Meyer v. Nebraska

Status

58 later cases cite Meyer v. Nebraska; 58 of those citations sat close to treatment language and were flagged for reading, and all of them have been read. Citations that did not sit near treatment language were not flagged and were not read one by one, so a court that weakened this case without using any of that language would not appear here.

Treatments

Limited

• The district court declined to extend the fundamental parental right recognized in Meyer to a parent’s decision to allow a minor child in public during curfew hours.

  Hodgkins v. Peterson · United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana · filed November 6, 2001

  However, after a careful study of Troxel and the earlier Supreme Court parental rights cases such as Meyer, Pierce, Yoder, and the other cases cited by the Troxel plurality, see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not made a clear showing that the fundamental parental right extends to the right asserted in the instant case: a parent’s right to allow his or her minor children to be in public with parental permission during curfew hours.

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• The New Jersey Appellate Division declined to extend Meyer’s protection of parental educational choices to a parent’s waiver of a child’s future tort remedies.

  Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park · Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division · filed March 10, 2005

  We find three arguments raised in the preceding cases to merit further discussion. First, we note the argument, expressed in decisions such as those in Sharon, supra, and Zivich, supra, that a parent can release the tort claims of a child as the result of the parent's fundamental right to make decisions that bear upon the care, custody and upbringing of their children. 769 N.E.2d at 746. Although we acknowledge that fundamental right to exist, as we must (see, e.g. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2060, 147 L.Ed.2d 49, 56-57 (2000)), we do not read the precedent defining that right (as does our colleague) as encompassing a decision such as this to forego substantial tort remedies, a decision that we find to be different from such fundamental concerns as establishment of a home, upbringing and education, religion, or medical care. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2505, 61 L.Ed.2d 101, 120 (1979)(mental hospital institutionalization); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1935-36, 52 L.Ed.2d 531, 537 (1977) (family living arrangements); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1532, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 24 (1972) (freedom of religion in light of compulsory education); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558-59 (1972) (termination of parental rights); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 1077-78 (1925) (private schooling); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923) (teaching of modern languages). Were it otherwise, existing restrictions on parental conduct in the context of litigation involving minors would long ago have been abrogated in New Jersey.

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• The district court declined to extend Meyer’s foreign-language instruction holding and its broader occupational-right language to a claimed right to operate a diesel repair business on agricultural property contrary to local zoning.

  Skilwies v. City of Huber Heights · S.D. Ohio · filed August 31, 2023

  Plaintiff asserts a protectable interest in “a fundamental right to engage in the common occupations of life on his property.” (Doc. 3, PageID 33). Plaintiff marks the centennial of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), by citing to it for this proposition. In upholding the right to instruct one’s children to read and write German, Meyer does recite this as a fundamental right, citing, inter alia, Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394 (1872); Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746 (1884); and Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133 (1905). It is worth noting that the Lochner-era cases protecting a due process theory of freedom of contract, were expressly abrogated in Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536-37 (1949), and other earlier cases cited in that opinion. The Court is unaware of current caselaw supporting a substantive due process protection of a right formulated as broadly as Plaintiff propounds. Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any likelihood of success on his substantive due process claim, his motion will be denied.

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Questioned

• The Fifth Circuit called Meyer's broad liberty formulation of questionable strength when assessing a financial privacy claim.

  Plante v. Gonzalez · Fifth Circuit · filed June 30, 1978

  The parties suggest two different tests for determining whether their privacy interest is subject to this protection. They offer the formulation from Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 that...Neither standard appears helpful. Both authorities are of questionable strength. Meyer comes to us from the heyday of substantive due process analysis....Even if these statements maintain their full precedential weight, their words provide no easy answers. Therefore, we turn to cases concerning financial privacy, and to the considerations which support the autonomy branch of the right to privacy....Financial privacy is not within the autonomy branch of the right to privacy.

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