Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5

Law changed since Effective September 1, 2024, Utah repealed § 30-3-5 and recodified its subjects in Title 81; this note names the former section rather than the current location.

Section 30-3-5 gives Utah courts jurisdiction to modify a custody decree and continuing jurisdiction over the resulting decree.

Tufares v. Wright · filed 1982-04-13

Utah had jurisdiction under its own law to modify the New Mexico decree, and it continues to have jurisdiction over its custody decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, 1953 (Supp.1981); McLane v. McLane, 570 P.2d 692 (Utah 1977).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) allows a court to modify a child custody stipulation incorporated into a divorce decree when circumstances warrant.

Myers v. Myers · filed 1989-02-02(3)

In the present case, the stipulation incorporated into the divorce decree, as in Despain and Balls, deals with an issue normally open to modification under the court’s equitable powers, child custody. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1985). Therefore, it comes under the continuing jurisdiction of the court and may be modified. The trial court is not bound by the parties' stipulation, and may rule otherwise if the circumstances warrant.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) allows visitation orders to be modified.

Peterson v. Peterson · filed 1991-10-15(3)

Nevertheless, we affirm, noting that all orders of visitation are subject to modification. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989); Utah Code of Jud.Admin. R6-404.

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Section 30-3-5(4)(a) grants certain immediate family members standing to seek visitation in a divorce; that limited grant excludes other nonparents from seeking visitation under the common law.

Jones v. Barlow · filed 2007-02-16(4)(a)

The grant of standing to immediate family members under certain well-defined cireumstances, however, creates the negative implication that all other categories of nonparents are prohibited from seeking visitation rights. Otherwise, the standing requirement would not serve its function as a jurisdictional bar to litigation because every unmentioned class of nonpar-ent could attempt to establish visitation rights under the common law. We decline to expand the common law into an area occupied by statute so as to contradict the apparent legislative intent.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8) gives courts continuing jurisdiction to modify custody orders, subject to res judicata.

Huish v. Munro · filed 2008-07-25(8)

Notwithstanding the trial court’s “continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their support ... as is reasonable and necessary,” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (2007), there is no question but that the principle of res judicata applies to modification proceedings, see Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah Ct.App.1990).

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Section 30-3-5(5)(a) may give a stepparent standing to seek visitation during the marriage, but that standing ends when the marriage ends and the legal parent terminates the in loco parentis relationship.

Strauss v. Tuschman · filed 2009-08-06(5)(a)

We conclude that the district court correctly determined that Stepfather lacked standing to petition for visitation with Child. While Stepfather may have had statutory standing to petition for visitation with Child prior to the parties’ divorce, that standing was lost when the marriage officially ended and Mother terminated the in loco parentis relationship between Stepfather and Child.

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Section 30-3-5(8)(a)(v) requires courts determining alimony to consider whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support.

Tobler v. Tobler · filed 2014-10-09(8)(a)(v)

One of the statutory factors that must be considered in determining an alimony award is “whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives district courts continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable and necessary changes to child custody orders.

Jones v. Jones · filed 2016-05-12(3)

The district court’s ruling was within its “continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children . . . as is reasonable and necessary.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives a divorce court continuing jurisdiction to amend a retirement QDRO when reasonably necessary to effectuate the property distribution in the divorce decree.

Potts v. Potts · filed 2018-08-30(3)

Utah Code section 30-3-5(3) governs the disposition of, among other things, property interests such as retirement accounts. ... Therefore, having determined that it was reasonable and necessary to effectuate the terms of the decree, the court had jurisdiction to amend the 1995 QDRO.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) preserves the district court’s continuing jurisdiction to modify child custody and support orders as reasonable and necessary.

Cox v. Hefley · filed 2019-04-18(3)

By statute, the district court “has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of a child and the child’s support . . . as is reasonable and necessary.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). Thus, although Hefley must comply with the Vexatious Litigant Order, she may petition to modify the Stipulated Decree if “there have been changes in the circumstances upon which the previous award was based that are sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the question.” See Blocker v. Blocker, 2017 UT App 10, ¶ 11, 391 P.3d 1051 (quotation simplified).

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Section 30-3-5(3) reserves jurisdiction to the trial court to change an alimony award after the divorce decree.

Eames v. Eames · filed 1987-04-09(3)

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1986) specifically reserves jurisdiction to the trial court to "make subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties... ."

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives district courts continuing jurisdiction to amend alimony.

Petersen v. Petersen · filed 1987-05-18

The district court retains continuing jurisdiction in divorce- actions to amend alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1986).

Law changed since The May 1, 1995 amendment added an unforeseeable-change requirement for alimony modifications and limited orders addressing newly arising needs absent extenuating circumstances; the earlier modification standard is incomplete for later petitions. Utah repealed § 30-3-5 effective September 1, 2024 and moved its subjects to Title 81.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives the district court continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony when the parties’ circumstances substantially change.

Rayburn v. Rayburn · filed 1987-05-29(3)

In addition, the district court has "continuing jurisdiction” to change the alimony award “as is reasonable and necessary,” id. (3), provided there develops a substantial change in the parties’ circumstances.

Law changed since Effective September 1, 2024, Utah repealed § 30-3-5 and recodified its subjects in Title 81; this note names the former section rather than the current location.

Section 30-3-5(1) permits later support orders, but a substantial change in circumstances alone does not overcome a knowing and specific alimony waiver in a divorce stipulation.

Kinsman v. Kinsman · filed 1988-01-12(1)

At the time the decree was modified, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1984) provided that: "The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties... ." However, a party who brings an action to modify a divorce decree "must initially show that a substantial change in the circumstances of at least one of the parties has occurred." Jeppson v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984), and cases cited therein. ... We decline to hold that a change of circumstances can overcome a knowing and specific waiver in a stipulation.

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Section 30-3-5(1) gives divorce courts equitable discretion to award alimony based on a spouse’s separate property.

Sampinos v. Sampinos · filed 1988-02-25(1)

At the time of the divorce, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1984) provided that “[w]hen a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it such orders in relation to the ... property and parties, ... as may be equitable.” ... Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s allocation of alimony from defendant’s inheritance.

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Section 30-3-5 permits permanent alimony subject to its statutory conditions.

Martinez v. Martinez · filed 1988-04-19

For the reasons stated previously and based upon the facts in the record, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to an award of alimony on a continuing basis and we award permanent alimony in the sum of $750.00 per month subject to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987).

Law changed since The May 1, 1995 amendment added marriage length as an alimony factor, and the May 3, 1999 amendment added three more factors; this earlier three-factor account is incomplete for later awards. Utah repealed § 30-3-5 effective September 1, 2024 and moved its subjects to Title 81.

Section 30-3-5 allows a court setting alimony to consider disabilities arising during the marriage when assessing a spouse’s needs and ability to earn income, regardless of their cause.

Noble v. Noble · filed 1988-08-15

In determining the amount of the award necessary to accomplish this aim, the trial court must make adequate findings and conclusions demonstrating that it has considered three factors: (i) the financial condition and needs of the party seeking alimony, (ii) that party’s ability to produce a sufficient income, and (iii) the ability of the other party to provide support. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074-75; see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984 & Supp.1988). In weighing those three factors, it is entirely appropriate for the trial court to take into account whether physical or mental disabilities arising during the marriage, regardless of their cause, have made the receiving party’s needs greater or reduced that party’s ability to produce an income.

Law changed since Effective September 1, 2024, Utah repealed § 30-3-5 and recodified its subjects in Title 81; this note names the former section rather than the current location.

Section 30-3-5 permits a party to seek modification of alimony if the recipient becomes employed and her income rises.

Schindler v. Schindler · filed 1989-06-06

Once respondent becomes gainfully employed and her income rises, there is nothing to preclude appellant from moving for a modification of the alimony award at that time.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(5) allows alimony to continue after the recipient remarries if the decree so provides, but the court must make specific findings justifying that award.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1993-06-04(5)

The trial court therefore has the discretion to make an award of alimony that will survive the remarriage of the receiving spouse. In exercising this discretion, however, the trial court must make adequate and specific findings of fact justifying such an award.

Law changed since The May 3, 1999 amendment added three mandatory alimony factors; this earlier four-factor list is incomplete for later awards. Utah repealed § 30-3-5 effective September 1, 2024 and moved its subjects to Title 81.

Section 30-3-5(7)(a) requires courts setting alimony to consider the recipient’s needs and earning capacity, the payor’s ability to provide support, and the length of the marriage.

Griffith v. Griffith · filed 1998-06-04(7)(a)

Under Utah law, a trial court must consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: “(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and (iv) the length of the marriage.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (Supp.1997). ... Because the trial court in this case followed the mandatory factors and we see no inequity in its alimony and child support awards, we must affirm its alimony award.

Law changed since Effective September 1, 2024, Utah repealed § 30-3-5 and recodified its subjects in Title 81; this note names the former section rather than the current location.

Section 30-3-5 does not require alimony to last as long as the marriage.

Childs v. Childs · filed 1998-10-01

We have reviewed section 30-3-5 and find nothing to support the argument that the trial court is required to award alimony for a period equivalent to the length of the marriage.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(7)(h) requires an explicit finding of extenuating circumstances to award alimony for longer than the marriage lasted.

Rehn v. Rehn · filed 1999-02-19(7)(h)

In reviewing the plain language of this statute, we conclude that a court must explicitly make a finding of “extenuating circumstances” in order to extend the alimony period beyond the duration of the marriage.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(7)(h) caps the duration of alimony at the length of the marriage absent extenuating circumstances; it does not require an award for that full period when additional alimony is unwarranted.

Thomas v. Thomas · filed 1999-08-12(7)(h)

Ms. Thomas challenges only the duration of the alimony awarded her by the trial court, arguing the court should have awarded her alimony for the maximum statutory period — the length of the marriage. ... Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to award additional alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(7)(h) limits alimony to the length of the marriage unless the court finds extenuating circumstances.

Kelley v. Kelley · filed 2000-08-03(7)(h)

Because the court made no finding of extenuating circumstances, the time for which the court may order alimony is limited by section 30-3-5(7)(h) to the duration of the common law marriage, to wit: five years.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The 1995 amendment requiring extenuating circumstances for additional alimony is substantive and does not apply to modification petitions filed before it took effect.

Wilde v. Wilde · filed 1998-12-03(7)(g)(ii)

We hold that the prior version of section 30-3-5 applies to this action because it was in effect at the time the original petition to modify the divorce decree was filed, and the new version of the statute constitutes a substantive change in the law that does not apply retroactively.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

An alimony award may be modified only after a substantial material change in circumstances that was not foreseeable at the time of divorce.

Moon v. Moon · filed 1999-01-22(7)(g)(i)

As a threshold issue, before modifying an alimony award, the court must find “a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the [parties’] divorce.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998); see Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah Ct.App.1988). ... Further, our review of the record shows the ruling is supported by the evidence; we thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(7)(a) requires a court modifying alimony to consider all four statutory factors and make findings on them.

Williamson v. Williamson · filed 1999-07-01(7)(a)

The trial court, however, should have substituted a sharpened pencil for its broad brush and set forth detailed findings on the factors specified in section 30-3-5(7)(a).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) permits modification of permanent alimony when a substantial material change of circumstances was not foreseeable at the time of divorce.

Bolliger v. Bolliger · filed 2000-02-25(7)(g)(i)

However, even if permanent alimony is awarded, a later substantial material change of circumstances not foreseen at the time of the divorce can provide grounds for modifying the permanent alimony “upon appropriate petition.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(g) bars modifying alimony to address needs that arose after the divorce decree unless extenuating circumstances justify it.

Wall v. Wall · filed 2007-02-23(8)(g)

Under Utah law, "(tlhe court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating cireumstances that justify that action." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(@) (Supp.2006). ... In making his argument, Mr. Wall fails to acknowledge the substantial debt Mrs. Wall accumulated to attend college. As we noted above, the record indicates that this was a cireumstance contemplated by the trial court at the time of the divorce. In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to modify Mrs. Wall's alimony award.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(7)(b) allows the court to consider fault when awarding alimony.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2003-08-07(7)(b)

Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated section 30-3-5(7)(b) allows the trier of fact to consider fault when awarding alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(b) permits a court to consider a spouse’s fault when determining alimony, including when an award exceeds what economic factors alone would support.

Riley v. Riley · filed 2006-05-25(8)(b)

Utah statutory law expressly provides that a trial court “may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.” Utah Code Ann. § 30 — 3—5(8)(b). Certainly the facts of this case — Husband’s engagement in extramarital affairs and his prolonged deceitful conduct that led to the divorce — present precisely the type of situation where the legislature intended the trial court to consider fault.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Alimony may extend beyond the length of the marriage when the court finds extenuating circumstances, which can include a continuous marital relationship following an essentially sham divorce.

Kelley v. Kelley · filed 2003-09-25(7)(h)

Notwithstanding their initial divorce, the court found that Wayne and Sonia had a continuous marital relationship in either a solemnized or common law form for more than sixteen years. This unique situation presents the type of "extenuating circumstance" that could justify a longer than normal alimony award, and we thus conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(7)(g) requires findings of an unforeseeable substantial material change in circumstances and, when modification addresses needs that arose after the decree, extenuating circumstances.

Van Dyke v. Van Dyke · filed 2004-02-20(7)(g)(i)-(ii)

In this ease, it is clear that the trial court failed to adequately comply with either section 30 — 3—5(7)(g)(i) or section 30-3-5(7)(g)(ii). Accordingly, we remand for the entry of further findings explicitly addressing the requirements of these provisions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A stipulation waives the right to seek future alimony after a material change in circumstances only if the waiver is clear and unmistakable.

Medley v. Medley · filed 2004-06-04(8)(g)(i)-(ii)

Moreover, even if the stipulation can be fairly construed as a waiver of the present right to receive alimony, it cannot be fairly construed to waive the right to future alimony in the event of a material change in circumstances, pursuant to the alimony provisions of the divorce statute.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) gives courts continuing jurisdiction to modify alimony based on an unforeseeable substantial material change in circumstances, even when the parties agreed that their divorce decree would be nonmodifiable.

Sill v. Sill · filed 2007-05-24(8)(g)(i)

We conclude that pursuant to Utah law, the non-modification provision did not divest the court of its continuing jurisdiction under section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In setting alimony, a court must consider the payor spouse’s ability to provide support, including the effect of tax obligations on net income.

Andrus v. Andrus · filed 2007-09-07(8)(a)(ii)

In determining alimony, a trial court must consider, along with other factors not under attack in the instant appeal, "the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(ii) (Supp.2007). ... We therefore reverse and remand for adequate findings that will show proper consideration of Husband's net fncome.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) requires a substantial material change in circumstances that was not foreseeable at the time of divorce before alimony may be modified.

Paulsen v. Paulsen · filed 2018-02-01(8)(i)(i)

To be entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his petition to modify the decree of divorce, Keith was first required to show that Holly’s increased income and satisfaction of her mortgage constituted “a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2017).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 permits prospective alimony increases when a change in the parties' finances is certain to occur within a known time frame.

Richardson v. Richardson · filed 2008-08-19(8)

Where the future event is certain to occur within a known time frame, then prospective changes are appropriate. ... Because Petitioner's obligation to pay child support for each child is certain to end at a specified time, prospective changes to the amount of alimony based thereon are appropriate, and are within the district court's discretion to include in the alimony order.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires an express finding of the recipient spouse’s financial needs to support an alimony award.

Baum v. Hayes · filed 2008-10-23(8)(a)

We agree with Baum that the trial court was required to make an express finding as to her financial needs. ... We therefore remand so that the trial court may enter specific findings on Baum's financial needs.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires courts setting alimony to consider the relevant statutory factors, including each spouse’s finances, earning capacity, and contributions during the marriage.

Jensen v. Jensen · filed 2008-10-30(8)(a)

Despite that omission, we conclude that the trial court considered each of the relevant statutory factors in determining the amount of Wife's alimony award, and accordingly, we now examine whether the amount of alimony was seriously inequitable.

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A court must consider the statutory factors before awarding alimony.

Kotter v. Kotter · filed 2009-03-05(8)(a)

Thus, while the record demonstrates that Judge Low contemplated an award of alimony, it also indicates that he intended to engage in further analysis using the statutory factors before making any such award. We therefore hold that the trial court erred in ruling that Judge Low had actually awarded alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) does not require consideration of the other alimony factors when the spouse seeking alimony has sufficient income to meet their needs.

Sellers v. Sellers · filed 2010-12-30(8)(a)

And we agree with Glen that unless the court determines that the party seeking alimony has insufficient income to meet his or her own needs, there is no occasion to consider the other section 30-3-5(8)(a) alimony factors.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires a court awarding alimony to consider the statutory factors and make findings sufficient for appellate review.

Keyes v. Keyes · filed 2015-04-30(8)(a)

To ‚support*+ its *alimony+ decision with adequate findings and conclusions,‛ the trial court is obligated to consider the factors set forth in Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires courts setting alimony to consider the recipient’s ability to earn income and the payor’s ability to provide support.

Osborne v. Osborne · filed 2016-02-11(8)(a)

Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a) sets forth the factors trial courts must consider in fashioning an alimony award. ... Among other things, the court must consider “the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income” and “the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires courts to consider the listed alimony factors in both initial awards and modification proceedings.

Nicholson v. Nicholson · filed 2017-08-24(8)(a)

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) of the Utah Code prescribes a procedure for calculating the appropriate amount of alimony: “The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony.” Because the legislature has not enacted separate procedures for initial and modification proceedings, the same procedure applies in both situations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires courts determining alimony to consider the recipient’s financial needs and earning capacity and the payor’s ability to provide support.

Sandusky v. Sandusky · filed 2018-02-23(8)(a)

George also takes issue with the trial court’s analysis under Utah Code section 30-3-5(8), which establishes the factors that a court shall consider in determining alimony. ... Because George asks us to reweigh the evidence and fails to demonstrate a legal problem in the evidence, he has not shown error in the trial court’s findings regarding the alimony factors.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(ii) requires a finding of extenuating circumstances when alimony is modified to address needs of the recipient spouse that arose after divorce, but not when modification rests on the payor's later entitlement to Social Security benefits.

Young v. Young · filed 2009-01-02(8)(g)(ii)

Although some evidence of an increase in Wife's post-divorce needs was alluded to before the trial court, Wife's modification petition was based on Husband's recent entitlement to social seeu-rity benefits, not an increase in Wife's needs. As a result, the trial court did not err by failing to make a finding of "extenuating cireumstances."

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(b) permits courts to consider fault in setting alimony, but fault cannot affect the award until the legislature defines it.

Mark v. Mark · filed 2009-12-10(8)(b)

As currently written, Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(b) provides no meaningful guidance on this issue. Rather, the plain language simply grants trial courts discretion to consider fault in fashioning alimony awards. ... Accordingly, until the legislature clearly defines fault in the statute, it is inappropriate to attach any consequence to the consideration of fault when making an alimony award.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(b) permits, but does not require, a court to consider a party’s fault when awarding alimony.

Boyer v. Boyer · filed 2011-05-05(8)(b)

While the Utah Code permits trial courts to consider fault in awarding alimony, it provides only that the trial court "may consider the fault of the parties." Utah Code Ann. § 30-8-5(8)(b) (emphasis added); it does not require the trial court to do so. The court therefore did not err in failing to adjust the alimony award based on Husband's fault.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 requires courts to consider a spouse’s support of the other spouse’s education when determining alimony, but does not make alimony the exclusive remedy for an enforceable student support contract.

Ashby v. Ashby · filed 2010-02-09(8)

Rather, the plain language of section 30-8-5 is unambiguous and simply makes clear that one spouse's support of their student spouse's educational efforts is properly considered as a factor in making the alimony determination. It says nothing regarding prohibition of legal remedies predicated on a student support contract.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When assessing a payor spouse’s ability to pay alimony, the court must consider living expenses as well as income and make findings detailed enough to support its decision.

Connell v. Connell · filed 2010-05-27(8)(a)(iii)

In determining alimony, the trial court must consider several statutory factors, including the recipient spouse's needs and earning capacity and the payor spouse's ability to pay. See id. § 30-3-5(8). ... The court must also consider the payor spouse's "needs and expenditures, such as housing, payment of debts, and other living expenses." Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). ... In short, the trial court's findings are sufficient ly detailed to demonstrate that its determination of alimony was rationally based. We find no abuse of discretion here.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) requires the court to consider the alimony recipient's earning capacity and make findings about it.

Fish v. Fish · filed 2010-10-21(8)(a)(i)

In awarding alimony, the trial court must consider "the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (Supp.2010). ... However, the trial court is required to consider and make factual findings regarding Wife's earning potential. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to make additional findings of fact as to Wife's ability to earn and whether imputation of full-time employment to Wife is appropriate.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(h) limits alimony to the length of the marriage unless the court finds extenuating circumstances justifying a longer period.

Robinson v. Baggett · filed 2011-08-04(8)(h)

Yet Judge Roth entered no findings that would justify an award of alimony for longer than 114 months. Given this lack of findings, the fact that the commencement date in the Amended Decree would have violated section 30-3-5(8)(h) supports our conclusion that the Amended Decree was contrary to Judge Roth's ruling.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In determining alimony, the court must consider the payor spouse’s ability to pay, including tax obligations.

McPherson v. McPherson · filed 2011-11-10(8)(a)

A sufficiently detailed finding regarding the statutory factor relevant to the present appeal-the payor spouse's ability to pay-includes consideration of the payor spouse's tax obligations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(e) allows a court to base alimony on the standard of living at trial after considering relevant facts and equitable principles.

Mullins v. Mullins · filed 2016-04-14(8)(e)

‚[T]he court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial.‛ Id. § 30-3-5(8)(e). ... Although the court determined Wife’s needs based on her standard of living after the parties’ separation, it explained that Husband’s and Wife’s standards of living needed to be equalized because there was not enough income to meet either party’s needs.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(e) generally uses the standard of living at separation to determine alimony; a shortage of resources alone does not justify using the standard at trial.

Rule v. Rule · filed 2017-08-03(8)(e)

Section 30-3-5(8)(e) sets forth the “general rule” that “the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony,” but it also provides that the court, through consideration of “all relevant facts and equitable principles,” “may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(e) (LexisNexis 2013). However, as we have explained above, the existence of a resource shortfall alone is not sufficient to justify a departure from the general rule, because our traditional needs analysis that begins with determination of the marital living standard has itself been designed to deal with the circumstance of insufficient resources.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(e) permits courts to assess different alimony expenses as of separation or trial and does not require a specific finding linking each expense to the marital standard of living.

Xu v. Zhao · filed 2018-10-04(8)(e)

Indeed, while the alimony statute encourages courts to consider the standard of living that “[existed] at the time of separation” in determining alimony, it does not require the court to make specific findings explaining how each imputed expense contributes or fails to contribute to that standard of living.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(i)(ii) does not bar an order that denies modification and leaves alimony unchanged, even when the recipient has new needs.

Fish v. Fish · filed 2016-06-09(8)(i)(ii)

Because the district court’s order did not change the amount of alimony or modify the divorce decree, it was neither a modification of alimony nor a new order of alimony, and the order therefore did not run afoul of section 30-3-5(8)(i)(ii).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires findings about both spouses’ expenses to assess the recipient’s ability to meet her needs and the payor’s ability to provide support.

Taft v. Taft · filed 2016-06-30(8)(a)

Husband’s and Wife’s relative expenses are determinations that relate directly to Wife’s ability “to produce sufficient income” and Husband’s ability “to provide support”—in other words, findings the trial court must make to determine the alimony award.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(e) permits a court to assess reasonable housing needs using the standard of living at separation, even when a spouse’s current housing is subsidized.

Sauer v. Sauer · filed 2017-07-13(8)(e)

This does not require a court to find that the party has no reasonable housing expenses; rather, the court may consider what constitutes a reasonable rental or mortgage payment in the relevant area for housing similar to the housing previously shared by the parties. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(e) (LexisNexis 2013) (“As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony[.]”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) requires an alimony court to consider the recipient spouse’s financial needs and make findings detailed enough to explain the award.

Chesley v. Chesley · filed 2017-07-28(8)(a)(i)

However, we ultimately conclude that, in considering Moriah’s needs, the trial court failed to make sufficiently detailed findings regarding her demonstrated financial need.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(i)(i) permits modification of alimony only for a substantial material change in circumstances that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of divorce.

MacDonald v. MacDonald · filed 2017-08-03(8)(i)(i)

Consistent with the statute’s plain language, and as applied in our decisions in Fish and Earhart, we hold that the standard to be applied in determining whether a substantial change in circumstance warrants a modification of alimony is whether the circumstance was foreseeable at the time of divorce. Where the circumstances are foreseeable, or may be reasonably anticipated, modification is not permitted.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When the parties’ combined resources cannot meet their reasonable needs, an alimony award must equitably share the shortfall rather than merely equalize their incomes.

Vanderzon v. Vanderzon · filed 2017-08-17(8)(a)

Alimony determinations require a trial court to consider three factors relevant here: “(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income; [and] (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(iii) (LexisNexis 2013); see also Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 8, 80 P.3d 153. ... We conclude that the trial court in this case plainly erred by equalizing monthly income between the parties even though it had determined that Heidi’s reasonable needs were significantly greater than John’s, thus burdening her with an inequitable portion of the shortfall between the parties’ resources and the expenses of maintaining separate households.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(h)(ii) allows a court to address a spouse’s needs that did not exist during the marriage or when the divorce decree was entered only if it finds extenuating circumstances.

Anderson v. Anderson · filed 2018-02-01(h)(ii)

Utah Code section 30-3-5 allows the district court to address the needs of a spouse that did not exist during the marriage or at the time the divorce decree was entered only if “the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(g) requires consideration of a major income change resulting from the spouses’ collective efforts, but does not require an alimony adjustment for a temporary decrease caused by a payor spouse’s voluntary job change.

Gerwe v. Gerwe · filed 2018-04-26(8)(g)

Utah law provides that “[w]hen a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered . . . in determining the amount of alimony.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g) (LexisNexis 2013). ... Husband has cited no authority suggesting that this provision applies to a temporary change in income based on a voluntary decision of the payor spouse to seek less lucrative employment. Accordingly, we hold that the court did not exceed its discretion in declining to adjust the alimony award based on Husband’s anticipated change in income.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) allows a court to find a spouse’s financial needs from testimonial and circumstantial evidence without supporting financial documents.

Munoz-Madrid v. Carlos-Moran · filed 2018-05-24(8)(a)(i)

Thus, a court can make findings related to the statutory alimony factors without supporting financial documents and can impute reasonable expenses based on circumstantial and testimonial evidence.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Alimony may be modified for a substantial material change in circumstances only if the change was not foreseeable at the time of divorce.

Armendariz v. Armendariz · filed 2018-09-07(8)(i)(i)

The district court “has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at ... the time of the divorce.” ... We conclude that Gary’s retirement was foreseeable at the time the divorce decree was entered and the decree did not provide that Gary’s alimony obligation would terminate upon his retirement.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(11)(a) permits modification of alimony for a substantial material change in circumstances not addressed in the divorce decree or its findings.

Thayne v. Thayne · filed 2022-11-03(11)(a)

A party may seek changes to an award of spousal or child support when there has been a substantial change of circumstances not addressed in the divorce decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(11)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2022) (“The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not expressly stated in the divorce decree or in the findings that the court entered at the time of the divorce decree.”); id. § 78B-12-210(9)(a) (“A parent, legal guardian, or the office may at any time petition the court to adjust the amount of a child support order if there has been a substantial change in circumstances.”). ... And therefore, these employment changes do not amount to unanticipated changes that would warrant a modification of the support amounts.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

When a substantial material change in circumstances warrants reconsidering alimony, the court must analyze the statutory alimony factors, including the recipient’s needs and earning capacity and the payor’s ability to provide support.

Myers v. Myers · filed 2023-03-02(8)(a)

This analysis should include examination of the statutory alimony factors, see Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(a) (2019), including the factors commonly referred to as “the Jones factors,” see Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); see also Nicholson, 2017 UT App 155, ¶ 7 (stating that, after finding that circumstances have changed, “the court must then consider at least the following factors in determining a new alimony award: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; (ii) the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and (iv) the length of the marriage” (quotation simplified)).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(11)(a) allows a court to modify alimony when a substantial material change in circumstances, including a change in income, was not expressly stated at divorce.

Merrill v. Merrill · filed 2024-09-06(11)(a)

For this reason, the code allows for adjusted alimony orders and new child support orders when there is a substantial change between a party’s future income as anticipated and the party’s future income as it turns out to be. See id. §§ 30-3-5(11)(a), 78B-12-210(9).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 requires courts setting alimony to consider the recipient spouse’s financial needs, generally measured against the standard of living at separation.

Hartvigsen v. Hartvigsen · filed 2018-12-28(8)(a)(i), (8)(c)

In calculating an alimony award, courts are required to consider, among other things, “the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010). Generally, courts are expected to assess need based on the standard of living existing at the time of the parties’ separation. See id. § 30-3-5(8)(c). ... Because the district court did not exceed its discretion in imputing income to Danielle and in calculating her need, we decline to disturb its alimony award.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(i)(ii) generally bars modifying alimony to address needs that arose after the decree without extenuating circumstances; it does not bar a decision based on needs that existed at the time of divorce.

Eberhard v. Eberhard · filed 2019-06-27(8)(i)(ii)

Ultimately, new or “increased needs did not factor into” or underlie the court’s decision. Because we disagree with Todd’s characterization of the district court’s decision, Todd has not shown that it ran afoul of section 30-3-5(8)(i)(ii).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) requires a court deciding alimony to consider the payor spouse’s ability to provide support.

Burggraaf v. Burggraaf · filed 2019-11-29(8)(a)(iii)

When deciding whether to award alimony, a district court must consider seven statutory factors, including “the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2019). ... We conclude the court’s failure to consider Joseph’s ability to pay alimony was a “clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

In assessing a payor spouse’s ability to provide alimony, courts generally treat marital debt payments as expenses affecting the spouse’s needs.

Redden v. Redden · filed 2020-02-13(8)(a)(iii)

And as explained, all else being equal, marital debts generally constitute legitimate expenses affecting a payor spouse’s needs and ability to provide alimony to the receiving spouse.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(9)(a)(iii) requires courts to consider the payor spouse’s tax obligations when assessing the ability to pay alimony.

Knowles v. Knowles · filed 2022-04-07(9)(a)(iii)

When awarding alimony, the district court must consider “the ability of the payor spouse to provide support,” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021), which “includes consideration of the payor spouse’s tax obligations,” McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ¶ 13, 265 P.3d 839.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(8)(a) requires courts deciding alimony to consider the recipient’s needs and earning capacity and the payor’s ability to provide support.

Petrzelka v. Goodwin · filed 2020-03-05(8)(a)

To that end, in deciding whether to award alimony, a court must consider several factors relevant to alimony’s purposes, including the “financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse,” “the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to produce income,” and “the ability of the payor spouse to provide support.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A court setting alimony may consider a subsequent spouse’s ability to share living expenses.

Issertell v. Issertell · filed 2020-04-16(8)(i)(iii)(A)

In setting alimony, “[t]he court may consider the subsequent spouse’s financial ability to share living expenses.” ... Here, the district court did take into account the financial contributions of James’s current wife.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A spouse seeking an alimony increase after a later change in housing circumstances must file a petition to modify the award.

Bjarnson v. Bjarnson · filed 2020-10-16(10)(a)

But the proper procedure for seeking an increase in alimony, should she eventually secure other housing, would be for her to file a petition to modify the alimony award. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2020).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Alimony generally may not be ordered for longer than the marriage unless extenuating circumstances exist.

Miner v. Miner · filed 2021-07-15(8)(j)

Our legislature has set an outer boundary on the length of alimony awards, mandating that, in the absence of “extenuating circumstances,” “[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(10)(a) bases alimony on the spouses’ finances, so discretionary gifts from third parties do not count toward the recipient’s needs or the payor’s ability to pay.

Knight v. Knight · filed 2023-08-10(10)(a)

The alimony factors refer only to the finances of the spouses, not those of outside parties.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

The recipient spouse’s reasonable financial needs set the maximum alimony award, and courts must make findings about reasonable expenses in light of the marital standard of living.

Lunt v. Lunt · filed 2024-10-18(10)(a)(i)

Accordingly, because the trial court’s alimony award was based on the marital standard of living instead of the parties’ reasonable expenses, the award is the result of a misapplication of law, which constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Law changed since The May 1, 1995 amendment added an unforeseeable-change requirement for alimony modifications and limited orders addressing newly arising needs absent extenuating circumstances; the earlier modification standard is incomplete for later petitions. Utah repealed § 30-3-5 effective September 1, 2024 and moved its subjects to Title 81.

Section 30-3-5 requires a substantial change in the parties’ circumstances before a court may terminate alimony.

Fullmer v. Fullmer · filed 1988-09-16

While the trial court retains “continuing jurisdiction” to terminate an alimony award, under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1988), the court must base its decision upon a substantial change in the parties’ circumstances.

Law changed since Effective September 1, 2024, Utah repealed § 30-3-5 and recodified its subjects in Title 81; this note names the former section rather than the current location.

Section 30-3-5 makes an indefinite alimony award subject to termination upon specified statutory occurrences.

Munns v. Munns · filed 1990-04-04

Of course, alimony will terminate as a matter of statute upon certain occurrences, see Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989), and may be modified as to amount upon appropriate petition and a showing of changed circumstances.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(6) provides for termination of alimony when the recipient cohabits with another person.

Barber v. Barber · filed 1990-05-14(6)

Neither of the parties seriously disputes that, under Utah law, cohabitation warrants termination of alimony. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(6) (1989). ... Anita has neither marshaled the relevant evidence nor shown the finding to be clearly erroneous. We therefore uphold the termination of temporary alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(5) terminates alimony upon the receiving spouse’s remarriage unless the divorce decree provides otherwise, but preserves a claim for alimony for the period before remarriage.

Roberts v. Roberts · filed 1992-05-28(5)

Husband maintains that Wife's remarriage on about September 12, 1991 moots this contention under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5) (1989). This statute states that "[u]nless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse." Although this section extinguishes any alimony claim Wife could make subsequent to September 12, 1991, it does not moot her claim to alimony during the approximately nine-month interim period after the divorce was decreed but before Wife remarried.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5’s remarriage termination rule does not end a spouse’s property interest in retirement benefits.

Burt v. Burt · filed 1990-10-12

While a present settlement is preferable, ... the trial court may award the defendant a share of the income stream from the retirement benefits as they are paid, ... not in the form of alimony but as a property award not terminable upon remarriage.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(6) requires both common residency and sexual contact to terminate alimony.

Pendleton v. Pendleton · filed 1996-05-31(6)

The version of the statute in force at the time of this action uses the term "residing” but makes clear that both residency and sexual contact are required to terminate alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Subsection (9) uses the established alimony-termination definition of cohabitation: common residency and sexual contact evidencing conjugal association.

Hill v. Hill · filed 1998-11-13(9)

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court correctly followed the supreme court’s direction by applying the Haddow definition of cohabitation in this case. We thus affirm the trial court’s decision not to terminate Ms. Hill’s alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(9) permits termination of alimony when the paying party establishes that the former spouse cohabits with another person, including a person of the same sex.

Garcia v. Garcia · filed 2002-11-15(9)

The plain language of the statute requires only that the alimony payee cohabit “with another person,” and contains no requirement that the other person be a member of the opposite sex.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(10) terminates future alimony obligations upon proof of cohabitation and leaves the retroactive reach of termination to the trial court's discretion.

Black v. Black · filed 2008-12-18(10)

The plain language of section 30-3-5(10) indicates the legislature's express mandate that the order imposing alimony terminate automatically upon the establishment of cohabitation, thereby eliminating any future alimony obligations. ... Section 30-8-5(10), therefore, wisely leaves decisions regarding retroactivity to the trial court.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(10) requires the party seeking to terminate alimony to prove cohabitation in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.

Myers v. Myers · filed 2010-04-01(10)

It places the burden of proving cohabitation on the party seeking to terminate alimony. ... Even assuming for purposes of our analysis that Wife and MH. were having sexual contact, they were not living together in a manner akin to husband and wife, and thus were not cohabitating for purposes of section 30-3-5(10).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Alimony terminates when the paying spouse establishes that the former spouse is cohabiting with another person, unless the divorce decree provides otherwise.

Levin v. Carlton-Levin · filed 2014-01-09(10)

Especially in view of the trial court's careful consideration of the hallmarks of cohabitation and other relevant factors to inform the question of whether Wife and Tucker's relationship resembles that of a married couple, we agree that the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Wife and Tucker were cohabiting.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(10) terminates alimony when the paying spouse establishes cohabitation; an intimate relationship and occasional shared food expenses do not establish cohabitation without a common residence or shared major household expenses.

Roberts v. Roberts · filed 2014-09-05(10)

Without any conclusive evidence that Wife and Friend had established a common residence and shared any major household expenses, their sexual relationship and willingness to buy food together simply does not amount to cohabitation as a matter of law and therefore did not require such a determination by the trial court.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

A couple’s reputation as married, or whether they hold themselves out as married, is irrelevant to cohabitation under subsection (10).

Christensen v. Christensen · filed 2017-07-20(10)

However, whether the couple has a reputation as being married, or hold themselves out as being married, is not a relevant consideration in determining cohabitation for purposes of section 30-3-5(10).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(10) terminates alimony from the date proven cohabitation began, even if the cohabitation ended before the payor sought termination.

Scott v. Scott · filed 2016-02-19(10)

The alternative reading—that once the recipient spouse’s cohabitation is demonstrated or ‚established‛ through an appropriate process, alimony terminates as of the date the cohabitation began—provides a much more predictable outcome and better accords with the purpose of alimony to provide for the recipient spouse’s needs without penalizing the payor spouse.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(9) automatically terminates alimony upon the receiving spouse’s remarriage unless the divorce decree specifically provides otherwise.

McQuarrie v. McQuarrie · filed 2019-08-29(9)

Therefore, we conclude that Melvin’s alimony obligation did not automatically terminate upon Janette’s remarriage, because the Decree “specifically provides otherwise,” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9), and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Melvin’s petition to terminate alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under the applicable version of subsection (10), a spouse seeking to terminate alimony based on cohabitation had to file a petition while the cohabitation was occurring.

McFarland v. McFarland · filed 2021-06-04(10)

The district court correctly determined that Bruce’s alimony obligation was not terminated—at least not under the alimony statute—by the parties’ cohabitation in 2009 and 2010, because the statute required Bruce to file a petition seeking termination while the cohabitation was still occurring, and he did not do so.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

For alimony termination, frequent overnight visits with a romantic partner alone do not establish that a former spouse resides with that partner under § 30-3-5(1)(a).

Kinsey v. Kinsey · filed 2024-08-22(1)(a)

In other words, even if a person spends “a substantial amount of time” at another home, a court may still conclude that the person is not residing there based on additional facts and circumstances about the nature of that person’s relationship to both the home and its other occupants. ... As a result, even if this case is evaluated under the new statutory definition of “cohabit,” this determination is sufficient to support the court’s ruling.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) gives trial courts broad discretion to divide property equitably regardless of its source or when it was acquired.

Smith v. Smith · filed 1987-06-10(1)

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1986) states, “When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, and parties.” The Utah Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this statute as conferring “broad discretion upon trial courts in the division of property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 authorizes equitable division of property in a divorce decree, including a spouse's retirement interest.

Marchant v. Marchant · filed 1987-09-18

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984) authorizes the trial court to include equitable orders relating to children, property, and parties in a decree of divorce. ... We believe that the trial court erred when dividing this asset and should have applied the formula delineated in Woodward.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) permits division of premarital property and requires courts to consider all the parties’ circumstances, including child and spousal support obligations, when distributing property.

Peterson v. Peterson · filed 1988-01-21(1)

Instead, we construe Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) to mean that not only may the parties’ premarital property be subject to division by the court, but that the court shall consider all the circumstances of the parties in determining the distribution of real and personal property, including the obligations of the parties for child and spousal support.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) permits modification of a divorce decree when circumstances substantially change, but later recognition of a new category of marital property alone does not justify reopening a property division.

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton · filed 1988-12-19(3)

The trial court “has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, ... or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1988). ... We agree with the Arizona Court of Appeals and find that legal recognition of a new category of property rights after a divorce decree has been entered, is not itself sufficient to establish a substantial change of circumstances justifying a reevaluation of a prior property division.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 permits equitable property distribution in a divorce, including a scheduled cash payment for a spouse’s share of closely held corporate stock.

Weston v. Weston · filed 1989-05-04

In dividing the marital estate, the trial court can enter such orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are equitable. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987). ... Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order requiring plaintiff to pay out to defendant a portion of the value of the stock in plaintiffs closely held corporations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives trial courts broad discretion to divide property in a divorce, regardless of its source or when it was acquired.

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe · filed 1990-05-10

However, in making equitable orders pursuant to section 30-3-5, the court has consistently concluded that the trial court is given broad discretion in dividing property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) authorizes equitable division of marital property, including use of a home's actual sale price when both parties caused a delay in its sale.

Bettinger v. Bettinger · filed 1990-05-10(1)

Guiding our efforts to interpret the language of the decree, however, is the trial court’s authority to divide and distribute property equitably. ... We hold, therefore, that it is equitable that both parties equally share the result of that delay, by determining equity from the actual sale price of the home.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) permits a divorce court to distribute premarital property when unique circumstances justify doing so.

Walters v. Walters · filed 1991-05-14(1)

Before a trial court can include either of the parties’ premarital property in the marital estate, it must find unique circumstances that warrant disregarding the general rule that premarital property is separate property.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) permits an equitable property division that credits a spouse for inherited funds invested in marital property.

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer · filed 1987-11-13(1)

In dividing the marital estate, the trial court may make such orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are equitable. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1984 & Supp. 1987). ... Therefore, we conclude that the trial court exercised its discretion within the bounds set by our cases when it credited Kathryn with the inheritances she put into the homes.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 generally calls for property one spouse receives by gift or inheritance during marriage to be awarded to that spouse, subject to equitable exceptions.

Mortensen v. Mortensen · filed 1988-08-16

We conclude that in Utah, trial courts making "equitable" property division pursuant to section 30-3-5 should, in accordance with the rule prevailing in most other jurisdictions and with the division made in many of our own cases, generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, Dubois v. Dubois, supra , or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives trial courts continuing jurisdiction to modify property distributions when a party’s circumstances or condition changes after the original decree.

Naranjo v. Naranjo · filed 1988-03-22

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1984) has been consistently interpreted to mean that the trial court has continuing jurisdiction over the divorce decree with respect to property distributions, and the decree may be modified when there has been a change in the circumstances or condition of a party since the entry of the original decree.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 permits division of a presently assignable right to reproduce a creative work as marital property, even if its economic benefits may arise later.

Moon v. Moon · filed 1990-03-19(1)

However, an asset distributable under section 30-3-5 need not be readily and immediately convertible into money. It is enough that the right to reproduce a creative work is a right capable of being validly assigned in the present.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 allows courts to account for earning capacity enhanced by both spouses' efforts through alimony and property division.

Martinez v. Martinez · filed 1991-09-16

Mrs. Martinez's contention that the remedies provided by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 are insufficient is without merit. Those remedies are adequate to fashion an appropriate award that meets the standards to be applied in determining awards of alimony. ... Thus, if one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 allows a divorce court to consider property transferred by a spouse into a revocable trust when dividing marital assets.

Knickerbocker v. Cannon · filed 1996-02-23

In a divorce action, the trial court must be able to make such orders concerning the “children, property, debts or obligations, and parties” as will be fair and reasonable to all concerned. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. To make an equitable division of the marital assets, the court needs flexibility to decide upon the evidence whether any property, including property transferred by one spouse into a revocable trust, should be included within the marital estate.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) allows modification of a divorce property distribution when circumstances have substantially changed since the decree; a change in law does not qualify.

Toone v. Toone · filed 1998-01-29(3)

While a trial court “has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for ... distribution of the property ... as is reasonable and necessary,” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1995), a party seeking modification of a divorce decree must demonstrate that “a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree.” ... That enactment does not, under Throckmorton, constitute a substantial change sufficient to justify reopening the decree.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) authorizes equitable property distribution in divorce, and the court must make findings classifying the disputed property before distributing it.

Stonehocker v. Stonehocker · filed 2008-01-10(1)

In making a property distribution, the trial court considers and must make findings on several issues. First, the court must identify the property in dispute and determine whether each item is marital or separate property.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) allows a divorce court to award one spouse a lien representing that spouse’s share of marital property, which the other spouse cannot defeat with a homestead exemption.

Wiles v. Wiles · filed 1994-03-15(1)

Under section 30-3-5(1), the trial court has the power to divide the parties’ property in a divorce action. ... We agree and hold that the trial court’s distribution of the Wileses’ property, including placement of the lien, supersedes Ms. Wiles’s ability to enforce the homestead exemption against her husband’s interest in the real property created by the court.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) permits equitable distribution of marital property, with possession of the family home determined in light of the children’s welfare and the parties’ support obligations.

Rosendahl v. Rosendahl · filed 1994-06-07(1)

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1993) gives the court the power to distribute marital property in an equitable manner. A trial court does not consider property division in isolation.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) requires courts to consider retirement benefits accrued during marriage when equitably dividing marital assets.

Jefferies v. Jefferies · filed 1995-05-11(1)

Accordingly, two principles are clear from the law of this state. First, all assets acquired by the parties during marriage are to be considered by the trial court when making an equitable distribution, unless the law specifically prevents the court from considering a particular asset. Second, a marital asset is defined functionally as any right that has accrued during the marriage to a present or future benefit.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) permits a divorce court to distribute property equitably when the spouses’ agreement leaves a property issue unresolved.

Jacobsen v. Jacobsen · filed 2011-05-19(1)

As a result, the trial court distributed the property according to equitable principles and its statutory powers under Utah Code section 80-3-5. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (2007) ("When a decree of divoree is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.").

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Under section 30-3-5, homemaking and child care alone do not justify awarding a spouse the increase in value of the other spouse's separate business property.

Jensen v. Jensen · filed 2009-01-02

The Mortensen court acknowledged that property divisions in divorce cases are to be "equitable" pursuant to section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code. See id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (2007). ... Wife behaved in a very normal and commendable manner by caring for the parties' child, maintaining the household, and running her own part-time business from their home. More is required, however, to justify an award of Husband's separate property.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) authorizes courts to equitably divide property in a divorce but does not define the spouses’ ownership interests.

West v. Christensen · filed 2017-08-01(1)

The nature of property interests owned by spouses is not defined in Utah divorce statutes, although Utah divorce statutes do establish the court’s authority to make an equitable division of any property interests owned by the parties to a divorce.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 does not require an adjustment to an equitable property division for theoretical or speculative tax consequences.

Labon v. Labon · filed 2022-08-18

In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to make adjustments related to potential tax consequences resulting from the division of marital property because those consequences were theoretical and speculative.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 allows a divorce court to set interest on property equalization payments above the statutory postjudgment rate when reasonable and equitable.

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth · filed 2022-01-13(1)

The statute “does not preclude a District Court, under [section 30-3-5] from imposing an interest rate of more than [the statutory postjudgment rate] where, under the circumstances, that award is reasonable and equitable.” ... Thus, we find no merit to Guy’s contention that the court was bound to apply the default postjudgment interest rate to the equalization payments.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 permits a court to set interest on divorce equalization payments above the statutory postjudgment rate when the higher rate is reasonable and equitable.

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth · filed 2022-03-03(1)

The statute “does not preclude a District Court, under [section 30-3-5] from imposing an interest rate of more than [the statutory postjudgment rate] where, under the circumstances, that award is reasonable and ... equitable.” ... Thus, we find no merit to Guy’s contention that the court was bound to apply the default postjudgment interest rate to the equalization payments.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) does not support reimbursement for life insurance premiums paid during marriage when the coverage was consumed during the marriage and no benefit remained after divorce.

Beckham v. Beckham · filed 2022-05-19(1)

Thus, the expenditures for the insurance premiums fell into the category of normal living expenses voluntarily paid from marital assets, and they were not subject to reimbursement because they had been entirely exhausted and consumed in paying for a marital expense, namely, buying life insurance for Randall—from which Vicki would have benefited had Randall died during the term of the policy.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(2)(c)(i) requires a divorce decree to specify which party is responsible for joint debts incurred during marriage.

Fox v. Fox · filed 2022-07-14(2)(c)(i)

In issuing a divorce decree, a trial court must include “an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(2)(c)(i) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021). ... In the present case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning the marital debt owed to DiAnn’s father to DiAnn.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 requires a divorce decree to assign responsibility for joint marital debts, with findings that explain the division.

Cox v. Cox · filed 2023-06-08(3)(c)(i)

“In issuing a divorce decree, a trial court must include an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage.” Fox v. Fox, 2022 UT App 88, ¶ 32, 515 P.3d 481 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1263 (Utah ... 2022); see also Utah Code § 30-3-5(3)(c)(i). ... But, again, the district court must enter findings of fact that are “sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which [it] reached its ultimate conclusion on each issue.” Oldroyd, 2017 UT App 45, ¶ 5. ... Without any such explanation, we vacate this award.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(2) does not authorize a divorce court to divide property owned by an irrevocable trust that is not a party to the divorce.

In re Agusta National Trust 1 · filed 2023-11-09(2)

The divorce court did not—and really could not—address the ownership of the properties because those properties were owned by a third party—the Agusta Trust—that was not a party to the divorce. See Utah Code § 30-3-5(2) (“When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in the decree of divorce equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.”).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(5) permits modification of a divorce decree’s property distribution after judgment when circumstances have substantially changed, despite res judicata.

McFarland v. McFarland · filed 2024-03-14(5)

Thus, modification of the Decree’s property distribution provisions is appropriate—even post-judgment and even taking into account principles of res judicata—so long as Bruce can demonstrate that, since entry of the Decree, there has been a substantial change of circumstances that would justify the court taking a second look at the terms of the distribution.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 permits a court to raise the statutory interest rate on a child support arrearages judgment when equity requires, but not to lower, stay, or waive interest.

Stroud v. Stroud · filed 1987-06-17(1)

Although the trial court may, in its discretion under section 30-3-5, raise the statutory interest if equity so requires, the court does not have the discretion to lower, stay, or waive interest.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1)'s general equitable authority does not permit a court to stop interest accruing on a judgment for unpaid child support when the specific judgment-interest statute requires it.

Stroud v. Stroud · filed 1988-06-10(1)

... and that the more specific provisions of section 15-1-4 take precedence over and control the more general provisions of section 30-3-5(l).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives courts continuing jurisdiction to modify child support set by a stipulation incorporated into a divorce decree.

Balls v. Hackley · filed 1987-11-16(3)

The parties’ stipulation was accepted by the court and incorporated into the decree. The terms of the stipulation thereby fall under the continuing jurisdiction of the court in divorce actions.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 reserves the power to modify an existing support order to the courts.

Starks v. State, Department of Social Services · filed 1988-02-10

DSS does not have the authority to modify an already existing support order as that power is retained by the courts under section 30-3-5.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives courts authority to make equitable child-support orders, including support through age twenty-five for a disabled child when the evidence warrants it.

Asper v. Asper · filed 1988-05-04

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987) gives the court power to make equitable orders relating to children. ... We believe that the evidence supports the court’s finding that support should continue until age twenty-five, and such determination was within the court’s properly exercised discretion.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives trial courts continuing authority to modify child support when reasonable and necessary.

Maughan v. Maughan · filed 1989-02-22(3)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (Supp.1988), the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to make changes in child support awards “as is reasonable and necessary.” ... In view of this substantial change in circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the child support award will not be disturbed on appeal.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives trial courts broad equitable discretion to set child support based on the children's needs and the parent's ability to pay.

Proctor v. Proctor · filed 1989-05-05

Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987), a trial court has broad equitable power to order the payment of child support, taking into account the needs of the children and the ability of the parent to pay.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives courts continuing jurisdiction to modify child support orders, including orders based on a stipulation obtained through misrepresentation or material omission.

Gates v. Gates · filed 1990-02-22(3)

A party may not obtain a stipulation based on a misrepresentation or material omission of facts and later claim that a child support order cannot be modified because there has been no material change in circumstances based on those same undisclosed or misrepresented facts.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives trial courts continuing authority to make reasonable and necessary changes to child support based on the children’s needs and the parent’s ability to pay.

Ostler v. Ostler · filed 1990-03-20(3)

Trial courts have continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable and necessary changes in child support awards, taking into account “not only the needs of the children, but also the ability of the parent to pay.” Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 permits modification of child support when the party seeking it shows a substantial change in circumstances.

Dana v. Dana · filed 1990-03-30

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989), the trial court has continuing jurisdiction to modify child support obligations. The party seeking modification has the burden to show a substantial change in the circumstances of at least one of the parties such as to warrant a modification. ... In sum, because defendant failed to meet his burden to show a substantial change in circumstances, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s petition to reduce the child support payments.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(1) gives trial courts discretion to decide whether child support payments should go directly to a third-party caregiver during a child’s extended absence from the custodial parent.

Durfee v. Durfee · filed 1990-08-09(1)

The means by which child support payments are made is to be designed by the trial court. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (1989). ... A trial court therefore has discretion to make such arrangements as may be required by the circumstances of a given case to ensure that a child receives the support ordered.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives district courts exclusive jurisdiction over actions to enforce past due child support obligations.

State, Department of Human Services, Office of Recovery Services v. Child Support Enforcement · filed 1994-12-28

Thus, it is the district court, not the circuit court, that has exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to divorce, child custody, paternity, and child support. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp.1994) (district court has initial and continuing jurisdiction regarding child support); ... Based on the applicable statutes construed in light of the foregoing policy considerations, we hold that Utah district courts possess exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over actions to enforce past due child support obligations.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) permits later child support orders, but modification of a divorce decree requires a substantial change in circumstances since entry of the decree that was not contemplated in it.

Krambule v. Krambule · filed 1999-12-09(3)

Nonetheless, “[t]he court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their support ... as is reasonable and necessary.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1999); ... Consequently, principles of res judicata require that “a party seeking modification of a divorce decree must demonstrate that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree, and not contemplated in the decree itself.”

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives trial courts discretion to credit either parent for children’s medical insurance provided by a third party when the child support statutes do not address that coverage.

Ball v. Peterson · filed 1996-02-29(1)

Because the statutes relating to child support obligations do not address the situation of a third party providing for the insurance coverage, the trial court has broad discretion under section 30-3-5 to credit one or both parents, as the court deems equitable, for the coverage provided by the third party.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives courts continuing equitable power to enforce judgments for past-due child support, including through payment orders and contempt.

Hamilton v. Regan · filed 1997-05-02(1), (3)

We have never held, however, and now explicitly decline to hold, that such judgments lose their fundamental character as instruments of family support subject to the statutory and equitable enforcement powers of the courts.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives the court that granted a divorce continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable and necessary later orders concerning support, custody, children's care, and property.

Rawlings v. Weiner · filed 1988-04-15(3)

This statute establishes continuing jurisdiction in the First District Court of Box Elder County as the court granting the decree of divorce.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives a court continuing jurisdiction to modify an original divorce decree, making speculative decreases in alimony generally inappropriate.

Rasband v. Rasband · filed 1988-04-18

Accordingly, we think decreasing alimony —based on speculation about a future ability to earn — is generally inappropriate in view of the court’s continuing jurisdiction to modify an original decree under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 gives a divorce court continuing jurisdiction over a party to resolve outstanding property and alimony matters.

Maxwell v. Maxwell · filed 1988-05-06

Third, the trial court maintained continuing jurisdiction over David under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives the court that granted the divorce continuing jurisdiction to make reasonable and necessary orders concerning support, custody, and property.

Kelly v. Draney · filed 1988-05-10(3)

This statute establishes continuing jurisdiction in the original court granting the decree of divorce.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives Utah courts continuing jurisdiction to change child custody and support orders.

Curtis v. Curtis · filed 1990-03-27(3)

Second, Utah clearly had continuing jurisdiction under Utah law: “The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for ... the custody of the children and their support....” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1989).

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5 reserves the power to modify a divorce decree to the courts.

Utah Dept. of Social Services v. Adams · filed 1991-02-13

We agree that the power to modify a divorce decree is vested solely in the courts.

Law changed since Same change as noted above.

Section 30-3-5(3) gives the court that issued a divorce decree exclusive jurisdiction to modify it, so a petition to modify must be filed in the original forum.

Rimensburger v. Rimensburger · filed 1992-09-22(3)

Subsection (3) provides that the “court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders” regarding these same issues. Thus, the court issuing the original decree retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify its decrees. Parties wishing to modify a decree must do so in the original forum.