Mapp v. Ohio
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
Other courts denied Mapp retroactive effect, confined the exclusionary rule to criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings and law-enforcement investigations, recognized exceptions for new crimes and impeachment, or declined to extend it to employment and civil-conservatorship proceedings. The other opinions read applied Mapp, described Mapp's own overruling of older law, or placed adverse language on unrelated authorities, rulings, and arguments.
9,062 later cases cite Mapp v. Ohio; 484 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading; 449 of them have been read, and the text of 35 citing opinions could not be retrieved, so those remain unread. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Mapp v. Ohio?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Limited
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The court limited Mapp's retroactive reach, holding that it gave no relief from a conviction that became final before Mapp was decided.
Wolochen v. Police Department of New York · New York Supreme Court, Kings County · filed
It has specifically held against *103permitting the Mapp - determination to have any retroactive effect. Under ;the circumstances, the granting of this motion would give the petitioner no relief, while at the same time casting an undue burden upon the already overburdened Police Department of the City of New York.
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Mapp's exclusionary rule was unavailable through coram nobis to reopen a conviction obtained before Mapp, when the evidence was deemed constitutional.
People v. Hyde · New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department · filed
Nor, under the rule of Mapp v. Ohio (367 U. S. 643), does coram nobis lie to vacate a conviction obtained by proof which, at the time of the trial, was deemed to be constitutional evidence (People v. Muller, 11 N Y 2d 154; People v. Figueroa, 220 N. Y. S. 2d 131; People v. Angelet, 221 N. Y. S. 2d 834; People v. Oree, 220 N. Y. S. 2d 121).
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Mapp had no retrospective effect on a state conviction finalized before Mapp was decided.
Moore v. State · Alabama Court of Appeals · filed
The 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, has no retrospective effect on State court convictions.
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Mapp did not apply retroactively through a Section 2255 collateral attack to unsettle Gaitan's final federal conviction.
Joseph Aguilar Gaitan v. United States · Tenth Circuit · filed
We find nothing in Elkins, Rios, or Mapp which says whether those decisions should be applied retroactively or prospectively. ... The final judgment against Gaitan was appealed and affirmed and certiorari was denied. ... In the circumstances we are convinced that the judgment of the district court was correct.
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Mapp did not operate retroactively against a state conviction that became final before Mapp announced its change in law.
Taylor v. People · Supreme Court of Colorado · filed
The controlling factor here is thát the judgment of conviction against Taylor became final before Mapp announced the change in law and against this' judgment Mapp does not operate.
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Mapp was not retroactive to state judgments already final when Mapp was decided, although it applied where a direct appeal remained pending.
In Re Winkle · Supreme Court of Michigan · filed
Neither Mapp v. Ohio nor Ker v. California, supra, gives us an answer to this question and until such an answer is forthcoming, this Court will follow the ... Maryland and Colorado Federal and New York State courts’ reasoning above set forth, and hold that Mapp v. Ohio is not applicable retrospectively except in a case like the present one where the judgment had not become final at the time of Mapp v. Ohio because an appeal from the judgment was pending.
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Mapp's exclusionary rule does not apply retrospectively to state convictions that became final before Mapp was decided.
Linkletter v. Walker · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
All that we decide today is that though the error complained of might be fundamental it is not of the nature ... requiring us to overturn all final convictions based upon it. After full consideration of all the factors we are not able to say that the Mapp rule requires retrospective application.
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Mapp could not be applied retrospectively to a conviction that became final before Mapp, so Wolf remained the governing rule.
George H. Winkle v. George A. Kropp, Warden, State Prison of Southern Michigan · Sixth Circuit · filed
However, irrespective of whether this question of law was raised by counsel for appellant, it is clear from Linkletter that it was error to apply Mapp retrospectively. The rule in Wolf should have been applied.
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Mapp's exclusionary rule does not apply at a post-Mapp retrial when the case was originally tried before Mapp.
State v. Wilbanks · Supreme Court of Alabama · filed
We believe, however, that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Jenkins v. State of Delaware (June 2, 1969), 395 U.S. 213, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 23 L.Ed.2d 253, is authority for the holding that the Mapp exclusionary rule does not apply to post Mapp retrials in cases originally tried prior to that decision.
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Mapp's exclusionary rule was confined to criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings involving evidence obtained by law-enforcement officers investigating criminal activity.
State Forester v. Umpqua River Navigation Co. · Supreme Court of Oregon · filed
The exclusionary rule, where it is applicable, is now required by the federal constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, supra (367 US 643). ... Mapp itself gives no express clue. It was a criminal case. ... We hold that illegally seized evidence should only be excluded in a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding and if obtained by law enforcement officers investigating criminal activity.
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Mapp's exclusionary rationale did not displace the Walder impeachment exception, so unlawfully obtained evidence could remain available for impeachment.
Riddell v. Rhay · Supreme Court of Washington · filed
Neither Miranda, nor Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961), which first announced that the exclusionary rule extends to the state as well as the federal system, specifically overruled Walder. The question is whether Miranda, Mapp and other decisional law which develop in greater detail the matters which cannot be included within the state’s case in chief also indicate a change in exclusionary policy of such significance that they implicitly undermine the impeachment exception on the Walder facts or in the confession context to which it spread. The answer must be in the negative. ... In light of the Walder setting, the extension of the rationale in Mapp and Miranda cannot be viewed as implicitly overruling Walder.
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina confined Mapp's exclusionary rule by holding that it does not require suppression of evidence of a new crime committed against officers after their illegal entry.
State v. Miller · Supreme Court of North Carolina · filed
Admittedly, the constitutional exclusionary rule has been broadly formulated. In Mapp v. Ohio, supra, the Court said: “We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court.” (Emphasis added.) ... Even so, the meaning of these expressions must.be discerned in light of the facts in each case. When so considered, it is apparent that the rule does not require the exclusion of evidence obtained after an illegal entry when that evidence is offered to prove the murder of one of the officers making the entry.
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The Supreme Court limited the Mapp exclusionary remedy by barring federal habeas relief when the state provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth Amendment claim.
Stone v. Powell · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
The discussion in Kaufman of the scope of federal habeas corpus rests on the view that the effectuation of the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires the granting of habeas corpus relief when a prisoner has been con *481 victed in state court on the basis of evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure since those Amendments were held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961), to require exclusion of such evidence at trial and reversal of conviction upon direct review. ... We hold, therefore, that *482 where .the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require that a.state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.
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The Supreme Court confined Mapp's exclusionary rule by recognizing a good-faith exception for evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant later found defective.
United States v. Leon · Supreme Court of the United States · filed
We have concluded that, in the Fourth Amendment context, the exclusionary rule can be modified somewhat without jeopardizing its ability to perform its intended functions. ... Language in opinions of this Court and of individual Justices has sometimes implied that the exclusionary rule is a necessary corollary of the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. *906 Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 651, 655-657 (1961); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 462-463 (1928), or that the rule is required by the conjunction of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Mapp v. Ohio, supra, at 661-662 (Black, J., concurring); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33-34 (1925). These implications need not detain us long. ... As yet, we have not recognized any form of good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 11 But the balancing approach that has evolved during the years of experience with the rule provides strong support for the modification currently urged upon us. As we discuss below, our evaluation of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should be admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief.
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The Arkansas Court of Appeals declined to extend Mapp's exclusionary rule to a municipal employee-termination proceeding.
Miller v. City of Little Rock · Arkansas Court of Appeals · filed
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Court held that due process required state courts to exclude such evidence in a criminal case. ... We hold that the trial court did not err in declining to apply the exclusionary rule in the case at bar.
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The Supreme Court of California declined to extend Mapp's exclusionary rule to involuntary civil-conservatorship proceedings.
Lake County Mental Health Department v. Susan T. · Supreme Court of California · filed
Although once described as an essential part of the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment (Mapp v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643, 657 [6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1091]), the rule has more recently been characterized as a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.” (United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 348 [38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571, 94 S.Ct. 613], quoted with approval in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [82 L.Ed.2d 677, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 3405].) ... Under these circumstances we decline to extend the exclusionary rule to conservatorship proceedings under the act.
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