Ree v. State
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
It also allowed a same-day written statement after oral sentencing, successive one-cell increases for successive probation violations, and an exception for a valid plea agreement. Later sentencing laws changed the time for written reasons for newer crimes, and the Criminal Appeal Reform Act displaced automatic reversal for a harmless filing delay.
28 later cases cite Ree v. State; 28 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Ree v. State?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Overruled in part
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The Florida Supreme Court receded from Ree's prospective-only rule and applied its written-reasons holding to cases not final when Ree's rehearing mandate issued.
Smith v. State · Supreme Court of Florida · filed
Our decision today requires us to recede in part from Ree to the extent that we now hold that Ree shall apply to all cases not yet final when mandate issued after rehearing in Ree
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Superseded by statute
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The 1993 statute and sentencing rule relaxed Ree's contemporaneous-writing requirement for crimes committed on or after January 1, 1994; Ree continued to govern earlier crimes.
State v. Colbert · Supreme Court of Florida · filed
Furthermore, section 921.0016(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1993), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.702(d)(18) now relax the requirements of Ree for crimes committed after January 1, 1994.[1] We find no reason to overrule Ree for crimes committed prior to that date.[2]
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The Criminal Appeal Reform Act displaced Ree's automatic-reversal rule for an immaterial delay in filing written departure reasons.
Weiss v. State · District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District · filed
It seems clear that in this respect the Act was meant to and did overrule such cases as Ree v. State, 565 So.2d 1329 (Fla.1990) and Pierre v. State, 708 So.2d at 1037.
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The Criminal Punishment Code and rules replaced Ree's immediate-writing requirement with a seven-day filing period for downward departures under the newer scheme.
Jackson v. State · Supreme Court of Florida · filed
Prior sentencing schemes required a trial court to provide a contemporaneous written explanation for the imposition of any departure sentence at a sentencing hearing. See § 921.001(6), Fla. Stat. (1987); see also Ree v. State, 565 So.2d 1329, 1331 (Fla.1990), receded from on other grounds by Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063 (Fla.1992). However, the CPC and applicable rules now require a sentencing court to file written reasons supporting the imposition of a downward departure sentence within seven days after the date of sentencing.
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Limited
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The Florida Supreme Court modified Ree to permit reasons announced orally at sentencing to be reduced to writing that day and filed the next business day.
State v. Lyles · Supreme Court of Florida · filed
We adhere to our statement of options available to a trial court when imposing a sentence that departs from the sentencing guidelines, as expressed in Ree,[2] but we modify those options to allow the trial judge the leeway to reduce to writing, immediately after the hearing, the reasons orally stated to the defendant in open court. It is important that these written reasons are entered by the trial judge on the same date as the sentencing. These written reasons should, if at all possible, be filed on the same date; however, a filing on the next business day does not require a new sentencing proceeding.
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The Florida Supreme Court confined Ree's one-cell limit to each probation violation, permitting another one-cell increase after a later violation.
Williams v. State · Supreme Court of Florida · filed
In Ree we cited Lambert for the proposition that any departure sentence for probation violation is impermissible if it exceeds the one-cell increase permitted by the sentencing guidelines. ... Neither Lambert nor Ree involved multiple violations of probation[3] and neither made reference to Adams. ... It is entirely consistent to conclude that where there are multiple violations of probation, the sentence may be successively bumped to one higher cell for each violation.
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The Fourth District declined to carry Ree's written-reasons rule into resentencing after probation revocation where the original downward departure was validly agreed to.
State v. Hogan · District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District · filed
We recognize that the appellee has not contested the state's argument that reversal is mandated by Ree v. State, 565 So.2d 1329 (Fla. 1990), receded from by, Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1992) and Blair v. State, 598 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 1992), modified by, State v. Lyles, 576 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1991), Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1990), and Owens v. State, 598 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1992), which require a guidelines sentence where the trial court has failed to enter written reasons for departure. However, we do not deem those authorities as controlling with respect to a downward departure following a violation of probation, where the initial sentence validly departed downward.
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The Florida Supreme Court held that Ree's written-reasons requirement does not apply to a departure sentence based on a valid plea agreement recorded in the case.
State v. Williams · Supreme Court of Florida · filed
Id. at 1067; see also Ree v. State, 565 So.2d 1329, 1332 (Fla. 1990), receded from on other grounds, Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1992). When a court accepts a valid plea agreement, the rationale underlying contemporaneous *193 written reasons for departure is vitiated. In other words, a departure sentence imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement does not need written reasons to justify the departure; "a voluntary plea agreement spread out on the record for all the world to see fully justifies such a departure."
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