Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Hunt's first two requirements remain in force. All 62 flagged citations have been read; the six confirmed statutory treatments are listed below. Two state courts' separate choices for their own standing law are also listed below.
62 later cases cite Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission; 62 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Superseded by statute
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The Supreme Court held that the WARN Act removed Hunt's third standing requirement for a union authorized to sue on its members' behalf.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc. · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
... an association’s action for damages running solely to its members would be barred for want of the association’s standing to sue. See Hunt, supra, at 343. ... The questions presented here are whether, in enacting the WARN Act, Congress intended to abrogate this otherwise applicable standing limitation so as to permit the union to sue for damages running to its workers, and, if it did, whether it had the constitutional authority to do so. We answer yes to each question.
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The court held that statutory authority to represent people with mental illness allowed the organizations to sue without satisfying Hunt's third requirement.
Joseph S. v. Hogan · E.D.N.Y. · filed
As discussed above, both Congress and the New York legislature clearly intended to confer standing on DAI and MHLS to bring lawsuits to protect the rights of individuals with mental illness in New York. In light of their statutory mandates, I conclude that DAI and MHLS have associational standing to pursue claims on behalf of their constituents in this action without regard to whether they meet Hunt’s third prong.
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The court held that federal authorization for a protection and advocacy organization made Hunt's third requirement inapplicable to its suit.
R.P.-K. v. Department of Education · D. Haw. · filed
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). ... Finally, the third prong of the Hunt test is irrelevant with respect to Protection and Advocacy organizations as they are specifically authorized by federal statute to bring litigation on behalf of their constituents.
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The court held that Congress's authorization for the disability rights organization removed Hunt's third requirement in this action.
Jacobs v. Salt Lake City School District · D. Utah · filed
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). ... Thus, where Congress has eliminated prudential barriers to standing by granting an organization the right to sue on behalf of others, the organization need only satisfy the first two requirements of the Hunt test rather than all three. ... The SLCSD argues at some length that the DLC is unable to satisfy the third Hunt requirement: that the lawsuit may not require the participation of individual constituents. But, as discussed above, the DLC need not satisfy this third requirement.
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The court held that federal disability rights legislation displaced Hunt's third requirement for this organization's authorized claims.
M.G. v. Scrase · D.N.M. · filed
Because DRNM is the designated protection and advocacy organization authorized to pursue legal remedies on behalf of individuals with developmental disabilities under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15043-15044, DRNM need not satisfy Hunt’s third prong.
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The court held that the PAIMI Act's authorization to sue for constituents displaced Hunt's third requirement in this case.
Community Legal Aid Society, Inc. v. Adult and Prison Education Resources Workgroup · D. Del. · filed
CLASI contends that the third Hunt requirement is abrogated by Congress’s designation of CLASI as a P&A system with the statutory authority to bring claims under the PAIMI Act. ... The court finds this authority persuasive and concludes that the third Hunt requirement in this case is abrogated due to CLASI’s statutory authority to bring claims on behalf of its constituents.
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