker and its progeny to the extent they permitted a looser reckless-disregard standard.
Miller v. Held (In Re Held) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida · filed
However, Tinker and its progeny have been expressly overruled by § 523(a)(6) of the Code to the extent that they apply a looser “reckless disregard” standard.
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The court held that the Code requires an intentional act and displaced decisions applying Tinker's reckless-disregard standard.
Waltz v. Rodgers (In re Rodgers) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio · filed
Since that decision the Bankruptcy Code section as to willful and malicious injury has been slightly changed. By legislative history it would appear that the meaning of the Code section of ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional; that to the extent Tinker v. Colwell held to a looser standard of ‘reckless disregard’ decisions based upon Tinker are overruled. Now an intentional act is required although not necessary to find that personal ill will existed.
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The Fifth Circuit held that Congress legislatively displaced the reckless-disregard test attributed to Tinker when it enacted § 523(a)(6).
Quezada v. Quezada · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · filed
In Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 472, 24 S.Ct. 505 (1904) the Supreme Court held nondischargeable under this provision a husband's recovery of damages in state court against the bankrupt-defendant for adultery committed with the plaintiff's consenting wife. Some courts subsequently interpreted the Supreme Court's rationale as providing that conduct entered into with reckless disregard for the rights of others that caused damage resulted in nondischargeable liability for "willful" injury within the meaning of Section 17(a)(8).1 Arguably, the harboring of a vicious dog in a crowded neighborhood could be regarded as harm-causing conduct entered into with reckless disregard for the injury it might cause to others.2 6 Nevertheless, by the replacement of the former Act's Section 17(a)(8) with the 1978 Code's Section 523(a)(6), Congress expressly intended to overrule legislatively the reckless-disregard test for nondischargeability.
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The court held that the Bankruptcy Code displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard definition of willfulness and now requires deliberate or intentional wrongdoing.
Gunther v. Kuepper · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin · filed
In Grace, this Court concluded that the pre-Code Tinker v. Colwell common law definition for “willful” (namely, reckless disregard) established a looser standard and had been overruled by the Code which now requires a more stringent standard of deliberate or intentional wrongdoing.
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The court held that Congress circumscribed Tinker's scope as to recklessness while preserving its intentional-injury rule.
Tobler v. Carey (In Re Carey) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee · filed
That is, while the legislature meant to circumscribe the scope of the Tinker case, its holding that “willful and malicious” under the statute is satisfied where there is an intentional injury remains valid. Defendant’s intentional drinking unleashed the unbroken causative chain which led to the injury to plaintiff’s vehicle. It will not avail defendant in his effort to avoid this result to argue that he did not know plaintiff prior to the accident and therefore the injury could not have been intentionally caused. One is responsible under the law for the natural outcome of his actions. Greenwell, 21 B.R. at 421. The district court concurred in this analysis and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding that the injuries caused by the debtor driving while intoxicated were willful and malicious within the meaning of those terms in Code § 523(a)(6). *898 7. The Greenwell decision was followed in Prosch v. Wooten, 30 B.R. 357 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ala.1983), wherein the court quoted recent remarks of Senator De Concini made on the Senate floor: Today there exists in the bankruptcy statute an unconscionable loophole which make it possible for drunk drivers or others who have acted with willful, wanton, or reckless conduct and who have injured, killed, or caused property damage to others to escape civil liability for their actions by having their judgment debt discharged in Federal bankruptcy court. This loophole affords opportunity for scandalous abuse. [[Image here]] Bankruptcy was never meant to be a shield behind which drunk drivers, and others who have acted in a reckless manner, can absolve themselves of liability. The concept of the fresh start for a debt- or must defer to the possibility of a fresh start of the innocent victim. [[Image here]] The term reckless generally is understood to mean that the perpetrator of the injury knew of the risk and went ahead with his action anyway. He adverted to the harm. Surely, we do not want to insulate from liability people that conduct themselves in a willful, wanton, or reckless manner as these words are generally understood. It may even be questionable whether we want to discharge a negligent tortfeasor, but my amendment does not address that. 129 Cong.Rec. S 5326 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983) (statement of Sen. De Concini). 8. This court concurs in the Greenwell court’s analysis of the legislative history of Code § 523(a)(6).
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The court held that Congress legislatively overruled the use of Tinker to treat reckless, indifferent, or grossly negligent conduct as willful.
Thatcher v. Austin (In Re Austin) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee · filed
It is clear .. . that the Congress intended to overrule those decisions that had construed Tinker to permit conduct in ‘reckless disregard’ or with ‘reckless indifference’ to the rights of another and even ‘gross negligence’ to come within the definition of a willful act.
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The court held that Congress displaced the reckless-disregard standard associated with Tinker and imposed a more restrictive deliberate-or-intentional test.
Pahlke v. Granberg (In Re Granberg) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois · filed
The legislative history indicates, however, that in enacting § 523(a)(6), Congress intended that a more restrictive interpretation of the phrase “willful and malicious” apply: Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is in-, tended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that Congress overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard willfulness rule while leaving its implied-malice holding undisturbed.
Firstmark Financial Corp. v. Aldrich (In Re Aldrich) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio · filed
As the Court subsequently noted, however, a careful reading of the Committee Report in § 523(a)(6) reveals that Congress only intended to overrule those cases which relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard to the term ‘willful.’
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The Eleventh Circuit held that Congress displaced Tinker and its progeny's reckless-disregard rule for conversions.
In Re Jack David Held, Debtor. Ann F. Miller v. Jack David Held, in Re Robert Ray Held, Debtor. Ann F. Miller v. Robert Ray Held · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · filed
A finding of recklessness does not resolve the § 523(a)(6) inquiry. In fact, by adopting the requirement that the conversion be willful and malicious, Congress expressly overruled prior caselaw that had refused dischargeability when the conversion occurred innocently or recklessly. See H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 *630 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5963, 6320-21 (“reckless disregard” standard of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), and progeny, which refused dis-chargeability to conversions recklessly done, overruled)
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The district court recognized that Congress displaced Tinker's recklessness standard through the 1978 Code.
CSM Federal Credit Union v. Lange (In Re Lange) · Southern District of Ohio · filed
We also note that the legislative history manifests Congress’ intention to overrule existing case law (e.g., Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902)), holding that the recklessness standard applicable to claims based upon the willful and malicious language of § 17a(2) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act (previously codified at 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(2)).
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The court held that Congress rejected Tinker's reckless-and-wanton negligence standard for § 523(a)(6).
Perkins v. Scharffe (In Re Scharffe) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan · filed
The legislative history to § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code reveals a clear congressional rejection of the case law under the Act which grounded a finding of willful and malicious conduct upon negligence. As summarized in Colliers: ... Cases decided under section 17a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, such as Tinker v. Colwell [193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904)] holding that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that Congress narrowed Tinker's scope by eliminating reckless disregard as sufficient, while preserving its rule for intentional injury.
Caldarelli v. Callaway (In Re Callaway) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · filed
That is, while the legislature meant to circumscribe the scope of the Tinker case, its holding that “willful and malicious” under the statute is satisfied where there is an intentional injury remains valid.
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The court held that Congress changed Tinker's application by requiring an intentional act rather than reckless disregard of consequences.
Grimsley v. Owens (In re Owens) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio · filed
The main case applied in the interpretation of the now superseded Bankruptcy Act of § 17(a)(8) was Tinker v. Colwell, 139 [193] U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902). It is clear that in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, the Congress meant to change the way in which that case was being applied. ... What is to be gleaned from this review is that Congress intended that it not be sufficient to classify an act as willful and malicious that it be one done with reckless disregard for consequences. An intentional act is required.
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The court held that the 1978 Act overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard construction of willful injury.
Richmond Metropolitan Hospital v. Hazelwood (In Re Hazelwood) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · filed
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 overrules Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), a case which had construed the term “willful” injury to include the “reckless disregard” of another entity or its property.
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The court held that enactment of § 523(a)(6) overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard definition of willfulness while leaving its malice definition intact.
Roberson v. Schwenn (In Re Schwenn) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin · filed
Willful means deliberate or intentional, as contrasted with inadvertent or negligent, and it no longer includes the looser standard of ‘reckless disregard’ as adopted in the pre Code decision of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904)....
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The court held that § 523(a)(6) significantly departed from prior law and displaced Tinker's looser standard by requiring specific intent to injure.
Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Hostetler (In Re Hostetler) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida · filed
Section 523(a)(6) of the Code without doubt represents a significant departure from § 17(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, its predecessor, and clearly indicates that the terms “willful” and “malicious” were used by Congress to require a specific intent to hurt and this intent will not be found to exist by implication. The House Report accompanying § 523(a)(6) states in pertinent part as follows: ... Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1902) [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754, 11 Am.Bankr.Rep. 568] held that a lesser standard is intended and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that § 523(a)(6) displaced the looser Tinker interpretation and required an actual conscious intent to harm.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Gallaudet (In Re Gallaudet) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont · filed
“Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 [193] U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.” The Senate made the same observation. See S.R.Rep. 95-989 at page 79. Consistent with the foregoing legislative history of § 523 the Court is convinced that it was incumbent upon Ford Credit to establish that there was an actual conscious intent on the part of Gallaudet to harm it by failing to make payment for the 11 cars that were sold out of trust.
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The court reaffirmed that Congress eliminated Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and limited willfulness to deliberate or intentional injury.
Nuckols v. Nuckols (In Re Nuckols) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · filed
As stated in White, the legislative history annexed to the newly enacted Code of 1978 indicated that Congress intended to eliminate the Tinker “reckless disregard” standard and restrict the term “willful” to a meaning of deliberate or intentional.
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The Ninth Circuit held that § 523(a)(6) excludes merely reckless conduct, adopting the legislative rejection of Tinker's looser standard.
In Re Robert Stephen Adams, Debtor. Betty Hilda Ida Koepke Moraes v. Robert Stephen Adams, Robert Stephen Adams · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · filed
The legislative history underlying section 523(a)(6) made it clear that conduct which was merely reckless did not rise to the level of “willful and malicious.” ... “Under [§ 523(a)(6)], ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.”
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The court held that Congress overruled Tinker's malice holding insofar as it equated reckless disregard with malice.
Kellerhuis v. Egan (In Re Egan) · Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota · filed
Thus, at least to the extent it and its progeny equated "reckless disregard” with malice, Tinker’s holding on the malice element was overruled.
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The district court held that Congress overruled the Tinker-derived reckless-disregard standard when it enacted § 523(a)(6).
Cassidy v. Minihan · United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri · filed
Before the Bankruptcy Code was amended in 1978, some courts had relief on Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), for the proposition that an injury is ‘willful and malicious’ and therefore nondischargeable where the debtor’s conduct evidenced only ‘reckless disregard’ for the rights of others. As demonstrated by the legislative history, Congress meant to overrule this ‘reckless disregard’ standard when it enacted § 523(a)(6) in 1978.
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The court held that the Bankruptcy Code displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard rule and required an intentional act plus specific intent to harm.
First of America Bank-Central v. Bafford (In Re Bafford) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee · filed
From the comment it is clear that “willful means deliberate or intentional.” However, Courts facing 523(a)(6) issues are split on the standard to be applied to the “malicious” requirement given the Comment’s language overruling Tinker’s “reckless disregard” standard.
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The court held that the Code displaced Tinker's looser reckless-disregard standard and required deliberate or intentional conduct.
Safeco Insurance v. Orrick (In Re Orrick) · Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma · filed
To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [(1904)] [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754, 11 Am.Bankr.Rep. 568], held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled. Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 95-595. Therefore, willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity requires that the willful act be one committed deliberately or intentionally.
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The Tenth Circuit held that § 523(a)(6)'s legislative history rendered Tinker and its reckless-disregard progeny obsolete.
In Re Compos · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · filed
We hold that the legislative history of Sec. 523(a)(6) of the Code expressly establishes Congress's intent to render obsolete Tinker and its progeny and to make the ‘reckless disregard’ standard applied by some courts under the Act inapplicable under Sec. 523(a)(6) of the Code.
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The court held that the Code displaced Tinker's looser standard and requires a deliberate or intentional act by the debtor.
Yelton v. Eggers (In Re Eggers) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee · filed
The legislative history accompanying § 523(a)(6) indicates that a debt is nondischargeable only where injury has resulted from some deliberate or intentional act of the debtor: Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled, [footnote omitted]
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The Utah Supreme Court held that Congress legislatively overruled the Tinker-derived reckless-disregard test.
State v. Stayer · Supreme Court of Utah · filed
In Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), the Supreme Court held as nondischargeable under this provision a husband's recovery of damages in state court against the bankrupt defendant for adultery committed with the plaintiff's consenting wife. Some courts subsequently interpreted the Supreme Court's rationale to mean that conduct manifesting reckless disregard for the rights of others and causing damage resulted in nondischargeable liability for "willful" injury within the meaning of section 17(a)(8). Nevertheless, by replacing section 17(a)(8) of the former act with section 523(a)(6) of the 1978 code, Congress expressly intended to overrule legislatively the reckless disregard test for nondischargeability.
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The court held that Congress eliminated Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required deliberate or intentional injury.
Cooper v. Noller (In Re Noller) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin · filed
In deciding to reject this view in favor of the “intent to injure” standard, this court has considered the Congressional intent as evidenced by the following and frequently quoted legislative history to § 523(a)(6): “Under this paragraph, 'willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902) held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.” ... This legislative history makes clear that the “reckless disregard” standard no longer applies and that proof of “deliberate or intentional” injury must be established in order to except the debt from discharge.
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The court held that Congress displaced Tinker's reckless-conduct standard but retained its rule that personal hatred or ill will is unnecessary.
Dearborn Chemical Co. v. Lindsay (In Re Lindsay) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma · filed
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrates that Congress clearly intended to provide a standard of intentional and deliberate conduct, not merely reckless conduct, in promulgating § 523(a)(6): ... To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902) [ (1904) ], held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.
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The Fourth Circuit held that Congress displaced Tinker only to the extent it permitted reckless disregard to establish willfulness, while preserving implied malice.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company v. Vaughn · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · filed
Nonetheless, Congress did intend to change the effect of that retained language, by overruling Tinker to an extent.
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The Ninth Circuit held that Tinker's reckless-disregard standard was explicitly overruled, while retaining a no-specific-intent-to-injure rule for intentional conversion.
Impulsora Del Territorio Sur, S.A. v. Cecchini (In Re Cecchini) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · filed
The ‘reckless disregard’ standard of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902) and its progeny has been explicitly overruled.
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The court held that Congress overruled the reckless or gross-negligence applications of Tinker while otherwise retaining pre-Code meaning.
Ross v. DeVier (In Re DeVier) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan · filed
However, the legislative history accompanying section 523(a)(6) makes it clear that cases which equated grossly negligent or reckless conduct with intentional conduct are overruled. The pertinent legislative history states as follows: Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another. Under this paragraph “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902 [1904]), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that Congress overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard willfulness rule but did not disturb its constructive-malice rule.
Mason Lumber Co. v. Martin (In Re Martin) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama · filed
Congress was concerned only with excluding from ‘willful injury’ the proposition found in Tinker that the term ‘willful’ can include reckless disregard of duty. Congress therefore wrote § 523(a)(6) in such manner that ‘willful’ includes only deliberate and intentional acts. ... Congress in overruling Tinker did not intend § 523(a)(6) to require a showing of special malice.
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The court held that the Bankruptcy Code expressly displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard construction of willful injury.
Creditway of America, Inc. v. Brubaker (In Re Brubaker) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia · filed
The Bankruptcy Code expressly overrules the decision of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), which construed willful injury to include the lesser standard of “reckless disregard” of another entity or its property.
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The court held that Tinker's reckless-disregard standard was overruled and that § 523(a)(6) required subjective intent to harm.
Hale v. Frazee (In Re Frazee) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri · filed
The case decisions which control this issue in this district explicitly reject that reckless disregard of the rights of another, without more, can suffice as proof of willfulness and malice. ... ‘Under this paragraph ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.’
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The court treated Tinker as an example of precedent Congress undid through the 1978 Code to the extent it authorized reckless disregard.
In Re Churchfield · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan · filed
If Congress disapproved of those decisions, it had the opportunity in 1978 to undo them in the Bankruptcy Code. For example, Congress enacted § 523(a)(6), which provides that debts arising from willful and malicious conduct by the debtor may be excepted from discharge. The House Committee on the Judiciary stated that “ ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.”
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The Eighth Circuit held that Congress displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard interpretation and intended § 523(a)(6) to reach only intentionally inflicted injuries.
Stephen Michael Cassidy v. Thomas Francis Minihan · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · filed
The Tinker interpretation of ‘willful and malicious injury’ prevailed until passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Congress retained unaltered the ‘willful and malicious injury’ language of the 1898 Act in section 523(a)(6) of the 1978 Code. However, the House Judiciary Committee’s report accompanying the bill stated: ‘ ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, * * * held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.’
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The court held that the Code displaced the Tinker-derived reckless-disregard standard and required deliberate or intentional conduct.
American Honda Finance Corp. v. Tester (In Re Tester) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia · filed
As the legislative history suggests, to the extent the Supreme Court case of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to equate a “reckless disregard” standard with the term “willful”, they are overruled.
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The Eleventh Circuit held that Congress displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and that recklessness is insufficient under section 523(a)(6).
In Re Peter J. Wrenn, Debtor. American Cast Iron Pipe Company v. Peter J. Wrenn · Eleventh Circuit · filed
Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other eases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled. ... The legislative history makes clear that an act in reckless disregard of the rights of others is insufficient to constitute “willful and malicious” conduct for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
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The court treated the 1978 Code as displacing Tinker's reckless-disregard willfulness rule, though it rejected strict versions of both competing post-Code malice tests.
Coffing v. Burdick (In Re Burdick) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana · filed
The other line of cases views the legislative history as only obviating the ‘willfulness’ holding of Tinker but keeping intact the implied or constructive malice holding.
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The court held that Congress overruled Tinker to the extent reckless disregard could bar discharge, while retaining a separate malice requirement.
National Bank of Commerce of Pine Bluff v. Hoffman (In Re Hoffman) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Arkansas · filed
The legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) suggests that Congress intended to overrule Tinker v. Colwell to the extent that the lesser standard consisting of a reckless disregard of creditors’ rights could bar a discharge.
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The court held that the Code displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard component and, following Compos, required deliberate action plus specific intent to harm.
Bank of Utah v. Auto Outlet, Inc. (In Re Auto Outlet, Inc.) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah · filed
Under section 523(a)(6), successor to section 17(a)(2), of the Bankruptcy Code, the accompanying legislative history indicates that Tinker to some extent has been overruled.
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The court held that Congress specifically overruled Tinker's broader reckless-disregard standard.
Moribondo v. Lane (In Re Lane) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · filed
The legislative history of § 523(a)(6) is absolutely clear that this section was intended to specifically overrule Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), which applied a broader standard of “reckless disregard.”
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The court held that the Code displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required knowing, targeted conduct.
Herman v. Remick (In Re Remick) · Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri · filed
Otherwise, the authorities under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code literally eschew the “reckless disregard” standard. See H.R. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 365 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 6320, to the following effect: “Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person. Under this paragraph, ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473[, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902 [(1904)]), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.”
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The court recognized that the 1978 Code expressly refused to treat reckless disregard as a substitute for intent under § 523(a)(6), displacing Tinker to that extent.
American Bank of Raytown v. McCune (In Re McCune) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Missouri · filed
When the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 came into effect on October 1, 1979, its explicit refusal to consider ‘reckless disregard’ as a substitute for intention appeared to give early impetus to the subjective standard. ... ‘Under this paragraph, ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.’
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The court held that the legislative history specifically overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard standard.
Stewart v. Gargac (In Re Gargac) · Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio · filed
Basically, the Tinker decision interpreted “willful and malicious” to be a “reckless disregard” standard. However, the legislative history to § 523(a)(6) specifically overrules Tinker.
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The court held that Congress displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard willfulness rule but did not overrule Tinker's implied-malice holding.
Shaver Motors, Inc. v. Mills (In Re Mills) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana · filed
The legislative history to this provision must be carefully scrutinized regarding this provision. The House Report is as follows:' ... Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754, 11 Am.Bankr.Rep. 568 (1902)], held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled. ... The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code reflects that Congress clearly intended a standard of intentional and deliberate conduct, and not merely a willful disregard or reckless conduct.
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The district court held that § 523(a)(6) excludes negligently or recklessly caused injuries and displaced Tinker to the extent it permitted a looser standard.
Laganella v. Braen (In Re Braen) · United States District Court for the District of New Jersey · filed
While “willful and malicious injury” can be subject to somewhat different interpretations, it is clear from the legislative history of the section that the language was not intended to prevent the discharge of debts for either negligently or recklessly caused injuries. Paragraph (6) [5] excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intention. To the extent that Tinker v. Coldwell [Colwell], 193 U.S. 473 [1904] (1902) [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754, 11 Am.Bankr.Rep. 568] held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard standard, they are overruled.”
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The district court held that Congress overruled Tinker's definition of willfulness but left its definition of malice intact.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Cerar (In Re Cerar) · Central District of Illinois · filed
The approach which seems most logical is that employed in In re Fussell, 15 B.R. 1016 (W.D.Va.1981), where the court noted that the holding in Tinker was a dual one, defining both willful and malicious. The legislative history demonstrates an intent by Congress only to overrule Tinker in its definition of “willful,” not to alter statutorily the Tinker definition of “malicious.”
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The court held that Congress replaced the Tinker-derived reckless-disregard standard with a deliberate-or-intentional requirement.
Rolland v. Johnson (In Re Johnson) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana · filed
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code reflects that Congress clearly intended a standard of intentional and deliberate conduct, and not merely a willful disregard or reckless conduct. ... Cases decided under section 17a(2) of the former Bankruptcy Act, such as Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.
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The Eighth Circuit held that Congress displaced Tinker's looser reckless-disregard standard and required the injury itself to be intentional.
In the Matter of James Lee Hartley, Debtor. James Lee Hartley v. Rickey D. Jones · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · filed
Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that Tinker was statutorily overruled at least as to reckless disregard and adopted a deliberate-and-intentional standard.
Bankers Trust Co. v. Hicks (In re Hicks) · Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida · filed
Under § 523(a)(6), successor to Section 17(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the accompanying legislative history indicates that Tinker to some extent has been overruled.
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The court held that Tinker's reckless-disregard standard was displaced and that § 523(a)(6) requires a deliberate or intentional injury.
Madden v. Fate (In Re Fate) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts · filed
A negligent act or even one committed with reckless disregard for the safety of another will not suffice. The legislative history makes this clear, ... This Court too follows the legislative history on this point because the history comports with the plain meaning of the term willful. It merely affirms that willful means willful, not reckless or negligent. ... The Senate and House Reports both state as follows: "Under this paragraph 'willful' means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled.”
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The court held that the amended discharge exception displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and defines willful as deliberate or intentional.
Buoscio v. Costarella (In Re Costarella) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida · filed
The legislative history of this section leaves no doubt that, to the extent the case of Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904) held that a less strict standard is intended and the reckless disregard standard is required, this amended version of an exception to the discharge overrules Tinker.
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The court held that section 523(a)(6) overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and requires deliberate, intentional injury.
Shearson Lehman Hutton Mortgage Corp. v. Gierman (In Re Gierman) · Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida · filed
Moreover, it is clear that under this exception the reckless disregard standard established by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754, 11 Am.Bankr.Rep. 568 (1904), has been overruled by this section and the Congress clearly intended to cover only deliberate and intentional wrongful acts which involves specific intent to injure.
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The district court held that § 523(a)(6) specifically displaced Tinker's broader reckless-disregard standard and requires intent to cause injury.
United States v. Stelweck · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · filed
The legislative history of § 523(a)(6) is clear. This section was intended to specifically overrule Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), which applied a broader standard of “reckless disregard” in analyzing accusations of willful and malicious conversion in bankruptcy cases.
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The court held that § 523(a)(6) excludes reckless disregard and requires deliberate or intentional injury, recognizing the legislative displacement of Tinker to that extent.
Realty Investments v. Gresso (In Re Gresso) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana · filed
The legislative history states that to ‘[t]he extent that Tinker v. Colwell [, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904)] held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a reckless disregard standard, they are overruled.’
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The court held that enactment of § 523(a)(6) displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard component while preserving its implied-malice standard.
Vaughan v. Murray (In Re Murray) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia · filed
Although the enactment of § 523(a)(6) in the Bankruptcy Code overruled Tinker in part, the interpretation under Tinker that “constructive or implied malice was sufficient to establish malice under the exception” was not overruled.
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The court treated Tinker's reckless-disregard willfulness rule as displaced while retaining implied malice under controlling Fifth Circuit law.
Guaranty Corp. v. Fondren (In Re Fondren) · Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Louisiana · filed
Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902 [1904]), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled, (citations omitted). It is clear from the legislative history that “willful” means a deliberate or intentional action. ... A second line of cases has continued to adopt the Tinker standard of implied or constructive malice and requires an intentional act which results in injury or harm to the creditor ... (citations omitted). This Court finds that the standard adopted by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is controlling here, is the interpretation of “willful and malicious” set forth in Collier on Bankruptcy, the leading bankruptcy treatise.
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The court recognized that Congress overruled the application of Tinker's reckless-disregard standard to § 523(a)(6).
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Kupinsky (In Re Kupinsky) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Illinois · filed
Several courts utilized dicta from Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902) finding that the ‘reckless disregard’ standard involved in negligent conduct translated into willful and malicious conduct. In the legislative history to the Bankruptcy Code, however, Congress made it clear that the application of the lesser culpable conduct of ‘reckless disregard’ to willful and malicious conduct is overruled.
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The court held that Tinker's reckless-disregard standard was overruled and insufficient under § 523(a)(6).
MRB, Inc. v. Marshall (In Re Marshall) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida · filed
Both the House and Senate Reports regarding § 523(a)(6) made it clear that for purposes of this Section, ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional and ‘[t]o the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a lesser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.’ ... Because ‘reckless disregard’ is insufficient to prove willful and malicious conduct for purposes of § 523(a)(6), it would be inappropriate for this Court to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to resolve Count I.
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The court held that Congress legislatively displaced the reckless-disregard standard attributed to Tinker and required deliberate and intentional conduct.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Marinko (In Re Marinko) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio · filed
This conduct was willful, as it was both deliberate and intentional. (See, Legislative History to § 523(a)(6)), H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1977), U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 5787, 5963, 6320-6321, which legislatively overruled the “reckless disregard” standard enunciated in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904).
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The court held that the Code displaced Tinker's looser reckless-disregard standard and limited willfulness to deliberate or intentional conduct.
Agricredit Acceptance Corp. v. Gosnell (In Re Gosnell) · Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont · filed
The legislative history as to this section indicates that “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904) held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that the Code overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required conscious intent to harm.
Motta v. Bernard (In Re Bernard) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont · filed
The legislative history of this section indicates that the term ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional and that the looser standard of ‘reckless disregard’ under Tinker v. Colwell 139 [193] U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 was overruled. There must be an actual conscious intent to harm.
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The court held that the Code displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard construction and defines willfulness as deliberate or intentional.
Silva v. Frias (In Re Frias) · Bankruptcy Court for the District of Rhode Island · filed
The terms willful and malicious are not defined in the code; however, the legislative history to § 523 illuminates the meaning of willful as follows: “Under this paragraph ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.”
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The court held that Congress clarified § 523(a)(6) by displacing Tinker insofar as it equated reckless disregard with willfulness.
Sophos v. Hibbs (In re Hibbs) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California · filed
In enacting .the Code, Congress clarified the fest by expressly overruling Tinker to the extent the Supreme Court found reckless disregard to be the equivalent of willfulness.
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The court held that the 1978 Code amendments overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard approach.
Frantz v. Schuster (In Re Schuster) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan · filed
A myriad of cases focus on wilfulness as interpreted by Tinker to hold that willfulness could be established upon a finding of a reckless disregard of duty. See also Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610 (6th Cir.1986). However the amendments of the 1978 bankruptcy code have overruled the need to find reckless disregard.
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The Eleventh Circuit held that § 523(a)(6) requires intent to injure, not merely an intentional act causing injury, thereby rejecting Tinker's looser reckless-disregard route.
Hope v. Walker · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · filed
In reenacting this language in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, both houses of Congress stated that "[u]nder this paragraph "willful' means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473[, 485, 24 S.Ct. 505, 508, 48 L.Ed. 754] (1902) [ (1904) ] held that a less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a "reckless disregard' standard, they are overruled."
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The Ninth Circuit BAP held that the Code excludes gross negligence and relied on Congress's displacement of Tinker's looser reckless-disregard standard.
Kelly v. Okoye (In Re Kelly) · Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit · filed
The state court judgment only established gross negligence at best and not willful and malicious conduct as required by § 523(a)(6). Thus, the bankruptcy court erred in ruling that the debt was nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6) based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 5 See In re Ikner, 883 F.2d 986, 990 (11th Cir.1989) (holding mere showing of reckless disregard of duty does not establish “willful and malicious” injury); In re Posta, 866 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir.1989) (stating acts caused by the debtor’s negligence or recklessness are not encompassed by § 523(a)(6)); In re Compos, 768 F.2d 1165, 1159 (10th Cir.1985) (finding of reckless disregard insufficient under § 523(a)(6)); In re Woolner, 109 B.R. 250, 254 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1990) (stating hypothetically that a debt arising from professional malpractice would be dischargeable even if the conduct was reckless); In re Donnelly, 6 B.R. 19, 22 (Bankr.D.Or.1980) (concluding that gross negligence is not the equivalent to a finding of “willful and malicious” conduct). See also H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320-21 (“To the extent that Tinker v. Cold-well, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.”)
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The court recognized that Congress legislatively overruled Tinker's reckless-disregard test for nondischargeability.
Corley v. Delaney (In re Delaney) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana · filed
Matter of Quezada, 718 F.2d 121 (5th Cir.1983) citing Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904). However, “Congress expressly intended to overrule legislatively ... the reckless-disregard test for nondischarge-ability.”
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The Fourth Circuit held that Congress displaced Tinker's lower willfulness standard in part but left its implied-malice rule intact.
In Re James B. McNallen; Patricia McNallen Hagan v. James B. McNallen · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · filed
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1009 (4th Cir.1985), we concluded that the amendments to § 523(a)(6), which sprang from Congress’ desire to overrule in part Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), which applied a lower standard of “willful and malicious” than Congress had envisioned
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The court held that Congress displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard willfulness rule but retained its constructive-malice standard.
Brzys v. Lubanski (In Re Lubanski) · Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts · filed
Other courts believe that Congress only intended to overrule the application of the reckless disregard standard to the “willful” requirement and did not intend to alter Tinker ’s standard of implied or constructive malice. See generally, Southgate, 35 B.R. 766. These courts have held that “willful and malicious” requires only that a debtor intentionally committed an act, without just cause or excuse, which necessarily produces an injury. E.g., Vulcan Coals, Inc. v. Howard, 946 F.2d 1226, 1228-29 (6th Cir.1991); Transamerica Commercial Finance Corporation v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 942 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir.1991); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257 (11th Cir.1988); Blackman v. Gaebler (In re Gaebler), 88 B.R. 62, 65 (E.D.Pa.1988); Littlefield v. McGuffey (In re McGuffey), 145 B.R. 582 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1992). This view is consistent with policy considerations, namely, that “requiring proof that a debtor subjectively intended to harm a creditor’s interests would impose a nearly insurmountable burden on a creditor seeking to have a debt declared nondisehargeable under § 523(a)(6).” McGuffey, 145 B.R. at 586. Several bankruptcy decisions in this District have espoused the standard of constructive or implied malice. See Fate, 100 B.R. 141 (Bankr.D.Mass.1989); Materia v. Pereira (In re Pereira), 44 B.R. 248 (Bankr.D.Mass.1984); Trudeau, 35 B.R. 185, 187 (Bankr.D.Mass.1983). These decisions together hold that term “malicious” means an act done in conscious disregard of one’s duties. No special malice toward the creditor need be shown. For the policy considerations stated in McGujfey, this Court finds the standard of constructive or implied malice to be the appropriate standard for defining the term “malicious” under § 523(a)(6)
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The district court held that § 523(a)(6) requires deliberate or intentional injury and displaced Tinker's looser reckless-disregard standard.
Taneff v. Hoehn (In Re Taneff) · United States District Court for the Western District of New York · filed
The legislative history clarifies that § 523(a)(6) requires a “deliberate or intentional” injury to except a debt from discharge: Paragraph (6) excepts debts for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another person or to the property of another person. Under this paragraph, “willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754] (190[4]), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other eases have relied on Tinker to apply a “reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The en banc Eighth Circuit held that the 1978 Code displaced Tinker's expansive intentional-act standard and required an intentional injury or substantial certainty of injury.
In Re Paul W. Geiger, Debtor. Paul W. Geiger v. Margaret Kawaauhau and Solomon Kawaauhau · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · filed
When the bankruptcy code was revised in 1978, the words of the exception to discharge under consideration in this case remained unchanged, but both the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives, in reenacting what is now 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), observed in legislative reports that they intended the word ‘willful’ to mean ‘deliberate or intentional,’ and stated specifically that to ‘the extent that Tinker v. Colwell ... held’ that a ‘less strict’ (Senate), or ‘looser’ (House), ‘standard is intended ... [it is] overruled.’
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The court held that Congress displaced Tinker to the extent of its lower willfulness standard but retained its implied-malice rule.
Ruben v. Harper (In Re Harper) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina · filed
When Congress revised the bankruptcy code the Tinker decision was overruled to an extent.
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The Ninth Circuit held that the Code excludes recklessness from section 523(a)(6), relying on Congress's express displacement of Tinker's less strict standard.
In Re Nancy Shao Su in Re Louis C. Su, A/K/A Chienlu Su, Debtors. Dora Carrillo v. Louis C. Su · Ninth Circuit · filed
The Senate Committee Report accompanying the Bankruptcy Code’s "willful and malicious injury” language, for example, reads: Paragraph (5) provides that debts for willful and malicious conversion or injury by the debtor to another entity or the property of another entity are nondischargeable. Under this paragraph "willful” means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), held that a less strict standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a "reckless disregard” standard, they are overruled.
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The court held that Congress partly overruled Tinker by displacing its looser willfulness standard.
Gomes v. Limieux (In Re Limieux) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts · filed
When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it partly overruled Tinker stating in legislative history that: ‘ ‘wilful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 139 U.S. 472 (1902)[sic], held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.’
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The court held that the 1978 Code displaced Tinker's recklessness threshold with a higher intentional-injury standard.
Stevens v. Antonious (In Re Antonious) · Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · filed
Prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts found that a nondischargeable injury arose whenever the debtor’s conduct was at least reckless and was done without just cause. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 487, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904); see In re Conte, 33 F.3d 303, 306 (3d Cir.1994) (discussing pre-1978 case law). Courts have concluded, however, from the legislative history accompanying the 1978 legislation, that Congress intended that section 523(a)(6) have a higher standard than just recklessness. In re Conte, 33 F.3d at 306; H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1978), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5963, 6320 (“ ‘[Wlillful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, ... held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.”).
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The Ninth Circuit BAP expressly treated Tinker as superseded by the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
Plyam v. Precision Development, LLC (In Re Plyam) · Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit · filed
Second, as the Supreme Court clarified in Geiger, recklessly inflicted injuries do not satisfy the § 523(a)(6) willfulness requirement. ... See H.R. Rep. 95-595, at 365 (1977) (“‘Willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [1904], held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled.”)
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The court held that the 1978 Code added elements absent from Tinker and rejected reliance on Tinker as making criminal-conversation liability per se nondischargeable.
In re Minick · Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia · filed
Mr. Roberts relies upon a Supreme Court ruling interpreting the Bankruptcy Act as support for his argument that the tort of criminal conversation is per se excepted from discharge. See Tinker v. Colwell , 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904). The Court takes a moment to note that the Bankruptcy Code includes elements not found under the Act required for a debt to be excepted from discharge. This Court is compelled to apply the Code, not the Act, when deciding a matter of dischargeability.
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The court held that Congress displaced Tinker's reckless-disregard standard and required intent to cause the specific injury or objective substantial certainty of harm.
Mouton v. Dehler (In re Dehler) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana · filed
Under [ section 523(a)(6) ], ‘willful’ means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell , 193 U.S. 473, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a ‘reckless disregard’ standard, they are overruled. Based on Legislative History and jurisprudence, the Court finds that negligence and gross negligence are not ‘willful and malicious.’
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Questioned
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The court stated that the 1978 Code's legislative history suggests Congress intended to overrule Tinker's intent standard, while using that point only as support for a separate tort-versus-contract analysis.
Wish Acquisition, LLC v. Salvino (Salvino) · United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois · filed
The legislative history of the 1978 Code suggests that Congress intended § 523(a)(6) to overrule the intent standard applied by the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473, 487, 24 S.Ct. 505, 48 L.Ed. 754 (1904) (holding that a wrongful act of the debtor necessarily causing injury may be within the scope of the Bankruptcy Act's ‘willful and malicious’ discharge exception, even if the debtor did not intend the injury).
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