Statute Annotations › Utah › Utah Code Ann. § 41

Utah Code Ann. § 41

Motor vehicles: the cases that interpreted this section

Jurisdiction
Utah
Case notes
3
Cited in passing
8
Citing cases indexed
12
Case dates
1985–2011
Screened through
2011-12-30
Courts' treatment: live
No reviewed case has held this section invalid, preempted, superseded or repealed.
This reflects what the reviewed cases said, not legislative action: a later amendment or repeal by the legislature would not appear here unless a reviewed case discussed it.

11 citing cases reviewed of 12 in the citation index: 3 interpreted the section (annotated below), 8 cited it only in passing. Cases filed after 2011-12-30 may not have been reviewed yet.

Have a situation under Utah Code Ann. § 41?

These notes show how courts have ruled. Ask about your specific facts and see which of these rulings apply, with citations you can check.

Turn signals and lane changes

Section 41-6-69(1)(b) requires a driver signaling a turn or lane change to signal continuously for at least the last three seconds before beginning the maneuver.

United States v. Paul · filed 2003-01-16(1)(b)

Officer McCarthy observed a violation of Utah law when he saw defendant’s vehicle change lanes before signaling for the required three seconds in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41 — 6—69(l)(b). ... Because Officer McCarthy had reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred, the stop of defendant’s vehicle was justified at its inception.
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Definition of an intersection

The cited provisions prohibit driving on the left within 100 feet of an intersection and define an intersection using the roads' public-maintenance status and physical relationship, without requiring that the intersection be visible or that the motorist have notice of it.

Johnson v. Matlock · filed 1985-09-04(a)(2), (17), (19)(a)

Applying the statutory criteria to the facts of this case inescapably reveals an intersection as a matter of law. The evidence was uncontroverted that the roads joined at right angles and were publicly maintained. ... Nowhere in the statutes is there a requirement that the intersection be visible to the motorist or that the motorist have notice of its existence. The district court erred, therefore, when it submitted to the jury the determination of whether the collision occurred in an intersection.
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DUI—Subsequent chemical test

Subsection (1)(a) prohibits driving after consuming enough alcohol before or while driving to produce a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater on a subsequent chemical test.

State v. Manwaring · filed 2011-12-30(1)(a)

Thus, stated succinetly, the plain language of subsection (1)(a) puts a person who drives on notice that he or she violates subsection (1)(a) if (1) the person had alcohol in his or her system prior to or while driving and (2) the alcohol present in the person's body prior to or while driving causes a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as measured in a subsequent chemical test.
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8 more cases cited this section only in passing

These cases mention the section without interpreting it (a string cite, a footnote, background). Listed so you can see the full citation record, not just the annotated rulings.

United States v. Mikulski, the opinion mentions Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-102(3)(b) and (c) as background to the vehicle impoundment issue, but resolves the motion under the Fourth Amendment and does not decide the statute’s meaning, compliance, or independent application. opinion →
Salt Lake City v. Bench, the court cited § 41-6a-804(l)(b) only to show that Bench's signaling was lawful while deciding whether the officer had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop; it did not construe or independently decide a question about the statute. opinion →
Dabol v. United States, the Utah statute is mentioned only in footnote 8 as one of several comparable state statutes. The court construed Washington’s statute and did not decide anything about the meaning or application of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-78. opinion →
Burkett v. Schwendiman, the court dismissed the appeal as moot and did not decide whether the report satisfied the statute’s sworn-statement requirement. Its discussion of the statute was only to explain that a statutory amendment made the issue unlikely to recur. opinion →
State v. Carruth, the opinion mentions the Title 41 joyriding statute only in describing the charge and procedural history. Its holding concerns lesser-included-offense standards under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(e), not the meaning or application of § 41. opinion →
Progressive Northern Insurance Co. v. Corder, the statute appears only in a footnote noting that Utah repealed a comparable frozen-liability statute; the court does not interpret, apply, or otherwise decide anything about it. opinion →
United States v. Hernandez, the court applied the rear license plate lighting requirement in § 41-6-120(b) when evaluating the traffic stop, but did not decide a rule of § 41 itself. opinion →
State v. Preece, the court decided rules under specific motor vehicle provisions, including sections 41-6-44 and 41-6-69, rather than section 41 itself. opinion →

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