Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201

Former subsection (7)(a) set the middle minimum term as the default and allowed a judge to adjust that minimum for aggravating or mitigating circumstances without raising the statutory maximum.

State v. Garner · filed 2008-01-25(7)(a)

Utah’s indeterminate sentencing scheme, as it was then in effect, required a trial court to impose the middle of the three minimum terms “unless there [wejre circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(7)(a) (2003) (repealed 2007). ... Judicial fact finding, as contemplated by Utah’s statutory scheme, cannot lead to an elevation of the maximum term of Defendant’s sentence and therefore does not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment.

Former section 76-3-201(7) permitted a judge to find facts supporting a lower indeterminate minimum term without violating the Sixth Amendment.

State v. Johnston · filed 2009-05-21(7)

Therefore, there is no constitutional prohibition on judicial fact finding to impose a lower minimum term in an indeterminate sentencing scheme, and Defendant's sentence is legal.

Section 76-3-201(6) does not give a court jurisdiction to reopen a criminal case after final judgment.

State v. Burr · filed 2018-12-21(6)

The pay-to-stay statute is also unhelpful. This provision does not speak to jurisdiction—much less to the power to reopen a criminal case after final judgment is entered.

Section 76-3-201 permits a court, within statutory limits, to impose a fine, imprisonment, or both, and to include a civil penalty in the sentence.

Richfield City v. Walker · filed 1990-03-26(1), (2)

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1) (1978) allows a court, within limits prescribed by statute, to sentence a guilty person to pay a fine, to be imprisoned, or both. Section 76-3-201(2) (1978) also allows a court to include a civil penalty in a sentence.

Section 76-3-201(6)(a)’s 120-day limit does not prevent a court from correcting clerical errors or illegal sentences at any time.

State v. Lorrah · filed 1988-08-26(6)(a)

We reject defendant’s argument that the new sentence was not imposed within 120 days of the initial commitment as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(6)(a). As stated, both clerical errors and illegal sentences may be corrected at any time.

Section 76-3-201(1)(a)(ii) defines conviction to include a guilty plea.

State v. Bernert · filed 2004-09-16(1)(a)(ii)

Section 76-3-201(l)(a)(ii) of the Utah Code, dealing with sentencing, defines “[cjonviction” to include a “plea of guilty.”

Section 76-3-201(2) permits a court to sentence a convicted person to probation; probation is a sentence in its own right.

State v. Anderson · filed 2009-02-17(2)

Probation has two roles under Utah law. It is both a sentence and an alternative sanction to be imposed after the suspension of a harsher sentence. First, since 1973, Utah law has stated that probation is a sentence. Section 76-3-201(2) states that "a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense to ... probation." [6] Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (2008).

Section 76-3-201(3)(a) requires written reasons for a restitution order; failure to provide them is error but may be harmless if it causes no prejudice.

State v. Snyder · filed 1987-07-29(3)(a)

Thus, in this case, it was error for the trial court not to set forth in writing its reasons for ordering restitution. However, the record reflects that the error was not prejudicial.

Section 76-3-201(3)(b)(i) requires a court to state its reasons for awarding or denying restitution in enough detail to permit appellate review, though formal findings are unnecessary.

State v. Haston · filed 1991-05-06(3)(b)(i)

Although the statute does not impose the requirement of full formal findings, a requirement which would perhaps simplify and expedite appellate review, the court must declare reasons within the statutory framework for awarding or denying restitution. A statement in the nature of findings which adequately apprises a reviewing court of the trial court’s reasoning is minimally required.

Section 76-3-201(3)(c) requires a full hearing when a defendant objects to restitution, including an opportunity to present evidence about whether damages occurred.

State v. Starnes · filed 1992-10-14(3)(c)

A defendant is statutorily entitled to a “full hearing” on the question of restitution. Section 76-3-201(3)(c) provides: “If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full hearing on the issue.” ... Even when the third and fourth hearings are combined, however, it is evident that Starnes was not afforded a “full hearing.” The trial court refused to “hear” Starnes’s evidence that there was no actual damage. Therefore, while Starnes was allowed to appear in court, he was denied an opportunity to present his evidence.

Section 76-3-201(4)(e) requires a restitution hearing when the defendant requests one at sentencing.

State v. Haga · filed 1998-02-26(4)(e)

Although defendant requested a restitution hearing at his sentencing, he never received such a hearing. Thus, in accordance with section 76-3-201(4)(e), we remand to the trial court to hold the required restitution hearing and to enter such order thereon as may be appropriate.

Section 76-3-201(4)(e) requires a full restitution hearing when a defendant objects to the amount at or before sentencing.

State v. Breeze · filed 2001-06-28(4)(e)

The language of section 76-3-201(4)(e) is unambiguous and unconditional. If a defendant objects to a restitution amount at or before the sentencing hearing, the trial court must allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue.

Section 76-3-201(4)(e) requires the Board of Pardons and Parole to hold a full hearing if an inmate objects to an order of restitution.

Monson v. Carver · filed 1996-12-06(4)(e)

Section 76-3-201(4)(e) provides, "If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full hearing on the issue." We agree that this provision applies fully to the Board. It requires that after restitution is ordered and after an inmate objects to the order, the Board must hold a "full hearing" on the inmate's objections.

Section 76-3-201(4)(d)(i) requires the court to state on the record its reasons for deciding whether to order restitution of extradition costs; an appellate court cannot presume those reasons were considered.

State v. Robertson · filed 1997-02-18(4)(d)(i)

Moreover, when the court determines whether restitution of extradition costs is appropriate, "the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the court record." Id. § 76-3-201(4)(d)(i). ... We read this requirement to mean that after taking into account the factors listed in section 77-3-201(4)(c), the trial court must take the additional step of explicitly noting on the record the reasons for the decision it reached, reflecting the detailed factors listed in the statute. This directive precludes the use of the Ramirez assumption.

A full restitution hearing under subsection (4)(e) does not require evidence admissible at trial because the rules of evidence do not apply.

State v. Weeks · filed 2002-10-08(4)(e)

A full hearing under subsection 76-3-201(4)(e) of the Utah Code does not require that the State present evidence that would be admissible at trial. No such requirement exists because the rules of evidence do not apply to a restitution hearing.

Pecuniary damages for restitution include misappropriated insurance premiums even when the victims suffered no major losses while uninsured.

State v. Twitchell · filed 1992-05-06(4)(b)

The statute’s definition of pecuniary damages includes the misappropriated policy payments in this case, even though the victims were fortunate enough to suffer no major losses during the time they were uninsured.

Under the 1997 version of section 76-3-201(4)(a)(i), a victim’s insurance reimbursement does not itself bar restitution paid directly to the victim.

State v. Stirba · filed 1998-12-24(4)(a)(i)

In this case, Judge Stirba’s ruling that “a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution ... to a victim who has already been reimbursed by the victim’s insurance carrier” was an incorrect interpretation of the restitution statute then in effect.

The 1999 version of § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) requires restitution to crime victims for pecuniary damages but does not authorize double restitution.

State v. Shepherd · filed 1999-10-21(4)(a)(i)

Though courts at one time had authority to order double restitution, the statute in effect at the time of Defendant’s restitution hearing provided no such authority. ... The trial court plainly acted beyond the scope of its statutory authority in ordering Defendant to pay double restitution. Thus we reverse and remand for entry of an order of simple restitution.

Section 76-3-201 permits restitution to be paid directly to an insurer under the amended definition of victim; applying that definition does not increase punishment when the total restitution owed stays the same.

State v. Dominguez · filed 1999-12-02(1)(e)(i)

No additional punishment is inflicted on defendant if, under the amended statute, a portion of the same amount of restitution is merely paid directly to the insurer.

Section 76-3-201’s definition of pecuniary damages does not exclude a victim’s loss because the victim received an insurance payment.

State v. Corbitt · filed 2003-12-04(4)(b)

However, evidence of insurance coverage should be included neither in the "pecuniary damages" determination, nor in the "complete restitution" determination because in making these determinations trial courts only look to whether or not the victim suffered damages as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct and, if so, how much.

Section 76-3-201(4) permits restitution for economic injury only when the State proves that the injury arose from the defendant's criminal activity.

State v. Brown · filed 2009-10-08(4)

Restitution may be ordered for pecuniary damages arising out of the defendant's criminal activity. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4) (2008). ... Thus, to include an amount in a restitution order, the State must prove that the victim has suffered economic injury and that the injury arose out of the defendant's criminal activities.

Section 76-3-201 treats a parent obligated to pay for a child's treatment as a victim eligible for restitution when the expense results from the defendant's criminal activities.

In Interest of Tw · filed 2006-06-22(1)(e)(i)

We find that the juvenile court correctly applied the Sentencing Statute's definition of victim to K.C.'s father. The Sentencing Statute defines victim as "any person who the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)(e)(i). As K.C.'s father was obligated to pay for K.C.'s treatment, it is clear that the father is "any person" within this definition. See id.

Section 76-3-201(3)(a)(i) permits restitution to a victim not named in the charge when the defendant admits the criminal conduct in a diagnostic report used for sentencing.

State v. Simonette · filed 1994-09-13(3)(a)(i)

Thus, defendant knew that the trial court would use the diagnostic report as a basis for sentencing. As such, defendant admitted to the sentencing court that J.T. was a victim of his criminal conduct. Therefore, the trial court did not err in ordering defendant to pay restitution for J.T.’s counseling and treatment.

Section 76-3-201(1)(b) requires the defendant to admit responsibility for unconvicted criminal conduct to the sentencing court; statements by defense counsel do not suffice.

State v. Galli · filed 1998-06-16(1)(b)

The plain wording of section 76-3-201(1)(b) requires that the "defendant admit[] responsibility to the sentencing court," not to defense counsel. (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, admissions by defense counsel do not generally constitute an admission of criminal responsibility by the defendant.

Section 76-3-201(1)(b) requires an admission to the sentencing court that firmly establishes responsibility for criminal conduct before restitution may be ordered for that conduct.

State v. Watson · filed 1999-09-30(1)(b)

It does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant’s state of mind, but rather asks it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing court. In other words, the statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution.

Section 76-3-201 limits restitution to pecuniary damages caused by criminal conduct for which the defendant was convicted or admitted responsibility.

State v. Mast · filed 2001-12-20(4)(a)

Defendant may be ordered to pay restitution only for pecuniary damages resulting from the crime of receiving stolen property, and not for damages resulting from the burglary. The trial court may impose restitution for amounts proximately caused by defendant's conduct, specifically damages resulting from her possession of the victim's watch, rings, and checks.

Section 76-3-201 permits restitution for conduct outside the charges when the defendant admits responsibility or agrees to pay restitution for it.

State v. Bickley · filed 2002-10-18(4)(a)(i)

According to the plain language of the statute, restitution can include payment for crimes not listed in the information so long as a defendant admits responsibility or agrees to pay restitution.

Section 76-3-201 allows restitution for criminal conduct when a defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court without admitting guilt.

State v. Wallace · filed 2004-09-30(1)(b)

The statute itself does not require the actual admission of guilt, and holding that Defendant must actually admit criminal guilt would render the latter part of the statute — the language “with or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct”' — inoperable.

Section 76-3-201(4)(a) permits restitution for pecuniary losses clearly resulting from a crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty, even if the defendant did not admit taking each missing item.

State v. Hight · filed 2008-04-03(4)(a)

Once Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, the trial court acted within its broad discretion, after reviewing the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, in ordering restitution for any pecuniary damages clearly resulting from the burglary.

Section 76-3-201(4)(a) permits restitution only for pecuniary damages sufficiently connected to the defendant’s criminal activity.

State v. Harvell · filed 2009-09-24(4)(a)

Accordingly, we conclude that the restitution order, with respect to the brake system repairs and iPod replacement, is contrary to the plain language of the restitution and sentencing statutes and must be reversed.

Section 76-3-201 limits restitution to pecuniary losses caused by the defendant’s convicted or admitted conduct.

State v. Gibson · filed 2017-08-03(4)(a)

Regardless of whether a defendant has been convicted of a certain offense by a jury or by a guilty plea or has otherwise admitted responsibility to a particular criminal activity, restitution awards are limited by the pecuniary damages caused by the admitted conduct.

Section 76-3-201(4)(a) requires the State to prove that the victim’s economic injury arose from the defendant’s criminal conduct, even when the defendant agreed to pay restitution.

State v. Becker · filed 2018-05-03(4)(a)

Although Becker agreed to pay restitution for the aggravated assault, the State was nevertheless required to prove “that the victim has suffered economic injury and that the injury arose out of the defendant’s criminal activities.” See State v. Brown, 2009 UT App 285, ¶ 10, 221 P.3d 273, overruled on other grounds by State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8.

Section 76-3-201(4)(a) requires restitution to victims in addition to any other sentence; the parties’ stipulated restitution amount does not bind the sentencing court.

State v. Hamilton · filed 2018-10-25(4)(a)

Under Utah law, the district court “shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims” “in addition to any other sentence it may impose.” ... We therefore conclude the district court was not bound by the parties’ stipulated restitution amount and did not exceed its authority in ordering Hamilton to pay restitution.

Section 76-3-201(4)(a) requires restitution for victims of criminal activity causing pecuniary damages and permits restitution for conduct the defendant agrees to cover in a plea agreement.

State v. Randall · filed 2019-07-11(4)(a)

“When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, . . . the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) (LexisNexis 2017). ... And Randall agreed to allow the sentencing court to determine the amount of restitution owed to all investors, “whether named or unnamed,” harmed by his pattern of unlawful activity. ... Once Randall pled guilty to a pattern of unlawful activity during the period in question, the sentencing court “acted within its broad discretion . . . in ordering restitution for any pecuniary damages” suffered by the 156 victims Randall defrauded during that time.

Section 76-3-201(3) makes restitution an independent component of a criminal sentence, so the end of probation does not extinguish the restitution obligation.

State v. Dickey · filed 1992-11-03(3)

The expiration of the court’s jurisdiction to require payment of restitution as a condition of probation, therefore, does not diminish the enforceability of restitution as an independent component of the sentence decreed in the judgment.

Section 76-3-201 lets the party awarded restitution enforce the order under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; it does not authorize the sentencing court to order the sale of the defendant’s property when imposing restitution.

State v. Schweitzer · filed 1997-07-31(4)(a)(iv)

Thus, the statute does not authorize the trial court, upon imposing restitution, to also order the sale of defendant’s property to satisfy that restitution order.

Section 76-3-201(3) makes restitution a component of the sentence that remains enforceable after probation ends.

State v. Nones · filed 2000-07-07(3)

Applying the reasoning found in State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Utah Ct.App.1992), to the statutes in force when Nones was convicted, we hold that the trial court retained jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-201 (Supp.1992) and 76-3-201.1 (1990) to enforce its 1992 restitution order.

Section 76-3-201 allows a court to require restitution after probation ends; the statutory changes applicable to this defendant did not remove that authority.

State v. Allen · filed 2000-11-30

However, Utah law provides an independent legal basis for restitution, allowing a court to require a defendant to pay restitution after his probation has been terminated. ... We note that the restitution statute has again been modified by the Legislature, so that the version under which defendant was ordered to pay restitution differs from that at issue in Dickey and in Nones. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1996). However, our review of those changes persuades us they do not affect the issue we consider in this case.

Section 76-3-201(6)(a)(i) permits reimbursement for county jail time served before conviction or sentencing when the defendant is later convicted of the criminal activity that caused the incarceration and the statute’s other conditions are met.

State v. Wilkerson · filed 2020-11-27(6)(a)(i)

Once those conditions are satisfied, and assuming that all other conditions of the statute (including lack of indigency) are met, a court may order a defendant to repay the county for the costs of his or her incarceration, even if that incarceration was served prior to conviction or prior to sentencing.