Irvin v. Dowd
Is it still good law? What later courts have actually done to this case.
Status
More on how this was screened
The Ninth Circuit also limited the impartial-jury guarantee when the defendant's own misconduct caused the alleged partiality, and the Indiana Supreme Court criticized Irvin's appellate reassessment of prospective jurors' credibility. The other opinions applied or factually distinguished Irvin, or used the nearby treatment language for different precedents and rulings.
3,692 later cases cite Irvin v. Dowd; 104 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.
Relying on Irvin v. Dowd?
This page shows what later courts did to it. Ask about your specific facts and see whether it still carries your argument, with citations you can check.
Treatments
Superseded by Statute
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The Seventh Circuit recognized that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 replaced the de novo federal-habeas review standard for which Irvin was cited with the more deferential standard in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
Moffat v. Gilmore · Seventh Circuit · filed
Under pre-1996 law, we would take up afresh state courts’ determinations of federal law (meaning both questions of federal law and of mixed law-and-fact). Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 300-01, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 2494-95, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). Under the new habeas statute, we ask whether the state adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1997).
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Limited
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The Ninth Circuit held that Irvin's impartial-jury guarantee affords no relief when a defendant's own misconduct caused the alleged juror partiality and the trial judge used reasonable measures to preserve fairness.
Williams v. Woodford · Ninth Circuit · filed
“The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial ‘guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.’ ” United States v. Sarkisian, 197 F.3d 966, 981 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)) (internal quotations omitted). However, the constitutional right to an impartial jury is not absolute. The Sixth Amendment affords no relief when the defendant’s own misconduct caused the alleged juror partiality and the trial judge employed reasonable means under the circumstances to preserve the trial’s fairness.
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Criticized
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The Indiana Supreme Court criticized Irvin for independently reassessing prospective jurors' credibility as though acting as a trial court.
Baker v. State · Indiana Supreme Court · filed
The Supreme Court of the United States, in reaching its decision, obviously assumed the role of a trial court and determined for itself the credibility of the prospective jurors, as witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony. We have not conceived this to be a proper function of this court, as a court of review.
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