Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
The three confirmed treatments listed below concern the reach of Roth’s liberty-interest language and its property-entitlement framework for elected public office. Some later opinions describe Paul v. Davis or Siegert v. Gilley as overruling or abrogating Roth. Reading those Supreme Court opinions shows that they apply Roth’s employment-loss context to distinguish defamation alone; neither supplies an overruling entry here.
14,283 later cases cite Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth; 305 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Limited
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Refuses to extend Roth’s broad liberty language beyond charges of dishonest, illegal, or immoral conduct, despite acknowledging its language could support the broader construction.
Brito v. Diamond · Southern District of New York · filed
Building on this holding, this court has held that a dismissal must be accompanied by an accusation of dishonesty, illegality or immorality in order to meet Roth’s requirement that the employee be stigmatized. ... While Roth’s language is broad enough to be given this construction, the Supreme Court was not faced with the present issue in Roth or any subsequent case. Hence the rule in this court will be followed.
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Held that Roth’s broader property-entitlement approach did not establish a protected property interest in elected public office, because Taylor and Snowden remained controlling.
Velez v. Levy · Second Circuit · filed
We are mindful that, since Taylor and Snowden were decided, the Court has adopted a more expansive approach to identifying "property" within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. But while intervening cases may cast a shadow over Taylor and Snowden, "it is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997). Accordingly, we follow the Court's pronouncements on this issue, and are bound to conclude that Velez lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official.
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Held that Roth’s expanded property-entitlement approach did not create a due process property right in elected office or candidacy while Taylor and Snowden remained controlling.
David Wilson v. Gerald Birnberg · Fifth Circuit · filed
Wilson correctly notes that since Taylor and Snowden were decided, the Supreme Court has charted a somewhat new course in defining property under the Fourteenth Amendment. ... Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); ... Though these “intervening cases may cast a shadow over Taylor and Snowden, ‘it is the Supreme Court’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.’” Velez, 401 F.3d at 87 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997)). Thus, we continue to hold that public office does not constitute property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
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